



Universidade de Brasília – UnB
Instituto de Relações Internacionais
Programa de Pós-graduação em Relações Internacionais

Mirella Vaz de Castro

Fim do não alinhamento: os reflexos da movimentação russa na política externa finlandesa
entre 2014 e 2022

Brasília
2023

MIRELLA VAZ DE CASTRO

Fim do não alinhamento: os reflexos da movimentação russa na política externa finlandesa
entre 2014 e 2022

Trabalho apresentado ao Programa de Pós-graduação em
Relações Internacionais da Universidade de Brasília como
requisito para obtenção do título de mestre em Relações
Internacionais.

Orientadora: Prof^a Dr^a Carvalho Pinto.

Brasília

2023

AGRADECIMENTOS

Este trabalho não poderia ter sido concluído sem o auxílio de várias pessoas, das quais algumas gostaria de aqui registrar agradecimento.

Primeiramente gostaria de agradecer à minha orientadora, Prof^a Dr^a Vânia Carvalho, que, desde o primeiro momento aceitou minha proposta de pesquisa e me auxiliou nos percalços que a vida impôs ao meu objeto de estudo.

Agradeço também o apoio incondicional da minha família, minha mãe, meu pai e minha irmã, que, além de me auxiliarem nessa jornada com todo o suporte necessário, contribuíram com a revisão final do texto.

Agradeço a todos os meus colegas do PPGRI e aos meus amigos, que foram rede de apoio nesse processo, majoritariamente solitário, que é a escrita de uma dissertação.

E por fim, agradeço aos meus colegas de trabalho da ApexBrasil que, além de compreenderem as dificuldades e olheiras que se impunham, me incentivaram a continuar nessa caminhada para aqui chegar.

RESUMO

Esta pesquisa busca entender como a movimentação russa na Ucrânia influenciou a alteração da política externa de neutralidade no discurso oficial finlandês entre 2014 e 2022, ano em que o país iniciou o processo de adesão à Organização do Tratado do Atlântico Norte (OTAN). Por meio da análise de discursos proferidos pelo presidente finlandês Sauli Niinistö, bem como de relatórios governamentais, buscou-se aplicar a teoria do *Master Frame* para analisar como a política externa de neutralidade da Finlândia deixou de ser tratada no discurso oficial finlandês como uma solução à segurança do país frente à Rússia e deu lugar à defesa da opção pela adesão à OTAN. A partir da aplicação do método de análise de discurso em conjunto com o marco teórico citado, foram identificadas alterações nos elementos de *ressonância* do discurso oficial do governo da Finlândia à medida que a movimentação russa na Ucrânia se intensificou, de forma a adaptá-lo à nova realidade vivida pela audiência à qual estava direcionado. As mudanças constatadas permitiram concluir que a ofensiva da Rússia na região influenciou de forma significativa o discurso oficial do governo finlandês em relação à política de neutralidade do país a partir da alteração de dois dos pilares dessa: as relações com a Rússia e a cooperação com a OTAN, levando ao seu consequente abandono.

Palavras-chave: neutralidade; Finlândia; Rússia; Ucrânia; ressonância; discurso; OTAN; security.

ABSTRACT

This work seeks to comprehend how the Russian actions in Ukraine has influenced the way the neutrality foreign policy stands in the Finnish official discourse between 2014 and 2022, the year in which the country applied to enter the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Through the analysis of the discourses proffered by the Finnish President Sauli Niinisto, as well as of government's reports, it was aimed to apply the Master Frame's theory to analyze how Finland's neutrality foreign policy was replaced by NATO as a solution to guarantee the country's security facing Russia. Using the discourse analysis' method along the Master Frame Theory, it was possible to identify changes in the resonance elements of the Finnish government's official discourse as the Russian actions in Ukraine got stronger, adapting it to the new reality of the audience to which it was directed. The changes identified allows to conclude that Russia's offensive actions in the region had had great influence in the Finnish government official discourse related do the country's neutrality foreign policy by altering two of its pillars: the Finnish-Russian relations and the cooperation with NATO, leading to its abandonment.

Key words: neutrality; Finland; Russia; Ukraine; resonance; discourse; NATO; security.

LISTA DE TABELAS

Tabela 1 - Critérios do <i>framing</i>	15
Tabela 2 – Funções Essenciais do <i>Master Frame</i>	17
Tabela 3 – Representações por Tema e Frequência.....	43
Tabela 4 – Funções Essenciais do Master Frame de Segurança da Finlândia.....	54
Tabela 5 – Códigos Predominantes no Discurso Oficial Finlandês entre 2014 e 2022.....	67
Tabela 6 – <i>Credibilidade Empírica</i> do <i>Master Frame</i> de Segurança da Finlândia.....	71
Tabela 7 – <i>Comensurabilidade Experimental</i> do <i>Master Frame</i> de Segurança da Finlândia...	74
Tabela 8 – <i>Fidelidade Narrativa</i> do <i>Master Frame</i> de Segurança da Finlândia.....	78
Tabela 9 – O <i>Master Frame</i> de Segurança da Finlândia entre 2014 e 2022.....	79

LISTA DE GRÁFICOS

Gráfico 1 – Frequência Total das Representações.....	40
Gráfico 2 – Frequência das Representações no Discurso Oficial Finlandês no ano de 2014.....	56
Gráfico 3 - Frequência das Representações no Discurso Oficial Finlandês no ano de 2015.....	57
Gráfico 4 - Frequência das Representações no Discurso Oficial Finlandês no ano de 2016.....	58
Gráfico 5 - Frequência das Representações no Discurso Oficial Finlandês no ano de 2017.....	59
Gráfico 6 - Frequência das Representações no Discurso Oficial Finlandês no ano de 2018.....	60
Gráfico 7 - Frequência das Representações no Discurso Oficial Finlandês no ano de 2019.....	61
Gráfico 8 - Frequência das Representações no Discurso Oficial Finlandês no ano de 2020.....	61
Gráfico 9 - Frequência das Representações no Discurso Oficial Finlandês no ano de 2021.....	62
Gráfico 10 - Frequência das Representações no Discurso Oficial Finlandês no ano de 2022.....	63

SUMÁRIO

Introdução	9
1. <i>Master Frame</i> e análise de discurso: a construção da narrativa como ferramenta de pesquisa	13
1.1. A Teoria do <i>Framing</i>	13
1.2. O <i>Master Frame</i>	16
1.3. O <i>Master Frame</i> como ferramenta de análise em contextos democráticos.....	18
1.4. A análise de discurso como método.....	19
2. A política externa de neutralidade finlandesa e a movimentação russa na Ucrânia	24
2.1. A política externa de neutralidade da Finlândia.....	24
2.2. A política ofensiva de Vladimir Putin na Ucrânia entre 2014 e 2022.....	29
3. <i>Diagnóstico</i> e <i>prognóstico</i> no discurso oficial finlandês de 2014 a 2022	38
3.1. O discurso finlandês de 2014 a 2022: representações.....	38
3.2. O <i>Master Frame</i> de segurança finlandês entre 2014 e 2022: orientação atributiva.....	44
3.2.1. <i>Diagnóstico</i>	44
3.2.2. <i>Prognóstico</i>	49
3.3. Escopo de articulação.....	51
4. O fim do não alinhamento finlandês no discurso oficial do governo entre 2014 e 2022	55
4.1. As camadas do discurso oficial finlandês.....	55
4.2. A potência do <i>master frame</i> de segurança da Finlândia.....	65
4.2.1. Posição no espectro de código restrito-elaborado.....	66
4.2.2. <i>Credibilidade Empírica</i>	67
4.2.3. <i>Comensurabilidade Experimental</i>	73
4.2.4. <i>Fidelidade Narrativa</i>	75
Conclusão	81
Referências	83
Anexo 1 – Discursos Analisados Durante a Pesquisa	98
Anexo 2 – Representações Exportadas Do Software Maxqda 2021	289

INTRODUÇÃO

No dia 24 de fevereiro de 2022, as forças militares russas adentraram o território ucraniano e deram início a uma guerra que marcou a violação da soberania de um país em um continente que, desde o final do século XX, não enfrentava conflitos. O fato trouxe diversas mudanças de paradigmas sendo uma das principais o abandono da política externa de neutralidade pela Finlândia, que optou pela adesão à Organização do Tratado do Atlântico Norte (OTAN), rompendo com uma tradição de política externa de mais de sete décadas, parte integrante da identidade nacional do país.

Localizada em uma região historicamente permeada por tensões decorrentes de assimetrias de poder, principalmente relacionadas à interação entre a Rússia e os países bálticos, a Finlândia apresenta uma trajetória de política externa que, desde a Segunda Guerra Mundial, a insere cenário internacional como país neutro e mediador (COTTEY, 2018, p. 8). A política externa de neutralidade do país foi adotada em 1948, com a assinatura do Tratado de Amizade, Cooperação e Assistência Mútua (FCMA, na sigla em inglês) com a União das Repúblicas Socialistas Soviéticas (URSS), cujo preâmbulo reconhecia o direito do país de “permanecer fora dos conflitos de interesse das grandes potências”. Ao longo da Guerra Fria, a postura finlandesa, apesar da neutralidade reconhecida, foi permeada por concessões ao país vizinho para preservar as boas relações entre ambos, o que, muitas vezes, foi criticado pelo Ocidente por se assemelhar a uma dinâmica de submissão (KARSH, 1986, p. 269-71). Essa priorização das relações com os soviéticos passou a ser referida pelo Ocidente como *Finlandization*, termo polêmico entre os finlandeses e que ainda hoje é utilizado na academia para se referir a situações em que um país pequeno opta por ceder aos interesses de um país maior com o qual compartilha fronteira como estratégia de segurança (FORSBERG & PESU, 2016, p. 474).

Mesmo após o fim da URSS e a extinção do FCMA em 1992, a Finlândia continuou a optar pela neutralidade como política externa, posição que, entre 1996 e 2020, contou com o apoio de uma parcela expressiva da população, variando entre 70% e 53% (ABDI, 2021). O apoio popular à neutralidade tem origem no fato de essa ter sido incorporada à identidade nacional do país, sendo entendida como um fator garantidor da integridade territorial da Finlândia frente à vizinha Rússia. A continuidade da política não esteve imune, porém, aos questionamentos trazidos com as mudanças no sistema internacional após o fim da Guerra Fria. A intensificação das dinâmicas de integração regional e o aumento das movimentações russas na região nas últimas décadas trouxeram desafios à ideia de neutralidade finlandesa, tendo sido já identificadas pelo menos três ondas de debate acerca do tema no país: (1) entre 1991 e 1994,

com a discussão acerca da entrada para a União Europeia (EU); (2) em 2008, quando um dos maiores partidos políticos do país, o Partido da Coligação Nacional (PCN), incorporou o apoio à entrada para a OTAN à sua plataforma eleitoral; e (3) em 2014, quando a Rússia anexou a Crimeia (LANKO, 2021, p. 146).

O primeiro debate foi marcado pela redefinição da política externa finlandesa para o não alinhamento militar, de forma a permitir a adesão à UE sem caracterizar o abandono da neutralidade por completo, haja vista o grande apoio da população a esta (FORSBERG, 2018, p. 103). O segundo debate trouxe a incorporação definitiva do tema à dinâmica da política interna do país, tendo a neutralidade se tornado assunto recorrente e sido divulgado, em 2009, um relatório, elaborado pela coalizão que governava o país, no qual foram elencadas as razões pela quais a Finlândia deveria entrar para a OTAN (MICHEL, 2011, p. 9). A anexação da Crimeia em 2014, por sua vez, trouxe questionamentos acerca da segurança do país e de sua capacidade de defesa, bem como se a boa relação nutrida com a Rússia ao longo das últimas décadas seria suficiente para evitar uma possível ofensiva do país contra os finlandeses. O maior promotor do debate acerca do tema é o Partido da Coalizão Nacional (PCN), cuja ala jovem já se declarava abertamente favorável ao ingresso do país para a OTAN em 1997 (VAAHTORANTA & FORSBERG, 2000, p. 29).

A continuidade da movimentação russa na região nos anos seguintes, com a invasão da Ucrânia em fevereiro de 2022, intensificou esse debate em meio à sociedade finlandesa, imbuindo-o de uma importância maior que em outros momentos. Dados de uma pesquisa realizada pelo jornal YLE News, em março de 2022, após a invasão da Ucrânia, demonstrou o apoio de 62% dos finlandeses à entrada do país para a OTAN, o que indicou uma mudança expressiva em relação aos anos anteriores, onde a maior parcela da população era contrária a essa medida (YLE POLL, 2022). Em maio do mesmo ano, o assunto foi levado ao Parlamento (PRIME MINISTER'S OFFICE, 2022) e, diante da grande repercussão no país e da decisão do próprio presidente de abandonar a neutralidade, o pedido oficial do país para aderir à Organização foi realizado em conjunto com a Suécia no dia 18 do referido mês (FINLAND AND SWEDEN SUBMIT..., 2022).

Dessa forma, desde 2013, a Finlândia se deparou com o dilema neutralidade *versus* alinhamento militar, o qual foi trazido ao debate público tanto pela mídia, quanto pelos partidos políticos. A percepção da população finlandesa e dos principais tomadores de decisão do país em relação à política de não alinhamento passou por um momento de redefinição, o qual este trabalho assume ter sido induzido pelas movimentações russas na região, que compreendem desde a anexação da Crimeia, em 2014, até a invasão da Ucrânia, em 2022. Um dos pilares

centrais da segurança finlandesa e da política externa do país, as boas relações com a Rússia, foram testadas em seu limite, o que também se refletiu em mudanças no discurso oficial do governo finlandês. Essa mudança na percepção da população finlandesa e no discurso do governo oficial do país em relação à política de não alinhamento da Finlândia entre 2014 e 2022, foi o que instigou esta pesquisa.

Os próximos capítulos buscam, portanto, responder à seguinte pergunta: “*Como a movimentação militar russa na Ucrânia, no período de 2014 a 2022, alterou o discurso oficial do governo finlandês em relação à política externa de neutralidade do país?*”. A hipótese inicialmente levantada foi a de que as alterações geopolíticas no entorno da Finlândia teriam ocasionado mudanças em dois elementos da política externa de não alinhamento da Finlândia: as relações com a Rússia e a cooperação com a OTAN. Nesse sentido, como forma de averiguar a relação de causa e efeito entre a movimentação russa e as alterações no discurso do governo, optou-se pela aplicação da teoria do *Master Frame*, cujo ferramental permite avaliar a *ressonância* que um discurso possui em meio à audiência que almeja mobilizar, bem como sua alteração ao longo do tempo para garantir esse resultado. Em complemento a esse arcabouço teórico, a análise de discurso foi também escolhida como método de análise das informações, de modo a proporcionar um entendimento mais preciso dos elementos presentes no discurso.

O presente trabalho busca contribuir com uma área de estudo ainda pouco explorada nas Relações Internacionais, qual seja a do relacionamento entre políticas de neutralidade e o alinhamento militar com a OTAN (COTTEY, 2018, p. 7). Embora muito se tenha estudado acerca das políticas de neutralidade, poucos são os trabalhos dedicados às novas demandas militares da ordem mundial originadas no pós-Guerra Fria e seus impactos nos países que optaram por essa linha de política externa. Ademais, observa-se a ausência de trabalhos que versem sobre as relações entre a Finlândia e a OTAN, sendo os existentes, em sua maioria, voltados para as dinâmicas da Organização como um todo (FORSBERG, 2018, p. 97-98), área para a qual o presente trabalho também almeja contribuir.

Houve também, nesta pesquisa o objetivo de contribuir para o debate acerca do declínio do modelo nórdico, caracterizado, segundo Ole Waever (1992, p. 77-88), pelo pacifismo da região, pela consolidação do Estado de bem-estar social e pela preocupação com os países em desenvolvimento. Isso porque a projeção pacífica dos países escandinavos no cenário internacional, que lhes asseguraria um estatuto de superioridade em relação ao resto da Europa, está, entre outros fatores, associada à política de neutralidade adotada pela Finlândia, a qual enfrenta questionamentos abordados por este trabalho. Ressalta-se, ainda, a baixa produção

acadêmica acerca de países escandinavos fora dos ambientes acadêmicos da região, em comparação com outras dinâmicas estudadas pela disciplina de Relações Internacionais.

No que tange ao campo teórico da disciplina, esta pesquisa buscou contribuir com a expansão da área temática de aplicação de correntes construtivistas das Relações Internacionais, ao propor a aplicação de uma teoria originada da interface com as Ciências Sociais — o *master frame* — a um tema de segurança internacional, área por muito tempo tratada majoritariamente por teóricos realistas. Tal aplicação, focada nas preferências de uma determinada audiência permite, ainda, a utilização de mais de um nível de análise das Relações Internacionais, contribuindo, assim, para o reconhecimento dos indivíduos como agentes capazes de influenciar o sistema internacional e para um melhor entendimento das dinâmicas que determinam as ações dos Estados. Ademais, o presente trabalho propõe a aplicação de ferramentas e conceitos teóricos a um estudo geograficamente localizado, almejando colaborar com a mitigação da escassa interação entre o campo teórico da disciplina e os estudos de área, contribuindo para o desenvolvimento da corrente conciliatória entre os dois ramos (DERICHS, 2015, p. 5).

O trabalho está, então, dividido em quatro capítulos, sendo o primeiro dedicado à apresentação das ferramentas teórico-metodológicas utilizadas, a saber, a Teoria do *Master Frame* a análise de discurso, bem como a justificativa da escolha por essas e a adequação delas ao objeto de pesquisa. O segundo capítulo, por sua vez, trará uma contextualização da política externa de neutralidade finlandesa e da política externa russa para a Ucrânia desde 2014, de forma a abordar o *Master Frame* de segurança da Finlândia. O terceiro capítulo iniciará a aplicação do marco teórico às fontes analisadas, quais sejam, os discursos proferidos pelo presidente finlandês Sauli Niinistö e os relatórios governamentais afetos ao tema de segurança e política externa, ambos proferidos e elaborados entre os anos de 2014 e 2022. Por fim, o último capítulo finaliza a aplicação do marco teórico, com a análise das alterações no discurso oficial finlandês durante o período analisado frente aos eventos da movimentação russa na Ucrânia.

1. MASTER FRAME E ANÁLISE DE DISCURSO: A CONSTRUÇÃO DA NARRATIVA COMO FERRAMENTA DE PESQUISA

Este capítulo tem por objetivo abordar as ferramentas teórico-metodológicas a serem utilizadas para análise das alterações que a movimentação russa tem ocasionado no discurso do governo do país em relação à política de neutralidade no período de 2014 a 2022. Em um primeiro momento, será apresentada a Teoria do *Framing* e sua derivada, a teoria do *Master Frame*, arcabouço teórico que será aplicado neste trabalho. Posteriormente será explicado o método escolhido para a análise das informações coletadas, a saber, a análise de discurso, elucidando, em ambos os casos, as razões pelas quais os métodos citados se adequam ao caso finlandês.

1.1. A Teoria do *Framing*

Originado na psicologia, o *frame* foi aplicado inicialmente às Ciências Sociais, em 1974, por Erving Goffman, que o definiu como um esquema de interpretação que permite a qualquer indivíduo localizar, perceber e rotular eventos concretos. O *frame* conforma, portanto, uma estrutura mental interpretativa que tem a capacidade de influenciar a visão que o indivíduo constrói da realidade que o cerca, bem como sua relação com essa (CARVALHO PINTO, 2012, p.5).

O *frame* pode ser concebido de forma natural ou social. O naturalmente concebido tem como principal característica a ausência de orientação para um fim específico, ou seja, não há a presença de um ator estratégico que o guie para alcançar um determinado objetivo, tendo determinantes naturais e sendo, por isso, muito utilizado entre as ciências físicas e biológicas. Um exemplo de *frame* natural, segundo Goffman (1974, p. 22), são as notas meteorológicas, cujas diretrizes são determinadas de forma alheia à vontade do indivíduo que a transmite. O *frame* social, por sua vez, é concebido com um objetivo específico, incorporando o desejo e o esforço de um ator estratégico. Nesse esquema de interpretação são utilizados os “*guided doings*”, orientações elaboradas e utilizadas pelo ator a fim de moldar as ações de uma determinada audiência. Dessa forma, o *frame* socialmente concebido tem origem no objetivo específico de um ator estratégico de orientar ou influenciar ações coletivas ou individuais de um público (BENFORD; SNOW, 2000, p. 614).

O trabalho iniciado por Goffman teve sequência com os autores David Snow, Burke Rochford, Seteven Worden e Robert Benford (1986), que passaram a utilizar o conceito do

frame, na Sociologia, como método de análise da capacidade de mobilização de movimentos sociais. Para tanto, os autores trouxeram o foco no processo de elaboração do *frame*, com a designação do verbo *framing* para defini-lo, em uma tentativa de preencher a lacuna de análises interpretativas sobre as reivindicações desses movimentos (SNOW et al., 1986, p. 465).

O *framing* consiste, portanto, na articulação de elementos presentes no universo ideacional da audiência que se almeja mobilizar de modo a criar significados agrupados em um esquema de interpretação que induza à mobilização. No contexto dos movimentos sociais, esse processo corresponderia ao trabalho de criação de significados, concebidos como os esquemas de interpretação, tanto para seus participantes quanto para seus antagonistas, com o propósito de mobilizá-los (SNOW; BENFORD, 1988, p. 198). Na ocorrência da mobilização, foi constatada a presença de uma harmonia entre os valores e as crenças projetados pelo movimento, ou seja, pelo *frame* por ele elaborado, e as crenças do(s) indivíduo(s) mobilizado(s). A esse fenômeno de congruência os autores chamaram *frame alignment* ou *alinhamento do frame*, entendendo ser a sua presença determinante para a ocorrência da mobilização de uma determinada audiência (SNOW et al., 1986, p. 464).

Após a constatação do *alinhamento do frame*, a aplicação da teoria do *Framing* na Sociologia passou a privilegiar o estudo das funções desse processo e das condicionantes de sucesso do alinhamento, ou seja, da mobilização almejada. Foram então identificadas três funções essenciais ao *framing*: (1) o *diagnóstico*, que consiste na identificação de um aspecto social que, visto como problemático, demanda alteração social; (2) o *prognóstico*, que apresenta as medidas a serem tomadas a fim de corrigir o problema identificado no diagnóstico; (3) e o *frame motivacional*, que compreende o esquema de interpretação elaborado no intuito de provocar a mobilização de uma determinada audiência em prol da implementação do *prognóstico* apresentado (SNOW; BENFORD, 1988, p. 200-202). Em contextos eleitorais, o processo do *framing* e suas funções ficam claros quando, por exemplo, um candidato apresenta diversos problemas da gestão anterior (*diagnóstico*) e se coloca como a solução adequada para solucioná-los (*prognóstico*), construindo um discurso para defender sua eleição, baseado nos valores e crenças dos eleitores que almeja mobilizar em prol de sua eleição (*frame motivacional*).

Identificadas as principais funções do *framing*, David Snow & Robert Benford (1988) se voltaram para o estudo das condicionantes de sucesso desse processo, atribuindo-as à capacidade do *frame motivacional* de obter ressonância em meio à audiência escolhida. De acordo com os autores, essas condicionantes encontram-se divididas em dois critérios: *credibilidade* e *saliência*, que buscam aferir a credibilidade do ator estratégico perante sua

audiência e a congruência entre os valores e as crenças dessa e os elementos abordados pelo *frame* (BENFORD; SNOW, 2000, p. 619).

Cada um desses dois critérios desdobra-se em outros três. A *credibilidade* é composta pela (1) *consistência do frame*, referente à congruência entre os valores, as crenças e as ações do articulador do *frame*; pela (2) *credibilidade empírica*, relacionada à alocação do *frame* entre os eventos reais da forma como são experimentados pela audiência; e pela (3) *credibilidade do ator estratégico*, que compreende a autoridade deste perante sua audiência quanto ao assunto abordado pelo *frame*. A *saliência*, por sua vez, compreende a (1) *centralidade*, relacionada à essencialidade dos valores evocados pelo *frame* em relação à audiência; a (2) *comensurabilidade experimental*, referente à relação entre o *frame* e as experiências cotidianas do público selecionado; e a (3) *fidelidade narrativa*, correspondente à congruência entre o *frame* e as narrativas culturais que perpassam a audiência (BENFORD; SNOW, 2000, p. 621-622). As funções e condicionantes de sucesso do *framing* encontram-se resumidos na tabela a seguir:

Tabela 1- Critérios do *framing*

Critérios do <i>framing</i>			
Participantes	Dimensões do <i>framing</i>	Critérios do <i>framing</i>	
Ator estratégico	Funções essenciais do <i>framing</i>	Diagnóstico Prognóstico Frame Motivacional	
Relação entre o <i>frame</i> e a audiência	Ressonância	Credibilidade	Consistência do <i>frame</i> Credibilidade empírica Credibilidade do ator estratégico
		Saliência	Centralidade Comensurabilidade experimental Fidelidade narrativa

Fonte: adaptada de Carvalho Pinto (2012, p. 12).

Para que um *frame* consiga alcançar seu objetivo de mobilização de uma determinada audiência, é necessário que sejam satisfeitos os critérios de credibilidade e saliência elencados.

1.2. O Master Frame

Dando continuidade ao estudo e aplicação da Teoria do *Framing* na Sociologia, durante a década de 1990, David Snow e Robert Benford desenvolveram o *Master Frame*, a partir da concepção do *frame motivacional* ou *frame de ação coletiva*, direcionado à mobilização de uma determinada audiência e mencionado na seção anterior. Nessa abordagem, os autores retomam que o discurso do *frame* exerce um papel que vai além do apontamento, apresentando outras duas funções essenciais: de atribuição e articulação. Dessa forma, o *frame de ação coletiva* não apenas aponta uma situação problemática que necessita de mudança — o *diagnóstico* —, mas indica também os culpados por sua existência e sugere uma linha de ação para que o referido problema seja solucionado — o *prognóstico*. Além dessa atribuição, o *frame* permite que ativistas, movimentos sociais e outros atores articulem e alinhem diversos eventos e experiências de uma forma relativamente unificada e significativa (SNOW & BENFORD, 1992, p. 136-138).

A articulação proporcionada pelo *frame motivacional* ou *frame de ação coletiva* tem sua aplicação restrita a contextos restritos por atores específicos. Com a disseminação da aplicação da teoria, por sua vez, passou-se a identificar que, em alguns casos, esse *frame* era aplicado a contextos maiores, onde o uso do discurso ultrapassa um movimento específico e passa a ser adaptado e utilizado por diversos grupos em diversos momentos, dando origem ao conceito de *master frame*. Apesar de compartilhar o objetivo de mobilização de uma determinada audiência, entre outras características do *frame de ação coletiva*, o *master frame* possibilita uma análise empírica mais próxima da realidade ao considerar que o processo por meio do qual eventos e ações passam a ser vistos como desejáveis ou indesejáveis, mais ou menos arriscados e custosos, deve ser tratado como algo fluido. Essa abordagem sugere ainda que o processo de *framing* pode ter um importante papel afetando oportunidades e mudanças no contexto político e na disponibilidade de recursos (SNOW & BENFORD, 1992, p. 152). Neste trabalho, acredita-se, portanto, que esse referencial teórico permitirá o estudo conjunto das mudanças em paralelo que ocorreram tanto nas preferências da audiência, no caso a população finlandesa, quanto nos discursos do governo do país, em um contexto amplo, que vai além de um movimento social individual e envolve mudanças políticas, como a decisão de adesão à OTAN. Nesse sentido, espera-se a identificação de um *master frame* relacionado à segurança nacional da Finlândia, que, inicialmente fundamentado na política de neutralidade, tenha passado a ser associado ao abandono desta e à defesa da entrada para a OTAN.

Assim como o *frame de ação coletiva*, o *master frame* apresenta três funções essenciais, as quais permitem a análise de sua capacidade de mobilização social. A primeira delas está

relacionada a suas atribuições diagnósticas, que lhe requerem a identificação de um problema (*diagnóstico*)— no caso estudado, a ameaça representada pela movimentação russa na Ucrânia —; bem como de sua causalidade e sua possível solução (*prognóstico*)— para a Finlândia, a adoção de uma estratégia que garanta sua integridade territorial, seja a neutralidade, seja a adesão à OTAN. A segunda se refere ao seu escopo de articulação, podendo seu código linguístico ser classificado como restrito ou elaborado. Nesse sentido, um padrão de código restrito apresenta um discurso rigidamente organizado, que possui um número restrito de alternativas sintáticas e é, portanto, mais previsível e reflete a estrutura social imediata com a qual interage. Um padrão de código elaborado, por sua vez, tem como característica um discurso mais flexível e organizado em uma quantidade maior de alternativas sintáticas, que permite um universalismo e uma imprevisibilidade. Por fim, a terceira característica do *master frame* diz respeito à sua potência, que pode ser determinada pela combinação entre a posição do discurso no espectro do padrão de código restrito-elaborado, e a ressonância que o mesmo possui em meio à sua audiência. Como forma de mensurar essa ressonância, os autores apresentam três fatores interrelacionados que a determinariam: a *credibilidade empírica*, que se refere aos referenciais empíricos do diagnóstico e do prognóstico em meio à audiência; a *comensurabilidade experimental*, relacionada à posição que os problemas apresentados ocupam na experiência diária da audiência; e a *fidelidade narrativa*, que compreende a centralidade do *frame* na ideologia e valores da audiência (SNOW & BENFORD, 1992, p. 134, 138-140). A tabela abaixo resume as funções essenciais do *master frame*.

Tabela 2 – Funções Essenciais do Master Frame

Funções Essenciais do Master Frame		
Orientação Atributiva	Diagnóstico Prognóstico	
Escopo de Articulação	Código Restrito Código Elaborado	
Potência	Localização no espectro de código Restrito-Elaborado	
	Ressonância	Credibilidade Empírica
		Comensurabilidade Experimental
		Fidelidade Narrativa

Fonte: elaboração própria, adaptada de Snow & Benford (1992).

Assim como ocorre com o *frame de ação coletiva*, para que o *master frame* garanta a mobilização de sua audiência em contextos e momentos diferentes, é necessário que o mesmo se encontre em uma posição no espectro de código restrito-elaborado que contribua para sua ressonância.

1.3. O *Master Frame* como ferramenta de análise em contextos democráticos

No processo de *framing*, seja por meio de um *frame de ação coletiva* ou de um *master frame*, a mobilização compreende a modificação da forma como a audiência interpreta determinados acontecimentos, por meio da aproximação entre esses e seus valores e crenças. Por essa característica, o *framing* se constituiu ferramenta importante aos estudos das tomadas de decisões em países onde o apoio popular é considerado meio de legitimação política, como em contextos democráticos. Isso porque, nessas conjunturas, é observado certo grau de dependência entre as políticas executadas pelo governo e sua respectiva aprovação pela população, o que enseja, muitas vezes, discursos para o convencimento desta (NELSON; OXLEY, 1999, p. 1040-41).

A utilização de discursos nesses contextos é justificada, segundo Nelson e Oxley (1999, p. 1043), pela capacidade desses de alterar a forma como uma determinada audiência interpreta uma situação. O modo como uma questão política é repassada à população por meio de um discurso permite a sua aproximação com fatos inicialmente distantes de sua realidade cotidiana, direcionando a atenção para aquilo que melhor convir a quem profere o discurso (JACOBY, 2000, p. 751). Partindo desse pressuposto, alguns autores, como William Jacoby (2000), Thomas Nelson e Zoe Oxley (1999) e William Gamson (1992 apud KINDER; SANDERS, 1996, p. 164-192) propuseram a aplicação do *frame* como método de análise em casos de mobilização em contextos políticos, com a concepção do *issue framing*.

Segundo Gamson (1992 apud KINDER; SANDERS, 1996, p. 164-192), a política é, em parte, uma competição de ideias, onde há a possibilidade de contestação de questões políticas a partir da maneira como essas são expostas à população. Diante disso, todo assunto colocado em um contexto político possui em sua elaboração um *frame*, ou seja, “uma organização central de ideias ou uma linha histórica que atribua significados à manifestação de uma seleção de eventos” (GAMSON, 1992 apud KINDER; SANDERS, 1996, p. 164, tradução nossa). O processo de *issue framing*, consiste, portanto, na elaboração desses *frames* que perpassam um determinado problema político, a fim de mobilizar uma determinada audiência. Esse processo

marca a transição da aplicação do processo de *framing*, inicialmente estudado por Snow & Benford, para contextos políticos, como se almeja realizar na presente pesquisa.

Como será elucidado no capítulo seguinte, a política externa de neutralidade na Finlândia foi, desde a sua concepção, na década de 1940, consolidada por meio de um discurso que defendia a manutenção de boas relações com a Rússia como a melhor forma de garantir a soberania e a integridade territorial finlandesa. Os russos foram, desde a independência da Finlândia em relação à Rússia Soviética, em 1917, considerados uma ameaça constante aos finlandeses, percepção acentuada após os acontecimentos da II Guerra Mundial (ver capítulo 2). Consolidada dessa forma, a possibilidade de um comportamento ofensivo russo em relação à Finlândia passou a ser parte da rotina política do país durante a Guerra Fria e foi incorporada como um problema para o qual o país deveria tomar atitudes para se proteger, ou seja, passou a compor um *diagnóstico*. Restou evidente que o país precisava de uma estratégia para lidar com a constante ameaça vizinha e a neutralidade foi a escolhida, compondo o *prognóstico*. A adoção e manutenção dessa estratégia demandou sua legitimação pela população, razão pela qual foi elaborado um *master frame*, pelo governo do país, à época presidido por Juho Kusti Paasikivi, fundamentado na necessidade de a Finlândia estabelecer uma estratégia de política externa e de segurança que minimizasse os atritos com a Rússia.

Baseado na neutralidade por mais de sete décadas, esse *master frame* teve sua *ressonância* em meio à audiência finlandesa desafiada pelas atitudes de Vladimir Putin em relação à Ucrânia, principalmente a partir de 2014. A neutralidade que antes era vista como o principal mecanismo de segurança do país foi abandonada em prol do início do processo de adesão à OTAN, em 2022. Nesse contexto, o *prognóstico* e o *master frame* foram adaptados como forma de garantir a manutenção do apoio da população à uma estratégia de política externa em relação à Rússia, ainda que de forma oposta à defendida anteriormente. Essa mudança nos discursos que constituem o *master frame* de segurança da Finlândia compõe o objeto de pesquisa do presente trabalho, os quais pretende-se analisar por meio do método de análise de discurso, descrito a seguir.

1.4. A análise de discurso como método

Um discurso pode ser definido como um sistema de produção de significados que possibilita a um ator entender o mundo à sua volta e nele agir. A análise de discurso, por sua vez, é usualmente definida como o estudo da linguagem em uso nesse sistema, trazendo o estudo de como e porque as coisas aparecem da forma como aparecem e como determinadas

ações se tornam possíveis. Em geral, o analista de discurso questiona o modo por meio do qual esses sistemas específicos de produção de significados são gerados, disseminados, internalizados ou enfrentam resistência (DUNN & NEUMAN, 2016, p. 4; 17-18).

A análise de discurso possui diversas abordagens tanto na disciplina de linguística quanto nas Ciências Sociais, sendo que nesta, destacam-se a Análise Crítica de Discurso (ACD) e a Análise Pós-estruturalista. A corrente da ACD, responsável pela popularização do método nas Ciências Sociais, adota muitas das posições ontológicas e epistemológicas da disciplina, argumentando a existência de duas dimensões distintas, a discursiva e a extra discurso. Nesse sentido, o discurso é concebido e constrangido por uma realidade material constituída independentemente dele. Para os teóricos da ACD, os discursos podem possuir, porém, um grau mensurável de causalidade que, muitas vezes, orienta para a necessidade de um rigor empírico, e ocorrem em uma realidade onde a agência humana existe em meio a uma relação dialética entre discurso e sistemas sociais. Essa dinâmica de co-construção é a base do arquétipo que permite aos estudiosos dessa corrente conceituarem discursos como esquemas capazes de instigar percepções e entendimentos para objetivos específicos, permitindo a mensuração da efetividade da utilização de um discurso (DUNN & NEUMAN, 2016, pp. 35-37).

A corrente pós-estruturalista, por sua vez, tem por base que tudo pode ser estudado como texto, como fenômenos ligados por um código. Para esses estudiosos, nada pode ser compreendido sem o recurso ao texto, rejeitando a divisão colocada pela ACD entre as dimensões discursiva e não discursiva, sendo as teorias desenvolvidas por Michael Foucault e Jacques Derrida para a valorização do poder da linguagem referências para essa abordagem (DUNN & NEUMAN, 2016, pp. 39-40). Responsáveis pela introdução da análise de discurso nas Relações Internacionais, os pós-estruturalistas colocam, portanto, a linguagem como o meio social central por meio do qual os significados são criados, tornando-se uma espécie de prática, na qual o mais importante é entender não a veracidade das informações veiculadas, mas como elas moldam valores, normas e identidades (HANSEN, 2016, p. 95-96; 102). Conformando um sistema social e tendo uma lógica própria e racional, a linguagem é capaz, dessa forma, de produzir uma realidade para os humanos por meio da mediação dos sentidos (NEUMAN, 2008, p. 61). Nesse contexto, o discurso surge como um macro conceito utilizado para demonstrar como esse processo se dá, ou seja, como a linguagem modela os processos sociais e cria significados, estando também relacionada ao poder na sociedade (LARSEN, 1997, p. 28).

A análise de discurso passou a ser utilizada nas Relações Internacionais com a intenção de suprir a necessidade latente de se estudar a política externa como uma prática discursiva, a fim de produzir análises críticas do modo como os Estados e as instituições internacionais

constroem suas políticas externas e, por meio delas, suas próprias identidades e de seus pares. Foi então que os pós-estruturalistas trouxeram a ideia de que a política, inclusive, a política externa, é orientada por interesses, mas esses são discursivos, ou seja, articulados em uma linguagem por meio dos atores que os defendem. Nesse sentido, identidades e concepções em relação ao outro são definidas por meio do discurso, sendo o próprio Estado, um sujeito constituído em discurso (HANSEN, 2016, p. 97-101).

Definindo identidades, concepções e significados, o discurso regularmente presente nas relações sociais cria pré-condições para a realização de ações (NEUMANN, 2008, p. 62). Segundo a corrente pós-estruturalista, as decisões em política externa são tomadas com base em construções discursivas, como por exemplo, as relacionadas à aquisição de capacidades materiais, usualmente, orientadas pela percepção do Estado em relação à quantidade de aliados confiáveis e inimigos que possui (HANSEN, 2016, p. 102).

Considerando a construção discursiva da política externa e suas decisões, o discurso é ainda, de acordo com os pós-estruturalistas, o meio utilizado para justificar as razões da adoção de uma determinada política. Dessa forma, a política externa deve fornecer representações de um “problema”, que almeja solucionar, podendo esse ser personificado em um Chefe de Estado, um país ou uma população (HANSEN, 2016, p. 102). Essa característica na construção da política externa por meio do discurso assemelha-se à concepção do *diagnóstico* que baseia a elaboração do *frame de ação coletiva* e/ou do *master frame*, como exposto anteriormente, o que colabora para a utilização das duas metodologias em conjunto para o estudo de fenômenos discursivos, como o que se pretende analisar no presente trabalho.

O principal objeto de estudo da análise de discurso são essas representações, que constituem significados socialmente construídos e que, por serem re-apresentadas por repetidas vezes ao longo do tempo, passam a ser institucionalizadas e normalizadas. Ao pesquisador, cabe a identificação dessas representações, bem como a presença de afinidades entre elas para constatar se são pertencentes a um mesmo discurso. Uma vez constatado o pertencimento, faz-se importante capturar as variações culturais que inevitavelmente ocorrem na representação da realidade por meio do discurso estudado, identificando as posições que cada representação ocupa no contexto linguístico em que estão inseridas, se ora dominantes ora marginalizadas (NEUMAN, 2008, p. 61-62). A atenção dada pela análise de discurso às mudanças culturais na representação da realidade remete à importância da constante adequação desse às características da audiência à qual é dirigido, de forma a garantir sua ressonância. A mesma atenção se faz presente na teoria do *framing*, cuja base se encontra na análise dos elementos de *ressonância* do *frame*, baseados nos valores e crenças da audiência para a qual ele foi elaborado. Mais

explícita é a semelhança quando da análise de um *master frame*, que busca se adequar a novos contextos, ou seja, às mudanças sociais e culturais de sua audiência, para garantir a continuidade de sua *ressonância*. Nesse sentido, a análise de discurso fornece um método de análise das informações do *master frame* para identificação dos critérios de sucesso elaborados por Snow & Benford (1992).

Ainda em relação às mudanças presentes no discurso ao longo do tempo, Hansen (2016, p. 106) aponta dois principais caminhos pelos quais essas alterações ocorreriam no contexto de aplicação do método à Análise de Política Externa. O primeiro é por meio da pressão presente no nível do discurso, exercida tanto pelos atores do contexto político interno quanto por outros Estados, sob o argumento de que a política externa adotada não seria capaz de lidar com o problema por ela apresentado. Outra possibilidade seria a ocorrência de mudanças no objeto da política externa em si, quando, por exemplo, o problema apresentado se resolve e a política perde a justificativa de sua existência. Em ambos os casos, faz-se necessária uma adaptação do discurso para que ele continue a obter *ressonância* e mobilizar o apoio à política externa adotada, o que, mais uma vez, demonstra a complementariedade entre a análise de discurso e a teoria do *framing*.

A justificativa para a utilização da análise de discurso em contextos democráticos, como o da Finlândia, se assemelha à apresentada anteriormente para o uso da teoria do *framing*. O conflito de ideias que caracteriza a política, conforme colocado por Gamson (1992 apud KINDER; SANDERS, 1996, p. 164-192), é apresentado a uma audiência por meio do *issue frame* que, nada mais é do que um discurso. Segundo Neumann (2008, p. 71), a política envolve a contestação entre posições relativamente definidas, que competem por *ressonância* diante de uma determinada audiência, havendo, geralmente uma dominante, constantemente desafiada por outras. A necessidade de legitimidade de decisões políticas em contextos democráticos, como colocado por Nelson & Oxley (1999, p. 1040-1041), ratifica a importância do discurso e sua relação com o poder na sociedade, corroborando a adequação do uso da análise de discurso para estudo de políticas externas, que, nesses contextos necessitam da chancela da população.

No presente trabalho, almeja-se, portanto, a utilização da análise de discurso como método de análise de informação para complementar a aplicação da teoria do *master frame* no estudo da influência da movimentação russa no abandono da política externa de neutralidade pela Finlândia. Os passos a serem seguidos para a análise das informações das fontes, em sua maioria discursos, relatórios e notas de imprensa publicadas pelo governo finlandês, serão baseados no trabalho elucidado por Neumann (2008, p. 63) sobre a percepção europeia da política externa russa. Segundo o autor, o pesquisador disposto a realizar a análise de discurso

deve inicialmente delimitar um conjunto de fontes em um período que seja amplo, mas de possível manuseio. No presente trabalho, essa delimitação temporal será entre os anos de 2014 e 2022. Após essa definição, o pesquisador deve passar para a identificação das representações que compõem o discurso. Em paralelo, deve-se averiguar a presença de “monumentos” na literatura secundária, isto é, de trabalhos citados por diversos textos e que tendem a se referenciar entre si, podendo auxiliar na validação da escolha de fontes relevantes. Nesta pesquisa, essa etapa será realizada em conjunto com a aplicação das duas funções essenciais do *master frame*, de orientação atributiva (*diagnóstico e prognóstico*) e de escopo de articulação (*código restrito* ou *elaborado*), a fim de identificá-los entre as representações verificadas no discurso.

Identificadas as representações e as duas primeiras funções essenciais do *master frame*, passar-se-á à verificação das mudanças ocorridas no discurso, por meio de seu desdobramento em camadas, etapa também prevista por Neumann (2008, p. 63). Nesse momento, buscar-se-á, então, a presença da terceira função do *master frame*, qual seja, a de potência, identificando os elementos de *credibilidade empírica*, *comensurabilidade experimental* e *fidelidade narrativa*, que foram alterados no discurso para garantir sua *ressonância* em meio à audiência. No caso finlandês, esses elementos serão levantados para analisar as mudanças ocorridas no discurso diante da movimentação russa e que culminou na troca da defesa da neutralidade pela entrada na OTAN como melhor forma de garantir a integridade territorial do país.

No próximo capítulo será apresentado um breve histórico da política externa de neutralidade finlandesa, bem como da política externa russa e sua movimentação na Ucrânia nos últimos anos, a fim de contextualizar e apresentar o objeto de pesquisa deste trabalho. No capítulo três, a análise de discurso será aplicada às fontes para identificação das representações e das funções de orientação atributiva e de escopo de articulação do *master frame*. Por fim, no quarto capítulo serão apresentadas as mudanças ocorridas no discurso estudado e os elementos de potência que garantem a *ressonância* do *master frame* em um contexto distinto do qual ele foi concebido originalmente.

2. A POLÍTICA EXTERNA DE NEUTRALIDADE FINLANDESA E A MOVIMENTAÇÃO RUSSA NA UCRÂNIA

Este capítulo tem por objetivo apresentar o contexto de concepção do *master frame* de segurança da Finlândia a partir da identificação de suas funções atributivas, que compreendem a elaboração do *diagnóstico*, ou seja, a avaliação da situação e a identificação do problema a ser resolvido, bem como do *prognóstico*, a solução a ser adotada. O capítulo iniciará com a apresentação da política externa adotada pela Finlândia a partir de 1948 e da discussão teórica acerca da neutralidade. Para a identificação do *diagnóstico*, destaque será dado às relações do país com a Rússia, demonstrando como a movimentação na Ucrânia desde 2014 transformou a política de neutralidade finlandesa, primeiramente concebida como um *prognóstico* adequado, em um possível obstáculo à segurança do país, a ser solucionado com a adesão à OTAN.

2.1. A política externa de neutralidade da Finlândia

As relações entre a Finlândia e a União das Repúblicas Socialistas Soviéticas (URSS) foram, desde a independência do país até o fim da Guerra de Continuação¹, permeadas por tensões, conflitos e medo. Tendo se tornado independente da Rússia Soviética em 1917, a Finlândia logo enfrentou uma guerra civil entre a Guarda Branca Finlandesa, apoiada pela Alemanha, e as Forças Vermelhas Finlandesas, apoiadas pelo regime bolchevique e derrotadas em 1918. Em 1920, foi assinado um tratado de paz com a Rússia Soviética, estabelecendo as fronteiras entre os países, mas somente em 1932, seria acertado um pacto de não agressão entre ambos, em uma tentativa de melhorar as relações fino-soviéticas (ALLISON, 1985, p. 5-8). Em 1938, os soviéticos tentaram ainda aprofundar a cooperação com os finlandeses em caso de tentativas de ataque ocidentais a Leningrado, por meio do território finlandês, o que não foi bem recebido pela Finlândia e influenciou a URSS na assinatura com o pacto de não agressão Ribbentrop-Molotov com a Alemanha um ano depois. Assegurada pelo referido tratado, a URSS tentou, então, negociar a região de Karelia² com os finlandeses, o que, mais uma vez,

¹ A Guerra de Continuação se refere à participação finlandesa na operação alemã de invasão à URSS em 1941. A decisão do país de invadir o território soviético foi à época justificada como uma forma de reparar as perdas sofridas com a Guerra do Inverno lutada contra o país em 1939, que resultou na morte de 25 mil finlandeses e na cessão de parte significativa do território da Finlândia à Rússia (ALLISON, 1985, pp. 7-8).

² A região da Karelia está localizada ao sudeste da Finlândia, compreendendo desde o Mar Branco até a costa do Golfo Finlandês e foi alvo de disputas entre a Rússia e a Suécia durante o século XIII, tendo sido finalmente concedida à Finlândia no século XIX. O Tratado de Tartu, assinado com a URSS em 1920, determinou que a região seria finlandesa, mas não evitou a pretensão soviética sobre a região, que acabou por contribuir para o início da

resultou em negativa do país vizinho. Amparados pelo pacto com os alemães, em novembro de 1939, os soviéticos invadiram a Finlândia, acusando-a de ser a responsável por um ataque à vila soviética de Mainila, na Karelia. Iniciava-se, assim, um dos episódios mais traumáticos da história finlandesa: a Guerra do Inverno.

Com o advento da guerra, a Finlândia iniciou oficialmente sua participação na II Guerra Mundial, em um conflito que resultou na morte de 25 mil finlandeses e se encerrou com um tratado de paz assinado em 1940, cujos termos não foram bem aceitos pela população por ceder parte significativa do território do país à URSS. Ressentido, o país assinou com a Alemanha, em 1941, um acordo de trânsito secreto e, logo após a invasão alemã à URSS, a Finlândia declarou guerra aos soviéticos como co-beligerante. Apesar da parceria e participação na operação Barbarossa, como ficou conhecido o episódio da invasão alemã à URSS, os finlandeses afirmavam não serem aliados dos nazistas e sim estarem lutando a Guerra de Continuação contra os soviéticos, referindo-se a uma espécie de acerto de contas ainda relacionado à Guerra do Inverno (ALLISON, 1985, p. 7-8). Esse segundo conflito com a URSS terminou em 1944, com um armistício que restaurou as fronteiras finlandesas àquelas de 1940 e desmobilizou o exército do país, deixando intacto apenas o contingente necessário para expulsar as tropas nazistas do território da Finlândia (FORSBERG, 2018, p. 99).

Apesar das décadas conflituosas e permeadas por tensões entre os dois países, a partir de 1946 houve uma mudança radical na política externa finlandesa, a qual passou a ter como ponto central as boas relações com o país vizinho, tendo por base a neutralidade. O responsável por essa mudança foi o presidente eleito no referido ano, Juho Kusti Paasikivi, o qual instituiu a política que ficaria conhecida por seu próprio nome (Linha Paasikivi). Paasikivi defendia que as preocupações da URSS em relação à Finlândia tinham natureza securitária, de forma que não seria de seu interesse a satelitização ou a ocupação do país, mas apenas a garantia de que o território finlandês não seria utilizado como rota de ataque aos soviéticos. Dessa forma, o presidente acreditava que, caso a Finlândia fosse capaz de assegurar ao país vizinho que não permitiria atividades hostis à URSS em seu território, os soviéticos cooperariam e respeitariam a independência finlandesa (KUUSISTO, 1949, p. 37). Paasikivi dava início, portanto, à construção do *master frame* de segurança na Finlândia, que é o objeto de pesquisa deste trabalho, a partir do *diagnóstico* da *Rússia como uma ameaça permanente ao país, mas que poderia ser evitada por meio de uma estratégia preventiva de política externa e de segurança*.

Guerra do Inverno (CARLSON, 2003). Atualmente, a região encontra-se dividida, estando uma parte sob autoridade finlandesa e outra sob responsabilidade russa.

A *neutralidade* foi o meio escolhido pelo presidente para embasar seu discurso e as ações de seu governo, passando a ser essa a base do *prognóstico*, ou seja, da solução a ser adotada para o problema identificado.

Seguindo essa lógica, Paasikivi buscou a aproximação com a URSS, decidindo não fazer parte do Plano Marshall em 1947 e assinando com o país vizinho, em 1948, o Tratado de Amizade, Cooperação e Assistência Mútua (FCMA na sigla em inglês), que passou então a regular a relação entre os países e marcou o reconhecimento da neutralidade finlandesa como política externa pelos soviéticos. O Artigo 1º do FCMA previa que, em caso de ataque à Finlândia ou de utilização de seu território pela Alemanha para atacar a URSS, os finlandeses lutariam contra os alemães e, em caso de dificuldades em defender sua integridade territorial, ajuda seria concedida pelos soviéticos por meio de acordo específico. O Artigo 2º, por sua vez, estabelecia que, uma vez constatada ameaça de ataque armado à URSS, os dois países se reuniriam para tratar do assunto (KUUSISTO, 1949, p. 44). A parte mais importante, porém, veio no preâmbulo do acordo, o qual reconhecia o direito finlandês de “se abster dos conflitos de interesse das grandes potências” marcando o início da adoção da política externa de neutralidade pela Finlândia (KARSH, 1986, p. 269-270).

Embora não tenha estabelecido nenhuma restrição ou obrigação acerca das relações não-militares entre a Finlândia e o Ocidente, o FCMA privou, na prática, o país de se envolver militarmente com o bloco capitalista e foi também complementado por algumas outras ações direcionadas a evitar qualquer desaprovação soviética, as quais deram início à dinâmica que ficaria conhecida internacionalmente como *Finlandization*. Entre essas ações está a não participação da Finlândia na fundação do Conselho Nórdico³, em 1952, mesmo tendo sido um de seus países idealizadores (KARSH, 1986, p. 270) e os episódios conhecidos como “*Night Frost*” e “*Note Crisis*”, ocorridos em 1958 e 1961 respectivamente. O “*Night Frost*” ocorreu quando Moscou, recusando-se a aceitar o governo finlandês recém-formado, retirou seu embaixador de Helsinki, provocando uma crise que resultou na renúncia do novo governo. Na “*Note Crisis*”, por sua vez, Moscou requisitou consultas militares com a Finlândia, com base no FCMA de 1948, para tratar de uma suposta ameaça militar da Alemanha e seus aliados. Ambas as passagens foram interpretadas pelo Ocidente como consequências negativas oriundas da cooperação com a URSS, contribuindo para a popularização do termo *Finlandization* de

³ Fundado em 1952, o Conselho Nórdico é o órgão oficial de cooperação interparlamentar entre os países da região nórdica, sendo atualmente integrado por Dinamarca, Finlândia, Islândia, Noruega, Suécia, Ilhas Faroé, Groelândia e Ilhas Aland. Os finlandeses entraram para o Conselho apenas em 1955, três anos após sua fundação (THE NORDIC COUNCIL, 2022).

forma pejorativa no debate doméstico alemão da década de 1960. Para o bloco dos países capitalistas, portanto, cooperar com a URSS seria sinônimo de incorrer na submissão aos interesses desta, como teria ocorrido com a Finlândia, por isso o termo *Finlandization*. Com o passar dos anos, porém, o termo passou a ser comumente utilizado para descrever uma estratégia de política externa por meio da qual um país pequeno cede aos interesses de uma grande potência com a qual divide fronteiras (FORSBERG & PESU, 2016, p. 474).

Apesar da visão, muitas vezes negativa, dos países ocidentais em relação à política de neutralidade adotada pela Finlândia durante a Guerra Fria, muitos finlandeses acreditam que a adoção dessa postura foi o que garantiu ao país sucesso em não se tornar parte do bloco socialista e, ainda, prosperar economicamente no período, ao manter boas relações com as duas partes (FORSBERG, 2018, p. 101). Essa percepção corrobora a mudança ocorrida em relação à concepção da neutralidade como política externa, a qual deixou de ser uma posição adotada apenas em tempos de conflito, passando a ser também utilizada como um modelo de política externa em tempos de paz, dando origem à neutralidade política, que inclui as atitudes e práticas dos Estados neutros em períodos de paz (AGIUS & DEVINE, 2011, p. 269). Dessa forma, Joenniemi (1988, p. 58) elucida que a neutralidade adquiriu um novo sentido, moderno, deixando de ser atrelada ao abstencionismo em tempos de guerra para assumir um caráter mais ativo no Sistema Internacional em tempos de paz, passando a estar relacionada à remoção de ameaças a outros países e à resolução de conflitos e a ser reconhecida como um modelo de política externa. Propícia também a este movimento foi a divisão do mundo entre os blocos capitalista e socialista, que criou o nicho adequado para o ressurgimento da neutralidade como grande estratégia de sobrevivência e projeção para países que estivessem em zonas de grande tensão geopolítica, como a Finlândia, a Suécia e a Áustria. Nesse contexto, esses países se projetaram no Sistema Internacional como “*bridge-builders*”, ou seja, intermediários entre o Ocidente capitalista e o Oriente socialista por serem precisamente neutros, apoiando e promovendo diversas iniciativas de diálogo para a paz (AGIUS & DEVINE, 2011, p. 271), como a própria Conferência de Helsinki de 1975⁴, organizada pela Finlândia.

⁴ A Conferência de Helsinki foi o último evento de um processo de dois anos que tinha como objetivo a redução da tensão entre os blocos capitalista e socialista e culminou na criação da Organização para Segurança e Cooperação da Europa (OSCE). O documento assinado na ocasião previa ações para cooperação política e econômica, bem como relacionadas a Direitos Humanos, contendo dez princípios fundamentais que deveriam guiar as relações dos Estados com seus cidadãos e entre eles próprios. Assinaram o documento 35 países europeus, os EUA e o Canadá (OSCE, 2022).

Contando, portanto, com grande apoio popular, a política de neutralidade finlandesa não foi abandonada após o fim da Guerra Fria e a extinção do FCMA, em 1992⁵, mas passou a ser questionada diante da crescente dinâmica de integração regional no Sistema Internacional e da possibilidade de ingresso da Finlândia na União Europeia. Segundo Dmitry Lanko (2021, p. 146), esse início da década de 1990 teria sido o momento da primeira de três ondas de debates no país acerca da neutralidade, a qual teve como resultado a efetiva entrada finlandesa para o bloco europeu, acompanhada da Suécia, em 1994. A grande questão na primeira onda de debate centrava-se nos impactos que a adesão poderia gerar na política de neutralidade — se significaria o seu abandono, algo até então inaceitável à população. Tentando contornar esse aparente conflito, a neutralidade finlandesa foi reformulada para o não alinhamento militar, de forma a permitir que o país integrasse blocos regionais desde que não fossem alianças militares, a fim de garantir a independência do país em caso de conflitos. Dessa forma, a Finlândia logrou aderir à União Europeia sem o abandono completo de seu estatuto de neutralidade, agradando à população que almejava a aproximação com a Europa, mas não à custo da política externa de Paasikivi (FORSBERG, 2018, p. 103).

A redefinição da postura finlandesa na década de 1990 foi também acompanhada da intensificação da cooperação do país com a Organização do Tratado do Atlântico Norte (OTAN), como forma de robustecer a capacidade de defesa nacional sem violar o não alinhamento militar. Em 1994, a Finlândia entrou para o Programa de Parceiros para a Paz da OTAN (BJERELD; MOLLER, 2016, p. 441) e, no ano seguinte, enviou tropas para a operação da Organização na Bósnia-Herzegovina, o que se repetiu no Kosovo, em 1999, e no Afeganistão entre 2003 e 2014 (YDÉN; BERNDTSSON; PETERSSON, 2019, p. 12). Seguindo a aproximação, em 2008, o país foi e continua a ser o único não membro a fazer parte do Programa de Estratégia de Capacidade Aérea, gerido pela OTAN (PETERSSON, 2018, p. 85). Nesse mesmo ano, com o aumento da cooperação militar com a aliança, o não alinhamento passou a ser novamente questionado no país, na segunda onda de debate identificada por Lanko (2019, p. 441). Os questionamentos centravam-se em um possível abandono da política para comportar uma adesão à OTAN, o que acabou sendo incorporado oficialmente à plataforma eleitoral de um dos maiores partidos políticos do país, do qual é parte o atual presidente finlandês Sauli Niinistö, o Partido da Coligação Nacional (PCN). A possibilidade de entrada da

⁵ O FCMA, ao ser expirado, foi substituído por um novo tratado assinado entre a Finlândia e a Rússia em 1992, o qual passou a regular as relações entre os dois países, prevendo a recusa ao uso da força entre os dois signatários, bem com o respeito à fronteira entre ambos (RUSSIA, FINLAND SIGN..., 1992).

Finlândia para a OTAN passou, então, a ser assunto recorrente nas eleições do país e defendida pelo PCN.

A resistência popular a essa opção continuou, porém, bastante forte, tendo a adesão se tornado uma possibilidade que poderia se concretizar, mas em momento futuro, não no presente (FORSBERG, 2018, p. 104). Entre as razões para a cautela no trato de uma possível adesão à OTAN estiveram as consequências que a decisão teria sobre as relações com a Rússia e o alto apoio dos finlandeses à continuidade do não alinhamento, que alcançava a marca de 67% em 2013 (ABDI, 2022). O apoio à possibilidade de entrada para a OTAN também não encontrou aumento nesse período, permanecendo restrito a uma parcela de 21% da população no mesmo ano (ABDI, 2022). Essa resiliência da política externa de neutralidade, instituída por Paasikivi na década de 1940, ratifica a presença de um *master frame* de segurança consolidado em meio ao governo e à população, no qual a neutralidade é colocada como a grande estratégia de sobrevivência frente à constante ameaça russa.

A movimentação da Rússia na região, iniciada em 2013, com uma simulação de ataque aéreo à Suécia na noite do dia 29 de março daquele ano (RUSSIA SIMULATED..., 2013), seguida da anexação da península da Crimeia em 2014 e da invasão à Ucrânia em 2022, trouxe, entretanto, diversos impactos à opção finlandesa pelo não alinhamento. Para Lanko (2021, p. 441), a anexação da Crimeia em 2014 deu início à terceira onda de debate no país acerca da viabilidade do não alinhamento militar. Na pesquisa de opinião pública realizada pelo governo naquele ano, o apoio popular à adesão do país à OTAN atingiu o maior índice da série histórica, 30%. Mudança significativa começou também a ser sentida na visão que os finlandeses possuem dos vizinhos russos, tendo 50% da população caracterizado o efeito da Rússia sobre a segurança do país como negativo (ABDI, 2022).

