UNIVERSITY OF BRASÍLIA
INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
GRADUATE PROGRAM IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

RODRIGO FÜHR

GOVERNING (IN) THE RUINS: "CLIMATE MIGRATION" AND THE GLOBAL GOVERNANCE OF CLIMATE ADAPTATION

BRASÍLIA
2022

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Master's Thesis

GOVERNING (IN) THE RUINS: "CLIMATE MIGRATION" AND THE GLOBAL GOVERNANCE OF CLIMATE ADAPTATION

Master's Thesis submitted to the Graduate Program in International Relations at the University of Brasília, as a requisite for obtaining the title of Master in International Relations.

Concentration area: Global and Polycentric Governance
Line of research: Planet Politics and the Anthropocene
Supervisor: Prof. Cristina Yumie Aoki Inoue
Co-supervisor: Prof. Carolina de Abreu Batista Claro

Rodrigo Führ

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Defense date: 01/12/2022, 07 h

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BRASÍLIA
2022

Proclamava-se ali o fim do mundo, a salvação penitencial, a visão do sétimo dia, o advento do anjo, a colisão cósmica, a extinção do sol, o espírito da tribo, a seiva da mandrágora, o unguento do tigre, a virtude do signo, a disciplina do vento, o perfume da lua, a reivindicação da treva, o poder do esconjuro, a marca do calcanhar, a crucificação da rosa, a pureza da linfa, o sangue do gato preto, a dormência da sombra, a revolta das marés, a lógica da antropofagia, a castração sem dor, a tatuagem divina, a cegueira voluntária, o pensamento convexo, o côncavo, o plano, o vertical, o inclinado, o concentrado, o disperso, o fugido, a ablação das cordas vocais, a morte da palavra, Aqui não há ninguém a falar de organização, disse a mulher do médico ao marido, Talvez a organização seja noutra praça, respondeu ele. Continuaram a andar.

They were proclaiming the end of the world, redemption through penitence, the visions of the seventh day, the advent of the angel, cosmic collisions, the death of the sun, the tribal spirit, the sap of the mandrake, tiger ointment, the virtue of the sign, the discipline of the wind, the perfume of the moon, the revindication of darkness, the power of exorcism, the sign of the heel, the crucifixion of the rose, the purity of the lymph, the blood of the black cat, the sleep of the shadow, the rising of the seas, the logic of anthropophagy, painless castration, divine tattoos, voluntary blindness, convex thoughts, or concave, or horizontal or vertical, or sloping, or concentrated, or dispersed, or fleeting, the weakening of the vocal cords, the death of the word, Here nobody is speaking of organisation, said the doctor's wife, Perhaps organisation is in another square, he replied. They continued on their way

José Saramago (1995, 284)

Indeed, I am nothing but a wanderer and a pilgrim on this earth! And what more are you?

Johann W. Goethe (1774, ‘July 16’)

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

There is an internet meme that sums up nicely the experiences I had while writing this thesis. It goes like this: 'writing a thesis during a global pandemic is easy. It is like riding a bike, and the bike is on fire, the floor is on fire, and everything is on fire because you're in hell'.

Writing this thesis was a great challenge – not so much because of the particularities of studying climate change and migration at a moment when they are two very polarized topics, but by doing so during a pandemic in a country that was threatened every day by either the losses of loved ones or a coup d'état. It was no easy task to have the mental stability to sit in front of a computer to write while watching online classes, trying to discover who is Brazil's Ministry of Health for the day, or following general news. And to think that people warned me that doing a Master's was a boring thing to do. Nevertheless, if I managed to get through and submit this finished thesis, it was because I have had the opportunity to share this experience with many amazing people. I do not feel that this thesis is mine alone – I certainly would not have been able to do it without the help of many.

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In this regard, I also want to acknowledge the professors from the University of Brasília who guided me through this process. Prof. Cristina Inoue has had a great impact on me regarding how I understand International Relations, science, and teaching. Not only as a supervisor but also as a teacher in the 'Planet Politics and the Anthropocene' class, Cristina showed me that it was possible to be a scholar and yet foster an environment with more care and kindness to others and ourselves. As if that was not enough, Cristina has guided me through the complexities of the scholarship on the Anthropocene, global governance, and climate change, supporting me immensely with this thesis. My co-supervisor, Prof. Carolina Claro, besides paving the way for researching climate migration in Brazil, was a role model in the classroom, showing me how to teach and discuss migration issues in international studies without losing focus that it was the suffering and hardships of real people we were talking about. Carolina has also been a friend and, in our conversations, gave me great advice on the world of teaching and researching. Cris and Carol, I will be forever grateful.

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GOVERNING (IN) THE RUINS: "CLIMATE MIGRATION" AND THE GLOBAL GOVERNANCE OF CLIMATE ADAPTATION

ABSTRACT

The climate migration scholarship is still short in comprehensively reviewing how international actors interact concerning climate-related human displacement. In International Relations, most works have either tried to prescribe how a just and effective governance framework should look like or demonstrate the lack of governance and policy instruments available for those displaced by climate change-related phenomena. Unlike these perspectives, I argue that the lack of formal international policies does not equate to a lack of governance and governmentality of climate mobility. Instead, there is a need to inquire about whose interests are reproduced in the institutional settings, how mobility is framed, and who are the leading players addressing it within global governance architectures, moving beyond analyses of formal documents. This task can be achieved, I argue, by investigating international discourses on climate mobility at the Global Adaptation Governance Architecture. This Thesis applies Critical Discourse Analysis to interrogate discourses on climate mobility into and as a result of multilateral negotiations, primarily focusing on two sites of deliberation: the United Nations General Assembly, and the High-Level Segments of the Conference of the Parties (COPs). The results are then compared with the framings that migration has received in theoretical and conceptual debates. I argue that, both in scholarship and policy negotiations, climate mobility is still conceived in pathological framings typical of the Holocene, harmfully embedding the discursive constitution of climate mobility into securitization, societal resilience, and cosmopolitanism. These are enclosed in the frameworks of migration-as-crisis, led by estimates of hordes of billions of migrants fleeing the Global South towards the North due to global warming and sea-level rise, and in the 'migration-as-adaptation' setting, in which governments instrumentalize resettlement to enhance climate adaptation capacities. While critical scholars have sought to surpass these frames by departing from an ontological precedence of mobility rather than stasis in social reality, envisioning a more-than-human approach to climate mobility that is more at home with Earth System science, the literature still lacks a proper investigation of which framings and discursive schemata are employed by international actors. Through Critical Discourse Analysis, I explore how climate mobility is constituted in international norms and negotiations and the governance implications thereof. My hunch is that one can gain insights on the governance of climate (im)mobility by critically analyzing discourses within and as a result of international negotiations, juxtaposing and reflecting upon them with ecological reflexivity, critical governance studies, and planetary justice. This might arguably get us one step closer to conceiving an Earth System Governance for migration suited for governing in the Anthropocene.

KEYWORDS

Climate migration. Climate mobility. Climate adaptation. Anthropocene. Global Governance. Earth System Governance. Critical discourse analysis.

GOVERNANDO (N)AS RUÍNAS: "MIGRAÇÕES CLIMÁTICAS" E A GOVERNANÇA GLOBAL DE ADAPTAÇÃO CLIMÁTICA

RESUMO

O campo de estudos sobre migração climática ainda não se aprofundou na análise de como atores internacionais interagem em relação à governança do deslocamento humano relacionado ao clima. Nas Relações Internacionais, a maior parte dos estudos focaram-se em prescrever como uma governança justa e efetiva poderia ser arquitetada, ou demonstrar a atual lacuna de instrumentos políticos e jurídicos que governam a vida de pessoas forçadas a se deslocar por fenômenos climáticos. Diferentemente dessas perspectivas, eu argumento nessa Dissertação que a falta de mecanismos e políticas formais não significam que não haja uma governança e uma governamentalidade da mobilidade climática. Ao invés disso, é necessário indagar-se quais interesses são reproduzidos nas configurações institucionais, de qual forma a mobilidade climática é enquadrada discursivamente em negociações, e quais são os principais atores introduzindo o tema de mobilidade climática nas arquiteturas de governança global para além de análises formalistas de documentos finais. Argumento que essa é uma tarefa que pode ser realizada ao se investigar discursos internacionais sobre mobilidade climática feitos no contexto da Governança Global de Adaptação Climática. Eu aplico nessa Dissertação o método de Análise Crítica de Discurso para interrogar discursos sobre mobilidade climática em e como resultado de negociações multilaterais, focando principalmente em dois espaços de deliberação: a Assembleia Geral das Nações Unidas e os segmentos de alto nível da Conferência das Partes (COPs) da Convenção-Quadro das Nações Unidas sobre Mudanças Climáticas (UNFCCC). Os resultados dessa análise são então comparados com os enquadramentos sobre migração climática em debates teóricos e conceituais, em diferentes disciplinas e agendas de pesquisa. Meu argumento é de que, tanto na academia quanto em negociações políticas, a mobilidade climática ainda é concebida em enquadramentos patológicos típicos do Holoceno, incorporando-a em enquadramentos discursivos de securitização, resiliência social e cosmopolitismo. Esses enquadramentos estão inseridos em discursos de "migração-como-crise", que prevê hordas de bilhões de migrantes climáticos fugindo do sul Global em relação ao norte devido ao aumento do nível do mar e ao aquecimento global, e também em discursos de "migração-como-adaptação", em que governos instrumentalizam o reassentamento de pessoas deslocadas como uma maneira de aumentar sua capacidade de adaptação às mudanças climáticas. Enquanto pesquisadores críticos têm buscado ultrapassar esses enquadramentos ao iniciarem suas analises em uma ontologia de movimento e não em estabilidade como precedente na realidade social, imaginando uma abordagem mais-do-que-humana para a mobilidade climática mais próxima das Ciências do Sistema Terrestre, a literatura ainda carece de uma investigação propicia de quais enquadramentos e esquemas discursivos são empregados por atores internacionais. Utilizando-se de Análise Crítica de Discurso, eu exploro como a mobilidade climática está constituída em normas e negociações internacionais, interrogando ainda quais as implicações destes discursos para a sua governança. Acredito que, ao analisar criticamente discursos em e como resultado de negociações internacionais, pesquisadores

podem aprofundar suas investigações sobre a governança de (im)mobilidade climática, especialmente ao justapor os resultados das pesquisas com literaturas sobre reflexidade ecológica, estudos críticos de governança, e justiça planetária. Ao refletir sobre esses processos, essa Dissertação pode nos levar um passo mais perto de conceber uma Governança do Sistema Terrestre para migração climática que seja adequada para a governança global nas e a partir das ruínas do Antropoceno.

PALAVRAS-CHAVE
Migração climática. Mobilidade climática. Adaptação climática. Antropoceno. Governança global. Governança do Sistema Terrestre. Análise crítica de discurso.

LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

CDA – Critical Discourse Analysis

COP – Conference of the Parties

ESG – Earth System Governance

GCAG – Global Climate Adaptation Governance

IOM – International Organization for Migration

IOs – International Organizations

IR – International Relations

LIO –Liberal International Order

NELM – New Economics of Labor Migration

NGOs – Non-Governmental Organizations

NMP – New Mobilities Paradigm

PDD – Platform on Disaster Displacement

SAF – Strategic Action Fields

SIDS – Small Island Developing States

SLA – Sustainable Livelihood Approaches

UN – United Nations

UNFCCC – United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change

UNGA – United Nations General Assembly

UNHCR – United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

WIM – Warsaw International Mechanism

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1 INTRODUCTION

> *We cannot wait for speeches when the sea is rising around us all the time (*Tuvalu's Minister Simon Kofe, 2021, at Glasgow, COP-26)

At a side event of the 26th Conference of the Parties of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (henceforth 'COP') in Glasgow, November 2021, a small island state's foreign minister's speech drew attention and went viral for a surprising reason. Simon Kofe, then Tuvalu's Minister for Justice, Communication and Foreign Affairs, decided to issue his country's opening speech in an unorthodox scenario. Wearing a full suit and reading an official statement addressing climate change consequences on Pacific islands, it initially seemed a routine discourse by a government representative. However, as the camera zooms out, we see that Kofe was not in the traditional lectern, sitting in his office. Instead, he was knee-deep in seawater, standing where once was dryland. His intent was to showcase the reality of sea-level rise and climate change in his country, beyond the usual discursive means by drawing upon a shocking image (Kofe 2021).

Powerful as it was, Kofe's choice of scenario was complemented by an authoritative discourse on his part. While standing with half his body submerged in water, he affirmed that climate change was 'deadly' for his country due to rising seas. However, he pleaded an even broader argument, suggesting that the deadly effects of climate change were not visible in atoll islands only. He implied that the pervasive impacts of climate change were catching up throughout the whole planet and was symbolic of a crisis for humankind; in his words, 'we are sinking – but so is everyone else' (Kofe 2021). Among the plethora of messages, the one that was unmistakable was that while the international community was gathering to bargain around mitigation and adaption, Tuvalu was 'living the reality of climate change' (Kofe 2021). Such case was highlighted by a single and compelling call to action: 'we cannot wait for speeches when the sea is rising around us all the time' (Kofe 2021).

Distrust around climate negotiations is commonplace. Youth leaders, humanitarian actors, and journalists often denounce how these negotiations are marked by 'empty promises' and, underlying these, a limited commitment to change the business-as-usual rationale. Curiously enough, the famous climate activist Greta Thunberg described discourses at COP 26, the same conference in which Simon Kofe condemned the delay in climate action, as 'blah, blah, blah' (The Guardian 2021). On the other side, scientists are increasingly pointing out the dreadful trajectory of global warming and other climate-related disasters. These same scientists are alerting the international community to climate change pervasive impacts, especially because of how national commitments are lagging in mitigation and adaptation efforts (e.g., IPCC 2022). That is how this spirit of hopelessness and distrust regarding climate action was born: activists, scientists, and policy-makers from most affected countries call for radical change at the top of their lungs, while the international political scenario does not look promising (see Maniates 2016).

One of the issues related to such anxiety related to climate change, and to which Simon Kofe (2021) was trying to bring attention to, is *climate-related human mobility*. Over the last decades, a scholarship on 'climate migration' emerged inquiring whether and how the environment can play a significant role in people's decision to migrate, primarily investigating

if and how climate change affects (im)mobility patterns (e.g., Hoffmann et al. 2020; Hoffmann, Šedová, and Vinke 2021; IPCC 2022; Zickgraf 2021). In contrast with this burgeoning literature, there is not yet a formal recognition of the climate migrant within international law (see Atapattu 2020; Cantor 2020; 2022), as climate change is not considered a driver for forced displacement within the International Refugee Regime. That puts the issue of climate migration in an uncomfortable place alongside several other social struggles related to climate change: while academia, humanitarian actors, and climate and migrants' justice movements call for the protection of people disproportionally affected by climate disasters, their governance at the global level is still wanting.

A closer look at Kofe's discourse shows how it was part of a larger movement making an emergency call to bolder actions regarding climate migration. For instance, following his critique of the platitudes regarding international climate policies, Kofe (2021) added that 'climate mobility must come to the forefront' of policy negotiations. His speech was part of a long tradition by small islands delegates in bringing climate mobility to the fore of international life (Naser 2020, 42; Simonelli 2016, 122; Warner 2012, 1065). Tuvalu's representatives have been chiefly bringing human mobility to the agenda of climate conferences in past decades, alongside a handful of other international actors. Nevertheless, even the most optimist must realize that the governance of climate migration is still secondary on the global stage, with little hope of regulation to be found in recent negotiations (Atapattu 2020, 96–97). Despite emerging within multilateral debates on climate adaptation, climate migration is still sidelined in final documents and often overlooked by policy-makers.

That is not to say, however, that there are no efforts to introduce climate migration within international policies' negotiations. On the contrary, as international actors have failed at achieving the necessary carbon emissions reductions to mitigate global warming, climate negotiations have shifted focus to include adaptation policies (among them, displacement) within their concerns. And so, human mobility has been one of the topics entering the lexicon of climate negotiations in the last two decades, with the links between migration and adaptation brought upon in a handful of different negotiating sites (see Bilak and Kälin 2022; Warner 2012; 2018). While at the first moment migration was seen as a failure of adaptative capacities on the state's part, in the last two decades a new argument was put forward calling for migration to be seen as a potential tool to increase national adaptative capacities, which has received the name of 'migration-as-adaptation' thesis (see Baldwin and Fornalé 2017).

A discursive shift thus originated, changing the issue's framing in the international social system; rather than something to be stopped, climate migration flows were now desirable, as long as they were governed through command-and-control instruments (e.g., through 'planned relocation'[1]) and led to an increase of 'resilience capacities'[2] (Methmann and Oels 2015). Whereas academics and policy-makers initially welcomed this discursive and political

[1] 'Planned relocation' is described in the Nansen Protection Agenda as 'a planned process in which persons or groups of persons move or are assisted to move away from their homes or places of temporary residence, are settled in a new location, and provided with the conditions for rebuilding their lives' (The Nansen Initiative 2015, 17).

[2] Resilience is defined, by official United Nations terminology (2009, 24), as 'The ability of a system, community or society exposed to hazards to resist, absorb, accommodate to and recover from the effects of a hazard in a timely and efficient manner, including through the preservation and restoration of its essential basic structures and functions'.

shift, it did not take long before critical scholars started to point out how such shift was set upon troubling assumptions. Most of all, those denouncements highlighted how ‘a modernist analytical framework’ surrounded this mechanical link between migration and climate adaptation (Chandler 2019, 384), meaning that it took part in the same rationale (rather than challenged it) that created the current socio-ecological crisis (Nail 2019, 377). Figures of who the climate migrant supposedly were became criticized for their stereotypical nature, at first a victim or a security threat, and now a possible adaptive tool without agency of their own (see Ransan-Cooper et al. 2015). Critical migration scholars, alongside groups of Indigenous peoples and nationals from those countries most affected by climate change, even denounced the very assumption that climate change could be the sole cause of migration flows. Such scholars argued how the discursive construction of the climate migrant is based on racialized (Baldwin 2016; 2017b), apocalyptical (Bettini 2013a), and modern and neoliberal (Felli and Castree 2012; Rothe 2017) assumptions – more broadly, based on a hardly sustainable Cartesian divide between society and nature (Baldwin and Bettini 2017; Chandler 2019).

These critiques are somewhat derived from the notion that, rather than an observable and material phenomenon, climate migration is a *social* construction (Baldwin and Bettini 2017). While climate change is not an object that can be easily observed in everyday lives, to assume that we can distinguish it as a factor for pushing people to move is a social construct above all else, an apparatus through which one is ‘inventing a category that corresponds with how we imagine the world to be, not one that describes the world as it really is' (Baldwin 2017a, 3). That means climate migration and its relation to adaptation must not be normalized as part of nature and thus need to be ingrained in social and political struggles (see Baldwin, Fröhlich, and Rothe 2019). Finally, conceiving climate migration as a social construction entails an imperative for engaging it as constituted in and through the use of language. Rather than a part of a ’mirror image’ of reality, the relationship between climate change, adaptation, and migration is shaped and reproduced by the use of discursive scripts and frames, embedded into social and power struggles of the international social system – and not a physical, material phenomenon that can be witnessed by human senses (Baldwin 2017a).

Engaged as a discursive and not strictly material matter, the ways and extent to which climate migration is framed, perceived, and dealt with at international negotiations gain analytical relevance. But despite this purported importance, there has been a limited effort on the part of the scholarship on climate migration to analyze the issue’s international or global presence in actors’ discourses. This is not to say that there is not an emerging community of scholars exploring, interpreting, and remarkably denouncing discourses on climate migration (e.g., Bettini 2013b; Hartmann 2010; Mayer 2013; Ransan-Cooper et al. 2015) for their dysfunctionalities and pervasiveness. Even so, scholars from international studies are yet to engage with the issue through lenses that can help us understand how it is socially constituted in international negotiations and final documents deriving from these negotiations, with an eye to societal order of discourse formation and actors’ relationality. Thus, there is much space for one to investigate how climate migration is discursively constructed in the everyday life of the international system.

This relationality among international actors and the social structure, explored through its discursive dimension, can thus allow us to delve into the normative premises embedded in

the complex figure of the climate migrant. Understanding the assumptions regarding the social construct of such migrants and looking to its discursive constitutions entails another question, one that was brought up by Simon Kofe's (2021) call to action: how should or could climate migration 'come to the forefront' of climate negotiations? And furthermore, how could it be governed at the global scale? This interrogation puts climate migration, through its migration-as-adaptation thesis, at the intersection with other climate-related issues that are yet to be adequately managed at the international level. Accordingly, it may be helpful to take a step back and look at the backdrop of the social construction of climate migration – that is, the idea that we are now living in a different geological epoch, often called 'the Anthropocene'.

The Anthropocene has swiftly found space in debates within social sciences, with its conceptual and normative framework accumulating positive reviews and several critiques (e.g., Crist 2013; see Lorimer 2017). While within Earth Sciences the Anthropocene revolves around golden spikes and stratigraphic markers, trying to depict the period when humanity has become a geological force (e.g., Crutzen and Stoermer 2000; Steffen et al. 2018; Zalasiewicz et al. 2016) 2016), in social sciences the concept is often engaged as a means to spur consideration toward our current climate crises, its emergence and effects on society (e.g., Baldwin and Erickson 2020; Biermann et al. 2016; Biermann 2016; S. Hamilton 2017). Hence, from an initial formulation of a recognition of how mankind's activities were prominent telluric and geological forces, altering Earth's biogeochemical dynamic, scholarly discussions have mounted toward asking what the Anthropocene entails for humans and non-humans (e.g., Bauer and Ellis 2018) for governance (e.g., Biermann 2021; Dryzek 2016; Dryzek and Pickering 2019) and for how we conceive of humanity (Gill 2021a; 2021b; Tsing 2015).

How do the conceptualizations of the Anthropocene and the climate migrant relate to one another? While initially this relationship may appear straightforward, since they are both linked to climate change, the trespassing of planetary boundaries, and the increasing frequency and intensity of climate disasters, I hold that there is a dimension of this interaction more approximate to international politics. Critical governance scholars often invoke the Anthropocene to argue that the international society, in its current political and institutional structure, is incapable of dealing with environmental policies' challenges (Biermann 2021; Burke et al. 2016; Dryzek and Pickering 2019). The limited commitment to mitigation efforts is regularly employed as an example for showcasing a harsh reality: international actors historically dependent on fossil fuels have not been able to shift their energy sources swiftly enough to prevent global temperatures from reaching alarming levels (see Biermann et al. 2012), much because they are still part of the same macrostructure that created the necessary conditions for climate change to happen (Chandler 2018; Erickson 2020; Moore 2017). The Anthropocene thus calls for a different political paradigm, one that is suited to the current socio-ecological challenges and that can deal with the instability of planet politics (Biermann 2021; Dryzek 2016; Pickering 2019). When engaged with climate mobility, the Anthropocene concept reminds us that international institutions are still governing the issue with the same rationale, institutions, and actors that have produced the planetary failure of the liberal international order (LIO), putting the Earth in its state of 'crisis' in which migration is inevitable (see Nail 2019). In other words, the same rationale that caused our current crisis is most likely unequipped to deal with its aftermath.

Simon Kofe's (2021) viral appeal, arguing that 'we cannot wait for speeches' and that 'climate mobility must come to the forefront' of climate negotiations, is a facet of this convoluted scenario of the global governance of climate migration. At this point, it would perhaps be self-evident to declare that climate migration is a complex phenomenon. Its discursive formation is at the intersection of several other intricate questions of the contemporary international political society, related to the complexities of migration and climate affairs while also submerged into deeper questions of modernist, colonial, and racialized abstract notions that are pervasive within the international social system and the scholar discipline of International Relations, engaged here through the Anthropocene. However, despite these complexities, how climate migration is discursively constituted in the 'blah, blah, blah' of international politics that Kofe claims humanity cannot wait for anymore however is an object of inquiry still up to be investigated.

1.1 Problem statement, research question and arguments

Problem statement. So far, scholars have scantly investigated how climate migration is discursively constituted at the global scale, with studies often focusing on empirical phenomena (e.g., Global Migration Data Analysis Centre 2018; Kelman et al. 2019; Obokata, Veronis, and McLeman 2014; Piguet 2010; 2022), normative prescriptions and analysis (e.g., Atapattu 2020; Biermann and Boas 2010; Cantor 2020), or the issue's entanglement with modernity and humanity (e.g., Amo-Agyemang 2022; Boas et al. 2019; Baldwin 2013; Baldwin and Bettini 2017). There are few investigations of how climate migration is disseminated in multilateral negotiations (c.f. Mayer 2013; Warner 2012; 2018) and even fewer on what the current frames and discourses entail for its governance (c.f. Baldwin 2017b; Baldwin and Fornalé 2017; Methmann and Oels 2015). International negotiations are often understood as epiphenomena (that is, as secondary to multilateral agreements in the form of final documents) and thus not investigated in-depth.

As for migration and its relation to climate adaptation, despite the rise of a critical scholarship denouncing negative traits of the migration-as-adaptation thesis (e.g., Bettini and Gioli 2016; Felli and Castree 2012), researchers have not taken up the task of analyzing how these discourses are constituted in *governance architectures*. That is, it is still up to investigate how international actors' discourses comprises and is composed by the 'system of public and private institutions, principles, norms, regulations, decision-making procedures, and organizations that are valid or active in a given area of global governance' (Biermann and Kim 2020, 4). Instead, discourse analyses tend to be focused on expert discussions or final documents (e.g., Methmann and Oels 2015; Ransan-Cooper et al. 2015). The focus on the formal aspects of treaties and international regimes means that there is still a room to investigate the governance of human mobility and climate adaptation through a critical governance lens, interrogating everyday discourses as constitutive of the global governance efforts.

Thus, the climate migration scholarship is still short in comprehensively reviewing how international actors interact, negotiate, and frame the issue at multilateral negotiations, especially in exploring the novel framing of migration-as-adaptation. There is thus a need for inquiring whose interests are reproduced in the institutional settings, which organizations are most active and which institutions matter the most, what is the influence of international norms,

and who are the leading actors addressing climate migration within the architecture of global climate adaptation governance – and the implications thereof. This can be investigated, I argue, by critically[3] analyzing discourses on climate mobility within and as a result of multilateral negotiations.

Research question. This thesis explores the following question: '**How has "climate migration" been discursively constituted within the architecture of Global Climate Adaptation Governance?'**

Argument. The argument underlying this Master's thesis can be divided into **three propositions.** The first two concerns agency and architecture, one focused on how discourses on climate mobility co-constitute architecture and the other revolving around how they co-constitute agency. Both propositions regard descriptive and analytical aspects alike, since this thesis' 'thick' constructivist epistemological and ontological approaches entail that 'what' things are (i.e., description) is indistinguishable from 'how' and 'why' they operate (i.e., analysis). The third proposition, however, is not directly aimed at the agency-architecture debate. Instead, it is a proposition concerning the social order of discourse in which climate mobility is (re)produced, especially considering its governance facet in the Anthropocene. I call this proposition 'discursive'. These distinctions between the three propositions, and also between architecture and agency, are proposed only heuristically as they are interdependent and co-constitutive in the international social system.

Proposition nº1 (architecture). Discourses connecting human mobility and adaptation conceive of climate migration within a *managerial, technocratic framework*. That is, it is a problem that can be 'solved' through technical practices and increase of adaptative capacities or that should be 'averted' through command-and-control technologies. In regards to governance performance, these discourses are effectively shifting the discussion away from how migration is embedded in the complex structure of international affairs, framing it as a context-free, specific crisis to be addressed through technical expertise. Consequently, international actors with structural power successfully manage to discursively decouple climate migration from International Political Economy dynamics and international power relations.

Proposition nº2 (agency). There are different constellations of actors proposing alternative agendas regarding climate mobility. Actors holding strong social skills (especially states with structural power) either do not engage with climate migration under the scope of adaptation governance due to *an unfounded security concern* with climate migrants (securitization thesis) or propose and disseminate norms that *dismiss their responsibility for climate migration through the instrumentalization of migrants as adaptation tools* (migration-as-adaptation thesis).

[3] Critical, here, does not make a reference to the Frankfurt School of Critical Theory nor to those theories commonly depicted as 'critical theories' within IR historiography, but rather allude to 'Critical Discourse Analysis' as developed by Norman Fairclough (1995, 36), in which 'critique is essentially making visible the interconnectedness of things' by investigating, for instance, the opacity, presupposition, and implicatures present in discourses (see section 2.3.1).

Via these discursive schemata, actors reinforce rather than halt international institutions premised on progress and stability, which are foundational of the Holocene and its modernity claims. Such institutions thus iterate a *pathological* path-dependency that ignores 'feedback from a changing Earth System' (Dryzek and Pickering 2018, 23), meaning that they disregard the fast changing, unstable complexity of the Anthropocene. Weaker actors' constellations attempt to resist by employing other social skills, shaping their discourses around legitimation arguments based on moral and epistemic claims, but are sidelined in multilateral governance mechanisms.

Proposition nº 3 (discursive). The relationship between migration and adaptation is still pathologically conceived within the architecture of global climate adaptation governance. Pathological path-dependencies, from and beyond the Holocene, are implicit in the content and form of international actors' discourses, constituting climate migration in a non-emancipatory character. Through a critical analysis of discourse of international negotiations, final agreements, and experts' discussions, we can distinguish *four governance pathologies*: securitization, technocracy, resilience, and liberal cosmopolitanism. Critical Discourse Analysis shows how the current constitution of climate migration dismisses great powers' international responsibility and their economic dependence on migrants' exploitation within IPE dynamics. This is done by enforcing specific discursive narratives regarding temporality (migration is perceived either in a *negative future timeframe*, as something that will only happen in the distant future, or in a *toxic nostalgia* sense, in which the issue should be solved through an increase of resilience to shift back to a time of 'stability' and 'normality') and political paradigms (enforcing *modernist and Holocentric-laden governance technologies with pathological technologies* that disregard how mobility is the rule and not the exception of international social reality, and as such govern mobility in the name of a kinetic elite). There is still limited space for envisioning a via media of an Anthropocene political paradigm in which international institutions are capable of coping with instability, change, and uncertainty, fully aware of (and not disregarding) the structural restraints set out by 'sedentarism', modernity, power relations, and capitalist dynamics.

