Normatividade e obrigações: uma investigação da autoridade no raciocínio prático

Abstract

This dissertation deals with authority on practical reasoning. In light of the thesis of normal justification, I investigate how legitimate authority influences reasoning by claiming to provide practical reasons, specifically concerning second-order reasons.. In this sense, I analyze how a directive that epistemologically influences reasoning - but is treated as authoritatively binding - is able to serve as a reason for action. I relate this discussion to law, as it claims to guide behavior through its prescriptions and has a conceptual connection with authority. I suggest that possibly, a legal directive that functions as a source of evidence provides reasons that influence salience in reasoning, that is, first-order reasons. If the law claims to provide reasons for action, it must do so by serving as a non-normative source to trigger reasons for action that were already pre-existing. Thus, what we understand as the normativity of law consists of reasons for action that were created through the mediation of law.