Novas e paradigmáticas mudanças na opinião pública e na política externa finlandesa foram observadas novamente em 2022, após a invasão russa da Ucrânia em 24 de fevereiro do referido ano. Uma pesquisa realizada pelo jornal *YLE News* cerca de um mês após o início do conflito russo-ucraniano demonstrou que, pela primeira vez, a maioria (62%) dos finlandeses apoiava a entrada do país para a OTAN (YLE POLL, 2022), o que trouxe desafios ao *master frame* de segurança disseminado no país com base na neutralidade. A capacidade de adaptação do discurso ao novo contexto (no espectro de código restrito-elaborado) foi colocada à prova para garantir sua *ressonância* em meio à sua audiência, a população finlandesa. Tendo em vista ser esse movimento de alteração no discurso do governo finlandês, que culminou no pedido oficial de adesão do país à OTAN no dia 18 de maio de 2022 (FINLAND AND SWEDEN SUBMIT, 2022), o objeto de estudo deste trabalho, torna-se essencial entender a política

externa de Vladimir Putin para a Ucrânia na última década, a fim de identificar seus efeitos sobre o *master frame* de segurança presente na Finlândia.

2.2. A política ofensiva de Vladimir Putin na Ucrânia entre 2014 e 2022

A política externa da Rússia de Vladimir Putin para a Ucrânia é alvo de diversas interpretações, que tentam explicar o comportamento ofensivo do presidente russo em relação ao país vizinho. Andrei Tsygankov (2015) divide as relações entre a Rússia e a Ucrânia no período entre 2004 e 2014 em três fases distintas: (1) relações congeladas, com Yuschenko (2004-2010); (2) parceria limitada, com Yanukovych (2010-2013) e (3) confrontação (fevereiro-agosto de 2014). Tsygankov analisa as relações entre Rússia e Ucrânia a partir da Revolução Laranja, ocorrida em 2004, quando os ucranianos saíram às ruas para protestarem contra a eleição de Viktor Yanukovych, candidato apoiado por Vladimir Putin. As manifestações culminaram em novas eleições, nas quais Yanukovych foi derrotado por Viktor Yushchenko, candidato da oposição. O novo presidente da Ucrânia apresentou, então, uma política de aproximação com o Ocidente, afirmando o compromisso do país em buscar a adesão à OTAN, o que deu início às “relações congeladas” com a Rússia, permeadas por tensões. Em junho de 2006, o Ministro das Relações Exteriores russo declarou que a adesão da Ucrânia ou da Geórgia à OTAN poderia ocasionar uma mudança colossal na geopolítica global (TSYGANKOV, 2015, p. 4).

Para além da questão securitária e de aproximação com o Ocidente, o comércio de energia entre Rússia e Ucrânia também foi alvo de mudanças. Subsidiando o gás fornecido aos ucranianos desde a década de 1990, exigindo em troca baixas tarifas para o trânsito do gás fornecido para a Europa, em 2005 e em 2009 a Rússia cortou o fornecimento, como forma de pressionar o país a ceder na venda de parte da companhia nacional ucraniana de gás, sem obter sucesso. Solucionando a crise, Vladimir Putin, então Primeiro-ministro, negociou um novo contrato com os ucranianos, prevendo a manutenção do subsídio do gás em troca das baixas tarifas de trânsito por dez anos, o que não impediu o presidente da Rússia, Dmitriy Medvedev de denunciar Yushchenko por promover “políticas anti-russas”. (TSYGANKOV, 2015, p.5)

A retórica russa contra Yuschenko não tardou a obter apelo entre os ucranianos e em 2010, Viktor Yanukovych, apoiado pelo país vizinho, foi eleito presidente da Ucrânia, dando origem a relações mais próximas com a Rússia. No primeiro ano de mandato, Yanukovych estendeu o acordo de arrendamento para a frota russa do Mar Negro por mais vinte e cinco anos, em troca de subsídio no gás natural. A parceria, porém, como bem colocado por Tsygankov,

foi limitada, não tendo o presidente ucraniano aberto mão das ações da companhia de petróleo nacional da Ucrânia e nem aceitado ser parte da União Aduaneira criada pela Rússia, a União Econômica Eurasiática⁶. Yanukovich não resistiu, entretanto, à oferta de Vladimir Putin de 15 bilhões de dólares e optou pela aproximação com a Rússia em detrimento da União Europeia, decidindo adiar um Acordo de Associação com o bloco (FISHER, 2014; TSYGANKOV, 2015, p. 6).

A decisão de Yanukovich foi o estopim para os protestos populares na Ucrânia que ficaram conhecidos por *Euromaidan* e culminaram no controverso *impeachment* e na fuga do presidente para a Rússia, marcando o início da fase de confrontação entre os dois países. (FISHER, 2014; TSYKANGOV, 2015, p.6). Dias após o ocorrido, homens não identificados começaram um movimento de tomada da região da Crimeia, no Leste da Ucrânia, o qual posteriormente passou a contar explicitamente com o apoio de Vladimir Putin, após a aprovação pelo parlamento russo do envio de forças armadas para proteger a população russa na região (ANTHONY, 2014, p. 57). O argumento utilizado pelo presidente é explicado pelo fato de as regiões de Donetsk e Luhansk serem povoadas por uma população majoritariamente russa, que atua em prol de relações mais fortes com a Rússia em detrimento da União Europeia (CONANT, 2014).

Aproveitando-se da proximidade com os habitantes do Leste da Ucrânia, em 20 de fevereiro de 2014, Putin anexou a região da Crimeia sob a justificativa de que havia sido realizado um referendo no qual a maioria da população teria optado pela adesão à Rússia (FISHER, 2014; TSYGANKOV, 2015, p. 7). Dois meses após a anexação, em 12 de maio daquele ano, separatistas pró-Rússia realizaram também um referendo para declarar a independência das regiões de Donetsk e Luhansk em relação à Ucrânia (CENTER FOR PREVENT ACTION, 2022). O que parecia inicialmente um conflito interno ao país, logo passou a contar com interferência externa, ao constatar-se que os equipamentos utilizados pelos rebeldes separatistas não eram de origem ucraniana, mas sim estrangeira, o que foi evidenciado pela queda do avião da *Malaysia Airlines*⁷ e, posteriormente, revelado por diversos relatórios internacionais (ANTHONY, 2014, p. 60).

⁶ A União Econômica Eurasiática é uma organização internacional para promoção de integração regional, com personalidade jurídica e uma União Aduaneira. São membros: Armênia, Bielorrússia, Cazaquistão, Quirguistão e Rússia (EAEU, 2022).

⁷ No dia 17 de junho de 2014, um avião da *Malaysia Airlines*, que partiu de Amsterdã, com destino a Kuala Lumpur, foi derrubado por um míssil de alta precisão estrangeiro erroneamente disparado por manifestantes da região Leste da Ucrânia (FISHER, 2014).

A intervenção russa na Ucrânia foi interpretada por John Mearsheimer como uma resposta à política estadunidense de alargamento da OTAN, que tinha como um de seus objetivos a retirada da Ucrânia da órbita de influência russa (TSYGANKOV, 2015, p. 17). Para Michel McFaul (2020), por outro lado, o comportamento ofensivo russo teria origem na concepção que Vladimir Putin possui em relação à natureza da Rússia, aos EUA e às relações entre ambos. O presidente teria se baseado no conservadorismo e no antiliberalismo para definir o interesse nacional e colocou os EUA como um ator hostil a esse e aos valores ortodoxos russos, o que conforma a linha de pensamento denominada “putinismo” por alguns analistas (MCFAUL, 2020, pp. 99-100). Seguindo essa lógica, a intervenção na Ucrânia em 2014 teria sido baseada não em cálculos de *realpolitik*, mas orientada pelo conjunto de crenças de Vladimir Putin, que levou à visão do governo de Kiev como uma ameaça ideológica e à necessidade de avançar sua agenda no país (MCFAUL, 2020, pp. 120-123).

O conflito, que se arrasta ainda em 2023, foi objeto de diversas tentativas de negociação da paz, tendo se sobressaído os Acordos de Minsk. Em setembro de 2014, foi assinado o Acordo de Minsk I, entre representantes da Rússia, da Ucrânia e das duas repúblicas separatistas, Donetsk e Luhansk, prevendo, entre outras ações, a adoção de um cessar-fogo, a libertação de prisioneiros e a entrega de ajuda humanitária, mas foi rapidamente violado por ambos os lados. Seguiu-se, então, com a assinatura do Acordo de Minsk II, em fevereiro de 2015, pela Rússia, pela Ucrânia, pela Organização para Segurança e Cooperação na Europa (OSCE) e pelos líderes das regiões separatistas, incluindo novamente outro cessar-fogo, a retirada de todas as formações e equipamentos militares estrangeiros da zona de conflito e a realização de eleições nas regiões, entre outros pontos (FACTBOX..., 2022). Novamente, foram constatadas violações ao novo acordo por ambos os lados e o conflito seguiu persistindo no Leste do país.

Nesse período, observou-se também o aumento da cooperação militar entre a Ucrânia e a OTAN, tendo o país se tornado um dos seis parceiros de oportunidade engajada da Organização em 2020, fato que chamou a atenção do presidente russo (MASTERS, 2022). Já no ano seguinte, em outubro de 2021, o incômodo do país vizinho com o comportamento ucraniano se tornaria explícito com a movimentação de tropas e equipamentos militares russos em direção à fronteira com a Ucrânia. No mesmo ano, Vladimir Putin publicou o artigo “Sobre a união histórica entre ucranianos e russos”, dando sinais de sua insatisfação em relação ao comportamento do país vizinho. Apresentando um breve resumo da história da região, quando ambos os países faziam parte do Império Russo, Putin abordou as relações conflituosas entre os dois países no contexto atual como fruto de um jogo geopolítico que tenta colocar a Ucrânia como barreira entre a Europa e a Rússia. Referindo-se ao episódio ocorrido em 2014 como um

golpe, o presidente russo ressaltou o apoio do Ocidente e as ações realizadas na Ucrânia como uma política de caráter russófóbico, que teria forçado milhares de russos que vivem na Ucrânia a negarem suas raízes e gerações. As relações econômicas entre os dois países, que, segundo Putin, conformam um exemplo natural de economias complementares, foram também abordadas, com menção à cooperação entre ambas de mais de trinta anos, pautada principalmente no pagamento do trânsito do gás russo no território ucraniano. Afirmando que ambos os países são um só povo, Putin concluiu o artigo garantindo que a Rússia nunca foi e nunca será “anti-Ucrânia”, mas que necessita ter a certeza de que o país está lutando por seus interesses e não servindo a outros Estados (PUTIN, 2021, p. 8-10).

As tensões continuaram se elevando e, em dezembro de 2021, diante da presença de mais de 100.000 tropas na fronteira, o serviço de inteligência dos EUA alertou para a possibilidade de uma invasão russa no início de 2022. Corroborando, de certa forma, a ameaça identificada pelos EUA, o ministro de relações exteriores da Rússia, Sergey Lavrov, divulgou uma série de condições para que o país reduzisse seu contingente militar na fronteira. Entre os pedidos estava o de que os EUA e a OTAN interrompessem todas as atividades militares no Leste Europeu e na Ásia Central e não promovessem a expansão da Organização para países próximos à Rússia, incluindo a garantia de que a Ucrânia não se tornaria membro no futuro. Rejeitando os pedidos russos, os EUA ordenaram a movimentação de tropas para a Polônia e para a Romênia, no início de fevereiro, tendo como reação o envio de contingente militar russo para as regiões de Donetsk e Luhank sob o argumento de manutenção da paz (*peacekeeping*). A ação acirrou as sanções dos EUA contra o país e, em 24 de fevereiro de 2022, no momento em que o Conselho de Segurança das Nações Unidas (CSNU) se reunia para discutir a crise na Ucrânia, Vladimir Putin ordenou a invasão do país vizinho (FACTBOX, 2022).

Para além da violação de diversas normas do Direito Internacional, a invasão da Ucrânia pela Rússia em 2022 consolidou o desrespeito, iniciado em 2014, ao Memorando de Budapeste, assinado por ambas, pelos Estados Unidos da América e pelo Reino Unido, em 1994. O documento previa o respeito pelas partes à independência e à soberania ucraniana, bem como a suas fronteiras, além do compromisso de não uso ou ameaça de uso da força contra o país. Como contrapartida a essas garantias de segurança, foi requerido à Ucrânia ceder seu arsenal nuclear, então o terceiro maior do mundo, à Rússia, para que a mesma não se tornasse mais um país detentor de armas nucleares (PIFER, 2019). Do ponto de vista de países vizinhos, como a Finlândia, a postura ofensiva de Vladimir Putin passou a trazer questionamentos do real valor que garantias de segurança firmadas em tratados com outros países realmente teriam no novo contexto geopolítico contemporâneo.

Como mencionado anteriormente, a Finlândia assinou com a Rússia, em 1992, o Tratado sobre as Relações entre a Rússia e a Finlândia, que substituiu o antigo FCMA e passou a regular as relações entre os dois países. Entre os diversos pontos acordados, está o compromisso do não uso da força entre as partes e o respeito à fronteira de 800 milhas compartilhada por ambas. O tratado, que tinha duração prevista de 10 anos inicialmente, continua a ser automaticamente renovado a cada cinco anos (RUSSIA, FINLAND SIGN..., 1992), mas já não traz para o governo finlandês e para a população do país a mesma segurança em relação à amizade com os vizinhos russos. Dados de uma pesquisa realizada pelo jornal *YLE News*, em março de 2022, demonstraram que 62% dos finlandeses passaram a apoiar a entrada do país para a OTAN, o que indica uma mudança expressiva em relação aos anos anteriores, onde a maior parcela da população era contrária a essa medida (YLE POLL, 2022). A magnitude dessa alteração na opinião pública pode ser entendida a partir da constatação de que, entre 2005 e 2021, o apoio à adesão foi restrito a uma parcela que não ultrapassou os 30% da população.

Para além das pesquisas de opinião, a população se mobilizou para o debate acerca do tema por meio da elaboração de duas petições para que a adesão do país à OTAN fosse debatida pelo parlamento finlandês. A primeira, lançada no dia 21 de fevereiro, contou com mais de 75 mil assinaturas e tinha por objeto a realização de um referendo sobre a adesão, tendo sido enviada para discussão na casa legislativa em 8 de março de 2022. A segunda, por sua vez, foi lançada no dia 25 de fevereiro do mesmo ano e tinha como principal argumento o de que a entrada finlandesa para o Organização contribuiria para o cumprimento da obrigação constitucional da Finlândia de proteger os direitos básicos e humanos por meio da cooperação internacional para prevenção da guerra na região do Atlântico Norte (SECOND NATO..., 2022). Tendo alcançado cerca de 2 mil assinaturas a mais que as 50 mil requeridas constitucionalmente para ser encaminhada ao Parlamento, a proposta passou a ser discutida por esse no dia 4 de março de 2022.

Para além da ativação vinda da sociedade civil, o tema foi também abordado em dois relatórios periódicos do governo finlandês que fundamentaram a discussão no Parlamento e contribuíram para a criação de uma visão unificada e abrangente do governo sobre a possível adesão à OTAN. Em 20 de abril de 2022, foi publicado o “*Government Report on Changes in the Security Environment*”, que trouxe como ideia central o objetivo russo de mudar a ordem de segurança da Europa, com demandas de restrição da liberdade de escolha dos Estados em relação a suas políticas externa e de segurança, em especial à da Ucrânia. De acordo com o documento, a Rússia está buscando aumentar sua influência no território da ex-URSS e a

invasão à Ucrânia é interpretada como uma continuação da Guerra da Geórgia de 2008⁸ e da anexação da Crimeia em 2014. Essa movimentação teria diminuído o espaço de manobra finlandês, elemento essencial à sua política externa, de defesa e de segurança, além de ter fortalecido o papel da OTAN como uma aliança de defesa, o que se refletiu no aumento do apoio das populações suecas e finlandesas à entrada de seus respectivos países para a Organização (FINLÂNDIA, 2022, p. 8-9; 10-12).

Restou claro, para o governo finlandês, por meio desse relatório, a necessidade de a Finlândia fortalecer sua capacidade de defesa e segurança e intensificar sua cooperação de longo prazo com parceiros, citando, inclusive, algumas ações já tomadas pelo país nesse sentido, como a alocação de recursos adicionais para a área de defesa, o aumento do contingente das Forças de Defesa, entre outras (FINLÂNDIA, 2022, p.14). As ações ofensivas russas na região são apresentadas no documento como uma ameaça, ou seja, um problema que a Finlândia não só precisa solucionar, como já está se movimentando nessa direção, corroborando, portanto, que o *diagnóstico* do processo de *master frame* identificado por Paasikivi na década de 1940, continua a existir no país atualmente.

O documento ainda elenca as consequências da possível adesão da Finlândia à OTAN, sendo o aumento do efeito de dissuasão frente a um ataque ao país o principal argumento a favor do movimento. Ao ser parte do Artigo 5º da Organização, que institui a defesa coletiva, os custos de uma ação militar contra a Finlândia e toda a região do Mar Báltico aumentariam, o que contribuiria para a estabilidade do Norte da Europa. A adesão à Organização começa aqui a aparecer, portanto, no posicionamento oficial do governo como a solução a ser adotada para solucionar o *diagnóstico* previamente identificado, ou seja, passa a compor o *prognóstico* do *master frame* de segurança da Finlândia, que antes era baseado na neutralidade. Por outro lado, o documento ressalta que a maior contribuição da Finlândia para a OTAN seria sua capacidade de defender seu território, vez que a adesão dobraria o ponto de fronteira do bloco com a Rússia (FINLÂNDIA, 2022, p. 15-16; 26-27).

O segundo Relatório, sobre a Adesão à OTAN, foi publicado no dia 15 de maio de 2022, cinco dias após a Comissão de Defesa do parlamento finlandês recomendar que o país se juntasse à Organização. Seguindo a linha do Relatório anterior, o documento frisou como a adesão fortaleceria o poder de dissuasão da Finlândia e a estabilidade na região do Mar Báltico,

⁸ A Guerra da Geórgia teve origem no contexto de tentativas separatistas das regiões da Abecásia e da Ossétia do Sul em relação à Geórgia, as quais contavam com o apoio russo. Segundo George Friedman (2008), a invasão russa pode ter sido interpretada com uma tentativa de recuperar a influência da Rússia sobre os ex-membros da URSS, bem como de se posicionar frente o Ocidente que havia apoiado a Revolução Laranja na Ucrânia e a independência do Kosovo (FRIEDMAN, 2008).

sendo este o argumento principal para justificar o abandono da neutralidade, apontando, mais uma vez, para a OTAN como o *prognóstico* mais adequado ao contexto de segurança atual. Outro ponto abordado é o estatuto das Ilhas Åland, região autônoma e desmilitarizada, localizada no Mar Báltico, que não seria alterado mesmo com a adesão à OTAN; continuaria a ser uma região neutra e sem presença de armamentos (FINLÂNDIA, 2022a, p. 3-4).

Ainda no dia 15 de maio de 2022, o Presidente Sauli Niinisto e a Primeira-Ministra Sanna Marin anunciaram que a Finlândia prosseguiria com o pedido de adesão à OTAN e que o assunto, então, seguiria para o Parlamento para debate (JOINT STATEMENT..., 2022). De acordo com o parágrafo 93 da Constituição finlandesa, a política externa do país deve ser liderada pelo Presidente, mas cabe ao Parlamento discutir e aprovar obrigações internacionais, assim com consentir ao Chefe de Estado declarar guerra ou paz (FINLAND'S PARLIAMENT VOTES TO..., 2022).

Seguindo, portanto, o rito constitucional, foi apresentado para discussão na casa legislativa, no dia 17 de maio de 2022, o Relatório do Comitê de Relações Exteriores do parlamento acerca dos dois relatórios publicados pelo governo. Concordando em grande parte com o posicionamento apresentado nos documentos, o Comitê reforçou a necessidade de que ações fossem tomadas para garantir a segurança nacional finlandesa, baseada na conscrição, na manutenção de reservistas treinados, na defesa do Estado como um todo e no grande desejo da população de defender o país. Em relação à cooperação internacional, é ressaltado que, embora a Finlândia tenha acordos com vários países como EUA e Reino Unido, não há nessas parcerias a garantia de auxílio em caso de um ataque militar, o que diminui o poder de dissuasão do país. Outra preocupação abordada é a necessidade de assegurar e reafirmar que a adesão finlandesa à OTAN tem por objetivo única e exclusivamente o aumento da segurança finlandesa, sem envolver qualquer tipo de provocação a um país em específico (FINLÂNDIA, 2022b, pp. 7-9;19).

Apesar de a maioria dos parlamentares terem previamente acenado para a aprovação da proposta, o debate contou com mais de 200 pronunciamentos e com uma contraproposta apresentada pelo membro do Partido de Esquerda, Markus Mustajarvi, sob o argumento de que a Finlândia continuaria a ser a fronteira entre a OTAN e a Rússia e que as tensões com o país vizinho seriam não apenas um risco durante o processo de adesão, mas uma nova condição de tensão permanente para o país (FINLAND'S PARLIAMENT VOTES TO..., 2022). Por outro lado, em favor da adesão foram citados argumentos como o aumento da segurança de toda a Europa, bem como da região nórdica, vez que todos os seus países passariam a se tornar membros da OTAN com a entrada da Finlândia e da Suécia. O fato de a Rússia ter apresentado

comportamento ofensivo mesmo com a Finlândia fora da OTAN foi também levantado como argumento para invalidar a neutralidade que o país adotava como solução efetiva para lidar com o país vizinho, tendo sido a Noruega citada como um modelo a ser seguido pelos finlandeses (FINLAND: PARLIAMENT VOTES TO..., 2022). Após um dia e meio de discussões, a proposta foi aprovada com 188 votos a favor, 8 contra e 4 abstenções e, no dia 18 de maio de 2022, o pedido de adesão da Finlândia à OTAN foi formalizado, juntamente ao da Suécia (FINLAND AND SWEDEN SUBMIT..., 2022).

O abandono da neutralidade finlandesa foi, portanto, em grande parte, associado pelo governo a uma forma de aumentar o poder de dissuasão do país e, conseqüentemente, garantir sua segurança diante do novo contexto de segurança internacional permeado pelas ofensivas russas. A violação do Memorando de Budapeste questionou toda e qualquer segurança que o tratado assinado com a Rússia em 1992 poderia proporcionar à Finlândia, requerendo uma nova estratégia para lidar com o país vizinho. A segurança nacional finlandesa passou, então, a ser associada não à abstenção de participação em alianças militares, mas à necessidade de ser parte dela. O surgimento dessa nova concepção do *master frame* de segurança do país, que continua a lidar com o mesmo *diagnóstico*, mas com um novo *prognóstico*, será explorado no próximo capítulo, onde serão identificados e classificados os códigos presentes nos documentos e discursos de representantes do governo que possam auxiliar na análise da presença dos elementos de *ressonância* que garantiram o alinhamento do posicionamento oficial da Finlândia aos anseios da população.

3. DIAGNÓSTICO E PROGNÓSTICO NO DISCURSO OFICIAL FINLANDÊS DE 2014 A 2022

Dando continuidade ao apresentado no capítulo anterior, este almeja apresentar as orientações atributivas (*diagnóstico* e *prognóstico*) e o escopo de articulação (*código restrito* ou *elaborado*) do *master frame* de segurança da Finlândia no discurso oficial do governo do país entre os anos de 2014 e 2022. Por meio da utilização do método de análise de discurso, relatórios governamentais e discursos do então presidente da Finlândia, Sauli Niinisto, foram analisados a fim de constatar como a movimentação russa no período alterou o *prognóstico* do *master frame* de segurança da Finlândia, enquanto o *diagnóstico* se manteve, em um discurso cujo escopo de articulação possui código majoritariamente restrito.

3.1. O discurso finlandês de 2014 a 2022: representações


Em seu discurso inaugural como presidente da Finlândia em 1º de março de 2012, Sauli Niinisto (2012) mencionou que “(...) a continuidade tem seu lugar na política externa; ela traz previsibilidade e estabilidade ao nosso entorno. (tradução nossa)”. A fala do presidente refletia o contexto de estabilidade vivido pelo Norte da Europa até então, que não demandava uma mudança na política externa de neutralidade do país como garantidora de sua segurança e integridade territorial.

A anexação russa da Crimeia, por sua vez, trouxe novos elementos a serem considerados na política externa e de defesa da Finlândia. Isso transpareceu tanto nos relatórios governamentais anuais quanto nos discursos do presidente Sauli Niinisto, os quais, em conjunto, compõem, para este trabalho, o discurso oficial finlandês, proferido pelo *ator estratégico* governo da Finlândia. Tendo como proposta o estudo dessa mudança e sua relação com a movimentação russa na região, a presente pesquisa analisou catorze relatórios governamentais emitidos entre os anos de 2014 e 2022, relacionados aos temas de política externa, defesa e segurança. Foram incluídos também programas de governos dos Primeiros Ministros que assumiram seus cargos neste período, além de setenta e seis discursos proferidos pelo presidente finlandês, sobre política externa do país. A escolha pela análise dos discursos do presidente Sauli Niinisto deu-se pelo fato de que, desde a criação da República da Finlândia, em 1919, a Constituição atribuiu ao presidente a responsabilidade pela condução das relações exteriores do país e pelas decisões de guerra e paz, esta sob aprovação do Parlamento (MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, apud HODGSON, 1962, p. 81). A importância da

imagem do presidente no país foi ainda fortalecida com a instabilidade na formação de governos logo após a II Guerra Mundial, sendo o líder associado à ideia de unidade (HODGSON, 1962, p. 82), característica que persiste até os dias atuais. Por essa razão, tendo em vista a importância atribuída ao presidente tanto na tomada de decisão em política externa quanto diante da própria população, este foi escolhido como principal porta-voz do governo finlandês para ter seus discursos analisados neste trabalho.

A pesquisa teve início com a utilização do método de análise de discursos proposto por Iver Neuman (2008, p, 63), com auxílio do software MaxQDA, desenvolvido para esse fim. O primeiro passo, conforme elucidado no primeiro capítulo deste trabalho é a identificação das representações de diversos temas/fatos presentes no discurso, tidas como significados constituídos socialmente e construídos por um ator, que, por serem re-apresentados por repetidas vezes ao longo do tempo, passam a ser institucionalizados e normalizados. A análise inicial das fontes resultou na identificação de trinta e oito possíveis representações presentes no discurso oficial finlandês no período de 2014 a 2022 relacionadas aos temas de política externa e de defesa. Considerando, porém, a necessidade de que, para ser considerado uma representação, o significado construído deve possuir uma frequência significativa para ser institucionalizado, as possíveis representações foram reduzidas para quinze, após análise qualitativa e quantitativa. Em termos quantitativos, para fins desta pesquisa, considerou-se a frequência mínima de dez aparições no material de investigação para consideração do significado como representação. O gráfico a seguir demonstra a frequência com que cada representação apareceu no discurso no período analisado:

Gráfico 1 – Frequência Total das Representações



Fonte: elaboração própria por meio do software MaxQDA, 2023.

A análise qualitativa, por sua vez, procurou agrupar significados parecidos ou que poderiam estar contidos uns nos outros. Ao elencar as representações, constatou-se a presença de cinco temáticas principais, nas quais aquelas foram agrupadas, de forma a facilitar a análise posterior do discurso: segurança e defesa, contexto externo, Rússia, OTAN e política externa.

Relacionados a segurança e defesa, foram elencadas as seguintes representações e seus respectivos significados:

Segurança e defesa finlandesa – apresentação de uma visão holística da segurança finlandesa, baseando-a em quatro pilares: segurança e defesa nacional; integração e parceria com o Ocidente; relações com a Rússia; e sistema internacional baseado em regras. No âmbito do primeiro pilar, a existência de uma capacidade de defesa de credibilidade é colocada como necessária não apenas como forma de aumentar o custo de um possível uso da força contra a Finlândia, mas também fator de posicionamento do país enquanto parceiro atrativo para cooperação (NIINISTÖ, 2014j; 2015f; 2016g). Nesse sentido, essa capacidade é abordada tendo

como base a conscrição geral, o treinamento dos reservistas para defesa do território como um todo e a grande disposição da população em defender o país (NIINISTÖ, 2018g; 2021f).

Cooperação em defesa – a cooperação em defesa com outros países em tempos de paz é apresentada como uma forma de desenvolvimento da confiança e capacidade de trabalhar em conjunto com parceiros em tempos de crise (FINLÂNDIA, 2021), sendo ressaltado que a mesma em nada se assemelha a soluções de defesa coletiva, com garantias de segurança e obrigações (NIINISTÖ, 2018g).

Cooperação com países nórdicos – os países nórdicos são abordados como o grupo de referência internacional mais próximo à Finlândia, sendo a cooperação com os mesmos muitas vezes estabelecida fora do âmbito de estruturas institucionais, o que garante maior grau de flexibilidade (FINLÂNDIA, 2018, p. 9).

Cooperação com a União Europeia – a cooperação com a União Europeia é apresentada como de extrema importância para a Finlândia, estando presente em um dos pilares de sua política externa. Essa importância vem, nos discursos, atrelada à necessidade, apoiada pela Finlândia, de fortalecimento da política externa e de segurança do bloco, a qual, dada sua frequência de aparições deu origem a outra representação neste trabalho (NIINISTÖ, 2021f).

No âmbito do contexto externo, as representações presentes foram:

Mudanças no contexto externo – o contexto internacional é abordado como estando em processo de mudança, com a busca de um novo equilíbrio no sistema multilateral e nas relações de poder entre as potências (NIINISTÖ, 2018f). O aumento da incerteza e da instabilidade são apontados, bem como a crescente preocupação com a *cyber* segurança (FINLÂNDIA, 2020, p. 28; NIINISTÖ, 2021a). A polarização entre o Ocidente e a Rússia e a chegada da guerra à Europa também compõem o significado dessa representação (FINLÂNDIA, 2018, p. 5).

Necessidade de mudança na Política Externa e de Segurança Comum (PESCO) da União Europeia – a necessidade de mudança na PESCO aparece no discurso finlandês atrelada à proposta de fortalecimento da capacidade de defesa do bloco, como forma de equiparar sua posição no cenário geopolítico ao seu poder econômico (NIINISTÖ, 2019d). O contexto externo de mudanças significativas, com a crise na Ucrânia, é também apontado como o momento ideal para a realização desse movimento no bloco (NIINISTÖ, 2021k).

Impactos do conflito na Ucrânia – o conflito na Ucrânia é apresentado como o maior impacto na segurança da Europa desde a guerra dos Balcãs (1913), trazendo implicações não apenas para a Finlândia, mas para o continente como um todo (NIINISTÖ, 2014h).

Relacionadas à Rússia, foram elencadas as representações a seguir:

Ameaça russa – nessa representação é ressaltada a condenação das ações russas na Ucrânia, desde a anexação da Crimeia, em 2014, à invasão do país, em 2022 (NIINISTÖ, 2014h; 2015a; 2016g; 2021b; 2022h). Essas são apresentadas como as responsáveis pela deterioração da segurança na Europa, bem como pelo colapso da confiança internacional na Rússia, a qual não respeita a soberania e a integridade territorial de seus pares e tem o uso da força como instrumento para conquista de seus interesses (NIINISTÖ, 2022c; 2022o; FINLÂNDIA, 2022, p.8).

Relações com a Rússia – manutenção de relações funcionais com a Rússia são colocadas como uma necessidade e um desejo da Finlândia, tendo em vista o compartilhamento de fronteira entre ambas (FINLÂNDIA, 2020, p.26; NIINISTÖ 2021k; 2022i). Nesse sentido, a aproximação da União Europeia com o país vizinho também é abordada (NIINISTÖ, 2021k).

Apoio da Finlândia à Ucrânia – o apoio da Finlândia à independência, soberania e integridade territorial da Ucrânia é apresentado e reforçado não apenas como uma posição do país em si, mas também como parte da União Europeia e do Ocidente, com a condenação das ações russas (NIINISTÖ, 2022h).

Em relação à OTAN, as seguintes representações foram identificadas:

Cooperação com a OTAN – a cooperação com a OTAN é apresentada como um fator de estabilidade e previsibilidade na região do Mar Báltico e uma forma de eliminar qualquer obstáculo prático que possa surgir caso a Finlândia decida por aderir à Organização (FINLÂNDIA 2020, p. 31). Além disso, a cooperação é colocada como importante para o desenvolvimento da defesa da própria Europa (FINLÂNDIA, 2020, p.28).

Adesão à OTAN – a adesão à OTAN é abordada como um passo natural e não uma mudança radical na política externa finlandesa. A continuidade é reforçada com a afirmação de que, tendo a Finlândia como membro, a Organização dobraria sua fronteira com a Rússia, o que requer que os finlandeses continuem a aprimorar constantemente a capacidade de defesa do seu território (NIINISTÖ, 2022e).

Vantagens da adesão à OTAN – a cobertura pelo artigo 5º do Tratado do Atlântico Norte, referente à defesa coletiva, é apontada como uma das maiores vantagens da adesão à OTAN, por fortalecer a capacidade de defesa e o poder de dissuasão da Finlândia. Além disso, a adesão traria maior segurança e estabilidade à região do Mar Báltico e do norte da Europa como um todo, ao aumentar o custo do uso da força contra os países da região (NIINISTÖ, 2022k, 2022n).

Relacionadas à política externa foram constatadas as seguintes representações:

Neutralidade tradicional – a neutralidade tradicional finlandesa aparece por meio da apresentação do país como não alinhado, que mantém uma capacidade de defesa robusta e a possibilidade de aderir a uma aliança militar, caso necessário (FINLÂNDIA, 2017, p.14; 2021, p. 43). Além disso, a característica mediadora, que também compõe a neutralidade, aparece nesta representação com a oferta de bons ofícios do país para solucionar a crise na Ucrânia, desde 2014, além da valorização do diálogo entre as partes (FINLÂNDIA, 2016, p. 28; NIINISTÖ, 2016g; 2020c; 2021e; 2022i).

Necessidade de mudança na política externa finlandesa – a crise de segurança no entorno da Finlândia é apresentada como um fator que requer mudanças na política externa finlandesa, com o fortalecimento da capacidade de defesa do país (NIINISTÖ, 2014j; 2016b; 2022c).

A tabela a seguir resume a distribuição das representações nos grupos temáticos, bem como a frequência de aparição destes ao longo dos documentos.

Tabela 3 – Representações por Tema e Frequência

Tema	Representações	Frequência
Segurança e Defesa	Segurança e defesa finlandesa Cooperação em defesa Cooperação com países nórdicos Cooperação com União Europeia	250
Contexto Externo	Mudanças no contexto externo Necessidade de mudança na PESCO Impactos do conflito da Ucrânia	178
Rússia	Ameaça russa Relações com a Rússia Apoio da Finlândia à Ucrânia	128
OTAN	Cooperação com a OTAN Adesão à OTAN Vantagens da adesão à OTAN	110
Política Externa	Neutralidade tradicional Necessidade de mudança na política externa finlandesa	90

Fonte: elaboração própria, com base nos dados gerados por meio do software MaxQDA,2023.

Conforme elucidado pelo gráfico e pela tabela, as representações ligadas às temáticas de segurança e defesa e de contexto externo predominaram ao longo do discurso oficial

finlandês entre 2014 e 2022, ainda que em proporções distintas, como demonstrado no próximo capítulo, destinado à análise da evolução do *master frame* durante esse período.

3.2. O *Master Frame* de segurança finlandês entre 2014 e 2022: orientação atributiva

3.2.1. Diagnóstico

Conforme elucidado no primeiro capítulo do presente trabalho, a política externa de um país tende a apresentar representações de um possível “problema” que demande e justifique a tomada de determinada ação (HANSEN, 2016, p. 102), o que, na teoria do *master frame*, se aproxima de sua orientação atributiva do *diagnóstico*. O capítulo seguinte, apresentou então o *master frame* de segurança da Finlândia, construído ainda durante o governo de Juho Paasikivi, e seu *diagnóstico*, historicamente fundamentado na ameaça representada pela Rússia, bem como seu *prognóstico*, constituído na adoção da política externa de neutralidade. O agrupamento temático das representações e seus respectivos significados identificados nas fontes analisadas e apresentado na seção anterior, por sua vez, ratificam a continuidade da presença desse *master frame* no período de 2014 a 2022, com a continuidade do seu *diagnóstico* e a alteração do seu *prognóstico*, conforme será demonstrado no decorrer deste capítulo.

Continuando com a análise das fontes utilizadas nas análises quantitativa e qualitativa, entre as representações agrupadas no tema Rússia estão a que identifica essa como uma ameaça e condena as ações do país na Ucrânia (Ameaça russa), e a que reforça o apoio da Finlândia aos ucranianos (Apoio da Finlândia à Ucrânia). Ambas as representações contribuem para a continuidade do *diagnóstico* identificado no capítulo anterior desta pesquisa. A Rússia é apresentada como a responsável pela deterioração da segurança e da cooperação internacional, como colocado pelo presidente finlandês Sauli Niinistö em seu discurso por ocasião da abertura da sessão de abertura do Círculo do Ártico, em outubro de 2014 (NIINISTÖ, 2014i). A mesma representação se faz presente também em 2016, no “*Government Report on Finnish Foreign and Security Policy*”, o qual afirma que

“(…) A Rússia praticamente abandonou o pensamento de segurança baseado na cooperação. Ao contrário, agora ela desafia o sistema de segurança da Europa. A Rússia tem publicamente promovido seu objetivo de um regime de segurança baseado em esfera de influência e demonstrado seu desejo e capacidade de utilizar a força militar no alcance de seus objetivos.” (FINLÂNDIA, 2016a, p. 14, tradução nossa).

A imagem da Rússia como uma possível ameaça à Finlândia é também mencionada no “*The Effects of Finland’s Possible Nato Membership: an assessment*”, publicado no mesmo ano e que afirma que a Rússia, ao longo dos últimos quinze anos, se tornou uma potência insatisfeita, que tem questionado os acordos celebrados na era pós-Guerra Fria e demonstrado propensão a causar problemas (FINLÂNDIA, 2016, p. 53). Dois anos depois, em 2018, o documento “*Future Review of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs: Finland acts in a changing world*” publicado pelo governo, afirmou que “a Rússia não demonstra sinais de mudança em sua abordagem revisionista e belicosa” (p. 12; tradução nossa), o que elucida a perenidade do *diagnóstico* do *master frame* de segurança da Finlândia.

Em 2022, a ameaça russa passa a ganhar abordagem mais incisiva por parte do presidente Sauli Niinistö que, em sua fala, por ocasião da Conferência dos Embaixadores, afirmou que pouco restou da relação anteriormente estabelecida entre a Finlândia e a Rússia, tendo a confiança entre ambas se esvaecido, sem que haja previsão do estabelecimento de bases para um novo começo (NIINISTÖ, 2022h). No Fórum de Segurança de Helsinque, em setembro do mesmo ano, a concepção apresentada pelo presidente foi ainda reforçada com a menção de que as relações com a Rússia são o pilar da política externa finlandesa que colapsou (NIINISTÖ, 2022j).

Corroborando a representação da Rússia como ameaça está também o apoio finlandês aos ucranianos, atrelado à condenação das ações russas no país. Em 2014, em seu discurso durante o Seminário dos Embaixadores, o presidente Sauli Niinistö condenou a violação da integridade territorial e da soberania da Ucrânia, o que se repetiu em seu discurso de ano novo, em 1º de janeiro do ano seguinte (NIINISTÖ 2014g, 2015a). Persistindo ao longo dos anos, em 2021 e em 2022, o presidente Sauli mencionou novamente que a Finlândia não aceitaria a anexação da Crimeia (NIINISTÖ 2021b, 2022h).

A Rússia é colocada, portanto, no discurso oficial finlandês, durante o período de 2014 a 2022, como uma possível ameaça constante à segurança do país, compondo a primeira parte do *diagnóstico* hodierno do *master frame* de segurança da Finlândia. A ênfase dada ao seu comportamento revisionista, contrário às regras internacionais e pautado no uso da força, corrobora o questionamento relacionado à confiança desconfiada construída entre ambos os países desde o governo de Paasikivi. Essa concepção do país vizinho apresenta ainda relação com outras representações presentes no discurso, que contribuem para a composição do *diagnóstico*. A representação “Ameaça russa” apareceu simultaneamente a outras em vários trechos, tendo sido a “Mudança no contexto externo”, a mais frequente, com dez coincidências

entre as setenta e quatro aparições da representação, demonstrando a presença de mais uma temática na composição do *diagnóstico* do *master frame* no contexto atual da Finlândia.

A representação “mudança no contexto externo” está relacionada às ações russas desde 2014 e ao modo como essas impactaram a segurança e a geopolítica, colocando fim à sensação de segurança predominante na Europa desde o fim da Guerra Fria. Após mencionar em seu discurso, na 69ª Assembleia Geral da ONU, em 2014, que a Europa não experimentava uma ruptura como essa desde o fim da Guerra dos Bálcãs (NIINISTÖ, 2014h), a narrativa do presidente finlandês ganhou reforço no ano seguinte em sua fala de ano novo, ao afirmar que “(...) A catástrofe ucraniana, que destruiu milhares de vidas até o momento, nos levou de volta no tempo — a questões de guerra e paz. A guerra não é mais apenas uma novidade de terras distantes; é uma realidade na Europa de hoje. (...)” (NIINISTÖ, 2015a, tradução nossa). Além da relação entre a crise na Ucrânia e a ruptura do *status quo* de paz no continente, o presidente Sauli acrescentou a seu discurso a intensificação do distanciamento entre a Rússia e o Ocidente iniciado antes dos acontecimentos de 2014 (NIINISTÖ, 2015f).

O aumento das tensões na região é destacado no *diagnóstico* com o aumento da capacidade militar russa e a diminuição do limiar do uso da força por essa, conforme elucidado pelo presidente finlandês em seu discurso de abertura do encontro de verão da Associação Finlandesa do Curso de Defesa Nacional, em 2016:

“(...) Em termos de política de segurança, as tensões aumentaram quando a Rússia engajou em uma política de poder na Ucrânia, em desrespeito ao direito internacional. Em uma perspectiva mais abrangente, isso também está relacionado à crescente capacidade militar da Rússia e à observação frequente de que seu limiar de uso da força diminuiu. Além disso, a menção ao uso de armas nucleares tem sido realizada de uma forma nunca vista desde a Guerra Fria, ou pelo menos de seus estágios finais.” (NIINISTÖ, 2016b, tradução nossa).

As mudanças mencionadas nos discursos do presidente finlandês apareceram também no “*Government’s Defence Report*” em 2017, o qual ressaltou não apenas o aumento das tensões e atividades militares na região do Mar Báltico, mas também a já mencionada redução no custo do uso da força pelo país vizinho e a consequente deterioração na situação de segurança da Finlândia (FINLÂNDIA, 2017, p. 8), acrescentando mais um aspecto ao *diagnóstico* do *master frame* de segurança. Esse aspecto é novamente reforçado no “*Government Report on Finnish Foreign and Security Policy*” de 2020, que caracteriza o ambiente operacional da política externa e de segurança da Finlândia como de intensa fluidez e instabilidade (FINLÂNDIA, 2020, p. 11).

A invasão da Rússia à Ucrânia em 2022, por sua vez, aparece no “*Government Report on Changes in the Security Environment*” como uma mudança fundamental no contexto da política externa e de segurança da Finlândia, corroborando a presença no *diagnóstico* de um novo ambiente internacional, cujo nível de previsibilidade é o menor desde o fim da Guerra Fria (FINLÂNDIA, 2022, pp. 7-10). Nos discursos realizados pelo presidente Sauli Niinistö no mesmo ano, essa dimensão é reforçada com a afirmação de que a situação de segurança na Europa é perigosa, estando suas bases desafiadas pela Rússia e sua lista de demandas apresentadas ao final de 2021, e de que a era pós-Guerra Fria havia terminado (NIINISTÖ, 2022h).

A segunda parte do *diagnóstico* do *master frame* de segurança da Finlândia entre os anos de 2014 e 2022 é composta, portanto, das mudanças ocorridas no contexto operacional da política externa e de segurança do país, o qual encontra-se permeado por níveis de instabilidade e imprevisibilidade nunca vistos desde o fim da Guerra Fria, em função das atividades russas na Ucrânia e a diminuição do limiar do uso da força pelo país. Esse não é, porém, o último aspecto presente no discurso que compõe essa função atributiva do *master frame*. A representação “Mudanças no contexto externo” também aparece simultaneamente a outras representações, sendo a “Segurança e defesa finlandesas” a mais frequente, presente em dez trechos coincidentes, e que compõe o terceiro aspecto do *diagnóstico*.

A segurança finlandesa é apresentada por Sauli em seus discursos como construída em uma visão holística que abarca quatro pilares fundamentais: defesa e segurança nacional, integração com o Ocidente, relações com a Rússia e a existência de um sistema internacional baseado em regras (NIINISTÖ, 2014j; 2015f). Em seu discurso, por ocasião do Seminário de Embaixadores em 2014, o presidente finlandês ressaltou que a crise na Ucrânia era um lembrete de que a segurança não deve ser algo que se tem por garantido, nem mesmo na Europa (NIINISTÖ, 2014g), relacionando a mudança no contexto externo com alterações na segurança e defesa da Finlândia. Essa concepção é aprofundada no “*Government’s Defence Report*” de 2017, o qual afirma haver uma diferença entre a necessidade de desenvolvimento da defesa finlandesa frente o contexto externo e o nível de recursos disponíveis, apontando para a realização de uma ação corretiva para evitar a degradação da capacidade de defesa da Finlândia (FINLÂNDIA, 2017, p. 13).

A relação entre a “Mudança no contexto externo” e a temática de segurança e defesa também passa pela representação “Cooperação com os países nórdicos”, a qual, segundo o “*A Stronger North? Nordic cooperation in foreign and security policy in a new security environment*”, publicado pelo governo em 2018, passou a ter como prioridade a segurança

regional (MARKKU; INNOLA; TIILIKAINEN, 2018, p. 9). No ano seguinte, o programa de governo do Primeiro-Ministro Antti Rinne reforçou que as mudanças na situação de segurança requerem a manutenção de um alto nível de prontidão e desenvolvimento contínuo da capacidade de defesa do país (FINLÂNDIA, 2019, p. 96), o que foi mencionado nos Relatórios de Defesa do governo de 2020 e 2021 (p. 25), tendo este mencionado o aumento da importância de um forte poder de dissuasão no ambiente operacional imprevisível no qual a Finlândia se encontra. Ambas as passagens corroboram, portanto, a necessidade de fortalecimento da capacidade de defesa finlandesa diante das mudanças no contexto externo como parte do *diagnóstico* do *master frame*.

A invasão da Ucrânia pela Rússia em 2022 também repercutiu neste aspecto do *diagnóstico*, tendo o “*Government Report on Changes in the Security Environment*” (FINLÂNDIA, 2022, p. 15) afirmado que o acontecimento traz a necessidade de preparo para uma situação similar à que ocorreu no país, onde a escala, a duração e a natureza multidimensional da crise apresentaram um grande desafio à capacidade de defesa previamente estimada. Ademais, o documento afirma que

“(...) em uma situação na qual a Rússia almeja a construção de uma esfera de influência através de demandas e meios militares, falhar na reação às mudanças no contexto de segurança pode levar a mudanças na posição internacional da Finlândia e à redução de seu espaço de manobra [em defesa].” (p. 29, tradução nossa)

As mudanças no contexto externo finlandês são, portanto, relacionadas à necessidade de fortalecimento da capacidade de defesa do país, compondo a terceira parte do *diagnóstico* do *master frame* de segurança. As ações russas na Ucrânia desde 2014 são colocadas como ameaças que questionam pelo menos dois dos pilares da segurança da Finlândia, quais sejam, a capacidade de defesa nacional e as relações com a Rússia. Diante desse cenário, medidas devem ser tomadas para garantir a segurança e a integridade territorial do país.

Em suma, conforme o exposto, constata-se que o *diagnóstico* do *master frame* de segurança da Finlândia entre os anos de 2014 e 2022 possui três dimensões fundamentais e inter-relacionadas: as ações russas na região, a mudança no entorno estratégico do país e a capacidade de defesa do país. Ao longo do discurso oficial finlandês, a Rússia é apresentada como uma possível ameaça à segurança da Finlândia em função de sua movimentação na Ucrânia, desde a anexação da Crimeia, a qual tem provocado uma alteração significativa no contexto de segurança da região. Essas mudanças, por sua vez, trouxeram o questionamento da capacidade das forças armadas finlandesas de garantir a segurança do país diante do novo

contexto no qual o país está inserido. Nesse sentido, o *diagnóstico* do *master frame* de segurança da Finlândia continua a ser a ameaça que a Rússia representa ao país, acentuada pela movimentação dessa na região desde 2014.

3.2.2. *Prognóstico*

Conforme apresentado no primeiro capítulo deste trabalho, além do *diagnóstico*, o *master frame* possui uma segunda função em sua orientação atributiva: o *prognóstico*, que apresenta a medida a ser tomada para solucionar o problema apresentado no *diagnóstico* (SNOW & BENFORD, 1992, pp. 136-138). No contexto de adoção da política externa de neutralidade, essa foi colocada como *prognóstico* à ameaça russa à Finlândia desde a década de 1940 e permaneceu como a política oficial da Finlândia até 2022. Nesse ano, o país decidiu pela adesão à OTAN, abandonando o não alinhamento e mudando a concepção quanto à solução mais adequada para lidar com a vizinha Rússia. Essa alteração no *prognóstico* foi evidenciada no discurso oficial finlandês entre 2014 e 2022, como mostram as representações presentes nos grupos temáticos de política externa e de cooperação com a OTAN.

Em 2014, a adesão da Finlândia à OTAN é apresentada como uma possibilidade ao país, mas que não seria realizada no curto prazo (NIINISTÖ, 2014g), evidenciando a prevalência da neutralidade como *prognóstico*. Em 2016, porém, o governo publicou o “*The Effects of Finland’s Possible Nato Membership: an assessment*”, trazendo as possíveis vantagens de a Finlândia ser parte da Organização como membro permanente. Os argumentos no documento se concentraram no aumento do poder de dissuasão finlandês na região, proporcionado pelas armas nucleares da OTAN, tendo em vista a cobertura do artigo 5º da Organização em caso de ataque externo (FINLÂNDIA, 2016, p. 30). Ainda em 2016, no “*Government Report on Finnish Foreign and Security Policy*” (FINLÂNDIA, 2016a, p. 23), foi mencionado como a presença da OTAN na região traz segurança e estabilidade, bem como a importância da cooperação com essa para o desenvolvimento da capacidade finlandesa de defender seu território. Com indícios de uma possível mudança no *prognóstico*, o documento também menciona que “enquanto monitora atentamente o desenvolvimento em seu contexto de segurança, a Finlândia mantém a opção de aderir à OTAN” (FINLÂNDIA, 2016a, p. 24, tradução nossa).

A mesma frase foi repetida no “*Government’s Defence Report*” do ano seguinte, acrescida, porém, da afirmação de que a cooperação com a OTAN teria ainda como função a retirada de qualquer obstáculo prático que pudesse surgir caso a Finlândia decidisse por aderir à Organização (FINLÂNDIA, 2017, p. 17). Em 2019, a representação “Cooperação com a

OTAN” começou a aparecer com maior frequência, agora abordando o significado da participação em uma aliança militar, a qual não seria um fim em si mesmo, mas um meio a ser utilizado para reforçar a posição internacional e a segurança do país (NIINISTÖ, 2019d).

A tendência de alteração no *prognóstico* foi reforçada nos anos seguintes, com o destaque dado às vantagens da cooperação finlandesa com a OTAN. No “*Government Report on Finnish Foreign and Security Policy*” de 2020 (p. 31) foi reforçado como a cooperação traz maior previsibilidade e estabilidade para a região e elimina obstáculos que possam surgir a uma possível adesão à Organização, como mencionado dois anos antes. No ano seguinte, o “*Government’s Defence Report*” (2021, p. 42) enfatizou a utilização das ferramentas de parceria com a OTAN como forma de desenvolvimento da capacidade de defesa da Finlândia e sua habilidade de interoperação com parceiros.

Os benefícios relacionados à cooperação presentes no discurso do governo foram, então, substituídos pelas vantagens da adesão à Organização em 2022, quando o “*Government Report on Changes in the Security Environment*” (2022, p. 26) mencionou a cobertura pelo artigo 5º e o aumento do poder de dissuasão finlandês como os efeitos mais significativos desse movimento. A temática ganhou ainda mais repercussão com a publicação do “*Report on Finland’s Accession to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization*” (2022a, p. 3), que reforçou o elencado no Relatório anterior, colocando a adesão como uma solução de defesa adequada ao contexto no qual a Finlândia se encontra. Por fim, o tema ganhou destaque nos discursos do presidente Sauli Niinisto, com os mesmos argumentos, como citado em seu pronunciamento por ocasião da Conferência dos Embaixadores que

“(…) quando a Finlândia se tornar um membro da OTAN, é precisamente o efeito preventivo da dissuasão conjunta que será a adição mais significativa à nossa segurança. Como um membro da OTAN, a Finlândia participará do planejamento e construção da dissuasão mantida pela Aliança. Isso proverá o tipo de proteção que não teríamos fora da OTAN (NIINISTÖ, 2022g, tradução nossa).”

A mudança no *prognóstico* é ainda corroborada pela frequência com que as representações “Adesão à OTAN” e “Vantagens da adesão à OTAN” apareceram no ano de 2022. Do total de trinta aparições daquela, vinte aparecem apenas no ano de 2022, assim como o total de vinte e seis ocorrências da representação “Vantagens da adesão à OTAN”. A aparição frequente do tema nos discursos, com o posicionamento da adesão à OTAN como solução que aumentaria a capacidade de defesa do país é também acompanhada da mudança nas representações relacionadas à política externa.

Em 2016, o “*Government Report on Finnish Foreign and Security Policy*” (FINLÂNDIA, p. 18) afirmou que a política externa e de segurança da Finlândia tem por principal objetivo evitar que o país seja parte de um conflito armado, o que é reafirmado no “*Government’s Defence Report*” (FINLÂNDIA, 2017, p. 14) do ano seguinte, o qual menciona também que o não alinhamento militar finlandês faz com que o país fortaleça sua defesa nacional e intensifique sua cooperação internacional nesse âmbito. A força da neutralidade na política externa transparece também no discurso do presidente Sauli Niinistö que, em seu pronunciamento na abertura do parlamento finlandês em 2017, elogiou a tradição iniciada por Paasikivi e seguida por Kekkonen como tendo sido a responsável por assegurar a existência finlandesa ao lado da União Soviética, ao mesmo tempo em que abriu as portas para a integração com a Europa (NIINISTÖ, 2017a).

Mudança mais significativa na abordagem se deu, porém, em 2020, quando o presidente finlandês em seu discurso, no seminário de mídia (2020d), afirmou, se referindo à política externa do país que “(...) quando o ambiente está mudando consideravelmente, nosso conjunto de instrumentos deve também estar apto a mudar, se nosso interesse assim requerer. Não devemos nos agarrar ao antigo apenas por ser algo familiar (...)” (tradução nossa). Em 2022, o presidente Sauli foi além e, ratificando a mudança no *prognóstico* para lidar com a ameaça russa, afirmou em seu pronunciamento no parlamento sueco que “(...) nossa confiança nas formas tradicionais de garantir nossa segurança e manter nossas relações com a Rússia se quebrou. Nossas antigas políticas não são mais adequadas à nova situação.” (tradução nossa).

Diante do exposto, a política externa de não alinhamento militar da Finlândia, antes apresentada no discurso oficial como solução para lidar com a ameaça russa, ou seja, como *prognóstico* do *master frame* de segurança do país, foi substituída pela adesão à OTAN, essa agora associada ao aumento da capacidade de defesa e dissuasão finlandesa diante de um novo contexto de segurança.

3.3. Escopo de articulação

A segunda função do *master frame* está relacionada ao seu *escopo de articulação*, podendo o discurso estar estruturado sob a forma de um *código restrito* ou *elaborado*. O *código restrito* representa um discurso organizado de forma rígida, com um número restrito de alternativas sintáticas e que reflete a estrutura social imediata com a qual interage. O *código elaborado*, por sua vez, organizado de forma mais flexível, apresenta diversas alternativas sintáticas, permitindo certo universalismo (SNOW & BENFORD, 1992, p. 134). O

posicionamento do discurso nesse espectro é ainda parte da potência do *master frame*, em conjunto com os critérios de *ressonância*.

O discurso oficial finlandês entre 2014 e 2022 apresenta uma narrativa com significados majoritariamente bem definidos e reiterados ao longo dos anos, principalmente nas temáticas de segurança e defesa, da OTAN e de política externa. Nas representações relacionadas a segurança e defesa, a segurança finlandesa é definida como baseada em quatro pilares, repetidos ao longo de todo o discurso: defesa e segurança nacional, integração com o Ocidente, relações com a Rússia e o sistema internacional baseado em regras (NIINISTÖ, 2015f; 2016g; 2017f; 2021h). A defesa da Finlândia, por sua vez, é também apresentada como tendo duas funções e duas bases muito bem estabelecidas. A conscrição geral e a disposição dos finlandeses em defender o país são as bases da defesa finlandesa, que tem como função não apenas a proteção do país em caso de conflito, mas também a dissuasão, aumentando o custo do uso da força contra o país (NIINISTÖ, 2018g, 2019e, 2021h; FINLÂNDIA, 2017, p. 28; 2021, p. 19, 40, 2022, p. 38).

As representações “Cooperação com a OTAN” e “Adesão à OTAN” também apresentam significados muito bem definidos ao longo do discurso. A possibilidade de adesão à Organização é colocada, tanto nos relatórios governamentais quanto nos discursos do presidente finlandês como uma opção que pode ser prosseguida pela Finlândia, sendo a manutenção do espaço de manobra para realização desse movimento parte da política externa do país (NIINISTÖ 2014g; FINLÂNDIA 2021, p. 43, 2022, p. 14). Em relação às vantagens que a adesão poderia trazer ao país, os significados também são bem definidos e pautados na solidariedade de defesa em caso de crise, coberta pelo artigo 5º, a qual aumentaria ainda o poder de dissuasão da Finlândia (FINLÂNDIA 2016a, p. 30; FINLÂNDIA 2022, p. 26; NIINISTÖ 2022g).

Outro significado definido e reiterado entre os anos de 2014 e 2022 é o relacionado à cooperação com a OTAN, o qual buscou estar orientado à estrutura social imediata à qual se dirige. Estando a maioria da população finlandesa apoiando o não alinhamento do país entre os anos de 2014 e 2021 — com porcentagem de apoio variando entre 68 e 53% (ABDI, 2022, p. 48) —, a cooperação com a OTAN teve seu significado esclarecido ao longo dos discursos, sendo ressaltada sua ocorrência dentro dos termos da neutralidade da Finlândia, baseada na ausência da cobertura do artigo 5º, e utilizada como forma de aumentar as capacidades de defesa nacional do país (NIINISTÖ, 2018g).

Nas representações relacionadas à política externa, o objetivo desta é apresentado e reiterado diversas vezes como evitar que a Finlândia seja parte de um conflito militar

(FINLÂNDIA 2016, p. 7, 2017, p. 14). Outra característica associada à política do país que permeia o discurso de forma significativa é a promoção da estabilidade da região por meio do diálogo e da mediação, ressaltando a disponibilidade do país em auxiliar na crise da Ucrânia (NIINISTÖ, 2016g, 2021e; FINLÂNDIA 2020, p. 47, 2022, p. 15).

O discurso oficial finlandês entre 2014 e 2022 pode ser posicionado, diante do exposto, mais próximo de um *código estrito*, no espectro estrito-elaborado. Apesar de apresentar uma alteração no *prognóstico*, os significados dos argumentos utilizados permanecem os mesmos ao longo dos anos, não abrindo margem para universalismos e imprevisibilidades. A cooperação com a OTAN é devidamente esclarecida e tem seus termos delimitados, buscando evitar o surgimento de interpretações distintas da almejada pelo governo, a qual está adequada à estrutura social imediata à qual o discurso é dirigido, qual seja a população finlandesa e seu apoio à neutralidade. O mesmo ocorre com a definição da segurança, da defesa e da política externa do país, cujos elementos constitutivos elencados estão diretamente relacionados à sociedade e sua opinião.

O presente capítulo teve por objetivo apresentar as representações identificadas no discurso oficial finlandês, bem como duas das funções do *master frame* de segurança da Finlândia: orientação atributiva, composta pelo *diagnóstico* e pelo *prognóstico*, e escopo de articulação. Em relação ao *diagnóstico*, restou claro que este se manteve o mesmo ao longo do discurso, em continuidade ao elencado no capítulo 2, estando construído em três dimensões: a Rússia como um ameaça; um entorno estratégico alterado, com diminuição do limiar do uso da força; e a adequabilidade da capacidade de defesa finlandesa frente a essas alterações em seu contexto de atuação. O *prognóstico*, por sua vez, inicialmente associado à adoção de uma política externa de neutralidade, posteriormente resumida ao não alinhamento militar, foi alterado ao longo do discurso para a adesão à OTAN, esta colocada como a solução apropriada ao novo contexto de movimentações russas na Ucrânia.

Quanto ao escopo de articulação, o discurso oficial do governo finlandês apresenta um código em sua maior parte *restrito*, apresentando significados que continuam ao longo da narrativa. A cooperação com a OTAN é definida dentro das limitações da política de não alinhamento da Finlândia e as vantagens de adesão à Organização permanecem as mesmas, quais sejam, o auxílio em caso de ataque militar e o aumento da capacidade de dissuasão do país, ambas oriundas da cobertura pelo artigo 5º. A segurança finlandesa é apresentada como tendo quatro pilares que não se alteram ao longo do discurso: defesa e segurança nacional, integração com o Ocidente, relações com a Rússia e o sistema internacional baseado em regras. Outro significado perene nas fontes analisadas é o objetivo da política externa finlandesa de

evitar que o país seja parte de conflitos militares. A tabela abaixo resume as duas primeiras funções essenciais do *master frame* de segurança da Finlândia.