Objectives. This thesis analyzes how climate-related human migration is discursively constituted within global climate adaptation governance.

Additionally, there are three specific objectives, each corresponding to one of the thesis chapters. These are: (i) to devise a theoretical and methodological framework that is suited for critically analyzing discourses with a focus on the co-constitution of agency and architecture in the Earth System Governance; (ii) to critically analyze international discourses on climate migration, investigating if and how they (re)produce a Holocene, modernist rationale, via integration with document analysis and literature review; and (iii) to present and review the concepts, norms, and discourses that are given as solutions to overcoming such climate mobility's pathologies, while also reflecting upon their hindrances on abstract, cosmopolitan solutions and considering what they entail for the global governance of climate migration and adaptation.

1.2 Research design

Theoretical framework. I envisioned this as a thesis on IR – it is guided by international theory, its object of study is that of global governance, and it is conducted within an Institute of International Relations. Yet, this is not a work *solely* on IR – at least not in how it regards the relation between its units and levels of analysis, how it is much indebted to critical social theory and sustainability studies, and how much it abstracts from contributions originated outside the disciplinary territory of IR.

Most generally, this is a thesis about the social co-constitution of architecture and agency. That is, the concepts, theories, and methods were employed to investigate and explore how the global governance institutional macrostructure (architecture[4]) reproduces and is reproduced by its subjects (international actors), focusing on its discursive dimension. Therefore, the two key theories operationalized within this framework are Global Governance Architecture (Biermann and Kim 2020) and Global Governors (Avant, Finnemore, and Sell 2010), understood within a social constructivist ontology of co-constitution. The core of the theoretical debate I am attempting to dialogue with is arguably set within International Relations' disciplinary boundaries. However, I am also much indebted to scholars from other disciplines, since both migration (see Castles 2010) and climate change (see Pereira 2017; 2021) are discussions with extensive disciplinary reach while IR still grapples with the idea of dealing with them (see Chandler, Müller, and Rothe 2021; Simangan 2020).

I contend that any attempt to grasp climate migration without moving beyond disciplines would fall into epistemological violence, seeing how the issue has a range of complexities that possibly no discipline could claim to get thoroughly. So, I faced the challenge of dealing with a very much IR-led debate on architecture and agency of the international system and concurrently some rich scholarly debates held within cognate disciplines. This quest led me to a theoretical framework based upon interdisciplinarity. As a result, my primary methodology is originated from linguistic studies and operationalized for social scientists, with a scant application within IR still. The theoretical core here is broadly constructed by contributions from International Political Sociology, critical social theory, Earth System and sustainability approaches, migration (and mobility) theory, critical law studies, and systemic functional linguistics – alongside, of course, international theory[5].

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[4] 'Architecture' can be understood either as a research lens/mid-level theory (Biermann and Kim 2020) or as an empirical object encompassing the overarching institutional design of a given area of global governance (Pattberg et al. 2014). For differentiating them throughout this thesis, the concept is employed in uppercase whenever referring to the theory (Architecture) and lowercase whenever referring to the empirical and descriptive 'patchwork of institutions' (architecture).

[5] I am putting forward an interdisciplinary approach via an 'integrative pluralism' (Dunne, Hansen, and Wight 2013) instance, especially in how this framework regards metatheory by trying to move beyond IR mainstream's pressure toward developing grand theories. The two main conceptual frameworks I employ throughout this thesis (Global Governance Architecture and Global Governors) are arguably mid-level theories. None of them is thought of as explaining every single variable of international affairs, requiring thus context-specific analysis for moving to understanding and explaining. As such, these theories are not some syntheses between concurrent approaches; they cannot be framed as leading to a single grand theory shortly after. Unlike conventional IR theories, mid-level theories are not all-encompassing. Instead, they focus on a single part of the political process and attempt to develop context-specific investigations, reflections, and explanations. They are hardly generable, as a positivistic stance on the philosophy of science would require them to be (see Lake 2013). It further allows the analyst to adhere not to a single set of assumptions but to acquire from different approaches whatever appears to be most fitting to understand the constitution of the issue at hand (Sil and Katzenstein 2010), which is especially useful for Critical Discourse Analysis (more details below).

By recognizing how different approaches and disciplines may have valuable and helpful insights to understanding the research problem at hand, mid-level theories open venues for integrating these contributions to the theoretical-methodological disciplinary core, as long as they share the same epistemological and ontological basis. This pluralism by pragmatic and integrative integration[6] can be of particular importance in the field of global governance studies because, despite IR limitations, 'many traditional IR theories prove quite useful for understanding the dynamics of authority and governing outcomes' (Avant, Finnemore, and Sell 2010, 8). In sum, I believe one can still do IR if reading more widely from cognate disciplines, embracing the complexity of the Earth System, and learning from critical social theory and (especially) methods. The main challenge is to use these contributions in the most proficient, coherent, and cogent manner, without stripping them from their initial background and recognizing their drawbacks.

Thus, both theoretical frameworks are here employed as mid-level theories with similar ontological and epistemological nature, at least concerning how their apparatuses define the international system as socially constructed by processes of meaning-making through language and other cognitive mechanisms ('semiosis'). Accordingly, I contend that this thesis' application of methods, concepts, and theories abstract from a similar onto-epistemological foundation. Furthermore, the pluralism achieved through their mix is suitable to help us understand how the discursive constitution of an issue (i.e., climate migration) within international relations (i.e., global governance architectures) shapes its governance, departing from the more abstract notion that the international system is socially co-constituted (see section 2.1).

Methodology. This thesis is aimed at looking at discourses in content *and* form. There are two primary data sources: one international site of policy negotiation, with public meeting records (United Nations General Assembly), and a number of final agreements and other multilateral documents which formally govern climate migration (for the full list, see section 2.3). To deal with these documents, I am using the qualitative analysis software NVivo (see Section 2.3). As my primary method, I am employing Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) (Fairclough 1989; 1995; 2003; 2006; Chouliaraki and Fairclough 2002) to analyze with more depth a selection of discourses practices, investigating how meaning is (re)produced through the use of language and to how these practices express or relate to power struggles in the international society. Through CDA, I am mainly focusing on how these specific discourses practices are part of a broader societal discursive order that co-constitutes social phenomena (climate mobility) while also being cognizant of individual discourses' practices that hint us about individual agency.

The approach I am engaging here for understanding discourses is heavily related to the 'thick constructivism' (i.e., 'post-positivistic constructivism') and 'post-structuralist' schools of IR, in which discourses are thought of as constituting reality (see Carta 2019; Peltonen 2017). By way of a constructivist-oriented meaning of discourses, I am not aiming at discovering some hard truth expressed through language or finding an objective reality represented within discourses (known as the 'picture theory') (Wittgenstein 2009 [1953], 5). In this conventional

[6] This integrative pluralism approach is broadly derived from works on interdisciplinarity within Natural and Social Sciences, commonly framed as the 'unification' and 'pluralism' debate (see Olsson and Ness 2019).

construction, discourses are arguably understood as something to be unveiled and 'discovered' by thoughtful analysis. Language, in other words, is considered nothing but a group of signs reflecting the material world. However, if one deems that language is part of the ideational world that intercedes for how we conceive of reality (Fierke 2010; see Wittgenstein 2009, [1953], 27; Carta 2019), either by intersubjectively creating subjects and objects or by dominating one's perception of reality (Carta 2019), this 'representational' construction of language is disrupted (see Woolley 2015). Rather, an interpretive instance of discourse analysis means that there may be no deep truth to be 'unveiled' about the international system but rather that discourse analysts act to construct meanings through their usage of methods (see Carta 2019; Woolley 2015).

On a more general note, I argue that this methodology, combining critical governance studies with a social constructivist onto-epistemology and critical language studies, could be applicable to other attempts at understanding co-constitutive aspects of discourses within global governance architectures. Section 2.3 provides a detailed account of how these methods are operationalized under this thesis framework.

Justification. The normative justification for undertaking this research resides in the fact that, although climate-related human mobility is expected in every region of the world as the socio-environmental crisis aggravates, it is a social and political issue mainly for the global South (see Biermann and Boas 2010) Climate change affects countries in a non-uniform manner, and the poor adaptative capacities of developing states place them in hardships when it comes to climate migration (Atapattu 2020; Biermann and Boas 2010). In spite of this backdrop, there is an 'uneven geography' (Piguet, Kaenzig, and Guélat 2018) in the scientific production regarding climate migration, for those who engage with the scholarship are primarily from the global North, mostly from European countries. Contributions from the global South are still rare, at the same pace that it is where both migration and climate injustices are most present. I believe that these inequities place climate mobility, as a social and academic issue, within the entanglements of planetary and epistemic justice: countries with less responsibility in effecting climate change are the ones more affected by climate-related human migration (Biermann and Boas 2010) and the least participating in the epistemic debates (Piguet, Kaenzig, and Guélat 2018; see Ferris 2020).

On the other side of the planetary and epistemic justice argument, however, resides the fact that there has been a sustained push for migrant scholars to provide policy-relevant contributions[7]. As a consequence, a significant part of the research conducted in the field often starts from, rather than questions, formal categories and policy practices departing from International Refugee Law. Thus, it is to be expected that research on the interrelation between climate change and migration should be questioned as politically irrelevant (since, for now, climate change is not legally considered a driver for migration and, consequently, it is not a reason for granting refugee status) while there are more pressing issues within the field's research agenda. Rather than contesting this criticism, however, I embrace it: as Bakewell

[7] On a more general note, this is also the case for climate change research and the core of research originated from developing countries – since there is always a quest for providing solutions that could prompt national development.

(2008) has put it, there is a need for engaging with 'policy irrelevant' research on forced migration to give attention to other, non-conventional, and non-formal categories of human mobility beyond of the dichotomy imposed by the refugee regime between voluntary migration and asylum.

By this, I am aware that I place this thesis in two controversial positions: first, I defend that global South scholars should have a more considerable role within the scholarship to improve governance outcomes, yet focus on so-called 'policy irrelevant' research. Second, while I am dismissive of the perspective that our current global institutions can adequately govern climate migration, I look to formal sites of global governance architectures to interrogate the co-constitution of climate migration governance. I am well aware that these are elitists sites (Dunford 2017) at the core of the Holocene global governance (Dryzek and Pickering 2019) and that, by these choices, I overlook solutions coming from other governance's patches, actors, and scales of action (see Gill 2021b; Inoue 2018; Tsing 2015). I try to deal with these contradictions throughout, but perhaps they are inevitable with methods and data sources employed in researches such as this thesis. Despite all that, I still defend that exploring discourses on climate migration through a co-constitution approach can help us draw critical insights into the performance of the Global Climate Adaptation Governance architecture in the Anthropocene. This effort can possibly lead us a small step further in overcoming the Holocene in its pervasive institutional aspect of pathological path-dependency.

Terminology. Before moving to the chapters, a final consideration that I must make here relates to different terminologies of climate change-related human migration. In many ways, my terminological choices result from theoretical, methodological, and normative choices presented in this Introduction. So far, the reader may or may not have realized the usage of two terms: climate migration (such as in the title) and climate mobility (such as in 'Proposition 3'). This distinction is relevant and has a theoretical divergence (see section 4.1). I have chosen the perhaps more general and abstract concept of 'climate migrant' consciously of the implications that it has, especially in regards to its ontology – because, as I have briefly discussed, the category of a climate migrant is but a socially constituted one, and so a thesis that is aimed at uncovering the use of language in social reality has the obligation of being reflexive of its own discourses (see Vaandering and Reimer 2021).

The use of different terminologies to represent those people influenced by environmental stressors in their decision to move (or to stay in place) is thoroughly debated in the literature (e.g., Dun and Gemenne 2008; Farbotko and Lazrus 2012; Gemenne 2015), especially by international law scholars (since different terms have different normative implications) and researchers on the intersection of critical security studies and migration (who have mostly criticized the figure of the 'environmental refugee' – see section 3.1). Despite these long-held debates, it is remarkable how the core of the literature on the figure of these migrants does not differentiate between those who are forced to migrate and those who migrate for tourism or leisure purposes. Climate migration is hardly a universal story, and in spite of general accounts focusing on global South 'vulnerable'[8] societies affected (always in the future) by sea-

[8] Vulnerability is defined, by United Nations official terminology (2009, 30), as 'The characteristics and circumstances of a community, system or asset that make it susceptible to the damaging effects of a hazard'.

level rise and droughts, the (hi)story of people on the move due to the climate is more appropriately a plural one, complex in space and time. Migration flows do not unfold nearly as automatic as deterministic accounts suggest, and countries in the global South are not the only ones affected – in fact, climate migrants are moving all around, and dreadful estimates of South-to-North flows are but an exaggeration (Warner and Boas 2017; 2019), since international displacement influenced by climate change is commonly toward border nations (in the few cases that it is 'international') (Rigaud et al. 2018; Clement et al. 2021).

Hence, if climate migration cannot be contained in a single-story, it cannot be described in a single term either. Attempts that try to do so – mostly in public and media discourses – are very often based on racialized political substrates (Baldwin 2017b) ignoring the blurred relationship that climate change has to global Northers' own (im)mobilities. Those who migrate after experiencing an intense disaster such as a hurricane and those migrating to dwell in a more comfortable climate on beautiful beaches are all moving due to climate aspects – but not in the same capacity. The figure of the 'environmental refugee' is, perhaps unconsciously, placed solely on those moving into the suburbs of the world. Thus, within this terminological discussion, a relevant differentiation to be made here is about how different people have different *capacities for mobility* – or how they hold different 'motilities' (Kaufmann, Bergman, and Joye 2017). Adaptation capacities, access to resources, and other social factors influence whether people are seen as forced migrants fleeing climate change or if they are part of a 'mobile elite' (Sheller 2018, Kindle loc. 3310) that have the privilege (and the power) to move whenever and however they desire to.

Thus, there is a discursive difference in the terminology of the climate migrant: those displaced or 'trapped' (see Zickgraf 2019; c.f. Farbotko 2018; Farbotko et al. 2020, on voluntary immobility) by climate change are 'victims' that should be prevented from moving or resettling if, by doing so, the government enhances their societal resilience capacities. However, those that move around the world departing from developed countries, often looking for better climate conditions in tropical zones or tourist attractions in 'exotic' lands, are protected within the international system for holding 'kinetic' power. We can trace back to this mobile elite the argument that moving and migrating is the most idealized token of freedom (Sheller 2016, 2). They possess the discursive power to shape their borders, time, and space, exercising their right to unlimited mobility, all the while heavily dependent on the (im)mobility of others. Put differently, as Sheller (2018, Kindle loc. 354) places it, while elites can easily move, their movements 'require a great deal of work, and that work requires many other kinds of movements, pausing, waiting, stilled readiness' Outside of the elite, however, the 'Other' faces several frictions (Tsing 2011) in their movement, holding thus different *motilities*. The climate migrant is, in sum, a very diversified group of subjects that is often discursively scripted into a singular one.

So, throughout this thesis, whenever 'climate migration' or 'displacement' appears, it is alluded to 'climate-related human migration' rather than the 'climate-induced' or 'caused' variables. The reasons for these are varied, but perhaps I can sum them up in a twofold argument. First, as migration is not universally experienced and people have different motilities, to presume whenever a movement is in fact 'induced' by environmental stressors (if ever) would require a different approach, engaging with methods that consider the subjectivity of

people's decision-making. Second, to presume that climate migration is a natural (only influenced by environmental conditions) and not political (influenced by social factors and constituted intersubjectively) phenomenon would be harmful since I am departing from a 'post-modern' reading on the Anthropocene, questioning the Cartesian binarism between society and nature. In lieu, engaging with the 'related' participle hint at how climate change can influence migration patterns in complex ways. At the same time, by bringing the entanglement of migration flows with climate change, the concept brings a critical focus to the world-history of capitalism, imperialism, and colonialism that placed climate change processes in motion (and the ethical and normative responsibility that derive from these processes). Nevertheless, this is a choice that is not unproblematic, and the terminological debate will appear again later on, for it is indissociable to a critical discourse analysis on this subject.

1.3 Outline of the thesis

This Master's thesis comprises five chapters, the first being this Introduction.

Chapter 2 presents a point of departure for the conceptual, theoretical, and methodological discussions by putting into conversation this essay's building blocks. It presents the theoretical framework of co-constitution of the International Social System by relying upon the Agency-Architecture debate, in this manuscript understood via the interaction of Global Governance Architecture (Biermann and Kim 2020) and Global Governors (Avant, Finnemore, and Sell 2010). It also abstracts more broadly from the set of contributions identified as governance studies within IR, delving into the type of relationship international actors create among themselves and the overarching structure. Furthermore, I highlight how I operationalize text analysis for this research enterprise by way of Critical Discourse Analysis, discussing how language can be a powerful dimension for interrogating and exploring IR in its governance facet. Finally, this chapter still holds a brief introduction to the Anthropocene as a third point of departure, seeing how the socio-ecological crisis calls for a remaking of the IR discipline and of international order's premises and configuration.

Chapter 3 starts by mobilizing these three building blocks to the study of discourses on climate migration. It departs from a general presentation of the emergence of discourses on 'environmental refugees' at the global level, showing how early framings of the topic rendered human mobility a failure of adaptation. This is followed by the discursive shift that took place in the late 2000s, which saw the rise of a new schema on the figure of the 'climate migrant' as a possible adaptive tool for vulnerable households. These sections are composed of the results of CDA and their triangulation with climate migration scholarships. Throughout, I highlight those caveats I have identified across different disciplines as belonging to a Holocene-oriented perspective on climate change, migration, and global governance. These are summarized in the (i) securitization, futurology, and the self-fulfilling prophecy critique, and (ii) the migration-as-adaptation thesis and its fetishization of resilience and technocracy.

Chapter 4 discusses the constitution of discourses on climate migration identified in the previous chapter to inquire whether we can envision a global governance architecture of climate migration in the Anthropocene. This interrogation is done via two interconnected paths. First, I underscore some theories and concepts that have the capacity to overcome Holocene's institutions' pathological representation of climate migration by not falling into securitization,

neoliberal resilience, or technofixes. Second, I try to identify how IR as an intellectual project and political order can be fostered to govern (in) the ruins of the Anthropocene.

Finally, the fifth chapter sets the final remarks of this thesis, summarizing the main findings and pointing a way forward through which we can conceive of climate mobility as enmeshed with the Anthropocene. It tries to conclude this thesis not with decay but by looking at possible sites of hope through which we can better entangle ourselves with the many planetary (im)mobilities part of our 'social nature'.

2 POINTS OF DEPARTURE: THE DISCURSIVE CONSTITUTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL SOCIAL SYSTEM

This first chapter presents the building blocks of this thesis about theories and methods, and it is thus divided into three main sections. Section 2.1 (theory) presents the debate on the co-constitution of architecture and agency within the Earth System Governance. Delving into the agency-structure debate through a framework of co-constitution requires a twofold theoretical instance. Therefore, the two main theoretical contributions guiding this thesis are Global Governance Architecture (Biermann and Kim 2020) and the concept of Global Governors (Avant, Finnemore, and Sell 2010), hence framing this endeavor as one of investigating the interrelation between agency and architecture at a meso-level of analysis. In such questions, it seems suited to make use of mid-level theories that do not have the premise of generating grand theories or abstract explanations but instead provide the analyst with the necessary conceptual toolkit to make sense of the constitutive aspects at play (see Lake 2013).

Section 2.2 sets the backdrop of this thesis: the emergence of the Anthropocene and the LIO general failure in dealing with climate change and migration. After presenting the concepts and discussions at the backbone of my theory usage, I aimed to juxtapose them with the pervasiveness of the Anthropocene for IR scholarships and governance studies, which I thought as presenting the case for 'adapting' global governance. To introduce it, I briefly present the 'emerging but contested domain' of Global Climate Adaptation Governance (Persson 2019), as it sets the norms, institutions, and organizations composing the governance of climate migration and adaptation internationally. In such a way, the theoretical framework presented in Section 2.1 intersects with the Anthropocene and the 'adaptation of global governance' so that we can better grasp the global governance of adaptation.

Section 2.3 presents the methods employed, discussing the role that discourses take theoretically and methodologically within this thesis research design. In brief, I intend to look upon discourses on climate migration as social practices that co-constitute the architecture of Global Climate Adaptation Governance. I do this through Critical Discourse Analysis, which explores discourses' content *and* form. By way of CDA, I investigate and interrogate how discourses shape and are shaped by the international social system and actors. I also present in this section the methods of data collection and analysis used and how the qualitative software (NVivo) assisted with data collection. While these sections were divided along the lines of theory and method, it must be said that it was done so solely heuristically; there is no way to apply Governance Architecture and Global Governors' theoretical approaches without methodological implications, and the same is true of the theoretical implications of my choice of methods, especially considering how CDA is rich in social theory and how the Anthropocene disrupts theory and method applications. Finally, section 2.4 offers a concluding remark for this chapter as we move to test this framework for analyzing the discursive constitution of climate migration at the governance of adaptation.

2.1 The co-constitution of Architecture and Agency in the earth system

This thesis aims to contribute to studies on the interplay between Architecture and Agency, one of the research lenses of the Earth System Governance's (ESG) science plan (Burch et al. 2019).

Since the Cold War demise, governance studies have shifted from analysis of specific international institutions, organizations, and international regimes to ultimately a focus upon 'global' governance, understood more broadly. This analytical move meant that the scholarly community started to realize that actors and structures were onto-epistemologically interwoven. In other words, the interaction between individual actors (either the conventional conception of national states or the more alternative one regarding non-state actors) and the international institutional framework, generally composed of principles, norms, and decision-making procedures, should not be researched separately. The ESG community has played a prominent role in this regard, highlighting how this interplay should be a 'key ambition' in their new Science Plan (Burch et al. 2019, 7). This thesis attempts to contribute to this task[9], placing ESG's scholars' findings on the Architecture-Agency debate in the context of Global Climate Adaptation Governance more generally and to climate migration specifically.

Although debates on Global Governance have been present in the IR literature since before the Cold War, it was at the end of the 20st century that such studies stood out. Its emergence as a research subject is often attributed to the rise of multilateral instances and a common-held perception of ascending global order, steered not by a single state but rather by a multitude of international institutions – each entitled to an issue area of international affairs. From a first period of optimism related to global governance as a panacea of sorts, the field of study has turned more complex and diverse, just like the phenomenon of global governance itself (see Gonçalves and Inoue 2017).

Governance scholars have tended to frame *the* global governance as the ultimate instance of order in the international system. In this more traditional reading, global governance comprised at least one more sphere of action. The first and most primitive form of institutions mediating interstate affairs is thought to be international organizations, either intergovernmental organizations (e.g., UN-related agencies) or non-governmental organizations (e.g., humanitarian or advocacy actors such as the Red Cross or Greenpeace). The second level of institutional order is international regimes, which conceptually act as a meso-level by uniting different institutions in a given issue area. International regimes are most famously defined by Krasner (1982, 186) as 'sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors' expectations converge in a given area of international relations'. The third sphere is global governance itself. Hence, a conventional approach by governance scholars, despite plural divergences among them, frames 'global governance' as the institutional configuration of international affairs three-dimensionally, composed of IOs and other organizations, regimes, and then the 'global order' (Rosenau and Czempiel 1992, 8).

Some scholars later criticized this three-dimensional analytical framework for its oversimplification. The regime's theoretical framework has received critiques since its outset

[9] I justify this move because, as it is argued in the ESG's Science Plan, to consider adaptation governance within the Earth System entails recognizing a 'paradigm shift' on how governance is usually depicted in the Holocene (Biermann 2021a, 3): rather than creating an artificial separation between the social and the ecological dimensions of reality, an Earth System perspective recognizes their entanglement in the Anthropocene (Burch et al. 2019). Overcoming the virtual dichotomy between humanity and the environment is embedded into this framework and is required for fully grasping the governance challenges existent for adapting to the current socio-ecological crisis (Dryzek 2016; Pickering 2019), and hence an earth system approach to governance seems desirable.

by mainstream (e.g., Strange 1982; Mearsheimer 1994) and critical scholars (e.g., Okereke, Bulkeley, and Schroeder 2009). However, as multilateral instances became fragmented, the 'regimes' concept was constantly criticized for no longer (if ever) representing the increasing complexity of global affairs (Zürn 2018, 1:6). Many 'issue areas' of international relations were governed not by one but by a 'regime complex' composed of several regimes interacting in alternative configurations, fragmentation levels, and hierarchical orders (Keohane and Victor 2010). Regime complexes, in a way, added another layer between the regimes and the global order. Further on, these 'complexes' were observed and conceptualized as loosely coupled to one another, composing a broader and more overarching level of institutional configuration within international affairs, which became known as 'Global Governance Architectures' (Biermann, Pattberg, et al. 2009; Biermann et al. 2014).

As conceptualized by Biermann and Kim (2020, 4), Global Governance Architecture is 'the overarching system of public and private institutions, principles, norms, regulations, decision-making procedures, and organizations that are valid or active in a given area of global governance'[10]. In simpler terms, an 'architecture' of global governance is the institutional setting on a specific issue of international affairs, a 'patchwork of institutions' (Pattberg et al. 2014, 5). They tend to be constituted by and around sovereign states, which remain the central actor in most governance efforts (Biermann and Kim 2020, 7; c.f. Young 2020, to a counter example) but are also composed of intergovernmental institutions (such as IOs), international bureaucracies (such as conventions secretariats); transnational networks (of non-state actors), and advocacy networks (such as organizations of organized civil society). Structurally, these groups of actors and institutions can often be found interlinked or grouped into regime complexes, and when the whole 'patchwork of institutions' is considered at once, they appear somewhere in a continuum between integration and fragmentation (Biermann and Kim 2020, 10). If we go back to the three-dimensional conceptual framework at the outset of the global governance scholarship, it is clearcut how the governance architecture concept presents a more complex and fragmented scenario for the international institutional order. Instead of a triple-layer, several building blocks compose every single governance architecture (Biermann and Kim 2020, 8).

If we move down the ladder from structural components to agency analysis, it may seem that the framework of Global Governance Architecture already establishes an initial descriptive boundary for those subjects that can have actorness bestowed. Public and private institutions, principles, norms, regulations, decision-making procedures, and organizations' (Biermann and Kim 2020, 4), for example, are all part of an architecture. Nevertheless, that does not presuppose that they have an ontological *agency* within every architecture, only that they can be considered *actors* that take part in decision-making. The main difference resides in their authority 'to

[10] In regards to methodology, Biermann and Kim (2020) put that there are a number of challenges to be faced in every attempt at mapping an institutional setting within the highly interconnected, complex, and ever-changing scenario of Global Governance since it is expected to be an arduous and time-consuming task regardless of the specific methodological approach. Thus, most of the work has employed a range of mixed methods, a common feature of mid-level theories (Dunne, Hansen, and Wight 2013; Lake 2013). As they posit (2020, 22), three main sorts of methodologies are popularly applied for Governance Architectures' research: (i) small-n qualitative case studies, which often focus on a subset of actors in a given architecture; (ii) medium-n analysis, frequently employed in regime's interactions or regime complexes approaches (Keohane and Victor 2010; 2015); and (iii) large-n datasets, focusing on describing and analyzing a whole governance architecture (Kim 2019).

exercise power legitimately' in the earth system (Betsill, Benney, and Gerlak 2020, 8). Hence, to grasp the degree and type of agents and actors within a single architecture is a query for theoretical, normative, and empirical evidence (Biermann and Kim 2020, 7) The amount and diversity of agents and actors that exert influence in a governance architecture require looking to broader questions of social agency and ontology. In regards to Earth System Governance[11], it concerns 'how non-state actors relate to the state; the sources of authority on which different types of actors rely; the relationship between agency and structure; and variations in governance and agency across different spheres and tiers of society' (Betsill, Benney, and Gerlak 2020, 8–9).

To explore further the difference between agency and actors and to provide the conceptual toolkit necessary for investigating the discursive constitution of climate migration within adaptation governance, it seems valid to engage here with the framework of 'Global Governors' proposed by (Avant, Finnemore, and Sell 2010, 2). Although at first sight it may seem tautological to characterize an actor in a governance architecture as a 'global governor', the relevance becomes clear if one observes how they qualify the concept:

> Global governors are authorities who exercise power across borders for purposes of affecting policy. Governors thus create issues, set agendas, establish and implement rules or programs, and evaluate and/or adjudicate outcomes. Rather than assuming that states govern, we investigate. […] Our hunch, however, is that it is not the type of actor but the character of relationships, both among governors and between governors and governed, that is key to understanding global politics (Avant, Finnemore, and Sell 2010, 2–3).

As their definition implies, the 'type' of agent is not the sole ontological criteria for Avant, Finnemore, and Sell (2010): the *character* of the relationship is critical. Differently from Betsill and colleagues (2020) discussion of 'earth system agency', the 'Global Governors' framework delve into agency mainly through a relational approach, with a social and symbolic interaction standpoint at their ontological backbone. Hence, it seems suitable for a quest such as this thesis, interested in the social co-constitution of agency through the discursive dimension only attainable by the symbolic interaction (i.e., relationality) between agents. This relationality standpoint and the definition of governors as those that can exercise *power across borders* expand recognition to a multitude of actors beyond the national state, even though sovereign states might remain central if the empirical institutional setting suggests as much. Furthermore, they point to some identifiable types of agencies, all of which have a discursive dimension. The creation of issues, setting of agendas, establishing and implantation of rules, and the evaluation/adjudication of outcomes all happen via discursive interactions between agents and actors. This way, their conceptual toolkit can be employed at a meso-level, such as the one in which Governance Architectures are located (Biermann, Pattberg, et al. 2009; Biermann et al. 2014), to identify governors through discursive practices – also allowing to notice institutions, constraints, and actors that may have their recognition hindered without the relationality focus.

