Título:	Direito e tomada de decisão : elementos para uma Teoria da Decisão Jurídica
Autor(es):	Horta, Ricardo de Lins e
Orientador(es):	Costa, Alexandre Araújo
Assunto:	Teoria do Direito Direito e Psicologia Decisão judicial Psicologia da punição Racionalidade limitada
Data de publicação:	16-Jan-2024
Data de defesa:	14-Mar-2019
Referência:	HORTA, Ricardo de Lins e. Direito e tomada de decisão: elementos para uma Teoria da Decisão Jurídica. 2019. 188 f. Tese (Doutorado em Direito) — Universidade de Brasília, Brasília, 2019.
Abstract:	Although central to Law, the issue of Decision-Making is surprisingly absent from legal guidebooks. This work aims to show how extraneous or extralegal variables matter in judicial decision-making and. Based on recent findings of the Behavioral Sciences, we suggest a reformulation of the concept of Rationality in Legal Theory, posing problems about the influence of biases and institutional design of choice architectures. The first article proposes to rethink how Legal Theory understands "Rationality". Based upon the tradition of cognitive biases research, derived from Cognitive and Social Psychology, Behavioral Economics, and specifically the "argumentative theory of reasoning", by Dan Sperber and Hugo Mercier, we call into question formulations about legal rationality limited to its justification dimension. We suggest that it is possible to integrate, in a theoretical formulation of judicial rationality, the extralegal factors that the empirical literature has been pointing out, conceiving the phenomenon of judicial decision in a broader framework. The second article draws a landscape of the causal roots of the phenomenon of cognitive biases in decision making, from the point of view of the Behavioral Sciences. Based on two lines of explanation, the evolutionist and the neurophysiological, we suggest that the way human rationality operates responds to specific pressures to solve certain challenges. We thus invite those interested in Legal Decision-Making in Law to adopt a more realistic view of human decision-making, as well as a deeper understanding of why there are cognitive biases mapped by the experimental literature. The third article proposes a methodological debate within the community of empirical legal researchers in Brazil. Analyzing the recent literature on Psychology of Judicial Decision-Making, we identify the setbacks and challenges that this area of research has faced elsewhere. Furthermore, in describing the methods adopted by experiments that isolate psychological variables in the judicial decision-making process, we intend to chart possible research strategies for future work in this area in Brazil. The fourth and final article analyzes a specific case of Judicial Decision-Making in the light of what is currently known in Experimental Psychology: the decision to punish an offender. Analyzing experiments that aim to understand what goes on in the minds of both those who decide to punish, and those who are punished, a series of assumptions of current Criminal Theory are called into question.
Unidade Acadêmica:	Faculdade de Direito (FD)
Informações adicionais:	Tese (doutorado) — Universidade de Brasília, Faculdade de Direito, Programa de Pós-Graduação em Direito, 2019.
Programa de pós-graduação:	Programa de Pós-Graduação em Direito
Licença:	A concessão da licença deste item refere-se ao termo de autorização impresso assinado pelo autor com as seguintes condições: Na qualidade de titular dos direitos de autor da publicação, autorizo a Universidade de Brasília e o IBICT a disponibilizar por meio dos sites www.unb.br, www.ibict.br, www.ndltd.org sem ressarcimento dos direitos autorais, de acordo com a Lei nº 9610/98, o texto integral da obra supracitada, conforme permissões assinaladas, para fins de leitura, impressão e/ou download, a título de divulgação da produção científica brasileira, a partir desta data.
Aparece nas coleções:	Teses, dissertações e produtos pós-doutorado

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