Tabela 4 – Funções Essenciais do *Master Frame* de Segurança da Finlândia

Funções Essenciais do <i>Master Frame</i>		
Orientação Atributiva	<i>Diagnóstico</i>	Movimentações russas na região alteraram o entorno estratégico da Finlândia e trouxeram o questionamento da adequabilidade de sua capacidade de defesa para lidar com a ameaça do país vizinho.
	<i>Prognóstico</i>	Adesão à OTAN aumentaria a capacidade de defesa e o poder de dissuasão da Finlândia, por meio da cobertura do artigo 5º do tratado da Organização.
Escopo de Articulação	<i>Código Restrito</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Definições claras de significados relacionados à cooperação com a OTAN (dentro dos limites da política de não alinhamento da Finlândia); • Vantagens da adesão à OTAN (aumento da capacidade de defesa e do poder de dissuasão); • Segurança finlandesa (quatro pilares: defesa e segurança nacional, integração com o Ocidente, relações com a Rússia e sistema internacional baseado em regras) • Política externa finlandesa (objetivo de evitar a participação da Finlândia em conflitos militares). <p>Todos permanecem ao longo da narrativa entre 2014 e 2022.</p>

Fonte: elaboração própria, adaptada de Snow & Benford (1992), com dados extraídos por meio do software MAXQDA.

4. O FIM DO NÃO ALINHAMENTO FINLANDÊS NO DISCURSO OFICIAL DO GOVERNO ENTRE 2014 E 2022


Este capítulo tem por objetivo demonstrar como o *master frame* de segurança da Finlândia foi alterado entre 2014 e 2022 frente à movimentação russa na região, de modo a garantir sua ressonância em meio à população do país. Para tanto, serão analisados os elementos de potência do *master frame*, a saber, sua localização no espectro de *código restrito-elaborado* e sua ressonância, composta pela *credibilidade empírica*, *comensurabilidade experimental* e *fidelidade narrativa*, a partir da utilização da análise de discurso já iniciada no capítulo anterior. Explorar-se-á primeiro a divisão dos discursos em camadas e, posteriormente, a evolução dessas ao longo dos anos.

4.1. As camadas do discurso oficial finlandês

No capítulo anterior foram realizadas as duas primeiras etapas da análise de discurso proposta por Iver B. Neumann (2008, p. 63), quais sejam, a delimitação das fontes a serem utilizadas na pesquisa e a identificação das representações presentes nessas. As representações foram ainda agrupadas por temas, de forma a facilitar e enriquecer a análise do discurso, com a percepção da predominância de determinadas temáticas ao longo dos anos. Após a identificação das representações, Neumann (2008, pp. 73-75) menciona a necessidade de se analisar os graus de dominância, duração e profundidade das mesmas, a fim de constatar as camadas do discurso, conforme elucidado no capítulo 1 deste trabalho. Considerando a aplicação do *master frame*, essa etapa é ainda essencial para que possamos analisar seus critérios de potência ao longo do tempo, identificando quais representações predominaram em cada elemento de ressonância ao longo do ano e se houve alterações que acompanharam a movimentação russa na região.

A primeira análise teve por foco o grau de dominância das representações ao longo dos anos. Em 2014, a representação “Segurança e defesa finlandesa” foi a dominante no discurso, com doze aparições que representam vinte e cinco por cento das quarenta e oito representações encontradas naquele ano, seguida por “Mudanças no contexto geopolítico e de segurança” e “Necessidade de mudança na política externa finlandesa”, com oito aparições cada, representando dezessete por cento do total, conforme ilustra o gráfico a seguir.


Gráfico 2 – Frequência das Representações no Discurso Oficial Finlandês no ano de 2014



Fonte: elaboração própria, por meio do software MAXQDA.

Em relação aos grupos temáticos apresentados no capítulo anterior, observa-se, portanto, a predominância de três deles em 2014: segurança e defesa finlandesa, contexto externo e política externa. No ano seguinte, porém, observou-se a alteração da representação dominante para duas: “Mudanças no contexto geopolítico e de segurança” e “Neutralidade tradicional”, ambas com quinze aparições, representando vinte e seis por cento das cinquenta e sete representações encontradas no discurso de 2015. O gráfico abaixo demonstra a distribuição das frequências das representações nesse ano.


Gráfico 3 - Frequência das Representações no Discurso Oficial Finlandês no ano de 2015



Fonte: elaboração própria, por meio do software MAXQDA.

Apesar da alteração nas representações dominantes, percebe-se que, em 2014 e 2015, os mesmos grupos temáticos continuaram a predominar no discurso, o que se repetiu no ano seguinte. Em 2016 houve, porém, um aumento significativo na frequência total das representações encontradas no discurso, que totalizaram cento e trinta e uma aparições, lideradas pelas mesmas representações do ano anterior, conforme demonstra o gráfico a seguir.


Gráfico 4 - Frequência das Representações no Discurso Oficial Finlandês no ano de 2016



Fonte: elaboração própria, por meio do software MAXQDA.

Em 2017, as temáticas, como um todo, tiveram sua presença reduzida no discurso oficial do governo, tendo sido constatadas ao todo cinquenta e duas aparições, voltando a predominância da representação “Segurança e defesa finlandesa”, seguida pela “Mudança no contexto geopolítico e de segurança”, como havia sido identificado em 2014. O gráfico a seguir demonstra essa mudança.


Gráfico 5 - Frequência das Representações no Discurso Oficial Finlandês no ano de 2017



Fonte: elaboração própria, por meio do software MAXQDA.

No ano seguinte, em 2018, as representações aparecerem em maior número no discurso oficial, totalizando oitenta e sete aparições, com a predominância de uma representação que, até então, não havia aparecido de forma expressiva, qual seja, a “Cooperação com os países nórdicos”, que, identificada vinte e três vezes, representou trinta e quatro por cento do total. Essa liderança foi seguida pelas representações “Mudanças no contexto geopolítico e de segurança” e “Cooperação com a OTAN”, o que demonstra uma mudança na tônica do discurso, que, nesse ano, voltou seu foco à cooperação da Finlândia com seus parceiros em segurança e defesa, como demonstrado abaixo.


Gráfico 6 - Frequência das Representações no Discurso Oficial Finlandês no ano de 2018



Fonte: elaboração própria, por meio do software MAXQDA.


No ano seguinte e em 2020, as representações voltaram a estar menos presentes no discurso, tendo sido identificadas apenas trinta e quatro em 2019 e quarenta e sete no ano posterior. A predominância voltou a seguir a tendência anterior a 2018 e foi a mesma nos dois anos, com a liderança da representação “Segurança e defesa finlandesa”, seguida da “Mudança no contexto geopolítico e de segurança”. Em 2021, a predominância foi a mesma, mas com um aumento substancial da aparição das representações, que totalizaram cento e vinte e cinco, como demonstrado nos gráficos abaixo.

Gráfico 7 - Frequência das Representações no Discurso Oficial Finlandês no ano de 2019




Fonte: elaboração própria, por meio do software MAXQDA.

Gráfico 8 - Frequência das Representações no Discurso Oficial Finlandês no ano de 2020



Fonte: elaboração própria, por meio do software MAXQDA.


Gráfico 9 - Frequência das Representações no Discurso Oficial Finlandês no ano de 2021



Fonte: elaboração própria, por meio do software MAXQDA.

Por fim, em 2022, as representações apareceram duzentas e trinta vezes no discurso oficial do governo, o maior número em todo o período analisado. A predominância continuou a ser da representação “Mudanças no contexto geopolítico e de segurança”, com quarenta e uma aparições, seguida, porém, de duas representações que, até então, não haviam aparecido de forma expressiva: “Ameaça russa” e “Adesão à OTAN”, o que demonstra alteração no discurso após a intensificação das movimentações russas na Ucrânia, conforme o gráfico abaixo.

Gráfico 10 - Frequência das Representações no Discurso Oficial Finlandês no ano de 2022



Fonte: elaboração própria, por meio do software MAXQDA.

Diante do apresentado, em relação ao grau de predominância, primeiro elemento para a identificação de camadas no discurso, é possível observar que, em todos os anos, pelo menos uma das representações “Segurança e defesa finlandesa” e “Mudanças no contexto geopolítico e de segurança” figuraram como predominantes. As grandes alterações se deram em 2018, com o aumento das aparições da “Cooperação com os países nórdicos”, e em 2022, com a “Ameaça russa” e a “Adesão à OTAN”.

Analisando, à luz da movimentação russa na região, constata-se que a anexação da Crimeia em 2014, não trouxe ao discurso enfoque à possibilidade de adesão à OTAN, mas apenas a constatação de que o entorno estratégico da Finlândia estaria passando por um período de alterações significativas, o que vai ao encontro da continuidade da neutralidade como *prognóstico* do *master frame* de segurança até o ano de 2016, como elucidado no capítulo anterior deste trabalho. A alteração, em 2018, com a predominância da representação “Cooperação com países nórdicos”, por outro lado, reflete a preocupação finlandesa com sua capacidade de defesa solo, diante da perpetuação da situação na Ucrânia, com a violação dos Acordos de Minsk I e II, dando indícios da alteração do *prognóstico* do *master frame* de segurança do país, a qual se concretiza em 2022. Nesse ano, a aparição em maior número da representação “Ameaça russa”, em consonância com “Adesão à OTAN,” indica a alteração do *prognóstico* do *master frame* impulsionada pela movimentação russa na Ucrânia.

Seguindo com a identificação das camadas do discurso, em relação ao grau de duração, algumas representações aparecem em todos os anos, enquanto outras apenas em momentos específicos. A maioria das representações apareceram desde 2014 a 2022, à exceção de duas: a “Necessidade de mudança na Política Externa e de Segurança Comum da União Europeia (PESCO)”, que apareceu de 2017 a 2021, e as “Vantagens da adesão à OTAN”, presente em 2016 e 2022. Das representações que estiveram presentes de 2014 a 2022, apenas duas não apareceram em pelo menos seis dos nove anos analisados: “Apoio à Ucrânia” (2014, 2021 e 2022) e “Impactos do conflito da Ucrânia” (2014, 2016 e 2022).

A variação do grau de duração das representações também refletiu a influência da movimentação russa no discurso oficial finlandês. O “Apoio da Finlândia à Ucrânia”, as “Vantagens da adesão à OTAN” e os “Impactos do conflito da Ucrânia”, representações relacionadas à defesa do fim do não alinhamento do país, apareceram em momentos coincidentes com a intensificação das ações da Rússia na região, como a anexação da Crimeia em 2014, a violação dos Acordos de Minsk em 2015 e 2016 e a invasão do território ucraniano em 2022.

O grau de profundidade das representações, terceiro elemento considerado para atestar as camadas do discurso, foi aferido a partir do cruzamento de dois aspectos apresentados no capítulo anterior: a frequência de cada uma ao longo do discurso — quanto mais vezes uma representação aparece, maiores são as chances de essa apresentar aspectos distintos de um mesmo tópico — e suas definições, que resumem seus principais pontos. A representação com o maior número de aparições, “Segurança e defesa finlandesa”, é também a que apresenta o maior detalhamento do tópico abordado, trazendo todos os pilares e as características da defesa da Finlândia. A representação com a segunda maior frequência no discurso finlandês, “Mudança no contexto geopolítico e de segurança”, segue a mesma lógica e, apesar de uma definição um pouco menor, apresenta um grau de profundidade significativo ao apresentar as mudanças no entorno estratégico finlandês sob várias perspectivas, como a mudança no equilíbrio internacional, a deterioração do sistema multilateral, a relação entre as grandes potências, utilizando-se até mesmo de comparações com outros momentos da história, como a era Paasikivi (NIINISTÖ, 2015f, 2018f). Na terceira posição de aparições está a representação “Ameaça russa” que também apresenta um grau de profundidade ao trazer não apenas a condenação das ações atuais russas na Ucrânia, mas uma análise do país como uma potência insatisfeita ao longo dos últimos quinze anos (FINLÂNDIA, 2016, p. 52) e do desenvolvimento de sua indústria bélica (NIINISTÖ, 2014a).

A quarta representação com mais ocorrências no discurso oficial finlandês, a “Neutralidade tradicional”, apresenta um grau de profundidade um pouco menor, mas ainda considerável, trazendo o detalhamento de dois dos pilares da política externa do país: a mediação, com a disponibilidade da Finlândia em contribuir para a resolução do conflito na Ucrânia, e as relações com a Rússia, ressaltando a necessidade de boas relações com o país vizinho. Além disso, é abordado o objetivo central da política externa de neutralidade de evitar que a Finlândia seja parte de um conflito armado. A partir da quinta representação com maior número de aparições no discurso, é possível ver uma diminuição no grau de profundidade, a exemplo da representação “Cooperação em defesa”, que restringe sua abordagem à definição da cooperação como ausente de qualquer obrigação de solidariedade militar em casos de conflito. O mesmo ocorre com as demais representações, à exceção da “Cooperação com a OTAN”, que, apesar de aparecer em menor número, vai além da descrição da relação da Finlândia com a Organização, trazendo os benefícios da mesma para o país, como o aumento da capacidade de influência em seu contexto de segurança, e para a região, bem como a eliminação de possíveis obstáculos práticos em caso de adesão.

Considerando, portanto, os graus de dominância, duração e profundidade, sugeridos por Neumann (2008, p. 73), é possível perceber coincidência com os grupos temáticos apresentados no capítulo anterior enquanto camadas do discurso oficial finlandês. Em relação ao primeiro critério, tem-se que as três representações dominantes ao longo dos anos, à exceção de 2018 e 2022, foram “Segurança e defesa finlandesa”, “Mudança no contexto geopolítico e de segurança” e “Neutralidade tradicional”, todas sendo parte de três grupos temáticos distintos que emergiram no capítulo anterior: segurança e defesa, contexto externo e política externa, respectivamente. Em relação à duração, constata-se também a permanência dessas mesmas representações no discurso oficial finlandês ao longo dos nove anos analisados. Por fim, os maiores graus de profundidade foram observados nessas representações, acrescidas da “Ameaça russa”, que traz o quarto grupo temático mencionado anteriormente, referente à Rússia. Dessa forma, é possível identificar quatro camadas no discurso oficial finlandês, as quais coincidem com quatro dos cinco grupos temáticos identificados na análise inicial das fontes: segurança e defesa, contexto externo, política externa e Rússia.

4.2. A potência do *master frame* de segurança da Finlândia

Conforme explicitado no primeiro capítulo deste trabalho, o *master frame* possui três funções essenciais que, em conjunto, constituem sua capacidade de mobilização social: as

atribuições diagnósticas, relacionadas à identificação do problema e sua solução, ou seja, *diagnóstico* e *prognóstico*, respectivamente; o *escopo de articulação*, relativo à construção do código, se de forma restrita ou elaborada; e a potência, constituída da *posição do discurso no espectro de código restrito-elaborado* e da *ressonância*, essa dividida em *credibilidade empírica*, *comensurabilidade experimental* e *fidelidade narrativa*. O capítulo anterior analisou as duas primeiras funções, tendo demonstrado a continuidade do *diagnóstico* do *master frame* de segurança entre os anos 2014 de 2022, qual seja, o questionamento da adequabilidade das forças de defesa finlandesas frente ao entorno estratégico alterado pelas movimentações russas na Ucrânia. Em relação ao *prognóstico* para essa situação-problema, foi apresentada a alteração com a opção pelo abandono do não alinhamento militar e o pedido de adesão à OTAN, em 2022, em detrimento da política externa de não alinhamento. Sobre o escopo de articulação, restou claro que o discurso oficial do governo finlandês foi elaborado, predominantemente, com *códigos restritos*, de significados bem delimitados e perenes ao longo do período analisado. Nesta seção, portanto, dar-se-á continuidade à análise do *master frame* de segurança da Finlândia em sua função de potência, a fim de constatar sua ressonância em meio à população finlandesa.

4.2.1. Posição no espectro de código restrito-elaborado

Como mencionado, o primeiro elemento a ser analisado na potência é o posicionamento do *master frame* no espectro de *código restrito-elaborado*. Conforme esclarecido nos capítulos 1 e 3 desta pesquisa, o *código restrito* apresenta um discurso organizado de forma rígida, com um número restrito de alternativas sintáticas, enquanto o *código elaborado* possui uma organização mais flexível, com diversas alternativas sintáticas que permitem certo universalismo (SNOW & BENFORD, 1992, p. 134). Com base no elucidado no capítulo anterior, é possível concluir que o discurso oficial finlandês se encontra posicionado mais próximo do *código restrito*, tendo em vista que foram identificados significados bem delimitados em três dos cinco grupos temáticos de análise das representações, conforme apresentado anteriormente e resumido na tabela a seguir.

Tabela 5 – Códigos Predominantes no Discurso Oficial Finlandês entre 2014 e 2022

Tema	Código Predominante	Principais Significados Delimitados
Segurança e Defesa	Restrito	Segurança finlandesa apresentada em quatro pilares: defesa e segurança nacional, integração com o Ocidente, relações com a Rússia e sistema internacional baseado em regras. Defesa finlandesa apresentada tendo como fundamento a conscrição geral e a disposição dos cidadãos de defender o país e como funções principais a proteção do país e a capacidade de dissuasão.
Contexto Externo	Elaborado	Não há.
Rússia	Elaborado	Não há.
OTAN	Restrito	Cooperação com a OTAN é delimitada aos termos da política de não alinhamento da Finlândia. Adesão à OTAN traria aumento da capacidade de defesa finlandesa e do poder de dissuasão do país.
Política Externa	Restrito	Objetivo da política externa finlandesa é evitar que o país participe de conflitos militares.

Fonte: elaboração própria, com dados extraídos por meio do software MAXQDA.

4.2.2. *Credibilidade Empírica*

Identificada a posição do *master frame* no espectro de código, passou-se à análise de seus elementos de ressonância em cada uma das camadas do discurso (contexto externo, segurança e defesa, política externa e Rússia) ao longo dos anos, de forma a identificar possíveis alterações desses diante da movimentação russa na Ucrânia. O primeiro deles é a *credibilidade empírica*, a qual busca constatar a presença de referenciais empíricos tanto do *diagnóstico* quanto do *prognóstico* em meio à audiência à qual o discurso é direcionado (SNOW & BENFORD, 1992, p. 134, 138-140).

No discurso oficial finlandês de 2014 a 2022, a credibilidade empírica foi o elemento de *ressonância* do *master frame* com o maior índice de incidência, tendo sido possível identificar sua presença de diversas formas. Em 2014, predominou a relação do *diagnóstico* com a realidade conflituosa presente na Europa após a anexação da Crimeia, como elucidado

pelo presidente Sauli Niinisto em seus discursos. Em 2014, o político finlandês afirmou que a crise na Ucrânia seria um lembrete de que a segurança não deve ser tomada por certa, nem mesmo na Europa (NIINISTÖ, 2014g), e que teria um impacto profundo na segurança do continente, trazendo uma ruptura de magnitude ausente desde a guerra dos Bálcãs (NIINISTÖ, 2014h). Nessas menções, que abarcam as camadas de defesa e segurança e contexto externo, ainda em relação à Rússia, o presidente finlandês abordou a modernização das forças armadas do país, questionando as reais capacidades dessas (NIINISTÖ, 2014g) de forma a tornar tangível à audiência o *diagnóstico* da alteração do entorno estratégico da Finlândia.

Em 2015, a *credibilidade empírica* apareceu somente na camada de contexto externo, mas, em complemento à tendência do ano anterior, esteve relacionada não apenas ao *diagnóstico*, mas também ao *prognóstico*. Em relação ao primeiro, a situação na Ucrânia continuou a ser o referencial empírico predominante, como colocado no discurso de ano novo do presidente finlandês, ao afirmar que “a guerra não é mais uma novidade de terras distantes, é uma realidade na Europa atual” (NIINISTÖ, 2015a, tradução nossa). Sobre o *prognóstico*, por sua vez, o presidente finlandês apontou a necessidade de garantir uma performance atualizada da capacidade de defesa do país e de reorientar a política de expansão europeia para segurança e defesa diante das circunstâncias (NIINISTÖ, 2015b).

No ano seguinte, as aparições de referenciais empíricos se deram majoritariamente nos relatórios governamentais, com tópicos das camadas de defesa e segurança, Rússia e contexto externo, além da temática da OTAN, em função da publicação do “*The Effects of Finland’s NATO membership: na assessment*”. Em relação ao *diagnóstico*, além da menção à situação na Ucrânia como evidência do aumento da tensão e da diminuição da segurança no continente (FINLÂNDIA, 2016, p. 11) a violação do regime de fronteira pela Rússia em 2015 é mencionada como demonstração da propensão russa a criar problemas na região (FINLÂNDIA, 2016, p. 53). Pela primeira vez, também em 2016, o “*Government Report on Finnish Foreign and Security Policy*” (2016a, p.11) passou a afirmar que “o uso ou ameaça do uso da força contra a Finlândia não pode ser excluído” (tradução nossa), evidenciando como a movimentação russa em 2014 e 2015 influenciou a imagem da mesma como ameaça no discurso oficial do governo. Diante desses elementos, o *prognóstico* ganhou repercussão com a realidade finlandesa com a menção da adesão à OTAN como uma forma de aumentar a segurança do país não apenas por meio do artigo 5º, de solidariedade militar, mas também pelo fortalecimento da sua capacidade de dissuasão (FINLÂNDIA, 2016a, p.47). Por fim, em seu discurso durante a recepção do presidente da Estônia, o presidente Sauli Niinisto acrescentou mais um elemento empírico ao *prognóstico*, afirmando que “A história e a geopolítica explicam o nível de

preocupação entre os países bálticos e o desejo por uma presença mais forte da OTAN” (NIINISTÖ, 2016d, tradução nossa), fazendo referência aos conflitos passados vividos pela população da região.

Nos anos de 2017 a 2020, os elementos de *credibilidade empírica* no discurso oficial finlandês continuaram a estar relacionados às alterações no contexto operacional militar do país, tendo surgido como nova a menção à diminuição do limiar do uso da força pela Rússia (FINLÂNDIA, 2017, p.5), haja vista as ações do país na Geórgia, Ucrânia e Síria (FINLÂNDIA, 2020, p.21), reforçando a relação do *diagnóstico* com a realidade da audiência. Em 2021, o *prognóstico* de adesão à OTAN passou a ganhar mais relevância, tendo o documento “*Effective crisis management: Recommendations of the Parliamentary Committee on Crisis Management on Developing Finland’s Crisis Management*” (2021, p.42) afirmado que a organização seria um ator chave no avanço da segurança e estabilidade europeia. O mesmo relatório ressaltou ainda que

“A importância de uma forte função de dissuasão — dissuadindo um adversário de utilizar a força militar contra a Finlândia — está acentuada no contexto operacional imprevisível atual, no qual a antecedência de alertas para crises militares foi reduzida e o limiar do uso da força diminuído.” (p.15, tradução nossa).

As mudanças no contexto operacional finlandês foram também apontadas como elementos da realidade que instiga a prontidão situacional e compreensiva das forças armadas do país, pois, ainda que a Finlândia não esteja sob ameaça militar, é necessário estar preparado para o pronto uso da força caso essa venha a se concretizar (FINLÂNDIA, 2021, p.11).

No ano seguinte, a preocupação com a Rússia se acentuou no discurso, com a menção do presidente Sauli Niinistö às exigências feitas pelo país vizinho em dezembro de 2021 em relação à OTAN⁹ para diminuição da tensão na Ucrânia (NIINISTÖ, 2022g). Segundo o presidente, as demandas russas, pautadas na não expansão da Organização para os países da região, violavam a liberdade de escolha da Finlândia de alinhar-se e aderir à OTAN (NIINISTÖ, 2022c). O “*Government Report on Changes in the Security Environment*” (2022, p.10), também trouxe as exigências do país vizinho como imbuídas do objetivo de realizar uma mudança fundamental na estrutura de segurança europeia, o que corrobora a imagem negativa que passou

⁹ Em 17 de dezembro de 2021, a Rússia publicou uma série de demandas a serem acatadas pelo Ocidente como condição para a redução das tensões na fronteira com a Ucrânia. Entre os pedidos estavam garantias por escrito de que a OTAN não se expandiria para o leste europeu, ou seja, não aceitaria adesão de países como Ucrânia e Finlândia, e retiraria da Europa as armas nucleares dos Estados Unidos, bem como removeria os batalhões multinacionais da Organização presentes na Polônia e nos países bálticos, de forma a retornar para a configuração de distribuição de tropas de 1997 (“RUSSIA ISSUES LIST...”, 2021; TÉTRAULT-FARBER & BALMFORTH, 2021; KRAMER & ERLANGER, 2021).

a ser associada à Rússia. A invasão da Ucrânia em 2022 trouxe, então, a intensificação desse *diagnóstico*, sendo relacionada à demonstração de como o uso da força é instrumento chave na política externa russa, o qual o país está disposto a utilizar de forma extensiva, contra alvos civis, para perseguição de fins políticos. De forma mais direta, o relatório afirma que a “Rússia não respeita a soberania e a integridade territorial dos países (...) e trouxe a guerra para a Europa” (2022, p.9-10).

Com essa representação da Rússia como uma ameaça iminente, reforçando o *diagnóstico*, a adesão finlandesa à OTAN também ganhou mais força como solução adequada ao contexto no qual o país está inserido. As vantagens da adesão relacionadas à cobertura militar pelo artigo 5º e ao aumento da estabilidade na região continuaram a ser mencionadas, acrescidas, porém, da segurança de abastecimento e do preparo da sociedade para crises, que a participação na Organização proporcionaria (FINLÂNDIA, 2022, p. 21), fazendo um paralelo com as dificuldades vivenciadas pela população ucraniana e reportadas pela mídia. Os possíveis efeitos da inação finlandesa em meio ao contexto alterado pela movimentação russa são ainda mencionados como forma de reforçar a necessidade de mudança na política externa finlandesa (*prognóstico*), como no seguinte trecho do “*Government Report on Changes in the Security Environment*” (2022, p.29, tradução nossa): “(...) em uma situação na qual a Rússia almeja criar uma esfera de influência por meio de demandas e meios militares, falhar em reagir às mudanças no ambiente de segurança pode levar a mudanças na posição internacional da Finlândia e ao enfraquecimento do seu espaço de manobra”. A mesma percepção pode ser encontrada no discurso do presidente Sauli Niinistö diante do parlamento sueco, ao afirmar que “(...) nossa confiança nas formas tradicionais de garantir nossa segurança e manter nossas relações com a Rússia se quebrou.” (NIINISTÖ, 2022c), reforçando ao mesmo tempo o *diagnóstico* e o *prognóstico* do *master frame* de segurança do país.

Diante do exposto em relação aos elementos de *credibilidade empírica* presentes no discurso oficial finlandês, resta evidente a influência exercida pela movimentação russa no reforço do *diagnóstico* e na alteração do *prognóstico*, identificados no capítulo anterior, conforme ilustrado na tabela abaixo.

Tabela 6 – Credibilidade Empírica do Master Frame de Segurança da Finlândia

Ano	Movimentação Russa na Região	<i>Credibilidade Empírica Presente no Master Frame de Segurança da Finlândia</i>
2014	Anexação da região da Crimeia pela Rússia.	<p>Reforço do diagnóstico (Rússia como ameaça):</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Crise na Ucrânia como lembrete de que a segurança não pode ser tomada por certa na Europa. • Modernização das forças armadas russas. <p>Reforço/alteração do prognóstico (neutralidade): ausente.</p>
2015	Violação do regime de fronteira com a Finlândia e assinatura dos Acordos de Minsk I e II, como tentativa de solucionar a crise na Ucrânia.	<p>Reforço do diagnóstico (Rússia como ameaça):</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Crise na Ucrânia prova que a guerra não é mais algo de terras distantes, mas próxima à realidade dos finlandeses. <p>Alteração do prognóstico (de neutralidade para adesão à OTAN):</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Necessidade de garantir uma performance atualizada da capacidade de defesa finlandesa. • Reorientação da política de expansão europeia para segurança e defesa.
2016	Continuidade da crise na Ucrânia com a violação dos Acordos de Minsk I e II.	<p>Reforço do diagnóstico (Rússia como ameaça):</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Violação do regime de fronteira pela Rússia evidencia tendência do país a criar problemas. • Não exclusão da ameaça ou uso da força contra a Finlândia, pela primeira vez. <p>Alteração do prognóstico (de neutralidade para adesão à OTAN):</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Vantagens da adesão à OTAN: cobertura militar pelo artigo 5º e aumento da capacidade de dissuasão finlandesa. • Referências históricas corroboram presença estabilizadora da OTAN na região. (continua)

Tabela 6 – Credibilidade Empírica do Master Frame de Segurança da Finlândia (cont.)

Ano	Movimentação Russa na Região	Credibilidade Empírica Presente no Master Frame de Segurança da Finlândia
2017 a 2020	Continuidade das tensões na Ucrânia, nas repúblicas de Luhank e Donetsk.	<p>Reforço do diagnóstico (Rússia como ameaça):</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Ações russas na Geórgia, Ucrânia e Síria demonstram diminuição do limiar do uso da força pela Rússia. <p>Alteração do prognóstico (de neutralidade para adesão à OTAN):</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Mudança no entorno estratégico exige prontidão das forças armadas e maior capacidade de dissuasão, a ser alcançada com a adesão à OTAN.
2021	Movimentação próxima à fronteira com a Ucrânia e demanda de não expansão da OTAN para países da região.	<p>Reforço do diagnóstico (Rússia como ameaça):</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Exigências russas em relação à OTAN são ameaça à liberdade de escolha da Finlândia de aderir à Organização. <p>Alteração do prognóstico (de neutralidade para adesão à OTAN):</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • OTAN como ator chave no aumento da segurança e estabilidade europeia. • Necessidade de forte poder de dissuasão no contexto atual da Finlândia.
2022	Invasão da Ucrânia pela Rússia em 24 de fevereiro.	<p>Reforço do diagnóstico (Rússia como ameaça):</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Invasão à Ucrânia demonstra disposição russa em utilizar a força de forma extensiva como instrumento político. • Guerra na Ucrânia demonstra ainda como a Rússia não respeita a soberania e a integridade territorial dos países. <p>Alteração do prognóstico (de neutralidade para adesão à OTAN):</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Adesão à OTAN como forma de aumentar não apenas a capacidade de defesa e dissuasão finlandesa, mas também de abastecimento e de preparo da sociedade para situações de crise. • Falha em reagir à nova realidade de segurança pode levar à diminuição do espaço de manobra finlandês.

Fonte: elaboração própria, com dados extraídos por meio do software MAXQDA.

4.2.3. *Comensurabilidade Experimental*

Após a identificação do primeiro elemento de ressonância do *master frame* de segurança da Finlândia e sua evolução ao longo do marco temporal analisado, passou-se para a análise do segundo, qual seja, a *comensurabilidade experimental*, que diz respeito à posição ocupada pelos problemas apresentados na experiência cotidiana da audiência (SNOW & BENFORD, 1992, p. 134, 138-140). Por ser o mais específico e o mais próximo da experiência da audiência dentre os três que constituem a ressonância, esse elemento foi o mais difícil de identificar no discurso oficial finlandês e esteve concentrado na camada de segurança e defesa, conforme elucidado a seguir.

Em 2014, a *comensurabilidade experimental* esteve restrita à menção realizada pelo presidente Sauli Niinistö, em seu discurso por ocasião da Conferência Nacional de Salen¹⁰, de que “O serviço militar compulsório permanecerá como o centro do sistema de defesa da Finlândia” (NIINISTÖ, 2014a). Ao abordar uma das formas de participação direta da população na defesa do país, o presidente aproximou o discurso de segurança da realidade da audiência e de sua participação nesse contexto. Trechos relacionados à experiência cotidiana da população finlandesa aparecem novamente apenas em 2016, quando o presidente do país aproximou novamente a temática à vivência da população, ressaltando a alta disposição dos finlandeses em defenderem a nação, lembrando que oito em cada dez cidadãos estão dispostos a lutar ao lado das forças armadas finlandesas (NIINISTÖ, 2016g). O mesmo assunto é ainda abordado no “*Assessment on Nato Membership*” (2016, p.54), como sendo reflexo de identidades históricas e seu papel na política de defesa e segurança do país.

Em 2017, além da continuidade da menção à disposição dos finlandeses em defender o país no “*Government’s Defence Report*” (2017, p.28), a *comensurabilidade experimental* do *master frame* ganha um novo elemento com a afirmação do presidente Sauli em seu discurso no dia da bandeira que

“O serviço compulsório tem um forte papel social, assim como um aspecto defensivo. Ele une uma diversidade de finlandeses — de diferentes partes do país, diferentes contextos e com diferentes ideais —, os quais então aprendem a conviver uns com os outros. A coesão de uma nação é um grande fator de sucesso. Quanto mais nos entendermos uns com os outros e mantermos todos no mesmo barco, maiores são nossas chances de sucesso no segundo século de nossa independência” (NIINISTÖ, 2017f, tradução nossa).

¹⁰ A Conferência Nacional de Salen é o principal fórum sueco para discussão de política de segurança, defesa e preparação da sociedade para crises. O evento ocorre anualmente desde 1946 (FOLK OCH FORSVAR, 2023).

Em 2019, a conscrição geral ganhou espaço como parte integrante da defesa nacional finlandesa, sendo abordada tanto no discurso do presidente Sauli na cerimônia de promoção de cadetes daquele ano quanto no documento “*Effective crisis management: Recommendations of the Parliamentary Committee on Crisis Management on Developing Finland’s Crisis Management*” de 2021. Além da conscrição, este documento ainda elenca como fundamentos da capacidade de defesa do país a grande disposição dos cidadãos em defendê-lo e uma reserva treinada, afirmando também que a defesa militar nacional é uma parte integrante da sociedade (FINLÂNDIA, 2021, p.26).

Conforme demonstrado, a *comensurabilidade experimental* do *master frame* de segurança da Finlândia se dá, em sua maior parte, de forma geral, em um movimento de abordagem da contribuição dos cidadãos com a defesa do país, com a menção à conscrição geral e ao serviço militar compulsório. Em 2022, porém, há uma maior assertividade na relação dessa com a movimentação russa na Ucrânia, quando o “*Government Report on Changes in the Security Environment*” (2022, p.37) afirma que a invasão da Ucrânia pela Rússia aumentou a disposição dos finlandeses em defender o país. A tabela a seguir resume os principais pontos de comensurabilidade experimental encontrados no discurso oficial finlandês no período de 2014 a 2022.

Tabela 7 – Comensurabilidade Experimental do Master Frame de Segurança da Finlândia

Ano	Movimentação Russa na Região	Comensurabilidade Experimental presente no Master Frame de Segurança da Finlândia
2014	Anexação da região da Crimeia pela Rússia.	Serviço militar compulsório como centro do sistema de defesa da Finlândia.
2015	Violação do regime de fronteira com a Finlândia e assinatura dos Acordos de Minsk I e II, como tentativa de solucionar a crise na Ucrânia.	Ausente.
2016	Continuidade da crise na Ucrânia com a violação dos Acordos de Minsk I e II.	Alta disposição dos finlandeses em defenderem o país.
2017 a 2020	Continuidade das tensões na Ucrânia nas repúblicas de Luhank e Donetsk.	Serviço militar compulsório tem função social e não apenas defensiva. (continua)

Tabela 7 – Comensurabilidade Experimental do Master Frame de Segurança da Finlândia

(cont.)

2021	Movimentação próxima à fronteira com a Ucrânia e demanda de não expansão da OTAN para países da região.	Conscrição geral e uma reserva treinada como partes integrantes da capacidade de defesa do país. (continua)
2022	Invasão da Ucrânia pela Rússia em 24 de fevereiro.	Invasão da Ucrânia aumentou disposição dos finlandeses em defender o país.

Fonte: elaboração própria, com dados extraídos por meio do software MAXQDA.

4.2.4. Fidelidade Narrativa

A *fidelidade narrativa* foi o último elemento do *master frame* analisado nesta pesquisa, seguindo o mesmo processo realizado para os outros dois, *credibilidade empírica* e *comensurabilidade experimental*. Esse terceiro critério está relacionado à centralidade que o discurso ocupa na ideologia e nos valores da audiência (SNOW & BENFORD, 1992, p. 134, 138-140), completando a avaliação da ressonância do *master frame* de segurança da Finlândia. Em comparação com os outros dois critérios, a *fidelidade narrativa* esteve presente em trechos do discurso em todos os anos, mas em frequência menor que a *credibilidade empírica* e maior que a *comensurabilidade experimental*.

Os elementos de *fidelidade narrativa* apareceram, em sua maior parte, na camada de política externa, relacionados aos valores do não alinhamento finlandês, que orientou a atuação internacional do país por mais de sete décadas. Em 2014, essa correspondência com o apoio da população à neutralidade esteve presente no discurso do presidente Sauli Niinistö durante a Conferência Nacional de Salen, quando o mesmo afirmou que “(...) Apesar de a adesão à OTAN permanecer como uma solução possível, nós [Finlândia] não temos planos de aplicar para nos tornarmos membros” (NIINISTÖ, 2014a, tradução nossa). A preocupação do líder político em compatibilizar o discurso oficial com os valores e crenças da população foi também demonstrada com a menção, na fala, por ocasião do início do curso nacional de defesa, à necessidade primária de uma defesa nacional forte como forma de dissuadir o uso da força contra o país e não de lutar uma guerra (NIINISTÖ, 2014j), tendo em vista o objetivo da política externa finlandesa de evitar que o país seja parte em um conflito armado.

No ano seguinte, esse objetivo da política externa foi reforçado nos discursos do presidente, acrescido da manutenção da independência, segurança e bem-estar do país, assegurando ainda que a cooperação com a OTAN seria realizada nos termos da Finlândia (NIINISTÖ, 2015a), respeitando suas opções e valores de política externa. Esse entendimento foi reiterado em 2016, no “*Government Report on Finnish Foreign and Security Policy*” (p.24), assim como a manutenção da adesão a uma aliança militar como opção à Finlândia, e, em 2017, no “*Defence Report*” (2017, p. 14), que ressaltou a importância do não alinhamento militar para o fortalecimento da defesa nacional finlandesa e sua cooperação internacional no assunto. Os elogios à neutralidade, parte da identidade nacional dos finlandeses, conforme elucidado no capítulo 2 deste trabalho, se mostraram também presentes no discurso do presidente Sauli, durante a recepção do presidente da Estônia, ao afirmar que “Uma grande tradição de política externa foi também estabelecida. Seja chamada de Paasikivi, Kekkonen ou os dois, sua orientação e objetivo era direcionada para o Ocidente, mas, de forma necessária, ela assegurou nossa existência ao lado da nossa vizinha, a União Soviética (...)” (NIINISTÖ, 2017b, tradução nossa).

Em 2018, a *fidelidade narrativa* apareceu novamente relacionada à adequação da cooperação com a OTAN em relação ao não alinhamento militar finlandês, tendo a publicação “*A Stronger North? Nordic cooperation in foreign and security policy in a new security environment*” (2018, p. 21) reiterado que a participação do país em exercícios conjuntos com a Organização são fruto de decisões compatíveis com a política externa e de segurança compreensiva da Finlândia, replicando uma situação de crise real onde não haveria amparo pelo artigo 5º. No ano seguinte, o foco nos discursos do presidente esteve em garantir a continuidade no objetivo da política externa do país, esclarecendo que, ser parte de uma aliança ou grupo de países não seria um fim em si mesmo, mas uma forma de fortalecimento da posição internacional da Finlândia (NIINISTÖ, 2019d).

A menção à possibilidade de adesão a alianças militares voltaria a ganhar foco no discurso oficial apenas em 2021, tendo os elementos de *fidelidade narrativa* do ano de 2020 estado relacionados ao valor da mediação e da resolução de conflitos. Em sua fala, na Assembleia Geral das Nações Unidas, o presidente finlandês conclamou a comunidade internacional a investir mais na prevenção e solução de conflitos, colocando a Finlândia à disposição para exercer seus bons ofícios (NIINISTÖ, 2020c). A menção do presidente evidencia a tentativa de aproximação do discurso oficial com mais um dos valores constituintes da política de neutralidade valorizada pela população, qual seja, a mediação, função por meio da qual a Finlândia se projetou no contexto internacional durante a Guerra Fria.

No ano seguinte, a *fidelidade narrativa do master frame* de segurança finlandês continuou a valorizar o diálogo e a disponibilidade do país em exercer bons ofícios, mas acrescida de menção direta a outro pilar da neutralidade finlandesa: as relações com a Rússia. Essas foram colocadas pelo presidente da Finlândia como tendo experimentado flutuações ao longo dos anos, com prevalência, porém, do entendimento mútuo e do objetivo de manutenção da funcionalidade das relações entre as partes (NIINISTÖ, 2021k). A necessidade de manutenção de diálogo com o país vizinho foi acompanhada, entretanto, da ressalva de que essa não entraria em contradição com a defesa dos interesses finlandeses, tendo o “*Effective crisis management: Recommendations of the Parliamentary Committee on Crisis Management on Developing Finland’s Crisis Management*” (2021, p.43), publicado naquele ano, ressaltado que a manutenção de um espaço de manobra e da liberdade de escolha são também partes integrantes da política externa de não alinhamento do país, incluindo a possibilidade de escolha pelo abandono dessa em favor da adesão à OTAN. O aumento das tensões com a movimentação russa na região trouxe, portanto, uma tentativa no discurso do governo de adequação do mesmo aos valores da audiência já influenciados pela alteração do contexto de segurança no qual o país estava envolvido, com o aumento das tensões militares na região.

A alteração na relação entre o discurso e os valores da audiência foi corroborada em 2022 em documentos como o “*Government Report on Changes in the Security Environment*” (2022, p. 10), que reforçou o espaço de manobra e da liberdade de escolha como parte integrante da política externa do país. Em seu discurso durante o Fórum de Segurança de Helsinque, o presidente Sauli Niinistö mencionou a Rússia como o pilar da política externa finlandesa que colapsou, evidenciando a adequação do discurso ao contexto de alta tensão com a invasão da Ucrânia, que alterou a percepção e as crenças da audiência em relação ao país vizinho (NIINISTÖ, 2022j). Adaptando o discurso à mudança da percepção da população em relação à adesão à OTAN, que foi apoiada por 68% dos finlandeses em 2022 (ABDI, 2022, p. 26), o presidente Sauli afirmou ainda que a adesão à Organização nada mais é do que o próximo passo natural a ser tomado pelo país, reiterando que a mesma não significaria uma alteração drástica da política externa e de segurança da Finlândia (NIINISTÖ, 2022e).

A *fidelidade narrativa do master frame* de segurança da Finlândia esteve, portanto, em sua maior parte associada à política de não alinhamento do país, parte da identidade nacional finlandesa, e buscou, diante do exposto, acompanhar a alteração nos valores e crenças da população em relação à essa política e à opção pela adesão à OTAN. Associada no início do período à ausência de intenção de aderir à OTAN no curto prazo, sendo a cooperação com a Organização cuidadosamente descrita como aderente aos termos do não alinhamento finlandês,

a *fidelidade narrativa* do discurso foi, ao longo do período analisado, moldada aos acontecimentos e percepções da audiência para garantir a *ressonância*, de modo a questionar dois dos pilares da neutralidade do país: as relações com a Rússia e a cooperação com a OTAN. A tabela abaixo evidencia essa alteração e sua relação com a movimentação russa na região.

Tabela 8 – Fidelidade Narrativa do Master Frame de Segurança da Finlândia

Ano	Movimentação Russa na Região	Fidelidade Narrativa no Master Frame de Segurança da Finlândia
2014	Anexação da região da Crimeia pela Rússia.	Adesão à OTAN como possibilidade, mas não de curto prazo, em concordância com a política de não alinhamento. Forte capacidade de defesa para dissuasão, em concordância com o objetivo do não alinhamento de evitar que a Finlândia seja parte de um conflito militar.
2015	Violação do regime de fronteira com a Finlândia e assinatura dos Acordos de Minsk I e II, como tentativa de solucionar a crise na Ucrânia.	Cooperação com a OTAN é realizada de acordo com os termos estabelecidos pela Finlândia, não violando a política de não alinhamento do país.
2016	Continuidade da crise na Ucrânia com a violação dos Acordos de Minsk I e II.	Adesão à OTAN como possibilidade, mas não de curto prazo, em concordância com a política de não alinhamento.
2017 a 2020	Continuidade das tensões na Ucrânia nas repúblicas de Luhank e Donetsk.	Política de não alinhamento é uma tradição de política externa que garantiu a sobrevivência da Finlândia frente à Rússia. Disponibilidade da Finlândia em exercer bons ofícios em conflitos internacionais, valorizando o pilar da mediação, parte da política de não alinhamento do país.
2021	Movimentação próxima à fronteira com a Ucrânia e demanda de não expansão da OTAN para países da região.	Relações com a Rússia, pilar da política de não alinhamento do país, sofreram flutuações ao longo dos anos, mas prevaleceu a manutenção da funcionalidade. Liberdade de escolha para eventualmente aderir a uma aliança militar com a OTAN é parte da política de não alinhamento, acrescentando nova concepção à forma como essa foi incorporada à identidade nacional finlandesa. (continua)

Tabela 8 – Fidelidade Narrativa do Master Frame de Segurança da Finlândia

2022	Invasão da Ucrânia pela Rússia em 24 de fevereiro.	Pilar da política de não alinhamento, as relações com a Rússia colapsaram. Aderir à OTAN não é uma mudança drástica na política externa e de segurança do país, mas um passo natural.
------	--	--

Fonte: elaboração própria.

Analisadas todas as funções essenciais do *master frame* de segurança da Finlândia, proposta deste capítulo, quais sejam, a atributiva (*diagnóstico e prognóstico*), a do escopo de articulação (código restrito ou elaborado) e a da potência (*posicionamento no espectro restrito-elaborado e ressonância*, distribuída em *credibilidade empírica, comensurabilidade experimental e fidelidade narrativa*), restou evidente como a movimentação russa na Ucrânia influenciou a alteração do discurso oficial finlandês entre os anos de 2014 e 2022. O *prognóstico* para lidar com a Rússia enquanto ameaça (*diagnóstico*) foi alterado do não alinhamento para a adesão à OTAN, tendo os demais elementos do *master frame* sido adequados ao longo dos anos para corroborar essa mudança e garantir sua *ressonância* em meio à audiência, a população finlandesa. A tabela abaixo sintetiza os elementos do *master frame* de segurança da Finlândia e suas alterações entre os anos de 2014 e 2022, de acordo com a movimentação russa na região.

Tabela 9 – O Master Frame de Segurança da Finlândia entre 2014 e 2022

Funções Essenciais do Master Frame	
<i>Diagnóstico</i>	Movimentações russas na região alteraram o entorno estratégico da Finlândia e trouxeram o questionamento da adequabilidade de sua capacidade de defesa para lidar com a ameaça do país vizinho.
<i>Prognóstico</i>	Adesão à OTAN aumentaria a capacidade de defesa e o poder de dissuasão da Finlândia, por meio da cobertura do artigo 5º do tratado da Organização.
<i>Escopo de Articulação</i>	Código majoritariamente restrito, com definições claras relacionadas à cooperação com a OTAN, vantagens de adesão à Organização, segurança e política externa finlandesas.
Localização no espectro de código Restrito-Elaborado	Mais próximo do código restrito. (continua)

Tabela 9 – O *Master Frame* de Segurança da Finlândia entre 2014 e 2022 (cont.)

Funções Essenciais do <i>Master Frame</i>		
<i>Ressonância</i>	<i>Credibilidade Empírica</i>	<p>Durante os anos de 2014 e 2015, a crise na Ucrânia, iniciada com a anexação da Crimeia, é apresentada como um lembrete de que a segurança não pode ser tomada por certa na Europa. Em 2016, a violação do regime de fronteira pela Rússia é apontada como uma demonstração da tendência do país a criar problemas, assim como surge a não exclusão da possibilidade de uso da força contra a Finlândia. Vantagens de adesão à OTAN, como a cobertura pelo artigo 5º e o aumento do poder de dissuasão adentram o discurso. Entre 2017 e 2020, as ações russas em outros países são apresentadas como evidência da redução do custo do uso da força pelo país. Em 2021, as exigências russas em relação à expansão da OTAN no Leste Europeu são apontadas como ameaça à liberdade de escolha da Finlândia em aderir à Organização. Por fim, em 2022, a Guerra na Ucrânia aparece como a demonstração da disposição russa em utilizar a força como instrumento político, sem respeitar a soberania dos países.</p>
	<i>Comensurabilidade Experimental</i>	<p>Serviço militar compulsório é apresentado no discurso como centro do sistema de defesa da Finlândia em 2014 e como detentor de uma função social no país no período de 2017 e 2020. A alta disposição dos finlandeses em defender o país se faz mais presente em 2016, após a violação do regime de fronteira pela Rússia em 2015, e também em 2022, depois do início da guerra na Ucrânia, esta apontada como fator de aumento dessa característica da população da Finlândia. A conscrição geral é também mencionada como parte integrante da capacidade de defesa do país em 2021.</p>
	<i>Fidelidade Narrativa</i>	<p>Entre 2014 e 2016 a adesão à OTAN é apresentada como uma possibilidade, que não seria concretizada a curto prazo, em concordância com os princípios da política de não alinhamento, parte da identidade nacional finlandesa. Nesse período, a cooperação com a Organização é mencionada como aderente à política externa do país. De 2017 a 2020, os elementos já apresentados são acrescidos da mediação, outro pilar do não alinhamento e da identidade nacional. Em 2021, outros dois pilares do não alinhamento ganharam destaque: relações com a Rússia e liberdade de escolha em aderir à OTAN, sendo que, em 2022, o primeiro é mencionado como tendo colapsado e o segundo como um passo natural a ser dado pela Finlândia.</p>

Fonte: elaboração própria, com base nos dados extraídos por meio do software MAXQDA.

CONCLUSÃO

A partir do demonstrado neste trabalho, pode-se afirmar que a movimentação russa na Ucrânia impactou de forma significativa o discurso oficial finlandês relacionado à política externa de neutralidade do país, oficialmente abandonada com o pedido de adesão à OTAN, em 2022. Foi constatada a presença de um *Master Frame* de segurança na Finlândia, isto é, um discurso mobilizador, concebido ainda na década de 1940, durante o governo de Juho Kusti Paasikivi, em prol da instituição da política de neutralidade como a solução (*prognóstico*) adequada para garantir a integridade territorial finlandesa e evitar conflitos com a Rússia, a qual era vista como uma ameaça (*diagnóstico*), desde a Guerra do Inverno, em 1939.

Ao longo do século XX e início do XXI, esse *Master Frame* se perpetuou no discurso oficial finlandês, tendo a política de neutralidade se tornado parte da identidade nacional do país e se perpetuado por mais de sete décadas. Após o fim da Guerra Fria, a política passou a ser desafiada pelas tendências de integração regional, sendo redefinida para o não alinhamento militar, a fim de conciliar a entrada da Finlândia para a União Europeia. Desde então, a neutralidade não havia sofrido, porém, questionamentos que de fato a colocassem à prova enquanto solução adequada para lidar com a vizinha Rússia, até 2014, quando essa anexou a Crimeia e iniciou a movimentação que culminou na invasão à Ucrânia em 2022.

A partir de então, conforme demonstrado nesta pesquisa, o *prognóstico* do *Master Frame* de segurança da Finlândia passou por um processo de alteração que resultou no abandono da política de neutralidade em favor da adesão à OTAN. A análise das fontes, compostas pelos discursos proferidos pelo presidente finlandês Sauli Niinistö entre 2014 e 2022 e de relatórios governamentais publicados nesse período, permitiu a identificação de quinze representações no discurso oficial do governo, classificadas em cinco grupos temáticos: segurança e defesa, contexto externo, Rússia, OTAN e política externa. O estudo dessas representações demonstrou que, no período analisado por esta pesquisa (2014 a 2022), o *diagnóstico* do *Master Frame* de segurança permaneceu o mesmo, qual seja, a colocação da Rússia como uma possível ameaça à integridade territorial finlandesa, em muito acentuada pela invasão do país à Ucrânia, associada à redução do custo do uso da força pelo país vizinho. O *prognóstico*, por sua vez, muito em função da intensificação do próprio *diagnóstico*, apresentou mudança, sendo direcionado para a necessidade de adesão à OTAN como forma de garantir a solidariedade militar do artigo 5º, não apenas em caso de conflitos, mas também como forma de aumentar o poder de dissuasão finlandês e evitar o uso da força contra o país.

A análise dos elementos de *ressonância* do *Master Frame* de segurança da Finlândia no período de 2014 a 2022, por sua vez, trouxe o posicionamento desse mais próximo ao *código restrito* no espectro restrito-elaborado do escopo de articulação. Essa constatação veio com a identificação de significados bem definidos e que se perpetuaram ao longo do discurso relacionados à: segurança e defesa finlandesa; cooperação com a OTAN; vantagens da adesão à OTAN e objetivo da política externa finlandesa. A análise da *credibilidade empírica* deixou claro como a movimentação russa na região trouxe elementos da realidade vivida pelos finlandeses, principalmente da alteração do entorno estratégico do país com a movimentação russa na região, para o discurso, de forma a reforçar o *diagnóstico* da Rússia como uma ameaça e a alteração do *prognóstico* para a adesão à OTAN. Os elementos da *comensurabilidade experimental* presentes no discurso no período demonstraram que a disponibilidade dos finlandeses em defender o país aumentou com a movimentação da Rússia na região, reforçando também a continuidade do *diagnóstico* apresentado. Por fim, a análise da *fidelidade narrativa* corroborou a tendência encontrada nos demais elementos de *ressonância*, demonstrando como a movimentação russa alterou dois dos pilares da política externa finlandesa: as relações com a Rússia e a cooperação com a OTAN.

A pergunta de pesquisa que motivou este trabalho, qual seja, “*Como a movimentação militar russa na Ucrânia, no período de 2014 a 2022, alterou o discurso oficial do governo finlandês em relação à política externa de neutralidade do país?*”, pôde, portanto, ser respondida por meio da aplicação da teoria do *Master Frame*, que corroborou a hipótese levantada inicialmente. A movimentação russa na Ucrânia desde 2014 de fato influenciou o discurso oficial do governo finlandês em relação à política de neutralidade do país a partir da alteração de dois dos pilares dessa: as relações com a Rússia e a cooperação com a OTAN.

A adesão da Finlândia à OTAN, concluída em abril de 2023, representou uma quebra de paradigma na história da política externa do país que traz grandes implicações geopolíticas, como o aumento em cem por cento da fronteira atual da OTAN com a Rússia, que merecem estudos próprios. Esta pesquisa teve por objetivo contribuir com o estudo das políticas externas de neutralidade no sistema internacional contemporâneo, limitando-se ao movimento de abandono da neutralidade pela Finlândia, mas muito espaço ainda há para expandir as abordagens relacionadas ao tema e os desafios por ele enfrentados em uma realidade que urge pela mudança na balança de poder entre os Estados.

REFERÊNCIAS

ABDI (The Advisory Board for Defence Information). Finn's Opinion on Foreign and Security Policy. **ABDI Bulletins and reports**. Helsinki: ADBI, dezembro de 2022.

AGIUS, C & DEVINE, K. 'Neutrality: a really dead concept?' A reprise. **Cooperation and Conflict**, Vol. 46, N. 3, pp. 265-284, 2011.

ALLISON, R. **Finland's relations with the Soviet Union: 1944-1984**. London: The Macmillan Press Ltda, 1985.

ANTHONY I. The Ukraine crisis: from popular protest to major conflict. **Security and Conflicts**, 2014. Disponível em: <https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/SIPRIYB15c03sI.pdf>. Acesso em: 20 de abril de 2022.

BENFORD, R. D.; SNOW, D. A. Framing Processes and Social Movements: An Overview and Assessment. **Annual Review of Sociology**, v. 26, p. 611–639, 2000.

BJERELD, U.; MÖLLER, U. Swedish Foreign Policy: the policy of neutrality and beyond. In: PIERRE, J. (Ed.). **The Oxford Handbook of Swedish Politics**. Oxford: Oxford Press, 2016. p. 433-446.

CARLSON, C. Finland: Soviet annexation of Karelia still a taboo subject. **Radiofree Europe**, 1º de julho de 2003. Disponível em: <https://www.rferl.org/a/1103688.html>. Acesso em: 25 de abril de 2022.

CARVALHO PINTO, V. **Nation-Building, State and the Genderframing of Women's Rights in the United Arab Emirates (1971 – 2009)**. Inglaterra: Ithaca Press, 2012.

CENTER FOR PREVENT ACTION. Conflict in Ukraine. Council on Foreign Relations, 12 de maio de 2022. Disponível em: <https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/conflict-ukraine>. Acesso em 18 de abril de 2022.

CONANT, E. How history, geography help explain Ukraine's political crisis. **National Geographic**, 19 de janeiro de 2014. Disponível em: <https://www.nationalgeographic.com/science/article/140129-protests-ukraine-russia-geography-history>. Acesso em 22 de março de 2022.

COTTEY, A. Introduction – The European Neutral States. In: **The European Neutrals and NATO – non-alignment, partnership, membership?** Inglaterra: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018. p. 1-20.

DERICHS, C. Shifting Epistemologies in Area Studies: From Space to Scale. **META**, v. 4, p. 29-36, 2015.

DUNN, K. & NEUMAN, I. **Undertaking Discourse Analysis for Social Research**. EUA: University of Michigan Press, 2016.

EAEU (Eurasian Economic Union). About the Union, 2023. Disponível em: <http://www.eaeunion.org/?lang=en#abou>. Acesso em 20 de janeiro de 2023.

FACTBOX What are the Minsk Agreements on the Ukraine conflict? **Reuters**, 21 de fevereiro de 2022. Disponível em: <https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/what-are-minsk-agreements-ukraine-conflict-2022-02-21/>. Acesso em 20 de abril de 2022.

FINLAND AND SWEDEN SUBMIT applications to join NATO. **NATO website**. Disponível em: https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_195468.htm. Acesso em 12 de junho de 2022.

FINLAND`S PARLIAMENT VOTES yes to NATO. **Reuters**, 17 de maio de 2022. Disponível em: <https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/finlands-parliament-likely-vote-nato-application-tuesday-2022-05-17/>. Acesso em 10 de dezembro de 2022.

FINLÂNDIA, GOVERNO DA. **Effective crisis management: Recommendations of the Parliamentary Committee on Crisis Management on developing Finland's crisis management**. Helsinki: Prime Minister's Office Publications, 2021.

FINLÂNDIA, GOVERNO DA. **Futures Review of The Ministry for Foreign Affairs: Finland Acts in a Changing World**. Helsinki: Governo Finlandês, 2018a.

FINLÂNDIA, GOVERNO DA. **Government's Defence Report**. Helsinki: Prime Minister's Office Publications, 2017.

FINLÂNDIA, GOVERNO DA. **Government Report on Finnish Foreign and Security Policy**. Helsinki: Prime Minister's Office Publications, 2016a.

FINLÂNDIA, GOVERNO DA. **Government Report on Finnish Foreign and Security Policy**. Helsinki: Prime Minister's Office Publications, 2020.

FINLÂNDIA, GOVERNO DA. **Government Report on changes in the security environment**. Helsinki: Prime Minister's Office Publications, 2022.

FINLÂNDIA, GOVERNO DA. **Programme of prime Minister Antti Rinne's Government: Inclusive and Competent Finland – a socially, economically and ecologically sustainable Society**. Helsinki: Governo Finlandês, 2019.

FINLÂNDIA, GOVERNO DA. **Report in Finland's Access to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization**. Helsinki: Prime Minister's Office Publications, 2022a.

FINLÂNDIA, GOVERNO DA. **The Effects of Finland's Possible NATO Membership: an assessment**. Helsinki: Ministry for Foreign Affairs. 2016.

FINLÂNDIA, GOVERNO DA. **The Foreign Affairs Committee on Government Report on Changes in the Security Environment and on Government Report on Finland's Accession to the North Atlantic Organization**, 17 de maio de 2022b. Disponível em: <https://www.eduskunta.fi/EN/tiedotteet/Documents/Committee%20Report%20on%20Changes%20in%20the%20Security%20Environment.pdf>. Acesso em 8 de dezembro de 2022.

FINNISH PARLIAMENT'S Defence Committee. **Reuters**, 10 de maio de 2022, Disponível em: <https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/finnish-parliaments-defence-committee-recommends-nato-membership-2022-05-10>. Acesso em 13 de dezembro de 2022.

FISHER, M. Everything you need to know about the 2014 Ukraine crisis. **Vox**, 3 de setembro de 2014. Disponível em: <https://www.vox.com/2014/9/3/18088560/ukraine-everything-you-need-to-know>. Acesso em: 30 de março de 2022.

FOLK OCH FORSVAR. Sobre Níós, 2023. Disponível em: <https://folkochforsvar.se/rikskonferensen/>. Acesso em 24 de abril de 2023.

FORSBERG, T, & PESU, M. The “Finlandisation” of Finland: The Ideal Type, Historical Model, and the Lessons Learnt. **Diplomacy and Statecraft**, Vol. 27, N. 3, p. 473-495, 2016.

FORSBERG, T. **Finland and NATO: Strategic Choices and Identity Conceptions. In: The European Neutrals and NATO – non-alignment, partnership, membership?** Inglaterra: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018.p. 97-128.

FRIEDMAN, G. The Russo-Georgian War and the Balance of Power. **Worldview**, 12 de agosto de 2008. Disponível em: <https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/russo-georgian-war-and-balance-power>. Acesso em 22 de janeiro de 2023.

GOFFMAN, E. **Frame analysis: an essay on the organization of experience**. New York: Harper & Row, 1974.

HANSEN, L. Discourse analysis, post-structuralism, and foreign policy. In: SMITH, S.; HADFIELD, A.; DUNNE, T. **Foreign Policy: Theories, Actors, Cases**. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2016.

HODGSON, J. H. Postwar Finnish Foreign Policy: Institutions and Personalities. **The Western Political Quarterly**, Vol. 15, N. 1, p. 80-92, 1962.