By this definition, the Global Governors approach advances on a vital concern of the IR discipline: the threshold of who and what can and cannot be considered acting in the International System. Especially within governance studies more attuned to an earth system

[11] See Michelle Betsill and colleagues (2020, 3–24) for a literature survey on different conceptions of agency and actors within Earth System Governance's research.

perspective, the definition of the boundaries of agency is central to not restricting analyses to a pre-conceived statecentrism. Governance scholars have been historically interested in questions such as state centrality and power (Finnemore and Goldstein 2013), agency beyond the national state (e.g., Barnett and Finnemore 1999; Avant, Finnemore, and Sell 2010; Ling 2017), and even agency besides humanity, bearing in mind new forms of ontologies and materialities that are conceptualized under the banner of 'post-human' agency (e.g., Tsing 2015; Hirschfeld 2020) .

In Finnemore, Avant, and Sell's framework, the state is likewise not considered a monobloc of institutional authority. As national states are complex entities, with several bureaucratic bodies within, they can show dysfunctional action in different parts of the same architecture, depending on their relationship with other actors and the overarching structure's restraints. For instance, experts, bureaucrats, and foreign policy delegates might have dissimilar positions, placing their government in different positionalities within the same architecture. States' actions may not correspond to any notion of utility maximization either; as norms create the international social system from which national interests are derived, and as there are internal orderings (i.e., bureaucracies) that influence decision-making procedures within collective actors, they may exercise power in ways unpredicted by their mandate, other actors' expectations, and notions of 'universal rationality' (Finnemore 1996; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998). This expansive notion of actorness besides the national state is much needed in climate-related studies because non-state actors, both public and private, are especially relevant in International Environment Regimes (Franchini, Viola, and Barros-Platiau 2017) and more so in Climate Adaptation Governance (Hall and Persson 2018; Persson and Dzebo 2019). Conversely, although migration is primarily a state-centered topic, climate migration is of interest of several IOs and organized civil society, especially those belonging to the UN system (McAdam 2011; 2012). Refusing to attribute centrality and homogeneity to states *a priori* can offer valuable reflections for any theoretical approach (Avant, Finnemore, and Sell 2010) and is particularly suited for a Global Governance Architecture approach (Biermann and Kim 2020, 7–8).

Further on, we should delve it some sources of 'character of relationship' to better define who are the global governors in this object of inquiry. The most abstract theoretical assumption I depart from is that the international system is *socially co-constituted*. The main implication of the 'social' premise is that, rather than looking only upon material or historical bases for understanding and explaining issues, one must investigate the social meanings intersubjectively shared by international actors through norms, rules, and beliefs. The 'co-constitution' particle alludes to the idea that instead of placing national states or the structure of the 'international system' in a position of ontological precedence, the most basic level of ontological agency is given to the symbolic interaction among international actors *and* between them and the social structure. In other words, through social interactions, international actors shape the social structure. This structure, by establishing the social conditions available to every actor and thus constraining and enabling action, shapes interests and identities (mostly known as 'the duality of structure'). Therefore, instead of looking at an international system based on materiality, I am approaching it as an international *social* system. By not restricting to either agentic or structuralist theories and engaging with IR through critical social theory, I am departing from

constructivist, post-structural, and postmodern theories of IR – even though I also utilize concepts from the English School, International Political Sociology, and more broadly of those known as critical IR theories.

Under the co-constitution metatheoretical umbrella, the Global Governors framework helps understand how the *positionality* of a given actor within the architecture and among other actors is analytically relevant. It further deepens the understanding of how the relationships that actors have among themselves produces (and is produced by) the Global Governance Architecture. Developing these contributions into an IR traditional vocabulary means that this theoretical framework is not inherently state-centric, but it can nevertheless assign a central position to states in a specific architecture, if analyses at the meso-level show as much (Avant, Finnemore, and Sell 2010, 2; Biermann and Kim 2020, 8). Even in these cases, rather than assuming that states and IOs have prior interests, the international social system's approach implies that these actors not only disseminate their own agenda in multilateral forums but also adhere to the agenda and interests set by other constellation of actors there present – meaning that, for example, not a single state has an exogenous interest regarding how migration and climate adaptation should be governed, as this is a result of their symbolic interaction at the international and domestic level (see Finnemore 1996). Thus, discursive frames developed at international negotiations are constituent of states' own identities and actions.

If agency is defined intersubjectively, that is, a result of the relations between actors, other kinds of institutions may exercise power significantly. Following the Global Governors definition, the most basic form of agency characterizing a global governor is perceptible through the exercise of power across borders. Power, perhaps, is the most popular and yet disputed concept in International Relations and social theory. It bears to note how any concept of power is not neutral and may underestimate, make invisible, or inflate how power is exerted (Guzzini 2007). Having this as a backdrop is critical for grasping why power is not solely a representation of 'hard' or 'soft' power as much present in the neo-neo debate of IR, in which the first is generally defined in terms of material capacities and the second of the capacity to attract actors to abide by interests without the sole usage of material resources (Guzzini 1993). To move beyond it, the conceptual typology of power employed here is developed by Barnett and Duvall (2005) with a further contribution by Kratochwill and Ruggie (1986). Following their definition, power is 'the production, in and through social relations, of effects that shape the capacities of actors to determine their circumstances and fate' (Barnett and Duvall 2005, 42).

Barnett and Duvall (2005) provide a fourfold taxonomy: compulsory, institutional, structural, and productive power. The first one (compulsory) is the most material notion of power, exerted from one actor to another to control their action. The institutional variant happens when power is used diffusively through the control of an international institution, even if unpredictably and unintentionally (see Guzzini 1993). The third taxonomy of power (structural) is exercised through actors' influences on the structures that co-constitutes what actors are, that is, shaping the international social system. Finally, the fourth (productive power), overlapping with the previous concept, is also exerted on the structural level but in a more diffusive, non-intended way, through discourses, meaning-making, and knowledge. Epistemic power (Kratochwil and Ruggie 1986) is also relevant for this research endeavor. It

seems adequate to investigate how and which knowledge produced by scientific communities shapes the structure and the actors themselves, especially because this is one of the main sources of power that IOs can exert (Barnett and Finnemore 1999; 2004). Epistemic power is also fundamental to understanding the shift from local to the transnational scale of climate adaptation (see Persson 2019) and the role played by expert communities in conceptualizing climate migration (see Ransan-Cooper et al. 2015). All of these typologies of power are constituted in and through discourses, even if some are more perceptible (such as epistemic) and others opaquer and more naturalized (especially compulsory power) (see section 2.2.2).

Global governors exert actions according to their interests, degrees of autonomy, and authority. These might take shape, but not exclusively, of setting agendas by creating issues of interest or taking issues out of it; making rules; implementing and enforcing interests; and evaluating, monitoring, and adjudicating outcomes. The qualification of these actions is a derivative of the degree of authority actors consider that the other holds (legitimacy), with authority conceptualized as 'the ability to induce deference in others' (Avant, Finnemore, and Sell 2010, 9). Hence, authority is interwoven with legitimation, which Michael Zürn (2018, 63) names 'the authority-legitimation link'. For Avant, Finnemore, and Sell (2010), global governors have their authority drawn from five sources of legitimacy: institutional, delegated, expert, principled, or capacity-based. Zürn advances by pointing out how these sources tend to be 'crafted together in a narrative that […] usually do not consist of single claims or references, but rather a combination of different sources' (Zürn 2018, 70). These legitimacy claims are discursively constituted via a sevenfold combination of different sources: participatory, legal, fairness, technocratic, traditional, relative gains, and manipulative narratives. By mobilizing different legitimation sources, actors engage with one or more of these narratives, constituting their identity as an authoritative agent (Zürn 2018, 70). Rather than elements of actors themselves, thus, these narratives are only attainable due to social configurations within the overarching structure and actors' relationality in the intersubjective realm, which is why the authority-legitimation link has a discursive dimension that can be analyzed and explored.

International Organizations are probably the most prominent actors besides sovereign states considered within the Global Governance scholarship (see Eckhard and Ege 2016). Inasmuch as they interact in the same international social system as other governors, IOs are able to influence policy-making and the architecture by their actions. In specific situations, IOs can act as an 'orchestrator', enabling or halting action in a specific regime or architecture but not through conventional power-laden processes (see Abbott, Bernstein, and Janzwood 2020). Instead of being in a position of net centrality or vertical hierarchy, which could put them in the role of hegemonic actors, they can govern indirectly through an 'intermediary' that acts under its influence (e.g., either by deference to authority or legitimation claims) (Abbott, Bernstein, and Janzwood 2020, 233). NGOs, private companies, and other international actors can effect change in the same dynamics (see Clapp and Fuchs 2009; Dauvergne and Lister 2010). Forum shopping (Hafner-Burton 2009) was also observed within fragmented governance architectures, meaning actors' capacity to fluctuate between different institutional arrangements, norms, principles, and international regimes to better achieve their interests. Forum shopping affects the performance of a given Architecture because it is a direct result of fragmentation: the more fragmented, the more easily actors can shift toward other constellations, while the costs of doing

so are greater in more synergistic settings (see Biermann and Kim 2020). Thus, questions of agency are attributed more to positionalities of actors in the governance architecture (how close to the center or periphery they are located) than to ontological characteristics reducible to agent-level (Avant, Finnemore, and Sell 2010) of a 'singular, hegemonic state' (see Fligstein and McAdam 2011, 8).

At the social dimension, agency exerted across border tend to create international norms that indicate proper conduct by defining 'what is good or bad about what is in light of what one ought to do' (Schmidt 2008, 306). In the international social system, norms can shape and alter national interests and state behavior via their dissemination and socialization (Finnemore 1996; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998), even though they are always part of a process of social struggle in which they are contested at other scales of action (see Acharya 2004; 2011, for regional and local contestation; see Börzel and Zürn 2021, for a discussion on norm contestation and socialization). Constructivist scholars have engaged with the creation and dissemination of norms through a heuristic of 'norm life cycle', by which norms emerge (step one), cascade through dissemination after a tipping point of acceptance (step two), and are finally internalized in societies (final step) (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, 896). This happens as a result of its creation and dissemination by 'norm entrepreneurs', meaning by actors who are interested in their international diffusion (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998), and then localized and contested by local actors who may alter their configuration to abide by their interest (Acharya 2004; 2011).

A final consideration must be made here regarding the (non-)novelty of this framework within social theory. In a second-order theorizing, a governance architecture is a field of action in which collective actors interact to push for strategic advantage, with social life composed of a myriad of different 'meso-level orders'. Earth System architectures are among these orders, placed between regime complexes and the more broadly understood 'international system' or global order. Thus, at least in a more general sense as it relates to social theory, the governance architecture framework does not present much novelty since 'how to think about the role that social actors play in the construction of social life has been one of the core controversies in social theory in the past 20 years' (Fligstein and McAdam 2011, 6). Governance architectures, as a meso-order, are a perfect example of a 'strategic action field' (SAF) in which strategic action means the intent to take 'control in a given context' by employing their 'social skill' in a situation of collective action (Fligstein and McAdam 2011, 7).

The same rationale applies at the agentic level. The idea that states can have their authority fragmented means that states are composed of a web of SAFs in distinct patterns of fragmentation – and hence also subject to the same theoretical principles. The 'social skill' of collective actors can be understood in terms of power, authority, and legitimation. Thus, in a situation where actors hold a significant amount of 'social skill', they can become 'institutional entrepreneurs' that create or reproduce collective identities through cognitive, empathetic, and communicative actions (Fligstein and McAdam 2011, 7). The degree of social skill they have is dependent on the aggregated sum of SAFs that co-constitute both the agent and the structure.

Therefore, in second-order, one might argue that there is little novelty in engaging these issues through the governance architecture framework and not through social theory, for example, SAFs. I contend, however, that the importance of engaging with the global

governance 'architecture' construct is, above else, its contributions as a first-order theoretical approach (that is, closer to the object 'domain'). By determining which are the actors and institutions of relevance in the meso-level order of global governance, instead of the SAF abstract construct or of other proposals found in cognate disciplines, the Global Governance Architecture and Global Governors approaches provide a conceptual toolkit for fully grasping the social constitution of the *international order* and its issues – which is of relevance for mid-level theories. What is paramount is that the social interaction among actors, the proximity and or distance they have among themselves ('constellation of actors'), and the 'social skill' (Fligstein 2001) they possess given their position and relations within the network, influences the social reality of the architecture, shaping therefore governance outcomes. Nevertheless, being reflexive of second-order theories upholding these frameworks is necessary to open venues for engaging with social theory in a plural manner, which will help integrate these frameworks with Critical Discourse Analysis (see section 2.3) and to enmesh ourselves with critical perspectives on adapting to the Anthropocene in the following section.

2.2 The governance of adaptation and the adaptation of governance

Transnational climate adaptation is gradually gathering attention within multilateral climate negotiations. As the concentration of CO2 in the atmosphere increases yearly and environmental disasters are more frequent and intense, international actors are starting to recognize the urgency of developing responses to the consequences of climate change (Persson and Dzebo 2019). Every international negotiation on the matter since the 2007 Bali Action Plan of the 13th Conference of the Parties of the UNFCCC – a critical juncture within climate negotiations – contributed to the questioning of the old mantra 'mitigation is global; adaptation is local' (Persson 2019). Scholars have not taken long to point out how an international regime of adaptation was unfolding, even if most depictions were skeptical of their outcomes at first (see Felli and Castree 2012; Jerneck and Olsson 2008).

As such, climate negotiations became part of a shift of a long-lasting focus of the international community with questions of mitigation and carbon emissions reduction. Through negotiations, actors started to frame climate adaptation as an inherently transnational issue (see Hall and Persson 2018; Jerneck and Olsson 2008) in need of further international cooperation to have efficient governance. This change had a twofold dimension: one was in scale (with adaptation understood 'glocally', as part of global and local spheres) (see Persson 2019), while the other was in the nature and outcome of climate adaptation policy framing (with adaptation understood now also in the realm of political, and not strictly technical, concerns) (Huitema et al. 2016, 1). However, these moves in frames were limited and still ongoing. Goals set out for adaptation efforts were contested for being overtly generic ('to improve adaptative capacities') (Huitema et al. 2016, 2), reformist rather than leading to profound and necessary changes (Jerneck and Olsson 2008, 180), and weakened albeit expanded, in the sense that even though many institutions are dealing with adaptation (see Hall 2016), they are not necessarily effecting a radical change in their mandates, so that the institutional framework is lacking still (Persson 2019, 10).

In the last decade, there was an upsurge in governance scholars interested in the governance of adaptation, notably because of the number of organizations that started to address

the issue transnationally (see Maria, Maria-Therese, and Ece 2020). At the global level, the framework of actors, agreements, norms, and institutions concerned with transnational climate adaptation became known as the 'Global Climate Adaptation Governance' (GCAG). Although Biermann (2005; see Biermann and Boas 2010) is deemed as the one who coined the term (Persson 2019, 2), he and others have engaged with GCAG solely as a working definition, in a way that conceptual clarity is still needed[12] (see Hall and Persson 2018). That, in fact, is a common argument found in this emergent scholarship: as there is not a clear boundary between GCAG and other governance architectures, and since most institutions dealing with adaptation have yet other policy concerns in their mandate (with adaptation as secondary, if best), GCAG still lacks a fully comprehensive conceptualization (see Persson and Dzebo 2019).

Abstracting from the theoretical framework outlined in the previous section, we can sketch a description of GCAG by building upon Biermann and colleagues' (2009, 4) terminology for Earth System Governance. Applying ESG's framework for Global Governance Architecture and transnational adaptation brings much-needed conceptual clarity, advancing a few common-held notions of the governance scholarship (see Inoue 2016). GCAG, in this sense, may be understood as *the interrelated and increasingly integrated system of formal and informal rules, rule-making systems, and actor-networks at all levels of human society (from local to global) that are set up to steer societies towards* ***adapting*** *to global and local environmental change and, in particular, earth system transformation, within the normative context of sustainable development* (emphasis added[13]).

This working definition for GCAG, which abstracts from Earth System Governance's terminology, is handy for it points to one of the primary debates regarding the emergence of an adaptation regime. It invokes if climate adaptation must be a goal for institutions to deal with, in the sense of being an imperative for the international community to design novel institutions, norms, and organizations that are mandated to deal with climate adaptation; or alternatively, if institutions should 'strive for adaptability', in the sense of changing their institutional design and rationale to be adequately instrumentalized to adapt to climate change (Persson 2019, 8). Consequently, inquiring about the GCAG is in many ways interwoven with the enterprise of adapting global governance to our current socio-ecological crisis, or, in other words, envisioning global governance (in) the Anthropocene.

That is why the Anthropocene, if critically engaged, is at the backdrop of climate adaptation and mobility (Baldwin, Fröhlich, and Rothe 2019; Chandler 2019a). Although the idea that the planet has entered a novel geological epoch came into life mainly as a concern in Earth sciences, it promptly overtook the social sciences and humanities (see Lorimer 2017). Instead, it would be an understatement to posit that the Anthropocene has been assembling academic attention in the last decades. IR is one of the disciplines where the Anthropocene found space, albeit marginally still, as the literature review conducted by Dahila Simangan

[12] One of the early definitions found in the literature suggests that 'the governance of climate adaptation involves the collective efforts of multiple societal actors to address problems, or to reap the benefits, associated with impacts of climate change' (Huitema et al. 2016, 1). This terminology, however, is rather broad and leaves several aspects for further definition.

[13] Biermann and colleagues' (2009, 4) original definition for ESG involves not only 'adapting' but also 'preventing' and 'mitigating'. These other two instances were abstracted to render the definition fully operational as a concept for GCAG. Nevertheless, by employing the ESG project's framework, GCAG can be understood as part of the Earth System, interdependent on the dimensions of prevention and mitigation.

(2020b) indicates. There are still only a few prominent IR journals that have published pieces around the Anthropocene. While the reasoning for this is manifold, Harrington (2016, 3) suggests that perhaps it can be explained by how this new epoch challenges several core disciplinary features and IR scholars' beliefs. Interrogating the Anthropocene dilutes the Euclidian perspective of a disaggregated relationship between humanity and the environment, meaning that we can no longer dissociate mankind from the climate (Biermann 2021; Tsing 2015), which has profound and incommensurable implications for conventional IR theories.

Embraced in this manner, the Anthropocene can be regarded as the demise of modernity's premises and promises, shaking the liberal international order (LIO). It implies, among other fallouts, that progress cannot be harvested forever since 'there is no modernist future' (Chandler 2018, 13) following the business-as-usual capitalist dynamics (Tsing 2015, 21); that science can no longer be expected to predict and control the functioning of the earth system, every time more unpredictable, complex, and unstable; and that, if we are to strive, governance must be reconsidered as to 'operate without the handrails of modernist ideas of rationality and progress' (Chandler 2018, xv). In a more fundamental order, the Anthropocene departs from a basic conception that humanity is not only unable to control nature but that it is entangled with it in ways that the Cartesian divide between the social and the environment is questioned as to be hardly applicable. Put differently, rather than living strictly in society or in nature, 'we exist in social nature' (Burke et al. 2016, 12). Recognizing human agency as a geological force signifies how humans are not acting in a different sphere from other forms of Earth beings, diluting the artificial divide between inside and outside. At the same time, it recognizes humanity as having direct ethical responsibility for the earth system and climate change's adverse impacts (see Jonas 1984), enmeshed with it in unpredictable ways and thus inseparable (Chandler, Cudworth, and Hobden 2018, 201).

However, if reduced to claims of universality, the Anthropocene may fall into narratives that are pernicious to some extent. Its discursive constitution around humans as socio-ecological forces tends to suggest that humanity, as a whole, has effected irreversible change to the Earth – implying that the Anthropocene is a species-level phenomenon, a creation of some universal mankind (see Chakrabarty 2018). The proposition of the radical 'Anthropo', while aiming at presenting this epoch as a result of a homogeneous and universal homo economicus (Tsing 2016), by large reflects those that benefitted from the damage done to our ecology, that is, of European and North-American ruling classes (Haraway et al. 2016) and not surprisingly, male (Chiro 2013). If the LIO effectively was the creation of the whole humanity and all humans were 'modern', climate change would be scaled differently by how the inclusion of subalterns in the global pattern of consumption and carbon emissions would multiply our ecological footprint, seeing how unsustainable is the functioning of global North societies (Chakrabarty 2015, 49–50). In lieu, the Anthropo radical is a proper representation of 'a specific subset of the human, living within a particular form of social organization', ironically being the same subset better protected against the rapacious effects of climate change (Chandler, Cudworth, and Hobden 2018, 201). While the homogeneity implicated in the *Anthropo*cene is replaced in other conceptual constructions more akin to a critical and post-modernist agenda, such as the Capitalocene (Moore 2017), Plantationocene (Haraway and Tsing 2019), or Manthropocene (Chiro 2013), Anna Tsing and other scholars (see Haraway et al. 2016) argues that it should be

embraced as a proper nominal representation by how it rightfully embodies the rational, utility-maximizer male as the main actor of the liberal project demise.

The failure of IR to foresee and adequately engage with the Anthropocene has prompted critical theorists to approach the LIO demise from different angles. As a common ground, they all depart from the agreement that IR is ill-suited to deal with the socio-ecological collapse, both as a discipline and as a governance project (Burke et al. 2016; Chandler, Müller, and Rothe 2021). Moreover, they all make a case for IR to shift from an international to a planetary approach to move beyond global instances of policy-making and recognize local instances of world-making and more-than-human entanglement (see Burke et al. 2016; Escobar 2020; Inoue 2018; Pedersen 2021). Nevertheless, how this is to happen is where most disagreements are. Despite cognizant of how IR does not have what it takes to govern (in) the Anthropocene, some scholars have moved political and research agendas with the ultimate goal of reforming the discipline to be better suited to deal with the number of challenges this new epoch brings to the politics of the earth system (e.g., Burke et al. 2016; Fishel et al. 2018; Simangan 2020a).

Conversely, there have been those that stressed how keeping the same approaches afloat would mean that an IR for and of the Anthropocene would be entrapped within a cosmopolitan and Western worldview, incapable of dealing with Earth System's complexity. This means that the discipline should be able to recall the sense of urgency needed and yet surpass the Holocene's agenda of governing by top-down coercive approaches by 'command-and-control' technologies (Chandler 2019a; 2019b), enmeshed with managerialism and the usage of 'abstract modernist political categories' (Chandler, Cudworth, and Hobden 2018, 1; see also Harrington 2016, 12–13). They set an imperative for distancing the discipline from the 'liberal modernist political theory that has informed' it so far[14] (Chandler, Müller, and Rothe 2021).

Thus, affirming the socio-ecological crisis as a symptom of the LIO (either of its malfunctioning or of its premises all along; see (see Latour 1993) disrupts the character of politics that was typical of the Holocene, calling for a paradigmatic shift for the Anthropocene. At the global governance level, it hints at if and how we can promote institutions more suited to what has been termed the 'Politics of the Anthropocene' (Dryzek and Pickering 2019) or to 'New Earth Politics' (Nicholson and Jinnah 2016) – that is, a political paradigm that is suitable for governing (in) the Anthropocene. That would involve the construction of different governance and political virtues since, as Dryzek and Pickering (2019) underscored, the institutional design of our global governance has a limited perspective for efficiently dealing with the Anthropocene, seeing how international institutions have their origins and rationale traced back to the Holocene. Rather than solutions, these institutions are directly involved with the making of the Anthropocene (Chandler 2018, xiv). Instead of restricting governance options to the same dimensions of Holocene's institutions, which may have a tendency for pathological path-dependency (Dryzek 2016), governing in the Anthropocene thus requires questioning the long-lasting belief that better-designed institutions can 'solve' global problems, especially as and when these are the same institutions created and that took part in enforcing the current

[14] In many ways, the debate around reforming or transforming IR to better deal with the Anthropocene (better represented by the 'Planet Politics manifesto' and its opponents) is part of a long-standing tradition of IR theorists analyzing or calling for the end of IR theory (see Dunne, Hansen, and Wight 2013; Lake 2013). For an updated discussion of this debate, see Olaf Corry's 'What's the point of being a discipline?' (forthcoming).

socio-ecological crisis (Chandler 2019a; Nail 2019). For this scholarship, the Anthropocene set a demand for new criteria for evaluating institutional performance (Dryzek and Pickering 2017), analyzing institutions to how they better adapt to a changing climate rather than how it remains stable while the rest collapses. In other words, there is an imperative for a paradigmatic shift that can recognize rather than fight the complexity and the constant change of the Earth System, which is remarkably unlike Holocene's stability (Pickering 2019).

Finally, the arguments outlined in this section are not restricted to the global governance scholarship solely but rather disseminated through many IR and social theories. Avoiding the acknowledgment of the structural power that enabled the configuration of the current state of the international project is part of a modernist agenda, which does not recognize structural limitations within the Anthropocene (see Chandler, Cudworth, and Hobden 2018; Moore 2017), the responsibility of individual actors in causing our socio-ecological crisis, and overlooks the pathological path-dependency found in Holocene institutions (Dryzek and Pickering 2019; Nail 2019). It further disregards how great powers tend to avert and overlook their responsibility (Bernstein 2020) for causing the trespassing of the Planetary Boundaries (Rockstrom 2009; Steffen et al. 2018).

2.3 The role of discourses

The final building block of this thesis we should look into concerns the role discourses take in the co-constitution of the international social system. Approaching IR as socially co-constituted entails recognizing how shared meanings (e.g., norms, rules, beliefs) shape and are shaped by the international structure. There are some situations in which international actors interact in the construction of meaning and various processes that are put in place for this purpose. Nevertheless, at the meso-level order to which the Global Governance Architecture makes reference, there is one major field of multilateral interaction and one major social, symbolic, and interactionist practice through which meanings are constituted: international negotiations (field) and discourses (social practice).

International negotiations and discourses are often understood, in mainstream social sciences generally and IR specifically, as epiphenomena of actors pursuing their interests through coercion and power. This dramatically shifts if we look at the social realm and not the material one to understand the functioning of a given governance architecture. So, instead of considering multilateral negotiations places where actors (i.e., nation-states) pursue their interests, one may deem them as sites *from which* actors derive their interests. In multilateral forums, actors set agendas, disseminate norms, and participate in elaborating social knowledge and shared values, all of which shape the 'international social system' from which international actors abstract their interests and identities (Finnemore 1996, 2). This co-creation of interests is crucial since it shows the relevance of studying international negotiations for grasping insights about actors' 'social skills' such as authority, legitimation, and power, and for how these actors co-constitute the overarching structure, i.e., the governance architecture – with the crosscutting objective of understanding actors' relationality and positionality within the structure.

The premise of a socially co-constituted international system shifts the mainstream IR outlook to discourses. In such a framing of material power and interest, discourses are nothing

but a ‘secondary’ object reflecting material reality (see Carta 2019). Then, the use of language is either ephemeral or independent from society (c.f. Fairclough 1989, 23), not worthy of analytical pursuit. If we reverse this ontology and consider that language does not reflect the material world but instead acts to construct it (see Wittgenstein 2009 [1953], 27), the relevance of studying it becomes clearer. Language, then, is rather constitutive of (the international) society; and instead of epiphenomena, discourses are ‘the use of language as social practice’ (Fairclough 1995, 135). However, engaging with discourses as constitutive of social reality does not automatically translate to a set of assumptions regarding what discourses effectively are and which techniques can be used for noticing, describing, and understanding them. So, in what remains of this chapter, I am going to present the main method used for discourse analysis in this thesis, which is Critical Discourse Analysis. Following a brief presentation, I will present the framework for data collection and analysis employed and explain why an integrative pluralism between CDA and the theoretical framework outlined in this chapter is suitable under the scope of this research.

2.3.1 Critical Discourse Analysis

Building upon how discourses intervene in how we conceive of the world, we can deem the international system as intersubjectively constructed, or socially constituted by the ‘accumulation’ (Fairclough 1995, 43) of discourses made on the international stage (see Fierke 2010, 86–87). However, most discourses are immersed in naturalization processes that hinder perception of what composes them. Ideologies and power patterns are rendered ‘opaque’ for the audience by being represented as commonsensical, universal, and naturalized (Fairclough 1995, 42). The goal of a critical analysis of such discourses, thus, must be to ‘denaturalize’ these characteristics of discourses, making them visible within sociocultural practices and larger power dynamics (Fairclough 1995, 36). Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) is one of such methods that arguably can make these mechanisms visible, intending to be conscious of the ‘implicatures’ and ‘presuppositions’ within discourses, as this is ‘the first step towards emancipation’ (Fairclough 1989, 1).

CDA involves three integrated methods. The first of these is the description of textual properties (formal linguistics); the second is the interpretation of the relationship between text and discourse practice (text production, consumption, and distribution); and the third is the explanation of the relationship between the specific discourse practice related to broader sociocultural processes (which involves its integration with social theories). Accordingly, discourses are composed of three dimensions: (i) text, (ii) discoursal practice, and (iii) sociocultural practice[15]. Norman Fairclough (1995, 9) argues that CDA can bring much-needed social analysis to formal linguistic studies while operationalizing textual analysis for social scientists. Textual, discoursal, and sociocultural practice are not exclusive but complementary to CDA and, following Fairclough (1995, 134), are created from mechanisms of

[15] In the shape of texts, discourses are ‘social spaces in which two fundamental social processes simultaneously occur: cognition and representation of the world, and social interaction’ (Fairclough 1995, 6). As practices, discourses are ‘both the products of structures and the producers of structures’, meaning that they co-constitute reality through processes of reproduction or being ‘produced anew’ (Fairclough 1989, 39). This is why they can be perceptible in everyday, mundane acts, or at a wider institutional/organizational-level, or even at an overarching societal scale.

'interdiscursivity', broadly derived from the concept of 'intertextuality' or the construction of a text by abstracting from pre-existing texts. By interdiscursivity, CDA proposes that each discourse, as text and practice, is constituted by a multitude of already existent discourses and genres, highlighting 'a historical view of texts as transforming the past - existing conventions or prior texts – into the present' (Fairclough 1995, 134).

Textual analysis within CDA is grounded on the school of linguistics called 'Systemic Functional Linguistics' (SFL), notably the approach developed by Michael Halliday (1976). SFL develops an analytical framework that has the goal of capturing the foundational relationship between language and social action. It does so by framing language as a system of semiotics, structured in three 'strata': semantic (meaning); phonology and graphology (spoken and written text); and lexicogrammar (word-level analysis plus grammatical systems, e.g., transitivity, modality/mood, and theme/information) (see Fairclough 1995, 193). Despite terminological divergences among SFL theorists, transitivity is regularly conceived as the relationship agents of discourses create between themselves, other subjects, and objects ('how meaning is perceived in a clause'). Modality and mood are interrelated: modality is semantical, and mood is grammatical. In general terms, they refer to the discourse subjects' perception and attitude toward the world as well as their evaluation of reality and causality. Within CDA, two forms of modality are of importance: epistemic (in the range of causal 'probabilities' or 'possibilities') or deontic (in the range of 'obligation' or of how things 'ought to be') modalities, which are important for recognizing the subject's worldview expressed through language. In the dimension of grammar, moods can be perceived through the use of verb tenses (e.g., subjunctive; imperative; indicative) and of modal verbs, nouns, and adjectives (e.g., *might happen; must have)* (Fairclough 1995, 96).

As for information and theme, they are represented in three distinct and mediated stages: (i) schemata, (ii) frames, and (iii) scripts. Following Fairclough (Fairclough 1989, 158–59), schema refers to 'larger-scale textual structures' with 'a representation of a particular type of activity […] in terms of predictable elements in a predictable sequence'. At an intermediary stage, frames 'represent the entities that populate the (natural and social) world'. Finally, scripts 'represent the subjects involved in these activities, and their relationships'. The relationship between frame and script will be of particular avail here, because while frame determines what can figure as topics or 'referents' within discourses, scripts place those topics in a temporal, causal sequence – which is determinant to understanding how climate migration is discursively constituted.

At the level of *practices*, CDA involves the analysis of specific discursive practices via their production, consumption, and distribution – while also relating these to the discursive (re)production of broader sociocultural practices (which often have extra-discoursal features) (Fairclough 1995, 73). This is why CDA, compared to its more formal discourse analysis' variants, differs from recognizing 'how text work' and also 'how text work within sociocultural practices' (Fairclough 1995, 7). Discourses are thus composed inside a historical, social, and political context, with its practice abstracting and being composed of the use of determined

genres[16] (e.g., mobilizing discourses, voices, styles, and modes) within a specific order of discourse[17] that causes a 'historical impress of sociocultural practice on discourse' (Fairclough 1995, 10).

Power is considered the key structuring feature of discourses at a societal level (Foucault 1981 [1970], 52). Even though it cannot be resumed to language alone, since it exerts presence in various modalities (Fairclough 1989, 3–4), it is via power and the changing of power relationships within social institutions or society as a whole that 'discourses are structured in a given order' (Fairclough 1989, 30). Analysis of power (re)production in discourses can be done by a distinction[18] between 'power behind discourse' (Fairclough 1989, 55) and the 'power through discourse' (Fairclough 1989, 46). While power through discourses is embodied by the shaping of contents, relations, and subjects of discourses by, respectively, implementing experiential, relational, and expressive[19] values through the use of language, the power that exists 'behind' discourses has the effect of putting and holding together a social order of discourse (i.e., ideology and other hegemonical features).

Subjects of discourses exert these powers by 'controlling and constraining the contributions of non-powerful participants' (Fairclough 1989, 46), taking avail of language to cause change or to be tools for social change with a conservative or transformative outcome (Fairclough 1989, 39). The conservative nature of discourse tends to be employed by the most powerful, often via 'inculcation' in which power is exercised to transform a discourse into universal and normalized. The transformative feature of discourses, per contra, tends to be a tool of the subordinate and less powerful. They engage with rational communication for 'achieving coordination and commonality of practice in respect of knowledge and beliefs, social relationships, and social identities' (Fairclough 1989, 75), hence taking avail of other power sources available. The ultimate goal of conservative and transformative discourses is to make their discursive practice universal, meaning a situation in which subjects have no other discursive structure available to derive from. The process of social change, either at an agentic or structural (or even societal-level), often 'leaves traces in texts in the form of the co-occurrence of contradictory or inconsistent elements'. This happens due to change being a 'form of transgression, crossing boundaries, such as putting together existing codes or elements in new combinations, or drawing upon [alternative] order of discourses or their elements' (Fairclough 1995, 78–79).

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[16] Genres are 'the use of language associated with a particular social activity' (1995, 35). Within linguistics, 'the label we use is not so important (there is no closed 'list' of genres or discourses, and there are relatively few that have stable names either for analysts or for participants); the important point is that is recognizable as the type of language used' (Chouliaraki and Fairclough 2002, 56).

[17] Order of discourse is the 'totality of discursive practices of an institution, and relations between them' (Fairclough 1995, 35) or, more broadly, 'the social order in its discoursal facet' (Fairclough 1995, 14). CDA abstracts the concept of a societal order of discourse from Foucault, who claimed that 'in every society the production of discourse is at once controlled, selected, organised and redistributed by a certain number of procedures whose role is to ward off its powers and dangers, to gain mastery over its chance events, to evade its ponderous, formidable materiality' (Foucault 1981 [1970], 52).

[18] These are only conceptually divided since they are both parts of a process of social struggle and structural domination by which orders and practices of discourses are co-constituted (Fairclough 1989).

[19] In pragmatics, experiential value refers to knowledge and beliefs; relational value to social relationships; and expressive to social identities (see Fairclough 1989, 46).

Importantly for this thesis, Fairclough calls attention to how public political discourses are a representation of hidden power. As these are regularly one-sided, meaning that there is not a dyadic relationship between the subject of discourses (the politician) and its audience, politicians can address an 'ideal subject', shaping their use of experiential, relational, and expressive values accordingly. In this sense, subjects can exert the power of selecting 'certain interpretations and "wordings" of events, while excluding others' (Fairclough 1989, 49–52). The hidden power for efficiently addressing this ideal subject is however tricky, because of the complex distribution of public speeches. In international negotiations, for example, alongside the immediate audience, policy-makers need to consider their political supporters, domestic allies and opponents, their membership within distinct actor constellations, the interpretation of mass media, international audiences, and their own bureaucracy. Fairclough tells us that this 'anticipation of the potential polyvalence of the texts that such complex distributions imply is a major factor in their design' (Fairclough 1995, 128), which implies that analysis must consider the ways and extent that these discourses reverberate in different audiences. In this regard, one must acknowledge how institutions act as a 'speech community with its particular repertoire of speech events', facilitating and constraining social practices (i.e., discourses) by providing specific scripts, frames, and topics to draw upon – but restricting social practices within these same scripts, frames, and topics (Fairclough 1995, 38).

A final relevant point for analyzing public discourses revolves around the 'technologization of discourse', or the use of discourse as a technology that can impose power on an institution or organization. When employed as a technocratic tool, the social practice of discursive formation involves, among other features, (i) the emergence of expert discourse technologists; (ii) the design and projection of discursive techniques on context-free scenarios; (iii) and a pressure toward the standardization of discourse practices, all of which 'contributes to the widespread effect of "colonization" of local institutional orders of discourse by a few culturally-salient discourse types' (Fairclough 1995, 104–5). These are features present in the discursive (re)production of climate migration, as we will see later.

2.3.2 Data collection and analysis

Data collection. International negotiations are the primary data available for descriptive constituting a *Global* Governance Architecture (emphasis added on the scale). Since a governance architecture is composed of 'public and private institutions, principles, norms, regulations, decision-making procedures, and organizations' (Biermann and Kim 2020, 4) that are *overarching* in a given area of International Relations, it seems adequate to investigate documents such as agreements, treaties, and formal norms that relate to the object under study. Therefore, this thesis' primary data sources are documents deriving from international climate negotiations addressing climate change adaptation. These are, among others, final resolutions, treaties, agreements, transnational initiatives, and, most of all, the negotiations that led to final documents (through official 'meetings records' that contain the transcription of statements made by representatives of international actors).

Thus, on the one hand, I will critically analyze final documents of every purportedly global agreement that aimed at governing climate migration (see list below). On the other hand, I will critically analyze a selection of public speeches (discourses practices) made on an

international forum which have held negotiations, among other numerous topics, climate migration: the United Nations General Assembly (1995-2021)[20]. By engaging with negotiations in addition to final documents, I believe that we might investigate not only which actors are involved in policy diffusion and norms dissemination but also the structural, societal-level order of discursive constitution. That way, CDA allows us to at once investigate agentic-level discourse practice (negotiations) and structure-level social practices (final documents and norms) as they are (re)produced through the governance architecture.

The following international negotiations are identified as relevant sources of data:

(i) United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change's Conference of the Parties, from 1995 (COP 1, Bonn) until 2021 (COP 26, Glasgow);

(ii) The COP-21 mandated 'Task Force on Displacement' (2015a);

(iii) The 'Nansen Initiative for Disaster-induced Cross-Border Displacement', its 'Agenda for the Protection of Cross-Border Displaced Persons in the Context of Disasters and Climate Change' (2012), and its follow-up as the 'Platform on Disaster Displacement' (2016);

(iv) The 'Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030' (United Nations 2015b) and its predecessor, the 'Hyogo Framework for Action 2005-2015' (United Nations 2005);

(v) The 'Warsaw Mechanism for Loss and Damage associated with Climate Change Impacts' (United Nations 2013);

(vi) The United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) (1995-2021) and other UN official agreements deriving from the 'New York Declaration' (United Nations 2016): the 'Global Compact on Migration' (United Nations 2018a) and the 'Global Compact on Refugees' (United Nations 2018b).

Data analysis. Data analysis is performed through two procedures: one for exploring international negotiations and the other for final documents and agreements. To identify which documents mention climate migration (or related concepts), I commence both processes with keyword research, operationalized through NVivo. By running keyword research assisted by software, the total of documents to be manually analyzed is narrowed, and therefore the large-n dataset of discourses available can be scrutinized. NVivo (version 12.0) is employed here as it runs keyword research on documents once they are collected, curated, and inserted into its software. NVivo's keyword research runs by identifying documents that contain one or more recurrences of any words of interest (Table 1). The number of documents to be investigated is significantly lessened through this step, allowing the further in-depth reading and coding of instances where discussion on climate migration appeared within international negotiations.

Table 1: Keyword inputs for NVivo

Type of international negotiation	**Keyword input**
Climate negotiations	"migration" OR "migrant" OR "migrants" OR "refuge" OR "refugee" OR "refugees" OR "displacement" OR "displaced" OR "mobility"

[20] The timeframe between 1995-2021 was chosen because, while 2021 was the last year with data available, it was in 1995 that was held the first UNFCCC COP (Bonn, Germany), a forum in which later on (COP 16, in Cancun) migration was recognized as linked with climate change.

Migration negotiations	"climate" OR "climatic" OR "disaster" OR "disasters" OR "environment" OR "environmental" OR "natural" OR "adaptation" OR "mitigation"
General negotiations	"climate AND migra" OR "climate AND mobility" OR "climate AND displace" OR "climate AND refuge" OR "environment AND migra" OR "environment AND mobility" OR "environment AND displace" OR "environment AND refuge" OR "disaster"

Source: author's elaboration.

After identification, I ran a skim reading to identify if every document contains a valid reference to climate migration; every document identified as relevant is then categorized as a 'node' within NVivo. Alongside the identification that the document has one or more instances of discursive constitution of climate migration (node), this first skim-reading also details some basic content analysis relevant for later steps (subnodes). These subnodes are three: '[Name of the international negotiation/forum]', '[Type of document (negotiation/final document)]', and '[Subject (discourse issuer)]'. After concluding the skim reading, only pertinent documents are left under the general node, subcoded by the name of the forum where it occurred, the type of document and discourse that needs to be investigated (public speech; final documents; and so forth), and the discourse' issuer. Therefore, this second step aims to select which documents are worth manually investigating.

Having concluded the first selection of documents, I then delve into the global governance architecture and actors' discourse through CDA. By way of CDA, content *and* form of discourses are investigated in a twofold dimension. First, final documents are explored to inquire about structural components and constraints regarding the discursive constitution of climate migration within the governance architecture (social order). Second, a handful of discourses derived from international negotiations are analyzed to represent the scripts, frames, and schemata most found in international negotiations. Abstracting from Fairclough (1989; 1995; 2003; 2006; Chouliaraki and Fairclough 2002), discourses are selected, among those that better represent discursive frames, for it being routinely repeated, showing 'societal' processes, its visible representation of power and ideology (e.g., technologization of discourse), and finally its potential to 'denaturalize' discursive characteristics of governance mechanisms (re)produced in such discourses. An integration between method and theory is imperative to put forward the three-dimensional framework of CDA (description, interpretation, and explanation of, respectively, text, discoursal, and sociocultural practice).

Therefore, we should establish which textual properties ('texture') are relevant for data analysis. To critically analyze the discursive constitution of climate migration, the main feature I am looking for in the text, as forms of discoursal and social practices, is the act of *meaning-making (semiosis) and relationality*, via:

- modality, from semantics ('epistemic' modality, in the range of possibilities; 'deontic' modality, in the range of obligation);
- mood, from grammar (seen through verb tenses and endings, time particles, and modal verbs);
- transitivity, or how 'meaning is perceived in the clause' (in the sense of 'who do what to whom').

Involving, among others, the following:

- sentence-level grammar (i.e., declarative, action, event, or attributions-oriented sentences);
- meaning and values, understood through the pragmatics' threefold definition of experiential value (knowledge and beliefs); relational value (social relationships), and expressive value (social identities);
- meaning relations (synonymy, hyponymy, antonymy);
- (re-)collocation, understood through euphemism, rewording, and overwording;
- agent modifications, such as the use of passive voice and nominalization;
- pronouns usage (i.e., inclusive or exclusive, definite or indefinite articles, specific or universal subjects);
- connections between subordinated or coordinated sentences (to inquire about modality and mood);
- metaphoric expressions;
- information (vocabulary) and theme (i.e., topics, frames, and schemata);
- formality or informality mechanisms (representative of social struggle and change);
- genre identification (to acknowledge the 'type of language used' within specific institutions, or speech acts); and
- technologization of discourse (by way of the standardization of expert and content-free discourses).

Via the denaturalization of the 'texture' of discourses by the framework above, I contend that we can grasp the complexities and contingencies of the discursive constitution of climate migration within the global governance of adaptation. I argue that, through integrating analysis of final documents and negotiation meeting records, CDA is performed in such a way that not only specific discourses are explored to explain social orders of discourses but also changes in discourses are identified across the timeframe (1995-2021) and the 'weighting' (that is, the relevance of the discourse analyzed in relation to the processes of international norms dissemination) of the critically analyzed discourses are considered as well. Therefore, one can employ CDA for its potential to represent agentic and structural qualities and constituents, describing and understanding 'the social order in its discoursal facet' (Fairclough 1995, 14) by integrating actors and architecture's dynamics as co-constituted.

2.4 Final remarks

In this chapter, I presented the three building blocks of this thesis. The first is the theoretical framework composed of the co-constitution of the Earth System Governance by architecture and agency, understood here as the duality of structure composed of Global Governance Architecture and Global Governors. Via semiosis, that is, the creation of meaning, international actors constitute the international social system, which in result (re)produces actors, their identities, and interests. This theoretical framework is juxtaposed with the second building block, which is the governance of adaptation and the adaptation of global governance in the

Anthropocene. The Anthropocene is at the backdrop of this thesis for it challenges the standard rationale of policy-makers and academics regarding global governance's effectiveness during socio-ecological crises. Among several critiques, one of the central ones regards how the same institutions causing our current crisis are expected to 'solve' the problems of its makings. In lieu, international institutions might not have the necessary capacity to govern global issues since the Anthropocene is radically unlike the Holocene in its uncertainty, instability, and centrality of (im)mobility.

The third building block is the methodological approach toward discourses, departing from the conception that discourses are dialectically composed of content and form. Even though some IR theories have engaged with the content of discourses (primarily through framing theory), the form that this content is (re)produced within discourses is often overlooked. I try to engage with it both ways: even though part of my focus is on the content of discourse since it allows me to explore how international actors have interacted regarding climate migration within the GCAG architecture, the form that these specific contents have in discourses can further our understanding of the socially co-constitution of climate migration as expressions of larger social practices and discourse order. Thus, I employ Critical Discourse Analysis to inquire about both content and form, exploring discourses at negotiation sites (agentic discourses) and final documents (institutional speech acts and, by aggregation, social order of discourses).

Table 2 (below) tentatively summarizes these building block, aligning sources of data collection, methods for data analyses, and theoretical frameworks.

Table 2: Building blocks of data collection, analysis, and theories

Type of data	Data sources	Methods of data analysis (CDA)	Theoretical framework
International negotiations	United Nations General Assembly (1995-2021)	Textual analysis	Systemic Functional Linguistics (Halliday 1976)
		Discourse practice analysis	Constructivist and critical theories
		Sociocultural practice analysis	Global Governors (Avant, Finnemore, and Sell 2010); Critical governance studies; 'Postmodern' readings of the Anthropocene
Final documents	UNFCCC COPs (1995-2021); Task Force on Displacement; Nansen Initiative; Sendai and Hyogo Framework for DRR; Warsaw International Mechanism; Global Compacts	Textual analysis	Systemic Functional Linguistics (Halliday 1976)
		Discourse practice analysis	Constructivist and critical theories
		Sociocultural practice analysis	Global Governance Architecture (Biermann and Kim 2020); Critical governance studies; 'Postmodern' readings of the Anthropocene

Source: author's elaboration.

Before moving to the analysis of international discourses, however, I want to consider how all of these features presented in this chapter, if entangled in the same panorama (e.g., the centrality of adaptation, human and more-than-human (im)mobility, the challenges of global governance, and the pervasiveness of the Anthropocene), indicates why we should look upon

climate migration through a (critical) global governance lens. That is, as governance efforts are being placed on adapting to a changing climate, a feature that inevitably arises is that adapting to such an unstable and unpredictable climate might involve movement. Hence, as some scholars suggest, it would not be a stretch to assume that one cannot grasp the Anthropocene without looking at migration and vice-versa (see Baldwin and Bettini 2017, 10; Nail 2019). In a further step, reflecting upon how (im)mobility and the Anthropocene are parts of the LIO demise of a 'planet in spasm' means that climate migration is *also part of the Anthropocene ruins*.

What I am proposing here is that as much as climate adaptation requires more effective governance due to the international community's failure in dealing with climate change, global governance requires adapting to the instability and uncertainty of the Anthropocene. Furthermore, I suggest that looking at the governance of climate migration is a powerful strategy to interrogate how these two dimensions of adaptation are interwoven. That is why I contend that understanding the global governance of adaptation prompts one to direct attention to the adaptation of global governance in and for the Anthropocene, a task that can allegedly be done if one engages with critical theory and methods (as this framework intends to do). In turn, exploring and questioning how climate migration is (re)produced through international discourses might lead us one step closer to conceiving a proper governance of climate mobility in the Anthropocene.

3 THE 'BLAH, BLAH, BLAH': INTERNATIONAL DISCOURSES ON CLIMATE MIGRATION

Climate-related human migration is a contentious topic, both in academia and policy negotiations (see Boas et al. 2019). Scholars from different disciplines have engaged with the issue in the last decades, with interests varying widely. Some concerns of this literature are long-lasting; for example, a few enduring research questions are about what an institutional arrangement dealing with climate mobility should look like (Atapattu 2020; Biermann and Boas 2010); how this pattern of displacement will (or might) happen (El-Hinnawi 1985; Myers 1997; Rigaud et al. 2018); and what is a proper terminology to describe people displaced, directly or indirectly, by climate change – and the implications of these terminologies for governance and International Law (Dun and Gemenne 2008; Gemenne 2015; McAdam 2012).

Other concerns are however more recent and mainly denounced caveats and pitfalls of these lasting research interests. These are, among others, which is the actual role climate change plays in a person's decisions to move (Boas et al. 2019; Kelman et al. 2019; Schutte et al. 2021); how discourses on climate mobility are instrumentalized for the securitization of migration in Western politics through crisis-settings (Bettini 2013a; 2013b; Boas 2015; Olsson 2017); and if and how migration can serve as a strategy for climate adaptation, one approach that has received its fair number of critiques (Gemenne and Blocher 2017; Jha et al. 2017; Vinke et al. 2020; c.f. Baldwin and Fornalé 2017; Bettini and Gioli 2016; Felli and Castree 2012). More recently still, a novel scholarship has developed by further inquiring about what climate migration represents for modernity (Baldwin and Bettini 2017; Baldwin, Fröhlich, and Rothe 2019) and humanity (Baldwin 2017a; Bettini 2019), also considering other discursive framings that could be employed to conceive of migration surpassing Cartesian divides, modernity, and other deep-rooted features of colonialism (Chandler 2019a; Fishel 2019; Nail 2019).

There are two often-used narratives to describe and systematize literature reviews about climate migration. The first of these can be called the 'disciplinary divide' and is made by juxtaposing interests and debates throughout different disciplines and schools of thought. The 'disciplinary divide' discourse has gained much momentum in the last decade. It is often used as a heuristic to present the scholarship's development across time, primarily by showing how, over the length of the debate's existence, more disciplines have engaged with it – diversifying from its early years of dominance by environmental scholars (Piguet 2010; Piguet, Kaenzig, and Guélat 2018; see Ferris 2020). The second schematization often found in literature reviews can be summed up as the 'maximalist vs. minimalist' debate (also named 'deterministic vs. antideterministic' debate, among other nomenclatures) and focuses primarily on how much weight climate change is expected to have on a person or communities' decision to migrate. Maximalists argue that environmental stressors are a strong and compelling 'push factor', sometimes even deemed as the most decisive one (hence the 'deterministic' label, claiming causal primacy for climate change), while the minimalists criticize them for being too alarmist and propose that climate change is either one among a multitude of variables, that it influences migration in different ways, or that it does not influence migration patterns at all (Morrissey 2012; see Baldwin, Methmann, and Rothe 2014). The 'antideterministic' narrative is much backed by migration scholars who, besides delving into field experiences and migrants' perceptions, attempt to provide a more nuanced approach toward the climate-migration nexus,

criticizing the reductionism of deterministic environmental accounts (see Castles, de Haas, and Miller 2014, 209–12; Martin, Weerasinghe, and Taylor 2013, 125–26) typical of Western colonialism and modernity (Baldwin and Bettini 2017) and yet claiming to recognize the ominous impact of climate change in everyday life – albeit not in a deterministic nature that claims that the environment can be a singular driver for displacement.

Whereas these two narratives are somewhat appropriate for a literature review and encompass a great deal of the debates surrounding climate change and human migration, it is my belief that they do not suffice for an enterprise such as this thesis'. For once, if we are to engage with the governance of climate mobility, restricting to dissimilarities across disciplines may bluntly dismiss intricacies while at the same time focusing heavily on non-governance-related issues. Furthermore, reifying disciplinary distinctions may also be problematic, considering how interdisciplinarity is encouraged for academia to engage with the Anthropocene (see Bauer and Ellis 2018). Regarding the 'maximalist vs. minimalist' debate, it is concerned with peoples' decision-making and thus especially suited for studies aimed at investigating the climate-mobility causal nexus. Whilst a key concern, I depart from the idea that there may be a divergence between how international actors perceive the causal nexus and the actual empirics of climate-related human displacement – and hence limiting the presentation of the literature review to local experiences and migrants' subjectivity does not easily translate to how Global Governors have discursively framed the issue at the international level. Perhaps unfortunately, policy-making has not followed social scientists' contributions, and henceforth limiting the literature review to the climate-displacement causal nexus would miss part of the discursive constitution of the issue.

Therefore, I argue that both narratives are insufficient for research submerging into international discourses. Conversely, I try to devise in this chapter and in the following a novel framework for capturing the complexities of the climate migration literature, ultimately aiming at understanding and interrogating the discursive constitution that has been (re)produced in the international social system via governance architectures. I tentatively do so by reviewing the literature with the cross-cutting interest of interpreting them as in and between the Holocene-Anthropocene divide for the governance of climate adaptation, as discussed in the previous chapter. Departing from how climate adaptation is inherent to the Anthropocene and exploring how different concepts, debates, and critiques on climate migration falls among the lines of the 'epoch' debate concerning global governance scholarships, we get closer to fulfilling this thesis objective of analyzing discourses on climate migration within the Global Climate Adaptation Governance architecture.

My main argument in this chapter is that part of discourses on climate migration, in expert as well as policy domains, is still entrapped within a Holocene paradigm in regards to how they either ignore or perceive (and sometimes prescript) the global governance of climate migration. I contend that most discourses have constituted climate migration in such a way that it was embedded into one or more of four governance pathologies: securitization, technocracy, a fetishization of resilience, and liberal cosmopolitanism. That is, migration is either conceived (i) as an exception resulting from a crisis setting and an issue to be averted through 'command-and-control' instruments; (ii) a problem to be 'solved' through simple, technical, and depoliticized instruments; (iii) a tool to be taken avail by governments to enhance adaptation

capacities at the household level, and as a result increase 'societal resilience'; or (iv) as part of a larger LIO discourse that either promotes mobility as freedom of movement or depoliticizes migration by stripping away questions of power and responsibility from the theoretical core, adhering to abstract notions. While the first three I heuristically identify as pertaining to Holocene institutions, the fourth (which I call 'migration-as-cosmopolitanism') is at the borderline between 'epochs' since it aims at advancing the Holocene but arguably struggles at overcoming it. Thus, whist it is not pathological in the sense of being part of a Holocene harmful path-dependency, it is somewhat pernicious for not emancipating climate (im)mobility in the Anthropocene.

Before presenting the general results, however, I should disclaim that this thesis is not the first attempt to examine climate migration discourses. Notably within migration studies, but not exclusively, discourse analysis has been employed to question and overall criticize how experts in academia and humanitarian organizations have, purposely or not, framed the issue – more often than not exploring the negative consequences arising from these discourses. Most of the works in this regard have set their methodology around 'framing theory', arguing that such a method could provide important inputs for analyzing policy outcomes (e.g., Mayer 2013; Ransan-Cooper et al. 2015). Few exceptions have used discourse analysis to demonstrate how expert discussions on the links between environmental stressors and human migration was problematically leaning toward dangerous policy interventions (e.g., Felli and Castree 2012; Morrissey 2012; McHugh, Lemos, and Morrison 2021) and catastrophic narratives (e.g., Farbotko 2010; Farbotko and Lazrus 2012; Kelman 2018). In this regard, great efforts were employed combining discourse analysis and securitization theory (e.g., Bettini 2013b; Boas 2015). Despite dissimilarities, a common feature among such works is that they have focused on expert debates and discourses, arguing that the issue 'remains a concept prominent in expert, rather than everyday, domains' (Ransan-Cooper et al. 2015, 107).

Across disciplinary divides, analyses of discursive representations of climate migration are most commonly found among migration scholars (Ferris 2020). Composing part of a 'second generation' of scholars that started to address the issue in the early 2000s, they have applied discourse analysis to identify how the 'environmental refugee' figure was premised on unsound assumptions around the links between climate change and human displacement (Morrissey 2012; see Baldwin and Bettini 2017). Critical geographers have taken the vanguard of these enterprises by investigating how populist and nationalist movements were exploring apocalyptic discourses on climate migration to move an agenda of closed borders and restricted immigration (Bettini 2013a; Bettini and Gioli 2016; Warner and Boas 2019) and also interrogating how race, gender, and alterity are pervasive in such discourses (Baldwin 2013; 2016; Rothe 2017; Telford 2018). On a lesser scale, scholars from International Law also have taken the task of investigating how migration was represented in international norms on climate change (Mayer 2013; McNamara 2007). Whereas the core of these efforts has focused on how experts and few policy-makers from Western (mostly European) states frame the issue, some others were deployed to understand how those affected by climate change, especially islanders in the Pacific and the Caribbean, perceive climate migration. Via discourse analysis of interviews, researchers have focused on how they relate to dreadful narratives of 'sinking islands' disappearing in the near future (Farbotko 2010; Kelman 2018; Kelman et al. 2019) and

have found that seldom do islanders consider themselves as environmental refugees (Farbotko and Lazrus 2012; Kelman et al. 2019; Stojanov et al. 2017). The *in-situ* reality of climate migration, then, is counterposing to global narratives that conceive of islanders as extremely vulnerable communities, which suggests that the framing of climate migration as an existential threat for global Southerns is prompted from within Western states (Boas et al. 2019).

One paper that has engaged with the international discursive constitution of climate migration that has significant contributions, and that my work here builds upon, is Ransan-Cooper and colleagues' (2015) framing analysis of the figure of the environmental migrant. The authors identify four ways in which environmental migrants were framed in expert discourses: victims, security threats, adaptative agents, and political subjects. Their fourfold framings' proposition expands across a great share of the expert literature on climate migration and is, despite our onto-epistemological differences[21], at the backbone of my discursive analysis – meaning that I am much indebted to their authors.