JACOBY, W. Issue framing and public opinion on government spending. **American Journal of Political Science**, v. 44, n. 4, p. 750–767, 2000.

JOENNIEMI, P. Models of neutrality: the traditional and modern. **Cooperation and Conflict**, Vol. 23, pp. 53-67, 1988.

JOINT STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC AND PRIME MINISTER OF FINLAND ON FINLAND'S NATO MEMBERSHIP. **Finnish Government**, 15 de maio de 2022. Disponível em: <https://valtioneuvosto.fi/en/-/10616/joint-statement-by-the-president-of-the-republic-and-prime-minister-of-finland-on-finland-s-nato-membership>. Acesso em 26 de março de 2023.

KARSH, E. Finland: Adaptation and Conflict. International Affairs. **Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-**. Vol. 62, N. 2, p. 265-278, 1986.

KINDER, D. R.; SANDERS, L. M. **Divided by color: racial politics and democratic ideals**. Chicago & London: University of Chicago Press, 1996.

KRAMER & ERLANGER. Russia NATO Security Deal. **NY Times**, 17 de dezembro de 2021. Disponível em: <https://www.nytimes.com/2021/12/17/world/europe/russia-nato-security-deal.html>. Acesso em 20 de abril de 2023.

KUUSISTO, A. A. The Paasikivi Line in Finland’s Foreign Policy. **The Western Political Quarterly**, Vol. 12, N. 1, p. 37-49, 1949.

LANKO, D. A. Finlandization, Neutrality or Kekkoslovakia? Paasikivi-Kekkonen's line in Finnish discourses 30 years after the end of the Cold War. **Journal of International Analytics**, Vol. 12, N. 3, p. 139-153, 2021.

LARSEN, H. **Foreign Policy and Discourse Analysis: France, Britain and Europe**. New York: Routledge, 1997.

MARKKU, T.; INNOLA, E.; TILLIKAINEN, T. **A Stronger North? Nordic cooperation in foreign and security policy in a new security environment**. Helsinki: Prime Minister's Office Publications, 2018.

MASTERS, J. **Ukraine: conflict at the crossroads of Europe and Russia**. Council on Foreign Relations, atualizado em 1º de abril de 2022. Disponível em: <https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/ukraine-conflict-crossroads-europe-and-russia>. Acesso em: 28 de abril de 2022.

MCFAUL, Michael. **From Cold War to Hot Peace: An American Ambassador in Putin's Russia**. Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2020.

MICHEL, L. G. Finland, Sweden and NATO: From "Virtual" to Formal Allies? **Strategic Forum**, n. 265, p. 1-20, fev. 2011.

NELSON, T. E.; OXLEY, Z. M. Issue Framing Effects on Belief Importance and Opinion. **The Journal of Politics**, v. 61, n. 4, p. 1040, 1999.

NEUMAN, I. B. Discourse Analysis. IN: KLOTZ, A. & PRAKASH, D. **Qualitative Methods in International Relations: a pluralist guide**. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008, pp. 61-77.

NIINISTÖ, Sauli. "The Case for a Stronger Europe in a Harder World" – Speech by President of the Republic of Finland Sauli Niinistö at the Humboldt University, Berlin, 23 November 2021. Helsinki, 23 nov. 2021k. Disponível em: <https://www.presidentti.fi/en/speeches/the-case-for-a-stronger-europe-in-a-harder-world-speech-by-president-of-the-republic-of-finland-sauli-niinisto-at-the-humboldt-university-berlin-23-november-2021/>. Acesso em: 21 jan. 2023.

NIINISTÖ, Sauli. Inauguration speech by President of the Republic Sauli Niinistö on 1 March 2012, 1 de março, 2012. Disponível em <https://www.presidentti.fi/en/speeches/inauguration-speech-by-president-of-the-republic-sauli-niinisto-on-1-march-2012/>. Acesso em: 25 jan. 2023.

NIINISTÖ, Sauli. Keynote address by President of the Republic of Finland Sauli Niinistö at the Helsinki Security Forum, 30 September 2022j. Disponível em: <https://www.presidentti.fi/en/speeches/keynote-address-by-president-of-the-republic-of-finland-sauli-niinisto-at-the-helsinki-security-forum-30-september-2022/>. Acesso em: 29 jan. 2023.

NIINISTÖ, Sauli. Keynote Speech by President of the Republic of Finland, Sauli Niinistö, at the FIIA Forum, Helsinki, 29 September 2021. Helsinki, 29 set. 2021f. Disponível em: <https://www.presidentti.fi/en/speeches/keynote-speech-by-president-of-the-republic-of-finland-sauli-niinisto-at-the-fiia-forum-helsinki-29-september-2021/>. Acesso em: 15 jan. 2023.

NIINISTÖ, Sauli. Keynote speech by President of the Republic of Finland Sauli Niinistö at the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs in Oslo on 10 October 2022l. Disponível em: <https://www.presidentti.fi/en/speeches/keynote-speech-by-president-of-the-republic-of-finland-sauli-niinisto-at-the-norwegian-institute-of-international-affairs-in-oslo-on-10-october-2022/>. Acesso em: 31 jan. 2023.

NIINISTÖ, Sauli. Opening speech by President of the Republic of Finland Sauli Niinistö at the seminar on demilitarisation and neutralisation of Åland in Mariehamn on 20 October 2021. Helsinki, 20 out. 2021g. Disponível em: <https://www.presidentti.fi/en/speeches/opening-speech-by-president-of-the-republic-of-finland-sauli-niinisto-at-the-seminar-on-demilitarisation-and-neutralisation-of-aland-in-mariehamn-on-20-october-2021/>. Acesso em: 17 jan. 2023.

NIINISTÖ, Sauli. President Niinistö's statement in the White House following the discussions with the President of the United States and the Prime Minister of Sweden on 19 May 2022d. Disponível em: <https://www.presidentti.fi/en/speeches/president-niinistos-statement-in-the-white-house-following-the-discussions-with-the-president-of-the-united-states-and-the-prime-minister-of-sweden-on-19-may-2022/>. Acesso em: 24 jan. 2023.

NIINISTÖ, Sauli. President of the Republic of Finland Sauli Niinistö's speech at the News, Communication and Information Wars media seminar, 15 October 2020d. Helsinki, 15 out. 2020. Disponível em: <https://www.presidentti.fi/en/speeches/president-of-the-republic-of-finland-sauli-niinistos-speech-at-the-news-communication-and-information-wars-media-seminar-15-october-2020/>. Acesso em: 07 jan. 2023.

NIINISTÖ, Sauli. President of the Republic of Finland Sauli Niinistö's New Year's Speech on 1 January 2021. Helsinki, 1 jan. 2021a. Disponível em: <https://www.presidentti.fi/en/speeches/president-of-the-republic-sauli-niinistos-new-years-speech-on-1-january-2021/>. Acesso em: 09 jan. 2023.

NIINISTÖ, Sauli. President of the Republic of Finland Sauli Niinistö's New Year's Speech on 1 January 2022. Helsinki, 1 jan. 2022a. Disponível em: <https://www.presidentti.fi/en/speeches/president-of-the-republic-of-finland-sauli-niinistos-new-years-speech-on-1-january-2022/>. Acesso em: 22 jan. 2023.

NIINISTÖ, Sauli. President of the Republic Sauli Niinistö's New Year's Speech on 1 January 2020. Helsinki, 1 jan. 2020a. Disponível em: <https://www.presidentti.fi/en/speeches/president-of-the-republic-sauli-niinistos-new-years-speech-on-1-january-2020/>. Acesso em: 01 dez. 2022.

NIINISTÖ, Sauli. President of the Republic Sauli Niinistö's New Year Speech on 1 January 2019a. Disponível em: <https://www.presidentti.fi/en/speeches/president-of-the-republic-sauli-niinistos-new-years-speech-on-1-january-2019/>. Acesso em: 20 nov. 2022.

NIINISTÖ, Sauli. Speech at the dinner for the diplomatic corps at the Presidential Palace, 2 May 2019. Helsinki, 2 may. 2019c. Disponível em: <https://www.presidentti.fi/en/speeches/speech-at-the-dinner-for-the-diplomatic-corps-at-the-presidential-palace-2-may-2019/>. Acesso em: 23 nov. 2022.

NIINISTÖ, Sauli. Speech at the opening of the 227th National Defence Course on 5 November 2018g. Disponível em: <https://www.presidentti.fi/en/speeches/president-of-the-republic-sauli-niinistos-speech-at-the-opening-of-the-227th-national-defence-course-on-5-november-2018g/>.

[niinistos-speech-at-the-opening-of-the-227th-national-defence-course-on-5-november-2018/](#). Acesso em: 20 nov. 2022.

NIINISTÖ, Sauli. Speech by Address by President of the Republic of Finland Sauli Niinistö at the Centenary of President Kallio's Reconciliation Speech in Nivala on 5 May 2018c. Disponível em: <https://www.presidentti.fi/en/speeches/address-by-president-of-the-republic-of-finland-sauli-niinisto-at-the-centenary-of-president-kallios-reconciliation-speech-in-nivala-on-5-may-2018/>. Acesso em: 17 nov. 2022.

NIINISTÖ, Sauli. Speech by Keynote address by President of the Republic of Finland Sauli Niinistö at The Brookings Institution in Washington, D.C., on 27th September 2018f. Disponível em: <https://www.presidentti.fi/en/speeches/keynote-address-by-president-of-the-republic-of-finland-sauli-niinisto-at-the-brookings-institution-in-washington-d-c-on-27th-september-2018/>. Acesso em: 19 nov. 2022.

NIINISTÖ, Sauli. Speech by Mr. President of the Republic of Finland, at the opening ceremony of the Expo National Day Finland on Tuesday 20 June 2017. Astana, Cazaquistão, 20 jun. 2017g. Disponível em: <https://www.presidentti.fi/en/speeches/opening-words-by-president-of-the-republic-sauli-niinisto-at-the-kultaranta-talks-on-11-june-2017/>. Acesso em: 05 nov. 2022.

NIINISTÖ, Sauli. Speech by Mr. President of the Republic of Finland at the Ambassador Seminar on 22 August 2017. Helsinki, Finland, 22 Aug. 2017h. Disponível em: <https://www.presidentti.fi/en/speeches/speech-by-president-of-the-republic-sauli-niinisto-at-the-ambassador-seminar-on-22-august-2017/>. Acesso em: 05 nov. 2022.

NIINISTÖ, Sauli. Speech by New Year Speech by President of the Republic Sauli Niinistö on 1 January 2016. Helsinki, 1 jan. 2016a. Disponível em: <https://www.presidentti.fi/en/speeches/new-year-speech-by-president-of-the-republic-sauli-niinisto-on-1-january-2016/>. Acesso em: 12 out. 2022.

NIINISTÖ, Sauli. Speech by New Year Speech by President of the Republic Sauli Niinistö on 1 January 2018a. Disponível em: <https://www.presidentti.fi/en/speeches/new-year-speech-by-president-of-the-republic-sauli-niinisto-on-1-january-2018/>. Acesso em: 15 nov. 2022.

NIINISTÖ, Sauli. Speech by Opening remarks by President of the Republic Sauli Niinistö at the European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats, 2 October 2017j. Disponível em: <https://www.presidentti.fi/en/speeches/opening-remarks-by-president-of-the-republic-sauli-niinisto-at-the-european-centre-of-excellence-for-countering-hybrid-threats-2-october-2017/>. Acesso em: 07 nov. 2022.

NIINISTÖ, Sauli. Speech by Opening Speech by President of the Republic Sauli Niinistö at the Kultaranta Talks on 19 June 2016. Naantali, 19 jun. 2016e. Disponível em: <https://www.presidentti.fi/en/speeches/opening-speech-by-president-of-the-republic-sauli-niinisto-at-the-kultaranta-talks-on-19-june-2016/>. Acesso em: 15 out. 2022.

NIINISTÖ, Sauli. Speech by President of the Republic of Finland Sauli Niinistö at the dinner on the occasion of the state visit by President of the Swiss Confederation Didier Burkhalter, 7 April 2014c. Disponível em: <https://www.presidentti.fi/en/speeches/speech-by-president-of-the-republic-of-finland-sauli-niinisto-at-the-dinner-on-the-occasion-of-the-state-visit-by-president-of-the-swiss-confederation-didier-burkhalter-7-april-2014/>. Acesso em: 18 ago. 2022.

NIINISTÖ, Sauli. Speech by President of the Republic of Finland Sauli Niinistö at the Arctic Circle 2014 Opening Session on 31 October 2014i in Reykjavik, Iceland. Disponível em: <https://www.presidentti.fi/en/speeches/speech-by-president-of-the-republic-of-finland-sauli-niinisto-at-the-arctic-circle-2014-opening-session-on-31-october-2014-in-reykjavik-iceland/>. Acesso em: 27 ago. 2022.

NIINISTÖ, Sauli. Speech by President of the Republic of Finland Sauli Niinistö at the OSCE PA Annual Meeting in Helsinki on 6 July 2015. Helsinki, 6 jul. 2015e. Disponível em: <https://www.presidentti.fi/en/speeches/speech-by-president-of-the-republic-of-finland-sauli-niinisto-at-the-osce-pa-annual-meeting-in-helsinki-on-6-july-2015/>. Acesso em: 17 set. 2022.

NIINISTÖ, Sauli. Speech by President of the Republic of Finland Sauli Niinistö at the promotion and appointment of cadets on 30 August 2019. Helsinki, 30 ago. 2019e. Disponível em: <https://www.presidentti.fi/en/speeches/speech-by-president-of-the-republic-of-finland-sauli-niinisto-at-the-promotion-and-appointment-of-cadets-on-30-august-2019/>. Acesso em: 25 nov. 2022.

NIINISTÖ, Sauli. Speech by President of the Republic of Finland Sauli Niinistö at the Interparliamentary Conference for the CFSP and the CSDP in Helsinki, Kalastajatorppa, 5 September 2019. Helsinki, 5 set. 2019f. Disponível em: <https://www.presidentti.fi/en/speeches/speech-by-president-of-the-republic-of-finland-sauli-niinisto-at-the-interparliamentary-conference-for-the-cfsp-and-the-csdp-in-helsinki-kalastajatorppa-5-september-2019/>. Acesso em: 26 nov. 2022.

NIINISTÖ, Sauli. Speech by President of the Republic of Finland Sauli Niinistö at the Yalta European Strategy Conference Kyiv, Ukraine, 13 September 2019. Helsinki, 13 set. 2019g. Disponível em: <https://www.presidentti.fi/en/speeches/speech-by-president-of-the-republic-of-finland-sauli-niinisto-at-the-yalta-european-strategy-conference-kyiv-ukraine-13-september-2019/>. Acesso em: 29 nov. 2022.

NIINISTÖ, Sauli. Speech by President of the Republic of Finland Sauli Niinistö at the Ambassadors' Conference on 25 August 2020. Helsinki, 25 ago. 2020b. Disponível em: <https://www.presidentti.fi/en/speeches/speech-by-president-of-the-republic-of-finland-sauli-niinisto-at-the-ambassadors-conference-on-25-august-2020/>. Acesso em: 03 jan. 2023.

NIINISTÖ, Sauli. Speech by President of the Republic of Finland Sauli Niinistö on the 150th anniversary of the birth of President J. K. Paasikivi, 27 November 2020. Helsinki, 27 nov. 2020e. Disponível em: <https://www.presidentti.fi/en/speeches/speech-by-president-of-the-republic-of-finland-sauli-niinisto-on-the-150th-anniversary-of-the-birth-of-president-j-k-paasikivi-27-november-2020/>. Acesso em: 07 jan. 2023.

NIINISTÖ, Sauli. Speech by President of the Republic of Finland Sauli Niinistö at the opening of Parliament on 3 February 2021. Helsinki, 3 fev. 2021b. Disponível em: <https://www.presidentti.fi/en/speeches/speech-by-president-of-the-republic-of-finland-sauli-niinisto-at-the-opening-of-parliament-on-3-february-2021/>. Acesso em: 11 jan. 2023.

NIINISTÖ, Sauli. Speech by President of the Republic of Finland Sauli Niinistö at the Crimea Platform in Kyiv on 23 August 2021. Helsinki, 23 ago. 2021c. Disponível em: <https://www.presidentti.fi/en/speeches/speech-by-president-of-the-republic-of-finland-sauli-niinisto-at-the-crimea-platform-in-kyiv-on-23-august-2021/>. Acesso em: 11 jan. 2023.

NIINISTÖ, Sauli. Speech by President of the Republic of Finland Sauli Niinistö at the Ambassadors' Conference on 24 August 2021. Helsinki, 24 ago. 2021d. Disponível em: <https://www.presidentti.fi/en/speeches/speech-by-president-of-the-republic-of-finland-sauli-niinisto-at-the-ambassadors-conference-on-24-august-2021/>. Acesso em: 14 jan. 2023.

NIINISTÖ, Sauli. Speech by President of the Republic of Finland Sauli Niinistö in honour of the 225th anniversary of the Royal Swedish Academy of War Sciences in Stockholm on 12 November 2021. Helsinki, 12 nov. 2021h. Disponível em: <https://www.presidentti.fi/en/speeches/speech-by-president-of-the-republic-of-finland-sauli-niinisto-in-honour-of-the-225th-anniversary-of-the-royal-swedish-academy-of-war-sciences-in-stockholm-on-12-november-2021/>. Acesso em: 20 jan. 2023.

NIINISTÖ, Sauli. Speech by President of the Republic of Finland Sauli Niinistö at the 60th anniversary of the National Defence Course Association on 18 November 2021i. Disponível em: <https://www.presidentti.fi/en/speeches/speech-by-president-of-the-republic-of-finland-sauli-niinisto-at-the-60th-anniversary-of-the-national-defence-course-association-on-18-november-2021/>. Acesso em: 21 jan. 2023.

NIINISTÖ, Sauli. Speech by President of the Republic of Finland Sauli Niinistö at the Körber Foundation Event "International Dialogue Revisited: The Spirit of Helsinki in an Age of Great-Power Competition", 22 November 2021j. Disponível em: <https://www.presidentti.fi/en/speeches/speech-by-president-of-the-republic-of-finland-sauli-niinisto-at-the-korber-foundation-event-international-dialogue-revisited-the-spirit-of-helsinki-in-an-age-of-great-power-competition-22-novem/>. Acesso em: 21 jan. 2023.

NIINISTÖ, Sauli. Speech by President of the Republic of Finland Sauli Niinistö at the opening of Parliament on 2 February 2022b. Disponível em: <https://www.presidentti.fi/en/speeches/speech-by-president-of-the-republic-of-finland-sauli-niinisto-at-the-opening-of-parliament-on-2-february-2022/>. Acesso em: 23 jan. 2023.

NIINISTÖ, Sauli. Speech by President of the Republic of Finland Sauli Niinistö at the Swedish Parliament on 17 May 2022c. Disponível em: <https://www.presidentti.fi/en/speeches/speech-by-president-of-the-republic-of-finland-sauli-niinisto-at-the-swedish-parliament-on-17-may-2022/>. Acesso em: 24 jan. 2023.

NIINISTÖ, Sauli. Speech by President of the Republic of Finland Sauli Niinistö at the Finnish Defence Forces' Flag Day parade in Helsinki on 4 June 2022e. Disponível em: <https://www.presidentti.fi/en/speeches/speech-by-president-of-the-republic-of-finland-sauli-niinisto-at-the-finnish-defence-forces-flag-day-parade-in-helsinki-on-4-june-2022/>. Acesso em: 24 jan. 2023.

NIINISTÖ, Sauli. Speech by President of the Republic of Finland Sauli Niinistö at the Crimea Platform Summit on 23 August 2022g. Disponível em: <https://www.presidentti.fi/en/speeches/speech-by-president-of-the-republic-of-finland-sauli-niinisto-at-the-crimea-platform-summit-on-23-august-2022/>. Acesso em: 26 jan. 2023.

NIINISTÖ, Sauli. Speech by President of the Republic of Finland Sauli Niinistö at the Ambassadors' Conference on 23 August 2022h. Disponível em: <https://www.presidentti.fi/en/speeches/speech-by-president-of-the-republic-of-finland-sauli-niinisto-at-the-ambassadors-conference-on-23-august-2022/>. Acesso em: 29 jan. 2023.

NIINISTÖ, Sauli. Speech by President of the Republic of Finland Sauli Niinistö at the dinner held on 19 October 2022 in honour of the State Visit to Iceland. Iceland, 19 October 2022m. Disponível em: <https://www.presidentti.fi/en/speeches/speech-by-president-of-the-republic-of-finland-sauli-niinisto-at-the-dinner-held-on-19-october-2022-in-honour-of-the-state-visit-to-iceland/>. Acesso em: 31 jan. 2023.

NIINISTÖ, Sauli. Speech by President of the Republic of Finland Sauli Niinistö at the 74th Session of the Nordic Council in Helsinki on 1 November 2022n. Disponível em: <https://www.presidentti.fi/en/speeches/speech-by-president-of-the-republic-of-finland-sauli-niinisto-at-the-74th-session-of-the-nordic-council-in-helsinki-on-1-november-2022/>. Acesso em: 02 fev. 2023.

NIINISTÖ, Sauli. Speech by President of the Republic of Finland Sauli Niinistö at the opening of the 242th National Defence Course on 7 November 2022o. Disponível em: <https://www.presidentti.fi/en/speeches/speech-by-president-of-the-republic-of-finland-sauli-niinisto-at-the-opening-of-the-242th-national-defence-course-on-7-november-2022/>. Acesso em: 02 fev. 2023.

NIINISTÖ, Sauli. Speech by President of the Republic of Finland, Sauli Niinistö, at the closing of the electoral period 2015-2019 on 10 April 2019b. Disponível em: <https://www.presidentti.fi/en/speeches/speech-by-president-of-the-republic-of-finland-sauli-niinisto-at-the-closing-of-the-electoral-period-2015-2019-on-10-april-2019/>. Acesso em: 23 nov. 2022.

NIINISTÖ, Sauli. Speech by President of the Republic Sauli Niinistö at the Rikskonferens Seminar in Sälen on 12 January 2014a. Disponível em: <https://www.presidentti.fi/en/speeches/speech-by-president-of-the-republic-sauli-niinisto-at-the-rikskonferens-seminar-in-salen-on-12-january-2014/>. Acesso em: 18 ago. 2022.

NIINISTÖ, Sauli. Speech by President of the Republic Sauli Niinistö at the opening of Parliament on 4 February 2014b. Disponível em: <https://www.presidentti.fi/en/speeches/speech-by-president-of-the-republic-sauli-niinisto-at-the-opening-of-parliament-on-4-february-2014/>. Acesso em: 18 ago. 2022.

NIINISTÖ, Sauli. Speech by President of the Republic Sauli Niinistö at a dinner for the diplomatic corps at Helsinki City Hall, on 29 April 2014d. Disponível em: <https://www.presidentti.fi/en/speeches/speech-by-president-of-the-republic-sauli-niinisto-at-a-dinner-for-the-diplomatic-corps-at-helsinki-city-hall-on-29-april-2014/>. Acesso em: 19 ago. 2022.

NIINISTÖ, Sauli. Speech by President of the Republic Sauli Niinistö to the new Government on 24 June 2014e. Disponível em: <https://www.presidentti.fi/en/speeches/speech-by-president-of-the-republic-sauli-niinisto-to-the-new-government-on-24-june-2014/>. Acesso em: 19 ago. 2022.

NIINISTÖ, Sauli. Speech by President of the Republic Sauli Niinistö to the outgoing Government on 24 June 2014f. Disponível em: <https://www.presidentti.fi/en/speeches/speech-by-president-of-the-republic-sauli-niinisto-to-the-outgoing-government-on-24-june-2014/>. Acesso em: 20 ago. 2022.

NIINISTÖ, Sauli. Speech by President of the Republic Sauli Niinistö at the ambassador seminar on 26 August 2014g. Disponível em: <https://www.presidentti.fi/en/speeches/speech-by-president-of-the-republic-sauli-niinisto-at-the-ambassador-seminar-on-26-august-2014/>. Acesso em: 20 ago. 2022.

NIINISTÖ, Sauli. Speech by President of the Republic Sauli Niinistö at the opening of the 211th National Defence Course on 10 November 2014j. Disponível em: <https://www.presidentti.fi/en/speeches/speech-by-president-of-the-republic-sauli-niinisto-at-the-opening-of-the-211th-national-defence-course-on-10-november-2014/>. Acesso em: 27 ago. 2022.

NIINISTÖ, Sauli. Speech by President of the Republic Sauli Niinistö at the opening of the exhibition “Pro Finlandia – Finland’s road to independence” at the National Archives on 2 December 2014. Helsinki, 2 dez. 2014l. Disponível em: <https://www.presidentti.fi/en/speeches/speech-by-president-of-the-republic-sauli-niinisto-at-the-opening-of-the-exhibition-pro-finlandia-finlands-road-to-independence-at-the-national-archives-on-2-december-2014/>. Acesso em: 30 ago. 2022.

NIINISTÖ, Sauli. Speech by President of the Republic Sauli Niinistö’s New Year’s Speech on 1 January 2015. Helsinki, 1 jan. 2015a. Disponível em: <https://www.presidentti.fi/en/speeches/president-of-the-republic-sauli-niinistos-new-years-speech-on-1-january-2015/>. Acesso em: 01 set. 2022.

NIINISTÖ, Sauli. Speech by President of the Republic Sauli Niinistö at the Closing of the Electoral Period 2011-2015 at Finlandia Hall on 15 April 2015. Helsinki, 15 abr. 2015b. Disponível em: <https://www.presidentti.fi/en/speeches/speech-by-president-of-the-republic-sauli-niinisto-at-the-closing-of-the-electoral-period-2011-2015-at-finlandia-hall-on-15-april-2015/>. Acesso em: 03 set. 2022.

NIINISTÖ, Sauli. Speech by President of the Republic Sauli Niinistö at the Diplomatic Dinner held at the Presidential Palace on 23 April 2015. Helsinki, 23 abr. 2015c. Disponível em: <https://www.presidentti.fi/en/speeches/speech-by-president-of-the-republic-sauli-niinisto-at-the-diplomatic-dinner-held-at-the-presidential-palace-on-23-april-2015/> Acesso em: 12 set. 2022.

NIINISTÖ, Sauli. Speech by President of the Republic Sauli Niinistö at the Opening of Parliament on 29 April 2015. Helsinki, 29 abr. 2015d. Disponível em: <https://www.presidentti.fi/en/speeches/speech-by-president-of-the-republic-sauli-niinisto-at-the-at-the-opening-of-parliament-on-29-april-2015/>. Acesso em: 17 set. 2022.

NIINISTÖ, Sauli. Speech by President of the Republic Sauli Niinistö at the Ambassador Seminar on 25 August 2015. Helsinki, 25 ago. 2015f. Disponível em: <https://www.presidentti.fi/en/speeches/speech-by-president-of-the-republic-sauli-niinisto-at-the-ambassador-seminar-25-august-2015/>. Acesso em: 03 out. 2022.]

NIINISTÖ, Sauli. Speech by President of the Republic Sauli Niinistö at the Dinner for the Diplomatic Corps at Presidential Palace on 21 April 2016c. Helsinki, 21 abr. 2016. Disponível em: <https://www.presidentti.fi/en/speeches/speech-by-president-of-the-republic-sauli-niinisto-at-the-dinner-for-the-diplomatic-corps-at-presidential-palace-on-21-april-2016/>. Acesso em: 13 out. 2022.

NIINISTÖ, Sauli. Speech by President of the Republic Sauli Niinistö at a Banquet hosted by President of Estonia Toomas Hendrik Ilves and Mrs Ieva Ilves on 17 May 2016. Tallinn, 17 mai. 2016d. Disponível em: <https://www.presidentti.fi/en/speeches/speech-by-president-of-the-republic-sauli-niinisto-at-a-banquet-hosted-by-president-of-estonia-toomas-hendrik-ilves-and-mrs-ieva-ilves-on-17-may-2016/>. Acesso em: 15 out. 2022.

NIINISTÖ, Sauli. Speech by President of the Republic Sauli Niinistö at the Ambassador Seminar on 23 August 2016. Helsinki, 23 ago. 2016f. Disponível em: <https://www.presidentti.fi/en/speeches/president-of-the-republic-sauli-niinistos-speech-at-the-ambassador-seminar-on-23-august-2016/>. Acesso em: 21 out. 2022.

NIINISTÖ, Sauli. Speech by President of the Republic Sauli Niinistö at the Dinner in Honour of the Visit by President of Lithuania Dalia Grybauskaitė at the Presidential Palace on 18 October 2016. Helsinki, 18 out. 2016.h Disponível em: <https://www.presidentti.fi/en/speeches/speech-by-president-of-the-republic-of-finland-sauli-niinisto-at-the-dinner-in-honour-of-the-visit-by-president-of-lithuania-dalia-grybauskaite-at-the-presidential-palace-on-18-october-2016/>. Acesso em: 23 out. 2022.

NIINISTÖ, Sauli. Speech by President of the Republic Sauli Niinistö at the Opening of the 219th National Defence Course on 7 November 2016. Helsinki, 7 nov. 2016i. Disponível em: <https://www.presidentti.fi/en/speeches/speech-by-president-of-the-republic-sauli-niinisto-at-the-opening-of-the-219th-national-defence-course-on-7-november-2016/>. Acesso em: 23 out. 2022.

NIINISTÖ, Sauli. Speech by President of the Republic Sauli Niinistö at the Opening of Parliament on 2 February 2017. Helsinki, 2 fev. 2017a. Disponível em: <https://www.presidentti.fi/en/speeches/speech-by-president-of-the-republic-sauli-niinisto-at-the-opening-of-parliament-on-2-february-2017/>. Acesso em: 23 out. 2022.

NIINISTÖ, Sauli. Speech by President of the Republic Sauli Niinistö at a Banquet in Honour of Kersti Kaljulaid, President of the Republic of Estonia and Mr Georgi-Rene Maksimovski at the Presidential Palace on 7 March 2017. Helsinki, 7 mar. 2017b. Disponível em: <https://www.presidentti.fi/en/speeches/speech-by-president-of-the-republic-sauli-niinisto-at-a-banquet-in-honour-of-kersti-kaljulaid-president-of-the-republic-of-estonia-and-mr-georgi-rene-maksimovski-at-the-presidential-palace-on-7-march/>. Acesso em: 30 out. 2022.

NIINISTÖ, Sauli. Speech by President of the Republic Sauli Niinistö at the Dinner for the Diplomatic Corps at Presidential Palace on 25 April 2017. Helsinki, 25 abr. 2017c. Disponível em: <https://www.presidentti.fi/en/speeches/speech-by-president-of-the-republic-sauli-niinisto-at-the-dinner-for-the-diplomatic-corps-at-the-presidential-palace-on-25-april-2017/>. Acesso em: 30 out. 2022.

NIINISTÖ, Sauli. Speech by President of the Republic Sauli Niinistö at the Lennart Meri Conference on Tallinn, Helsinki, 13 May 2017d. Disponível em: <https://www.presidentti.fi/en/speeches/speech-by-president-of-the-republic-of-finland-sauli-niinisto-at-the-lennart-meri-conference-in-tallinn-on-13-may-2017/>. Acesso em: 02 nov. 2022.

NIINISTÖ, Sauli. Speech by President of the Republic Sauli Niinistö on the flag day of the Finnish Defence Forces. Helsinki, 4 June 2017f. Disponível em: <https://www.presidentti.fi/en/speeches/speech-by-president-of-the-republic-sauli-niinisto-on->

the-flag-day-of-the-finnish-defence-forces-in-helsinki-on-4-june-2017/. Acesso em: 05 nov. 2022.

NIINISTÖ, Sauli. Speech by President of the Republic Sauli Niinistö at the Opening of Parliament on 6 February 2018b. Disponível em: <https://www.presidentti.fi/en/speeches/speech-by-president-of-the-republic-sauli-niinisto-at-the-opening-of-parliament-on-6-february-2018/>. Acesso em: 15 nov. 2022.

NIINISTÖ, Sauli. Speech by President of the Republic Sauli Niinistö at the Banquet held on 29 August 2018d in honour of the official visit by President of France Emmanuel Macron. Disponível em: <https://www.presidentti.fi/en/speeches/speech-by-president-of-the-republic-sauli-niinisto-at-the-banquet-held-on-29-august-2018-in-honour-of-the-official-visit-by-president-of-france-emmanuel-macron/>. Acesso em: 17 nov. 2022.

NIINISTÖ, Sauli. Speech by President of the Republic Sauli Niinistö at the Ambassadors' Conference on 20 August 2019. Helsinki, 20 ago. 2019d. Disponível em: <https://www.presidentti.fi/en/speeches/24119/>. Acesso em: 25 nov. 2022.

NIINISTÖ, Sauli. Speech by Speech by President of the Republic Sauli Niinistö at the Spring Meeting of the Finnish National Defence Course Association on 5 April 2016b. Helsinki, 5 abr. 2016. Disponível em: <https://www.presidentti.fi/en/speeches/speech-by-president-of-the-republic-sauli-niinisto-at-the-spring-meeting-of-the-finnish-national-defence-course-association-on-5-april-2016/>. Acesso em: 12 out. 2022.

NIINISTÖ, Sauli. Speech by Statement by President of the Republic of Finland Sauli Niinistö at the Peacekeeping Summit in New York on 28 September 2015. Nova York, 28 set. 2015g. Disponível em: <https://www.presidentti.fi/en/speeches/statement-by-president-of-the-republic-of-finland-sauli-niinisto-at-the-peacekeeping-summit-in-new-york-on-28-september-2015/>. Acesso em: 03 out. 2022.

NIINISTÖ, Sauli. Speech by Statement by President of the Republic of Finland Sauli Niinistö at the UNGA 70th General Debate on 29 September 2015h. Disponível em: <https://www.presidentti.fi/en/speeches/statement-by-president-of-the-republic-of-finland-sauli-niinisto-at-the-unga-70th-general-debate-on-29-september-2015/>. Acesso em: 10 out. 2022.

NIINISTÖ, Sauli. Speech by Statement by President of the Republic of Finland Sauli Niinistö at the UNGA 71th General Debate on 21 September 2016. Nova York, 21 set. 2016g. Disponível em: <https://www.presidentti.fi/en/speeches/statement-by-president-of-the-republic-of-finland-sauli-niinisto-at-the-unga-71th-general-debate-on-21-september-2016/>. Acesso em: 21 out. 2022

NIINISTÖ, Sauli. Speech by Statement by President of the Republic of Finland Sauli Niinistö at the United Nations General Assembly, 73rd General Debate, on 25th September 2018e. Disponível em: <https://www.presidentti.fi/en/speeches/statement-by-president-of-the-republic-of-finland-sauli-niinisto-at-the-united-nations-general-assembly-73rd-general-debate-on-25th-september-2018/>. Acesso em: 19 nov. 2022.

NIINISTÖ, Sauli. Speech by the President of the Republic of Finland, Mr. Sauli Niinistö, at the Economic Club of Minnesota, September 22, 2017i. Disponível em: <https://www.presidentti.fi/en/speeches/speech-by-the-president-of-the-republic-of-finland-mr->

[sauli-niinisto-at-the-economic-club-of-minnesota-september-22-2017/](#). Acesso em: 07 nov. 2022.

NIINISTÖ, Sauli. Speech by the President of the Republic of Finland, Sauli Niinistö, at the banquet held in honour of the President of Poland, Andrzej Duda, and Mrs. Agata Kornhauser-Duda, at the Presidential Palace on 24 October 2017i. Disponível em: <https://www.presidentti.fi/en/speeches/speech-by-the-president-of-the-republic-of-finland-sauli-niinisto-at-the-banquet-held-in-honour-of-the-president-of-poland-andrzej-duda-and-mrs-agata-korhauser-duda-at-the-presidential-palace-on-24-o/>. Acesso em: 15 nov. 2022.

NIINISTÖ, Sauli. Statement by President of the Republic of Finland Sauli Niinistö at the 75th General Debate of the United Nations General Assembly 23 September 2020. Helsinki, 23 set. 2020c. Disponível em: <https://www.presidentti.fi/en/speeches/statement-by-president-of-the-republic-of-finland-sauli-niinisto-at-the-75th-general-debate-of-the-united-nations-general-assembly-23-september-2020/>. Acesso em: 04 jan. 2023.

NIINISTÖ, Sauli. Statement by President of the Republic of Finland, Sauli Niinistö, at the 76th General Debate of the United Nations General Assembly, New York, 21 September 2021e. Helsinki, 21 set. 2021. Disponível em: <https://www.presidentti.fi/en/speeches/statement-by-president-of-the-republic-of-finland-sauli-niinisto-at-the-76th-general-debate-of-the-united-nations-general-assembly-new-york-21-september-2021/>. Acesso em: 14 jan. 2023.

NIINISTÖ, Sauli. Statement by President of the Republic of Finland Sauli Niinistö at the NATO Summit in Madrid on 29 June 2022f. Disponível em: <https://www.presidentti.fi/en/speeches/statement-by-president-of-the-republic-of-finland-sauli-niinisto-at-the-nato-summit-in-madrid-on-29-june-2022/>. Acesso em: 26 jan. 2023.

NIINISTÖ, Sauli. Statement by President of the Republic of Finland Sauli Niinistö at the 77th General Debate of the United Nations General Assembly, New York, 20 September 2022i. Disponível em: <https://www.presidentti.fi/en/speeches/statement-by-president-of-the-republic-of-finland-sauli-niinisto-at-the-77th-general-debate-of-the-united-nations-general-assembly-new-york-20-september-2022/>. Acesso em: 29 jan. 2023.

NIINISTÖ, Sauli. Statement by President of the Republic of Finland Sauli Niinistö at the International Inaugural Summit “Grain from Ukraine” on 26 nov. 2022p. Disponível em: <https://www.presidentti.fi/en/speeches/statement-by-president-of-the-republic-of-finland-sauli-niinisto-at-the-international-inaugural-summit-grain-from-ukraine-on-26-11-2022/>. Acesso em: 03 fev. 2023.

NIINISTÖ, Sauli. Statement by President of the Republic Sauli Niinistö at the UNGA 69th General Debate on 24 September 2014h. Disponível em: <https://www.presidentti.fi/en/speeches/statement-by-president-of-the-republic-sauli-niinisto-at-the-unga-69th-general-debate-on-24-september-2014/>. Acesso em: 25 ago. 2022.

NIINISTÖ, Sauli. Statement by the President of the Republic of Finland, Sauli Niinistö, at the 74th General Debate of the United Nations General Assembly, New York, 24 September 2019. Helsinki, 24 set. 2019h. Disponível em: <https://www.presidentti.fi/en/speeches/statement-by-the-president-of-the-republic-of-finland-sauli-niinisto-at-the-74th-general-debate-of-the-united-nations-general-assembly-new-york-24-september-2019/>. Acesso em: 30 nov. 2022.

NIINISTÖ, Sauli. Speech by President of the Republic Sauli Niinistö at Commemorative speech at the funeral of President Mauno Koivisto. Helsinki, 25 May 2017e. Disponível em: <https://www.presidentti.fi/en/speeches/president-of-the-republic-sauli-niinisto-commemorative-speech-at-the-funeral-of-president-mauno-koivisto-on-25-may-2017/>. Acesso em: 02 nov. 2022.

OSCE (Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe). **History**. 2023. Disponível em: <https://www.osce.org/history>. Acesso em 20 de janeiro de 2023.

PETERSSON, M. “The Allied Partners”: Sweden and NATO Through the Realist-Idealist Lens. In: **The European Neutrals and NATO – non-alignment, partnership, membership?** Inglaterra: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018. p. 73-96.

PIFER, S. Why care about Ukraine and the Budapest Memorandum. **Brookings**, 5 de dezembro de 2019. Disponível em: <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2019/12/05/why-care-about-ukraine-and-the-budapest-memorandum/>. Acesso em: 02 de junho de 2022.

PRIME MINISTER’S OFFICE. Government adopts report on NATO membership. Prime Minister’s Office of Finland website. Disponível em: <<https://vnk.fi/en/-/government-adopts-report-on-nato-membership>>. Acesso em 12 de junho de 2022.

PUTIN, V. On the Historical Unity of Russian and Ukrainians. 12 de julho de 2021. **Kremlin’s website**. Disponível em: <http://www.en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/66181>. Acesso em 13 de dezembro de 2022.

RUSSIA simulated a large-scale aerial night attack on Sweden. **Business Insider**, 23 abril 2013. Disponível em: <<https://www.businessinsider.com/david-cenciotti-russia-simulated-a-massive-aerial-attack-2013-4>>. Acesso em: 10 de agosto de 2020.

RUSSIA, FINLAND SIGN political treaty. **Washington Post**, 20 de Janeiro de 1992. Disponível em: <https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1992/01/21/russia-finland-sign-political-treaty/84e04ce2-40e9-4b2d-ac5c-843b1174f543/>> Acesso em: 30 de abril de 2022.

SECOND NATO citizens’ initiative reaches required 50k signatures. **Yle News**, 3 de março de 2022. Disponível em: <https://yle.fi/news/3-12341365>. Acesso em: 15 de março de 2022.

SNOW, D. A. et al. Frame Alignment Processes, Micromobilization, and Movement Participation. **American Sociological Review**, v. 51, n. 4, p. 464–481, 1986.

SNOW, D. A.; BENFORD, R. D. Ideology, Frame Resonance, and Participant Mobilization. **International Social Movement Research**, v. 1, n. 1, p. 197–217, 1988.

SNOW, D. A.; BENFORD, R. D. Master Frames and Cycles of Protest. In: MORRIS, A. and MUELLER, C.M. (Org). **Frontiers in Social Movement Theory**. Yale University Press, New Haven, 1992.

TÉTRAULT-FARBER G. & BALMFORTH, T. Russia demands NATO roll back from East Europe and stay out of Ukraine. **Reuters**, 17 de dezembro de 2021. Disponível em: <https://www.reuters.com/world/russia-unveils-security-guarantees-says-western-response-not-encouraging-2021-12-17/>

RUSSIA ISSUES LIST OF DEMANDS AMID TENSIONS WITH EUROPE OVER UKRAINE AND NATO. **The Guardian**, 17 dez. 2021. Disponível em: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/dec/17/russia-issues-list-demands-tensions-europe-ukraine-nato#:~:text=The%20demands%20include%20a%20ban,1997%2C%20before%20an%20eastward%20expansion> . Acesso em: 3 jan. 2022.

THE NORDIC COUNCIL. About the Nordic Council. 2023. Disponível em: <https://www.norden.org/en/information/nordic-council>. Acesso em 12 de janeiro de 2023.

TSYGANKOV, Andrei P. **Russia's foreign policy: change and continuity in national identity**. Rowman & Littlefield, 2014.

VAAHTORANTA, T.; FORSBERG, T. Post-Neutral or Pre-Allied?: Finnish and Swedish Policies on the EU and NATO as Security Organisations. **Upi Working Papers**, v. 29, 2000.

WÆVER, O. L. E. Nordic Nostalgia: Northern Europe after the Cold War. **International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-)**, v. 68, n. 1, p. 77–102, 1992.

YDÉN, K.; BERMDTSSON, J; PETERSSON, M. Sweden and the issue of NATO membership: exploring a public opinion paradox. **Defence Studies**, v. 19, n. 1, p. 1-18, 2019.

YLE POLL: Supports for NATO membership hits record high. **Yle News**, 14 de março de 2022. Disponível em: <https://yle.fi/news/3-12357832>. Acesso em 25 de março de 2022.

ANEXO 1 – DISCURSOS ANALISADOS DURANTE A PESQUISA

Speech by President of the Republic Sauli Niinistö at the opening of the exhibition “Pro Finlandia – Finland’s road to independence” at the National Archives on 2 December 2014

Finland is preparing for the centenary celebrations of its independence. The theme of the jubilee year, in two years’ time, will be an open, learning and pluralistic Finland. These are the values upon which Finland has been built and will continue to be built.

The centenary celebrations of our independence are not only for looking back on the past. This is also an excellent moment to stop and contemplate the significance of our hundred year old independence; what does it mean here today? What does it mean for us Finns; who we are; how Finland is placed within Europe and the world?

For answers, we can look to the present, the past and also the future. We will not find them, however, without the understanding that history provides us of the various phases of Finland’s development.

Today we open the National Archives’ exhibition Pro Finlandia – Finland’s road to independence. This is the first in a series of four exhibitions that will examine the development of Finland’s independence as part of the country’s internationalisation. The first perspective on Finland’s independence is that of France and Italy.

At the end of the 19th century and beginning of the 20th century France, and especially Paris, had become a magnet for artists, researchers and political activists. Here in Finland, and particularly among students, the unification of Italy under the leadership of Giuseppe Garibaldi’s Redshirts was followed with great interest. With such enthusiasm, in fact, that bookshops ran out of Garibaldi photographs, medals and miniatures.

The interest was not one-sided. The general public in France and Italy, and elsewhere in Europe, was also gradually becoming more aware of Finland. Finland’s image was being created through participation in world exhibitions as well as international scientific and art events.

Leading Finnish artists, composers, singers, writers, architects and mathematicians of the time were making Finland known in Europe as well as outside the continent.

Albert Edelfelt, Akseli Gallén-Kallela and Helene Schjerfbeck, for example, worked in France or Italy. Jean Sibelius, Aino Ahté, Juhani Aho, L. Onerva and Eliel Saarinen as well as many, many others also worked in Europe.

By the 19th century Finland had developed into a strong, distinct and autonomous area within the Russian empire. It had its own senate, and its own Parliament and administrative authority, as well as its own legislation established already in the days of Swedish rule. Finland also possessed its own currency, its own stamps, its own national bank, and even a customs border with Russia. The metropolis of St. Petersburg offered economic opportunities, while tax revenues could be retained for the benefit of the Grand Duchy itself. No wonder Finns were reasonably content with their status in relation to Russia until the end of the 19th century.

The Finnish autonomy, which all the tsars of Russia had promised to preserve, was eroded by Russia’s policy of unification, which began in the end of the 19th century. This prompted Finland to launch a campaign in defence of its autonomy. This fight was conducted not only in Finland and Russia but also in various international fora.

Its most well-known manifestation occurred in the spring and early summer of 1899 through the rapid gathering of the Pro Finlandia petition, known as the cultural address. Leading European legal scholars, artists and several political figures demonstrated their support for

Finland. Here, France and Italy were in the forefront – each country also providing a representative to the delegation that submitted the petition to the Russian tsar. The sovereign declined to accept the petition. Nevertheless – and possibly partly because of this – the address sparked widespread attention throughout Europe.

The gathering of the cultural address within such a short space of time would have been impossible without the ties formed by Finns working abroad in the 19th century. In a vital way, they had participated in creating an image of Finland as a modern, economically developed and well educated country.

This recognition and strong image of Finland also formed the basis through which Finland was able to gain rapid acceptance of its status as an independent state in 1917. France recognised Finnish independence immediately on the same day as Russia. Italian recognition followed in 1919 at the Paris Peace Conference. Finland gratefully acknowledged the support it had received.

A country seeking recognition of its independence must possess the economic, judicial and cultural preconditions for acting as a sovereign state among sovereign states. The political and cultural development at the turn of the 20th century, despite the catastrophe of World War I, provided a credible image of Finland's readiness to succeed as an independent state. This credibility was the foundation upon which the independent Finnish state was able to continue its national construction – both internally and in its relations with foreign governments. This is why the message of this exhibition we open today is especially important.

It is my great pleasure to declare the National Archives' exhibition Pro Finlandia – Finland's road to independence opened.

Speech by President of the Republic Sauli Niinistö at the opening of the 211th National Defence Course on 10 November 2014

I wish you a warm welcome to the 211th course. The purpose of the National Defence Course is to provide you with a broad picture of how Finland's security can be maintained in both normal and exceptional circumstances. The course's main message is that responsibility for security involves all of us – the authorities, companies and organisations, you and me. Security means cooperation. The comprehensive defence and security model built in Finland over past decades forms the basis of this idea. It is also a source of strength for us now, at a time when, given the world situation, we once again seem to require strengths of this kind.

We began this year in the knowledge that it would be the one hundredth anniversary of the outbreak of the First World War. However, 2014 also became the year of a new conflict, the Ukraine crisis. We have once again heard the voices of war in Europe. The conflict in Ukraine has already claimed thousands of lives. Hundreds of thousands of people have been forced to leave their homes, at least temporarily.

Why did this shocking conflict arise in the first place? Its source can be traced back to internal events in Ukraine, which saw the country's development severely neglected for years. While internal governance rested on legal foundations, it had become so corrupt and murky that many Ukrainians had simply had enough. In this situation, citizens pinned their hopes for change on the European Union and the association and free trade agreement it offered. The reforms required and the possibilities offered by the agreement seemed to point the way towards, and perhaps represented the only opportunity for, a better future.

However, this development was in powerful contrast to the view taken of the matter by, and the perceived interests of, Ukraine's eastern neighbour, Russia. From Moscow, the prospective

agreement with the EU looked like a step taken towards Europe and its social model and sphere of interest, and therefore seemed against the interests of Russia. So, when Ukraine's development took this turn via the Maidan protests, Russia drew its own conclusions and acted accordingly. We have witnessed, and will continue to witness, the consequences of this.

Naturally, we believe that it is Ukraine and the Ukrainians who can best decide on their own foreign policy and trade issues. The final phase of the Cold War showed that attempts to hold peoples in a certain situation against their will are made in vain. Sooner or later, the dams built to contain popular sentiment will break. However, this is complicated by the fact that such dams are often built within, as well as between, states.

The situation in Ukraine has wider, even systematic, consequences. In the region of Eastern Europe, the territorial situation has become more uncertain. The European security system and its principles with respect to issues such as the peaceful settlement of disputes and respect for the sovereignty and self-determination of other states have sustained serious blows.

Due to the Ukraine crisis, relations between Russia and the West are at their most tense since the Cold War. This new, or to be more precise, new type of Cold War is a serious development which threatens to render our international environment more precarious over the long term. Although this is no longer entirely avoidable, it may still be possible to alleviate the situation to some extent. Since we have nothing to gain from such a situation, it is worth trying to improve it.

* * *

Of course, the impact of the conflict on Europe's security policy environment will also affect us in Finland. The general increase in tension can also be seen in the Baltic region, our neighbouring area. So far, this is more a question of the effects of the crisis rippling out into the Baltic region, rather than of the area becoming unstable itself. However, quite understandably, even this is being viewed as a cause for concern, since an active military presence in our neighbouring region – which was still an everyday fact of life in the 1980s – seemed to have become a thing of the past.

In the midst of various changes, we often hear loud voices urging us to change accordingly. They are also urging us to hurry. In many cases, this is good advice. We need to identify and react to changes – in situations where we have been unable to anticipate them.

While it is important to note changes during the phase in which they occur, our attention should also focus on issues that seem to be remaining constant. Distinguishing what is changing from what is remaining the same, and weighing these up, are key tasks of foreign and security policy. After all, mistakes in this sense can be expensive or, in the worst case scenario, impossible to rectify. Both history, and to some extent current affairs, provide examples of this. Hotheads have a tendency to describe composure as cowardice or evasion of responsibility. However, this is a misrepresentation.

There is a Russian proverb which says: "kazak berjot što ploha ležit" 'A Cossack will take whatever is not fixed to the ground'. It is worth taking heed of this household wisdom, which is doubtless based on experience. We must take care of issues and actively cherish the things we view as important. Failure to do so will have consequences. This is true of all aspects of life, from security to the economy.

We have sought to build Finland's security on a holistic basis. The various elements of our security have included close involvement with international cooperation, as a member of the EU as well as in building separate partnerships with Sweden, the Nordic countries and NATO. Overall security also involves fostering good relations with our neighbours and maintaining a

credible defence, built within the context of the circumstances in which we find ourselves. Of course, our security also includes a broader, worldwide dimension, in which we strive to maintain international justice and meet the challenges facing humanity as a whole, at the level of the UN for example.

Building our security on a holistic basis means maintaining a focus on each element and the balance between them. On the other hand, a security policy based on placing our trust, or ending up placing our trust, in a single dimension or just one trump card or another, would be a step in the wrong direction for us. The more options we have for strengthening our security, the better. It is in Finland's interests to ensure as well as we can that both the individual elements of our security and the balance between them are well maintained. Of course, as situations change, these various elements must be readjusted in order to ensure a well-working whole.

A credible national defence is and will remain one of the cornerstones of our security. The issue is not one of how big a war Finland is capable or incapable of winning; it is much more a question of our defence forming a strong deterrent, under any circumstances, to the possible use of military force or intimidation against us. A military defence must have a firm basis.

The credibility of our national defence too is holistic in nature, being dependent on a number of factors such as intent, military technology and tactics. A balance is required in this sense as well. Willingness without up-to-date equipment will not necessarily suffice. On the other hand, neither will modern materiel without the willingness to defend ourselves. Then again, willingness and equipment may not be enough to retrieve the situation if we rely on poor tactics.

While it is true that we Finns have the will to defend ourselves, the question remains as to whether we have the money. Based on our current expenditure, the economy threatens to become our Achilles heel. Due to economic developments, at one and the same time we are under pressure to cut public expenditure and increase our defence spending. On the other hand, we have developed a far-reaching consensus that we need to secure the defence capabilities of the Defence Forces – and the required development projects.

* * *

The National Defence Course you are about to begin will provide you with a better basis for evaluating the issues involved in ensuring Finland's security and acting accordingly. I know that you are all experts in your own fields. However, the National Defence Course will give you the opportunity to look beyond your own expertise and see the big picture. In this way, that big picture – us – will become more than the sum of its parts.

I wish you all a rewarding National Defence Course.

Speech by President of the Republic of Finland Sauli Niinistö at the Arctic Circle 2014 Opening Session on 31 October 2014 in Reykjavik, Iceland

We like to say that the future of the Arctic is in our hands – for good and for bad. It means we have new opportunities in the North. They are mainly economic – things like new resources, faster transport routes. But it also means we face serious risks. They are mainly – but not only – environmental.

I believe the great task that lies ahead of us is to combine these two factors – opportunities and risks – in a way that is sustainable. Sustainable both for us, the peoples of the region, and for the whole humankind. Fortunately, we still have the time to strike the right balance. We probably have made some mistakes already. But we still have the possibility of avoiding further, perhaps bigger mistakes. And we have those opportunities left.

While discussing the Arctic, special attention should be given to indigenous peoples that have populated the region for thousands of years. They do not only live there, they are part of it. They must have the right to take part in decisions that concern them. The United Nation Member States reaffirmed their support for this core principle at the World Conference on Indigenous Peoples in September.

Nature, environment and climate should always be our starting points as we ourselves cannot exist without suitable conditions. We know that climate change is advancing in the Arctic more rapidly than anywhere else. The rising temperature and the melting ice are directly affecting the four million people who live in the Arctic and call it their home. The effects stretch all the way round the globe. What happens in the Arctic does not stay in the Arctic.

Of course, tackling the climate change is not only a matter for the Arctic region. It is a global challenge that requires serious effort from all countries. And there we need a global response, which we hope to achieve next year at the United Nations Climate Change Conference in Paris. If we succeed, it will be especially important for the Arctic.

Everyone in this room is aware of the special vulnerability of the Arctic nature. It cannot sustain and recover from damage as well as some other neighborhoods of our globe. To put it simply: same mistake, but worse consequences. One should never forget this.

Those of us who use Arctic resources and benefit from the region are mainly responsible for managing other environmental risks in the North. How can we then make sure that we do things in a sustainable way?

I have no easy solution, but I offer a number of principles that should help us. First, high-quality research is a must in the Arctic. Science is a cornerstone. We really have to know what we are doing, what we can do and what we cannot do. So, we have to research, analyze and monitor extra carefully in the North.

Second, not just any technology suits the Arctic area. We need exactly those technological solutions that enable us to tap the potential while avoiding risks. In a word, we need cleantech which is designed also for these conditions.

Third, one cannot operate safely in the North without proper “Arctic know-how”. It is a combination of scientific research, practical experience and right technology. It should not come as surprise when I say that Finland actually has all these three in top shape – research, cleantech and know-how. If you don’t believe me now, you have a chance to learn more about our approach during our country session in the afternoon.

There will be no successful Arctic policies or practices without Arctic co-operation. After the twilight years of the cold war we saw a new kind of international cooperation emerging in the Arctic. On a Finnish initiative the first meeting between ministers of the Arctic countries was held in Rovaniemi in 1991. It was a historic meeting, establishing the idea of the eight Arctic states. The meeting produced the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy and launched the Rovaniemi Process, which then led to the establishment of the Arctic Council.

In two years’ time the Arctic Council will celebrate its 20th anniversary. During those years a lot of work has been done to strengthen the Council. Its evolution as an international forum has been impressive. The institutional role of the Council has grown. I believe its role should continue to grow step-by-step, from a decision-shaping forum towards becoming a decision-making organization.

All of us have recently witnessed dramatic developments in Ukraine. Russia’s actions have damaged international security and co-operation especially in Europe. However, I am convinced that we should keep the North and the Arctic Council on a road towards more – not

less – co-operation. The Arctic Council is the only circumpolar organization that deals with the specific problems of this region. Should its work get paralyzed everybody would lose. We don't want that.

Dear friends, I started by saying that the future of the Arctic is in our hands. I would like to conclude by rearranging the order of the words a bit: our future might be in the hands of the Arctic. Therefore, we must work with it. We must take care of it. Then it can work with us and take care of us as well.

Thank you

Statement by President of the Republic Sauli Niinistö at the UNGA 69th General Debate on 24 September 2014

Let me begin by congratulating you, Mr. President, upon your election as the President of the 69th session of the United Nations General Assembly. I pledge the full support of Finland to your important task.

The events of the past months fill us with sadness. We have entered another grim era of conflicts. What has happened in Ukraine and in Syria and Iraq illustrates this.

The core values and rules the United Nations is based on, have been violated. The crisis in Ukraine has a deep impact on the security of Europe. We have not experienced such breakdown since the tragedy of the Balkan wars. But I want to stress that Ukraine is not only a question limited to Europe.

This should – and eventually will – concern all of us. A rule-based international system is a precondition for peace and security, for human rights and development. If we cease to protect this system, it will cease to protect us. It would be a dramatic and far-reaching mistake to let our rule-based order slip towards chaos and the law of the jungle.

Unfortunately, the UN Security Council has not been able to uphold its responsibilities neither in Ukraine nor in Syria. We need to reform the Security Council. Finland supports the efforts to restrict the use of veto.

I am pleased that the General Assembly adopted the resolution on “Territorial integrity of Ukraine” on 24 March with a clear majority.

Yet the voice of this important body should have been even stronger, condemning Russia's actions and charting a way towards ending violence and restoring peace. When the territorial integrity of a Member State is violated and it loses control over a part of its own area through an illegal annexation, the Member State should be able to turn to the United Nations for justice and remedy.

De-escalation in Ukraine cannot happen without Russia's active steps. Russia should control its border and prevent the flow of arms and fighters, and thereby contribute to stabilization of the situation in Eastern Ukraine. There can be only a political solution to the crisis. We have currently seen steps towards this, but a lot of work remains to be done.

* * *

As the Secretary-General has reminded us, the international community must not abandon the people of Syria. We cannot forget those who have died or those driven from their homes – half of the population in Syria. Three million Syrians have been received as refugees in the neighboring countries.

The Syrian conflict can only be solved by political means. Finland continues to give its full support to the UN's Special Envoy for Syria. Women in Syria, as in other conflict-driven countries, must be included in the peace process. We welcome women's active efforts to strengthen their voices in Syria and everywhere.

The war in Syria has severely affected the security situation in the whole region: the geographical expansion of the ISIL organization, with its horrendous terror, is a by-product of the conflict. This situation has serious consequences locally, regionally and internationally. This challenge must be tackled together through a wide-ranging international co-operation. Finland will contribute to these common efforts.

The international community showed determination last autumn after the chemical attacks in Syria. The OPCW-UN Joint Mission focused on the verification and destruction of Syria's chemical weapons program. Finland has worked alongside the Joint Mission in this demanding operation. We must remain vigilant. In order to fulfill its UN commitments as well as to comply with the CWC (Chemical Weapons Convention), Syria must take further action.

We must show that determination again. I strongly reiterate the appeal to the Security Council to refer the Syrian situation to the International Criminal Court. The ICC must be used when the national justice system is not able to deliver.

* * *

These conflicts unfold at a time, when cooperation and common efforts are more needed than ever. We share the same global challenges like climate change. Ebola is another serious threat. It is critically important to us and our planet that we address them together. Here, I want to express my gratitude to the Secretary-General for his leadership in addressing these challenges.

Intergovernmental negotiations on the post-2015 agenda will commence soon. We should aspire to a new kind of global commitment to fulfill both the needs of the mankind and the planet earth. We owe this to our children and to their children.

To achieve sustainable development we need clear objectives. We need to be able to monitor our commitments in an efficient way. All resources and means should be mobilized.

We can't rely only on traditional resources any more. Public funding for development still is important for the poorest and those affected by conflicts. But at the same time, domestic resource mobilization, innovation, trade and technology and investments must play a stronger role in sustainable development.

Many countries of the global south enjoy a robust economic growth. This provides an opportunity to invest in tax systems, which, in turn, generates public resources for sustainable development. A just tax and redistribution policy is one of the most efficient ways to reduce inequalities and fight marginalization. Rule of law and fight against corruption play a huge role as well.

I trust the Secretary-General to be both visionary and concrete when setting the scene for the intergovernmental negotiations. This process will culminate next year in this very hall. The best way to celebrate the 70th anniversary of the United Nations next year is to adopt transformative commitments that set us on a path towards sustainable development.