Nevertheless, I contend that the majority of works relating climate migration and discourse analysis have either focused on expert, general, or abstract narrative constructions of the issue or are restricted to non-international study cases. Efforts such as this thesis' to explore how the issue is discursively constituted at a multilateral instance are still lacking. Accordingly, despite there being other attempts at investigating discourses on climate migration, I sustain that the approach here applied has significant nuances compared to these and that there are novel contributions that we can derive from this thesis' enterprise. Via Critical Discourse Analysis integration with the theoretical framework of Global Governance Architectures, Global Governors, and the intersubjective constitution of the international social system that is derived from Constructivists' school of thoughts in IR and social theory more generally, we can explore how climate migration is disseminated by international actors while interrogating how it is (re)produced through discourses at the global level. In what follows, I will present the main findings of the critical analysis of international discourses on climate migration within adaptation governance, integrating these results with expert scholarships. Afterward, this discussion set the stage for the final chapter, where we will delve into whether these pathological depictions of climate migration can, or might, be overcome.

[21] There are some relevant distinctions between Ransan-Cooper and colleagues' approach toward discourses and this thesis'. First, while they are especially interested in the different 'figures' of the climate migrant, my approach is more interested in the broader discursive level, linking these frames with their governance and institutional practices. This distinction can be explained perhaps by taking a step back and inquiring how our approaches perceive discourses and framing theory. For them, discursive framing analysis demonstrates how an issue is represented and interpreted within a process that has political consequences. That is, within their analysis, 'framing [is] a useful approach for analysing how the environmental migrant has been interpreted and translated in policy, advocacy and other arenas', focusing on the 'various cultural resources [employed] to define the boundary of an issue' (Ransan-Cooper et al. 2015, 107). Here, however, I engage with frame and discourses as the subjective creation of reality – not restricting to the interpretation of reality, but rather how reality is constituted through the use of language. So, despite our approaches' overlaps, I argue that my own has the potential to shed light on different issues, such as how climate migration is part of a larger discourse apparatus on modernity, colonialism, and citizenship (even if focused on a meso-level such as governance architectures), in lieu of their approach which is focused on 'practice-based level to explore detailed use of language and metaphor, in *specific situations*, rather than at a broader discursive level' (Ransan-Cooper et al. 2015, 107, own highlights).

3.1 The 'environmental refugee': securitization, self-fulfilling prophecy, and futurology

The discursive presence of climate migration within expert domains[22] is often traced back to the late 1970s when two reports were promoted by the United Nations calling attention to 'environmental migration' as a humanitarian consequence of environmental change. At this early stage, most efforts were directed toward understanding how climate change would occur and how it could affect human lives, with forced displacement as one of the ultimate coping strategies to deal with global warming. The focus was placed on the elaboration of models that could predict how many people would be on the move if emissions were not halted, and consequently led to various contested estimates that saw 'environmental migrants' appearing in the range of 200 million to 2 billion by the end of the 21st century (Myers 1997; Stern 2007; c.f. Bettini 2013a; Kelman 2019).

Intentionally or unintentionally, climate adaptation concerns were at the backdrop during the debate's emergence. Whereas the empirical reality was still far from the full grasp of environmental scholars, preliminary conclusions were that international forced migration flows were expected to depart from developing countries toward developed nations, as the former were the ones most affected by the adverse impacts of climate change while the latter had better adaptative capacities. The whole set of premises leading to deterministic accounts of environmental displacement sprung from the conclusion that developing countries did not have the capacity to adapt to a warming world. Migration was an expression of maladaptation (Baldwin and Fornalé 2017) and exposed the vulnerability of the Global South, requiring the compassionate assistance of rich countries, while the adaptive capacities of migrants' agency were sidelined (Ransan-Cooper et al. 2015, 110). In this scenario, however, recommendations for better management of adaptation were not at the forefront since migration was depicted as unavoidable and a crisis on a scale that was never experienced before. Therefore, underprivileged global Southern communities could not escape this 'dilemma of vulnerability'. Northern countries, having more resources and henceforth more adaptive capacities, were an obvious destination for the 'victims' of environmental displacement.

A consequence of this framing surrounding maladaptation, vulnerability, and a deterministic overview of climate change, was that the 'burden-sharing' debate was one of the key concerns for international policy-makers and expert communities. In between disagreements about whether affected communities should be included in the International Refugee Regime, what is a proper terminology, and which actions should be taken to better manage future flows of migrants, what was repeatedly urged was that rich and developed countries should bear some responsibility (e.g., Biermann and Boas 2008; 2010). Assumptions were explicit: since climate change was expected to cause 'natural disasters' (c.f. Kelman 2020) that would cause 'floods of refugees' fleeing from poor and underdeveloped countries, rich countries and their civil societies should share the costs of climate change's adverse impacts, relocating and 'solving' environmental refugees' flows (Ahmed 2018; Nawrotzki 2014; Vliet

[22] Whereas there are other periodizations, such as Bettini's (2013b, 12) account of the 'pre-history' and '[modern] history' of climate migration scholarship (with pre-history dating back as far as Malthus' 'surplus population' and Marxist debates on political ecology), conventional narratives emphasize that natural scientists and environmental scholars were the first to disseminate the issue (El-Hinnawi 1985; Myers 1997; see Ferris 2020).

2020). Debates were also raised around the possibility of some particular states and private companies being deemed politically responsible for global warming and its adverse consequences on human displacement. And if so, which mechanisms should be put in place so that affected nations could have access to financial assets to better deal with the issue. When it comes to migration, burden-sharing affairs moved further than only adaptive capacities by debating which countries could be considered as having moral responsibilities to receive climate migrants either by relocating them to third countries, putting forth internalization efforts or, in a more extreme scenario, resigning part of their territory to allow affected communities to autonomously reconstruct their nation.

A meaningful example of a discourse in which climate migration was perceived as a burden-sharing issue can be found in the last presidential address by former US President Barack Obama (2009-2017) at the United Nations General Assembly (2016a). Calling states for more adherence to the Paris Agreement and for achieving their National Determined Contributions, he asked for developed countries' support since 'if we don't act boldly, the *bill* that could come due will be *mass migrations, and cities submerged and nations displaced*, and food supplies decimated, and conflicts born of despair' (United Nations 2016a, 15, own highlights).

Modality, mood, and transitivity analyses (underlined) shed light on how this discourse is based on a deterministic and pathological premise toward climate migration. For once, the use of 'we' as the subject of the clause, whilst allegedly aimed at developed countries, dilutes agency and responsibility to a universal agent of which all of humanity is part (a universal 'Anthropo'). Furthermore, the modal verb 'will' points to a deontic modality: migration is impossible to stop if climate change is not mitigated, as this is not in a range of possibility but of *certainty*. It also asserts a temporality, as mass migrations 'will' happen in the future; but only if the universal (Western) men 'don't act boldly' enough. Vocabulary and thematic usage (italic) are of relevance as well. 'Mass migrations', 'cities submerged', and 'nations displaced' are some of the unquestionable consequences of a lack of action on the part of developed countries. Transitivity analysis shows these are passive objects in the clause structure, dependent on humanity's inaction. Breaking down, 'mass migration' is scripted as a result of 'our' failure to act boldly in regard to humanity's compliance with mitigation.

The universal 'we' is scripted as the one who will have to deal with the 'bill' of this lack of ambition. However, the fact that this discourse was directly envisaged and aimed at developed nations indicates that this universality can be traced back to a form of euphemism. Instead, it implies that developed countries will have a burden (or 'bill') to share in terms of 'environmental refugees'. Hence, a clear message was delineated: in the future, the global South will have a 'mass' of victims fleeing their submerged cities and displaced nations due to climate change, which will also have other adverse consequences such as food shortages and conflicts 'born of despair'. Burden-sharing, thus, is a reality; a 'bill that could come due' to richer nations.

Albeit paradoxical, the consideration that climate migration was unavoidable and that assistance was needed to 'solve' these flows was partially encouraged by a denouncement of environmental injustice (Baldwin and Fornalé 2017). The 'alarmist' depiction of the climate 'refugee' (see Bettini, Nash, and Gioli 2017, 6), despite limitations, was backed by claims upon

universal Human Rights and suggested that a proper route toward a solution boiled down to the recognition of migrants' vulnerability and called for an awareness of international responsibility. Ransan-Cooper and colleagues (2015, 109) even point out that the framing first received by environmental migrants at a larger scale was that of a 'victim' in a situation of 'helplessness and passivity', requiring some sort of top-down (and, further on, North-South) assistance (in the form of charity) for dealing with their state of calamity. This was, after all, how the 'environmental refugee' was depicted: poor and vulnerable communities fleeing from the Global South due to natural disasters such as hurricanes and droughts, which would cause famine, spread diseases, and overall create havoc in the suburbs of the world. In the backdrop was the idea that migration flows from the Global South were remarkably unlike of the developed world. This narrative is marked by a clear racialization of the figure of 'refugee' against the 'whiteness' of the European citizen (Baldwin 2013, 1477; see Baldwin and Bettini 2017, 14, on climate migration and race) – a construction of a 'myth of difference' that is much denounced by scholars from the Third World (Chimni 1998, 351).

I claim that it was paradoxical because while framing climate migration as an unjust phenomenon was intended to encourage cooperation and international assistance, the political outcome was quite distant. In turn, they led to the *securitization* of the figure of the climate migrant, especially within Western developed nations (Baldwin, Methmann, and Rothe 2014; Bettini 2013a; Boas 2015). As originally defined by scholars from the Copenhagen School of Security, securitization is the process in which an issue shifts toward a frame of 'existential threat' and 'survival', through which high-level policy-makers can legitimize the usage of 'emergency measures' of any kind and nature to deal with the alleged threat (see Buzan, Waever, and Wilde 1998, 21). Alternatively, as Ingrid Boas (2015, 1) summed up in the opening of her book on how climate change and human migration have become securitized,

> […] climate migration has become the subject of a process called securitisation, broadly defined as the process through which non-traditional security issues (such as climate change or migration) are discussed and/or acted upon in terms of security and thereby drawn into the security domain.

Among a multitude of reasons why climate migration started to be feared in national defense plans, the burden of climate change was among the most influential ones. The financial and humanitarian resources necessary to relocate billions of 'barbarian hordes' of environmentally displaced people, all of whom were allegedly expected to come from the Global South, were then framed as a threat to national defense – since there was no interest in sharing the costs of relocation and embracing planetary responsibility for climate change (see Bettini 2013a) Obama's discourse shows this shift: while proposing burden-sharing and calling developed states into action, the inevitable result was the emergence of 'conflicts born of despair' and 'mass migrations'. Without 'bold action', there was no way to prevent these mass migrations. Hence, climate migration was scripted as the pathological consequence of a lack of humanity's mitigation efforts.

Rather than moving toward environmental justice, a 'safe' policy that ensued within the hall of high-level politics, common of securitized affairs, was the promotion of closing borders as a way to avert future floods of poor 'environmental refugees'. The idea was that, since migration was inevitable, a harsher border policy could stop global Southerns from being

'pulled' toward rich nations (c.f. Nail 2019). By linking the 'environmental refugee' with the closing of borders, the discursive frame was altered into a new one, with different topics of relevance. It was not any longer a question of injustice or a result of a world-history of mankind effecting climate change; now, it was an issue of existential threat, requiring closed borders to avoid apocalyptic scenarios. This had the implication of a different governance strategy. A' burden-shift' was put forward, through which great powers act to extraterritorialize the costs[23] and dismiss international and collective responsibility for climate change and migrant flows (Atapattu 2020, 108; see Führ, Anschau, and Gonçalves 2021). Accordingly, the burden of climate migration was to be set upon the countries of origin or neighboring countries, even in cases when they had little or no impact on pollutant emissions and climate change more broadly.

The figure of the climate migrant as a 'victim' was developed into another: a pathological figure of the migrant as a vector of insecurity (Ransan-Cooper et al. 2015). Via the closing of borders and the framing of climate displacement as something to be halted, a facet common to different categories of underprivileged, racialized, and vulnerable migrants appeared. The constitution of the climate migrant as a source of insecurity is found across several public discourses besides Obama's (United Nations 2016a, 13–19); however, it also has a very noticeable epistemic nature. One of the most remarkable statements regarding the securitization of climate displacement is that of Lord Stern, author of the famous Stern Review (2007)[24] and then head of the Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change, in a public interview regarding global warming:

> When temperatures rise to that level, we will have disrupted weather patterns and spreading deserts […] Hundreds of millions of people will be *forced* to leave their homelands because their crops and animals will have *died*. The *trouble* will come when they *try* to migrate into new lands, however. *That will bring them into armed conflict with people already living there*. Nor will it be an occasional occurrence. It *could become* a permanent feature of life on Earth (Stern 2013 apud McKie 2013, online, own highlights).

While addressed as a scientific statement, Stern's commentary was constituted by the usage of several instances of deontic (underlined) rather than epistemic modality. Deontic modality is perceptible by the six occasions in which the modal 'will' is used in this excerpt to assert what 'ought to' happen. Unlike Obama's speech, Stern's prediction is not dependent on the lack of ambition or action by part of any constellation of actors: these scenarios will happen '*when* temperatures rise', as if it were only a matter of time. The only epistemic modality ('could become') appears modifying the word 'permanent', by which he is establishing a third and even further timeline in which migration and conflict had already happened. His word usage is also clear of the alarmist and securitization scenario he is creating: people will be 'forced',

[23] The 'categorical fetishism' found in epistemic and policy-makers communities and the impact that different categorical frames have on the protection of migrants is a feature that is not exclusive to climate migration but somewhat generalized to international migrants, especially from the Global South or racialized bodies. See Mourad and Norman (2020, 11–12) and Crawley and Skelparis (2018, 60).

[24] The 'Stern Review on the Economics of Climate Change' (Stern 2007) was a UK Government-sponsored report on the effect of climate change on the global economy. The Review's assessment modeling highlighted how early action was necessary in order to prevent climate change from becoming an economic disaster and set out some measures that could mitigate these negative impacts. At the time, Nicholas Stern was the chair of the Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment of the London School of Economics, granting the report a wide circulation among expert and policy circles.

animals will 'have died', migrants will 'try' to move and this will cause 'armed conflict' with the ideal citizen, those 'already living there'. This overwording creates an apocalyptic[25] scenery that is highlighted by even another word collocation: the 'trouble', which is the inevitable result of rising temperatures. Thus, migration is called into the security domain (Boas 2015), a *trouble* surrounded by several existential risks such as death and armed conflicts.

Stern's (2013) interview and Obama's General Assembly's speech (2016a) accentuate another face of the securitization of climate migration akin to climate change burdens and the migrant fear: the dread of the emergence of conflicts or their aggravation due to environmental migration. The debate on whether climate change can create or influence armed conflict is found across distinct disciplines, and experts' consensus is still far from reached (see Mach et al. 2019). There are still other dimensions of the climate-conflict-migration nexus, such as whether migration linked to environmental stressors can cause interstate violence (see Selby et al. 2017, on the Syrian war) or if conflict displacement can influence climate change (Ide 2015; Turner and Bailey 2021; von Uexkull 2016). Despite divergences, scholars agree that the climate-conflict-migration linkage is better understood within context-dependent research (Abel et al. 2018) since migrants' perception toward conflict may vary (Koubi et al. 2018) and that there are different pathways that this causal nexus can evolve into, taking the shape of complex phenomena rather than simplistic and deterministic ones. This complexity is disregarded when different experiences of climate migrations (and different discourse frames) are universalized into a single narrative (Brzoska and Fröhlich 2016, 13). Furthermore, as Olsson (2017) has denounced, generalizing the relationship between climate change, migration, and conflict risks contributing to a self-fulfilling prophecy by influencing policy-making. This, in turn, can result from the 'exaggeration' of the crisis-setting through which the issue is publicly framed (Warner and Boas 2017; 2019)

Moving our focus to expert communities opens a venue to note how the whole set of premises leading to the securitization of climate mobility is not only pathological to its governance but empirically questionable (Baldwin, Methmann, and Rothe 2014; Kelman 2019). Even though burden-sharing might need to be placed at the core of any planetary cooperation for dealing with human displacement (Biermann and Boas 2010) and other climate change consequences, the presumption that there will be a displacement of hundreds of millions from developing to developed countries is methodologically questionable. For instance, it is based on a notion of environmental determinism that foretells that as soon as environmental stressors exist, displacement will automatically follow – while the causal nexus[26] is way more complex and nuanced, with the climate not only generating flows of displacement but in other cases halting migration, creating patterns of immobility or altering migration routes (Cantor 2020; Zickgraf 2019; 2021; 2022).

[25] For a discussion on apocalyptic narratives on climate migration, see Bettini (2013a) and Baldwin (2014).

[26] Other considerations regarded how most climate-related displacements happen domestically or toward border nations, with South-North displacement being an exception and not the rule (Rigaud et al. 2018; Clement et al. 2021). On another note, the links between environmental change, migration, and conflict are not as straightforward as securitization discourses suggest, in which a complex nexus is perhaps a better definition – since migration can sometimes halt the emergence of conflicts, climate change can cause people to stay and not to move, and conflict can trap climate migrants in their country of origin (Brzoska and Fröhlich 2016).

Discursively, the overdeterminism of climate change in its relation to migration flows is interconnected with a 'dysfunctional treatment of time' (Falk 2016, 50), as one can easily witness by the several usages of the modal auxiliary 'will' in discourses on the issue (such as those excerpts shown in this chapter). Futurology plays a primary role in the dreadful 'environmental refugee' schema because these displacements are always expected in a distant future. Their placing in future timeframe is also discursively scripted as dependent on what actors 'ought to do' to reach specific policy goals, functioning thus as a principle-based justification for unpopular policies. Climate migration flows are scripted as a threshold in a 'negative temporality, a timeline set in the future that is never reached in the present' (see Falk 2016, 63). Climate change and migration are a distant and future threat, albeit they are instrumentalized to justify decisions and create narratives for what a proper action in the present must be.

Critiques of the securitization schema mainly originated among migration scholars, who appointed how these early attempts of predictions by environmental scholars oversimplified the complex decision framework existent in displacement decisions (Boas et al. 2019). They argued that the climate-mobility nexus is way more complex and nuanced than what early works had assumed, suggesting that the 'push-pull' models used for migration flows' prediction were non-applicable (Hunter and Simon 2022, 10–11) and that the causal nexus for environmental migrants should be studied in depth before conclusions were stated (Bettini 2019; Kelman et al. 2019). The notion that climate change can be reduced as a sole cause for displacement was denounced as it was taken too readily (Baldwin and Bettini 2017; Zickgraf 2019). In different manners, migration experts have maintained that if social scientists were part of the scholarship's emergence, the complexities of migration theories could be fully embraced. The momentum for securitization discourses could thus possibly be averted (Ebrahimi and Ossewaarde 2019; see Piguet, Kaenzig, and Guélat 2018, 364).

If we are to look specifically at forecasts of 'environmental refugees', they have appeared hard to prove so far. Scholars have denounced how every estimate showed significant methodological flaws, often assuming more people would automatically move due to climate change without any actual attempt to understand the complexity of the climate-(im)mobility nexus (Baldwin, Methmann, and Rothe 2014; Zickgraf 2019). Consensually, they have indicated how alarmist projections played a significant role in bolstering securitization discourses, mostly by alerting toward a migrant dystopia that has never become a reality. As mentioned above, a focus on the construction of intersubjective narratives on climate migration indicates how the same discourse script that led to the securitization of climate mobility was part of a narrative leading to a self-fulfilling prophecy (see Olsson 2017) due to how scholars reiterated and reified, without solid scientific bases, drastic projections for migration flows – thus triggering the emergence of securitization discourses within Western politics (Boas 2015; Warner and Boas 2019).

There is a shared concern[27] that inaccurate estimates and the 'environmental refugee' figure are availed by nationalist and anti-immigration movements within Europe and North

[27] Despite migration scholars agreeing to the need for complexifying the climate-mobility nexus within the literature and policy-making, they were not so cogent and unified in their recommendations issue (see Ferris 2020).

America (Hunter and Simon 2022). The environmental determinism that sustains the 'environmental refugee' figures, besides the call for burden-sharing, is denounced for the possibility of being instrumentalized as a tool for Western populism and, consequently, for moving a modernist agenda of 'command-and-control' (Chandler 2019a) of restricting immigration and closing borders (Baldwin, Methmann, and Rothe 2014; Bettini 2013a; Boas et al. 2019). Hence, via a disregard for social theory and the complexity of peoples' decision-making relating to migration, the attempt to estimate migration flows genealogically effected a pathological depiction of a need for securitizing climate mobility without evidence of such from the Earth System.

To conclude, we should witness, by interrogating these discourses and by looking back at the prelude of the scholarship on climate migration, how the call for environmental justice paradoxically created the necessary conditions for a set of policies bound to increase injustice (Bettini, Nash, and Gioli 2017; Warner and Boas 2019). While some scholars have proposed that these two migrant figures ('environmental refugees' as victims of injustice and 'environmental refugees' as sources of insecurity) belong to two distinct discourse frames (e.g., Mayer 2013, 30–31; Ransan-Cooper et al. 2015, 109–10), I suggest that it is not so. Via the critical governance outlook that is employed here, one can see how they are but two dimensions of the same process of discursive constitution of the figure of the 'environmental refugee' on a frame that seeks to promote justice but by abstracting from modernist, colonial, and racial-bounded premises (see Baldwin and Bettini 2017, 14), falls into the pathology of securitization. I argue that they constitute the same discursive schema because the 'environmental justice' and the 'burden-sharing' scripts were never truly disseminated within global governance formal architectures. That is, both the justice and burden-sharing concerns were part of a discursive schema. They prompted a movement that completely overlooked climate migration from international negotiations, dismissing quests of responsibility and ethics while securitization efforts were evident in actors' discourses. Overall, thus, they led to the same governance outcome: inaction.

Hence, within Holocene's governance prescriptions and analytical paradigms, the call for environmental justice through the figure of the 'environmental refugee' and futurology attempts was intrinsic to the securitization of the issue, leading to a policy inaction of sorts (i.e., did not lead to formal agreements). This scenario only partially changed when a discursive shift occurred to 'desecuritize' it (that is, to move the issue away from the realm of an existential threat) precisely by *delinking* climate migration from justice considerations. Due to this discursive shift, migration started to be formalized in climate governance architectures and inserted into final documents.

3.2 The 'climate migrant': Migration-as-adaptation thesis, technocracy, and the fetishization of resilience

From a first moment in which authors argued for climate mobility to be framed as voluntary and dealt with similarly to labor migration (cf. Gemenne 2015), others embraced alternative solutions proposed by International Law scholars for the creation of institutional arrangements in the global (Biermann and Boas 2010) or regional spheres (McAdam 2015; Ramos, Cavedon-Capdeville and Yamamoto 2017), without expanding the Refugee Regime.

Even while climate adaptation was hardly mentioned in climate migration discourses under the securitization schema, displacement was mainly seen as a failure to adapt. In international actors' script toward the climate-migration nexus, displacement was constituted under the premise that communities in the global South would not be able to adjust to the consequences of global warming and other climate change consequences. Thus, migration and adaptation were negatively correlated, in the sense that poorer adaptative capacities would inevitably lead to higher flows of 'environmental refugees' and that wherever adaptive capacities were high, flows of refugees were expected (see Methmann and Oels 2015).

A discursive shift over the relation between migration and adaptation happened in the late 2000s, following the crescendo of international political interests in climate adaptation. As international actors realized that mitigation strategies were no longer sufficient for sustaining a safe space for humanity, climate negotiations shifted part of their focus to concerns about how to learn to cope or adjust to climate change consequences and better manage (and further on, to reduce the risks of) disasters (Benzie and Persson 2019; Jerneck and Olsson 2008). That was the point of departure for greater initiatives on transnational climate adaptation, shifting it from the local to the regional and global scales of governance (see Benzie and Persson 2019; see section 2.2). With adaptation increasingly entering the lexicon of policy-makers and scholars, reinforced by scientific discoveries about how climate mitigation was failing to achieve the necessary goals, its intersection with migration was slowly inserted into policy negotiations.

In many ways, the attempt to link climate adaptation and human migration was meant to distance the issue from processes of securitization – moving forward its 'desecuritization', purportedly or not (see Ebrahimi and Ossewaarde 2019). Rather than referencing migration as an environmental injustice and consequently iterating it as a negative phenomenon that should be averted and securitized, efforts were put forward to promote ways in which the planned relocation of climate migrants could be used as a tool for enhancing adaptation capacities. By linking mobility as positively correlated with adaptation, discursive frames shifted and now inquiries of burden-sharing and international responsibility started to occupy a secondary role, with primary interests placed in how migration could ameliorate adaptation. Hence, the focus was now partly placed on whether climate migration could be a valuable *technique* for enhancing adaptation to the harms of climate change or, conversely, whether improving adaptative capacities could avert and minimize climate displacement (Gemenne and Blocher 2017; see Vinke et al. 2020).

In such a framing, the once securitized figure of the 'environmental refugee' was now not a victim of environmental injustice or a vector of insecurity but a tool that could be harvested into command-and-control instances. At the same time, displacement started to be framed not as forced but as an adverse consequence of the lack of planning and implementation of adaptation technologies by both 'fragile' governments and 'vulnerable' households. Therefore, while the early attempt to engage climate migration with justice ended up securitizing the issue and hence led to inaction, this second framing was disseminated and swiftly found space in national climate adaptation plans and programs. Moreover, due to international organizations, it was propagated in international fora and eventually started to appear in states' discourses and practices.

One of the ways that these scripts came into existence within international negotiations regarded how 'planned relocation' or 'managed retreats' should be encouraged by local and national governments as a possible instrument to adapt to climate change and increase individual and societal resilience capacities (see Ajibade, Sullivan, and Haeffner 2020; Gemenne and Blocher 2017). National and sub-national governments were recommended to undertake planned relocations in areas facing the risk of disasters or other environmental stressors, either as a pre-emptive or a post-factum adaptation measure. In this light, the transnational character of climate migration disappeared: displacement was expected to occur across the domestic territory since managed retreats were to happen before forced migration was an ultimate coping strategy. In addition, under this schema, little international assistance was needed and international politics were sidelined (Felli and Castree 2012, 3). Migration was constituted not anymore in a crisis setting but rather as a tool for affected countries to *increase* their adaptative capacities. Governments were encouraged to 'shift' migrants' communities domestically, according to their adaptative capacities and local environmental conditions, as a way to promote development and progress – irrespective of migrants' own agency and rights (Methmann and Oels 2015, 62).

Before this shift occurred in international negotiations, expert communities played a major role in effecting these discursive changes. They did so not only by delinking the 'environmental refugee' figure with security concerns but by effectively creating a novel script in which migration was considered in a positive light related to adaptation. This script did not necessarily take the form of novel scientific discoveries, however, since human (im)mobility relationship with adaptation, vulnerability, and resilience were already discussed in scholarships for decades. As a whole, migration scholarship foresaw displacement before, during, and after disasters as a constant adaptation strategy used throughout human history (Martin, Weerasinghe, and Taylor 2013, 126).

Rather than scientific discoveries, one can trace this discursive change to some publications that framed the climate-displacement nexus under different theories than the Neo-Malthusian ones that enclosed the securitization schema (see Bettini 2013b). These were published under the banner of two theories related to migration, called 'New Economics of Labor Migration' (NELM) (Stark and Bloom 1985) and 'Sustainable Livelihood Approaches' (SLA) (Chambers and Conway 1992). Their integration is better represented by the publishing of the United Kingdom's Government Office for Science-sponsored 'Foresight' report (London Government Office for Science & Foresight 2011) on 'Migration and Global Environmental Change'. In general terms, under the integration of NELM and SLA, migration (either influenced by climate change or not) was directly linked to household (and not individual) decision-making, in which families might initiate migration processes as a strategy for risk management. By sending remittances back to their country of origin, migrants were thought of as assistance tools to their households, improving their income and helping them to thrive and adapt to adverse conditions (e.g., climate change). Thus, whenever changes in climate or environmental conditions threatened the survival of a household, migration was expected or encouraged to happen so that, through remittances, the household could earn more 'assets' to balance livelihood threats.

Hence, a new depiction of climate migration in the schema of the 'migration-as-adaptation' thesis appeared – first in epistemic, and later in political, spaces. It was broadly based on the idea that, by delinking migration with securitization and integrating it with adaptation and resilience affairs, it was placed in a new light. Now, 'climate migration' could be conceived in a 'positive feedback loop' (see Bettini and Gioli 2016, 10) with climate adaptation. Either as a preemptive tool to adapt to climate disasters or as a consequence of disasters' aftermath, climate migration was somewhat 'beneficial' since it would involve sending remittances back to the community of origin and increasing their adaptive capacities. This way, migration could diminish societal and household vulnerability, as well as increase resilience in all its forms – individual, in the figure of the migrant; societal, in relation to the household; and national, by participating in governmental adaptation plans. All the while, climate migrants themselves were incorporated into 'wager labor abroad or in other parts of their home country (Felli and Castree 2012, 3) as a result.

The Foresight report was influential in this setting of a new agenda under adaptation policy (see Warner 2012, 1069) by precisely linking climate mobility with NELM and SLA. We can notice that more clearly under their key conclusions (2011, 9–10). Environmental stressors are considered as influencing migration[28] but rarely as the sole cause, more often impacting other push and pull drivers. While 'preventing and constraining migration is not a "not risk" option' in the sense that closing borders' policies were to be avoided, 'planned and well-managed migration […] can reduce the chance of later humanitarian emergencies and displacement', allowing 'households and populations to remain in situ for longer'. The report also suggests that migration can be seen as offering political opportunities if, for instance, governments allow migration to occur 'in a way that maximizes benefits to the individual, and both source and destination communities'. That is, rather than averting, migration should be included in good governance mechanisms to improve not only the national adaptive capacities but the migrants' household livelihood as well. Thus, migration and adaptation should be intrinsically correlated to achieve 'transformational adaptation to environmental change' in order 'to build long-term resilience' (London Government Office for Science & Foresight 2011, 9–10).

Although the migration-as-adaptation thesis was partially successful as a political strategy since it deviated from the pathological securitization of the 'environmental refugee' (see Bettini and Gioli 2016), prompting some level of coordinated international action, it has been denounced for being entrapped into at least two governance pathologies of its own. The first of these can be summed up in regards to how it is genealogically embedded in a neoliberal version of the fashionable concept of resilience. If migration is an adaptive tool, then successful displacement flows are dependent upon at-risk communities' level of resilience capacities (Methmann and Oels 2015, 52). Under this discursive frame, there is no space for political contestation, social struggles, and international responsibility. Climate migrants' hardships can only happen when migration is not well-managed or planned or when migrants cannot provide the conditions for the positive feedback loop by remitting sufficiently. Interwoven with the dismissal of the social and the political by the neoliberalization of resilience, technocracy emerged as a second pathology via technologies' rendition as a glorified instrument for dealing

[28] See Foresight (2011, 33) for their conceptual framework linking environmental change and migration drivers.

with migration. Not by coincidence, under the migration-as-adaptation thesis, the focus is set on the 'well-managed', 'planned', and 'proactive' migration schemes. A successful governance of migration and adaptation depends, thus, on the usage of 'engineering solutions that derive from developments in science and technology' (Chandler 2019a, 386) and not on complex issues embedded and derived from the international order and political economy dynamics.

Accordingly, migration is scripted not as a political but a technical issue, hinging on the inability of migrants' households to absorb changes and to create the conditions for improving their resilience; and, on the part of developing states, hinging on their lack of capacities to manage migration to allow it to be a 'transformational and strategic approach to adaptation', following Foresight (2011, 200) prescriptions. Through proper techniques, governments and households should strive for increasing resilience, as it 'implies providing vulnerable people or communities with the *means* to build up adaptive capacities and self-help potential that make them capable to recover from external shocks'(Rothe 2017, 44). Via this schema, migration is emptied of contextual factors, not being apprehendable as a social and political struggle (Bettini and Gioli 2016, 11–12; see de Genova 2018, 25–26, on migration and technocracy). Instead, it created the image of the climate migrant as someone who should be an 'adaptable human subject', reducing their inherent response to environmental stressors 'while becoming ever more the subjects of capitalist market relations'(Felli and Castree 2012, 1).

While the migration-as-adaptation thesis found space in international negotiations while the securitization/justice claims of climate migration did not, it has not yet moved beyond their rendition within Disaster Risk Reduction agreements and a few technical clauses under UNFCCC COP's resolutions. The first-ever mention of human mobility within a multilateral climate negotiation happened precisely under a call-for-action on adaptation. Departing from discussions held at the COP-15, in Copenhagen (United Nations 2009), it was at COP-16 (United Nations 2010), held in Cancun, Mexico, when actors established an adaptation framework that, inter alia with other concerns, 'invited' Parties to undertake 'measures to enhance *understanding, coordination and cooperation* with regard to climate change induced displacement, migration and planned relocation, where appropriate, at the national, regional, and international levels' (United Nations 2010, 5, paragraph 14(f)), highlights my own). The issue emergence under this frame was welcomed by experts and decision-makers alike for it 'provides a technical-level (rather than controversial political dialogue) stepping-stone' and by its framing of mobility 'as a phenomenon to be managed' (Warner 2012, 1072), which can be perceived by the 'overwording' in the operative part of the sentence (understanding, coordination, and cooperation).

One other domain of international negotiations where this framing shift can be perceived is disaster-related agreements. The first 'international blueprint' for dealing with disasters and hazards, the Hyogo 2005-2015 Framework for Action, was set prior to the emergence and dissemination of the migration-as-adaptation thesis. Under its priorities for action in the decade following its agreement, human mobility is mentioned in a single clause, not precisely related to post-disaster migration but rather to how planned migration should be put forward. The agreement places as a sub-priority that actors should 'endeavor to ensure, as appropriate, that programmes for displaced persons do not increase risk and vulnerability to hazard', which is followed by the assertion that populations in high-risk areas could reduce their vulnerability to

hazards by having access to 'diversified income options' (United Nations 2005, 11). Thus, human mobility should be well-planned not to harm adaptation plans instead of the other way around; and to accomplish that, a powerful tool was an increase in assets such as income.

After its decade of implementation, a follow-up agreement was adopted at Sendai, Japan, setting a successor to the Hyogo Framework from 2015 through 2030. While its predecessor focused on disaster management, the Sendai Framework was mainly built around Disaster *Risk Reduction*[29], with the aim of 'reducing existing risk and strengthening resilience' (United Nations 2015b, 5) While mobility was barely mentioned under Hyogo, it is referred to several times in Sendai prescriptions, which recognizes as a lesson from Hyogo's implementation that disasters had been 'exacerbated by climate change' which increased disasters' frequency and intensity, displacing people as a result (United Nations 2015b, 10). As recommendations, the document stressed that human mobility related to disasters should be governed locally, stating that governments should 'encourage the adoption of policies and programmes addressing disaster-induced human mobility to *strengthen the resilience* of affected people and that of *host communities'* (United Nations 2015b, 20, own highlights). Moreover, mobility was included in 'regular disaster preparedness', 'with a view to ensuring rapid and effective response to disasters and related displacement' (United Nations 2015b, 21). Its language use is quite similar to the Foresight report's vocabulary, which is unsurprising seen how, at the time of Sendai's negotiations, the Foresight policy recommendations 'have been floated in international policy-making circles in recent years' (Felli and Castree 2012, 1–2)

Under the UNFCCC, the latest inclusion of human mobility under Loss and Damage negotiations also evidences this schema. Following COP-21 Paris Agreement, a 'Task Force on Displacement' was established under the Warsaw International Mechanism (WIM) on Loss and Damage[30], with the ultimate goal of 'develop recommendations for integrated approaches to *avert*, *minimize* and *address* displacement related to the adverse impacts of climate change' (United Nations 2016c, 8, own highlights). Every mention of mobility on COPs after the establishment of the Task Force was made around their reports and recommendations, always stressing the objective of 'averting, minimizing, and addressing' climate displacement. This choice of words is not unproblematically; in many ways, this overwording can be considered a euphemism to push forward an agenda for framing mobility as harmful and pathological. Under Loss and Damage, integrated approaches were recommended for *stopping* people from moving (even if the meaning relation was constructed around synonyms, such as 'avert' and 'minimize'), suggesting that a well-managed adaptation policy could prevent migration from happening and enforcing communities to stay in place. Mobility, then, is framed under a negative outlook, a crisis or a disease that should be avoided to allow stasis and stability to rule (Nail 2019, 377).

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[29] Disaster Risk Reduction is defined, by official United Nations terminology (2009, 10–11), as 'The concept and practice of reducing disaster risks through systemic efforts to analyze and manage the causal factors of disasters, including through reduced exposure to hazards, lessened vulnerability of people and property, wise management of land and the environment, and improved preparedness for adverse events'.

[30] The Warsaw International Mechanism on Loss and Damage was first established in COP-19, held in Warsaw, Poland, even though its implementation started being negotiated at previous COPs. At Doha (COP-18), for instance, further work on loss and damage was called for, with part of the 'understanding of and expertise on loss and damage' placed upon the understanding of 'how impacts of climate change are affecting patterns of migration, displacement and human mobility' (United Nations 2012).

This is as far as an analysis of formal governance architectures can stretch out by critically analyzing discourses relating climate adaptation to mobility under the UN's umbrella. However, there are still other institutional arrangements at the international level that have governed human mobility, albeit not under the UN's leadership or orchestration. An institutional middle ground between regional and 'global' instances of governance, also entangling migration and adaptation, is the 'Nansen Initiative for Disaster-Induced Cross-Border Displacement'. The Nansen Initiative was launched in 2012 by a constellation of actors steered by the governments of Norway and Switzerland, with the assistance of a 'Consultative Committee'[31] under the chairmanship of Prof. Walter Kälin. Negotiated one year earlier at the UNHCR-sponsored 'Nansen Conference on Climate Change and Displacement in the 21st Century', held in Oslo, Norway, the Nansen Initiative was initially thought of as complementing the Cancun Adaptation Framework, which was the first international document to formally recognized climate change impacts on human displacement (as discussed before). Following Kälin's account (2012, 49), the Initiative came into existence precisely because 'Paragraph 14(f) [of the Cancun Adaptation Framework] does not, however, say exactly how climate change-induced displacement should be addressed', which 'was no accident but rather the expression of a lack of willingness by a majority of governments, whether from reasons of sovereignty, competing priorities or the lead role of the UNHCR in the process'.

The Nansen Initiative was then launched with the goal of being a 'state-owned consultative process, outside the UN, to build consensus – in a bottom-up way – among interested states about how best to address cross-border displacement in the context of sudden- and slow-onset disasters' (Kälin 2012, 49). In the three years that followed its creation, 109 governmental delegations endorsed 'The Agenda for Protection of Cross-Border Displaced Persons in the Context of Disasters and Climate Change', often called 'Protection Agenda' (2015), after a series of regional consultations meetings held between states' representatives, IOs, and the organized civil society. The Protection Agenda established a conceptual framework and identified good practices for 'prevent, prepare for and respond' (Kalin 2015, 5) to disaster displacement. Alongside that, it suggested the adoption of a three-fold prioritization for better protecting disaster displaced persons: (i) collecting data and enhancing knowledge; (ii) enhancing the use of humanitarian protection measures; and (iii) strengthening the management of disaster displacement through the integration of human mobility under disaster risk reduction and adaptation policies, facilitating migration with dignity, and improving the use of planned relocations (The Nansen Initiative 2015).

In the enforcement of its agenda, the Nansen principles claim to depart from a human rights-based approach, meaning that their focus was set on 'the needs of persons displaced across borders' (Kälin 2012, 49). Despite that, the actors involved recognized how mobility was an issue linked with other themes, such as 'disaster risk reduction, internal displacement, and the management of migration as an adaptation measure' (Kälin 2012, 49). This can be witnessed by how their long-term solutions paved under their prioritization involved, alongside data collection and humanitarian protection, the integration of migration under adaptation

[31] In Kälin's words, 'Intellectual underpinning for the Initiative will be provided by a Consultative Committee made up of representatives from international organisations and agencies as well as researchers, think tanks and academic institutions that can inform and support the process with their experience' (Kälin 2012, 49).

governance and planned relocations. Under the Nansen principles, disaster displacement is seen as an adaptation tool but also a survival strategy (Felli 2013, 342).

While recognizing that states had the discretionary power (intermediated by international law) to distinguish between voluntary and forced migration (The Nansen Initiative 2015, 23–24), by placing disaster mobility under questions of survivability, the Protection Agenda introduced novel features. One can acknowledge this by the Protection Agenda's suggestions for effective practices for recognizing which categories of displaced persons should receive assistance. These are persons or groups of persons that (i) have 'on-going' or 'imminent and foreseeable' risk to their life and safety; (ii) have been wounded, lost family members, or their livelihood; and (iii) that cannot access the protection of their own country (The Nansen Initiative 2015, 22), being 'forced or obliged' to move across borders. Thus, their institutional language recognizes that even if climate migration needs to be framed under adaptation and disaster risk reduction policies, it is discursively linked under a frame of life or death, bringing climate change as a survival threat to displaced communities. Using the expression of displacement 'in the context' of disasters, the Protection Agenda moved away from the need to establish a causal link between climate change and human mobility (Atapattu 2020, 99–100), recognizing the complex reality of climate migration.

Since the endorsement of its Protection Agenda, the Nansen Initiative became the 'Platform on Disaster Displacement' (PDD) (2016). The coordinated action that allowed the PDD to exist in the first place is *sui generis* in the GCAG architecture, with the scholarship noting some reasons why it was recognized as a possibility in states' perspectives. For once, the Nansen Initiative was never thought of as leading to a regulatory and formal mechanism under International Law. It was instead described by (Kälin 2012, 49) as a 'soft, state-driven and bottom-up approach'. Its effectiveness in this area was twofold: first, by not proposing 'a new framework for cross-border displacement, nor even a set of loose guidelines' and instead focusing on offering 'a set of good practices and practical tools', it was successful in emerging and disseminating in the international agenda (Ferris 2017, 22). Secondly, its 'bottom-up' approach, although controversial seeing how it was state-led in the first place (Nicholson 2017, 65–66), led to the realization of several regional consultative meetings that increased the diversity of its content and consequently its international acceptance (see Gemenne and Brücker 2015, 46), in which not only states representative but 'the views of academics and relevant organizations […] as well as representatives of affected communities' took part of.

Finally, its overall execution outside of the UN system might have prompted a different response as well. The steering committee, even though at its launch it was steered by Norway and Switzerland, has been composed of a balanced representation of countries from the global South and North[32]. By bringing a cogent constellation of actors to its negotiation table (i.e., only those who endorsed the Protection Agenda) that were steered, hosted, and oversaw by a diversified steering committee, the Nansen Initiative took the shape of a 'minilateral' governance architecture. Minilateralism might have led toward a more efficient governance by

[32] The Chair and Vice-chair of the Steering Group have respectively been, since the follow-up of the Nansen Initiative as the Platform on Disaster Displacement: Germany and Bangladesh (2016-2017); Bangladesh and France (2018-2019); France and Fiji (2019-2020); and Fiji and the European Union (2021-currently), with Prof. Walter Kälin occupying the role of the PDD's Envoy of the Chair (The Platform on Disaster Displacement 2022).

how ‘a smaller number of actors are able to negotiate faster and achieve potentially more progressive and far-reaching agreements as discussions are narrow but deep’ (Betts and Kainz 2017, 10). Conversely, ‘exclusive minilateralism’ institutional designs, such as Nansen’s, tend to ‘sacrifice procedure justice in the altar of an efficient and best-practical outcome’ (Eckersley 2012, 25).

Under formal governance, that is as far ‘global’ mechanisms go concerning migration and climate adaptation. This ‘formal governance gap’ can perhaps be seen as a result of the migration-as-adaptation framing in itself: as migration is not a social but technical issue, there is no need to include it in political negotiations. Rather, the ‘well-planning’ feature of climate migration was mandated toward experts’ communities, partly explaining the prevalence of IOs (specifically IOM) in disseminating the issue. As Koko Warner (2012) narrates, the emergence of climate migration-related norms into the UNFCCC can also be traced back to these IOs, as they were submitting these clauses in draft negotiating texts alongside a few national experts since ‘the major negotiating blocks place relatively little emphasis on the topic, while allowing their adaptation-focused delegates to work and refine the issue area’ (Warner 2012, 1068).

Experts’ predominance was not only a characteristic of the issue’s emergence but is still sustained in recent developments, such as the WIM Task Force. Throughout five stakeholder meetings (2016-2021) and an array of policy papers and technical reports, international organizations and experts participating in the Task Force called for a recognition of the need for international support to deal with climate change’s adverse consequences in relation to human mobility, noticing possible legal and political venues for international actors to abstract from and build upon. Nevertheless, their findings and recommendations never took the form of concrete measures, often framed in terms of technical expertise and being limited within COPs resolutions in the discursive formulation of concerns that Parties should ‘take into account’ or be ‘invited’ to act upon (Atapattu 2020, 98) implying again how climate migration is seen as a technical affair. This is only reinforced by their latest report annexed at COP-24 in Katowice (United Nations 2018c) resolution, which is signed by 'the technical members of the task force’ including a constellation of actors[33] composed of international organizations, executive secretariats, and civil-society groups represented through the ‘Advisory Group on Climate Change and Human Mobility’ (United Nations 2018c, 45).

As expected, then, by successfully scheming migration around technical adaptation concerns, IOs and other actors that have their authority traced back to technical expertise achieved a role of prominent Global Governors. Their social skills were highly rewarded in negotiations, taking part in norms emergence and dissemination, rule-making, and agenda-setting. Via the dissemination of the migration-as-adaptation thesis, discourse subjects moved a technologization of discourses on climate migration, which we can acknowledge by recognizing how three of such technologization’s instances (Fairclough 1995, 104–5) can be

[33] In full, ‘The technical members of the task force on displacement are from the International Labour Organization, the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, the International Organization for Migration, the Platform on Disaster Displacement, the United Nations Development Programme, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, and civil society groups as represented by the Advisory Group on Climate Change and Human Mobility, which includes the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, the Norwegian Refugee Council, the Hugo Observatory, the Arab Network for Environment and Development, and Refugees International.’ (FCCC/CP/2018/10/Add.1, 45).

found in international negotiations. For once, there was an emergence of new expert communities and discourses promoting the linking of migration to adaptation, for instance, by mixing NELM and SLA approaches in the Foresight (2011) and other policy reports. Secondly, solutions set out in this novel frame were promoted in a context-free scenario, as good governance was only a question of efficient planning and management of migration rather than a question of political complexity and structural, political economy dynamics (Felli and Castree 2012, 2–3). Furthermore, there was a pressure for standardization of discursive practices, shifting focus away from (in)justice concerns and the securitization schema by 'colonizing' (Bettini and Gioli 2016, 13) climate migration discourses through a fixation on climate adaptation, technocracy, and increase of household resilience.

In contrast, subjects who ingrained their discourses on other sources of authority have failed at achieving the same effects. A fitting example, going back to the environmental justice concerns that fell into securitization tendencies, is the many attempts of Small Islands Developing States (SIDS) to place climate change and migration as a moral issue, embedding discourses on 'principled' legitimation aspects (see Avant, Finnemore, and Sell 2010, 9) and partaking at narrative on fairness (see Zürn 2018, 70). Simon Kofe's (2021) discourse, presented in the introduction, is one of these cases. His choice of words around the 'deadly' aspect of climate change, the sea that is 'rising around us all the time', and his assertion that 'climate mobility *must come* to the forefront' of negotiations because 'we are sinking' are perfect examples of moral arguments that were regularly used to try to push norms emergence in climate negotiations (even though SIDS repeatedly abstracted from other arguments under the authority-legitimation matrix, especially scientific ones; see Corneloup and Mol 2014, 285). Nevertheless, their attempt to mobilize ethical, moral, and justice concerns to cause social change via exertion of 'power through discourse' (Fairclough 1995, 39) did not achieve the same level of recognition that the more technical and managerial migration-as-adaptation thesis, which sustained the conservation of the business-as-usual discursive order that put migrants in the space of alterity and precarity under capitalist dynamics (see Felli and Castree 2012).

Nevertheless, under the GCAG architecture, the migration-as-adaptation thesis became naturalized and part of everyday practices. Entangled with a modern and neoliberal reading of resilience and technocracy, discourses were framed around the dismissal of how the climate-mobility nexus is a collective and political issue, socially constituted and underlined by power relations and inequalities between and within national states. Framing climate migration solely as a technical adaptation concern ended up diminishing the hardship faced by societies affected by climate change and questions of international responsibility (Felli and Castree 2012, 3). Focusing on household and societal resilience as imperatives for governance, in turn, overlooked how communities most affected by climate change are hardly responsible for carbon emissions and global warming (see Atapattu 2020; Bettini, Nash, and Gioli 2017; Whyte, Talley, and Gibson 2019), imposing the costs of adapting to those that are already at the margins of the International System (Chandler 2020) through the creation of 'adaptable human subjects' (Felli and Castree 2012, 1). Building discursive scripts upon resilience and technocracy also partook in a distinct temporal imagination (see Falk 2016): policy goals are set with the objective of coping with climate change and allowing humanity to move back to a time of

pristine peace and stability. This pristine nature, however, is but part of a 'toxic nostalgia'[34] (see Klein 2022, online): a false, constructed memory of a good Holocene, in which the planet was not in spasm (see Wapner 2020) and great powers were not affected by climate change adverse impacts. Hence, while the securitization schema feared the emergence of billions of 'migrants from the Anthropocene', discourses on migration-as-adaptation aimed at inserting migrants into the International Division of Labor with the ultimate goal of trying to return to the long-gone Holocene stability.

3.3 Final remarks

The literature on climate migration is often systematized in two ways: the disciplinary divide (see Ferris 2020; Piguet, Kaenzig, and Guélat 2018) or the 'climate maximalism-minimalism' debate (for other denominations, see Baldwin, Methmann, and Rothe 2014; Baldwin and Bettini 2017; Morrissey 2012). While these are widely disseminated across the scholarship, they are arguably not sufficient for an analysis of how climate migration is governed and intersubjectively constituted at the global level. In this chapter, I proposed a different way in which we can analyze the different scholarships and discourses engaging with the governance of climate-related human migration: through critical governance studies, with the backdrop of the 'epoch' divide between the Holocene and the Anthropocene. By way of this, I aim to demonstrate possible caveats, gaps, and the relevance of a research agenda on the governance and governmentality of climate migration. I also aimed to introduce and locate this thesis' CDA results in relation to epistemic debates.

Table 3: Discourses on climate migration at the Global Climate Adaptation Governance architecture and their elements

Schemata	Frame	Genealogy	Pathologies	Characteristics
Burden-sharing/'environmental injustice'	Environmental refuge	Environmental determinism (e.g., Neomalthusianism); Methodologically unsound estimatives of billions of 'refugees'	Securitization and self-fulfilling prophecy	Apocalyptical discourses – vocabulary and overwording to represent migration as a security threat
				Universalization and dismissal of responsibility – passive voice and use of a universal 'we' to represent humanity
				Negative temporal imagination (Falk 2016) – deontic modality

[34] In Naomi Klein's (2022, online) words, 'all these nostalgia-based movements and figures share a longing for something else, something which may seem unrelated but is not. A nostalgia for a time when fossil fuels could be extracted from the earth without uneasy thoughts of mass extinction, or children demanding their right to a future, or Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change reports'.

Migration-as-adaptation thesis	Climate migration; 'planned relocation and 'managed retreats'	New Economics of Labor Migration; Sustainable Livelihood Approaches	Resilience	Part of a 'toxic nostalgia' (Klein 2022) narrative – deontic modality and euphemisms to represent migration as something to be 'averted' or 'planned' so that humanity can return to an alleged 'pristine' nature
				Disregard for international, planetary, and historical responsibilities – the culprit of migration is on the household/local level; migrants have no agency (passive objects in transitivity analysis)
			Technocracy	Overlook of migrants' hardships – migration passively constituted as a tool to increase adaptive capacities in context-free discourses
				Depoliticization – migration is no longer a complex issue but a technical one

Source: author's elaboration.

Rather than pursuing an all-encompassing literature review, then, my aim here was twofold. First, in the literature review, to explore how climate migration was intersubjectively constituted by expert communities, exposing its discursive frames and governance implications as in and between the Holocene-Anthropocene debate. And secondly, by applying these to the discourses and final documents critical analysis, to understand how these discourses (re)produced climate migration within adaptation governance and vice-versa. Main results are summarized in the table 3 (above).

Considering the pathological co-constitution of climate migration in the international social system, is there any possibility for us to conceive of its governance in the Anthropocene in such a way that promotes migrants' emancipation and considers (im)mobility in all its complexity? That is what we are investigating in the next chapter.

4 'CLIMATE MOBILITY': THE ANTHROPOCENE AND LIBERAL COSMOPOLITANISM

As the backdrop of this thesis is the idea that we are going through a new epoch, the Anthropocene. Regardless of the different concepts and discussions regarding it, one thing that is commonplace is that the Anthropocene calls for a more inter and transdisciplinarity[35]. Even though interdisciplinarity is hardly a new thing for socioenvironmental studies (in many ways, the whole field of sustainability studies was interdisciplinary by 'nature'), the 'epoch debates' prompted a novel momentum for research not confined to a single discipline, especially those that deal with approaches from earth system and social sciences. Without interdisciplinarity, analyses about the Anthropocene might fail at overcoming the Holocene rationale they denounce.

This modernist agenda for the Anthropocene ends up incurring some of the common-held criticism around global governance. It overestimates the applicability of institutional designs, fails to engage with questions of structural and relational power (see Barnett and Duvall 2005; Clapp and Fuchs 2009), and misses the complexity of world history (Moore 2017) and the entanglements of living (Tsing 2015) that drove the international community to the current state of emergency, overlooking the planetary responsibility some actors have concerning the ecological calamity[36] (see Bernstein 2020). Hence, it reassures rather than overcomes worldviews typical of the Holocene (Dryzek and Pickering 2019). Hinging from the reluctance to move beyond state-centrism and focusing on international institutions that are hardly actual instances of 'global' governance – but rather modernist and elitist constructions (Dunford 2017) –, it sustains a technocratic position (Chandler 2018; 2019a) embedded with the Cartesian divide between human and nature (Biermann 2021a).

The previous chapter and this one put forward the argument that, despite conceptual and theoretical dissimilarities, the discursive (re)production of climate migration is still entrapped within Holocene, modernist, or neoliberal outlooks of global governance. As such, it frames climate-related human migration as an exception in a crisis setting, suggesting that it should be averted in every possible way by closing borders and thus securitizing climate migration; or governed pathologically, either by 'command-and-control' stripping away migrants' agency, or depoliticizing the links between climate change and human mobility through a technocracy and

[35] In this regard, an interesting example is a heuristic proposed by the Anthropocene Working Group, suggesting the recognition of both an uppercase Anthropocene (based on stratigraphic criteria, formally part of the Geological Time Scale) and a lowercase anthropocene or anthropocenes, grasped through interdisciplinary lenses (Zalasiewicz et al. 2017; see Braje 2018 apud Bauer and Ellis 2018).

[36] Questioning the modernist framework embedded in the Anthropocene's concept recalls how capitalism has shaped the current status of our ecological emergence and how colonialism and racism are also deeply embedded in its foundation (see Danewid 2020; Gill 2021b). As Donna Haraway quotes, 'we need stories (and theories) that are just big enough to gather up the complexities and keep the edges open' (Haraway 2015, 160). Every single concept found in the literature presents its own history. The Capitalocene (Moore 2017), the Plantationocene (Haraway 2015), the Kinocene (Nail 2019), and others entail different perspectives and constructions of different worlds (e.g., Gill 2021b; Inoue 2018; Pedersen 2021). Restricting the analysis to the anthropocene, either uppercase or lowercase, would involve epistemological and ontological violence to those that were left behind by the modernist agenda. This violence is, in many ways, embedded within the liberal order (Baron et al. 2019, 200) and obscured by mainstream narratives that ignore how some parts of humankind and the non-human world are not considered subjects of ethical consideration (Gill 2021a; Mitchell 2015).

resilience fixation. Hence, the framings of climate migration in the Holocene are embedded with the pathological path-dependencies of securitization, technocracy, and societal resilience.

There are, however, a few scholars that criticized these frameworks and envisioned how climate mobility might be best constituted or understood in and for the Anthropocene. They have engaged with migration via interdisciplinary theories and concepts and thus, explicitly or not, sought to surpass Holocene paradigms for global governance. Most of these have departed from the 'mobility turn' in social sciences that pushes forward an interpretation for (im)mobility as the rule of social life and not as its exception. Building upon this paradigm, critical scholars have posited that we should not treat climate-related human migration as a separate issue but instead as a part of the 'Anthropocene mobilities' (Baldwin, Fröhlich, and Rothe 2019; Bettini 2019) or 'environmental mobilities' (Boas et al. 2018; 2022; Wiegel, Boas, and Warner 2019). This framework is arguably more at home with a political paradigm for the Anthropocene as it overcomes the cartesian divide between humanity and nature and thus regards migration in a more-than-human approach. Whereas by doing so they overcame some of the Holocene pathologies that are enclosed within conventional discourses on climate migration, there are still hindrances to their application for the study and governance of international migration, especially concerning the prevalence of abstract notions that, I will argue, are still (partly) entrapped within liberal cosmopolitanism discourses. Considering how the 'mobility turn' influenced critical scholarship on climate migration, I plan to highlight in this chapter how, despite conceptual and political advances, engaging with climate migration via the 'mobility turn' can give emergence to (or at least reinforce) another governance pathology, one that we perhaps might call 'migration-by-cosmopolitanism'.

Thus, this chapter is divided into three main parts. First, I present the 'mobility' turn in social sciences and migration studies, presenting the New Mobilities Paradigm and the 'Mobility Justice' approach. I then counterpoint with some critiques these approaches have received throughout different scholarships, especially via critical governance studies. I argue that discussing the potential and hindrances of mobility studies is a necessary step for us to truly engage with critical analyses of discourses and pathological schemata of (re)production of power through Holocene's frames of climate change and (im)mobility. Finally, the last section highlights some approaches that mobilized climate migration in the Anthropocene, such as the 'Environmental Mobilities" and the 'Anthropocene Mobilities', as they are entangled with Anthropocene as a new political and analytical paradigm, envisioning if and how we can conceive of climate mobility governance in the Anthropocene.

4.1 The age of 'mobility' and the New Mobilities Paradigm

In 2016, two pieces were influential in creating a new field of study and a novel approach to human migration. Mimi Sheller and John Urry's paper, entitled 'The New Mobilities Paradigm' (NMP), reflected upon how social sciences were unequipped to deal with mobility and change. They then argued that a new paradigm was being formed across several disciplines; among them, 'anthropology, cultural studies, geography, migration studies, science and technology studies, tourism and transport studies, and sociology' (Sheller and Urry 2006, 207). Later in the same year, Hannam, Sheller, and Urry (2006) published the first editorial of the *Mobilities Journal*, establishing a proper venue for studies about 'both the large-scale movements of

people, objects, capital and information across the world, as well as the more local processes of daily transportation, movement through public space and the travel of material things within everyday life'. Ever since these two popular papers came out, a research agenda has arguably formed around the NMP (see Sheller 2020). More than a catchword, the 'mobility turn' spawned a great interest in theoretical and methodological shifts that were necessary for researching social mobile objects in the 21st century. As Sheller and Urry (Sheller and Urry 2006, 1) evaluated, a community of research centers and scholars applied the paradigm for their research design and thus pushed 'normal', 'sedentarist', 'bounded', and 'static' social sciences to the study of moving objects.