* * *

I started by describing the grim state of international relations. My analysis is not an excuse for inaction, but a call to redouble our diplomatic efforts. We must act with determination and we must act now. Finland will support efforts to restore peace and prevent further damage to our

rule-based international system. We must also aim high – in addressing together the broader global challenges of climate change and sustainable development

Speech by President of the Republic Sauli Niinistö at the ambassador seminar on 26 August 2014

Your Excellencies, ladies and gentlemen,

exactly 100 years ago, in late summer 1914, Europe suddenly found itself plunged into a major war. Diplomacy was unable to prevent the war or stop the crisis from escalating. First there was bluster then there was destruction. And it did not even stop at one world war.

We would do well to remember that course of events as we contemplate today's world and Finland's foreign policy. The ancient, ultimate issues in security policy never really went away. The Ukrainian crisis is a savage reminder that security – even the security of entire nations – should. In 1938, Finnish poet Yrjö Jylhä wrote: "Fire in the east, smoke blows our way," anticipating future developments.

Now the smoke is blowing our way from eastern Ukraine. While the conflict is a regional one, it has implications for all of Europe and for international politics as a whole. It also has implications for us. never be taken for granted or considered axiomatic. Not even in Europe.

The causes and consequences of this crisis will be debated for a long time to come. What is important right now is to contain and put out this fire. Then, further down the road, we must rebuild the security that has been lost. To consider what would be the alternative to such a development makes one pause for thought.

Finland's position regarding the events in Ukraine has been clear ever since the beginning of the crisis. We condemn any and all violations of the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Ukraine. We have been involved in setting up sanctions imposed by the EU on Russia. We cannot excuse ourselves from responsibility regarding the principles employed in resolving conflicts in Europe. We can also not just look to our own narrow interests when our common values are trespassed upon.

We are part of the West and share the Western value base. However, our foreign policy cannot consist solely of declaring our opinions and principles to all and sundry. We also need to think about what practical measures we want to and can undertake. And then we need to try to undertake them.

It is clear to me that it is vital to keep communication channels open between different parties. That, after all, is what diplomacy is all about. And diplomacy is essential for understanding the views and actions of the parties involved in a crisis, which in turn is vital for achieving any steps towards a peaceful solution. This is essentially why I went to Russia and Ukraine the week before last. Of course, we are not in this alone but act as part of a larger entity. Our actions support the broader international effort to resolve this conflict.

We now have a better picture of the views and thinking of both Russia and Ukraine. There is potential for defusing the crisis, but that in itself does not guarantee anything, and indeed the situation might get worse. The process is extremely vulnerable, as recent events demonstrate. But once official talks are established, as was done in Berlin a week ago and will be done today in Minsk, the first step will have been taken. But we need to re-examine the situation after the Minsk summit.

It is important to note that we cannot isolate the Ukrainian crisis from its broader context, by which I mean the relationship between Russia and the West. That relationship too has fallen

into a spiral of mistrust and opposition. The Ukrainian conflict is thus both a cause and a consequence of this broader crisis. The diplomatic challenge is about more than just Ukraine, and it is not enough just to discuss concrete measures; we must also bring up issues of principle. Resolving the conflict is thus a difficult process for the EU too.

Since March, we have heard any number of opinions and guesses about what Russia is up to. We have heard conclusions and recommendations for swift action, often presented in very confident tones.

However, I believe that we have only seen the beginning of an in-depth international discussion of the gulf that has appeared between the West and Russia. We do not know how the Ukrainian crisis will develop. We need to think long and hard, not forgetting self-criticism. And we should also pay attention to those who warn against plunging into a new Cold War as a knee-jerk reaction, without consideration for what happens next. Falling into a hole is easy. Getting back up again is much more difficult.

It is through this broader picture – the opposition between Russia and the EU and uncertainty in security policy – that the Ukrainian crisis has implications for Finland. Therefore our response must also be broader. As a Member State of the EU, we must above all attempt to facilitate a comprehensive response on the part of the EU towards resolving the crisis and curbing its knock-on effects.

Finland faces no military threats. Our neighbouring regions are stable. Finland is also not a security vacuum, and we cannot afford to become one. We are managing this both nationally and internationally.

The Ukrainian conflict has prompted concern and discussion in many countries concerning the sufficiency of their national defence policies. The pressures are undoubtedly greatest on those countries that have not maintained their national defence well. Finland is not among them. We have never fully excluded the possibility of the deployment of military power in Europe, and therefore we have continued to maintain a credible national defence instead of focusing on crisis management.

We must continue to maintain a credible national defence. The Finnish Defence Forces have implemented significant cost-cutting and efficiency measures, but we have now come to the point where less is no longer more. We need to increase our defence spending in the future so that we can allow for our immediate further needs and long-term challenges.

This is not just a question of money. With hybrid warfare, we are facing a substantial change in military operations. The boundary between actual war and other exercise of power is becoming blurred. Means of cyber war and information war are becoming increasingly important. It is now possible to fight a war without actually being at war. At the same time, conflict escalation is setting new speed records, as we saw for instance in the Crimea.

This places new pressures on preparedness measures that rely on traditional threat scenarios. Finland is not too poorly off in this respect, because we focus on a strong comprehensive security approach and close cooperation between the various authorities. However, we too need to reappraise our national defence according to the spirit of the times, in terms of both capability and readiness.

It is understandable that as security policy stability is compromised in Europe, public debate on military cooperation and alliances grows in Finland. This is a welcome debate, and we engaged in it at the Kultaranta talks in the summer.

I said to this very gathering one year ago that we cannot outsource Finland's national defence. If we do not wish to take the responsibility, we can hardly expect anyone else to do so. On the

other hand, it is neither possible to create a credible ‘hermit defence’ model. Modern technology alone prevents such isolationism. International cooperation and building a network to support that cooperation is a natural approach for modern national defence solutions.

The Government and I have decided to launch the drafting of an overall review of security policy cooperation. This will be a broad assessment of various dimensions of cooperation, including the EU Security and Defence Policy, NATO, Nordic defence cooperation (Nordefco) and bilateral relations for instance with Sweden and the USA. The review will assess our cooperation networks across the board.

It will thus not be a NATO report as such. Our cooperation with NATO will progress with or without that report. Sweden and Finland are updating their NATO partnerships in keeping with the requirements of today, and I am hoping that this will be confirmed at the NATO summit in Wales next week. NATO itself is facing pressures towards change, with focus shifting towards territorial defence. Our forthcoming review may include an estimate of where NATO is going.

We will continue to keep military alliance through membership of NATO as an option in our security policy. In this debate, it is useful to remember the big picture, including the lessons taught by the harsh teacher known as history regarding the undercurrents of security policy and the policies of the great powers in particular. The issue of NATO membership cannot be evaluated just by tallying pros and cons on a spreadsheet. We can also not just look at legal details and rules; after all, NATO is not a district court.

The Common Security and Defence Policy of the EU has not developed as we would have liked. There are many reasons for this. But we have not lost hope. The political commitment is there. Mutual assistance and solidarity has been provided for through legislation. In the near future, investments will be made in crisis management, capacity and defence materiel cooperation. This is a platform that we, of all people, have no cause to belittle. On the contrary, we should be advocating and contributing to new forms of cooperation.

I consider it obvious that in the long term Europe must take a completely different approach to security matters. There are already growing pressures towards this, if only because there are also fires burning to the south of the EU, not just to the east. The turmoil in northern Africa and the Middle East that followed the Arab Spring is a phenomenon whose dimensions and impact on Europe are not yet clear. Its significance is certainly no smaller than that of Ukraine, quite the contrary, as I believe the Minister for Foreign Affairs said here yesterday. Europe is thus facing a tough challenge exacerbated by the concern for internal security. We must respond to this with closer cooperation and more investments.

Dear friends, in these days the Finnish foreign affairs administration – all of us – strive to do our best to function in an era that is very different from the one to which we had already become accustomed to. I have found that you have responded to these challenges with subtlety, sacrifices and efficiency. Particular thanks are due to those employees in the foreign affairs administration who have performed admirably in tough spots and under pressure.

Thank you!

**Speech by President of the Republic Sauli Niinistö to the new Government on 24 June
2014**

Esteemed Prime Minister, distinguished Members of Government,

In the election of the Prime Minister, Parliament has placed its confidence in you. I congratulate you on your election. With you as its leader, today is the first day in office of the 73rd Government of independent Finland.

Your Government inherits its foundation from its predecessor, but what it inherits most of all is a great deal of work. The much-debated and repeatedly ‘decided’ structural reforms must now be settled and implemented for good. Demanding times lie ahead of you.

Demanding times are also an opportunity. They are an opportunity for all of us to show that this nation can still override hardships, even those thrown at us by the outside world.

Let’s show them!

This is also an opportunity for the Government to prove its worth. There was talk of a ‘mini government programme’. This Government will also have a ‘mini’ term of office, but that doesn’t rule out our having a ‘maxi’ Government.

Show us!

In my speech to your predecessor I spoke about the problem with forecasts: they too easily lead to “quarterly” politics where immediate gains are chosen over solutions to future challenges. We Finns have the sense to appreciate decisions that seem painful at the time as long as you know the gain will follow later.

We place a lot of focus on how our actions appear from the outside. What we should now focus on is what our actions lead to, for we live in troubled times.

The severe crisis in Ukraine continues. Finding solutions and providing support are now the most important priorities. At the same time, we must also assess what all of this means – and what it does not mean – for Finland.

One conclusion is obvious. We must take care of our own defence capability. This requires investment, perhaps greater than we have so far discussed.

There is another equally obvious conclusion to make: it is important to develop international cooperation on security policy and defence. This is our common duty. At the Kultaranta talks it was proposed that we assess the various sectors of our international security cooperation. This is an issue we can revisit at the meeting between the President of the Republic and the Cabinet Committee on Foreign and Security Policy.

Our country now needs confidence and courage. Decision-makers are expected to secure the setting for everyday life. A permanent vote of confidence is needed on this. Decision-makers are also expected to leave room for creativity and to understand both success and failure. Encouragement is needed, even if this means encouragement to do things differently.

I would like to wish the Government and its members courage and a sense of responsibility in your work for the good of Finland! So – show us!

Speech by President of the Republic Sauli Niinistö to the outgoing Government on 24 June 2014

Esteemed Member of Parliament Katainen,

Thank you for your kind words. I would like to thank you and the Members of your Government for our cooperation of more than two years.

Before your term as Prime Minister, you served as Minister of Finance for one electoral term. During your years as minister you faced ‘seven thin years’, and the economy has still to return

to the level of 2007. Time and again we found ourselves discovering that, no matter how good they sound, we cannot put our faith in positive economic forecasts.

The Government that was formed after the previous parliamentary elections was a broad-based one, and had to spend a long time in finding a common vision. Ministers were reshuffled and portfolios revised. Close to the end of its term, the sextet was replaced by a quintet. Through all of this, you as Prime Minister aimed to instil confidence in the actions of the Government.

With your Government having survived altogether seventeen votes of confidence, you have now decided to leave your post as prime minister.

Your term of office was characterised by economic issues and the global financial crisis, the impacts of which were impossible to avoid in Finland and in Europe. Quite rightly, your aim was to balance the national economy and to stimulate growth. Following Governments will need to set these same objectives.

In EU politics the plot, stage and set have constantly changed. Finland's role, too, has changed: while still remaining faithful to the curriculum, the model student has been questioning the model.

The Ukrainian crisis has rocked Europe's sense of security, and continues to do so. Our own security policy thinking is based on continuity and anticipation, including the anticipation of poor alternatives, as in the latest Security and Defence Policy Report. This has been the correct policy.

Cooperation between the Government and the President has been smooth, also on the basis of the latest additions to the Constitution. However, we have perhaps had to share the experience of there being no need for further additions, at least not ones in the same direction. During the spring we witnessed how the importance of cooperation gains particular emphasis during crises, with the same issues being handled both within the EU and in other connections.

Esteemed Member of Parliament Katainen, I would like to thank you and the Ministers of your Government for the work you have done. I wish you success and good fortune in your future duties

Speech by President of the Republic Sauli Niinistö at a dinner for the diplomatic corps at Helsinki City Hall, on 29 April 2014

This is the third occasion on which I have had the opportunity to address this esteemed audience. Third time's the charm, they say! And I am indeed charmed by the active approach you have taken to your diplomatic work in Helsinki. Diplomatic relations retain their value, as recent events have reminded us. Diplomacy is based on human interaction: discussion and listening, and constructive interchanges. Helsinki's diplomatic community is very strong in this sense and it is always a great pleasure to discuss with you.

Of course, the recent events to which I just referred concern the Ukraine crisis. This crisis and – I believe we must say it openly – Russia's actions in particular, have rapidly subjected Europe's security system to intense pressure and damage.

One must admit that the outlook is grim. Familiar, established collective security mechanisms failed to prevent the outbreak and escalation of this crisis. In addition, attempts to return the crisis to where crises belong – the negotiating table – have yet to meet with genuine success. Instead, the crisis continues and is characterised by new, very unpleasant developments such as disappearances, even murders and the seizure of OSCE observers.

The international community now faces a serious challenge in Europe. Further escalation of the Ukraine crisis must be avoided and the matter must be resolved through effective negotiations. This forms the basis of EU and, of course, Finnish policy on the issue.

Should this succeed, at best the effects of the crisis on European security may remain limited: serious, but limited. In time, this would also enable the rebuilding of lost security and the creation of stronger mutual reassurance. I simply cannot believe that this would not be the best and most enduring solution for all European states and their citizens.

In any case, we stand before a major decision: do we control the crisis or allow it to control us? I would emphasise that, if the crisis continues to escalate and the situation deteriorates, the second alternative unavoidably comes closer – the path to open conflict and deep instability. No one should imagine that they can control such a development and its implications.

The outcome of the Ukraine crisis will be a measure of the wisdom and maturity of the states and the people involved. Both genuine dialogue and a sincere attempt to resolve the crisis are needed, sooner rather than later.

* * *

There are also reasons of wider-ranging significance for resolving the Ukraine crisis and preserving the European security system. For one thing, we simply cannot afford to turn our gaze inwards in solving or repeating the problems of the last century, as it were. For we are faced with new issues belonging to this century.

We can rest assured that global economic, technological and climate change will not pause to await a solution to this particular crisis. Such broader transformations will continue and require more from all of us. This is not only a question of the concentration of economic might and populations in emerging economies and new continents. It is about the capacity of our entire planet – our living environment – to withstand the impact of environmental and demographic factors. It is also about the internal cohesion of our societies, at a time when work is being redistributed by a technological and robotic revolution.

By the same token, it is clear to me that the challenges facing nations and humanity as a whole cannot be met through zero-sum games or isolationism. An economy capable of networking and taking its place in the international division of work is the only path to achieving lasting prosperity and success as a nation. We have no alternative but to seek openness and mutually sustainable solutions. None of us are exempt from these laws, however tempting other options may seem in some places.

In sum, we need to be able to handle acute crises such as the one unfolding in Ukraine; both for the sake of the crisis itself, and because bigger, longer-term issues require the international community's close attention. We cannot afford to forget the big picture. We are all part of it.

Finally, last year I promised you a briefing on the Kultaranta talks. I am well aware that you have been briefed about the proceedings on numerous occasions. I would like to revisit the topic simply by stating that the famous comment – that Finns have the ability to remain silent in several languages – is not true. Indeed, we plan to continue the conversation in June, with another session of talks in Naantali. As we have seen, the world does not stand still and I see no reason why the Finnish debate on foreign and security policy should stand idle.

Dear friends, now I am painfully aware that your cutlery has now been idle for far too long. Please therefore allow me this opportunity to thank you all for a very fruitful year of co-operation. I, my office and the Ministry for Foreign Affairs look forward to continuing this excellent tradition in the future.

Thank you!

Speech by President of the Republic of Finland Sauli Niinistö at the dinner on the occasion of the state visit by President of the Swiss Confederation Didier Burkhalter, 7 April 2014

It is a great pleasure for me and my spouse to welcome you to a state visit in Finland. For us this is a great opportunity to continue our discussion which we started last October. Our trip to beautiful Switzerland was one of the highlights of last year. In my turn, I'll try to make this visit as pleasant as I can for you. So I'll be brief!

On a more serious note, a lot has happened since we last met. Europe is facing challenges that many thought belong to the past century. In Ukraine, Euromaidan led to a government change. The country is in crisis after the Russian annexation of Crimea. It is clearly against Ukrainian and international law. It is also in breach of Russian commitments in front of the international community. In order to prevent further escalation of the crisis diplomacy and dialogue between all parties involved are very much needed.

Mr. President, during these difficult times you as Chairman in Office of the OSCE, have taken a leading role. You have shown what can be achieved through continued dialogue. I want to assure to you that Finland supports and highly appreciates your work. The decision on the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission in Ukraine was a welcome step forward in de-escalation of the situation. Without your determined efforts, I doubt this could have taken.

As your commitment to European security has once again proved, Switzerland is an inseparable part of Europe. Europe needs Switzerland. Not only as a broker but also as a partner. The EU has a closer relationship with Switzerland than with any other country outside the European Economic Area. Switzerland is the EU's 4th largest trading partner, and the EU is Switzerland's largest trading partner. Half a million Swiss citizens live in the EU and twice as many EU citizens in Switzerland. Switzerland's economic success and stability is an example to us in the EU.

Let me now turn to our bilateral relations, which are visibly strengthening. They are a subject of great potential and promise. Switzerland and Finland are both ranked as innovation leaders. I would like to encourage Finnish and Swiss research entities to continue looking at cooperation possibilities in this area. It is also my sincere wish that Finnish know-how in clean-tech, energy, health and information technology would attract more Swiss investment. Some partnerships are already at hand. I would like to see that the potential could be harnessed effectively.

Mr. President, Mrs. Burkhalter, I would like to once more warmly thank you for coming to Finland. It is always nice to be among old friends.

Ladies and gentlemen, I would like to raise a toast in honor of the President of the Swiss Confederation and Mrs Burkhalter, and to the Swiss-Finnish partnership.

Speech by President of the Republic Sauli Niinistö at the opening of Parliament on 4 February 2014

The Arab Spring, Syria, and now Ukraine – several factors are common to these events. Governments considered even to be strong have come face to face with an opposition whose nature and quality differs from one country to the next. However, the starting points have been almost identical everywhere. The people have had too much to bear and have come to

understand more; they have lost trust in their rulers – if there ever was any – while their confidence has grown in the legitimacy of their cause.

This has had immediate consequences. What was considered inevitable and eternal a month, a week or even a day earlier, has suddenly become questionable. What the eventual outcome of the current decade's uprisings will be, we do not yet know. Unfortunately, these events also share the phenomenon of extremist elements striving to take advantage of instability wherever it appears.

It is not difficult to identify the sources of this dissatisfaction. There is no such thing as enlightened despotism. When power is used without democracy, the result is always arbitrary rule. This means that the same rules are not consistently applied to all; room is left for inequality, predatory behaviour, concealment of ill-gotten gains and, finally, the erosion of any sense of justice.

We, the European supporters of Western traditions, are closely following these events and are supportive of the associated movements in so far as they are expressions of freedom. But are we aware of all aspects of the new era?

A recently published study claims that the 85 richest people in the world own as much as the poorest 3.5 billion. In other words, the ratio is 1: 40,000,000. No world map has the scale necessary to illustrate this gulf between people's lives. I do not believe that such a disparity in quality of life will be tolerated for much longer; more uprisings are in prospect. For the moment, the world is far from having achieved its final form.

Neither has Europe. The economic crisis has posed challenges to even the traditional democracies. Strict savings measures – necessary as they are – have been hard on the public, particularly in Southern Europe. But we must learn, even under duress; a nation can pass through hard times by borrowing, but it must wean itself off credit sooner or later.

In Finland, the scale of the issues in question is utterly different: Lutheran modesty is a virtue which we wish to retain. Here, too, the income gap has been increasing, even if the recession has diminished it somewhat as incomes in general have fallen. We should therefore remember that losses in income hit those hardest who have to compromise on the necessities.

* * *

I will now return to a subject on which I have spoken to you before. In Finland, we must strive to preserve our social stability. At the moment, we have a general consensus that Finland cannot rest on a foundation of growing indebtedness. In other words, a major task lies before the present government and Parliament. Balancing the public sector so as to maintain basic confidence in the economy and future will be challenging.

Some years ago, a young parliamentary candidate addressed decision-makers with a slogan: "We are willing to pay either your debt or your pensions, but not both." He was not elected. Unfortunately.

* * *

During the last year, even in Finland, various incidents in both the private and public sectors have aroused disapproval and distrust. In most cases, relatively small errors of judgement, with only a minor effect on the overall picture, have been in question. However, even minor misdemeanours are revealing and soon become talking points, particularly if they are indicative of arrogance, or total disregard for moderation and a sense of fairness.

It is a time-honoured saying that one should lead from the front. In other words, set a good example! I would second this idea. If leaders do not set a good example, it is unreasonable to

expect others to behave well. Due to the economic crisis, good governance has become a topic of debate – here I am not necessarily referring to the social and health sector reform or municipal reform. Rather, I refer to the general line taken on the economy and public sector activities, encompassing everything from practical ethics to efficiency. There is certainly room for improvement on all points of the scale. We should move on from debating the issue to action directed towards putting sound administrative principles into practice.

* * *

Finland is the promised land of volunteer activity. According to one estimate, some 1.35 million Finns are acting on behalf of a cause they consider important. In international comparisons, Finns are also considered a generous people. We bear much good will.

However, people have expressed the concern – sometimes in fervent terms – that volunteer activity and public service are somehow mutually exclusive. This cannot be the case.

I do not believe that a single volunteer wishes to assume the tasks now performed by the public sector. It is similarly difficult to conceive of the public sector crowding out voluntary societies and charitable organisations. Both have enough to do as it is.

The question might be about money. So let us talk about that. I do not believe that tax rates have ever been, or ever will be, reduced simply because people engage in voluntary, charitable donations as well as paying taxes. I am also doubtful that we could capture such donations for the common pot by raising taxes. The cost of a donation lies where they fall.

The Children's hospital is another matter. While the public sector did not view the hospital as its most urgent project, many private citizens felt differently and an initiative was launched. This is progressing alongside very strong public investment in the hospital. We can be certain that this is an excellent way forward and I wish this fine project the greatest of success.

However, it has given rise to a more general debate on where the line should be drawn. In addition to finances and emotions, we should also discuss continuity and long-term commitment, guaranteed by public sector involvement. It is also difficult to envisage that functions now arranged under a legal obligation could be left to volunteer activity or generosity alone. We should examine where the line should be drawn, although numerous examples already exist of smooth co-operation between municipalities and voluntary organisations.

* * *

In both Finland and Sweden, national security and defence policy are widely debated issues. In Sweden, defence has become a focus of attention in a manner unheard of there for decades.

Earlier this year, at the traditional security policy meeting held in Sälen, Sweden, Finland weighed strongly in Swedish considerations. The spirit of Sälen – as we might refer to it – contained a clear message. Our security and defence policy interests are largely shared and we have a strong intent to promote these together.

Such co-operation is conducted on multiple-levels. We will develop bilateral co-operation on defence and broader security issues. The defence ministers of the respective countries will proceed step by step in examining new areas of co-operation. Under the auspices of NORDEFECO, we will engage in Nordic cooperation along the lines laid down during the Finnish Presidency of this framework.

Finland and Sweden have a similar position and ideas concerning EU security co-operation and the development of the NATO partnership. It is therefore good that we keep each other well informed and strive to agree on a common policy line.

All of this formed part of the spirit of Sälen .

No defence co-operation can replace national defence, nor is it intended to. However, through co-operation national defence will become stronger. The national and the international aspects are mutually supportive.

During its previous session, Parliament adopted the Security and Defence Policy Report. It is good that there is a monitoring group in The Parliament. It ensures the continuity of debate on the issue until the next general election. Especially important will be the group's views on the impacts of various resource levels on credible defence.

Our security environment has changed. A new dimension has been added: cyber security. Our key functions are more and more dependent on information technology and data networks. Cyber influence forms a part of the picture of future conflicts separately or alongside other ways of applying pressure or using force. While the cyber dimension is not pervasive, it is present.

We still have much to do in this respect. We need new legislation. We need to put strategies into practice. All this must be implemented without violating fundamental rights or the protection of privacy. It would be beneficial if Parliament monitored this matter closely.

* * *

Today, you are beginning the last session of Parliament during the current electoral term. The Parliament's final, busy year lies ahead of you. I would like to thank you for the smooth co-operation between us thus far. I believe that it will remain equally close over the coming months.

I would like to congratulate the Speakers of the Parliament for the continued support they have received and wish every one of you the greatest success, as well as wisdom in your demanding work.

I hereby declare the 2014 session of Parliament open.

Speech by President of the Republic Sauli Niinistö at the Rikskonferens Seminar in Sälen on 12 January 2014

It is a great honour to attend the Sälen conference for the first time. I would like to convey my warm thanks to Folk och Försvar for its invitation. I should also confess that I have copied the conference concept for my own 'Kultaranta talks'. On the other hand, for my version I chose a summer schedule in order to avoid a clash with this event. Traditional sporting rivalries should be set aside when engaging in foreign and security policy.

I have come to Sälen from the east, but not from very far off. Finland's former capital city of Turku is closer to Stockholm than Sälen. Then again, the distance from Sälen to Turku is the same as that from Sälen to Umeå or Kalmar.

We are therefore close neighbours, and not just geographically. Perhaps this matters now more than in many decades. It is therefore important that we ponder matters together. I would like to give you my views on the kind of international political environment in which we now live. In addition, I will discuss a country which is even further to the east from Sälen, Russia. I will conclude by sharing a few thoughts on defence cooperation between Finland and Sweden.

* * *

This year will see the one hundredth anniversary of the outbreak of the First World War, a massive conflict which claimed millions of lives. It heralded a long-standing period of hostility and tension in Europe.

However, it also destroyed the European empires – Russia, Germany and Austria-Hungary. This presented many small nations, like Finland, with a "window of opportunity". Independence was achieved amidst the general tumult, representing a dramatic turning point in Finland's history. It brought great change – for the better – from Sweden's perspective also.

I recently read Carl Bildt's Christmas speech, "Sveriges säkerhetspolitik". In this speech, he spoke of a set of paradigm shifts in Sweden's international position. This brought it home to me that we have been undergoing the same shifts. First of all, there is the fact that we were once a single nation. Our separation in 1809 was another paradigm shift, for both countries. The next watershed came with the end of the First World War.

Finally, our paths converged at the end of the Cold War, when we simultaneously joined the EU. Our traditional neutrality was now no longer an option.

What does history therefore teach us? It teaches that we are together – even when we are apart. By this, I mean that our security and wellbeing are tightly bound to events in Europe. We therefore have a vital – and joint – interest in influencing matters at European level, in a favourable direction.

And where are we now headed? Despite the challenges involved, I feel that the last couple of decades have been a golden age for Finland and Sweden. Our neighbouring regions stabilised and became more secure, when the Baltic countries became independent and joined the European Union and NATO. We enjoyed rapid development and growth. Although, in the midst of our daily struggles, we perhaps failed fully to appreciate this period, it felt good at the time.

However, we have now entered a new age, for which it is difficult to find an apt name. But we can say that several major forces of change and development are in motion. Powerful new possibilities are emerging. These are accompanied by new – and some fairly old – concerns. There is greater uncertainty and turbulence. Both louder and quieter alarm clocks are ringing. But their message is the same: it is time to spring to our feet.

The key issue for us is the direction taken by Europe. The European Union now faces serious questions. Its economy has been much discussed. While light is appearing at the end of the tunnel, uncertainty still predominates. We have seen North-South and East-West divides, but will we see a common vision on whose basis Europe can move forward? Might security represent a basic interest of this kind, common to all?

We must find honest, and thereby sustainable, answers to these questions. The discussion must be open and honest. For example, what should we say about the euro: is collective responsibility a form of solidarity, or does it consist of handling issues ourselves without palming off our obligations onto others?

The world outside Europe is also in the throes of change. While there is nothing new in the growth of Asia's economic might, tensions related to security policy in the region are also emerging. New, potentially high-risk issues have emerged on top of the former ones.

The United States is clearly taking a growing interest in Asia. It would be amazing and anomalous if it did not. However, from our point of view this means that more work will be required in order to ensure that the US remains committed to Europe. The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) is therefore a strategic issue for Europe.

A strong transatlantic connection for Europe is of vital importance to Finland and Sweden. I would again like to thank Prime Minister Reinfeldt in this regard. During the recent visit by President Obama, hosted by Prime Minister Reinfeldt, all of the Nordic countries were highlighted as a single actor. I believe that Sweden's guest also viewed matters in this way. A

clearly growing trend can be seen, based on which effective groupings of countries are growing in international importance. The Nordic countries are just such a grouping.

The great global challenges – population growth and climate change – remain. We have had only a small foretaste of the problems these phenomena will pose. For example, the world's grain production will have to grow by 50 per cent in order to feed the nine billion people who will be living on the planet by 2050. What if grain production does not grow?

Finland and Sweden may feel somewhat distant from these issues: slightly on the margins and therefore safe. But this is an illusion. Before long, the pressure will grow on precisely those regions which are viewed as having shouldered less of the burden than others. We must give thought to these major questions together.

We should also acknowledge that security policy – including the traditional version – has not become extinct. On the contrary, it is showing clear signs of life also in Northern Europe. Somewhat surprisingly, old questions and emphases have re-emerged. We cannot confine our focus to the new challenges. However, we should also beware of immersing ourselves in a world of threat scenarios. We should be continuously oriented towards securing and reactivating cooperation.

No matter what the circumstances, defence in its current form is something that we must attend to. No one will do this for us. And defence has become ever more expensive. Uncertainty is also growing in this regard. We do not know what kinds of technical solutions are looming on the horizon. New and surprising phenomena may be on their way.

We are therefore living in an era of multiplying threats. Cyber security is a good example of this. Serious questions are coming to the fore, in more areas than just intelligence and information security. Will the presence of cyberweapons lower the threshold for shifting from diplomatic means towards pressuring other countries? A new dimension has now appeared somewhere between diplomacy and conflict, in which the culprits may not even be caught.

The cyber threat is accompanied by a change in the nature of and need for defence preparations. Finland has cyber security capabilities. But we also have a great deal to do at home.

And what about the progress made in the human rights, rule of law and freedom of speech that we so cherish? During the 1990s, we took it for granted that these would spread ever further afield. This is not how things turned out. Authoritarian countries are building alternatives which are achieving results, particularly in terms of economic development. We are being obliged to rethink, more critically, how best to promote our values. Hitting the Repeat or Volume button will not be enough: a fact which we have been unable to ignore.

* * *

When I referred to the joint paradigm shifts experienced by Finland and Sweden, I left one watershed unmentioned. This concerned Finland and happened in 1944, 70 years ago. Then, Finland managed to preserve its independence and the Nordic social system. At the same time our country rebuilt its relationships with the East on a new basis. If the Red Army had not been brought to a standstill in Karelia and the River Tornio had become the new border between the Soviet Union and the West, would this have marked another turning point in Sweden's security policy?

In the aftermath of the Cold War it was believed that Russia would return to somewhere it had never been – Western democracy. The realisation that this journey is more winding and longer than thought, if not unending, has been greeted with sore disappointment in some quarters.

We can scarcely understand how the 1990s felt to Russians. For us, it meant the rise of integration and a brave new world. But to many Russians they were years of crisis and humiliation. While the country was liberated and transformed, it also became less stable. These difficult years left a deep impression on the minds of many Russians.

Russia has aimed to overcome its own crisis of transition and return to the international stage as a powerful player. It should be no surprise that Russia has resumed its traditional strong state policy. Natural resources and their favourable price trends have provided the economic basis for this transition.

Russia has partially succeeded in achieving these aims. There has been a substantial rise in the living standards of its people. In addition, the Internet and travel have given Russians incalculably broader connections with the outside world than during the Soviet era. The only invasion of Finland since 1944 has been the influx of Russian tourists.

Russia has also strengthened its role internationally. Syria is an illustration of this. The aim of creating a Eurasian Union speaks volumes about Russia's aims.

Russia is modernising its armed forces: something which has been a long-term objective. We must pay close attention to this transformation, while taking a broad perspective. What are the true capabilities of Russia's armed forces? And what about the efficiency of its arms industry? We must also bear Russia's size in mind. Its borderline is almost 61,000 kilometres long. Russia's furthest point from Sälen is around 9,000 kilometres east from here.

Both the country's domestic policy and its actions abroad have raised concerns and some justified criticism in Europe. A focus on conservative values in Russia – and perhaps movement in the opposite direction in the West – has begun to open up a clearer mental gulf between the two regions. This has been exacerbated by the nature of Russia's foreign policy. Concerns about this are justified.

However, the future remains open. Russia too faces strong pressure to change and a major need for reform. For Russia, Europe remains the key partner, and perhaps the one with the most potential. However, we cannot regard the current state of cooperation as satisfactory. We need to return to a path with Russia along which mutual security and trust are built. In this regard, it would be important to take concrete steps, even small ones. Northern Europe has the structures for achieving this: the Council of Baltic Sea States (the CBSS), the Northern Dimension, Barents Cooperation and Arctic Cooperation.

* * *

Next year will mark the twentieth anniversary of Finland and Sweden's EU membership. During these years, we have been "in the same boat – almost" as the final book by Krister Wahlbäck, who passed away last year, puts it. We have had a mutual interest in promoting a more effective EU and will continue to do so. One aim is a stronger EU security policy.

An active NATO partnership is important to both Finland and Sweden. We also have good reason to engage in close cooperation in developing our partnership with NATO. For Finland this forms part of our cooperative security. Although membership of NATO remains a possible solution, we have no plans to seek membership. Finland must ensure that a credible defence for the entire country is in place. Compulsory military service will remain at the core of Finland's defence system

In recent years we have also built defence cooperation in the Nordic region. Nordic Defence Cooperation (NORDEFECO) has made rapid ground. Sweden's and Finland's joint participation in exercises related to Iceland's air surveillance in the spring is one hallmark of this. We have also laid down the broad lines along which NORDEFECO will develop over the next few years.

Among other aims, the objective is closer cooperation over air and maritime surveillance, smoother cooperation during exercises and better rapid reaction capabilities within the framework of the EU and NATO. Nordic cooperation often brings added value to crisis management operations. The most recent example of this is our contribution to the destruction of Syria's chemical weapons.

There are also limits to Nordic defence cooperation. NORDEFECO is too large a framework for some issues, and too small for others. Some members are not part of the EU, while we are not part of NATO. NORDEFECO requires a flexible and creative approach. But we must also be honest in acknowledging that the divergent basic defence solutions employed by the Nordic countries set limits on cooperation.

These issues leave room for the development of bilateral defence cooperation between Finland and Sweden. There are also other reasons for such cooperation. Hard economic realities will continue to loom large in the future. We need to be open-minded about whether it would be more rational to act alone or together. So far, the results have been good, whether for cooperation over naval and air force training and exercises, or in actions taken to improve situational awareness.

I believe that we would be justified in joining forces to consider and plan the further strengthening of our cooperation. For example, a range of possibilities lie in closer cooperation on defence materiel and capabilities. A major issue relates to how we can better coordinate our defence materiel purchases in either country. Closer cooperation would require that Sweden and Finland take account of one another at the earliest possible stage.

Defence industry cooperation deserves a separate mention. Closer cooperation in this sense would improve our security of supplies, which is of major significance to non-aligned countries such as Finland and Sweden.

In my view, we therefore have the room and the opportunity to take a step forward in our mutual defence cooperation. However, there is no call or need to leap in any direction.

Even if we are not on the same line on every single issue, Finland and Sweden are certainly on the same page in terms of our international policy. This is the view taken of us elsewhere. It is also how we should see ourselves. Thank you!

President of the Republic Sauli Niinistö's New Year's Speech on 1 January 2015

Citizens,

The past year has left us with many good memories, but also memories that may not grow sweeter with time. We are occupied with three major issues: security, economy and the environment.

We have seen that Europe is not the haven of peace that we imagined it to be. The Ukrainian conflict and Russia's actions in it proved otherwise. We have also learned that the economy will not fix itself if we just sit back and wait for the next upturn. And we were chilled to learn that global warming will have a particularly great impact here, in Finland.

So, we have moved from fine-tuning back to fundamental issues, and we must calibrate our actions and objectives accordingly.

The Ukrainian catastrophe, which has claimed thousands of lives to date, has taken us back in time – to the questions of war and peace. War is no longer only news from far-off lands; it is reality in today's Europe.

Finland has followed a consistent policy regarding events in the Ukraine from the very first. We condemned Russia's illegal annexation of Crimea as soon as it happened and then condemned Russia's actions in eastern Ukraine. We have done this in the EU context but have also made this clear in our direct contacts with Russia. We condemn any illegal occupations, illegal use of force or attempts to limit the sovereignty of independent nations. Such actions never achieve anything but danger and increased tension. While power may have once grown out of the barrel of a gun, these days it leads to nothing but chaos.

The Ukrainian crisis has led to a new polarisation between the West and Russia. The increased tensions are reflected in Finland's neighbouring areas, even though we are not under threat. It is vital to find a peaceful solution in Ukraine, and it is equally vital to interrupt the vicious circle of confrontation. Therefore Finland supports and actively seeks ways of finding a solution.

Russia has always been and will always be Finland's neighbour. We will continue to maintain close dialogue. We aim to facilitate any efforts to resolve the conflict and to pursue all forms of cooperation possible under these circumstances. Russia is well aware that Finland is and will remain part of the West.

Finland's foreign and security policy safeguards the continued existence of our country and the liberty, security and wellbeing of all Finns. Finland pursues an active policy of stability intended to ensure stability in northern Europe and contribute to decreasing broader confrontation. Finland plays an important role in its region.

Finland is one of the few European countries that continued to see military conflict as a potential threat even after the end of the Cold War and therefore maintained an appropriate defence capacity. This has proved to be a sustainable solution. However, we face the challenge of safeguarding a credible defence in changing circumstances and against the emergence of unexpected threats. This will not be possible without substantial extra investment.

Our Western partnership is one of the pillars of our security. Membership of the EU is an important security solution for Finland, even if it is not a defence solution. It is inconceivable that the EU would simply look on if the territorial integrity of one of its Member States were violated. If that were to happen, the Union built on values of peace and liberty would be standing on feet of clay. The EU has means that it can bring to bear, economic means above all, and these do have an impact.

Ever since I took office, I have stressed the importance of bilateral defence cooperation with Sweden. We are pursuing this together, step by step. Both governments are highly committed to the effort, and we are expecting new practical applications to emerge in the year now beginning. We have taken our NATO partnership to a new level and continue to pursue this angle. It goes without saying that we can always apply for NATO membership, if we wish to do so.

Citizens of Finland,

We are a stable community, even ranked number one in the world, and we have the basics needed for a good life. We have safeguarded the integrity of our society and must continue to do so, leaving no one behind. The common good is the most important natural resource we have.

Our problem is that the foundation of our economy is eroding. We have been papering over the cracks for years, counting on the next upturn to fix everything or lending more money to cover public expenditure, but now it is time for an open and thorough renovation. We are facing many changes: technology, automation, production methods and working practices are all changing. Yet human factors remain the same: Finns are regarded as reliable, loyal and

responsible professionals. Whatever the future may bring, our wellbeing ultimately still depends on the attitudes of the ordinary Finn.

We all know that change and reform are difficult things. I am reminded of what the current President of the European Commission, Jean-Claude Juncker, said about decision-makers years ago: “We all know what to do, we just don’t know how to get re-elected after we’ve done it.” But what if the voters are tired of no one doing anything? What if they change that saying to this: “They all know what to do, and if they do it, we will re-elect them.”

I am also reminded of a list from the 1990s known as ‘Liisa’s list’, a proposal for cutting government expenditure. There was nothing new on the list, but what was new was where the proposal originated from. It prompted many people to ask why the opposition would advocate something that is contrary to the opposition’s short-term interests. They must soon have realised that a virtue was made out of necessity.

We are very concerned about our price competitiveness and the state of central government finances. Many people are firmly of the opinion that someone must give up something – preferably someone else than the speakers themselves. To make a real difference, someone would have to say: we are prepared to give up this important benefit – what benefit will you give up? We should make a virtue out of necessity, again.

I encourage all decision-makers to be courageous even when facing their own supporters. Enough speeches; it is now time for action.

My fellow citizens,

It is also time for action at the Paris climate conference towards the end of this year. The international community faces a tough challenge: are we able to find a common solution to a problem that we all have in common?

Combating climate change and the economy seem to correlate: our efforts to combat it weaken if there’s an economic downturn. Our national debts and our common carbon debt are put in the balance, even though both debts eat away at our future.

Finland has acted responsibly but has also recognised opportunities: we are involved in combating climate change, but we are also developing business potential in doing so. Both are worth investing in.

My fellow citizens,

On Independence Day, the Finnish public was introduced to Hannes Hynönen, the 101-year old war veteran and expert on life. He cut through today’s incriminating debate on liberal versus conservative, tolerant versus intolerant, important versus less important, with a healthy dose of common sense.

My understanding of what he had to say is that to achieve a good life you must know yourself. You must measure your expectations of other people against what you do yourself. You must remember the good but be aware of the bad. And you must see that none of us is that much more special than the other but that together we are a force to be reckoned with.

I would like to wish you all a Happy New Year. God bless!

**Speech by President of the Republic Sauli Niinistö at the closing of the electoral period
2011–2015 at Finlandia Hall on 15 April 2015**

When President Halonen opened Parliament in 2011, she said that “we cannot know what this electoral period will bring”. How right she was. We did not even know how accurate her prediction would be.

What was thought would happen or what one wanted to happen when the electoral period began in 2011 never happened. Instead, what eventually took place one had no idea of back then. But this of course should not be surprising. Almost always at the end of an electoral period, the circumstances at its beginning seem very distant.

Throughout this electoral period, Parliament has been dragging a stone-laden sledge uphill, with more stones being added all the time: the Eurozone’s problems, ever-weakening economic prospects, the effects of the Ukraine crisis. We may not have reached the top of the hill yet, but we have also not crashed back down.

We have also heard it said that “politics is broken” or that “there was paralysis due to an overly broad base” or that “ideology was thin on the ground”. For the person in the street, such utterances say nothing, promise nothing and explain nothing. I suspect that such a person might now expect politics without divisions, as well as a functioning base and sufficient cohesion.

We have not crashed, and we will not crash. Crashes have been avoided by sticking together. I am reminded of the previous time our economy took a nosedive. The important thing back then was the will to cope with it. No one even said it out loud, it was just mutually understood. It was also understood that we had a mission, a great task, and one undertook to fulfil it – less with publicity, more with practical effort – and perhaps eventually achieved something.

It is said that the representatives mirror the people. This is good. But the people are also a reflection of their representatives. You have also been closely followed, and your actions have had an impact on citizens’ minds. Good things unfortunately tend to be overlooked.

The working practices and debating culture of Parliament have clearly improved. This indicates that representatives have an appreciation of their work and position. This development is important for democracy, and thanks are due to the Speaker of the Parliament and his staff and equally to each and every Member of Parliament.

I would like to acknowledge one of you in particular. Member of Parliament Anssi Joutsenlahti has set us a fine example of unselfishness, which is needed in these difficult times. After all, we have all seen plenty of selfishness.

* * *

Parliament is not only a legislative body but also expresses its views on developments in society at large. As an example, I would like to mention the extensive study conducted by the Audit Committee concerning the prevention of the social exclusion of young people. Initiatives like this, on the part of Parliament, are and should be important wake-up calls for public debate on key domestic issues.

I would also like to address something that concerns our mutual work. At the start of my term of office in 2012, the constitutional amendment enacted by the previous Parliament entered into force. Parliament took the reins by declaring that in case of a disagreement between the President and the Government – however theoretical such a situation may be – Parliament would be the final arbiter. I was Speaker of Parliament back then, and my personal contribution to this enactment was limited to banging the gavel. When I spoke at the closing of the electoral period in 2011, I considered that amendment to be a great achievement.

Now that I look at it from where I am standing today, I consider it an even greater achievement. What I am trying to say with this is that I feel that I have a kind of informal

parliamentary legitimacy in my office and that I feel supported and empowered by it. I would further like to emphasise that I deeply appreciate the cooperation with the Foreign Affairs and Defence Committees, involving a direct, confidential and informal exchange of opinions. This is exactly what we need in times like this.

* * *

Europe has seen not only seven lean years in economic terms but also complications in the security environment. The Arab Spring, that emerged in spring 2011 and prompted a whole range of expectations, has degenerated into a cluster of dangerous conflicts on Europe's southern borders.

During the past year, the Ukraine crisis and Russia's actions have destabilised the security situation of the eastern fringes of Europe. Thousands of people have been killed, the stability of security policy has been compromised, and key principles of international law have been violated. At the same time, relations between Russia and the West have soured in a way not seen since the days of the Cold War.

Only a few years ago, we envisioned our continent surrounded by a ring of stable friends, but this has not come to pass. Rather, we are now surrounded by a ring of strife. Circumstances have forced us to reorient ourselves from a European expansive policy of values to a defensive security policy. There is no need to spell out the magnitude of this shift, as we can all see it plainly. It is equally obvious that Europe must face these challenges in ways to which we are perhaps not accustomed to.

Finland has followed a steady and consistent policy. As a European nation, we have stood and will continue to stand for international law and the sovereignty of nations, by imposing sanctions if necessary. We have helped and will continue to help those in distress. We have aimed and will continue to aim to promote stability in northern Europe.

Russia is a superpower that will remain our neighbour, and we will remain Russia's neighbour. In geographical terms, one cannot choose one's neighbours, and so neighbourhood relations must be taken care of for better or for worse. Relations between Finland and Russia have not been unaffected by the broader tensions that I just described, especially as far as the economy is concerned. However, it would not be in anyone's interests – least of all our own – for us to deliberately undermine our mutual relations.

Developments in recent years have shown that Finland has made the appropriate fundamental decisions as far as upholding our national defence capacity is concerned. Chasing trends would have led us astray. In the past electoral period, we have commendably implemented a reform of our Defence Forces that has enhanced operations and cut costs.

Now we face a new challenge: ensuring the up-to-date performance of our national defence capability. This will require decisions and actions. Recent events have also reminded us that national security requires a wide range of readiness and risk management. This includes, amongst other things, up-to-date intelligence capabilities and legislation to back them up.

Close international cooperation has been an essential part of our security and defence policy in the past electoral period, and it will continue to be so. The nature of this cooperation will shift as circumstances change, and in addition to crisis management, joint exercises and the maintaining of performance capabilities will also become increasingly important. Finland should participate in this cooperation on our own terms, without excluding any of our options.

Foreign policy will continue to be at the forefront of ensuring Finland's national security, but a credible national defence is its vital ally.

* * *

I would like to extend my thanks to Parliament for the valuable work you have done for the nation, and I hereby declare Parliament closed for the present electoral period.

Speech by President of the Republic Sauli Niinistö at the diplomatic dinner held at the Presidential Palace on 23 April 2015

My spouse and I once again have the pleasure of meeting you, the representatives of the diplomatic corps accredited to Finland. I would also like to take this opportunity to present my sincere thanks for the energy you have shown in promoting relations between your home countries and Finland. Diplomacy consists of frenetic, intensive bursts of activity between periods of slow plodding, but it is always important.

In Finland, our general election is now behind us. It has given you, who have the task of following developments in Finland, plenty to do. The election result is always right, as I commented yesterday to the media. The result was just as Finland's voting public wished. Power and responsibility ultimately rests with the people. This is the iron law of democracy. At any rate, the result reflects the spirit of Finnish democracy. Despite differences of opinion, this spirit emphasises joint responsibility and calls for cooperation and trust. These will all be needed.

The election also involved a lively debate on foreign and security policy, even if there were no major points of disagreement. This was only natural considering Europe's more difficult security situation and the nature of the Finnish elections. No one, whether inside or outside Finland, can suppress such discussion. We have freedom of speech, leading to a broad range of analyses and conclusions. Under all circumstances, a responsible government will agree on a common policy and act accordingly. If necessary, the policy can be adjusted – together.

Of course, our national foreign policy discussion will continue. That is why we will again hold the Kultaranta talks in mid-June. At those talks, we will discuss broader international themes and our national security.

In the year since we last gathered here, we have become used to repeating that European security policy has entered difficult times due to the Ukraine conflict and Russia's widely condemned actions. We have nothing to add to such an assessment today. Although we have the Minsk Agreement, the violence has not ended.

Neither is today the first time that I have expressed my concern about the clear, widening gulf between the EU and Russia. This gulf has sometimes broadened at a slower and sometimes at a faster pace. Unfortunately this process of estrangement has not stopped. At stake are not only interests but also principles and values.

There are many reasons for this parting of the ways. Relations between the EU and Russia were in difficulties even before the Ukraine crisis, based on new positions in which we engaged in a dialogue of the deaf, or interpreted events from opposing standpoints. Our basic perspectives were already diverging. In the West, many saw Russia as being on a path of convergence with the West. However, Russia may have changed its idea of where it was going mid-journey. Little wonder, then, that we drifted into difficulties.

I doubt that this situation can be turned around quickly. There is no smooth development path to which we can return, even if going back were possible. This is not an occasion for off-the-cuff decision-making. Now is the time for cool-headed analysis and thinking, and the step-by-step diplomacy that follows.

In any case, containing and resolving the Ukraine conflict represent the first step in this process. The Minsk Agreement provides a basis for this, if the parties have the willingness to adhere to it. There is no doubt that the EU has reacted strongly to the Ukraine crisis through measures that include economic sanctions. This has been the only alternative in a situation without good alternatives. It is also Finland's position on the matter.

On the other hand, I regard it as important that we do not allow the crisis to spill over into new areas and sectors. We must also nurture our cooperation and contacts of various kinds. I think that this involves areas such as contacts between citizens and Arctic cooperation, which cover a range of common interests. Even if there is no return to normal, this does not mean that we should continue moving towards an abnormal situation without stopping to look at what is going on around us.

Thirdly, I also regard it as important that, in a responsible fashion, we keep our communication channels open with Russia's leadership. During times of crisis – especially during such times – we have to keep talking. However, at EU level we need to ensure that this does not undermine the EU's solidarity or the credibility of joint decisions.

Whatever the outcome, a long road lies before us and there are many more questions than answers. The pressure will continue.

Europe has woken up to a steadily deteriorating situation to the South, which has coincided with the conflict in Ukraine. We are surrounded by an arc of conflict. Violent clashes in North Africa and the Middle East have led to regional catastrophes whose consequences are rippling out into Europe. The whole world has been shocked by the many victims among the waves of refugees sweeping across the Mediterranean. The threat posed by growing terrorism has also been brought home to us. In all honesty, no end is in sight for this worryingly unstable situation.

It is clear that Europe cannot section off its problems in the north, east or south. These problems are common to us all. No one is immune. The call for shared responsibility is understandable, wherever it comes from. But the challenge now lies in finding effective and balanced ways for Europe to meet its responsibilities. Issues need to be rethought. Europe must take more responsibility for its own security.

I have recently pointed out that Europe is shifting from a policy of value expansionism to a defensive security policy. This means that rather than merely wondering how to export its values and models of governance, Europe must also consider how to defend them at home. The situation is now more complex and the certainties of the 1990s are behind us. Repeating past glories will not be enough – we also need a new approach.

* * *

In these challenging circumstances, Finland will remain an open member of the world community and a proactive builder of international cooperation. Of course, we will attend to our own security and interests, but without turning inwards to protect those alone. We want to continue living in a country which joins others in seeking better solutions to the broader issues facing the whole of humanity, such as climate change or the need to increase gender equality. Naturally, I hope that you, the heads of your embassies and missions, will lend us your practical support and efforts in this work.

With that, I would like to wish you continuing success in your work in and alongside Finland. We Finns truly value your work. Thank you!

Speech by President of the Republic Sauli Niinistö at the at the opening of parliament on 29 April 2015

Mr Speaker, Members of Parliament,

Today marks the first day of the 29th Parliament of independent Finland. Among you are new members of Parliament, experienced veterans and familiar faces who have returned. I am glad to see that the number of young members has again risen compared to the last few parliaments.

I congratulate all of you on your election. You have just passed a difficult job interview held all over Finland. Before you lies a difficult task, for which the Finnish people have given you a mandate. Continuous discussion between employer and employee forms part of a well-functioning employment relationship – I am sure that you will stay in close touch with your voters.

The people's representatives reflect the people, and that is how it should be. As you will have noticed while on the campaign trail, the feelings, worries and joys of everyday life are not confined to certain towns or cities. No boundaries separate us from one another, nor do we need any. Finland has room for a variety of lifestyles and personal situations, many cultures also.

On the other hand, we are not ready to accommodate everything: we cannot afford a culture based on selfishness or a feeling of superiority.

* * *

When opening the 1995 Parliament, President Ahtisaari drew attention to three tasks: to steer our country out of the recession; promote our interests in the European Union and shore up international security; and renew the Nordic welfare model. These sound very familiar today, too. On the other hand, all things change in the end, as will our current situation by the end of this Parliament.

You and the forthcoming Government have a difficult task ahead of you. No one in this building can be unaware of the situation in which Finland finds itself. Our economy has shrunk, the needle has swung towards critical on the public debt and deficit indicator, the state has large guarantee commitments and the national unemployment insurance fund has a considerable borrowing requirement. Together, these combine to form a challenge which we cannot meet without a new, firmer grasp of matters and positive will to change.

Finland is still competitive and does well according to many indicators. Now is the time to live up to our billing – it is up to us. We know what we need to do, so let's do it.

If you feel that you need a supporting hand with this, I would like to volunteer, or, to paraphrase Antti Rokka: I'm the man for the job!

* * *

I would like to turn away from current issues for a moment, to present a few observations on our parliamentary system.

Let me return to the watershed of 1987, which saw a thirty-year taboo broken on a certain large party considered unfit for government. This had the immediate effect of enabling completely new kinds of coalitions. Understandably, this new situation created a need to emphasise stability and parliamentary trust, to which a detailed Government programme committed the participants. We have indeed lived through a period of stable parliaments, in which not a single government has fallen victim to a vote of no confidence. While prime ministers have changed due to career changes and parties have left the Government, the situation has looked like business as usual when seen from the outside.

At a time when the continuity of and adherence to the Government programme has been viewed as a key principle, changes to or even rewriting the programme have seemed like a dangerous sign of political turbulence or weakness. When real life has departed from the programme's script, people have pointed out that the script had to be discarded, or the Government simply acted as it saw fit.

At the moment, we can only say for sure that, during a parliamentary term, circumstances change in ways that we cannot predict. This brings us to a question: should we not view it as natural that the Government will present Parliament with a new programme if the underlying assumptions of the previous one have changed and a new direction needs to be taken? Should we not, therefore, break the taboo of the unalterable Government programme? Facing up to reality is a sign of strength, not of weakness.

The recent election shows that we have once again, after thirty years, returned to a new situation in which the variety of possible governments increased considerably. This has brought a buzz of excitement to the opening moves in the coalition negotiations and will raise the level of interest in politics.

* * *

Seventy years have just passed since the last military operations on Finnish soil during the Second World War were finally wound up. In other words, Finland has enjoyed peace for seventy years. More than this, it has also developed into one of the world's most successful nations. A foreign policy well-framed to meet all of Finland's fundamental needs has been an indispensable part of, and has set the scene for, this success story. This will continue to be the case.

Finland's foreign and security policy has gone through many, varied phases over recent decades. Easier periods have given way to less stable, more anxious times. We have come through the harder times and coped with change. This is worth remembering now, at a time when the security policy situation has once again become more tense in Europe. International tensions will also overshadow the work of the Parliamentary term about to begin. Parliament will be confronted with simultaneous challenges from a number of directions.

The goal of Finland's foreign policy aims at securing our independence, security and wellbeing in all situations. It would be sensible to continue building Finland's international position on a broad basis, rather than resting on only one or two pillars. We must pay close attention to our national defence and security. As ever, close international cooperation is necessary. So too is nurturing our relations with Russia. We must take a broad view and promote the building of a world in which ground rules based on international law and cooperation between equals have the strongest possible basis. Such work is also necessary – indeed particularly so – when the prospects of success are fewer.

There is need for an open, pluralistic discussion on foreign and security policy. I intend to promote such a discussion at the Kultaranta talks to be held in June. On the other hand, great responsibility goes hand in hand with the leadership and execution of foreign and security policy. In our actions as decision-makers, we must give centre stage to the determined pursuit of our own goals based on the situation in question, not to emotional or short-term perspectives.

I would like to congratulate the Speaker and Deputy Speakers of Parliament for the continued support they have received and wish every one of you the greatest success, as well as wisdom in your demanding work on Finland's behalf.

I hereby declare the 2015 session of Parliament open.

Speech by President of the Republic of Finland Sauli Niinistö at the OSCE PA annual meeting in Helsinki on 6 July 2015

40 years ago Heads of State and Government gathered here in Helsinki to decide whether we could find more security in Europe, or would we still have to live in a world of continued tension and insecurity.

As a result of those discussions, an agreement was reached. The Helsinki Declaration was signed in an attempt to improve relations between the West and the Communist bloc. Although not legally binding, as it did not have a treaty status, the Helsinki Accords helped to build a bridge between opponents.

And while many deemed the accord to be flawed, as it seemed to consolidate the situation as it was, real political and moral commitments were made. Those commitments aimed at lessening tensions and opening further the lines of communications between peoples of East and West.

On that day, 30-years of mistrust and tensions were seen as enough. The process that started then helped to find common ground that eventually led to the end of Cold War. Peaceful change – once thought to be impossible in Europe – was made possible. In a sense, that meeting started a process of peaceful transition to a relatively long period of security and prosperity in our continent.

* * *

Today, the OSCE is back in the Finlandia Hall. And while today's distrust has not yet continued 30 years, not even three, tension has risen to an unwelcome level between the West and Russia. This situation has also, unfortunately, affected this meeting here and today. Maintaining the lines of communication and dialogue open is very important. Therefore it would be necessary for the EU to clarify the position of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly in its sanctions legislation.

The question I find myself pondering is can we afford to spend next decade or even more wrapped in a cold battle, matching each time the opponent's efforts to gain the upper hand in a spiraling conflict. Can we gain something if either party suffers, if lives are lost or if our economies already troubled in many countries have to face years of sanctions and countersanctions?

The answer to those questions is that we can't. Neither Europe nor Russia – not to even mention the people of Ukraine – will gain from this situation and this troubled relation. We need to stop the situation from worsening. The most urgent task is to end violence in Ukraine.

As postulated in the Helsinki Accords, both Moscow and the capitals in the west agreed to refrain from the use of force, respect the sovereignty of countries and inviolability of borders. These points are as valid as they were 40 years ago. Or they are even more valid now, when these principles have been violated. They must be the basis for our actions today and tomorrow.

The Minsk peace plan is the only available roadmap towards the peaceful resolution of the conflict in Eastern Ukraine and Crimea. We should all support the plan, and even more important is that the plan is fully implemented. We need also Russia to carry its responsibility to secure peace and honor those decisions made here, in this very house in 1975.

If we do not act again to build mutual understanding, if we fail to learn from our mistakes, and if we fail to construct that bridge again, we might see more anniversaries of mistrust than I care to predict.

* * *

There are those who argue that the European security architecture has serious flaws and that the Helsinki principles are broken. But there are also those, including myself who conclude that it is particularly timely now to stand in support of the key principles governing European security.

These principles are guarded by the OSCE, which has done its part in the efforts to stop the violence in Ukraine, and I would like to commend the organization for its active involvement. In the OSCE field presence, men and women from the participating States, including Finland, are risking their lives in support of what they believe is right – the peaceful solution of the conflict and promoting security through co-operation.

The Helsinki principles have stood the test of time – the end of the Cold War, the Balkan wars, globalization and huge technological changes. Today we can live in an interconnected world where co-operation is even more important than what it was 40 years ago.

Now we have to decide whether we have the will and determination to cherish this heritage? I think we don't even have a choice. There are no real other options.

We need to keep in mind that the OSCE area is not the whole world. Continuing turbulence in the Middle East and Northern Africa is also challenging European stability and security in a serious way. In addition to our problems, we have global issues and challenges, such as climate change, that we need to tackle.

One must remember that the weight given to European perspectives and ideas in this broad discussion is also dependent on how united and capable for co-operation our own OSCE region is. The days of a Euro-centric world are long gone but in a global scale the Euro-Atlantic community remains a major contributor. However, it cannot expect to be a very influential contributor if it cannot keep its own house in order.

The OSCE has served us well in the past and present. I hope it will continue to serve us well also in the future. I wish you every success in your demanding work. Thank you.

Speech by President of the Republic Sauli Niinistö at the Ambassador Seminar 25 August 2015

August is once again nearing its end and the ambassador seminar is upon us. While summer is perhaps fading, the political autumn is just beginning. Clearly, we should not forget that foreign policy is a 365-day-per-year activity, with no summer break. It is perhaps for that reason that now would be a good time to review recent events and, above all, to look ahead.

During the summer, we commemorated the 70th anniversary of the end of the Second World War. The hard war years were followed by the Cold War. Although this too was a conflict, it followed rules of its own and ended with a relatively stable period, which is also far behind us. So too is the optimistic period that followed – an interval of sorts that promised an eternal summer.

Eternal summer never came. At the Kultaranta talks in the early summer, I commented that the international system is now undergoing a profound transformation marked by major uncertainty and accumulating problems. That is the situation in which we now find ourselves.

Everywhere we look, textbooks on political realism are being re-opened. In Finland, such books were never quite closed. Our history saw to that. What we now see around us is less self-evident and increasingly 'self-enigmatic'. This is an age that calls for clear, honest and self-critical thinking.

* * *

Europe is now in the midst of its own years of danger. An arc of instability and violence stretching from Ukraine to the Middle East and North Africa lies on its fringes. At the same time, Europe is in a period of internal flux, of which the Greek debt crisis and its management is one, but not the only, sign. T

he Ukraine conflict is in its second year and shows no sign of ending. A tool – the Minsk Agreements –has been found for handling the crisis. The implementation of these agreements would clear a path, at least to ending military activities and pacifying the situation. I have been as active as I can in supporting such a process – naturally, in cooperation with our many partners. Needless to say, we will continue these efforts.