We may summarize the numerous NMP's premises[37] in six key features and concerns. First, social science is unequipped to deal with mobility and thus needs to 'change both the objects of its inquiries and the methodologies for research' (Sheller and Urry 2006, 208) Second, it is mobility and not stasis that is the rule and prime force of social life (Nail 2015b). Third, there is a 'mobility turn' creating a new paradigm in different disciplines within social sciences (Sheller and Urry 2016). Fourth, we should question 'romantic theories of mobility' that equate movement with freedom and overlook immobility in the process (Sheller 2018) Five, there is much to gain by engaging with mobility and immobility of humans, non-humans, and things in the same relational analytical framework (Adey 2006). Finally, the sixth point is that by focusing on mobility, researchers can shift more easily between scales of action and analysis since a relational approach calls for an overcoming of the territorial constraints common to social inquiry ('methodological nationalism', for instance) and consequentially moves beyond binarism such as between global and local (Sheller and Urry 2006, 209).

Among the several existing theories of migration, NMP has some prominent contributions to the field of climate change-related human displacement (see Sheller 2020, 40). While the arguments for doing so vary, it is safe to say that critical scholars found the mobilities' analytical framework helpful to engage with human migration outside of simplistic or over-deterministic theories, offering 'a starting point for an extended research agenda' (Wiegel, Boas, and Warner 2019, 7). As Sheller and Urry (Sheller and Urry 2016, 2) pointed out, this increased interest in mobility also derived from a discontent toward 'normal' social science research and its sedentarist methods, theories, and concepts. Instead of delving into the reasons why scholars started to engage with mobilities approaches, I want to present four ways in which this paradigm might progress our understanding of the relation between climate change and human migration, with a cross-cutting focus on governing in the Anthropocene.

The first is that unlike the environmental determinism that led to securitization or the NELM and SLA approaches which substantiated the migration-as-adaptation thesis, the NMP does not restrict its analysis to the Cartesian divide typical of Holocene framings of climate migration. In other words, 'environmental factors' are deemed as relationally connected with what mainstream migration theories call 'social factors'. Without this artificial divide, the maximalist approach that corroborates the narrative leading to the securitization of climate

[37] In fact, the NMP initial formulation abstracted from six bodies of theories from the 20th century, and in the 15 years spanning between the creation of the Mobilities Journal and this thesis, a few more have influenced how mobility studies unfolded. For more details, see Sheller and Urry (2006), Adey (2006), Sheller (2020), and Adey et al. (2021). For a few critical appraisals, see Glick Schiller and Salazar (2013) and Baerenholdt (2013).

migration is questioned – because, after all, without the simple determinism that equates climate changes with the increase of forced displacement from the Global South, there is no reason to fear that billions of 'climate barbarians' (Bettini 2013a, 69) will reach the borders of developed nations. Even more, as every mobility is relational and interdependent with other forms of movement, there would be aspects of climate mobility in every single international and domestic mixed-migration flow, diminishing the character of an international crisis that is input to climate change and human displacement in 21st century international politics.

The second insight that the NMP informs to the study on climate migration is related to its proposition of a mobile ontology, that is, by how the research agenda traces back the ontology of our time to mobility and not to stasis. Within social sciences' traditional paradigms, Hannam, Sheller, and Urry (2006, 5) argue, methodological and theoretical approaches are often 'sedentarist', with both concepts and objects treated as stable and incapable of moving or dealing well with changes. This is present in global governance studies, too: a common critique of the Holocene discourses regarding resilience is that stability is not only the norm but also the goal (Dryzek and Pickering 2019), and hence the normative objective of governing is to go back to a pristine time of unchanging nature. However, through a mobile ontology, agency is not confined to sedentarist concepts, and resilience might start to feel unappealing if there is no fixed point in time and space to which we should desire to move back.

A third contribution, moreover, can be inferred from the combination of the two above: the close approximation of mobilities approaches to more-than-human perspectives. By way of the relational approach that overcomes the Cartesian divide, the human centrality in social life and science is contested, and hence other forms of movement are considered interwoven to the constitution of human mobilities (see Fishel 2019). Even more, albeit mobile ontologies are a novelty for mainstream social sciences, they are entwined with many indigenous cosmovisions and worlds (Suliman et al. 2019; Whyte, Talley, and Gibson 2019). Thus, the New Mobilities Paradigm comes closer to a transdisciplinary[38] inquiry of climate migration, abstracting from indigenous knowledges and from non-human agencies that verge on the reflexivity needed for governing and researching in the Anthropocene – even if partially still.

The fourth and final addition of the NMP to the study of climate migration is related to how, unlike conventional migration theories, the paradigm tries to engage also with immobility, moving beyond the 'mobility bias'. While historically migration studies have only looked at those that are on the move as their object of study and neglected those that were forced or that chose to stay in place, NMP's research agenda puts as much attention to immobility as to mobility itself (Hannam, Sheller, and Urry 2006, 15). In their opening article, the Mobility Journal's editors stressed that there is an 'unequal power relation' that defines who can and cannot move. Mimi Sheller, in a more recent piece, claimed that most mobilities depend heavily on the movement and non-movement of others, with a clear relational ontology between mobility and immobility (Sheller 2018).

[38] Much of this more-than-human research within NMP has investigated how different mobilities are interrelated to the movement of humans, as with how production chains or information streams affect how we move in cities or transnationally. Nevertheless, in the same manner as much of social sciences that try to gather insights from non-Western world-making, it is often applied through an instrumentalization and hierarchization of multiple knowledge systems and not through a real integration with indigenous or more-than-human cosmovisions. For a detailed account of more-than-human approaches to climate mobility, see Fishel (2019).

Along these lines, the paradigm moves beyond common descriptions of migration as flows of people between places due to 'push and pull factors'. While some problematic narratives contend that trapped populations or immobile communities stay in place because they are not 'pushed' strongly enough from their homeland or 'pulled' toward their destiny, NMP's relational approach led to the implication that it is overly simplistic to define it as such. Conversely, a relational approach suggests that people and places are mutually constituted so that neither is fixed before mobility happens. In their words, 'places are often presumed to be relatively fixed, given and separate from those visiting', while 'rather there is a complex relationality of places and persons connected' (Hannam, Sheller, and Urry 2006, 13). This has significance for the study of national and international borders as well, since Sheller (Sheller 2018, Kindle loc. 3133), abstracting from poststructuralist studies, defines borders as co-constituted both by mobility and stasis. In this regard, borders are then 'a complex assemblage of people and things, data and bodies, objects and representations, all of which are put into relative relations of (im)mobility with each other'. Thus, immobility and 'trapped populations' can be traced back to the core of the NMP framework instead of an exception or anomaly.

Whereas justice concerns are widely spread in the scholarship, Sheller (2018), one of the founders of the *Mobilities Journal* and a prominent scholar on the 'mobility turn', proposes that the NMP can be of significance to reflect upon how justice concerns are sedentarist in nature. She sets forth a set of normative principles that should be followed if we are to achieve justice in mobility affairs. For that, she abstracted from different concepts and theories of justice, some of which much aligned with climate justice. The principles she sets out spawn across different scales, from the person to the planetary, and involve a great array of issues – which are, she argues, relational and crosscut. She does so by not only framing justice as a question of mobility but by 'mobilizing justice', aiming to 'decolonize the very approaches [academic research] employs, for example, by keeping out ideas and practices around transport and mobility from the Global South or from Indigenous knowledge or from critical disabilities scholarship' (Sheller 2018, Kindle loc. 205).

Following Sheller's narrative, mobility justice is necessary because of three 'apparently separate crises' involving (im)mobility: climate, urbanization, and refugee crises. Differently from securitization schemata, she claims that, while a crisis framework can be problematic, 'a focus on mobility crises remains a helpful rubric to think across these multi-scalar projects of managing, contesting, disrupting, and subverting unjust (im)mobilities'. Through a discursive frame of crises, however, she plans to 'turn the language of crisis back on itself' by recognizing how these are a result of the 'politics and power relations of (im)mobilities' (Sheller 2018, Kindle loc. 243). Thus, rather than a single 'problem' or pathology to be dealt with, climate migration is part of a relational and multi-scalar production of the way mobility and immobility are governed – or, as she proposes, of the way mobility is exercised by the unjust distribution of the 'mobile common', which is a 'kinopolitical struggle' (Sheller 2018, Kindle loc. 4158).

Considering these, then, we can argue that the New Mobility Paradigm is better positioned for a non-pathological framing of climate migration than those discourses I have defined as iterating the Holocene. Via the centering of mobility within the analytical framework, recognition of the movement of non-human animals and things, and (even if partially) dilution of the artificial divide between society and nature, studies of 'climate

mobilities' are better equipped for inquiring and exploring how the governance of climate-related human displacement could unfold in the Anthropocene. Securitization is strayed away from the research agenda as mobility is not considered an exception in a crisis setting, and the migration-as-adaptation thesis is at the very least complexified to move away from technocratic solutions. Hence, a mobility framework for climate migration can better inform international institutions, policy-makers, and humanitarian actors in the Anthropocene (Baldwin and Bettini 2017; Wiegel, Boas, and Warner 2019).

4.2 Power and the 'Planetary' cosmopolitics of mobility

Nevertheless, there are still a few shortcomings of the New Mobility Paradigm that can be found in critical scholarships, as well as some hindrances that appear when trying to apply it to the study and governance of climate mobility. These are fit for this thesis because I argue that, despite conceptual and practical advances, the climate mobility scholarship may fall into a pathological path-dependency of its own making – what I call here 'migration-as-cosmopolitanism'. For that, however, we need first to delve into two key questions and critiques of mobility studies that are already well-developed in critical literature: (i) their analytical purchase; and (ii) the overlooking of planetary dynamics, hegemony, and structural power relations.

The first question we should set out here is: 'what is the benefit of understanding human migration and other forms of mobility through the same analytical lens'? Or, more specifically for this thesis' argument, what is the analytical purchase of understanding human forced migration via the same framework applied for every other form of mobility? The tautological nature of the mobility turn was already debated (see Adey 2006; Glick Schiller and Salazar 2013), and a few of NMP's prominent authors have contested it accordingly (see Sheller and Urry 2016; Sheller 2018). This, in fact, was already disputed since the Mobilities' editorial, as they were aware that 'certain critics argue that there is no analytical purchase in bringing together so broad a field' (Hannam, Sheller, and Urry 2006, 9). Whereas since their first editorial the paradigm was centered on a relational and complex system framework, the analytical benefit of uniting so broad a range of objects of studies and theories for analyses is open to contestation. For once, departing from how the different categories of human migration have dissimilar implications and considering how capitalism, colonialism, and other geopolitical and planetary dynamics influence migrants' decision-making, we should be wary of the possibility that the 'mobility turn' might overlook particular hardships and power dynamics for the study of international migrations (see Glick Schiller and Salazar 2013).

This critical instance is necessary to consider mobility and immobility as always politically situated. The boundary between a relational and a tautological approach rests on methodological and epistemological implications, and thus the NMP needs to recognize, as Adey (2006) first denounced it, that 'if everything is mobile, nothing is mobile'. There are indeed different power dynamics at play in smart cities' automobility, everyday life transportation, and transnational migration forced by conflicts or disasters. In fact, Sheller and Urry (2006, 210) claimed that they 'do not insist on a new "grand narrative" of mobility, fluidity, or liquidity'. Despite their statement, I contend that without critical reflexivity, the NMP might fall within the same liberal subjectivity it is aimed at complexifying and

overcoming, normalizing or at least depoliticizing human migration (in that, see the discussion on mobility justice, section 4.2).

The second question present in critical scholarships can be summed up in the following: 'how does NMP's framework deal with scale and power?'. Since the early 2000s, especially due to its theoretical influences, most of the 'mobility turn'-related research was centered around microscales of actions, trying to 'capture fleeting moments of movement, while not being explicit enough about the larger apparatus of power' (Sheller 2016, 3). Via their research foci on specific locations such as airports, cities, or even smaller spaces, scholars have developed and applied more 'mobile methods' that could account for how mobility was the prime force of social interactions. However, in these processes, larger or more structural power relations flinched away from the theory's core. The major implication of this fixation on small scales was that it ended up dismissing the governance of mobility or how power is exerted through mobility – and hence sidelining power constraints that are more visible at larger scales, such as structural and territorial power that are features of the international system and that can be attainable by analyzing global governance architectures.

An argument that was put forward is that not only we should look more in-depth at the governance of mobility, but also that mobility – in all its forms – is used as a political technology for governing. Baerenholdt (2013) named this the 'governmobility', or 'governance through mobilities'. He argued that, despite mobility's overarching presence in everyday life and international dynamics, it should not be normalized or stripped of political content, seeing that 'mobility is infused with power' (Bærenholdt 2013, 20). Mobility in this sense can be a political technology used for governing, especially as it creates a strategy for keeping people in place or moving, as power interests dictate. By a syncretism between post-structuralism and mobility studies, he proposes that 'the regulation of mobilities is internalized in people's mobile practices', which means that mobility and mobility power stand at the core of societal dynamics of movement while are also constitutive of governance mechanisms.

Even further, other sources of power dynamics are often disregarded in mobility studies. One such example is the power exerted by governments through their usage of territorial constraints to bound people in place or move them around. Without it, nation-states and their power relations are excluded from the theory's framework (Glick Schiller and Salazar 2013, 9). Acknowledging this handicap has led a few scholars to engage with mobility not through NMP but by claiming that one should be concerned with 'regimes-of-mobility', which 'calls attention to the role both of individual states and of changing international regulatory and surveillance administrations that affect individual mobility' (Glick Schiller and Salazar 2013, 7). What these two concepts exemplify, after all, is that without an interrogation of larger dynamics of power, mobility studies are confined to 'a dominant interest in, if not even fascination with, the micro-sociology and phenomenology of mobile practices rather than macro issues', with concerns of 'issues of power, hegemony and social order' (Bærenholdt 2013, 21) sidelined.

The governmobility and regimes of movement frameworks are not only relevant to NMP's research agenda but also to this thesis' particular objective. Formal analyses within climate migration studies tend to suggest, either as a justification for studies or as a result of normative investigations, that climate mobility is hitherto 'not governed' and that it is positioned at a 'global governance gap', implying that it lacks governance of any sort. While

some works have departed from a reading of International Law to argue that there are no policy instruments readily available for these migrants, and others have explored discourses at the national level to unravel power dynamics, the majority of the scholarship so far has equated the lack of formal instruments to a lack of governmentality. Nevertheless, by departing from a critical outlook, we may be reminded that it is not because climate-related human displacement is not yet present at any formal and final arrangements that it is an issue not governed transnationally. Rather, the informality of its regime of governance is, borrowing Baerenholdt's words, 'infused with power' and might serve specific power interests. Hence, I argue that one should not limit analysis to formal governance mechanisms to inquire about climate mobility. Departing from the governmobility framework opens venues for interrogating how climate change and migration might be informally governed, which is an indication of why critically analyzing international discourses might hint at how states and other international actors have governed the issue.

We can attest to some of these situations by going back to the Holocene schemata of discourses discussed in the last chapter. Through exploring discourses within international negotiations, I reflected upon how international actors have disseminated frames of burden-sharing and migration as an adaptation tool to address (or, perhaps more appropriately, to 'solve') climate mobility. The results suggest which actors have had the power to, through discourses, disseminate norms and discursive framings to shape the governance architecture by constituting the policing of the issue in specific terms. We can grasp how these same actors have (re)produced pathological path-dependencies for the global governance of climate migration, failing into securitization, technocracy, a fetishization of societal resilience, and a liberal cosmopolitanism, all the while formal mechanisms were sidelined in the name of technical adaptation concerns.

Whereas the lack of formal governance mechanisms is sometimes equated to a lack of governance (or, more commonly, to a 'governance gap'), Baerenholdt's (2013) and Glick Schiller and Salazar's (2013) contributions open this for contestation. That is, rather than presuming that the limited presence of climate mobility in final documents results from a failure in governance processes, it might be precisely the informality of climate (im)mobility governance that powerful Global Governors desired. Through informal mechanisms, climate migrants were given a choice to either stay in place or migrate 'voluntarily', without legal status. Excluding them from legal instruments had a twofold impact: the most obvious one was of putting migrants in a place of human-rights vulnerability, undeserving of state protection. The second consequence, however, is more linked to capitalist dynamics, relating to how by being discursively constituted as 'illegal' or a 'pathological subject' in a space of alterity, the once to-be-protected 'environmental refugee' was now considered an economic migrant that can be exploited as a cheap workforce, subject to capital's primitive accumulation. In the migration-as-adaptation schema, migrants were encouraged to migrate in order to provide their household with remittances – while their rendition in a condition of 'irregularity', or at the very least precarity, leaves migrants susceptible to a 'deportation power' (de Genova and Peutz 2010; de Genova 2018) enforcing upon them a status of non-citizen. Via their rendition as adaptation agents, climate migrants were operated under the International Division of Labor's dynamics as a 'disposable industrial reserve army' created by climate change (Nail 2019, 378).

Hence, by being denied formal recognition, climate migrants are exposed to the *possibility* of deportation, expulsion, and other mechanisms due to a lack of legal conditions, which in turn places them upon a new form of vulnerability. However, 'the most productive power of deportation operates for the great majority of people who are susceptible to deportation but who do *not* get deported' (de Genova 2018, 24, own highlights). In other words, in the new age of migration and climate change, communities from former colonies in the Global South are put in a different but still enduring imperial, colonialist dynamic: stay in place to face the perils of climate change, or migrate to provide their life forces to capitalism heavy machinery 'in the exquisite form of illegalised (hence, deportable) migrant labour' (de Genova 2018, 26).

While the crisis-setting of the securitization frame is taken avail by the core of the International Division of Labor by depicting the climate migrant as 'illegal', the technocratic and resilient figure of the migrant as an adaptive tool also acts to put climate migrants into a neoliberal sociodynamic – all in all with the goal of creating a cheap workforce by expelling migrants from their country of origin (Nail 2019, 378). Rather than assume that it is an issue that is not governed, thus, via the governmobility of climate migration, we see how migrants are purportedly placed in a situation of vulnerability and irregularity. Due to a specific regime-of-mobility (of governing 'through' mobility), states can take avail of the dynamics of the International Refugee Regime and render climate migrants as 'illegals', so that their lives can be taken advantage for discursive, security, and economic reasons, while overlooking their international responsibility for these mobilities in the first place (see Führ, Anschau, and Gonçalves 2021). Through this governance architecture is how 'neo-liberal capitalism aims at strengthening particular governance mechanisms to deal with life on the margin – mostly life of the migrant who stands at the margin of society, economy, climate, security, market and reproduction' (Samaddar 2020, 183).

One instance where we can illustrate these cosmopolitan notions is Mimi Sheller's Mobility Justice (2018). Albeit it is unquestionable how the mobility justice framework advances much-needed concerns for international responsibility and brings climate justice to the NMP's core, it is embedded in the same abstract notions I have contested as discursively present in the migration-as-cosmopolitanism pathology. We can witness this by exploring the 'Principles for Mobility Justice', which summarizes the relational perspective on justice that she proposes (Sheller 2018, appendix). While most of the principles might help to achieve a better governance architecture for mobility in today's highly connected and interdependent society, I want to ponder here about the relationships she makes between spatial and transport justice with international migration and climate change issues, considering to which extent these principles grasp the complexities of climate (im)mobility. We may start by delving into three of her proposed principles, in which she specifically addresses climate change-related migration:

> - Those displaced by climate change shall have a *right to resettlement* in other countries, and especially in those *countries that contributed most to climate change*;
> - Principles of climate justice and environmental justice suggest that mobility consumed in one place should not externalize waste or pollution on other regions without *legitimately agreed upon deliberation, transparency, and reparations*;

> - Those industries and countries that have contributed the most to greenhouse gases and other forms of pollution have a responsibility of reparative justice to limit the impacts of their actions and to restore the atmosphere and environments as far as possible: a *global trust fund* shall be established into which polluters pay in order to meet the costs of urgent global climate change disasters (Sheller 2018, appendix, own highlights).

Since their first editorial, the proponents of the New Mobilities Paradigm have claimed that their approach was set on a non-cosmopolitan framework, in the sense that it does not see movement, migration, and mobility as tokens of freedom. Instead, they stress that there are different forms of mobilities, and that is part of their research interest to ponder how power shapes and revolves around these regimes of movement. Throughout prominent papers, they pointed out that while mainstream social science links migration to liberty, this concept of freedom is rather part of white, masculine, and bourgeois subjectivity. Sheller (2018, Kindle loc. 896) even compares the NMP with mainstream theories by reflecting upon how they are embedded in 'liberal notions of unfettered mobility, ever-increasing speed, and, in general, the framing of movement as freedom'. Hence, the NMP's counterpoint is not that migration should be enhanced and that all sorts of movement are inherently beneficial, but rather that life in the 21st century is immersed in mobility and not sedentarism – and research should thus track 'the power and politics of discourses and practices of mobility in creating both movement and stasis' (Hannam, Sheller, and Urry 2006, 4). They claim that their approach to mobilities problematizes both 'sedentarist' approaches in the social science that treats place, stability, and dwelling as a natural steady-state, and 'deterritorialized' approaches that posit a new "grand narrative" of mobility, fluidity or liquidity as a pervasive condition of postmodernity or globalization' (Hannam, Sheller, and Urry 2006, 5).

Despite that, even their most ambitious attempt to deal with critical governance is restricted to idealist or top-down coercive approaches similar to those criticized by Chandler, Cudworth, and Hobden (2018) as pertaining to a liberal cosmopolitan depiction of global governance. NMP's Principles for Mobility Justice only tackle climate injustice through abstractions such as 'deliberation, transparency, and reparations', and their most material suggestion is of a 'global trust fund' to help developing countries adaptative capacities, restricting solutions thus to market-based mechanisms. Efforts toward mitigation are sidelined for a 'right to resettlement', which is but part of a liberal narrative that somewhat depoliticizes migration in the global South and is embedded in the notion that migrants have the ultimate desire of living somewhere else (especially in developed countries, since the 'right to resettlement' is to be set preferably upon countries with high emissions' tracks). Hence, it reinforces apocalyptic discourses that strip migrants' agency and place them in a position of subordination to the goodwill of developed countries (see Baldwin 2017a). Arguably, the NMP still lacks a proper 'decolonial' or 'postmodern' turn that can lead it into the Anthropocene while recognizing the pervasiveness of capitalism, modernity, and imperialism dynamics – not only normatively but also institutionally.

Even more, the normative proposition of dealing with climate mobility through a liberal framing of great powers' responsibility, alongside burden-sharing, is bound to disregard the relationality of migration with the international political economy. That is, it contends that mobility justice can happen without any significant structural changes, entrenching justice into

a (reformed) capitalist and modernist international society (Baldwin, Fröhlich, and Rothe 2019, 290). All three of Sheller's (2020) recommendations for dealing with climate mobility outlined above are confronted by the harsh reality that, through climate change, capitalism encounters new venues for primitive accumulation and a renovated labor reserve via the framing of climate migrants as illegals (creating, then, 'surplus populations') (Samaddar 2020, 177). Therefore, while these principles can have more direct applicability to urban and transport justice and in this regard increase the scope of micro-level justice concerns, I argue that they have a troubled application for international climate migration. They reinforce a pathological cosmopolitanism rather than an emancipatory and transformational governance – and hence one can identify another Holocene pathology intrinsic to modernist and liberal discourses, the one of migration-as-cosmopolitanism.

In this sense, one should stress how limiting the non-recognition of structural components is for understanding the Anthropocene. Any cogent analysis aiming at interrogating existing socio-ecological crises needs to move beyond case-specific, technocratic solutions (see Chandler 2019a). Through a managerial universalist stance, Planetary Justice and the call for transformational thinking are ignored (Chandler, Cudworth, and Hobden 2018), and every solution proposed for dealing with the Anthropocene's challenges is allocated via individualistic changes (Maniates 2001) without structural considerations. Commonly proposed solutions for reaching the 'good Anthropocene' (see Bennett et al. 2016) are part of 'magical thinking', as termed by Maniates (2019), suggested as possible solutions all the while decoupled from and dismissing the pervasiveness of modernist and capitalism's rationale.

I suggested in the last sections that the Environmental, Anthropocene, and Mobility Justice approaches advance several of the Holocene pathologies typical of modernist discourses toward climate migration. I contend, however, that there are shortcomings of the New Mobilities Paradigm, concerning its (i) analytical purchase and (ii) the dismissal of larger dynamics of power (better denounced in the 'regimes of mobility' and 'governmobility' critiques). By way of these shortcomings, the NMP, without a further ingrain in postcolonial studies, might lead to the depoliticization of human migration and thus to a disregard of the hardships that migrants face in the Global South via a cosmopolitanism on migration and the dilution of its political differentiation into the mobilities framework. In their own way, they might originate pathological governance arrangements by restoring to 'abstract, high-flown and idealist notions' (see Chandler, Cudworth, and Hobden 2018, 193) commonly found in liberal cosmopolitanism discourses. However, this does not mean that they should be disregarded – conversely, they are starting points if grounded into yet other concepts and theories so it can take into account structural power, critical governance studies, and international political economy structural dynamics.

4.3 Moving forward: governing the ruins of mobility

So far, we have analyzed international discourses on climate migration made at international negotiations and final documents, inquiring about the agency-architecture co-constitution in the international social system. We have also discussed some of the critical scholarships that have tried, by abstracting from postmodern social theories, to conceive of climate migration more attuned to earth system and world-history dynamics. How can this whole scenery help devise a

global governance architecture suited for the Anthropocene and climate (im)mobility? For that, I contend that we need to delve a little deeper into the constitution of these discourses as part of the International Social System and ask ourselves if and how migration can be conceived outside of these Holocene pathologies and which institutions could be promoted for an Anthropocene political paradigm. My hunch was that looking at our purportedly global institutions and governors might give us important insights into how climate migration is constituted at the international scale – and that, in turn, could be an important step for envisioning a more just and reflexive global governance of and for climate migrants.

Within IR[39], fully grasping the Anthropocene entails more than recognizing the emergence of new topics for policy-making and research. It must involve an imaginative effort toward a new state of international affairs. Even if scholars are pointing out that the liberal international order can be reformed to 'survive' to the Anthropocene (e.g., Simangan 2020a) or that we can create 'a more just, prosperous, and ecological diverse world – a "good Anthropocene" ' (e.g., Bennett et al. 2016, 441) by, for instance, understanding how science can help us design 'plausible and desirable futures in the Anthropocene' (e.g., Bai et al. 2016), a genealogical effort indicates that the IR discipline, as part of a modernist project, is hardly equipped to adapt to the Anthropocene. If we are to enable different governance paths to emerge and 'appreciate rather than fear the Anthropocene condition' (Chandler 2018, 15), IR and global governance scholarships cannot be employed uncritically for devising a political and analytical approach for mobility in this new epoch.

4.3.1 Anthropocene mobilities

So, can IR in specific and social sciences more generally be useful for conceiving climate (im)mobility in the Anthropocene? Luckily, this same interrogation has already been placed elsewhere. A group of critical scholars has proposed different conceptualizations of climate change by putting forward mobile ontologies, placing works from 'mobility turn' in conversation with other postmodern and poststructuralist contributions, such as those found in the 'epoch' debates and more-than-human approaches. Most of these contributions have come from an international workshop held at the University of Hamburg in 2017, in which they reflected upon the possibilities of mobility in the Anthropocene seeking 'to initiate a fruitful dialogue between scholars working on climate change and human mobility, on the one hand, and scholars engaging with the Anthropocene concept and its theoretical and normative implications on the other' (Fröhlich and Rothe 2017, 3).

A special issue of the Mobilities journal resulted from the workshop, in which scholars were asked to reflect upon what mobilities meant and entailed in and for the Anthropocene. As a point of departure, papers at this special issue recognized the instability of this new epoch and, at the same time, acknowledged how the Anthropocene scholarship had still 'little to say about the ontological primacy of mobility and movement, the ever-presence of movement, in social life' (Baldwin, Fröhlich, and Rothe 2019, 289). They further claimed how mainstream

[39] Over time, the interdisciplinary character of the Anthropocene's scholarship moved from an initial moment of reluctance from Earth science scholars to engage with social sciences' contributions. The Earth System Governance project is one of these scholarly communities engaging with the Anthropocene in their work, as their last Science Plan recognizes the proposition of this new epoch as a 'contextual condition' (Burch et al. 2019, 5).

depictions of climate migration and the Anthropocene conceived climate change as dissociated from a world-history of capitalism, modernism, and colonialism, creating a 'toxic narrative' that saw human mobility as pathological (Bettini 2019, 337). Under this banner, 'governing mobility in the face of climate change (and the Anthropocene) becomes a way to reaffirm the privilege of the Western modern Anthropos' (Bettini 2019, 344), meaning in part that framing mobility as a singular issue to be dealt with dissociates it from more deep and existential questions, such as what it means to be human during times of climate change (see Baldwin 2017a). Rather than the age of the 'Anthropo', thus, a different terminology was suggested for the Anthropocene, in which movement and mobility are central: the 'Kinocene' (Nail 2019), derived from a 'Kinopolitics' or 'political theory of movement' (Nail 2015b, 24). Through it, the general account of migration as the result of crises is reversed to argue that movement, not stasis, defines 'postmodern' or 'late capitalist' societies.