But we should also take note of the underlying nature of such conflicts, of which Eastern Ukraine and Crimea are not the only examples. These are not traditional wars in which a direct military solution is sought through armed might. Instead, fault-lines in geo- and power politics and the military means created in response lie at the heart of the matter.

Creating an impact, even if only to slow down or impede certain developments, can be a sufficient and realistic goal in conflicts. As a solution, the avoidance of an unpleasant outcome for oneself can be equally sufficient. When necessary, conflicts can be taken ‘off the shelf’ or be ‘made to measure’. Military confrontations can be tailored to fit political needs, whether large or small. In many cases, the underlying logic of conflicts is hidden from the outside world, which is transfixed by the daily sequence of events at the front.

In this sense, a wider confrontation between the west and Russia underlies the Ukraine conflict. For the west, principles and rules are the key issue. Will Europe’s mutually agreed security principles and rules hold? Will Ukraine be permitted to determine its own future as, of course, it should? For Russia, the self-same crisis is perhaps about geopolitics and the balance of power. Of course, it is natural that we view the issue from our own starting points. But so too do the Russians. Herein may lie the basic problem.

Despite the serious nature of the Ukraine conflict, it pales beside the tragedy being enacted in the Middle East. The very structures that held the region together have given way, leading to a catastrophe. The world has witnessed horrors such as the brutal terrorism of ISIS, which seems to be systematically directed at women and children as well as men. It has also been astonishing to see how many young people born and raised in the west have departed to swell the ranks of this organisation. When, to so many, freedom is less important than vows, we can take little comfort in what follows, even here in the north.

The fight against terrorism and ISIS is a broad endeavour based on international cooperation. It is also worth remembering that ISIS is an issue on which Russia and the United States largely agree. Wider regional issues have brought these countries into closer, communicative contact. Finland is fulfilling its responsibilities on her own part by participating in the international coalition’s training mission in Erbil.

Huge-scale, rapidly growing migration is a phenomenon partly caused by the prevailing instability. Both the oppressed and those simply seeking a better life are being drawn to Europe. We are conflicted on this issue. As a civilised, humane people, we are honour-bound to help these migrants. On the other hand, we are aware that the unstable situation in the Middle East and Africa cannot be resolved by moving more and more people to Europe. We are approaching the limits of our capacity for this, even if these limits are somewhat different for different countries.

Failure to deal with this problem will have serious consequences in Europe. For example, we could question whether the Schengen system can really withstand any amount of pressure? Freedom of movement cannot mean the same as movement without any control. I think that unless Europe finds joint solutions to this challenge which are sustainable in terms of public and national opinion, national responses will come more to the fore as the crisis wears on.

We should be clear on one issue – ignoring the facts is not the answer. We need an open discussion and a clear and credible, effective policy which has the support of the majority of the people. We need to decide on the direction in which we want to take this issue. Should we help people here or abroad? Of course, many will prefer to say ‘both’. However, I think that we cannot avoid choosing a focus and acting decisively in accordance with it.

We will be better able to respond to the immigration challenge if we keep our heads and take a moderate approach. In addition, we cannot avoid making distinctions: some immigration is legal and some is illegal. Work-based immigration is a fact – no economy which means to grow can close this off. There are those in need of international protection and those who seek such protection based on financial motives.

An asylum system is in place for asylum seekers. It must deliver – if it does not, it must be adjusted. With respect to those with refugee status, a policy decision must be made on the quota each country will take. Unfortunately, among those heading for Europe there are some who have mischief in mind. We cannot deny this just because some refuse to acknowledge it.

You must also extend your gaze elsewhere, since we cannot confine our attention to events at home. We need a clearer view of the direction ideas are taking in Europe and the world around it. What are the latest developments with respect to nationalism in Europe? What about Asia, if the picture is unclear closer to home? In Europe, we can achieve much based on tolerance, but what of elsewhere? Hard-nosed self-interest and ruthlessness are often sugar-coated. Words cost nothing. Diplomats must therefore be ready to ask, “What’s really going on?” to quote Saarikoski.

Although the problems in the eurozone and the Greek debt crisis are beyond the President’s remit, we have learned a few lessons from them. No monetary or other system can work as planned if its underlying rules are broken. In Greece’s case we can once again see that if we do not manage our affairs, our creditors will do so for us.

* * *

In May 1863, our national philosopher J. W. Snellman wrote his famous article, “War or Peace for Finland”, in which he states the following: “Only in the imagination of the young do nations sacrifice themselves for the common good. In reality, each nation acts in its own interests, just as it should.” In the same text, Snellman enlightened his readers with a line that has been passed down the generations: “A nation should only trust in itself.”

As we know, Snellman’s article has long formed part of the intellectual legacy on which our foreign policy is based. Paasikivi read it, as did Kekkonen. However, I would not interpret Snellman’s underlying message as favouring an isolationist stance such as neutrality, much less nationalistic chauvinism. Snellman’s enduring idea was that, in our own calculations, we need to take full account of the deepest principles of international politics. We need to be critical of our own position, weighing up our options several moves ahead. Failure to do so and acting on the basis of appearances or emotions paves the way, at worst, to what Snellman called the “fate of the frivolous.”

Looking at our current position, it is clear that, in pursuit of our national security, we need continual evaluation and practical steps. After all, as I stated at the beginning of this speech, we

probably face a long period of uncertainty and risk. Despite our global obligations, we are unconditionally and primarily responsible for our own country and its future.

It is also realism to recognise that geopolitics and its iron hard principles are intrinsic to every key development. They have gone nowhere, and Russia is not their sole representative. Even if great power interests are often covered by the fig leaf of propaganda, the naked truth is the same as ever. The realm of great power politics remains largely undemocratic. In this realm great powers can afford to make great mistakes, while smaller states can perhaps not even afford small ones.

I view Finland's security as a holistic entity, resting on several pillars. These pillars are national defence and security, western integration, relations with Russia, and the international system, particularly its structure, rule-based nature and manageability. These pillars are ever-changing – they are weakened or strengthened by events. They also continually interact. The more pillars on which we rest, the stronger they are from our viewpoint, and the better the balance between them the stronger a position Finland is in.

When the Cold War ended all of these pillars began to strengthen, improving our national security. When other European countries began their major disarmament in the 90s, none other but we Finns bought the discarded weapons. We strengthened our defence. Our rapid integration with the west culminated in EU membership. We began to develop our partnership with NATO. In addition, our relations with Russia developed positively, no longer weighed down by the baggage of our relations with the Soviet Union. The entire international system seemed to be shifting towards a rule-based, multilateral future.

Our defence capabilities are being deprived of resources just when there is a need for new capabilities. Despite the fact that relations between Finland and Russia remain good, the broader crisis is also impacting on them. After all, we are participants in EU policies and sanctions. Multilateralism and respect for international justice have diminished within the international system.

So where do we go from here? I see no alternative to reinforcing the pillars that we can and trying to maintain all of them as well as possible. It would not be in our interests to rest on only one pillar, no matter how attractive it seems.

We need to strengthen and modernise our defences. The same is true of our internal security and intelligence capabilities. We cannot leave them to languish in a bygone era. Defence is about intent and actions. Our key line of defence always lies between the ears of Finns. Each and every Finn is a defender of his or her country.

We have to be responsible enough to prepare for unpleasant eventualities, even those not so likely. This is just a matter of fact when we try to ensure security. However, there is a difference between responsible preparation and fighting phantom wars in trench lines. This is a distinction that we need to bear in mind.

Our western cooperation is broadening, particularly in the development of our defence cooperation with Sweden and within the framework of our partnership with NATO. We are also maintaining our communication channels with Russia at all levels and engaging in cooperation wherever possible and useful. At the level of the international system, we must boldly defend international justice and a multilateral order. Through active diplomacy we must continuously seek room to maneuver, find the progressive role to play. The project to create a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East has been a good example of this. We cannot just sit on the sidelines and bemoan the fact that we have dwindling resources. Instead, we must learn to make wiser and better directed use of what we have.

Now and again we hear ideas based on which Finland will assume partial responsibility for the defence of the Baltic states. However, I have had to be fairly clear on this issue, for the simple reason that Finland is in no position to provide others with the kind of military guarantees as it is not covered by such guarantees herself. We are no superpower with “bullets and shells” galore to hand out to others. We have a longer eastern border than all of the NATO countries put together. If a country of around five million is supposed to manage its own defence in such circumstances, this is more than enough of an obligation.

This theme is directly linked to the EU’s obligations of mutual assistance. Some view such obligations as not worth the paper they are printed on. Some also believe that they oblige Finland to help defend other countries, such as the Baltic nations, if necessary. While this is all very interesting, it is a little odd to note that the same people seem to hold both opinions at once. There is clearly no point in exaggerating the EU’s mutual assistance obligations. But this does not mean that we should not seek to strengthen them.

In addition to national and regional concerns, we are being confronted with challenges – such as climate change – which supersede all others. While giving primacy to resolving issues that affect us in particular, we also need to participate in finding solutions to problems that affect everyone. Snellman was of the same opinion. When he wrote that each nation pursues only its own interests, he followed this with the words: “But fulfilling such aims depends on how well they interlock with the interests of humankind in general.”

We must therefore build Finland’s security and success on a holistic basis, rather than solely in a piecemeal manner. That is why such a task belongs to our entire foreign policy administration, regardless of the sector in question. All have their own tasks, but the same objective.

* * *

Despite the nature of the economic and – to some extent – security challenges we face, we can overcome them. History allows us no rest, but sets new slopes before us, which we must climb. Previous generations have done the work necessary to raise themselves, and we aim to do no worse.

You, our ambassadors and holders of senior office, bear a particular responsibility in this respect. You are called upon to represent and pursue our interests internationally and, when required, to defend them based on your best judgement and instincts. This is a challenging task, particularly when difficult issues rain down upon you without warning. I would like to thank you for your efforts so far. I also wish you a lovely early autumn, whatever the weather is like in the countries in which you are posted.

Statement by President of the Republic of Finland Sauli Niinistö at the Peacekeeping Summit in New York on 28 September 2015

I would like to thank President Obama for convening this event, as we seek to boost the United Nations Peacekeeping efforts. Finland warmly welcomes the Secretary-General’s initiative on a peace operations review. In support of this, together with Uruguay, Rwanda and Indonesia, Finland is hosting a ministerial meeting tomorrow.

In Finland, we have a proven track record of participation in peacekeeping operations: 50,000 Finnish men and women have served in 30 different operations since the Suez Crisis in 1956. With some 340 troops, Finland is the sixth largest contributor to UN peacekeeping in Europe. In per capita terms it is number two in Europe. We have shown strong commitment to peacekeeping for decades.

Today, I would like to announce our commitments in the following five areas:

First, we will serve as the lead nation in the Finnish-Irish battalion in UNIFIL until the end of 2016, contributing over 300 soldiers. After this term, Finland will contribute soldiers to UNIFIL for a further two years.

Second, we will increase our contribution to MINUSMA by up to 20 soldiers, by adding military observers to the operation.

Third, regarding the DPKO's request for support in 2017 under the UN Peacekeeping Capability Readiness Systems, we pledge an Amphibious Task Unit (up to 275 personnel), Special Operations Forces (tailored, with up to 200 personnel), and a deployable CBRN Laboratory (with a maximum of 55 persons from 2018).

Fourth, we will also offer more police officers for UN operations, with the aim of deploying 20 police experts in peacekeeping or specialist teams in 2016.

And fifth, we will further increase our capacity in building, training and education activities in support of peacekeeping in Africa, particularly the Eastern Africa Stand-by Force.

Our commitment to peacekeeping and crisis management remains strong. Let me add that Finland just sent 50 soldiers to train Peshmergas in OIR in Northern Iraq. We are supporting Resolute Support in Afghanistan by contributing 60 soldiers, and continue to participate in UNTSO and UNMOGIP.

We also want to do more with respect to Women, Peace and Security, a priority area which we have supported in countries such as Afghanistan, Kenya and Nepal.

Our commitment to peacekeeping and crisis management remains strong. Finland will do its share in finding new ways to respond to new needs.

Statement by President of the Republic of Finland Sauli Niinistö at the UNGA 70th General Debate on 29 September 2015

Let me begin by congratulating you, Mr. President, upon your election as the President of the 70th session of the United Nations General Assembly. You have the full support of Finland in your important task.

* * *

We are celebrating the 70th anniversary of the United Nations. The UN Charter was written in a world that lay in ruins after the Second World War. Today, we must face our challenges with the same determination our predecessors did in 1945. By adopting the ambitious new Agenda 2030 we are taking equally or even more important steps for humankind.

This year also marks the 60th anniversary of Finland's membership in the Organization. Finland joined a family of countries which do care and shoulder their responsibility. We felt this caring when Finnish national composer Jean Sibelius passed away in 1957. The UN General Assembly decided to honor him with a moment of silence. The Chairman of that Assembly, Mr. Leslie Munro, described how "Sibelius belonged to the whole world". We also felt what shouldering responsibility means by participating in the first UN peacekeeping operation in Suez.

* * *

We are now facing an extremely dangerous crisis in Syria, Iraq and parts of North-Africa. We are also witnessing an unprecedented humanitarian catastrophe unlike any other since the

Second World War. ISIL and its horrendous terror is a direct by-product of the conflicts in Syria and Iraq. It threatens the peace and stability in Middle East, in Africa and even in Europe.

Largely due to wars and conflicts, we are facing a new era of migration. Around sixty million refugees, largest number since the Second World War, are a clear proof of that. The present refugee situation in the Middle East, in many parts of Africa, and in the Mediterranean is unbearable for all.

Although the neighbouring countries bear the heaviest burden, the refugee crisis is causing serious political tension in Europe. Finland is also receiving proportionally a very high number of asylum seekers. Not helping is not an option for us. But we have to find more effective and sustainable ways to help those in need. Solving the conflict in Syria and elsewhere is essential for any lasting solution.

The international community must now show that we do care. Especially the UN Security Council and the countries in the region, must work together on finding a political solution to the crisis in Syria. Finland welcomes all constructive efforts that pave the way for a realistic, workable and lasting peace within a framework of international co-operation. Finland also remains committed to the work of the international counter-ISIL coalition.

The conflict in Ukraine has not yet been solved, although an agreement to this end has been approved. We welcome the steps taken towards the implementation of the Minsk agreement. All illegal measures, like the annexation of Crimea to Russia, cannot and must not be accepted.

* * *

These conflicts are not the only ones. Last year alone, we had 42 armed conflicts going on with approximately 180 000 fatalities. Wars and their consequences continue to threaten stability far beyond the war-zone itself.

The UN peace operations are at the very heart of its efforts to maintain international peace and security. Yet the scope and complexity of today's violent conflicts has surpassed the ability of the international community to address them properly. Critical thinking, flexibility and decisive action are needed to manage and solve these crises.

The initiative to carry out major reviews of the UN's peace and security architecture was therefore most timely. I very much welcome the excellent report produced by President Ramos-Horta's High-Level Panel. It rightly stresses the primacy of politics: political solutions must always guide the deployment of UN peace operations. The UN's prevention and mediation capacities must be strengthened and sufficiently funded.

Finland is proud to have contributed to this shift of paradigm especially through co-chairing the Group of Friends of Mediation, together with Turkey. The Group of Friends will continue its efforts to advance the recommendations of the Panel.

Since the beginning of its membership, Finland has contributed 50 000 men and women to UN peacekeeping operations. In per capita terms we are number two contributor in Europe. And we will further strengthen our contribution. We will shoulder our responsibility.

Let me add, that this year also marks a major success of international diplomacy: the historic agreement reached on the Iran nuclear programme. We look forward to the swift implementation by Iran of all the nuclear-related measures and its full engagement with the International Atomic Energy Agency to resolve all outstanding issues.

* * *

Humankind faces the need for profound change. We cannot continue business as usual, a way of life that exceeds planetary boundaries and exhausts the Earth's resources. We have all the

facts at our disposal, for example on global warming. It is up to us to act. We can choose – or lose – our future.

I believe we are on the right track: we have just adopted the new Agenda 2030, which has the potential to transform the world. For the very first time we have a real program for sustainable development, binding all Member States.

Now it is up to us to implement this ambitious Agenda. I urge the United Nations to show its convening power again. It is necessary to get everybody on board to make the commitments a reality. The private sector and the civil society are in a key position to take the Agenda forward, together with Governments. Even individual persons have a role to play.

Another vital step in tackling global challenges is yet to take place: the Climate Conference in Paris in December. Let us make it a success. We must care for our children and their children.

* * *

The post of the UN Secretary General has been called the most impossible job in the world. Actually, it is not only a job, it is an institution of which the whole UN membership should feel ownership. Strong political leadership is required, especially in cases where the international community is unable to find common views.

I very much welcome the efforts to enhance the transparency and inclusiveness of the selection process of the next Secretary-General. As a nation that has throughout its 60 year UN membership championed gender equality, my country Finland expects to see many excellent female candidates for the position. It is high time that the other half of humankind took up this challenge.

New Year Speech by President of the Republic Sauli Niinistö on 1 January 2016

My fellow citizens,

I want to begin with good news, because such news is often less prominent. Two images, in particular, remain with me from last year. One is of the satisfying conclusion to the Paris Convention on Climate Change and the second is of Presidents Obama and Putin sitting at the same table to discuss a solution to the Syrian crisis.

Although these images will not serve to defeat our common enemies, solve climate change or vanquish terrorism, they are better outcomes than expected.

Many probably feel otherwise; that 2015 brought only a sea of troubles. Problems have certainly emerged, but is it not the case that the source of these evils and misfortunes lies further back in the past and the dam is now breaking under its pressure? What was once hidden or unseen is now, inevitably, revealing itself.

In this vein, I will talk to you today about immigration, security and the economy.

My fellow citizens,

The refugee crisis took Europe by surprise, despite the fact that we had been witnessing huge numbers of people crossing the Mediterranean for years. The nature of asylum seeking has changed: those making their way to Europe include people who are not fleeing acute distress. Asylum-seeking and migration are now moving hand-in-hand towards Europe.

We, in Finland, face an unprecedented situation. In just half a year, we have received more than 30,000 refugees, and more are arriving. While some are fleeing danger, others are seeking a

better life – both of these are natural, human motives. Exploitation, sometimes even as a means of exercising power politics, can also lie behind this displacement of people.

The world contains untold numbers of people who would come here, but there are limits to our capacity to take care of them. I think that Prime Minister Löfven of Sweden went to the heart of the matter when he said that “we have been naive.” Like many other countries, Sweden has tightened up its immigration policy. I view the solutions enacted by the Finnish Government as an attempt to secure resources in order to help those most in need. This means that we can only help those who have come here fleeing persecution.

Problems have also arisen in our own midst.

For me, a lawyer of the old school, the fire-bombing of a building that could contain people should be characterised as arson, and my views on the matter have not changed. Arson is a serious offence. So too is the persecution of refugees, or inciting hatred against them. Too many such incidents have occurred.

Not all those who have come here have good intentions. Some have a terrorist background, and some do evil of other kinds. The backgrounds and actions of a few are creating undue suspicion towards all immigrants.

The authorities must communicate openly on such deeds and their consequences, regardless of whether the perpetrators are native Finns or immigrants. This will help to calm rising emotions and nip rumours in the bud.

We have been made anxious by extreme events. However, I firmly believe that Finns are not, on the whole, attracted by extreme ideas. Ulrich Lilie – President of the German church organisation Diakonie – has characterised his country’s general attitude towards immigration as follows: “a balance between scepticism and self-confidence.” I think that this is also the case in Finland; there are those who doubt and those who trust that we will cope.

To paraphrase the old maxim which remains relevant today – when in Finland do as the Finns do. Immigration can never mean that our core values – democracy, equality and human rights – are questioned.

My fellow citizens,

Our understanding of security has changed. We only woke up to war when it was upon us in Europe, where Russia’s reprehensible actions in Crimea and Ukraine disrupted our oasis of peace.

There has never been such an oasis in the Middle East and North Africa, where war has been waged on a scale many times greater than in Ukraine. This is displacing people and reinforcing terrorism.

Resolving the Syrian crisis is a key issue. The United States and Russia are involved, engaging in combat on the same front, but with somewhat different ideas of who the enemy is. While such a situation is a source of danger, it is also compelling them to seek common solutions. If such solutions can be found in Syria, this will hopefully enable the relaxation of tensions elsewhere.

Rising international tensions have also been reflected in Finland’s neighbourhood. Both Russia and NATO have increased their military presences in the Baltic Sea Region.

In last year’s speech, I said that Finland would pursue an active policy of promoting stability. In terms of our foreign policy, our relationships with Sweden and Russia, the Nordic framework and cooperation within the EU and with NATO countries are in a key position.

A policy promoting stability has good prospects of succeeding in the Baltic Region. The various states have no territorial claims on each other and their internal political situations are stable. Despite the fact that tensions from further afield are having an impact, no spontaneous crises are threatening to break out in the region.

Sweden and Finland are special partners of NATO. Our intensifying military cooperation is going well and is highly valued in both countries. However, we can do more.

Neither of our countries is in a military alliance. Together, we have strong links with both west and east, which gives both countries a special status. This also creates opportunities for engaging in important work to promote the security and stability of Northern Europe.

It would therefore be logical to continue extending our cooperation on foreign and security policy. It is in the interests of both countries to promote our security on a cooperative basis, with a view to developing confidence-building measures.

Dear viewers,

International tensions, the displacement of people and terrorism are undermining our ability to anticipate the future. Even the likely short-term consequences of these factors, which are beyond our control, are difficult to predict.

I believe that there is no need for Finland to enter the spring in a spirit of mutual recrimination and dissension. I would like to reiterate the point that our greatest strength lies in our unity as a society.

We have seen lean years in economic terms, with no great improvement yet in sight. We will continue to live on borrowed money for some time, even though we have already taken action to correct this situation. Such times also test our sense of justice; that each of us should do his or her share in line with our capabilities, while laying the basis for the future rather than grabbing whatever we can.

I would highlight two aspects of the recent economic debate. One concerns achieved gains and the other price competitiveness.

Achieved gains are an important issue – many people base their current and future wellbeing on them. Gains can be considered achieved once earned and distributed.

Many will be reminded of the discussion in 2007 of our “headroom” for distributing billions of euro. This was a reference to the gains expected in the years ahead. And so these future gains were distributed, but never actually appeared. They were gains that were never earned or achieved.

The key question is therefore: can achieved gains be based on earnings that were never actually made?

It has been suggested that these “unachieved gains” account for several percentage points in relation to the scale of our current problems, in terms of both the public economy deficit and lack of price competitiveness in the private sector. We should also remember that those who benefited most were those who already enjoyed the greatest share of the gains.

The problem of price competitiveness has been recognised by all sides, even if agreement has yet to be reached on how to solve the issue. Deciding on who will give up some gains is never easy, and many suspect that others will reap the benefits. Improvements in price competitiveness cannot be all about easier division of the winnings. We need to enter into sufficiently general or even company-specific commitments to using the gains as discussed, in order to safeguard jobs.

It is good that negotiating channels are once again open on the labour markets. I urge all of you to reach an agreement. We must not enter the spring at odds with one another.

My fellow citizens,

During the late summer and autumn, I followed the big story of young Oscar Taipale about tiny berries. Oscar made good earnings from picking hundreds of litres of forest berries. I too was delighted by the idea of a boy picking berries from bushes and inspiring his friends and many others to do the same.

Although we have many problems, there is also much to be glad about: for example, the fact that the desire to help has increased. Volunteering to help refugees, or to assist friends and relatives in getting through the everyday challenges of life, are sources of joy for those who give and receive help, while benefiting all of us!

I wish you all a Happy New Year and God bless you!

Speech by President of the Republic Sauli Niinistö at the spring meeting of the Finnish National Defence Course Association on 5 April 2016

Thank you for the opportunity to address such a distinguished and knowledgeable audience. It is vital that we in Finland remain sharp and engage with the latest ideas; it is in this light that I view your presence here today.

I will try to provide you with additional food for thought. We are emerging from another dark winter into the spring sunshine. This provides the setting for my speech, or at least ought to make it a little more palatable; once again, I have no particularly joyful news to share with you.

As you are well aware, the international system is in transition. This is a fact that has often been repeated from this lectern. Another well-known fact is that the European Union is struggling through a series of crises. New crises seem to appear, even as the old ones are still raging. That is what we see when we look around us.

Are we beginning to get used, or even dangerously numb, to this? Of course, we are deeply disturbed by events such as the Brussels terrorist attacks. They are met by entirely justified demands for stronger measures and a change in policy. But as each day goes by, it is perhaps becoming clearer that better times are unlikely to be just around the corner. In various ways, a long and difficult time may lie ahead of us, which may demand more from us than we dared to think.

We still remember the old east-west confrontation: the days of division between communist and capitalist countries. There still seems to be a division of this kind, but between democratic and non-democratic countries. The world is also divided on the basis of religion. However, these perhaps conceal a more fundamental divide – between order and stability on the one hand, and disorder and chaos on the other. This will continue to be a focus of discussion for us. We need to think in terms of wholes rather than our most cherished details.

In times of such profound upheaval, the key task is to safeguard Europe as a zone of order, stability, democracy and human rights. Only by succeeding in this can we secure development and the continuation of the European way of life. A great deal of work lies ahead of us, even if just a few years ago such circumstances were taken for granted and even viewed as export products. However, our certainties are diminishing, giving way to sources of uncertainty.

Bringing peace to the arc of conflict around Europe's periphery is one of the prerequisites for a better future. Unfortunately, many fires need to be put out. Even dormant conflicts can re-emerge, as we have seen in Nagorno-Karabakh. In the Middle East and North Africa, the roots

of instability and conflict are very deep, penetrating all aspects of life, including the economy and national development.

However, there have also been successes. The nuclear agreement with Iran was one of last year's key developments. The important issue now is that the agreement holds. A ceasefire has been achieved between the government and opposition forces in the Syrian civil war, mainly due to the efforts of the United States and Russia. The important issue now is that it holds. However, the journey towards peace is highly challenging and fragile. The fight against Daesh and other terrorist organisations will continue.

No positive developments have emerged in the east; there are no rapid solutions in sight for the Ukrainian conflict. Although the binding nature of – and the lack of alternatives to – the Minsk Agreement are widely recognised, its implementation seems to have become bogged down for various reasons. When a conflict of interests runs deep enough, even deadlock can begin to seem like a solution. At least the parties to the conflict are in no hurry to reject the agreement.

I could continue talking about conflicts and sources of instability for even longer. The fundamental issue is to realise that they are unlikely to stop impacting on life in Europe and its development for some time to come.

* * *

Large-scale migration flows are, of course, one of those effects. Previously, it had already become clear that Europe could not withstand uncontrolled migration forever – Europe would need to find solutions and take action to stem the flow of migrants, at least limiting it to manageable levels and routes. This had to be recognised, despite the fact that many people, even in Finland, did not want to acknowledge it.

In many respects, the agreement concluded between the European Union and Turkey is not perfect. It has been strongly criticised from the human rights perspective. It will be difficult to implement. Quite predictably, alternative migration routes will be sought; there are already signs of this in the Mediterranean. But such a solution is still better than making no attempt to solve the problem. It is also probably better than a model based on 28 different national solutions. Above all, it is intended to enable the targeting of assistance at people who are fleeing war.

When I spoke on this issue in February, I proposed that even a satisfactory solution would be a worthy goal. No better options were, or are, in sight. In many respects, we live in a time in which we have to choose between unpleasant options. In real life, we cannot simply retreat to the moral high ground, waiting on the perfect idea or reiterating general principles. We must also solve practical problems. We will sometimes make mistakes, but must always try to learn.

Uncontrolled immigration is a phenomenon which is bringing conflicts on the EU's neighbourhood together with its own internal problems. It has accelerated the Union's internal conflicts by creating a new dividing line, partly between – and frequently within – member states. It is clear that those fleeing war cannot be blamed for this. Europeans themselves are accountable for such disputes and choices.

The situation is being further aggravated by the intensification of Islamist terrorism targeted at ordinary citizens in Europe. Most observers view this as a long-term threat, since the phenomenon is closely linked to developments in many Islamic countries and, even more so, to the radicalisation of young people in Europe. The diversification in the means of terrorism, possibly extending to the use of radioactive materials, is worrying. This was a major concern at last week's Nuclear Security Summit in Washington.

How can we combat terrorism and ensure the safety of Europe's inhabitants? The aim is no less than the prevention of attacks. The police and intelligence agencies are the deciding factor in this. Cooperation and the exchange of information must be increased between national authorities as well as across borders. Structures and frameworks are in place for this; above all, we need clear directives and effective practices. Finland has strong capacity in this regard.

Greater coordination and exchange of information is no magic bullet for solving the problem, no matter how much we wish that it were. We also need to take account of our intelligence and anti-terrorism capabilities and the related powers. We must meet an elevated threat with greater capacity, ultimately with a preventative objective. No other goal is possible in countries where the key issue is to ensure the safety of its inhabitants without, of course, breaching other basic rights.

We should also combat terrorism by preventing the social exclusion of young people, in other words by providing them with work and prospects. However, this is easier said than done – even if it is generally accepted that we are dealing with what is mainly a socio-economic problem. In no way does economic growth hold out the prospect of better times in which all our problems will magically disappear. After all, western social policy has already been grappling with economic and social problems for decades. While results have been achieved, we cannot expect the dawn of the perfect society for some time to come.

* * *

The stability and security of our own neighbourhood, the Baltic Region and Northern Europe are Finland's key project – to borrow a term from the Government Programme – in foreign and security policy. That is where most is at stake for Finland.

In terms of security policy, tensions grew in this region when Russia engaged in power politics in Ukraine, in breach of international law. From a wider perspective, this also concerns Russia's increased military capacity and the frequently made observation that it now has a lower threshold for resorting to military force. In addition, mention has been made of the use of nuclear weapons in a manner never heard during the Cold War, or at least in its final stages.

One consequence of this development has been a mutual increase in military activity in the Baltic Sea region, since NATO has also responded to the situation by increasing its presence and activities. This increase may continue after the NATO Summit in Warsaw. Such a process will strengthen the key role played in Europe by the United States.

This change has been noted by Finland and Sweden, the two non-NATO countries of Northern Europe. The foreign and security policy of these two countries is extensively integrated. Both are strengthening their national defence and mutual defence cooperation. Both Finland and Sweden extensively engage in international cooperation. This applies to our NATO partnership as well as cooperation with the United States. There will also be an opportunity to emphasize transatlantic relations when we meet at the Nordic-US Leaders' Summit hosted by President Obama in May.

Finland is therefore reacting, but not overreacting. That is, of course, just my opinion: some believe that we have already overreacted, while others think the opposite. But we can all at least agree that we are reacting.

Why are we acting in this way? First, the increase in tension is having negative impacts, but not to the extent that they have become uncontrollable in scope or have forced a complete reappraisal of the situation. We are not yet out of options.

We will keep an open mind and retain Finland's room for manoeuvre. We are continuously assessing the situation in a rational manner and from a range of perspectives. This is everyday foreign and security policy, which is sometimes more prominent and sometimes subdued.

Under no circumstances can Finland's foreign and security policy rest on a single pillar; it must form a whole whose parts are in the right balance with respect to the challenges of our time. National defence and security, western integration, relations with Russia and international law – the pillars of our stability-oriented policy – are all important. It is on the basis of these pillars that we must take our opportunities, measures and, at times, the initiative. These constitute an active defence.

Together with the Government, we have sought to keep our channels of dialogue with Russia – including its national leaders – open in a transparent and responsible manner. This was the case during the Easter week, when I met with President Putin in Moscow. It is better to talk to one another than ignore each other. It is better to seek cooperation wherever possible. It is better to try to take care of problems than leave them unresolved. Such is Finland's neighbouring area policy in all directions. Looking in one direction does not prevent us from turning towards the others – even if some, who have lost their maps and compasses, clearly fear this.

There is no quick fix for securing the stability of Northern Europe. We need dialogue. We need greater transparency. We also need mechanisms for preventing clashes. By maintaining open links with both west and east, Finland and Sweden have credibility in this regard. Indeed, Finland has sought to bring these links together.

The short-term prospects are fairly uncertain. But we must take action now. The Kultaranta talks, to be held around mid-June, will provide a follow-up forum for this discussion.

* * *

Europe has fallen into what are in many ways difficult and uncertain times. In historical terms, however, this is not an exceptional state of affairs. Only those whose sense of history is limited to the last couple of decades view our times as unusual. Nations that take care of themselves and each other can cope and thrive even now, just as they have done before.

Speech by President of the Republic Sauli Niinistö at the dinner for the diplomatic corps at Presidential palace on 21 April 2016

This is already the fifth occasion on which I have the opportunity to address this esteemed audience. I would like to present my sincere thanks for the energy you have shown in promoting relations between your home countries and Finland. Helsinki's diplomatic community is very strong in this sense and it is always a great pleasure to discuss with you.

Diplomatic celebrations like our evening today get public attention and diplomacy is often described in terms of glamorous festivities. But beneath this pleasant surface lies a hard reality.

Diplomats and diplomatic relations retain their value as long as we want to live in a world that strives toward stability, development and civilized order. Several recent events have reminded us about this. Diplomacy is based on human interaction. It is about listening and understanding, not only about passing messages and advancing one's interests. It's a skill that takes a lifetime to master.

Diplomats and diplomatic efforts are even more needed today as the international system is in deep transition. Transition in international life usually entails rising pressures, crises and even conflicts. It often means also surprises. It can be increasingly hard to predict which end of the

stick one eventually gets. This causes uncertainty and anxiety. This is the world where diplomacy must now operate.

Transformation in world politics usually rearranges hierarchies and causes new divisions. Many of us still remember the old east-west division: the days of division between communist and capitalist countries. There still seems to be a division of this kind, but between democratic and non-democratic countries. The world is also divided on the basis of religion.

However, today even a more fundamental divide exists – the divide between order and stability on the one hand, and disorder and chaos on the other. But in a globalized world there is no clear border between the two. People are fleeing from chaos and disorder, from lack of perspective. But we are also witnessing violence that frequently visits the areas of order.

The global task of diplomacy is to keep territories of chaos and disorder to the minimum – and maximize areas of stability, which also enables development. This can only be achieved together with the international community and guided by the rules and principles of international law.

In times of such profound upheaval, our key task in Europe is to safeguard our continent as a zone of order, stability, democracy, rule of law and human rights. Only by succeeding in this can we secure development and the continuation of the European way of life. And by succeeding ourselves we can help others.

We are all well aware that the European Union is struggling through its own series of crises. I said a couple of weeks ago that in various ways, a long and difficult time may lie ahead of us, which may demand more from us than we dared to think.

Better times are unlikely to be just around the corner and they will not return automatically. It will take a lot of wisdom and courage to overcome several challenges that we are facing. Reiterating general principles or waiting for the perfect idea is not enough. Practical solutions must be found.

Most likely, this year is going to be especially important for the future of Europe. There is a great responsibility to be carried, not only in the eyes of existing generations, but the future ones, too.

* * *

On a number of occasions I have explained Finland's foreign and security policy using the so called "four pillars model". National defence and security, western integration, relations with Russia and international law together with global efforts to tackle the fundamental challenges of the mankind are the pillars of our stability-oriented policy. They are all important. A situation where our policy is not resting on any single pillar alone is always preferable. This is where we like to see continuity.

Those pillars form a whole whose parts need to be in the right balance with respect to challenges of our time. Pillars need continuous maintenance, rebalancing and adjustments. This is happening right now as we are preparing the next White Book on Finland's Foreign and Security Policy.

Of course, "four pillars model" envisages that Finland will remain a proactive member of the international community. We want to continue living in a country which joins others in seeking solutions to the challenges facing Europe and the whole world. Naturally, I hope that you, the heads of your embassies and missions, will lend us your practical support and efforts in this work.

I conclude by thanking once again all of you for your work, for developing our relations with your respective home countries. You represent all the continents of our globe here in Finland. We have had intensive cooperation with many of you and we are looking forward to continuing that. My office, together with the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, is always open to you. I wish you success in continuing or beginning your ambassadorial duties here in Finland.

Thank you!

Speech by President of the Republic Sauli Niinistö at a banquet hosted by President of Estonia Toomas Hendrik Ilves and Mrs Ieva Ilves on 17 May 2016

My esteemed colleague, Toomas Hendrik, dear Ieva,
Dear friends,

Many of the Estonians here will manage without the translation of my speech that has been laid on the table. This is unique: the spirit of togetherness felt by two peoples, separated by a narrow sea, can be heard in our languages. Our countries and peoples have been bound by their languages and history, aspirations and needs, and personal histories for as long as the Gulf of Finland's shores have been inhabited.

The first contacts across the Gulf of Finland go back to the 1300s. Finns brought fish to Estonia in the spring and were paid in rye in the autumn. Trade was based on trust and common needs. It did not pay to betray such trust. However, our period of coexistence was broken violently by war and the Soviet occupation of Estonia. Our southern cousins had to turn their backs on the sea and break with centuries of free movement, which had been based on trade and connections across the Gulf of Finland.

There was hardly any contact at all for decades. Then the connection was slowly but surely re-established via the shipping route and Finnish television. Visa-free travel represented the first step towards close interaction between our peoples. Then came the EU and Schengen, based on which Finland and Estonia have seamlessly integrated their people and economies.

But such connections need the people who build and maintain them. That is why it has been important to have so many opportunities to exchange greetings with you, Toomas Hendrik, both in person and by telephone. All relationships should be actively maintained.

Tensions are higher in the Baltic Sea region than they have been for many years. We are following the tone of pronouncements and watching military developments with concern. History and geopolitics explain the level of concern in the Baltic countries and the desire for a stronger NATO presence. Finland is a force for stability in the region, based on its own foreign and security policy which includes a credible national defence, cooperation with the EU, NATO and the Nordic countries, and dialogue with Russia.

Ladies and gentlemen,

History continues to affect the life of a nation long after the historical facts have been forgotten. I hope that both of our peoples continue to take an interest in each other's history. Understanding is based on the analysis of various experiences and the investigation of their causes – including, on occasions, a closer analysis of our own experiences.

Culture – by which I am not solely referring to presidential DJ gigs – has an important role to play in this. The current generation may feel disinclined to study the history of its neighbouring country – or even that of its own – from books. The plot of the film “The Fencer”, which was directed by a Finn, is set during the Soviet occupation. In essence, it is a depiction of how a

society was ruled by fear. The international success of the film shows that the story speaks to people across national frontiers.

But what does the border between Finland and Estonia signify? In practice, our economies are integrated, with millions of our citizens travelling back and forth for work or leisure. We sometimes even forget that we are abroad. The authorities too must respond to people's everyday needs. The keyword is digitalisation. We need services that can be effortlessly provided and used on both sides of the Gulf. The EU area is in greater need than ever of such technology.

With our economies closely intertwined, now is the time to explore the next steps and take them together. That was what happened today at the 'Future' forum at Mektory. Both countries are in need of structural reforms and – in their programmes – both governments have signalled their commitment to such reforms. Finland and Estonia are small, innovative countries with a high level of education and expertise. We should combine our efforts in exploiting this. Although practical ideas were generated by the discussion, it is the atmosphere that I find truly unforgettable. It was tinged with optimism. This is what is now needed in Finland, Estonia and the whole of the European Union.

Ladies and gentlemen,

I laid a wreath today at the monument for Estonian volunteers who fought in Finland. The setting was impressive and my meetings with veterans were memorable. The motto of the 'sons of Finland', "for the freedom of Finland and honour of Estonia", bears a strong message. As presidents, we wrote a foreword for a compilation of the personal histories of these volunteers, which was published last year. It is wonderful that their story has been recorded for posterity.

I also laid a wreath at the monument of Estonia's War of Independence. This commemorates the 'sons of the North' – Finnish men who came to Estonia to support its struggle for liberation – alongside Estonian fighters. They made their own decisions to come to the assistance of their neighbours.

Our young people have seen neither war nor struggles for independence. Times change, but our strong connection endures. Our neighbouring countries now represent an opportunity for work and study, or to have fun. The lives of our two peoples are intertwined.

Both Finland and Estonia are preparing for their one-hundredth anniversary celebrations. We also aim to hold events together. Our common history will unite us in celebration.

I would like to raise a toast to the Estonian success story, its creators and the future of our countries.

To your health!

Opening speech by President of the Republic Sauli Niinistö at the Kultaranta talks on 19 June 2016

Prime Ministers Löfven and Sipilä, distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen,

I wish you all a warm welcome to the Kultaranta talks. It is always a pleasure to see a group of enthusiastic and articulate participants at Kultaranta as mid-summer approaches. A busy day of discussion lies ahead, to which I am greatly looking forward.

I am particularly pleased that – for the first time – Sweden is represented here. Indeed, such representation, including Prime Minister Löfven himself, could hardly be stronger. In Finland, we always feel that Swedes love discussion. This can be confirmed by the fact that I borrowed

the model for the Kultaranta tradition from Sweden. My salient memory from there is the spirit of the Sälen defence conference; the urge to understand each other and champion a common cause.

We are holding these talks at a time when many truths once regarded as self-evident are being questioned. The European security system created at the end of the Cold War has sustained considerable damage and is under unrelenting pressure. Russia's annexation of Crimea from Ukraine and the conflict in Eastern Ukraine are having a broad impact, including here in the Baltic Sea region and Northern Europe.

But we face problems that are even wider in scope than this. Conflicts and instability in the Middle East and North Africa, and the difficult living conditions that prevail even further afield, present Europe with a major and, perhaps, growing challenge. These clouds are unlikely to clear from our skies for a long time.

The European Union, too, is in turmoil – next Thursday's UK referendum may mark a turning point, or even a fateful development. At any rate, the EU, which has proudly exported its security and values, must now defend them in its own backyard.

Finland completed its latest foreign and security policy report just the other day. The report immediately sparked a lively discussion exploring the issues in question. I will now highlight just a few of the ideas to emerge from the report, which I would like you to reflect on. They are all issues that we have in common with Sweden.

With respect to our security policy, I have often referred to the four-pillar model. All of these pillars – defence capability, western integration, relations with Russia and international law – are discussed in the report. Peace and security are the aim of our active, stability-focused policy, which depends on both dialogue and preparation.

Finland and Sweden are united in highlighting the importance of international law and consensus, especially the security of small countries. Have we reached the point where the significance of such issues is being forgotten and confidence in them is waning? If so, how can such confidence be restored?

The threat posed by hybrid warfare is a hidden reality, which can be realised in forms that we cannot even guess at. It could pose a threat to all aspects of our lives, in which case all citizens form part of our national defence. This restores the neglected notion of national resolve to a position of importance in relation to defence. Finland and Sweden are at the forefront of the western world in giving this value its due recognition and are united behind its common message.

The first pillar in my model has been a strong and credible national defence. We believe that strong armed forces prevent conflict by raising the threshold for aggression. It is perhaps less frequently recognised that they also create interest in partnerships. In this way, a strong defence capability provides options in the unlikely event of deterrence proving insufficient.

Ladies and gentlemen,

Finland and Sweden have a history of responding to the challenges of the time. One approach to this is closer mutual cooperation. Our mutual defence cooperation has deepened markedly in recent years. I have long been of the opinion and have said that defence and military cooperation must be combined with a closer foreign policy partnership between Finland and Sweden. After all, foreign policy and the related instruments are the most customary means to both of us.

The rift between Russia and the West, which was deepened dramatically by the Ukraine conflict, but whose origins lie deeper than the current crisis, is having a direct impact on Finland

and Sweden. While there is no easy and quick solution to the situation, I refuse to believe that it is not worth continuing, unremittingly, to seek one. This too is an issue we should ponder.

Dear friends,

I hope that, both today and tomorrow, we can raise joint questions and seek and find shared answers to them. I am very grateful to Prime Minister Löfven for agreeing to give the opening speech for the Kultaranta talks. May I express my appreciation for this, both personally and on behalf of the whole of Finland.

And by the way, our guests will see that we too know how to talk. We may also indulge in a little friendly rivalry. However, the emphasis is on bringing forth new, bold and concisely expressed ideas, rather on who can speak longest or with superficial conviction.

With these words, I would once again like to bid you welcome and wish all our guests rewarding Kultaranta talks which, this year, will be held bilingually in a bilingual country. I hope that you enjoy your time here and gain something worth taking home with you; if nothing else, at least the feeling that we Finns and Swedes have, and have had, much in common. I believe that we will continue to do so in the future – such is the link that connects Finland and Sweden. Thank you! Tack!

President of the Republic Sauli Niinistö's speech at the Ambassador Seminar on 23 August 2016

The world is transforming, but one issue remains the same: The autumn season of Finnish foreign policy opens with the ambassador seminar. It is always a pleasure to meet you, even if we are not living through the easiest of times.

This year is another in which events have flown by, from one surprise development to another. More now happens in a week than once occurred in an entire year.

It is clear that the burning issues of the day and their management attract most attention. However, in the everyday business of foreign policy, the most urgent issues are not always the most important ones. We need to be able to see not just further ahead, but also further afield. This is something that I would like to encourage you and Finland to do.

But before we can shift our gaze further afield, we need to recognise the dangers and opportunities right in front of us. We need to avoid the fate of those whose gaze is fixed only on the sky.

* * *

As you know, I take a holistic view of Finland's security status, seeing it as resting on four pillars. They are national defence and security, western integration and partnerships, well-functioning relations with Russia and the international system and comprehensive security.

The pillars of our security will not remain strong without constant care, but they require an active policy aimed at maintaining stability. It is not in Finland's interests to stand by and simply follow how things develop.

Let me take a recent example. The tension in the Baltic Sea area has increased due to the Ukraine conflict. Impaired flight safety is one of the dangerous symptoms of this, which could at worst lead to accidents and serious crises. This is not by any means a new issue – it has been discussed at a number of international forums over the years. Despite this, no significant improvements have been made in this regard.

Like many others, I have drawn the attention of both our Russian and western partners to this shared concern. The finger has been pointed at the Russians in particular with respect to dark flights. In light of this the rational conclusion was to take up the issue with Russia. If this is now viewed as being negative or confusing, that is because some other line of reasoning is behind it.

However, the condition of each and every pillar is not only in our hands, but depends on developments in our international environment. No progress on the most burning issues was made in the last year – in fact, the situation has in some respects even worsened. The Ukraine conflict and the Syrian civil war rage on. The most recent escalation in Crimea showed that matters could again take an unexpected turn for the worse.

New developments are also occurring in quick succession elsewhere. The relationship between Russia and Turkey is an example of this. Within nine months, these countries have succumbed from a partnership to a period of deep crisis, and then back again.

The rapid rapprochement between Turkey and Russia represents a major geopolitical change. While it does not necessarily amount to a stable alliance, even a tactical rapprochement poses new challenges to western actors. It should be borne in mind that both countries have expressed deep frustration with the EU at what they view as an endless process of negotiating a partnership – or a membership.

Developments in Turkey have raised legitimate concerns. It would not be in our interests for Turkey to spurn democracy and its EU partnership. There is also a slight historical irony in the harder line being taken by Turkey: there is now a danger that political terms will be set for the EU, which has been the one accustomed to setting the terms to others for many years.

The EU's banking crisis, which had already been declared as solved, is making a comeback after the UK's decision in favour of Brexit. Powerful forces are now shaking up the EU. The sluggish global economy is making an impact. We, who have for so long enjoyed the benefits of globalisation, are now also seeing its darker side. Tougher economic competition is eroding our comparative advantages.

The European Union appears to have reached an impasse in many other respects. This impasse is largely self-inflicted. We all know the steps of this dance: a crisis comes out of nowhere. Summits are held. And then the same thing happens again. And the can is simply kicked down the road. The problem becomes even more intractable.

The EU's problem is ultimately political. Too often, decisions are made to postpone genuine decisions until later. And even when decisions are made, their implementation often adds up to no more than good intentions. By acting in this way, the EU is undermining its own future in the eyes of its citizens. The feeble approach taken to the joint handling of the migration crisis is one example of this. There is much room for improvement.

The Union must not turn out to be a fair-weather organisation. The signs are not entirely encouraging. The UK's Brexit decision is a serious blow. Although it does not yet pose a threat to the Union, it must be taken seriously. One of the strong messages is that people throughout the EU often have little trust even in their own leaders, let alone the EU. This problem is not confined to Britain, but is also taking hold on the continent. If it is allowed to worsen, it will become a genuine threat to the Union and thereby to all of us.

Britain will remain an important partner for the EU and Finland, even after Brexit. We hope that our relations remain close and strong. This is not just an economic issue. Britain's strong and positive input will continue to be needed in terms of foreign and security policy as well.

However, it is clear that the EU's future is again in the melting pot. Many now want to see a radical deepening of the Union, while others want to see it break up. I think that both will be disappointed.

Instead of ambitious, new plans, it would be more relevant to focus on the essential, go back to basics and ensure that all member states and their citizens feel that the European Union brings an element of stability to their lives. However, many people say that even our everyday security is under threat and that terrorism has come permanently to Europe.

If the everyday security of EU citizens is lost, this means that the Union is without its basic function and thereby its legitimacy. For example, terrorism is not an uncontrollable force of nature, but always grows out of particular social and political settings. We must carefully identify and analyse these underlying factors. After that, we need to address them. That is the only way of preventing terrorism.

It is wrong to think that terrorism is new or that it uniquely threatens Europe and its values. On the contrary, regardless of where it occurs terrorism is a global scourge and a crime against life and humanity.

Islamist terrorism is raising particular concern, since the process of radicalisation still seems to be in its early days. Similarly, a number of global transitions and inequality between people and nations are creating long and continuous potential for radicalisation within countries.

The phenomenon of terrorism affects us all, including Finns in one way or another. The question is, what can we do about terrorism. There are means, but do we have the will to use them? Cooperation between the police and intelligence services must be deepened in order to prevent acts of terrorism. We must also develop our anti-terrorism tools. This too is to be covered by Finland's forthcoming new legislation on intelligence activities.

France, which has been the victim of callous attacks, is now giving the most direct thought to these issues. We can illustrate this point by referring to the fact that as many as 81 per cent of the French people favoured the restriction of personal freedoms, if security so requires, in the wake of the Nice attacks. Security and fundamental rights should not be set against each other. Yet it is difficult to get the balance between the two rights. Difficult choices may also lie before Europe and these choices will only become more painful the longer we delay dealing with terrorism and, in particular, its underlying reasons. At the same time, the remedies and their eventual price may be greater than we are ready to absorb at the moment.

In addition to combating terrorism, the EU has much to offer in the field of security. More joint action and a greater role for the EU would be in Finland's interests. The Government's foreign and security policy report approved during the summer refers to the EU as a strengthening 'security community' in stepping up the security of member states. The deepening relationship between NATO and the EU also implies a more important security role for the EU in the future. This is also what citizens wish from the EU. However, cooperation within the EU is always in addition to, and in no case displaces, our own active national role in safeguarding our security.

* * *

In addition to the external pillars, the strength of Finland's own national pillar is a key source of national security. A credible national defence forms an important part of this. We have learned to think that a credible defence creates a threshold and deterrent for intruders. It is equally important that, if a serious crisis should break out, a credible Finnish defence provides also strong incentives for partnership.

However, security is not based on weapons alone. Finland's social solidarity and everyday security for citizens is another important constituent of our national pillar. Our pillar rests on a

solid foundation. In international comparisons, Finland is an exceptionally safe, peaceful and developed country. Several international rankings list Finland as one of the world's most stable and advanced societies. For example, the Fund for Peace Index has once again rated Finland as a sustainably stable state – and, as such, the only one of its kind in the world. In international rankings, Finland is also near the top in terms of human development, low levels of corruption and freedom of the media.

We are often used to being modest and downplaying this by stating that surely we cannot be that good at anything. However, the rankings do tell us something.

It is clear that, in spite of its current challenges, Finland has succeeded well in getting the basics right. The fruits of economic success have been shared reasonably fairly and the entire nation has benefited. The resulting social solidarity is a great achievement by Finland and its people and is a major strength in terms of resisting hybrid and information-based forms of influence.

Yet despite our strengths our national solidarity is also under pressure. I would draw your attention to a report published by the think tank e2 early in the summer, “Kenen mitta on täysi” (“Who’s had their fill?”), on the social climate in Finland.

The report is a sobering read. It states that a large section of the public is dissatisfied, anxious about growing inequality and feels insecure. Many feel that even their own hard work no longer guarantees a living and that our democracy is dysfunctional. Finland is dividing into a nation of winners who are content with life and their country and to those who are dissatisfied and disappointed.

Particular attention should be paid to our young people, the builders of our future. The newly published study, “Finland as a growth environment for young people”, reveals that although most youngsters are faring well, one third of the cohort experience difficulty in finding secondary education and making the transition into working life. This is a worrying trend that sets us apart from other Nordic countries, where young people are better able to get a start in life. According to the latest survey of young people conducted in 2015, only 56 per cent feel that they truly belong to Finnish society. In 2012, three years earlier, the corresponding figure was 76 per cent. This is a negative trend and a fertile breeding ground for future problems.

This same dramatic division can be seen in the result of the UK’s Brexit vote and the popularity of Donald Trump in the United States. When those in society who view themselves as having lost out are roused, the consequences can be difficult to predict.

However, our reaction to the phenomenon should not be to demonise or condemn. Discontent is part of democracy. What is essential is where and how it is channelled, and by what kinds of leaders. If it prompts citizens to have a constructive social impact, it can only be of benefit.

Finnish society remains stable and functional, in spite of some tensions. Many things are going well. However, there are no grounds for complacency. Developments in Finland’s internal situation will also have a decisive influence on our national security.

* * *

I think that although the times have been hard and storm clouds are gathering on the horizon, in many respects Finland’s foreign and security policy has become newly topical and important. This is work that we cannot outsource to others and which presents Finland with opportunities to influence events in advance. These opportunities mainly arise via – and in the pauses between – the hard, everyday work of you and all foreign service employees. Incisive reporting is a key tool in this respect and no one’s contribution is unimportant.

I wish you all the wisdom and strength you need in your important and demanding tasks. But I have a feeling that you have thoughts of your own on these issues as well. In order to avoid a monologue this morning, I will now open up the floor to a discussion of these and other matters.

**Statement by President of the Republic of Finland Sauli Niinistö at the UNGA 71th
General Debate on 21 September 2016**

I wish to congratulate you, Mr. President, upon your election as the President of the 71st session of the General Assembly. You can count on Finland's full support in your important responsibilities.

Mr. Secretary-General, this will be your last General Assembly in this capacity. I thank you for your untiring efforts to advance the common good of humanity. During your time in office, you have been instrumental in setting an ambitious agenda for sustainable development and for tackling climate change. These achievements will make a difference for generations to come.

We had the pleasure to host you last December when Finland marked the 60th anniversary of her United Nations membership. It was an opportunity to remind ourselves of what the UN stands for. The UN is the embodiment and the arbiter of the rule-based international system of sovereign states. It is the only truly global body that we have. But we must work together to ensure that it functions better to fulfil its many tasks.

* * *

Unfortunately, the world continues to confront challenges to international peace and security all over. Narrow-minded nationalism, racism and violent extremism are on the rise. We must battle these destructive ideologies.

The recent nuclear test by North Korea is a cause for grave concern. The conflict in Ukraine still awaits its resolution. All illegal actions, including the annexation of Crimea to Russia, are to be condemned. The complex and horrendous conflicts in and around Syria and Iraq continue to affect not only the Middle East but indirectly also Europe, including my own country, Finland.

These conflicts have already killed and maimed hundreds of thousands, and displaced many more. They have given rise to unprecedented flows of asylum seekers toward and into Europe. European societies are compassionate but today they are under stress. Their capacities to provide for asylum seekers and integration at home, or to provide humanitarian assistance abroad, have limits.

During this UN high-level week we have discussed refugees and migration at two Summits, and for a good reason. We have to work together to find sustainable solutions at global and regional levels to better control borders while safeguarding the rights of those seeking international protection on the basis of a well-founded fear of persecution. That requires vision, courage and leadership. The alternative is stark: borders will become walls to even those entitled to refugee status.

The problem is severe. Every day tens of thousands of people are being displaced as a result of conflict, persecution or natural disaster. Others are on the move to seek a better life. There is an increasing need for humanitarian assistance. The European Union and my country as its member will continue to do their share but it will never be enough: Humanitarian action will never compensate for the inability to address the root causes of forced migration.

It is important to take a longer perspective. The conflicts we are facing now require urgent humanitarian action. Yet the underlying causes are long-term. Economic, social and political

progress is imperative. The international community can and must assist. The UN, for its part, can help to defuse latent conflict through conflict prevention, mediation and, if necessary, preventive peace operations. But the ultimate responsibility for redesigning societies lies with the respective peoples and their governments. Local ownership is the key.

For a number of years Finland and Turkey have taken the lead in efforts to strengthen UN-based mediation. There is a need to foster closer cooperation between different actors, such as traditional and religious leaders, and to draw more participation from the civil society. We are pleased that progress is being made, as evidenced by adoption of the latest General Assembly resolution on mediation just two weeks ago.

This year marks the 60th anniversary of Finland's participation in UN peacekeeping. Since 1956, some 50 000 Finnish men and women have served in UN operations around the world. Finns continue to serve in the Middle East and elsewhere. Some of them have made the ultimate sacrifice. We honour the work of these men and women.

Finland is committed to on-going efforts to strengthen the various aspects of peace operations. We welcome the Secretary-General's efforts to bring the UN peacekeeping to the twenty-first century. The Leaders' Summit on Peacekeeping hosted by President Obama last year was a significant step in the right direction. It needs to be followed up.

Problems with the illicit flow of conventional weapons continue but finally there is progress. The Arms Trade Treaty has entered into force. But two tasks remain: it needs to be adopted by all and implemented effectively. Many member States whose contributions are needed remain outside. I urge you to join without delay.

* * *

The adoption of the 2030 agenda for sustainable development a year ago was a milestone. Another was the conclusion of the Paris Agreement to combat climate change. The true test, however, will be their implementation.

In Finland, it is being carried out in an inclusive way. We focus on establishing partnerships between government, the private sector, universities and civil society. All of us, as Finnish citizens, are encouraged to get involved. I personally have committed to lowering my carbon footprint by half within a decade by signing up to the "Citizens Climate Pledge" initiative. The initiative was made global couple of weeks ago in an event hosted by the UN Climate Change Secretariat. Similar mechanism exists for the inclusive participation in support of the Agenda 2030.

Gender equality and the political, economic and social empowerment of girls and women are key drivers in sustainable development and in combating climate change. In my own country gender equality has been vital in our rise from poverty to prosperity. I welcome all efforts that raise the issue, such as the HeForShe movement initiated by UN Women. I am personally involved in this important work. But the UN and its Member States still have a long way to go to meet the target of gender equality.

*

*

*

The next Secretary-General will be a subject of almost colossal expectations. Finland welcomes a selection process that is more transparent and more inclusive. We also welcome the fact that so many female candidates are seeking the position.

We, too, have a message to the incoming UN leader. We would like to see the new Secretary-General working closely together with, and, if necessary, sometimes even one step ahead of the Security Council in fulfilling the mandate of the UN Charter.

Another challenge is to make the UN work better as an organization. The next Secretary-General can do so by ensuring that different UN activities complement each other, so that the UN truly delivers as one.

Let me finish by assuring you of Finland's full support to the incoming Secretary-General – whoever she or he may be.

Speech by President of the Republic of Finland Sauli Niinistö at the dinner in honour of the visit by President of Lithuania Dalia Grybauskaitė at the Presidential Palace on 18 October 2016

It is a great pleasure for me and my spouse to warmly welcome you to Helsinki. We are delighted that you are here. I look back with fond memories to my visit to Lithuania and your beautiful capital in 2013.

Our mutual ties are increasing. Political visits and exchanges are frequent. We have a lively dialogue and co-operation in the field of security and defence. Also trade and investments are growing.

All of these activities point to an important common interest: Increasing our connectivity. Rail Baltica, Via Baltica and the new energy connections, such as the forthcoming Baltic Connector, are important to both of us.

* * *

We are both members and partners in the European Union. At the moment the EU is facing many challenges. Brexit, migration and the wider arc of instability around the EU's borders are causes of concern. I am confident that these issues can be managed but hard and dedicated work looking for common solutions is required. One field where steps forward should be taken is security. The EU is hardly worthy of the name union if it cannot protect its own people.

The security situation in Europe has taken a dramatic turn for the worse. Breaches of international law and norms are never good news for small countries. The stability of the Baltic Sea region is a common and vital interest for both of us. Although our security policy solutions are not identical, we share the same concerns.

Finland's security rests on four pillars – our own defence capability; Western integration and partnership with NATO, US and bilaterally with Sweden and the United States; dialogue with Russia; and international governance and law. They are all important. Finland will not be a passive bystander. On the contrary, our aim is to pursue an active foreign and security policy aimed at fostering regional security and stability.

Times are turbulent well beyond our immediate borders and concerns. The catastrophe in Syria reveal our collective inability to deal with protracted conflicts. The massive movement of migrants over the past year showed that no country, however far removed, is exempted from worrisome developments.

* * *

The future of our shared environment is another key issue. There are some rays of hope. The conclusion of the Paris Agreement to combat climate change was an important milestone.

Closer to home, it is common knowledge that the Baltic Sea is the most polluted sea in the world. Therefore development of technology such as LNG-propelled ships and agreement not to dump wastewater into the sea are important developments. Also the Finnish companies are doing their part. Technology under the brand name "clean tech" is about making a positive

contribution both to the environment and the profit margins. This is another sector where I see untapped potential for our countries.

* * *

As I said at the beginning, we are happy to see you here in Helsinki. There is, however, one event where potentially seeing the Lithuanians is not only a source of joy. I am talking about the forthcoming European championship tournament in basketball next year which Finland is co-hosting.

And why is basketball not only a source of joy? We have to go back in history to the year 1939 when Finland for the first time played in the European championships. We lost all our matches, but to Lithuania we lost 112 to 9.

We have come a long way since then and are eager to follow in your footsteps: You have shown us that also small counties can excel at the highest level!

Even if we do not get to meet in the tournament, we will have plenty of opportunities to get together in the coming years. The next few years will mark some important anniversaries. Lithuania recently celebrated the restoration of its independence 25 years ago. In 2017 Finland will celebrate 100 years of independence and in 2018 you will follow suit.

Yet independence does not mean doing things alone. Increasingly it entails a pooling of resources and working together with others. I want to assure you that Finland is eager to continue working with Lithuania, both bilaterally and multilaterally, to the benefit of all.

Madam President, I want to raise my glass to the excellent relations between our countries, to your health and the continued success of the people of Lithuania.

Speech by President of the Republic Sauli Niinistö at the opening of the 219th National Defence Course on 7 November 2016

Congratulations on being selected to participate in the National Defence Course. You are on the course because you are needed. A great experience and an important lesson on the many ways in which our country is protected lies ahead of you.

Every one of us is needed. I have a habit of saying that each and every Finn is a defender of our country. In the unpredictable times we are living, our national will to defend ourselves is not merely old-fashioned rhetoric.

It is good that Finns share this idea. Eight out of ten Finns are ready to defend their country. This is high by international standards and sends a strong message to the world around us. Just as importantly, the skills and attitudes acquired during military service mean that a large proportion of our citizens know how to act in a state of emergency. This provides a strong foundation for our security.

We long believed that we were living in an ideal world. One dominated by consensus-based, international law and in which disputes are resolved peacefully.

The reality is different. Even we in Europe have witnessed this over the last few years. We have cherished the idea of an arc of stability around us, but that arc has started to disintegrate.

Some believe that the solution is to close our eyes. But this will not banish evil from the world. The threats and problems will remain in place or even strengthen. Others seek quick solutions, which they think will eliminate all of our problems at once. This is not realistic. In a constantly changing situation, there is no such thing as complete security. However, there are many ways in which we can increase our own security.

In national defence courses, the participants engage in open discussions, both in the classroom and around the coffee table. You are sure to do the same.

An open discussion on security is now underway in Finland. This discussion is most hotly contended by a minority at diametrically opposed extremes: there are those who believe that “now, if ever” is the time for Finland to join NATO, while others believe that “we should never join, not now or ever”.

Let me take the heated debate on our freedom of expression on Russia as an example. I do not really understand what is this all about. Finland has been quick and clear in condemning Russia’s actions in Crimea, Ukraine and Syria; during the last parliamentary elections the headlines again trawled through every possible route by which Russia might attack Finland. Now, the Åland Islands, which were forgotten at the time, have also fallen to Russia! Suspicions have also been publicly raised that Russia will dispute our independence during our anniversary year. It is difficult to think of anything that has been left unsaid. Inventiveness is now required in the contest over who can be harshest on Russia.

The other side has, in turn, complained that criticism of Russia has gone too far. I am worried about a completely different phenomenon – the trivialisation of evil. If we engage in war on paper on a daily basis, then war will grow near to us in our thoughts. The same holds true of the references to nuclear weapons during the Russian discussion on Crimea – the possibility of using them was somehow normalised.

Another sensitive topic appears to be military exercises alongside the West, meaning Sweden, NATO and the United States. According to some, this will endanger Finland’s military non-alignment while others advise us to increase training with our Western partners as soon as possible. The truth is that our western military cooperation is already much more extensive than before and that this will continue. Finland engages in such military cooperation only on the basis of its own points of departure and needs. Finland will develop its military preparedness and interoperability not only to form a deterrent and threshold for intruders but also to be an attractive partner should the worst happen. This will also serve the development of Finland’s own defence.

It is not in Finland’s interests to stir up confrontation. A wise person asks whether there are means of alleviating confrontation. This is called dialogue, or diplomacy. It is also Finland’s long-term foreign and security policy. It is also my policy.

What I have just said does not make our own defence unnecessary – on the contrary. I would like to mention a key theme, namely Finland’s preparedness in the face of a fast-changing security environment. It is a theme which I have already discussed with three governments.

The recent crises have challenged our notions of traditional warfare. We have witnessed systematic operations exploiting the vulnerabilities of the targeted state. A wide range of hybrid threats are employed: information-based operations, pressure by economic or technological means, unmarked armed forces and cyber warfare – and the range of means will continue to expand.

Via broad-based collaboration between public authorities, Finland’s overall security model aims to guarantee that society functions as smoothly as possible in all circumstances. Hybrid operations are specifically aimed at preventing the achievement of this. Although our model is up to date, we need to be capable of upgrading it continuously.

I believe that Finland's preparedness to respond to potential threats is based on an equation with three variables: accurate and real-time situational awareness, appropriate competences and sufficient capabilities. Finland has room for improvement with respect to all of these.

Accurate, up-to-date situational awareness is the first requirement of sufficient readiness. In our current world, military and civilian intelligence legislation is an absolute precondition for our general ability to identify actions that could have a significant impact on, or threaten, our security.

However, this is not enough in itself. New threats tend to progress fast, often on several fronts. That is why more foresight is required from our situational awareness. The bill – on the government's situational awareness – soon to be presented to Parliament is a step in the right direction.

Once a threat has been verified, the question of the required competencies arises. We should critically examine the application of the current Emergency Powers Act: Do our current practices enable sufficiently streamlined and rapid action? Regardless of the situation, it needs to be clear that we can easily identify emergency situations when necessary. At the moment, there is a hybrid-warfare-sized gap between routine powers and confirming an emergency situation. We need to investigate and, if necessary, plug this gap.

However, our response to possible threats ultimately depends on our capabilities. This places the focus on the performance of our Defence Forces, our border control and internal security resources, and the crisis tolerance of Finnish society in general.

Much has already been done. Above all, we have in many ways improved the readiness of our Defence Forces. We have improved our defence zone surveillance, particularly in sea areas and airspace. We have improved our troop mobilisation. A new legal interpretation has improved the availability of conscripts for various missions. Legislative amendments have expedited the recruitment of reservists. We have improved the material readiness of our rapid reaction forces. In addition, we have improved the skills of our troops through exercises.

However, action is still required in all sectors of national security. Ensuring the appropriate level of readiness in economically difficult times is certainly burdensome for our nation, but it is also unavoidable.

Our national defence and security form just one of the four pillars on which our security rests. The others are western integration and partnerships, well-functioning relations with Russia, and the international system and broad-based security. I will now only take up the EU which forms a part of our western pillar.

Membership of the European Union is of key importance to Finland's security policy. The EU has entered a new situation in relation to security, at a time when it faces many other difficulties. Military tensions have intensified rapidly on the EU's frontiers in the Baltic region.

Discussions on strengthening EU defence cooperation have intensified in many countries – this is not important to Finland only. Finland must make a strong contribution to this development effort – we can only gain by the process.

Progress, rather than speculation on the ultimate goal, is now of paramount importance. This reflects the basic wisdom of the founding fathers of integration: by moving forward on an ambitious but pragmatic basis, we can take tangible steps that, in this instance, increase our security.

Let me cite an example: There has long been talk of establishing a permanent military headquarters to strengthen the EU's own planning and command capabilities. Now, it should simply be established. Many other issues deserve our continued attention – including cooperation on defence materiel and measures to promote security of supply. When developing the EU's security policy, we should also bear in mind the fact that internal and external security are now more strongly integrated. When discussing asymmetric or hybrid threats, it is highly artificial to compartmentalise them into external and internal activities.

It would be natural for our intensifying security policy cooperation with Sweden to be reflected at European level.

Many people feel that we live in troubled times. However, I do not regard Finland's situation as bleak. We have a good security status, which we are further strengthening in many respects. In this, we will need to use our national strengths, engage in strong international cooperation and be ready to invest in our common security.

I believe that the course you are about to begin will reinforce this notion for many of you. May I wish you a productive and successful National Defence Course.

Speech by President of the Republic Sauli Niinistö at a banquet in honour of Kersti Kaljulaid, President of the Republic of Estonia and Mr Georgi-Rene Maksimovski at the Presidential Palace on 7 March 2017

This is our third meeting within a short time span. While it is rare for high-level meetings to be so frequent, this is customary between Finland and Estonia.

Our shared and partly separate histories loom large in our minds as Finland celebrates its centenary and Estonia prepares for its own anniversary. There are times when history is written by stronger states, at the expense of smaller ones. We have not had to submit to this. As the descendants of rune singers, we tell our own stories. This continues to be important during our age of information influence.

The key moments during our independence have been entwined in many ways. There were only 11 weeks between Finland and Estonia's declarations of independence. With the support of its Finnish brothers, Estonia fought a victorious war against foreign enemies. Estonia returned the favour, when its 'sons of Finland' came to our aid during the Continuation War. This is a debt of honour, which we Finns will never forget.

Despite our shared experiences, there have also been differences in our political history. It is little wonder that we sometimes disagree on details, emphasise different aspects or use different expressions. No one should be alarmed by this. The main thing is that we respect each others' views. And when we meet often enough, we hear and listen to each other's arguments. By doing so the gap between us then either diminishes or simply disappears.

* * *

The entire Western world is living through a period of confusion. In Europe, we are used to taking democracy, reliable media, equality and the rule of law for granted. Causes of uncertainty have now taken their place alongside these. New social undercurrents have sprung up due to uncontrolled immigration and growing, populist extremism and intolerance, combined with economic uncertainty. Terrorism affects us, too. Estonian lives were lost in Nice and Finns were injured in Brussels.

Much has also occurred in our shared Baltic Sea region. Geopolitics is said to have returned, if it ever really left our neighbourhood. Tension has certainly increased in our region.

I think that such tension reflects the cold winds blowing through the wider, international scene. Yet we, too, can feel these cold gusts on our faces. The result is uncertainty and unpredictability, which feels particularly unpleasant for small countries which respect international rules.

Finland and Estonia rely on international law and have a right – and even obligation – to demand that it is upheld. We must be scrupulous in our own actions, even if major powers occasionally interpret the rules to their own advantage. Only then can we demand the same from others. Finland and Estonia have fulfilled their EU and other international obligations well. This is both noted and appreciated.

However, the power of values and examples are not always sufficient. Initiative and actions are also needed in order to defuse tensions and demonstrate the value of cooperation and joint structures for all. A good example of this is the meeting, held last week in Helsinki, of the International Civil Aviation Organization's ICAO working group on aviation safety in our region. I am delighted that the meeting was arranged and that a further meeting will be held. I would like to thank Estonia for its support in promoting the initiative.

However, we are not alone, either individually or as a pair. A united European Union, mutual solidarity and the determination to find solutions lie in our own hands. I am confident that Estonia will provide a skilful EU Presidency in the second half of this year. Finland will support Estonia in every regard in this task.

The EU certainly needs reform and must focus on activities which generate added value for its people. An example of this, which comes to mind, is guaranteeing national security. It is often forgotten that the EU underpins the close interaction between the economies and people of Finland and Estonia. Without EU support, workers may well have remained immobile, energy and infrastructure projects unimplemented, and the Gulf of Finland much wider than it is now.

* * *

Finland regarded Estonia as a partner from the moment the latter regained its independence. Our Finland100 slogan is 'Together'. Although the original idea was perhaps to give the celebrations a Finnish stamp alongside other Finns, the slogan fits Finnish-Estonian relations perfectly. It should also resound around Europe.

To quote from Lennart Meri, individuals and even whole generations are always pursued by a human temptation to say: we have reached our goal. However, and in spite of our joint celebrations, this is never true for nations themselves, or – in our case – between nations: Our joint work and common journey is only just beginning.

Let us raise a toast to the singers of our ancient chants – to our shared mind-set and language, and to the many ways in which they are expressed.

Speech by President of the Republic Sauli Niinistö at the opening of parliament on 2 February 2017

Members of Parliament,

You are the custodians of great things. This year, Finland will celebrate 100-years anniversary of its independence as one of the world's most stable democracies. Rule by the people is a key factor in this success story, since its deep roots in the Finnish mentality have brought us this far. Our democratic principles have also been skilfully applied; as you are doing in your turn.

The early years were neither easy nor to be taken for granted. Our country was still being forged, in many respects, during our first three decades of independent democracy. Figures spring to mind from each decade of that period. First there was K. J. Ståhlberg, the author and uncompromising defender of our Constitution; then there was Väinö Tanner, who persuaded his own side to walk the path of parliamentary responsibility; and in the thirties there was P.E. Svinhufvud, who repulsed the opponents of democracy – also from his own political wing. In addition, Lex Kallio, a law whose very name is a kind of metaphor for being anchored in Finnish granite, formed the bedrock of all of this.

A great tradition in domestic policy was born: that differing views, including deep contradictions, can be solved by democratic means, even if this ultimately involves chastising your own side.

We would not have survived the wars and dangerous years that followed without this. In other words, we would not have survived without Finns feeling that ‘we are all a part of this, this is our common goal – the arguments can be had and solved later, when we can thrash out our differences properly’.

A great tradition in foreign policy was also established. Whether we name it after Paasikivi, Kekkonen, or both, its orientation and aim was towards the West, but necessarily sought to secure our existence alongside our neighbour, the Soviet Union, which later dissolved. The door opened to Europe and to the European Community, whose goals and values we felt very much at home. Many or most people believed that the circle had closed; this was where we have arrived, will stay and where we are comfortable.

Since those earlier days, the world and everyday life have gradually but fundamentally changed, at least externally, with technology, the digital world and robots taking us into entirely new realms. But there has been no change in basic human mentality; there are negative and positive feelings both within and between nations.

So the same issues always arise.

* * *

Now, as at almost any other time, domestic policy is dominated by the economy; not necessarily in terms of GDP or the deficit figures, but with regard to its impact on daily life.

The decade or more following the mid-nineties was a time of increasing well-being and growth. There was a general feeling that this would continue. We became complacent and set in our ways, unable to see that today’s prosperity can be tomorrow’s worst enemy.

The financial crisis brought us back to earth, but did not fully awaken us. During many of the following lean years we comforted ourselves with the idea that ‘growth will resume next year’ or we ‘will respond with a stimulus’, or that change would arrive ‘during the next term of government at the latest’. Living on credit began to be the new normal.

This is not a party political point; almost all political parties had a hand in this period of policy paralysis during their terms in government.

When speaking at the opening session a few years ago, I said that we must act, because we cannot afford to do nothing.

We have now seen that there are no easy solutions. The old saying, that you can’t make an omelette without breaking eggs, sometimes a lot of eggs, still holds true. There has been criticism, and even commotion on the public stage, sometimes on and sometimes off topic.

But I would encourage you to forge ahead; since we cannot afford to do nothing.

The key issue is that we continue our great tradition in domestic policy, of cherishing democracy. We have no major movements within or outside politics that would seek to challenge our democratic system.

It is clear that we have much to learn about the new, real-time media. For example, we often get worked up by momentary updates via the social and other media, but the news then changes in the blink of an eye.

We, the representatives of the people, need to remain cool-headed and – at times – be patient and remember the big picture. We need to show that we appreciate what we do, but that we also respect the efforts of those who disagree with us. This will send out a signal of stability to our fellow Finns.

* * *

Finland is highly dependent on the global economy. Free trade has increased prosperity in the world and in Finland. For example, extreme poverty has been halved in just two decades. On the other hand, competition has intensified and the issue of improving competitiveness has become a much repeated theme.

However, we may be on the brink of an era of a different kind. Suspicions about the rise of protectionism are well-founded. If trade restrictions are imposed, they are bound to lead to retaliation. Such a spiral would create a hugely paradoxical situation: the challenge would no longer be competitiveness alone, but can one benefit from it.

The closure of economic or other borders is not a cure for the imbalances of globalisation. No nation can flourish by forgetting the rest. The direction should be towards open cooperation based on international rules.

In addition to the good it has done, globalisation has increased inequality. By this, I not only mean the latest astonishing news that just a few individuals own as much as the poorest approximately four billion people in the world. This is not just about money, but increasingly about the concentration of economic power. A very small number of people can fundamentally affect the circumstances of very large masses.

I consider it important for Finland to combat inequality. I am sure that you would like to engage in broad cooperation in this respect. In addition to public sector activities, each and every Finn has the duty to help those who are in need; to encourage those who need encouragement; but also to prod those who choose to be inactive. And we must all give a clear message to greed: No!

* * *

The great foreign policy tradition has rested on the art of the possible. This remains true and will perhaps become even more so in the near future.

Finland is part of the West and is a country of western traditions. Nobody is questioning this. Our existence is based on the values of democracy, human rights and equality. These are also the foundations of our foreign policy.

So what constitutes the West at the moment? From Finland, the sun traces an arc westwards to the land of Brexit, and onwards to Trump Tower. This realignment of the West is raising many questions and inspiring a great deal of thought. In my New Year's speech, I made the point that the EU must speak out on geopolitical matters – it has now become clear that the voice of Europe is also much needed in championing western values.

Our security policy can have only one objective – how best to ensure a secure life for Finnish people. Neither Finland nor the Nordic countries in general are a source of danger that any

unrest would break out in our own back yard because of us or that would be directed against us in particular. However, we do need to be prepared for problems originating elsewhere.

This is where our foreign and security policies converge; we need to build our security in all places and in all ways.

The steps taken can be small, as in the effort to lessen tensions by improving air safety in the Baltic Sea area; or larger such as in the idea of holding an Arctic Council summit in Finland; or even broader, as in our activities in international organisations, peace mediation and development cooperation. All are important.

We must secure our own continued existence, in case the worst occurs. I would like to return to the four pillars I have mentioned on previous occasions, if only to update them. They are not static, but develop over time.

First of all, with regard to national measures, Parliament will soon receive a Government Report on Finnish Defence Policy for its consideration. It has a clear message: Evil will be met with stiff resistance. In addition to which, Finland will be a strong partner if a crisis occurs.

Secondly, I would like to refer to partnerships. Even we are surprised by how well cooperation with Sweden has progressed. Where applicable, the same cooperation could occur alongside the other Nordic countries. The EU has also woken up to the need of protecting itself, something which we in Finland have long advocated. We have been at the heart of a NATO Summit for the first time, which sends a strong signal. We are building on a long-standing relationship with the United States, which has yielded results in areas including arms sales and beyond.

Thirdly, there is our relationship with Russia, which has always been an inevitable and essential priority for us. We have no bilateral problems in this regard and have no interest in creating such problems. They respond to our invitations as do we to theirs, talking very frankly, as good neighbours tend to do. We know each other very well.

The fourth pillar is the rules-based international order resting on the United Nations. This is our weakest pillar and we draw no comfort from the fact that the same holds true globally. There are now major problems in this regard – will a few big fish cruise past the hundreds of minnows? We are on the side of the little fish, but not against the big ones. An effective and just international order is ultimately in everyone's interests.

* * *

And now for a small digression: At the beginning of the decade, Parliament decided to make itself the highest-level custodian of our foreign policy, as recommended by the Constitutional Law Committee. This concerned a hypothetical situation in which the Government and the President of the Republic were in disagreement. Parliament would resolve the matter and all sides would have to settle for that.

Digressions always need to be explained: Although such a situation is unlikely to occur in practice, the signal is positive and clear: Democracy is in your hands! Cherish it! Mr Speaker, Members of Parliament,

I would like to congratulate the party leaders for the continued support they have received and wish every one of you the greatest success, as well as wisdom in your demanding work on Finland's behalf.

I hereby declare the 2017 session of Parliament opened.

Speech by President of the Republic Sauli Niinistö at the dinner for the diplomatic corps at the Presidential Palace on 25 April 2017

Weather might be cold outside but a clear sign of spring is this annual get-together with the diplomatic community in Finland. It is always a pleasure to host this dinner and this year makes no exception.

And perhaps today we share an even more special feeling than usually. As you know, Finland is celebrating the 100th anniversary of its independence. In years Finland is still young, although in fact it belongs to the oldest third of independent states in the world.

Your presence here today bears witness to the historical depth of our ties with the world. I am happy to note that we get to celebrate our anniversary as a member of such a vibrant and global diplomatic community.

As always, I want to thank you for the invaluable work that you undertake to build relations between Finland and your countries. Your presence and your efforts are very much appreciated. I and my cabinet have worked with many of you over the past year. We are always open to further contacts and collaboration. The same applies to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs as well.

Our times seem to call for quick results and decisive victories. Yet we all know that lasting results only come about through hard and dedicated diplomacy.

As I have noted here before, the essence of diplomacy is dialogue. Not only talking but also listening: In addition to making your case you must make an honest effort to try to understand the vantage point of your partner. You do not always have to agree but you must show due respect. The assurances of our highest consideration that we repeatedly exchange are not mere words but a binding commitment to conduct an open and honest dialogue. This, if any, is the enduring wisdom of diplomacy. It is also the guiding principle of Finnish foreign policy.

* * *

The past year has been one filled yet again with a stream of seemingly unforeseen events. I am saddened to note that too few of them have been positive ones. Terrorist acts have become a recurring event also in Europe.

Finland is not sitting idle waiting for the events unfold. We have adopted three governmental reports, one on foreign and security policy, second on internal security and the most recent one on defence policy.

In these documents we have sought to portray a clear-eyed reading of our changing security environment while combining it with a can-do attitude towards charting a course forward for the country and indeed the wider European region.

For me the key messages of the foreign and security policy report read as follows: “Finland actively improves the stability of security in its vicinity” and does so by pursuing “an active policy of stability to prevent military threats.”

Active stability policy might sound like a contradiction in terms but it is not: In a rapidly changing and to a large degree worsening security environment sitting on our hands is not an option. On the contrary, we must all accept that security begins at home and make sure that we are adequately prepared for any eventualities. Ensuring that this will be the case in Finland is the main task of the internal security and defence policy reports. We want to send a strong message that we take our national security very seriously.

At the same time we must all keep in mind that lasting peace will never grow out of the barrel of a gun. It is our common responsibility to uphold co-operative forms of security.

Finland will do its part. We have been steadfast in defending the principles and structures underlying European security and stability. Finland has also done and will continue to do its share to alleviate regional tensions. Our tradition of respectful dialogue will endure. The

initiative for Baltic Sea air safety is a manifestation of this. I want to thank everyone who has played a role in enabling the work done under its auspices to become a success.

* * *

Luckily the world is not all doom and gloom. We must never lose sight of the positive aspects of life. One of them are gatherings like this dinner tonight that allow us to come together. I would like to propose a toast to diplomacy, dialogue and the continued success of our relations.

Thank you!

Speech by President of the Republic of Finland Sauli Niinistö at the Lennart Meri Conference in Tallinn on 13 May 2017

I would like to thank for this invitation. I am honoured to be delivering this key note.

Lennart Meri was an exceptional individual. He lived a remarkable life during a very difficult time in Estonian history and he left a lasting mark well beyond his own country. Lennart Meri was a man of keen intellect with a good sense of humour and he never missed an opportunity for a debate. This Conference is a fitting tribute to his memory.

Today I speak also in honour of another great statesman – President Mauno Koivisto – who passed away last night. When he, as a young soldier, heard that the war had ended, he got out of the trenches carrying his gun and thought to himself “there must be another, more peaceful way of dealing with ones neighbour.” His actions towards that goal are a legacy for us all to uphold.

* * *

Today I want to touch upon two issues. Firstly, I will give an overview of the security dynamics in Europe and highlight how Finland is seeking to uphold European security. Secondly, I will underline the Arctic as a global concern.

To begin with, I take it that we can all agree that Europe is not as stable and secure as we would like it to be. We are forced to admit that the post-Cold War promise of stable and prosperous Europe without dividing lines has not been achieved. Increased tensions, arms races and rise of terrorism show no signs of abating.

Many say that ‘geopolitics’ is back. Indeed, hard words have been followed with hard action: Military activities and build-up are increasing, and military operations and exercises are conducted in previously unseen ways. Threat perceptions also include asymmetric threats, such as hybrid and cyber. Even the very foundations of our democracy, elections, have been targeted with malign intents.

There is no denying that European security is riven by deep mistrust. Our joint co-operation platform, the OSCE, struggles as key commitments have been breached: The annexation of Crimea by Russia was a heavy blow.

Finland is steadfast in defending the principles and structures underlying European security and stability. We have also taken steps to enhance our own security. We are investing into our armed forces, in particular by enhancing readiness and rapid reaction. We are passing new legislation to ensure that we have all the means necessary to protect ourselves. We also contribute to increasing our common resilience towards hybrid threats.

We want to send a strong signal that we take security very seriously. We work closely with our partners in NATO and our bilateral defence co-operation with Sweden is progressing rapidly.

For Finland, the EU is of particular relevance. I have been raising EU defence co-operation to the debate for over a decade. My starting point is this: The EU is hardly a true union if it does not play its part in ensuring the security of its own citizens.

For many EU members NATO is the primary forum for collective defence, and rightly so. But there is a great deal we can do together under the banner of 'Protecting Europe'. I am confident that succeeding in this task is important for the EU also in the eyes of our citizens: Security is an area where the public has expectations towards the Union.

There has been a major shift in the EU's orientation towards defence. There was a time when the Commission did not even dare to say the word aloud. This changed in 2013 when the issue was debated at the European Council and the Commission launched its road map on defence. It was also then that the EU decided to start spending money on defence.

This year we have seen moves to strengthen the EU as a security community. I am happy to note that at last discussions concerning defence co-operation are bearing fruit. We are close to agreeing on activating Permanent Structured Co-operation (PESCO) in defence. Finland fully supports this development and will contribute to the process.

* * *

But as always the devil is in the detail. We need to strike the right balance, be ambitious but also see the value of inclusiveness. We are a Union and this should be reflected also in the field of security. We must ensure that the arrangements are and will remain inclusive while bringing concrete steps forward and real value added to the security of ordinary Europeans. Developing key capabilities, enhancing our operational readiness, but importantly also our willingness, are important.

But we also need dialogue. Finland has done and will continue to do its share to promote security in Europe. The initiative for Baltic Sea air safety is a manifestation of this. Although the work in the context of International Civil Aviation Organisation ICAO is low-political, it has been one of the rare occasions for constructive discussions on issues affecting our common security.

We need a chain of positive steps to foster confidence and security. This requires, firstly, that we see success in efforts to resolve the many crises of the day – particularly Ukraine, Syria and North Korea. At the same time we should take a fresh look at the bigger picture that includes technology development, weapons of mass destruction, arms control and military confidence building measures.

Two of the biggest concerns today are the use of chemical weapons in Syria and prospects regarding nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, including in North Korea. We must strictly enforce the Chemical Weapons Convention. These weapons should never be used. It is also important that the nuclear weapon states, in particular the United States and Russia, get back on track in their strategic talks and seek to reduce all types of nuclear weapons.

Conventional arms control is also crucial in preventing conflicts, alleviating tensions and building confidence. Since most of the current arms control measures in the OSCE framework were agreed during the Cold War almost three decades ago, the tool box is in need of modernization. Finland welcomes the efforts to promote arms control dialogue, such as the so-called Steinmeier initiative and recently initiated dialogue on security risks and challenges in Vienna.

We need more predictability and transparency. We also need to reduce risks and military activities that give rise to concerns. I believe now is the time for a genuine engagement on arms control and confidence building. I readily admit this is by no means an easy task. But to give

up the effort at the outset would be detrimental to European security, the OSCE, arms control regimes and to our own security interests.

* * *

The future of humanity does not depend on military security alone. Finland has just begun its two-year Chairmanship of the Arctic Council. Although the Council has only eight full members, the Arctic itself is a global concern.

The Arctic is a region that puts us face to face with the great dilemma facing humanity: do we approach the Arctic primarily as a source of economic opportunities, or do we admit that preserving the region's ecosystem is critical to our entire planet? In short: Do we put the environment or the economy first?

Recently we have seen mixed signals concerning the topic. On the one hand, the leaders of the two largest member states, the United States and Russia, have expressed views that climate change is not due to human action. On the other hand the Arctic ministerial meeting in Fairbanks earlier this week adopted a declaration that not only acknowledged climate change but also put the attempts at fighting it to the forefront.

It is clear that we need to utilise the economic potential of the Arctic but do it in a manner that is sustainable. At the same time we must make the tackling of climate change a priority.

I would recommend approaching the issue from the perspective of black carbon, an accelerator of glacier melting. Old energy plants in the neighbourhood of the Arctic are causing heavy pollution due to incomplete burning. And then we have flaring – a process, almost impossible for a lay man to understand, where excess gas is burnt off on the production site. Around the world, flaring wastes forty times more gas than Finland consumes in a year.

I believe that a 'neutral zone' for co-operation can be found from combating these two sources of emissions. Doing so would not interfere with interests bent on economic exploitation. On the contrary, refitting plants would create business opportunities.

* * *

Estonia will begin its first EU Presidency in July. It is an important position at a very challenging time. I am confident that the Estonian Presidency will be a success. You can count on Finland's full support in your tasks.

I opened this speech with Lennart Meri and I want to close it with him as well. Speaking in 1999 at an event commemorating the end of the Cold War he made an important remark: 'We, and indeed all of western Europe, have repeatedly stated that we want to have strong and friendly relations with all our neighbours. We do not wish, nor do we intend to build up new walls between the European Union and the countries east of us.'

I have no doubt that this vision is the right one. The path ahead will be long and narrow but there is no feasible alternative. We must also accept that achieving Lennart's vision does not depend only on us. But at least we should ensure that we ourselves are up to the task: Ready to ensure our own security as well as foster mutual confidence and trust through dialogue.

**President of the Republic Sauli Niinistö – Commemorative speech at the funeral of
President Mauno Koivisto on 25 May 2017**

A great Finn has departed from our midst. Mauno Henrik Koivisto, the ninth President of the Republic, has passed into eternity. He has left us, but remains close to us. In terms of his ideas, ways, values and principles, he is still with us.

Let us now remember him; it is as if Finland's success story is told in pictures before our very eyes.

President Koivisto's uniqueness did not lie in the fact that he knew the people, but that the people knew him. The people knew him; recognized him, even if his message was sometimes described as opaque or open to interpretation. In this, the people were a wise interpreter.

His thoughtful, deliberative way of approaching issues brought the ordinary citizen close to the statesman, perhaps closer than to any other in Finland's history. Mauno Koivisto's pithy, sharply analytical and often humorous remarks remain embedded in the essence of what it is to be Finnish. They reflect a way of thinking, principles and values that still affect our actions and deeds.

Only a man who is not just a great statesman, but also a great person, can make such an impression on his own people.

* * *

Work, education and trust are the cornerstones of Finland's success and prosperity. Mauno Koivisto was a strong, personal example of each of these.

The work ethic shone throughout his life in a uniquely varied career ranging from carpenter to harbour master, from school teacher to Governor of the Bank of Finland, and from Minister of Finance to Prime Minister and, finally, President of the Republic.

In these roles, Koivisto became familiar with Finnish working life and workers at all levels. Perhaps he discovered that the laws of human interaction vary little, whether you are wearing overalls on a construction site or wearing a suit around a ministerial table.

Koivisto continued studying while working: he earned a masters and then a doctoral degree after passing his baccalaureate. As well as talent, this required a thirst for knowledge and strong motivation to learn and acquire new skills. Nowadays, we refer often to life-long learning and adult education; Mauno Koivisto was decades ahead of us in this respect.

When addressing a session of the European Parliament in 1993, he said: "We Finns are a serious people. We are a people of few words. But no one should doubt that we tend to keep our word."

This is a wonderful statement, addressed to more talkative people. When carefully considered, it can also be understood in a number of ways. But the key message is clear: Trust is our, and your, watchword.

Mauno Koivisto never lacked faith. He did not hesitate to participate in voluntary civil defence and serve at the front on behalf of such trust. He wrote of those days in a letter: "When one has been involved in a contest in which life is at stake, all other contests seem minor afterwards."

Later, during the intense political contests of the 1980s, he had to trust in the fact that people had trust in him. His trust in this was not misplaced.

* * *

"People sometimes ask which republic we are running, and for whom. I think that we have the same republic that was created in 1917 and took its current form in 1919." This is what Mauno Koivisto wrote on almost the last lines of his memoirs in 1995.

Of course, we can interpret this issue in another way.

Prime Minister Koivisto suffered a setback in 1981, when an attempt was made to thrust aside the government he was leading. At the time, he said that: "A government has as much time as Parliament permits." In other words, no power could bypass that of Parliament.

As President, Mauno Koivisto continued with the same theme: the President's powers were reduced and those of Parliament enhanced through parliamentarianism. No hint of a nomenklatura remained, even when governments were being formed.

Koivisto's policy is crystallised in his own statement: "I think it safest that a pyramid rests on its base, not its summit: it is better not to concentrate great power in a single pair of hands, and better that the most critical decisions taken by a republic require the views of more than one person."

Koivisto's republic, at least, was therefore one of a different kind. This is not far from the idea that it actually marked the beginning of Finland's second republic.

* * *

Mauno Koivisto settled into leading foreign policy as the Cold War was once again intensifying. In this situation, he deployed steady deliberation and controlled wisdom. There was no reason to re-invent the foreign policy wheel when the traditional policy left enough scope for its flexible application.

The final account for these difficult years could be seen in the US and Soviet leaders choosing to meet in Helsinki. As events gathered speed and the opportunity arose in the early 1990s, Koivisto did not hesitate to seize it. The final outcome of Koivisto's period was a Finland closely integrated with Europe and the West, while retaining a balanced and equal relationship with the East. This provided a good basis on which to continue.

* * *

Over 50,000 Finns paid their final respects in Mauno Koivisto's books of condolence. One message was as follows: "Above, beneath, to the side, in front and behind; yesterday, today and tomorrow we have a good safety net. My thanks to God and you for keeping it intact."

These touching and respectful farewells reflect how highly regarded and missed the deceased is, and many refer to personal encounters.

Many stories are told about Mauno Koivisto, which often include a lesson. It is said that heavy snow once fell on Tähtelä. A helpful security guard grabbed a snow shovel until the master arrived and took over the shovel: "This is my snow!" Indeed, whatever the heavens throw at us, whether large or small; I'll keep my own house in order, no matter what – that was the message.

At Kultaranta a few years ago, closer to Mauno Koivisto than before, while in the stand watching a volleyball match between his senior team and Raisio's veterans. "I should have brought my gear after all," said Mauno, each time his own team seemed to be getting into difficulties. He had a burning desire to be in the arena, no matter what kind of arena, playing his part and having an impact.

But "WE" was the key issue.

"We" is a pronoun which recurs continuously in Mauno Koivisto's memoirs. We, meaning he and Tellervo, experience everyday issues together, work together and, every now and again, think things through together. They sometimes disagree but this ends immediately, when he learns to see things Tellervo's way.

There are great men and great women. Together, they are unbelievably great.

And nothing can drive them apart.

Today, the whole of Finland remembers President Mauno Koivisto and his life's work with deep respect and gratitude, and with the greatest of sympathy for his loved ones and friends.

Speech by President of the Republic Sauli Niinistö on the flag day of the Finnish Defence Forces in Helsinki on 4 June 2017

It is a great honour to receive the parade of the Flag Day of the Finnish Defence Forces here in the Senate Square, a centre of Finland's statehood and cultural and spiritual life. This day is always festive, but especially so this year. It has been customary to celebrate the Flag Day of the Finnish Defence Forces in our capital city whenever Finland marks another five or ten years since it became independent. The atmosphere of our celebration is reinforced also by the fact that today is the 150th anniversary of the birth of Marshal Mannerheim.

Alongside National Veterans' Day and Independence Day, Flag Day is a special celebration which highlights how much we cherish our independent Finland. Finland is among the top nations in almost every global comparison of positive characteristics, and one message is clear: We are the world's most stable state. This is invaluable in the current global situation.

With respect to our security, I have often referred to the four pillar model. These too are topical today. Our pillars are national defence and security, western integration, relations with Russia, and the international system, particularly its structure, rule-based nature and manageability. These are not static pillars, but develop over time. They also continuously interact. The better the balance between these pillars, the more stable Finland's situation is.

We will have to endure a period of global instability for some time. This obliges us to attend to our strongest cornerstone – a credible national defence. Our defence forces have succeeded in completing major reforms in recent years. However, you cannot upgrade an operating system in one go, but have to work on it continuously. This will require both resources and a vision of how our defence should be developed.

In everything we do, we should bear in mind that strong defence forces present a threshold to a potential enemy, while attracting our friends to engage in cooperation.

* * *

Compulsory military service has been the undoubted cornerstone of Finland's defence during the entire period of independence. Such a system has sometimes been subject to criticism, and many other European countries have wound down conscription. Despite this, Finland has consistently maintained its military service, and rightly so. Many other countries are now restoring what they once decommissioned.

Consistency has been another strength of Finland's defence. An example of this is the manner in which respect for compulsory military service has been the common thread running through a number of defence reforms. The cornerstone of our defence therefore remains strongly in place – and will continue to do so.

Compulsory military service has a strong societal role, as well as a defensive aspect. It brings together a diverse range of Finns – from different parts of the country, different backgrounds and with different ideas – who then learn how to get along with each other. The cohesion of a nation is a major factor in its success. The better we understand each other and keep everyone in the same boat, the better our chances will be of succeeding in the second century of our independence.

* * *

Around a year ago, a statistic measuring the confidence of citizens in their own army was published. Finland came first in this comparison, or should I say ‘in this comparison as well’. As many as 91 percent of Finns trust in our defence forces. Such trust cannot be taken for granted, but must be earned through continuous work and one conscript induction at a time.

The statistics reflect the support and willingness of our entire nation with respect to defending our country. Each and every Finn is a defender of our land, particularly during this time of changing threats. Although we cannot always know what lies ahead, we are ready to respond to new situations and willing to prevail during difficult times.

I would like to thank all of you who serve in our defence forces for the valuable work you are doing on behalf of our century-old country. I also wish you a patriotic Flag Day of the Finnish Defence Forces.

Opening words by President of the Republic Sauli Niinistö at the Kultaranta talks on 11 June 2017

The theme of this year’s Kultaranta Talks is “The Future”. Tomorrow we will be pondering the future of Finland. But our opening panel deals with “The Future of European Security Institutions”. You are all warmly welcome.

At the heart of European integration lies a paradox: The European project was born out of war and it was intended to ensure peace on the continent but it was meant to do so without an explicit mandate to discuss, let alone act on the topic.

Yet the question of European security, even common defence, has never been far from the surface. Soon after the Schuman declaration on May 9th 1950 the Pleven plan for European Defence Community was mooted – and quickly abandoned.

Since then the Europeans have taken repeated bites out of the forbidden fruit of European defence. In the process the fruit has become less forbidden and the need to act together in the field of security more pressing.

The Helsinki Headline Goals of 1999 were an important milestone in launching the EU as a security actor. Yet for all intents and purposes the EU in a way still outsources its security. There are good reasons for this and hardly anyone would question the key arrangements. At the same time it is becoming increasingly clear that we, as Europeans, have to devote more attention to our own security.

One should be very clear about what we mean by the terms. When we are talking about European defence co-operation we are not talking about collective defence, at least not yet. That is still the remit of NATO.

But under the banner of ‘protecting Europe’ we are increasingly asking ourselves, what more we can and must do together on the European level to better protect our citizens, common interests and values.

For me the issue boils down to this: any Union worthy of the name must play its full share in ensuring the security of its citizens. This might, in due course, entail common European defence.

But we are not there yet. For the moment we have more questions than answers: How do we share the responsibilities between the EU and NATO? What can the two do better together, and what must be done separately? How much we Europeans must be willing to contribute to our own security, and how best to organise it? Do we all agree what the key threats are and how best to respond to them? And how do we interpret the Article 42.7 of the Treaty of Lisbon?

Finland's approach is very straightforward: We see a lot of untapped potential in EU defence co-operation. We view the EU as a security community that is built on solidarity and mutual dependence.

We want the EU to be ambitious but at the same time we believe that taking small and concrete steps is the best way forward. We want the future arrangements to be open and inclusive but not to the point of the lowest common denominator. And finally, we want to help the EU and NATO to work better together to ensure an inter-locking and not an inter-blocking system of security in Europe.

* * *

The Kultaranta Talks is a forum for open exchange and debate. I trust the Spirit of Kultaranta will guide our discussions and I warmly welcome you all once again. I also want to thank our distinguished international guests for accepting my invitation: The title of our opening panel has never been more timely or topical.

I invite the moderator of the opening session, Monsieur François Heisbourg on the stage. He is the Chairman of the IISS and the Geneva Centre for Security Policy, and a Special Adviser of the Paris-based Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique. He is a great friend of Finland and one of the foremost experts on the topic of the day. He is uniquely qualified to introduce and moderate our opening debate. François, the floor is yours.

Speech by Mr. Sauli Niinistö, President of the Republic of Finland, at the Opening Ceremony of the Expo National day Finland on Tuesday 20 June 2017

I congratulate Kazakhstan for organizing this fantastic Astana Expo. I thank President Nazarbayev for inviting me for my third visit to Astana. Finland is proud to participate in the Astana Expo. Personally it is a particular honour to be here for this special event, the National Day of Finland at the Expo.

Finland and Kazakhstan are important partners, both politically and economically. Today Finland is Kazakhstan's biggest trading partner in Northern Europe and, vice-versa, Kazakhstan is Finland's most important trading partner in Central Asia. Our dynamic trade relations provide a good basis for further cooperation in various sectors, including green technology, sustainable development, and education.

This year we are celebrating the 100th anniversary of Finland's independence. Like Kazakhstan, we have worked hard during our independence to modernise our country. Today Finland is, among other things, known for its stability, a high standard of living, a clean environment and innovative technologies.

This year also marks the 25th anniversary of diplomatic relations between our countries. During this period we have become close partners and witnessed the modernisation of Kazakhstan. I want to congratulate our hosts for the success you have achieved both domestically and internationally. The EXPO is a manifestation of your economic dynamism. Internationally Kazakhstan is rapidly rising in prominence. The non-permanent membership of the UN Security Council and hosting the crucial Syria peace talks are good indications of this.

A total of 72 Finnish companies are participating in this Expo. Some of the best know-how and expertise, along with innovations, that my country has to offer are taking part. I firmly believe that the basis of innovations is a solid education and university system. Finland has built one of

the best education systems in the world and we are of course more than happy to share our experiences with you.

The general theme of the Astana Expo, “Future Energy”, is of utmost importance. We are facing enormous challenges relating to energy, sustainability and economic development. Most crucially we are facing a rapidly advancing climate change. This is already felt particularly severely in the Arctic which is warming twice as fast as the rest of the world. If the ice cover and permafrost melts in the North, we will all suffer irreparable damage.

It is a great joy for me to witness the many positive steps on display here at the Astana Expo. After the Expo new opportunities for cooperation will be opened here as the Astana International Financial Centre, the International Centre on the Development of Green Technologies and Investment Projects, and the International Technology Park of IT Start-ups are established.

I am really looking forward to visiting our pavilion, and I would like to invite everyone to do the same. Please join us at our pavilion and celebrate this special day devoted to Finland with us.

Speech by President of the Republic Sauli Niinistö at the Ambassador Seminar on 22 August 2017

Today, we have gathered for the Ambassador Seminar in a Finland that is celebrating 100 years of independence.

Over the past year, we have drawn attention to the many areas of society and life in which Finland is in international comparison strong. We are not emphasising these areas in order to boast our achievements, but to remind ourselves how much we have to cherish.

The terrorist attack in Turku has forced us to confront this issue right now. The most important thing we have to protect is people’s security and their feeling of safety. This has been shaken.

In Turku, the police, rescue personnel and fellow citizens did everything that could be done. Whatever can be done must be done. I believe that the required majority in Parliament is ready to supplement the inadequate powers of the authorities and also to carefully examine whether we have sufficient resources to ensure security.

As we have already seen, immigration – the process of entering our country – is inevitably and intrinsically linked to this discussion. Opinions are very divided on this matter. On the one hand it has been proposed that the borders should be closed, on the other hand forced deportations have been opposed. Many people do not see this issue as being so black and white, however. Those people are right.

Finland is bound by international agreements on refugees and asylum seekers and we comply with those agreements. Finland also has its own binding judicial system. We also comply with that.

This has to be said clearly: Finland cannot close its borders without closing off itself. A return to border checks in the west will not prevent asylum seekers from entering the country; it did not do so on the eastern border a few years ago. People also apply for asylum without grounds, and thus the court rules on the deportation of individuals residing illegally in the country. Our judicial system is one of the best in the world, also in matters of asylum. Disregarding or even directly resisting court decisions undermines our entire social order.

Immigration is not going to end. We face a difficult debate: How can we sustain our humane community without at the same time endangering it? This question must be addressed thoroughly.

* * *

In view of our size, Finland has a strong international status as it celebrates 100 years of independence. This both enables goal-oriented activities and obliges us to nurture that status.

Our international status is based upon solid democracy, and well-being and stability built through years of hard work. It stems not only from our deep and global international connections but also from the desire of Finns and our country's ability to take part in international burden – sharing and cooperation.

Our status is also stable in terms of security. Although no-one can ever be completely safe in these times, our choices concerning key guidelines have proven to be effective in rapidly changing conditions. Our pillar model provides opportunities for balancing actions. We can always compensate for the weakness of one pillar by strengthening the others. Still, the goal is to keep all the pillars functioning.

This is not an easy task. The world and, as a result, our own position appears unlikely to settle into a peaceful routine in the foreseeable future. This means that our solutions and structures must stand up to continuous critical examination. And although we have already achieved a lot, plenty of work still lies ahead.

* * *

Our times yearn for stability, responsible leadership and compliance with common rules. Demand for all of these is high at the moment, but unfortunately supply is very low. On the contrary, the world is extremely volatile right now.

Serious conflicts continue in Europe's neighbouring areas. The Ukraine conflict is stuck in its own instability: ceasefires do not last and implementation of the Minsk agreement is not progressing. The parties involved are blaming each other, and it is hard to find any signs of positive development.

The same applies to the Syrian civil war. Human suffering continues and the west – Europe in particular – remains powerless. Although violence in the region has now decreased, this state of relative calm has been achieved by means of brutal killing that took place earlier. This extended period of mutual cruelty and hatred is not a good foundation for building the future of Syria.

Turkey occupies a key position between Europe and the currently unsettled south. It is unfortunate that relations between the European Union and Turkey are subject to ever-increasing problems. Turkey is an important partner for the EU and for Finland, and Finland has always supported Turkey's European path. In light of this, Turkey's recent development and actions, particularly those aimed at suppressing the free media and human rights defenders, are cause for great concern.

There are continued tensions in Finland's neighbouring areas, in part because this autumn will be marked by a number of large military exercises. I consider the related alarmism presented in public discussion to be exaggerated at times, but it is clear that a greatly increased amount of military activity also involves risks, intentional and unintentional.

Finland is dynamic and proactive with regard to supporting stability in northern Europe. Last summer's proposal concerning flight safety over the Baltic Sea is one example. As a result, the work of the International Civil Aviation Organization's Baltic Sea project team has been

reactivated, and new measures to improve flight safety in the region were agreed upon in a spirit of cooperation. It is worth noting that both NATO and Russia have participated constructively in the project team's work. At the same time, support has been provided for activating dialogue in a NATO-Russia council.

* * *

It is quite difficult to find examples of international processes that have moved in a positive direction over the past year. However, there are some encouraging signs. The situation in the European Union has stabilised to a certain extent. The economy is growing and so is the case with trust that citizens have in the Union. Elections have also demonstrated that stability is gaining a foothold.

From Finland's point of view, the systematic strengthening of the EU's security policy role is particularly encouraging. In the autumn, the EU will review topics that include the future of crisis management operations, defence industry development, responses to hybrid threats, and the activation of permanent structured cooperation.

At this moment in time, movement is more important than the eventual destination: every step we take strengthens the EU's ability to safeguard the security of its citizens. This also increases citizens' faith in our shared Europe. It has been quite a while since the EU was at the centre of a self-driven positive cycle. We must seize this opportunity.

Activation of dialogue between the EU and Russia is also welcome. Although our views differ on many issues, an effort to find common ground is important. Based on my own discussions with President Putin in Savonlinna, I believe that although Russia remains inflexible on many issues, it is now looking for a more constructive approach in others. This particularly applies to the improvement of flight safety over the Baltic Sea and the problem of black carbon in the Arctic region. The Northern Dimension and its objectives are another such area.

* * *

Last year in this room, I stated that we need to be able to see not just further ahead, but also further afield. Today, I would again like to encourage you to do this.

The foundations of humanity's very existence are threatened by our own unsustainable development. Although controlling climate change is the most compelling of these, it is by no means our only challenge. The impending scarcity of resources and a decreased diversity of life also pose serious threats.

I have repeatedly called attention to the Arctic region as a key area in terms of climate change. It is now warming twice as fast as the rest of the world. This is melting the ice cover and the permafrost below it. The dark sea uncovered and the methane released from the ground laid bare by thawing will warm the climate even more. The end of the Arctic region would also mark the end of the world.

Our chairmanship of the Arctic Council began in May and provides a natural forum for highlighting these themes. However, the Arctic is an issue that affects not only the countries in the region but all humankind.

It is encouraging that agreement on actions aimed at limiting black carbon emissions has already been reached within the scope of the Arctic Council. However, the journey to practical measures is just beginning and success in this task will require constructive involvement on the part of all countries.

A second important theme shaping the future of humankind is the question of weapons of mass destruction, and the future of nuclear weapons in particular. Recently, North Korea's condemnable activities have made this a very topical issue.

Concerns about North Korea's nuclear weapons programme have existed for years. In defiance of numerous UN Security Council resolutions, the country has continued to develop its nuclear weapons programme and ballistic missiles. This is now a question of global rather than regional security.

At a time when relations between great powers are strained, it is positive to note that the Security Council found common ground on condemning missile tests and applying tougher sanctions. The world needs to engage with North Korea in order to freeze a fast-moving weapons programme and open a path for actual negotiations.

Weaker international security has increased concerns about drifting into a new arms race cycle. There have been signs that the tactical nuclear weapons card may have been played in conjunction with military exercises. This is why we need to discuss the future of nuclear disarmament.

It is easy to understand the objectives of those who pushed for international negotiations on a treaty to ban nuclear weapons. The goal is a good one, but it is unclear whether this will pave the way to real nuclear disarmament. Nuclear-weapon states did not participate in the negotiations and they do not support the outcome.

Finland, like most other EU states, did not participate in the negotiations. We are concerned that the process may actually do more to hinder than promote nuclear non-proliferation. In order to make progress in reducing nuclear weapons, we need the commitment and participation of nuclear-weapon states. The upcoming UN General Assembly is the next opportunity to find a path that would support both nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation. Finland will be an active participant in that discussion.

* * *

The world, and its geopolitics, are changing at an increasing pace. It almost seems like we're in a tunnel – one which perhaps promised a way out yesterday but one that is ending up becoming a dead-end of today.

Each year when we get together for this summery gathering, I have been certain that we have already seen everything and that such great changes as we had witnessed over the year will not be seen again. This year is different – I don't think that I can be surprised any more. Except by that something that will happen anyway.

You have been and will continue to be in that same position. But being small is a strength, because we don't have to be large.

Speech by the President of the Republic of Finland Mr. Sauli Niinistö at the Economic Club of Minnesota September 22, 2017

It is a great honour for me to address this distinguished audience. I want to thank the Minnesota Economic Club for this opportunity. In particular I want to thank you all for honouring the Centennial of Finland's independence in the form of this event.

For any nation, independence and freedom are the foundation upon which everything else is built. We Finns are no exception. Although we rarely boast of our achievements, it is fair to conclude that the first one hundred years of our independence have been a success. In four generations we have managed to transform a poor and agrarian country into a modern and

vibrant democracy. And into a country that has assumed leading positions in many international rankings. One ranking is especially important to me: for years Finland has been rated as the world's most stable country. In the current state of world affairs, this is of great value.

Looking back in history it is often easy to see a direct line between events and the final outcome. But history has very few inevitabilities. Before our independence, Finland had been a part of Sweden for more than 600 years and a part of the Russian Empire for some hundred years. We gained our independence from Russia during the final stages of the First World War, at the time of the Russian Revolution.

The first steps of Finland as an independent nation were far from easy. Almost immediately we descended into a civil war, with brother rising against brother. After the war, the Finns had the wisdom to start healing the wounds quickly. Democracy and equality were used as tools to unify the nation. Almost everyone began to feel as if they were a part of the nation. Keywords included trust and responsibility that resulted in the emergence of what I have called participatory patriotism. This process proved a blessing for Finland. When the Soviet Union attacked Finland twenty years later, the united Finns rose to defend their freedom. The miracle of the Winter War transpired.

There are two stories about these early times that I never fail to share. The first is that after the First World War, Finland was the only country to pay the United States its debts. We honour our commitments. The second is how during the Second World War, Finland was the only European country that fought the Soviet Union that was not occupied. We cherish our independence. I am tempted to add that our foreign and security policy ever since has been aimed at ensuring that there will not be a Third World War.

Today, Finland is a member of the European Union and we are part of its inner circle, the Euro area. For Finland the EU is a value community. We also view it as a security community and are working hard that it would play a stronger role in protecting Europe and its citizens. The EU is important also to our prosperity. Economic vitality is the backbone of any nation. The United States' economy is on an upswing, and you are close to full employment. The economy is looking up also on our side of the Atlantic.

Finland is a relatively small and export-dependent economy. We support free trade, but not only for self-serving purposes. Free trade produces competition and competition in turn spurs innovation. This benefits companies and consumers alike. I give you an example. If only Ford or Volkswagen had dominated the markets without competition, the Model T or the "Bug" would still today have been our mode of transport to this event. Indeed, free trade has been instrumental on Finland's journey to prosperity. It is important that free trade is continued and that an open and level playing field exists for everyone to compete. Free is fair.

Geopolitics, or power politics has made a return. Relations between the United States and Russia seem stuck. We also face new threats, as North Korea's rapidly advancing nuclear weapons programme shows. Some argue that we are in a new cold war, whereas others do not feel we have reached that point yet, while others still feel we might be in an even worse situation. But all of this is beside the point. For me the real issue is this: as a humanity we face a growing list of burning problems that can only be tackled through co-operation. Arms races, missile programmes and brinkmanship do not take us in the right direction. Moderation and co-operation do. Therefore Finland advocates consensual win-win solutions. From tackling the so-called black carbon in the Arctic to improving air safety in the Baltic Sea Region we want to show that small steps in the right direction are much better than large ones in the wrong.

The United States is one of Finland's key partners politically and economically. Our relations are strong and good. One indication of this is the fact that this is my second visit to the United States in a month. At the end of August, I visited Washington to meet with President Trump. We had a good discussion of our bilateral relations and about the state of the world. The focus in our discussions was security and economy.

The United States is one of Finland's most important trade partners. It is Finland's third most important country of export. Mutual trade has traditionally resulted in a surplus for Finland, but it should be noted that Finland has a much larger base of direct investments in the United States. In 2015, around 250 Finnish-owned companies, which directly employed 34,000 people, were based in the United States.

Finland's relationship with Minnesota is a special one. Minnesota is one of the most important areas to which Finns have migrated. Today, approximately 100,000 people of Finnish descent live in Minnesota. At the beginning of the 20th century, people moved to the United States predominantly to work in industry and forestry. In traditional manual labour. Today, Finns move to work as specialists in companies or to pursue careers as entrepreneurs. Or to excel in professional sports, culture and science sectors. I cannot go without mentioning that the current Nobel Laureate in Economic Sciences Bengt Holmström is a Finn who has worked for years as a professor at Yale and MIT. It is noteworthy that Minnesota, the "North Star State", and Finland have a great deal in common. Our populations and economies are around the same size. Our climates are similar. We are both known for our thousands of lakes. We value education and invest in it. We develop clean-tech and renewable energy. And of course, as is evident here today, ice hockey is a subject we are both passionate about.

"Together" is the theme for Finland's Centennial. Working together, the Finns have overcome many hardships, gained many hard-fought victories. But we have never been alone in our efforts. The United States has been and will continue to be a very important partner for Finland. And vice versa. We are not here only to celebrate Finland's independence and good relations between Finland and the United States, but also the strong friendship between Finland and Minnesota. We are striving to attain the same values and virtues for a better world. I want to thank you for this opportunity to speak here today. I am very pleased that we can now continue our discussion. I wish you and your companies and communities continued success. Thank you!

Opening remarks by President of the Republic Sauli Niinistö at the European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats 2 October 2017

As EU member states, we share a common security environment with NATO. The EU and NATO are facing the emerging challenges increasingly also together.

With this in mind, I am honoured to welcome the NATO Secretary General and the EU High Representative to Finland. Your joint visit is a clear sign of your commitment to counter threats also together.

When I think of hybrid threats, an old story told to me by the Algerian peace-mediator Lakhdar Brahimi immediately comes to mind. It goes like this:

An ordinary looking man riding a bicycle came to a border crossing. He had a big sack on the rack. Naturally the customs officer asked him what it contained. "Oh, it's just sand. I need it on the other side of the border," he said.

The sack was examined and it was indeed full of sand. The next day and the days following the same happened. Once the sack was sent to a laboratory, and the answer was the same: ordinary sand!

Little by little, the cycling sandman became a curiosity rather than a danger. But one junior customs officer remained restless, he had to know more. So, the next time the cycling sandman appeared, he asked the man: “Please, tell me the secret of your sand. I promise to keep it in secrecy.”

“Sand?”, the man replied, “it is just sand. I smuggle bicycles!”

This story reveals the basic dilemma we face with hybrid threats. Namely: the threats exploit our lack of understanding, preparation and foresight. Often we may see what the adversary is doing, but we fail to understand what it actually means. And when we finally grasp the situation, they have most probably already made a good collection of bicycles on the other side of the border.

The range of hybrid threats is wide. Information operations and cyber tools are at the core of attempts to influence. In a similar manner, vulnerabilities in the critical functions of our societies are abused in hybrid tactics. Also our political and economic freedoms are misused by our challengers.

Hybrid threats call for enhanced awareness. We have to understand – at a strategic level – the aims and means of our challengers. We need to identify our vulnerabilities and we need to be prepared and resilient. Resilience, or the ability to resist and recover from pressure, is of great importance. The citizens’ will to defend their nation is the key factor.

But one must remain level-headed about the threats we face. Sometimes the threat can also be less than meets the eye. At times I have been struck by the level of alarmism in our debates concerning the threat posed by the Russians.

It goes without saying that we must take Russia very seriously. At the same time we must avoid inflating the threats, either.

Sometimes it is hard to avoid the impression that we are waging a part of the information war on behalf of those who attack us. Therefore, I welcome the research component of the new Centre and hope that it will bring measured contributions to the debate.

We must also remember that the threat does not always come primarily from the outside. Our own divisions create opportunities for hybrid threats. Identifying and abusing them is always a delight for external actors. We must take a better care of the cohesion of our own societies.

* * *

I am happy to be delivering these opening remarks today. The Centre of Excellence highlights three central issues in Finnish security policy.

Firstly, it shows that Finland is a producer and not a consumer of security.

Secondly, we take a comprehensive approach to security. This is a must for a small a nation but it also reflects the changing nature of threats we face.

Thirdly, it highlights our determination to produce security in close co-operation with our partners.

On behalf of the Republic of Finland, I would like to thank the eleven governments that have joined us in establishing the Centre. Allow me also to express our appreciation to the European External Action Service and the European Commission and the NATO Secretariat – and

personally to Mr. Secretary General and Ms. High Representative and Vice President for your strong support in establishing the Centre.

With these words I wish you all a fruitful opening seminar and every success in the important tasks that await the Centre.

Speech by the President of the Republic of Finland Sauli Niinistö at the banquet held in honour of the President of Poland Andrzej Duda and Mrs. Agata Korhauser-Duda at the Presidential Palace on 24 October 2017

I and my wife are happy that you are paying us this state visit. You are visiting Finland at a very special time: This year we celebrate the Centenary of our independence.

The Finland100 slogan is “Together”. Together we celebrate the country that was built together: all citizens, women and men, have contributed to creating the Finnish society.

The centenary has also brought together friends of Finland from around the world. The first international Finland 100 event was in fact in Warsaw in January.

Looking back to one hundred years ago, Finland and Poland were both about to become independent. Next year Poland will be celebrating the 100th anniversary of regaining its independence in 1918.

Regarding cultural life, Poland and Finland have always had strong connections. We are both nations of music, and there is a similarity in the way Fryderyk Chopin and Jean Sibelius put into the language of music the mentality and collective feelings of entire nations.

This year, we are also celebrating the 150th anniversary of the birth of national heroes in both countries: Marshal Carl Gustaf Emil Mannerheim in Finland and Marshal Józef Piłsudski in Poland. Marshal Mannerheim spent several years in Poland as a commander of the Uhlan regiment in the imperial army, a period he described as the happiest of his life.

Strong ties have brought our countries together for centuries. Today, we are both members of the European Union. Membership in the EU has been an important milestone for us both.

Since 1989 we have witnessed Polish development: the impressive economic growth and dynamism, the modernization of the economy. At the same time Poland is an important partner in the EU and NATO as well as in regional fora.

Currently, the Union faces many challenges, but times of crises are also opportunities for renewal. As members of the EU, we are also members of the same community of values. This is enshrined in the EU Treaties. Common values are the basis for working together in the EU and they are also worth defending.

The history of promoting democratic values including the rule of law and the separation of powers goes far beyond the European Union, however. The Polish Constitution of May 3rd, 1791 was the most advanced of its kind in Europe, and it inspired many others. Upholding this tradition of the Enlightenment is also our duty today.

Today, we have grown used to many things that the EU brings us. We do not always even notice how much the EU touches our lives in a positive way.

At the same time we must work hard to rectify the problems and shortcomings. I firmly believe that any Union worthy of the name must play a strong role in ensuring the security of its citizens. I welcome all the steps taken in that direction and am glad to see that Poland is playing its role.

In the field of security the Enhanced Opportunities Partnership with NATO is very important for Finland. And like Poland, we also want to develop cooperation between the EU and NATO.