As a result, they suggested that much of what we may frame as climate migration is 'actually better conceptualized as the result of colonialism rather than the climate' (Baldwin, Fröhlich, and Rothe 2019, 292). In other words, it is not climate change that possesses ontological agency to displace people but its social and political causes and effects that put these processes in motion. For that, it would make sense to abstract from Indigenous (Suliman et al. 2019; Whyte, Talley, and Gibson 2019) and non-human (Fishel 2019; Reid 2020) mobilities tradition to grasp the relationality of human (im)mobility in the Anthropocene, moving away from its simplistic rendition of an adaptation tool. Because, if mobility were the solution to adapting to climate change, 'we would not be in the Anthropocene' (Chandler 2019a, 385) seeing the prevalence of migration in international social reality. Framed in another way, the same rationale that enforced climate changes to the planet cannot be expected to effectively generate solutions to these crises, 'i.e., capitalism, colonialism, and the nation-state' (Nail 2019, 377).

Besides those contributions directly derived from the Anthropocene Mobilities workshop, there are still other perspectives that engage climate migration with mobilities' and Anthropocene's scholarships by directly relating to governance studies. The 'Environmental Mobility' (Wiegel, Boas, and Warner 2019) approach abstracts from mobilities perspectives to pave the way for governing environmental-related issues in the Anthropocene. As a manner to advance the understanding of climate change-related displacement and yet overcome 'alarmist' and 'optimistic' depictions of the phenomena (Wiegel, Boas, and Warner 2019, 2), its leading proponents suggested that we must grasp migration through a 'climate mobility' outlook – that is, through 'movements impacting on the environment, movements shaped by environmental factors, and harmful environmental flows' (Boas et al. 2018). Perhaps the most notorious contribution in this regard is Ingrid Boas and colleagues' (2019) paper on *Nature Climate Change*, which unequivocally called for a change in the theoretical framing of climate migration to a more mobility-laden perspective. By way of this, they argued, social sciences could avoid 'climate migration myths' and be more attuned to the diversity of climate-related movements, not only focusing on international migration but also on daily, internal, and non-human climate displacement (Boas et al. 2019, 902).

In two other papers, Wiegel, Boas, and Warner (2019), and Boas and colleagues (2018, 110) developed further the 'environmental/climate mobilities' approaches by abstracting

directly from NMP's scholarship. In the former, the three scholars departed from the 'environmental refugee' and 'migration-as-adaptation' discourses to form their critique of how these are detrimental to the actual governance of climate-related mobilities. They further argued that the 'mobility turn', when applied to climate migration, could take into account more plural debates, such as those that investigated the unequal power pattern that has led to these alarmist/optimistic views and the ones grounded on local experiences and field works on places affected by climate disasters. A mobilities perspective, embedded in a 'relational understanding of differential im/mobilities', is henceforth an 'analytical starting point' (Wiegel, Boas, and Warner 2019, 7) for a better intersection between migration and environmental politics studies.

In the latter, Boas and colleagues (2018, 120) reverse common governance studies by departing from 'social, material, temporal, and spatial characteristics of these environmental mobilities' to reflect upon their governance. Via a multi-case study on tourism, waste, and migration, they propose a novel lens to interrogate global environmental governance. Their main objective is not to advance climate migration research only but to depart from these mobilities to inform studies on sustainability governance. Thus, they apply NEP's framework for thinking about environmental and climate issues, prioritizing a mobile ontology for global environmental governance. Via environment mobilities perspectives, then, one arguably has a means to 'centralize the environmental problem', 'detect the governance gap and weaknesses of hegemonic governance arrangement', and 'help to illuminate the emergence of mobilities-oriented governance' (Boas et al. 2018, 120–21). Furthermore, the perspective also calls attention to the politics and subjectivities of the more-than-human world, expanding agency to mobile arrangements and the relationships of humanity with non-humans and objects that compose the 'environment', which is a feature not only of the mobilities framework but relational approaches more broadly.

Despite their onto-epistemological dissimilarities, these propositions are better suited for an Anthropocene-centered debate on climate migration, taking into account mobility, colonialism, and critical governance studies – and hence move beyond 'toxic narratives' typical of Holocene's framings of climate mobility (Bettini 2019, 137). By uniting global environmental governance, Anthropocene critical scholarship, and the 'mobility turn', these scholars proposed that there are significant contributions we can infer by framing migration as part of the Anthropocene and not as its exception. From a normative standpoint, the Anthropocene stands as a useful term for contestation across disciplines and international policy (see Chandler 2018) while calling for a necessity for new political paradigms (see Biermann 2021a), a critical review of international institutions (see Dryzek 2016; Dryzek and Pickering 2019), and a more attuned look to climate change and humanity's relationship to the environment (see Haraway et al. 2016). Whereas common narratives purportedly argue that these events are derived from a species act of a 'universal man', a more reflexive analysis departing from postcolonialism studies and critical theory shows how these were hardly universal. Accordingly, interrogating climate mobility under the Anthropocene calls for a recognition of its instance as part of a 'crisis of humanism' (Baldwin 2017a). While justice concerns allow one to recognize how specific states, companies, and institutions have a planetary responsibility toward climate change and mobility, the Anthropocene and environmental mobilities approaches denounces how the same ('sedentarist') modernist

rationale that caused the current socio-ecological crisis is not capable of resolving it (Wapner and Elver 2016, 2). Or, stating differently, the institutions causing the increase of climate-related displacement are unable (nor willing) to govern it (Nail 2019).

Via mobile ontologies, an IR outlook for climate mobility in the Anthropocene faces a twofold challenge. First, mobile methods and theories are needed to engage with mobile things, and thus mainstream IR approaches (based on static concepts) cannot fully deal with climate change and migration. Secondly, and perhaps even more far-reaching, if one puts mobility as the center and not as the exception of politics, then human migration is the rule of the international system and not 'sedentary' citizenship – or, at least, both must be understood as interwoven. The forgetfulness of migration affairs within International Studies is then open to questioning, and genealogical efforts can show how this scenario is socially constructed through narratives of empires, colonialism, and racism. By placing an 'ontology of moving' and not one of being, we are able to interpret migration not as an exception but rather the rule, with nomadism taking precedence over sedentarism in history. Suppose we are all 'becoming migrants' as we are all moving between different borders, both spatial and temporal, political, juridical, and economic (Nail 2015b). In that case, there is not ultimately a reason to interpret sedentarism or citizenship as the innate norm within international politics (see Squire 2020). Or conversely, there is no justification for why forced migration should always be framed in crisis settings (see Crawley and Skleparis 2018) nor for it to be instrumentalized as something to be taken avail within migration strategies (Nail 2015b; 2019).

4.3.2 Noticing instability: resilience and reflexivity

We have a few hints of how to overcome Holocene pathologies and enmesh mobility with the Anthropocene. For once, we must thoroughly interrogate how climate migrants are availed by capitalist dynamics not to disregard emergent structural qualities of late capitalist societies and fall into a liberal cosmopolitan narrative. At a discursive level, we also recognized how pathological path-dependencies are set on different schemata by abstracting from very specific temporal imaginations, dealing with climate migration either in a negative future, permanently on the horizon to justify present's decision-making (through futurology), or in a return to a past time of stability and pristine nature entangled with a 'toxic nostalgia' (through resilience). Critical scholarships also have called how research needs to be set more grounded with migrants' actual experience and to the empirics of climate-related human flows, appreciating the world-making capacities of migrants as political subjects and dismantling the fear of migrants (in the sense of alterity) and its objectification within adaptation plannings (in the sense of technocracy). And last but not least, one must acknowledge mobilities' prevalence in international social reality and yet avert falling into a liberal cosmopolitan narrative that sees migration as a token of freedom, by interrogating if these movements are part of an emancipation project – or, conversely, as part of a technologization of mobility governance perpetrated by a kinetic elite (who, by externalizing movement, turns the mobility and immobility of others into kinetic power).

Still missing in this panorama is how and if these considerations can be mobilized for a governance approach. Within IR and global governance scholarships, this genealogy indicates that climate mobility challenges the core of institutional and disciplinary boundaries not only

to conceive of human migration beyond modernist frameworks but also to surpass Cartesian binarisms in international institutions and norms. Among these, artificial divides between society and nature, local and global (or also national and international), and mobility and stasis are especially detrimental to the governance of climate mobility. These contradictions have crosscut impacts in the political community, as the institutions responsible for our current socio-ecological crisis are still deemed as solutions for dealing with (or even 'solving') the Anthropocene (Dryzek and Pickering 2019). Despite the rise of critical scholarships interrogating the Anthropocene and its implications for Global Governance, there is still only a limited space to envision novel institutions, norms, and rules that are not embedded in a Holocene, modernist framework; that is, institutions that do not run in a top-down fashion with 'command-and-control' instruments (Chandler 2018; Chandler, Cudworth, and Hobden 2018). If these institutions can be traced back as part of the causes of our climate breakdown, they are hardly desirable if we are to create new instances of governance suited for the Anthropocene (Nail 2019).

Therefore, global governance must be rethought to adapt to these planetary challenges – and how this 'rethinking' is bound to happen is one of the questions that IR scholars must grapple with. Perhaps the most relevant condition of the Anthropocene that serves as a herald for fully grasping human and more-than-human mobility concerns instability. The fast-changing reality of the Anthropocene disrupts the notion of stability that was tantamount to governing in the Holocene (Dryzek and Pickering 2019; Pickering 2019). Most institutions were designed around conservation principles, with the goal of restoring the state of affairs to a pristine time of stable, unchanging conditions. The Anthropocene challenges these assumptions to their essences, as movement is no longer an exception but the rule (Nail 2019, 377). For instance, while borders are used to restrict the movement of people, they cannot restrain climate change spatially (Chandler 2019a; Nail 2019). This mismatch between stability and movement, and the dilution of the national and international's spatial differentiation, are some of the signs of how the Holocene's institutional setting cannot account for climate mobility within the Anthropocene (Baldwin, Fröhlich, and Rothe 2019).

Two institutional qualities[40] that can be found as ways forward to achieve efficient and desirable governance in the Anthropocene are resilience and ecological reflexivity. Resilience is perhaps the most disseminated interdisciplinary approach for engaging with socio-ecological systems within social sciences. Although the terminology is plural and different conceptualizations are present in the scholarship (see Thorén and Olsson 2018, 3; Thorén and Persson 2015), in a broader sense they all refer to resilience as 'the ability to cope with stress or, more precisely, to return to some form of normal condition after a period of stress' (Olsson et al. 2015, 1). Resilience is pervasive both in the Anthropocene, climate adaptation, and migration studies and governance, albeit in a problematic and technocratic nature (see Humbert

[40] One can find several proponents for 'governance virtues' to adapt global governance throughout the literature, especially those that engage with the Anthropocene. Here I have focused on these two because (despite space constraints) resilience is arguably the most disseminated across social sciences, receiving much scholarly attention, and is determinant to grasping the migration-as-adaptation thesis. Ecological reflexivity, however, is arguably the most useful for exploring the GCAG, as it encompasses several characteristics of adaptive, imaginative, transformative, and experiential governance. For a critical assessment of how these concepts differ, see Dryzek and Pickering (2019) and Pickering (2019).

and Joseph 2019, 5–6). That is, it is utilized as a proposition of a necessary quality for humanity to act throughout its institutions to 'bounce back' to times of stability and cohesion, i.e., the Holocene (Chandler 2019b; 2020). However, in cases in which institutions are malfunctioning or part of the problem, resilience thinking with its focus on conservationism and preventing collapse (Olsson et al. 2015, 6) can act not as a virtue but rather as a pathology, because its resilient nature will tend to keep institutions from reflecting and improving (Chandler 2014; 2019a; Dryzek and Pickering 2019). Under this formulation, resilience is part of the 'driving beat' of progress (Tsing 2015, 21), restraining institutions from affirming the emergence of the Anthropocene and the Holocene demise.

Ecological reflexivity can arguably help to overcome this hindrance. If our socio-ecological crises are characterized by a changing earth system in which the climate and the challenges to global governance change rapidly, institutions should be able to change rapidly, too. That is why Dryzek (2016, 6) contends that any institution proper to govern in the Anthropocene requires a capacity for ecological or ecosystemic reflexivity – that is, the ability to alter its functioning and nature as a response to its performance and the Earth System's. It is thus 'the antidote to [problematic] path dependency' (Dryzek 2016, 2), while resilience might reinforce these dysfunctions. Pickering (2019, 6–7) suggest that ecological reflexivity can be framed in three components: (i) recognition (of its past, current, and future impacts); (ii) rethinking (by learning from its past and critical reviewing its core values for the future); and (iii) response (by reconfiguring its nature and performance). By this terminology, he argues, institutions can critically reflect on their functions and be appropriately designed for the Earth System's fast-changing conditions, accounting for non-human agency and interests. Dryzek and Pickering's (2019) framework is distinct from resilient governance[41] as it surpasses the conservationist rationale that is at the core of how social sciences have engaged with socio-ecological systems insofar (see Chandler 2019b; Olsson et al. 2015; Thorén and Olsson 2018). Departing from the need for novel policy paradigms and institutional designs for the Anthropocene and for an approach toward governance that can acknowledge and deal with (im)mobility and instability, ecological reflexivity seems a valuable virtue.

However, there is a limit to solutions grounded on the global scale and analyses such as this one that follow the high-politics 'paper-trail' (Dunford 2017) of global governance. Migration and the governance of climate adaptation are planetary as well as local issues, and thus if one does not acknowledge how these issues are localized and constituted in other scales of action, they would struggle to overcome modernist paradigms. That is also why policy choices derived from institutional analysis such as the Governance Architecture framework[42],

[41] An alternative suggested by some scholars emerges if we engage resilience thinking discursively rather than as a grounded concept (Dryzek 2016, 8), acknowledging its normative nature (Thorén and Olsson 2018). In that case, resilience might be an effective approach for rendering reflexivity more ecological with the goal of 'breaking down the resilience of the old and building the resilience of the new' (Folke et al. 2010, 8), that is, creating a 'reflexive resilience' of novel institutions.

[42] If performances of Global Governance Architectures are restricted to questions of institutional design within meso-level analyses, without reference to the overarching structure of International Relations, Governance Architecture provides nothing but a sterilized and depoliticized view of international politics (see Chandler, Cudworth, and Hobden 2018). Looking only at the formal, high-level requires a critical reflexivity on the part of the analysts: knowledge is permeated by power, and these elite negotiations are embedded in expert knowledge that is formed through specific power relations, more often than not based on modernity tenets. In its turn,

if restricted to depoliticized and managerial solutions (see Chandler, Cudworth, and Hobden 2018), would incur the same conditions that originated the shift to our current socio-ecological emergency (Wapner and Elver 2016, 2). Dealing with climate migration not only requires politics of and from the Anthropocene (see Dryzek and Pickering 2019) that can surpass the Holocene boundaries in our institutional setting but also requires a recognition of different world-making capacities from different scales other than the formal, high-level policy-making (see Inoue 2018).

Considering these scenarios, can we, then, envision a global governance of climate (im)mobility in the Anthropocene? Without incurring policy prescriptions typical of a modernist tenet, my hunch is that, by delving into Dryzek's (2016) ecological reflexivity and Pickering's (2019) reflexivity components, we can reflect upon some concerns needed to set in motion a governance architecture framework that surpasses Holocene's pathological path-dependencies while recognizing mobility's prevalence in the Anthropocene. This can only be affirmed if juxtaposed with another imperative for a global governance of climate mobility: the recognition of planetary and international responsibility for the hardship faced by migrants due to climate change. Heuristically, then, we can set a stage for global governance of climate (im)mobility in the Anthropocene by entangling institutions with the Earth System via (i) recognition, (ii) rethinking, (iii) responding and listening (to the Earth System), all the while fully embracing planetary justice and the emancipation and world-making capacities of climate migrants.

The **(i) recognition** component is the first and much-needed step to conceive of climate mobility beyond the securitization and resilience pathologies. In his 'conceptual desiderata', Pickering (2019, 7) proposes that institutions must be able to 'demonstrate an awareness of its impacts on social-ecological systems' and how the Earth System functions irrespective of national borders. He adds that institutions must also be able to monitor their own performance and anticipate future impacts (Pickering 2019, 8). Recognizing Earth System complexity, as a virtue, eliminates the premises of the securitization and migration-as-adaptation thesis in three main ways: it helps to question the estimates leading to securitization discourses; it overcomes environmental determinism best represented in the figure of the 'environmental refugee' to allow the acknowledgment of the climate-mobility complex nexus; and it allows institutions to embrace the complexity of climate (im)mobility, not restricting to simple and depoliticized conceptions of resilience and technocracy.

Second, the **(ii) ability to rethink** its own functioning distinguishes the ecological reflexivity approach from resilience governance, as it surpasses the conservationist rationale at the core of how social sciences have engaged with socio-ecological systems insofar (see Chandler 2019b; Olsson and Jerneck 2018; Thorén and Olsson 2018). After recognizing its own institutional pathological path-dependency, governance mechanisms can be rethought to break this iterative pattern – not necessarily acting to absorb planetary changes to keep its action track.

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restricting prescriptions to a Governance Architecture's framework may incur a depoliticized worldview of international affairs and partake in a rationale where authoritative measures of technical and managerial nature are considered enough to solve the socio-ecological crisis (see Dunford 2017). Market-based mechanisms (Dubash 2016), climate engineering (Burns and Nicholson 2016), and promises of structural changes based on individual social action (Maniates 2019) are framed as sufficient for dealing with the Anthropocene without further reference to structural constraints.

The capacity to rethink its performance is present in other critical engagements with global governance, and, in some way, it can be argued that it is already existent in the mobilities paradigm as they recognize how dysfunctional it is to govern mobility in the same manner as stationary issues (Sheller 2018). Moving the mobility paradigm's instance closer to ecological reflexivity spurs consideration of other variables, as the fast-changing reality of the Anthropocene disrupts the notion of stability that was tantamount to governing in the Holocene (Dryzek and Pickering 2019). Since most Holocene's institutions were designed around conservation principles, they had the goal of restoring the state of affairs to a pristine time of stable, unchanging conditions – irrespective of whether they were mandated to deal with mobile or stationary objects. The mismatch between stability and movement, and the dilution of the national and international's spatial differentiation, are some of the signs of why institutions need to be able to rethink their performance to surpass the institutional setting of the Holocene; otherwise, this pattern of institutional conservationism would lead for the same institutions creating the Anthropocene to be proposed as solutions to deal with it, not surpassing but reiterating modernist and sedentarist pathologies (Wapner and Elver 2016, 2).

(iii) Responding (and listening) to the Earth System is the last component of ecological reflexivity that must be taken into account for envisioning a governance of climate mobility. If institutions were able to recognize its impacts and rethink their own failures and successes, then responding means overcoming their pathological path-dependencies. For one, this third component suggests that international institutions ought to listen to non-Western and Indigenous peoples as well as non- and more-than-human entities, as climate mobility is by far not a human-only phenomenon (Boas et al. 2018; Fishel 2019; Reid 2020; see Celermajer et al. 2020). Moreover, listening to the Earth System also entails, maybe cyclically, recognizing the complexity of climate mobilities within the international social system and especially the International Political Economy. Institutional responses would need to move beyond the depoliticized depiction of the climate migrant that we identified as pervasive in its discursive constitution in and throughout international negotiations.

And finally, **planetary justice and migrant emancipation** should be considered for governing mobility in the Anthropocene if we are to overcome universal, liberal cosmopolitanism. Even if we depart from the conception that movement is the rule, we should be aware of the depoliticization character that, by universalizing mobility, one might reproduce. Nail (2015b) claims that we can combine the current centrality of mobility and yet put at the forefront how migration is always politically and socially situated – or, in his words, migration is always located in an 'historico-onto-epistemological' context. Thus, he argues that one should refrain from any universal accounts of migration and mobility, moving forward to a conception of migration in social reality with power, capitalism dynamics, and colonialism consequences at the theory's core. It is not because 'nothing in the universe is not in motion' (Nail 2019, 376) that there are no different, unequal, and pathological mobility patterns in our time. If the Holocene was the age of stability, the Anthropocene is the age of social motion; but even if we may be living in the age of movement, every movement is politically unlike others, and unless one particular mobility is grounded on an 'anti-capitalist, cosmopolitan, and decolonial' (Nail 2019, 379) project, it must not be treated as inherently good (Nail 2015b, 5; see 2015a).

If we should not govern mobility by Holocene's institutional standards but instead devise new institutions that can be a part of an 'anti-capitalist, cosmopolitan, and decolonial' project, how can these be fostered? For once, migration studies should be especially concerned with not trying to reify academic and institutional prescriptions that promote human migration as instrumental to states' interests or as part of technocratic toolkits. Emancipation, in this sense, must be employed to surpass the 'statism' (that is, state centrism) of political theories to recognize migrants' world-making capacities (see Gill 2021b; Inoue 2018; Pedersen 2021). General description of migrants continually defines them as those that 'lack' the security of states to some degree, in the sense that mobility defies both stability and statism. The 'migrant cosmopolitanism' derived from migrants' emancipation, in lieu, is the capacity of migrants to create alternative worlds since 'it was migrants of all kinds throughout history – not states – who were the true agents of political inclusion and cosmopolitanism' (Nail 2015b, 193). On the other end, as Mimi Sheller (2018, Kindle loc. 3568) points out, there must be a process of reflexivity on the part of those who hold kinetic power, as 'before we can address the injustice of hydrocarbons, those living in automobile cultures (especially in the global North) need first to stop living in disregard of our own involvement in producing these injustices'. Thus, while global governance mechanisms must recognize migrant's world-making capacities, those who hold mobility power need to embrace some sort of 'slow mobilities' or, as Wapner (2020) suggests, a process of 'rewilding', in which mobility can be promoted positively for being ecologically balanced, in a different 'kind of temporality', and based on justice (Sheller 2018, Kindle loc. 3621). There remains a need for global institutions that can account for the mobility of the climate migrant and act toward climate, mobility, and planetary justice alike.

5 CONCLUSIONS? BEYOND THE RUINS

> *If we end the story with decay, we abandon all hope – or turn our attention to the sites of promise and ruin, promise and ruin.* (Tsing 2015, 18)

This thesis was an attempt to investigate and interrogate the discursive co-constitution of climate (im)mobility in the global governance of climate adaptation. Via literature reviews and Critical Discourse Analysis, I identified two main discursive schemata pertaining to the Holocene and its pathologies: the burden-sharing approach, embedded in the pathology of securitization; and the migration-as-adaptation thesis, rooted in a fetishization of resilience and technocracy. Both can be depicted as 'toxic narratives' (Bettini 2019, 337). As such, they are criticized for creating a 'cycle of self-perpetuation' and a 'self-fulfilling prophecy' (Olsson 2017), framing mobility, especially when cross-border, as a pathology for the international system or as a tool to be availed in command-and-control settings (Chandler 2019a; Nail 2019), mobilized in a negative temporal imagination regarding the future (Falk 2016) or as part of a 'toxic nostalgia' (Klein 2022).

I argued that, under a governance analysis, these schemata are dysfunctional since they hamper any initiative of successfully dealing with climate mobility at the global level. They end up either leading to inaction (securitization) or to a non-emancipatory and technocratic setting (adaptation), typical of Holocene political and analytical paradigms. Standard solutions departed from the adaptation-mobility schema are embedded in modernist, neoliberal notions of governance (Chandler 2019a; Nail 2019), framing (im)mobility, in the end, as something possible of 'solving' via better management of labor, income, and increase of adaptive and resilience capacities (Methmann and Oels 2015). It either objectified migrants through 'command-and-control' instances or removed them from social and political realms, which stripped away any agency of climate migrants in deciding their destiny (Chandler 2019a; 2019b) while imbuing upon them the responsibility for their situation of vulnerability.

The international system and its business-as-usual rationale, embedded in capitalism, colonialism, and modernism, is entrenched into a story of progress that inevitably involves the creation of ruined global landscapes, as Tsing (2015, 18) reminds us. It is part of a 'driving beat' of progress leading to nothing beyond devastation. It is a system deepening and dependent on the precarity of subalterns' and non-humans' lives (Tsing 2015, 6), often placing them outside the 'circle' of global ethics (Mitchell 2015, 77). While these ruins were once displaced toward the periphery of the international system, nowadays 'the planet is in spasm', as Paul Wapner (2020) metaphorically asserts. Instability is no longer a feature of the outskirts of the world alone. Humanity's effort to tame the environment 'set in motion developments that they can neither fully foresee nor control' (Wapner 2020), reaching even the epicenter of global politics.

Climate scientists increasingly denounce how the current patterns of greenhouse gas (GHGs) emissions are unsustainable and call for a radical shift in the International Political Economy toward a more just and sustainable way of living. Yet, the international system and its policy-makers are lagging in carrying out the necessary changes. So, with mitigation efforts failing, climate adaptation can be expected to become even more relevant to the international community as we follow along into the Anthropocene. Global governors are faced with the

challenge of adapting to and governing (in) the ruins of the Anthropocene – a system that is neither stable nor predictable. Conceiving the Anthropocene under this critical lens shows that if the Holocene was the age of stability, the Anthropocene is rather distinct. There is no longer the possibility of an imperative for governance and international politics to move back to a point of alleged pristine, stable nature. The Anthropocene, after all, is the age of instability, uncertainty, and (im)mobility – requiring the adaptation of global governance if we are to govern adaptation in an emancipatory manner.

Without a critical stance, an IR outlook for the Anthropocene might reinforce the interventionist rationale typical of the Holocene, and managerial, technocratic solutions may appear as adequate as ever to 'solve' Anthropocene challenges (Chandler, Cudworth, and Hobden 2018). Instead of promoting a critical reflexivity about how the socio-ecological crisis is a social and political struggle, these concerns are sidelined for a quest on the need of fast solutions, depoliticizing the Anthropocene and its origins. By way of this, IR's role in the Holocene and its pathological colonial origins are overlooked. Quick fixes proposed call for more intervention and enforcement of LIO violence (see Baron et al. 2019, 202) rather than an alternative that could steer toward an emancipatory planetary governance, overall suggesting that the same instruments that caused the Anthropocene are necessary for governing it (Chandler, Cudworth, and Hobden 2018, 197). This logic resembles the appearance of a 'good Anthropocene', where humanity would be able to shift its ecological footprint to authoritatively intervene and manage nature to its good use (see Bennett et al. 2016; c.f. Chandler 2018, 4), reverting the narrative of how the Anthropocene is a byproduct of humanity's actions. Combined with these notions are propositions of market-based mechanisms (see Dubash 2016), climate engineering (Burns and Nicholson 2016; "Give Research into Solar Geoengineering a Chance" 2021; Biermann 2021b), and other cosmopolitan solutions (see Maniates 2019) embedded in managerialism and technofixes. If assessed closely, all of these solutions are derived from the Holocene and entrenched into a cartesian human-nature dichotomy (see Biermann 2021a; Dryzek and Pickering 2019), part of the 'Climate Inc.' of a business-as-usual rationale that so far has failed to adapt and avert the ecology disaster (Wapner and Elver 2016), always framing climate change and its impacts in the future-tense (Falk 2016) while overlooking how there is no future following the current path (Chandler 2018, 13).

If one fails to recognize how the Anthropocene is interwoven with the failure of the LIO, the whole abstraction is employed uncritically and hence it is embedded in a modernist political and scientific agenda that ignores how it was originated within a world-history of inequity, dominance, and imperialism (see Gill 2021b; Haraway et al. 2016; Moore 2017). Instead of leading to transformation, the Anthropocene is thus instrumentalized as a new opportunity to employ the same rationale and instruments used so far. As IR was created in times of stability and its normative goal revolves around survival (Mitchell 2017), its disciplinary convictions are more often than not restricted to managerial rationale (see Chandler, Cudworth, and Hobden 2018), in a way that 'progress still controls us even in tales of ruinations' (Tsing 2015, 21). For this particular thesis enterprise, one of the things that tie this debate with climate adaptation and migration is how they are a powerful representation of the failures of the international system in governing migration and climate-related issues. Concurrently, it also serves as a possible critical point of entanglement to investigate if the IR discipline is suitable for engaging with the

Anthropocene regarding climate adaptation and human mobility. Therefore, as a point of departure, I claimed that climate change, adaptation, and mobility can be seen as part of the *ruins* of the current international society and its liberal order – or, rather than the problem in itself, 'global warming is seen as the harbinger of a new awareness of our humbler position in the world: the end of the reassuring assumptions of liberal modernity' (Chandler 2018, 12).

Departing from these convoluted assumptions, I argued that we need to conceive of climate mobility through a politically situated, decolonial, and justice-oriented governance framework. Through reflecting upon the fourfold heuristic abstracted from Dryzek (2016), Pickering (2019), Nail (2015b), and Sheller (2018), I posited that this can be done in part by advancing institutional qualities that are functional and non-pathological by overcoming Holocene path-dependencies. I argued that there is a need to conceive a global governance architecture for climate migration in which mobility is at the core, because stability is no longer something to be expected or desired in the Anthropocene, and stasis was never the ontology of our time. At the same time, one cannot overlook the hardships faced by migrants, with the risk of depoliticizing mobility and falling into a liberal cosmopolitanism. Conversely, a global governance capable of accounting for migrants' world-making capacities and responding to the Earth System is needed. Emancipation and justice, if grounded with structural and agentic constraints within the Anthropocene, allow us to understand climate migration from a mobility perspective and yet not be restricted to purely normative and abstract conclusions. This is necessary if we are to govern instability and mobility not in a crisis framing while also not universalizing migration; in other words, to imagine a governance architecture that recognizes migrants' hardships in the global South.

That is why I hunched that one could gain insights on the governance of climate (im)mobility by critically analyzing discourses within and as a result of international negotiations, juxtaposing and reflecting upon them with ecological reflexivity, critical governance studies, and planetary justice. With this thesis, I do not believe we got one step closer of *solving* climate change-related migration. Instead, we might use it to accept that we need to envision a governance architecture of climate mobility not on the modernist imaginary of the Holocene, but *in the ruins* left for the Anthropocene.

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