One area where work is under way is combating hybrid threats. Finland has been active in this field. One example is the inauguration of the Helsinki Centre of Excellence that took place last month. The participation of Poland in the Centre is very much appreciated.

It is my firm belief that Finland and Poland can further intensify contacts between our countries. This means identifying common interests and working together in search of further possibilities of cooperation. This state visit has been another important step in that direction.

I would like to raise a toast in honour of you, Mr. President, and your spouse, as well as the friendship between Finland and Poland.

New Year Speech by President of the Republic Sauli Niinistö on 1 January 2018

My fellow citizens,

A year of celebrations is behind us. The centenary of our independence was fêted in many ways and recalled with gratitude.

It has been rousing to see how people's festive mood took over the country during the course of the year. We recapped the past, looked to the future and, above all, felt genuine joy of our own Finnishness.

A milestone year easily leads us into thinking that it is as if we were at a watershed, where there is a time before and a time after. However, the clear message of the centenary year was that Finland's course has been successful, and that this is a good path to take into the future. The theme of the centenary year was "Together"; this was seen as the secret of our success and also the key to our future.

The year now beginning is a time that immediately pauses one for some self-reflection, however. The memories of 1917 and 1918 are almost diametrically opposed. The best that any nation could face came first, only to be followed by the worst. The year in which we gained independence was followed by a year in which civil war broke out. Not even long after have all the scars been healed.

And so in the early days of independence we were not "together", but very badly apart. This cannot simply be swept away. We must have the courage to be honest about history, because only honesty creates a foundation for trust. A strong society is able to face up to painful things as well. We must try to reconcile the past.

Nevertheless, the question of the diametrically opposing years remains. It took decades to gain full trust in democracy. Participatory patriotism was born; I, too, am part of this, together.

These stages teach us a clear lesson: there is diversity, people have different backgrounds, convictions and goals, we have a right to disagree. This is something we must be able to respect, however differently we ourselves might think.

Connection is a good word. We have a connection; this could just as easily mean deep similarity as being able to understand each other despite our dissimilarity. The path shown by understanding and the connection it brings is a good one for us to proceed along together also from now on.

* * *

Independence is both a gift and a vocation. There is certainly much to do.

After a lost decade, the economy is in an upswing and employment has begun to improve. This turn of events is sorely needed. Even so, our economy has yet to reach the level it was at in 2008.

Yet even without growth, heavy borrowing has increased public and private consumption. Massive stimulus measures by central banks have resulted in the availability of loans.

It is a well-known fact that as an export-driven country, our economy depends heavily on global demand. We must now note that our indebted economy is also very dependent on the policy of major central banks.

The warning that abundant funding has been channelled into increased debts and asset values is well founded. Tighter monetary policy, which is inevitable in the world at some stage, will lead to a more challenging situation. Reasonable caution is now called for.

A deep change is now under way in the global economy, where technological advances are quickly forging completely new sectors of industry and changing the traditional forms of work. We must ensure that we keep up with this development and competition. And not just keep up, Finland has the know-how to be a leader in this development.

A cause for joy in recent years has been the enthusiasm of young people to become entrepreneurs. The atmosphere from vocational colleges to Slush reflects this changing attitude more broadly. Young people trust in the prowess of their heads and their hands.

Young people also have their concerns. A study published in the autumn mapped the feeling of security among young Finns. The message was a serious one. Insecurity is penetrating their environment. The feeling of threat is not so much external, but comes from within our society. Concerns include livelihood, inequality or immigration.

Many young people are still marginalised and school bullying continues in Finland both face to face and in social media. The #metoo movement has made everyone aware of just how much also young people are harassed. Much would improve if we showed empathy or at least if we were able to respect each other. There would be understanding and the connection that ensues.

The only way to respond to young people's concerns is to galvanise their trust in that the difficulties will be overcome. We have often reiterated that everyone has an opportunity in Finland. Yet a point often raised is that the high cost of school books or learning materials frequently undermines the continuation of teenagers' education. Or that despite good efforts, young people cannot find a path to working life. Let us make sure that everyone indeed has a genuine opportunity.

* * *

Whereas Finland's foreign and security policy situation is stable, in other parts of the world there is upheaval. This affects us and everyone else.

In recent times few international political events taking place have been desired, let alone a cause for joy. Aggravating weapons development in North Korea during the past year has been a new addition to an already lengthy list of security threats.

It is increasingly apparent that China, Russia and the United States, in various line-ups, sit around those tables where the way of the world is regulated. Of course, dialogue between major powers is a good thing. But as far as we are concerned, the problem is the missing seats: The EU has remained on the sidelines and the role of the UN seems to be diminishing.

Fortunately, there is always room for small actors between the major powers. Finland is more than pleased to provide good services when required. Finland is also active in supporting stability and dialogue in the Baltic Sea area, Arctic areas and also globally.

Two messages came about of the UN before Christmas. On a positive note, the Security Council was able to agree unanimously on additional sanctions against North Korea. Whereas on a gloomier note, the United States bluntly criticised the activities of this global organisation.

Finland supports the proposals of UN Secretary-General Guterres to reform the organisation. The aim is to increase the effectiveness and responsibility of UN activities. And this is only right since, despite its shortcomings, the UN is an irreplaceable actor in promoting international peace and security.

* * *

We are now living in a critical time for the whole of the human race. Climate change is not a matter of opinion, but a real threat. For many of us this realisation has come too late and would have come even later had it not been for those people who started to ring the alarm bells. What a good thing they did!

Now is the time to act, not at the normal pace, but quickly. We are running behind.

Finland assumes and takes responsibility. We are committed to the implementation of the Paris Agreement and have just increased our international climate funding. The Finnish clean tech industry is also contributing by developing sustainable solutions.

Each of us must assume and take responsibility; our way of life is resulting in a critical burden on our planet. The world does not exist solely for us, but for continuity. It is ours to safeguard and pass on.

The world's population is increasing rapidly. It is paradoxical that the population is increasing fastest in those regions where it is difficult to take responsibility for children, where living conditions are otherwise poor and facing the greatest threat because of climate change. There will be atrocities, immigration, perhaps even mass migration.

This is why we must help and support women in developing countries to take a step to the front lines. Girls must be allowed to go to school and determine the course of their lives. This is not only right for them themselves, but at the same time, it is of utter importance for all of us. Women have made an invaluable contribution in Finland's own story. It is hard to imagine how humankind could afford not to set this potential free.

* * *

The world is changing, but something remains the same. In Aleksis Kivi's Seven Brothers, Juhani already knew how "... all will be well, if each of us works on his own part for harmony and peace. But if it's trouble we're looking for, we'll always be finding something to set our neck hairs bristling."

I wish you all a happy new year and God bless you!

Speech by President of the Republic Sauli Niinistö at the Opening of Parliament on 6 February 2018

Madam Speaker, Members of Parliament,

You are now embarking on the last parliamentary session of your electoral term. The concept of “parliamentary session” has always fascinated me; it is very traditional and ceremonious but, at the same time, somehow full of anticipation and obligation.

The electoral term may be ending, but you have endless things left to do. Since the world does not revolve around electoral terms, no parliament will ever have a shortage of things to do. And this is why we are here.

Parliament will now consider matters that have triggered lots of debate. Social welfare and health care reform, intelligence law – these are not simple to resolve. I hope that whatever each person’s stand is, no one would claim to have the absolute truth. In democracy, common sense usually prevails in the end, because people prefer arguments to agitation. The voice of reason instead of provocation.

All my experience of working with Parliament has been positive. The constitutional amendment approved in 2011 was significant: Any dispute between the President and the Government shall be resolved by Parliament. I was the Speaker back then and considered it a good idea.

And now as President, I still do. This amendment created a kind of connection between the President and his or her parliamentary responsibility. In other words, the President must understand exactly what is going on in the country, what the people are thinking. I hear this from you and I’m all ears.

An approach that I would like to develop further is interaction with the parliamentary group chairpersons. So far, we have usually discussed matters concerning security since their impact spans several electoral terms. But there are other matters of long-term impact, such as climate change, continuous changes in social structures or the EU’s political agenda. These should also be discussed outside day-to-day politics. I will be happy to provide a forum for such discussions. And if a topic is not considered to fall within the scope of the President’s role, I can still provide the setting but remain silent myself.

Such discussions would help us find a common theme that would not be disrupted by change of the government.

* * *

It’s getting lighter by the day now. The economy is improving and unemployment is falling. This has long been needed. And now we need to protect this growth and safeguard its continuation.

It is understandable that after years of austerity and cuts, there is pressure for public expenditure and unmet needs. And these should be assessed. But I must remind you of what was said during the economic revival about growth dealing with debt in due course. If we soon start saying that now we can afford an increase in expenditure, the debt will not be dealt with. And we are approaching the day when increased interest rates will make us feel the real burden of the debt.

An economic upturn can easily make us consider it the new normal, take it for granted and live overly well. We cannot afford such an illusion, however, as we will shortly be facing the hardest pressure caused by changes in the age structure – and we are already in debt. Of course it is easy to say that patience is a virtue, but as decision-makers we should always remember that we should set a good example.

* * *

The European Union has also returned to the growth track, and the improving economy is creating a positive atmosphere in and around the Union.

This good news raises hopes for the internal strengthening of the EU and putting European thinking back on the map. This year will no doubt be decisive pointing towards the EU's future direction.

The EU has sometimes been described as a house with the roof and walls in place, but nothing inside. Now is the time to explain how the Union is enhancing the living conditions of its citizens. There will be many views, as President Macron has called for a round of democratic conventions.

The first steps towards a security community have been taken. Finland has been in the vanguard of this development. Terrorism has intensified official collaboration and structured cooperation has been launched in the field of defence.

Europe will also face pressure caused by future migration, probably to a growing extent and particularly from Africa. The best way to alleviate this pressure is to improve living conditions in the countries of origin. The EU Member States and the Union itself have their respective development cooperation programmes, which need to be better coordinated.

The EU should also establish common practices for border control, the processing of asylum applications and the returns of immigrants. The content and interpretation of both the Schengen Agreement and the Dublin Regulation should be clarified.

The EU will not become a federation, but the stealthy integration in places may also create dilemmas for Finland. These can be caused by the development plans of our common currency and any suggestions about increasing joint responsibility.

It is clear that there are problems with the euro. But it is also clear that changing the foundation for a single currency will require consensus. Finland should adopt an active role in this process as well. Discussion on the principles is needed.

* * *

In a recent value research, security was considered the most important value by the Finnish respondents. The world has become more troubled and this instability also reflects on us.

What is security? Security is trust in people, the community and social structures. Public trust in the decision-makers and authorities to treat us properly and being able to respond to global changes. Public trust in the professional competence of a police officer, fire fighter or nurse. Furthermore, security means the maintenance of national defence and security of supply.

Finland is now more prepared to react to the increasingly complex security environment. Many legislative projects have moved forward and improved our preparedness. The Government and Parliament have been alert, which as such is a security factor.

Trust and the sense of security arising from it is something that we all have to vigilantly cherish. Love for one's neighbour, caring and equality – we can all contribute. Trust is created when we respect and look out for each other. It will require money, authorities, services and facilities, but above all it will require us all to maintain integrity.

* * *

The Parliament is the highest authority in our country. Its respect is based on your work – your respect for each other and the work you do together.

It is your demanding task to understand global change. To understand the fact that we cannot stop that change, and to understand how to best keep this country and its people up with the change. There is much talk about the breakup of the coherent culture. But we are still one people, one nation and therefore a community with our common interest to defend.

How to respond to the changes in working life or climate change, and how to respond to the ageing of our population, increasing immigration or the depopulation of remote areas? And how to respond to the feelings of insecurity, even fear and resistance, triggered by these changes? A sense of security takes a long time to grow, but can be shattered in a split second.

It is our job to anticipate people's emotions and to take them seriously. It took decades to gain full trust in democracy in independent Finland. We have to earn that trust every day. And to earn it, we must find and share what unites us, not what divides us.

We are a small, integrated and secure country. We have an equal, educated and resilient people. This is why we can face change – tenacious, agile and strong. We hold the key to continuous success. Let us use it to open doors.

Madame Speaker, I wish the Speakers the best of luck in your important task. I hereby declare the 2018 session of Parliament opened.

Address by President of the Republic of Finland Sauli Niinistö at the centenary of President Kallio's reconciliation speech in Nivala on 5 May 2018

This spring we have commemorated the centenary of the Finnish Civil War. The joy and gratitude expressed during Finland's centenary celebrations last year were quickly replaced by the sad memories of our national tragedy. But we must face the painful episodes in our history as openly as we do the joyful ones: the events which took place a hundred years ago are still of relevance for Finland today, and it is not insignificant how we account for the past. Civil war is the worst thing that can happen to a nation. Let it be a lesson to us to remember and preserve our stability at a time of turmoil in various parts of the world.

Finns have shown maturity and an understanding of history this spring: the discussion on the Civil War has not overheated. Patience is a virtue when processing painful memories, not least because we live in an age of active informational influence seeking to take advantage of any divisions between people. Today, we are not looking for the culprits of the war. Instead we observe how Finland and the Finnish people found their way from war to reconciliation. In his speech here in Nivala a hundred years ago, Senate member Kyösti Kallio pointed the way in this direction. We have gathered here today to pay tribute to this great Finn as well as to those choices and achievements that the Finnish people have together made during the past hundred years. We have successfully defended our freedom and created one of the most stable and free societies, which is also one of the happiest in the world. Even the air here is the cleanest. This is quite a remarkable feat for a small nation. And it is an achievement that will also show the way forward: it obliges us to manage our own affairs, while also taking responsibility for international matters.

While a good political speech will always captivate its audience and address topical issues, it will also reach out to the future by introducing new ideas and avenues. By showing the way forward. President Kallio's informal, just lightly drafted speech in the church at Nivala met these requirements. He gave the speech at a very difficult time. In May 1918, the Finnish Parliament was still suspended, people took the law into their own hands, executions prevailed in the country and the army held a kangaroo court based on martial law. At the end of April 1918, there had been three governments in the country: The Vaasa Senate chaired by P.E. Svinhufvud, the Senate in Helsinki, chaired first by Kyösti Kallio and later by E.N. Setälä, and the Finnish People's Delegation in Vyborg led by Kullervo Manner with dictatorial powers. The Vaasa and Helsinki Senates joined forces on 4 May and Finland finally had a government that governed the entire country. Independence had now been implemented in practice, not just

declared. The institution of a head of state had been born. The Finnish flag was replaced. The construction of Finland as a state could begin.

But once the guns fell silent, the most difficult task remained: the reconstruction of society, restoration of trust and finally reconciliation. The road from war to peace is hard, sometimes impossible. It takes a lot of wisdom and patience, a spirit of conciliation. Above all, it takes time and strong institutions which are constructed gradually and will only earn the trust and support of the people through their activities.

I have talked about participatory patriotism. The sense that this country and community are mine because I, too, am part of them. I enjoy the support and protection provided by my country, and in return, I participate to the best of my abilities in its construction and defence. Implanting this sense into people's minds in the early decades of Finnish independence has been the foundation for our success.

It would be a misrepresentation of history, however, to say that immediately after the Civil War Finland would have smoothly or straightforwardly been capable of shifting to politics that nurtured social inclusion. But important steps in that direction were taken in any case. One of these essential first steps was the reconciliation speech by Kyösti Kallio. It is an irony of history that the speech was not saved in its entirety for posterity. Yet its core message is still strong: the requirement to build a Finland in which "there are no Reds and Whites but only Finns who love their fatherland, citizens of the Republic of Finland who all feel themselves to be members of society and who are at home here" remains as engaging now as it was back in 1918.

Besides speeches, Finland also needed action, of course. Some action had already been taken before the Civil War when the Working Hours Act for the eight-hour day and the Local Government Act for the development of local and regional democracy were enacted in November 1917. Prepared by Kallio, the Crofters' Act had also been presented to Parliament in January 1918, but was not passed until the following October. Other reforms that continued after the Civil War included compulsory education and conscription. Another important step was "Lex Kallio", initiated in 1921, legislation allowing landless rural people to buy small farms and in that way gain affinity and new hope.

Democracy was strongly anchored in Finland, which eventually had chosen the republican form of government. Finland was the only country to become independent in the aftermath of the First World War and also to retain its independence and democracy throughout the turbulent 1930s and 1940s. The Winter War Miracle that saved our freedom was therefore not created in autumn 1939 but achieved by our own choices during those two decades following the Civil War. It is historical symmetry that during the Winter War, Kyösti Kallio was again in a key position, this time piloting our nation through a difficult period as the President of the Republic.

I have said that we have to try to reconcile ourselves with our past. This is an ongoing process which may never be finished. Every generation will have to reconsider the main historical events in the context of their own time. Understanding is not the same as acceptance. It is impossible to accept all that enmity and cruelty that the Civil War brought out in the Finnish people. We must try to understand the situation that led to war, however. It is the only way to ensure that the important lessons of the past remain in our minds.

The lesson of 1918 is that the most important task of a nation is to ensure its own integrity and stability. Participatory patriotism is therefore just as important today as it was a hundred years ago, and we are all responsible for it. I encourage you, ladies and gentlemen, to take the responsibility. Nurturing democracy is an invaluable tool in reconciling different points of view. This is a good rule of thumb: even where there is diversity and people of different

backgrounds, convictions and goals, we have a right to disagree. This is something we must be able to respect, however differently we ourselves might think. This is what Kyösti Kallio urged his fellow citizens to do, to seek reconciliation – in his famous Nivala speech as well as consistently in his other actions. Let's not forget it.

Statement by President of the Republic of Finland Sauli Niinistö at the United Nations General Assembly 73rd General Debate on 25th September 2018

I congratulate you, Madam President, on your election as President of the 73rd session of the General Assembly. I also wish to pay tribute to Secretary-General António Guterres for his vision in leading the United Nations. Finland wholeheartedly supports both of you in your important tasks.

* * *

My country has always been a strong advocate of multilateral cooperation. For Finland, the rules-based international order is of fundamental importance. At home, being able to rely on commonly agreed rules is a cornerstone of our own national security and welfare. On the global level, common solutions and rules are needed to address the most pressing challenges of our time.

Unfortunately, there is now reason to be worried for all of us who believe in the benefits of multilateralism. The international system we have built together is under pressure. Its capability and credibility are questioned. We can no longer take the rules-based order for granted. It is our common responsibility to actively defend and develop it.

Finland sees the United Nations as the core of the multilateral system. Therefore the defense of multilateralism must begin right here. The UN and its members need to show their will to act together, not past each other. We fully support the Secretary-General's ambitious and comprehensive reform agenda. Now is the time to implement these reforms. We must ensure that the UN of the future is more transparent, accountable and efficient.

In order for the United Nations to be credible, it has to practice what it preaches. For any organisation, every single case of sexual exploitation in its own ranks is a case too much. This is particularly true for an organisation stressing the importance of equality and human rights. I am proud to be a member of the Circle of Leadership and I welcome the efforts taken to prevent and combat all forms of abuse throughout the UN system.

* * *

The three pillars of the UN – peace and security, human rights and development – have stood the test of time. But we have also discovered that many of the present global challenges do not respect the boundaries between them. The pillars are increasingly interlinked, as are the challenges themselves.

The most important achievements of the UN system in recent years are testimony to this. I am thinking of the Agenda 2030, the Paris Agreement, and the Global Compacts on Migration and Refugees. Issues like sustainability, climate change and migration are not only about development and human rights. They are also essential questions of peace and security.

Climate change is the prime example of the need for prompt global action. The upcoming report of the IPCC will further underscore the urgency of our response. It will also show how much remains to be done. So far, the voluntary contributions from the state parties to the Paris Agreement are not enough to keep the global temperature rise well below two degrees Celsius. We must do a lot more, and more quickly.

In the North, we are witnessing how the Arctic region is warming with an alarming pace. This is not just a regional problem, as it poses a threat to the entire global climate system. One important factor in accelerating the melting of sea ice in the Arctic are black carbon emissions. Reducing black carbon that lands on the white ice would have immediate positive effects to prevent melting. A commitment to curb those emissions would be a key objective of an Arctic Summit that Finland, as the current Chair of the Arctic Council, is ready to host.

Without mitigation, climate change will also lead to a further increase in migration flows. Already now, some 65 million people across the world are displaced – the highest figure since the Second World War. Some hundred million people worldwide are in urgent need of basic humanitarian assistance, and the number is growing. There are no quick and easy solutions, but doing nothing is not an option. I therefore welcome the Global Compact on Migration and I look forward to participating in the conference to adopt it in Marrakech in December.

* * *

Full-scale wars, conflicts of varying intensity, and breaches of international law continue to haunt us. They constantly remind us of the immense human suffering involved. We, the international community, need to remain persistent in our efforts to solve ongoing conflicts, regardless of how deep-rooted and long-lasting they may be.

On a positive note, we have been encouraged by recent attempts to arrive at a genuine dialogue between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the international community. The momentum to take steps towards a peaceful Korean Peninsula should be maintained and supported. A successful outcome in that region could set a powerful example for non-proliferation and disarmament elsewhere, too.

Where peace has been achieved, the relevance of UN peacekeeping remains beyond doubt. But the Blue Helmets will also need to adapt to changing realities. We support the Secretary-General's Action for Peacekeeping initiative in making UN peacekeeping more effective.

While existing conflicts need to be solved, our priority must be preventing future ones. Finland welcomes the efforts to strengthen the UN's conflict prevention capacity.

In conflict prevention, mediation is an invaluable tool. It is vital for the future of mediation that experience gained in the past is passed on to future mediators. It was an honour for my country to host the meeting of the Secretary-General's High-Level Advisory Board on Mediation in June in Finland.

We remain strong supporters of the mediation activities of the UN and other actors. Where appropriate, Finland also continues to offer its good services to facilitate concrete discussions between parties, from Track-2 negotiations to high-level meetings.

* * *

Peace and security, human rights and development are not sustainable without the participation of women and the youth. Female voices and young voices must be heard – and acted upon. The needs of women, children and youth are still all too often marginalized in peace talks. Finland promotes the role of women's effective participation in peace processes through the Nordic network of women mediators. This and other similar networks provide a useful platform for advocacy and self-education. As a HeForShe Impact Champion, I highly value these efforts.

As we celebrate the 70th Anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, its importance in the international order deserves special attention. Human rights not only protect the individual, they also help us prevent conflicts, build sustained peace and speed up

development. If we are serious about human rights, accountability mechanisms for crimes against international law are needed. Perpetrators must be brought to justice.

Finland appeals to all Member States and the Secretary-General to consistently keep human rights, non-discrimination and gender equality on top of the agenda of the UN.

* * *

It was with profound sadness that I learned of the passing of Mr. Kofi Annan, former Secretary-General of the UN. His legacy is an inspiration for us all.

I would like to conclude by remembering these words from him: “More than ever before in human history, we share a common destiny. We can master it only if we face it together. And that, my friends, is why we have the United Nations.”

Keynote Address by President of the Republic of Finland Sauli Niinistö at the Brookings Institution in Washington D.C. on 27th September 2018

A Stronger Europe: Our Common Interest

Like many of my colleagues, I spent the past few days at the UN General Assembly. The sentiment I took away from the speeches and discussions there is not new, but it became much clearer: we are experiencing a fundamental transformation in international relations. The balance of power is changing. The credibility of institutions is being tested. And completely new challenges pile up on top of existing ones.

While there are reasons for hope and optimism, fear and pessimism often seem to outweigh them. We are leaving many familiar things behind us, and the visibility ahead of us is very limited. That leads to uncertainty. And uncertainty and insecurity go hand in hand.

This combination can be corrosive to the very fabric of our societies. We are rapidly losing our sense of community, a spirit of belonging, both domestically and internationally. Turning inward, we risk forgetting the value of working together.

Let me be very clear: this is a dangerous development. We need to boldly intervene and start shaping the future we want. In order to have a role in it, Europe has to become stronger.

* * *

The European Union was born in a previous era of insecurity, a much more severe one than today. Out of the ashes of the Second World War, the six founding members started pooling their coal and steel resources and began the project of a single market. It was a community of nation states, who decided to join forces – and share sovereignty – at their own free will. This principle has not changed over the decades. The member states are still in charge. People decide what the EU does. The European Union does not exist to serve its institutions. The EU and its institutions are there to serve the interests of the member states and their citizens.

And let's not forget: the European Union has succeeded remarkably well. Over several enlargement rounds, we have seen the internal market, the freedom of movement and a growing number of common policies develop. They have created welfare and stability previous generations on our continent could never have imagined. That internal strength of Europe has also made the transatlantic partnership stronger. Building on solid foundations at home, the Europeans and Americans have jointly defended and promoted our common values in the world: democracy, freedom and the rule of law.

For Finland, joining the EU in 1995 anchored us firmly into the community of nations and values we consider our own. I remember very well the powerful European spirit of that time, a sense of belonging. Unfortunately, that spirit has faded over time.

It is no secret that the EU is now in a difficult phase. Discord is overshadowing unity. Brexit is a loss for both the United Kingdom and the remaining 27 members of the union. In some member states, national elections have brought in governments that are questioning the very values Europe is based on.

In order to put our own house in order, I believe rebuilding the European spirit is essential.

When I talk about that spirit, it is not just a soft and idealistic goal. It is also hard realism. The spirit of belonging together increases our security and resilience. Without it, we are much more vulnerable to external threats. And it goes both ways: I believe that doing more together on security is the best way to strengthen that spirit.

* * *

The EU has plenty of tools to provide its members with soft security. Hard security and defence is where the Union has been slower to deliver. Ever since the failed attempt to create a European Defence Community in the 1950s, NATO has been the uncontested foundation for the collective defence of its members. This continues to be the case. Also to non-members like Finland and Sweden, NATO is fundamentally important for European security and stability. We highly value our close partnership with NATO.

For seventy years already, NATO has to a large degree meant the United States. The Americans have shouldered the lion's share of the burden for Europe's security. It has been highly valuable for Europe. And we fully understand why the US expects Europe to do more for its own security.

This is precisely what we aim to do now. I have been calling for a stronger European defence for over a decade already. I am delighted to see that there is finally movement in this field.

The European Union has started its first so-called PESCO projects. From the US perspective, this "Permanent Structured Cooperation" may sound technocratic and the sums of money may seem tiny. But it is an important step in developing the EU's defence investment, capabilities and readiness.

There is now also a fresh discussion about the Article 42(7) of the EU's Lisbon Treaty. For those of you not familiar with the treaty, this article declares that member states have an "obligation of aid and assistance by all the means in their power" if another member is under attack. I am glad that we are finally beginning to address what that would mean in a crisis situation. A core task of any union is to protect its own citizens.

I know that European "strategic autonomy" is almost a dirty word for many here in Washington. Let me assure you: the growing European activity in defence is not an attempt to undermine NATO. On the contrary. It aims at developing stronger European capabilities.

Those capabilities can equally well be deployed through NATO, through the EU, through multinational coalitions or nationally. This is not a zero-sum game. A stronger Europe means a stronger NATO. And a stronger Europe is a more useful partner for the United States.

Finland takes its own defence very seriously. After the end of the Cold War, we never let our guard down. Our citizens' will to defend their country is the strongest in Europe. Maintaining a strong national defence sends two powerful messages. It is a threshold against potential aggressors. And it makes us a more interesting partner. This is evident in our close bilateral cooperation with many NATO countries, including the US.

* * *

In these turbulent times, a stronger Europe is in the interest of us Europeans. But my argument is that a stronger Europe is also a shared transatlantic interest.

Let's just take a look at geopolitics and the two other major actors in the world. China and Russia are both seeking to increase their influence in our neighbourhood. Russia has been doing it aggressively, flexing its military muscles, and also using them, as we have seen in Ukraine and Syria. Chinese means have been more subtle. Towards Europe, both of them are currently showing a friendly face. Lately, we have not witnessed quite the same level of interest in Europe from Washington.

When China extends its Silk Roads to Europe and attempts to buy its way into our infrastructure, it prefers to work with individual European countries and ad-hoc groups, rather than with a strong EU. When Russia tries to rebuild its economic relationship with Europe, despite the sanctions, it declares it prefers to work with a strong EU. Also with Russia, the truth may be more fragmented than that.

Beijing and Moscow certainly have paid attention to the signs of a rift in the transatlantic bond. It cannot be in the US interest to have your major adversaries gain a bigger foothold on our continent. A strong and united Europe is better equipped to resist them.

Common competitors unite us. And so should common interests. I say this fully aware of the fact that the US and Europe now have open disagreements in many areas, from foreign policy to trade. But where can the US find a more reliable partner than Europe?

The same question applies even if we think of the transatlantic relationship as a transactional relationship. Our economies are deeply intertwined. There may be trade deficits on one side, but services and foreign direct investments balance the picture. An open and free trade benefits us both. The transatlantic value chains foster competitiveness in European and American companies alike.

Climate change and other environmental challenges will require completely new technological innovations. Our companies, universities and research labs have a lot to offer to each other in this field. Together we can ensure that standards continue to be set by democracies, not by others. Technological cooperation across the Atlantic will also help us face ever more complex hybrid and cyber threats.

And finally, beyond geopolitics and transactionalism, we should not forget how invaluable the transatlantic link is in its own right. I mean "invaluable" in both senses of the word. Extremely important. But also "valuable beyond estimation". Something of such immaterial value that it is impossible to measure it in dollars or euros. Let's call it the transatlantic spirit, a sense of belonging together. We cannot afford to lose it, on neither side of the Atlantic.

Speech by President of the Republic Sauli Niinistö at the banquet held on 29 August 2018 in honour of the official visit by President of France Emmanuel Macron

Monsieur le Président, Madame Macron,

nous, mon épouse et moi, sommes très heureux de vous accueillir à Helsinki.

A hundred years ago, France was one of the very first countries to recognise Finland's independence, and our countries established diplomatic relations. We greatly value the good relations between our two countries.

Our connections with France certainly began well before Finnish independence. For Finns, France has through the centuries been a source of inspiration and knowledge in the arts and sciences. Already in the Middle Ages, Paris was a seat of learning for Finns. A Finnish priest, Olavi Maununpoika (Olaus Magni), even served as rector of Sorbonne University.

* * *

In the 21st century, the cultural and scientific cooperation between our countries continues to become more valuable. We have much to give each other, whether in the field of contemporary literature or in high technology.

Economic growth creates the conditions for a continuation of the growth trend in bilateral trade between France and Finland. It is pleasing to note that besides the major and visible transactions, also small and medium-sized Finnish enterprises are increasingly interested in France.

Innovative technological enterprises in particular are currently active in the French market, attracted by the reforms of business legislation made by your government and by the good reputation of FrenchTech. In turn, we are pleased with the growing visibility of French start-up companies in Finland. Finno-Franco cooperation will help the whole of Europe to keep up with the rapid advances in digitalisation and artificial intelligence.

* * *

Europeanness began to unite our countries in a completely new way when Finland joined the European Union in 1995. As a founding member of the Union, France has a special role in European integration – and also particular responsibility for it. Your visit is very helpful as our country makes preparations for its third EU Presidency, due to begin in just under a year's time.

The European spirit highlighting the sense of belonging together has not been at its strongest in recent years. I have been longing for a return of that spirit, familiar from the early days of our EU membership. The leadership you have taken in laying out the common future of Europe has responded to this need excellently.

Finland considers it important that the mutual assistance clause in the Lisbon Treaty is no empty shell. This is why it was natural for us to respond to France's request and to show solidarity after the terrorist attacks of November 2015.

I have often posed the question: what is a union that does not guarantee the security of its citizens? The EU must assume more responsibility for this in the future. Finland, alongside France, belongs to the core group that wants to broadly strengthen the European security and defence policy. Tomorrow, our countries will issue a joint statement on European defence. We consider your European Intervention Initiative to be an important part of this development. Alongside this, it is also natural to intensify our bilateral defence policy cooperation.

* * *

There is also much more than EU policy between two EU member states. In addition to security and defence policy, our foreign policy cooperation extends to defending our shared values and responding to global challenges.

We agree that the voice of Europe should be heard more strongly in the world. It is important to ensure that our voice is both coherent and credible in defending traditionally important European values and the principles of human rights and the rule of law. We will have an excellent chance to do this during the coming year when Finland and France have the successive chairmanships of the Council of Europe.

We need to strengthen multilateral cooperation and the institutions maintaining it also outside the borders of Europe. A crumbling of the rules-based international order would be a real threat to our wellbeing and security. We Europeans must stick together in defending this order. It is essential to reform the United Nations into a more efficient and effective actor. As a permanent member of the UN Security Council, France has a special role in this.

* * *

We can only respond together, not separately, to the common questions concerning the destiny of humanity. This past summer has been a concrete reminder and, at the same time, only a pale foreboding of what climate change could herald. There is no time to lose: the commitments under the Paris Agreement must be implemented as a matter of urgency. Finland, like France, wants to be among the leaders in climate policy within the framework of both the EU and the UN. In addition to intergovernmental cooperation, we also need new openings to engage the business world in climate action. Here, too, Finland and France could take joint steps.

As chair of the Arctic Council, Finland is very concerned about the rapid loss of the ice cover in the northern regions. Black carbon emissions in particular are accelerating the melting of ice and so, together with our Arctic partners, we are now striving to reduce these emissions. We hope France will support these efforts in other international forums since, like carbon dioxide, black carbon is a factor accelerating climate change, not just in the Arctic, but globally.

* * *

Finally, as a former chairman of the Football Association of Finland, I have to admit that there is one field where we Finns still have particularly much to learn from the French: the football field. Perhaps the recipe for success could be similar to that of clergymen in the Middle Ages – it would seem we need to start sending large numbers of our young players to French football academies. Congratulations on the superb performance and the well-deserved World Cup!

Mr President, dear Emmanuel, I would like to propose a toast to you and your wife and to the friendship between Finland and France.

President of the Republic Sauli Niinistö's speech at the opening of the 227th National Defence Course on 5 November 2018

The National Defence Course commencing today will be the 227th of its kind. Over the coming weeks you will become part of this important tradition.

The National Defence Course gives you, its participants, a thorough understanding of how Finland takes care of its security. These courses, by their very design, reflect the cornerstones of our security. The speakers and instructors of this course will furnish you with plenty of new knowledge and skills, and I have no doubt you will discover that you have much to learn from each other too.

This is the source of our strength – the sort of strength that is very much needed in our day and age. When people coming from different backgrounds realise how much they have to give to each other, and to receive from each other, a genuine sense of community grows. When we feel a shared sense of responsibility for our community, we are more willing and better placed to defend it together. And when this willingness to stand up for your community rests upon high-quality education and the skills and know-how that it brings, we will all be less susceptible to disinformation and malicious attempts to influence our thinking. As I have said before, every Finn is a defender of our country, at least between the ears.

* * *

In international relations we clearly find ourselves in an era of growing instability and uncertainty. Many elements of stability that we mistakenly thought of as permanent are shaking. Many factors creating instability that we thought we had left behind are coming back. At the same time, new dangers are on the rise. Many of the old truths no longer hold, but the visibility towards the future is limited. In these circumstances, protecting Finland's security requires particular vigilance.

We must be able to actively grasp new positive opportunities as they present themselves. We must be prepared to rapidly react to changes in our environment, even when those changes are undesired.

* * *

That is what Finland's active stability policy is about. The policy applies to all of the four pillars that our security rests on: our national defence, our Western integration and partnerships, our relations with Russia, and the international rules-based order – we must attend to all of these pillars equally.

Each pillar would of course be worthy of a speech in its own right. Our defence capability, based on general conscription, continues to evolve all the time. Our defence forces are already in good readiness and Finns rank number one in Europe for their willingness to defend their country. The major procurements that lie ahead will further bolster our defence capacity. This has a twofold effect on our national security: on the one hand, it maintains a high threshold against potential aggressors and on the other, it makes us a more significant partner.

With regard to our relations with Russia, we stand firm in our support of the EU sanctions. They are measures that we jointly decided to put in place. However, at the same time a clear and working dialogue with Russia is needed, both on bilateral issues with our neighbour and on matters of international security. This dialogue has functioned.

We continue our efforts to safeguard the international rules-based order, across the established international fora as well as by offering our good offices and creative solutions to promote dialogue. The most important questions facing humankind call for truly global answers. Without them, our security is weakened. Climate change serves as an example. By defending our planet, we are also defending our country.

* * *

Of the four pillars that underpin our security, I would like today to focus on our international defence cooperation. In recent years, we have been consistently strengthening this cooperation. However, it appears that the extent and pace of these developments have led to some lack of clarity over the nature of it.

I would like to take this opportunity to set out, as comprehensively as possible, what our international partnerships are, and are not, about. It is perhaps easiest to approach the issue along the various frameworks: our European Union membership, our NATO partnership, our participation in smaller groups and our bilateral arrangements.

* * *

I have long been worried about the state of the European security policy. In recent years, significant progress has finally been made in the defence cooperation of the EU, in terms of both funding and the so-called permanent structured cooperation. References to a European army can easily lead to misunderstandings. The real point is that 28 national armies already exist within the European Union and there is scope for enhanced cooperation between them.

However, the true core of European defence lies in the basic treaty of the European Union. Article 42(7) of the Lisbon Treaty states that if a Member State is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other Member States shall have towards it an obligation of aid and assistance by all the means in their power. The language is very strong. Yet so far there is no certainty over what its implementation might mean in the event of a crisis.

That is why I am delighted that France's President Emmanuel Macron has been willing to discuss the content of that article. It does not mean bringing about a treaty renegotiation, the question is merely about the implementation of an existing obligation. Let me take this opportunity to add that while this article is a part of an EU treaty, its possible implementation is not EU policy. It is clearly part of the national foreign and security policy of each member state.

* * *

Our interest in developing European defence and the mutual assistance clause does not mean questioning the significance of NATO. NATO's role as the guarantor of European security, as well as its presence in the Baltic Sea region, is an important source of stability. Given their largely overlapping memberships, strengthening the EU's defence will as a by-product also strengthen NATO. Indeed, the United States has for many decades called on Europe to assume greater responsibility. This is by no means a zero-sum game.

The close partnership of Finland and Sweden with NATO is an important part of our international cooperation. The partnership contains both political dialogue and participation in joint exercises. As far as the exercises are concerned, the most widespread public attention here in Finland tends to focus on visible physical exercises, such as Trident Juncture, currently underway in Norway. Taking part in these exercises is a valuable opportunity for our troops to develop their skills and to enhance their interoperability. It also allows us to practice providing and receiving international assistance, in line with our newly enacted legislation. Let me stress, however, that these exercises are field training of military capabilities, nothing less, nothing more. They should not be used to draw conclusions on security policy.

* * *

Of an entirely different nature are NATO's decision-making exercises, in which Finland and Sweden also participate as partners. These so-called CMX exercises receive much less publicity. It is in the context of these map exercises that the political boundaries of our cooperation with NATO are clearly expressed. This is also the reason why the responsibility for preparing these exercises rests with the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, while the field exercises are the responsibility of the defence sector.

And despite our close partnership with NATO, political boundaries remain, on both sides. We are not a NATO member. In the exercise, "on the map", we behave exactly as we would in real situations. This means that Finland does not participate either in Article 5 decision making or in its implementation. In line with the position adopted by the Finnish parliament, we take care of our own territory and will not allow it to be used for hostile purposes against third parties. Finland can be entered by invitation only.

The joint exercises are a way of ensuring that none of the parties – NATO members, Sweden or Finland – is under any illusions of how each would behave in the event of a crisis. This increase in predictability serves to enhance the stability in our region.

There is nothing automatic about Finland's participation in exercises. Decisions are taken based on a comprehensive foreign and security policy assessment. We have already proceeded in our joint and planned exercises with NATO in such a way, that there is hardly need for qualitatively

new openings. As we go forward, it will mainly be about updating our existing skills and understanding.

* * *

Alongside our EU membership and NATO partnership, we also work on defence cooperation as part of smaller groups of nations. In addition to our Nordic defence cooperation NORDEFECO, we have consistently sought to join the cooperation fora set up by three large European countries – Germany, the United Kingdom and France. These groups complement each other, and they in no way undermine the cooperation underway within the EU structures.

We have also taken steps to further strengthen our network of bilateral relationships. We have recently signed bilateral cooperation documents with almost ten countries. With Sweden and the United States we even have a trilateral cooperation paper. These memoranda of understanding and letters of intent do not provide us with treaty obligations any more than security guarantees, but they facilitate practical cooperation in the event of a crisis.

Indeed, this is the very purpose of our entire international defence cooperation. We don't put all our eggs in one basket. We maintain a broad range of partners.

* * *

To conclude, I would like to raise the current disarmament situation, which relates to the international treaty system, the fourth pillar of our security.

The Cold War pulled the superpowers, the then-Soviet Union and the United States, far apart. However, out of their mutual fear, the two sides also agreed on a shared set of rules. As a result, the INF and START treaties sought to limit the numbers of ballistic and intermediate-range nuclear missiles – and were ultimately successful in doing so.

The current situation between Russia and the United States is different. The New START, which replaced the original START treaty, is due to expire soon and, so far, there is no agreement on its extension. The United States recently declared its intention of withdrawing from the INF. Both parties to the INF have accused the other of breaching the terms of the treaty.

The Cold War bequeathed us with a working treaty system limiting nuclear weapons. That system is now in danger of being lost. Without any treaties in place, the ensuing risks would be enormous. The Cold War of the past would be succeeded by an ice-cold war.

The world today is different in other ways, too. The world has become more multipolar, and it takes more than two to negotiate arms control treaties. This means that there is room for the entire international community to at least seek to promote disarmament.

The verbal exchanges on missiles between Russia and the United States has focused attention on Europe, but as an object rather than as a subject. Medium-range nuclear missiles in Russia or in Europe open a source of danger. Avoiding this danger is of vital importance for Europe.

Here in Finland, we have provided our diplomatic "good services", and in recent years they have been in demand. In my next meetings with the leaders of the great powers I will raise disarmament issues and Finland's readiness to facilitate the commencement of a new round of negotiations. The Paris Peace Forum at the end of this week and the discussions taking place around it are an excellent opportunity for defending the international rules-based system. Europe would do well to highlight the importance of this spirit, and it is also something Finland can focus on during our upcoming EU Presidency.

* * *

Dear National Defence Course participants,

I know from my own personal experience the scale of the challenge that awaits you here. I hope the course proves to be thought-provoking and that it offers you plenty of opportunities for learning. Thank you.

President of the Republic Sauli Niinistö's New Year's Speech on 1 January 2019

My fellow citizens,

Late this autumn, the memorial flame was burning beneath the Arc de Triomphe in Paris. A hundred years had passed since the end of World War I. World leaders joined in silence to commemorate the making of peace that ended a European war.

Less than a month later, in the vicinity of the Arc de Triomphe, cars were burning. At the same time, yellow-vested people were on the streets, telling that things were not right for them. Under the Arc de Triomphe, the ostensible unanimity and reconciliation with the past changed into a fierce battle over the life today.

This symbolism forces us to ponder. Europe is the most democratic, equal and free continent in the world. Now it has, however, drifted into divisive quarrels over its very own values.

* * *

If even the best begins to seem disorderly, the prognosis for the entire world looks bleak indeed. The temptation to choose a different path grows.

Exporting European values has changed into defending them on home ground. And are we seeing attempts to import values alien to us? We know what the opposites of democracy, equality and freedom are.

We must continue our tireless work to defend the rules-based international order. The UN system is a significant supporting pillar also of Finland's own security and well-being. At the same time, we also have to prepare for the possibility that the current system may not be able to recover to what it once was.

The world is rapidly becoming multipolar and the world order is changing its form. China is using its economic power, Russia is rearming and the United States is distancing itself from cooperation. In this transformation, we must remain vigilant.

Finland has good connections with Washington, Moscow and Beijing. We need to utilize these contacts in pursuing our global objectives.

Foremost in my mind is the danger of the return of nuclear weapons to the everyday life of international politics. If the arms control treaties formulated during the Cold War collapse, we have to strive for the creation of new ones to replace them. Finland stands ready to offer its good services to build contacts for negotiation. We will take this message forward also during the beginning year.

Alone, however, our possibilities to influence others are limited. Europe must be brought back to the tables where the decisions about the future are made. An internally weak European Union is not able to do this. Together we must perform better.

* * *

Europe has a long tradition of representative democracy. There are calls to complement it, or even replace it, with more direct democracy, aiming at immediate and quick impact. Marches, movements and counter-movements demanding change are born.

We are living in a transition period. New ideas are eagerly grasped, but they may be abandoned just as quickly. We risk losing something essential to representative democracy: that is the ability to harmonize different viewpoints. And at the same time the ability to listen and try to understand the opinions of others, even when not accepting them.

The right to call into question is at the core of democracy. The power of contentment or discontentment belongs to the people. Indeed, all the current political parties were once born out of discontent. Also the energy of these new movements may thus be channeled to the construction of common good.

Yet amid the change, there are also disturbing signs of dangerous extremist movements. Anarchists hiding among yellow vests and demonstrators marching openly under Nazi symbols remind us of the cruelties and atrocities of the previous century. In a democracy, there is no room for them.

A year ago I expressed my concern about how the will to misunderstand often outweighs the attempt to understand. A heated debate that twists the truth is a maelstrom that easily ends in permanent hostility.

This past centenary of the events of 1918 gave food for thought. When hatred takes over, an ordinary person may end up acting with cruelty that he or she would previously have found unimaginable. But from hostility, there is also a way towards a common future. In our case, it opened in lockstep with the increasing trust in democracy.

* * *

In recent years, migration has been the phenomenon that has divided Europe most. It has been controversial between countries as well as within them. Migration in the world is not about to end – on the contrary, the pressure for it is increasing. This is why we have to be able to manage it better, whether it is about work-related migration, refugees or asylum seekers.

An asylum application cannot be left unexamined without breaching international law. International agreements were created to protect those in real need of protection. Then we must help. But as we have also experienced, the system can be exploited by people trying to immigrate for other reasons. We have also seen how some people who have sought refuge in Finland, even some who have received it, have created insecurity here with inhumane acts. This is an intolerable situation.

Those residing here have to be given the opportunity to be a part of our society. In turn, there is the right to require a willingness to adjust to our society. And to bear responsibility, also by guiding their own. Behaviour contradicting our laws and values increases the risk of stigmatisation of entire groups of people and arouses deep mistrust, even hatred.

The EU is looking for solutions to the management of migration. The agreement with Turkey has provided at least a breathing space to agree on terms on who and how can enter Europe and where they will be placed. If the management is successful, many countries, Finland no doubt included, will be ready to increase the amount of quota refugees. They are in need of international protection.

We must not forget that we also need migration. Qualified experts and those learning to become ones, to participate in the maintenance of our society.

* * *

We can with a good conscience say that Finland is the most democratic, equal and free country in the world. Our strength has always been trust, also in authorities: from education to social services, from police to health care.

We have traditionally respected these people who provide us security. But today it becomes increasingly evident that they are faced with inappropriate, even aggressive behaviour in their work. Something has gone badly wrong if a person providing societal services has to be afraid of the ones receiving them.

The respect for democracy is measured in the everyday interaction, on both sides of the table.

* * *

We must remember for whom and why we are writing our great story. We do it for our children. In addition to raising them with our words and example, with our actions we also shape the world that we leave behind for them. It is precisely this view that opens for the next generation that makes a person stay or leave, try or give up, or – as we have witnessed – rebel.

Through the window of this room, I can during the spring observe groups of children on their school trips. They are taking steps from their homes to the world, led by their teachers, the smallest ones hand in hand with their friends. And wearing yellow vests.

Our population is growing older and the Earth's ability to sustain us is reaching its limit. We can no longer be certain that children have a better future ahead of them than their parents had.

From all of us, mitigating climate change demands the ability to give up something. The era of material abundance and continuous growth is about to change. It does not have to mean the end of welfare. It must not mean the end of equal opportunities. We have to be able to redefine the elements of the good that we strive for. Humans are adaptable and inventive. The new good can thus be better than the previous one.

* * *

Not only Finland and Europe, but the entire world is in many ways also doing better than ever.

Therefore it is good to end with the words by poet Eeva Kilpi.

<i>“There</i>	<i>is</i>	<i>beauty.</i>
<i>There</i>	<i>is</i>	<i>love.</i>
<i>There</i>	<i>is</i>	<i>joy.</i>

All those who suffer from the misery of the world, defend them!”

I wish you all a happy new year and God bless you.

Speech by President of the Republic of Finland Sauli Niinistö at the closing of the electoral period 2015-2019 on 10 April 2019

Madam Speaker, Members of Parliament,

It is the duty of Parliament and its members to look to the future. To work to ensure future well-being for us all. During this four-year term now coming to an end, we have nevertheless also been remembering the past. And rightfully so. We have celebrated a number of commemorative years.

In 2016, we marked 110 years since the parliamentary reform granting also women the full right to vote and stand for election. The following year was spent celebrating our 100-year journey as an independent country. Last year, we remembered a dark chapter of our history, the Civil War which was tearing our society apart immediately after Finland gained independence. And now, the Constitution Act, which defines Finland as a republic, will reach the age of 100 years.

Remembering the milestones of the past is of value in itself. It is important for a nation to know its own story. The story, which binds us together. History does by no means repeat itself as such. But the true added value of retelling our story only comes from understanding how the lessons of history guide us towards the future.

* * *

None of the themes of these recent commemorative years has lost its relevance. Equality was at the core of the year 1906. It remains one of Finland's most important strengths. Plenty of room for improvement still remains, however – between genders, between generations, between different groups of people. Equality requires daily nurturing and bravery to defend it, from us all.

The theme for Finland's centenary year was "Together". It is also a good guiding principle for the future. A democracy can cope with differences of opinion, in fact, they are needed. But we cannot allow our disagreements to drive us apart. Splintering into factions would also weaken our security. Working together requires respect for the fellow citizens. Not only prior to elections, but at all times, in politics and in the everyday life.

One of the sobering lessons of 1918 is how easy it is for a cycle of hate to lead to ruthless brutality. When we compare our story to that of other countries, however, we were able to find reconciliation exceptionally soon after the Civil War. But it would have been better if the concord had never been broken. If we now recognize signs of a cycle of hate, we must be able to nip it in the bud.

The old Constitution Act established 100 years ago still lays a firm foundation for our current Constitution. Finland is a republic in which the powers are vested in the people and the Parliament representing the people. Legislative, executive, and judicial powers are separated, fundamental rights are guaranteed. The unbroken rule of this Constitution throughout the tumultuous 20th century is also rare by international terms. Nevertheless, we should not take democracy granted in the 21st century, either.

* * *

Equality, working together, concord and democracy – safeguarding these principles is hard work at the best of times. And the current times are not of the best kind. We live in an uncertain and unpredictable environment.

The beautiful post-Cold War world, in which we would all have liked to believe, has quickly taken on darker tones. Peace, democracy and human rights did not continue their steady march to victory, after all. The belief in rules, agreements and international organisations is increasingly being put to the test.

Power politics of states has returned, if it ever really went away. And states are not by far the only ones using power. Malicious networks and individuals have new kinds of capabilities and means for harming others.

In this kind of a world, the good must be steadfast. All over Europe, this reality is now beginning to be understood. Compared to many other European countries, we have at no stage let down our own defence, and this has been our strength. But also our own system has had a whole range of legislative gaps that have left us vulnerable.

Far too little attention has been given to this Parliament's consistent work aiming to fill these gaps. The list of legislative achievements from this electoral period to strengthen our security is a long one.

Changes to the Military Service Act have made it easier to raise the level of our defensive preparedness. The act on providing and receiving international assistance has strengthened our decision-making ability on security cooperation. Our capacities for preventing money-laundering and funding of terrorism have improved. National security is now a more important consideration in matters of dual citizenship, land use and property ownership. The acts on civil and military intelligence, which are waiting for final confirmation, will give the authorities significantly better capacities to carry out preventative measures.

I would like to extend my warmest thanks to you all for this work. I also wish to remind you that we have not yet reached the end of the road. In the coming electoral period, we must continue the work to pass legislation responding to the realities of the world around us.

Realities are precisely what we are dealing with. It would be much more pleasant to simply be able to trust that nothing is threatening us. But all the good which our society represents needs decisive defending. In this, Parliament has a highly important role.

* * *

Last autumn, at the opening ceremony of the national defence course, I asserted that defending our planet is also national defence. Climate change and its impact on our living conditions are not simply a news item from the last four years. Climate science has been informing us of these realities for much longer – to those who have been listening. Acting on them has taken a long time. At the same time, the task has become more difficult.

The start of the electoral period coincided with the Paris Climate Agreement, and the end of the period saw the publication of the latest report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, which received much attention. We have enough information. We now know what we need to do to meet the 1.5 degree target. We also have a clearer understanding of how dramatic the difference is between a temperature rise of 1.5 and 2 degrees.

Young people, at least, have understood the urgency of this matter. And this is good. Young people are demanding a new kind of decisiveness from today's decision-makers. Their voices must be heard, because they are the true stakeholders in this matter. It is first and foremost their future and the future of the generations to come that is at stake.

* * *

To conclude, I will return to the core of our democracy, the Constitution. Especially in recent months, the discussions on interpreting the constitution and constitutionality of legislation have been heated. Although the consequences of this have been complex for many projects and reforms, the attention paid to the Constitution have been valuable for our democracy. Our nation is built on the strong foundation of the Constitution.

The Constitution also lives in time. Many seem to have missed one of its most recent amendments, which relates to the Constitution's foreign and security policy dimension. It is well known that foreign policy is led by the President of the Republic in cooperation with the Government. But the constitutional amendment that came into force in 2012 gives Parliament itself a decisive role, should the President and the Government come into conflict on significant matters relating to foreign and security policy.

Such a conflict will of course be avoided by all means. However, this constitutional amendment gives Parliament an even greater responsibility in foreign and security policy than before. The parliamentary contribution is also strongly visible in processing the Government's policy reports.

The need for debate on foreign policy is, in other words, not limited to the run-up to elections. There is also a need for it after and between elections. For my own part, I have engaged in such discussions with parliamentary committees and party leaders throughout this past electoral period. I intend to continue doing so with the incoming Parliament as well.

* * *

Madam Speaker, Members of Parliament,

I would like to extend my thanks to Parliament for the valuable work you have done for our nation, and I hereby declare Parliament closed for the present electoral period.

Speech by President of the Republic of Finland Sauli Niinistö at the dinner for the diplomatic corps at the Presidential Palace, 2 May 2019

Excellencies, ladies and gentlemen,

It is once again a pleasure to welcome you all to the Presidential Palace. As always, this dinner represents both continuity and change.

Continuity, in following the tradition of bringing together the Ambassadors from the entire diplomatic community once a year.

Change, in welcoming the new arrivals to this community. Almost thirty of you have presented your credentials during the past twelve months and join this gathering for the first time.

Allow me to take this opportunity to thank you all for your precious work to advance our relations.

Unfortunately, we have also received very sad news this week. We have lost one of the most recently arrived colleagues of yours. I want to express my deepest condolences to the family of Ambassador Moon and to the Embassy of the Republic of Korea.

* * *

In Finnish politics, this spring is a time of change. Plenty of new faces have entered Parliament – and there are now more female members than ever before. The negotiations to form a new government are about to begin.

This kind of renewal is normal after parliamentary elections. But the election last month also confirmed new features in our political landscape. The support for the largest parties has fallen, and others have caught up. The margins have become smaller. Not a single party received more than 18 percent of the vote.

Ever since the early 1980s we have been used to stable majority governments, staying in office for the full four-year term. This decade has already witnessed some deviations from this rule, but the general trend has persisted.

For coalition governments to work, commitment to common objectives is key. In these new circumstances it is even more important than before. Commitment is desirable not only in order to achieve the goals the government sets in its programme. It will also serve the continued stability of our democracy. If everybody begins to seek short-term gains, we will all lose in the long term.

Regardless of the domestic changes, there is one area where you can count on continuity. Throughout my term in office, I have regularly engaged the leaders of all parliamentary parties in discussions on foreign and security policy. Our thinking on Finland's international position and the main pillars of Finland's security is well aligned. I am therefore confident that the

successful cooperation in leading Finland's foreign policy continues also with the new government.

* * *

For Finnish diplomacy, this is a year of three chairmanships or presidencies. Two of them will run out in the next two weeks, those in the Arctic Council and the Council of Europe. The third one, in the European Union, will begin in less than two months.

It is not an easy time to assume leadership in the European Union. Our continent is going through turbulent changes. The uncertain outcome of the upcoming European election, the apparently inevitable departure of the United Kingdom, and a number of disagreements between remaining members – these elements often dominate the view we have of the Union.

But we should not allow these challenges to distort the bigger picture. At the start of our Presidency, I would like to pose the leaders of the other member states a simple, provocative question: Do we still have something in common?

Honest answers to this question should immediately reveal the reality. Despite some real differences, there is much more that binds us together. Not only our common values, but also our common interests.

And most of those common interests are not restricted to Europe. They are global in nature. Terrorism, nuclear weapons, new technologies, climate change, migration – all these challenges can only be managed together. They require close cooperation. Above all, they require diplomacy.

* * *

In his new memoir, summing up his long career in the US foreign service, William Burns defines diplomacy as “the main instrument we employ to manage foreign relations, reduce risks and exploit opportunities to advance our security and prosperity”.

As tensions in international politics are on the rise, and the trust in agreements and institutions in decline, I have been deeply worried about predictions of an “end of diplomacy”. We cannot afford to lose this instrument. If anything, our time calls for more diplomacy, not less. Diplomacy is what provides order and structure to our relations. The continuity it brings helps us to manage change.

In his book, Burns continues to note that much of diplomacy unfolds out of sight and out of mind. He writes, “Its successes are rarely celebrated, its failures almost always scrutinized.”

This evening is one of those rare occasions for celebration. I would like to propose a toast to the successes of diplomacy, and to the hope of many more to come.

Speech by President of the Republic Sauli Niinistö at the Ambassadors' Conference on 20 August 2019

Esteemed Heads of Missions, dear colleagues,

Major questions of world politics are strongly present in Helsinki this week. This year, it is not only the merit of the discussions that traditionally take place in the context of this Ambassadors' Conference. As far as my own visit exchange is concerned, the autumn season starts tomorrow when the Russian President Putin arrives in Helsinki. Yesterday we already had the opportunity to exchange opinions with the Foreign Minister of Iran here.

The interesting series of meetings continues in a few weeks' time with an official visit to meet the Ukrainian President Zelensky. And much more is in prospect during the autumn. It is therefore an appropriate moment to consider not only the state of international relations but also the ultimate essence of Finland's foreign and security policy.

* * *

Four years ago, when we were taking our first steps in the cooperation with the previous government, I quoted J.W. Snellman at this same event. Those thoughts from 1863 are worth repeating again. "Only in the imagination of youth do nations sacrifice themselves for the common good of humankind," wrote our national philosopher. And he continued: "In reality, each nation seeks its own interests, just as it should."

As we approach the 2020s, these ideas, on the one hand, may sound badly out-dated. Making a sharp distinction between the interests of humankind and the nation is not sensible, not even possible. Of course, Snellman also noted the close connection between them in his text. Yet now that connection is closer than ever before. We have on our hands a host of wicked global problems that no single state can solve alone. And there is also a more positive side to the connection: in addition to problematic phenomena, globalisation has also spread the interest of all humankind to those who were previously beyond its reach. The pursuit of the common good, when partners can be found for this, also promotes our own cause.

But in the midst of an accelerating great-power competition and a deteriorating international order, Snellman's state wisdom has, on the other hand, gained an entirely new topicality. "A nation should only trust in itself," he famously emphasised. Recalling this idea is by no means a matter of narrow-minded, exclusive nationalism. Timeless realism, rather. Ultimately, we alone are responsible for our own security and well-being, no one else. Not everyone promotes the common good.

* * *

This is a contradiction we have to live with. Forces pulling in opposite directions are simultaneously making themselves felt across the world. Those that bring nations together, and those that drive them apart. Unfortunately, the latter seem to be increasingly gaining the upper hand.

We must, of course, do everything we can to reverse this trend. "Rules-based system" and "international cooperation" – we do not emphasise these phrases in our speeches simply to demonstrate moral orthodoxy. When they function, they directly serve the interests of all humankind as well as our own interests. Defending them uncompromisingly requires not only words, but also concrete actions. Fortunately, we also have like-minded defenders of cooperation alongside us.

Our influence on the policies practised by others, even together with our partners, is limited, however. We must therefore also be prepared for an unwanted future. For one in which institutions and cooperation mechanisms are further weakened and power politics and confrontation are increasingly on the rise.

Whether circumstances are favourable for us or not, the main objective of Finland's foreign and security policy remains the same. It is strengthening our international position and ensuring our security. This is what we are most able to influence through our own actions. Succeeding in this is the measure of our policy's success.

The results of foreign policy should not be confused with the instruments of foreign policy. Being part of an alliance or a group of countries is not an end in itself, but a means. Initiatives, meetings and statements are not ends in themselves, but means. What is decisive is the results

achieved through these instruments. Do they lead to desired change or not? Do they strengthen our international position and our security or not?

* * *

As you well know, the global situation has become highly unstable. There are open and emerging conflicts in all directions, from Ukraine to Syria, from the Gulf to the Korean Peninsula. A new feature of the post-Cold War situation is now the increasingly open extension of great-power competition to all continents.

The definition of a great power depends on perspective. In economic terms, the United States and China are, compared with Russia, giants in a division of their own. We can only guess what the ultimate effects of the increased tension in their trade relations will be. In geopolitical terms, however, the world is not bipolar. With its military and political power, Russia has unquestionably shown itself to be the third great power. This triangle, with Washington, Beijing and Moscow at its vertices, is now making its mark on the entire international security situation.

And the tensions between the great powers are not limited to crisis areas. From the vertices of the triangle, strengthening cross-pressures are being directed at the European Union within it. These pressures are also beginning to be felt in EU Member States.

Maintaining, our international position, let alone strengthening it, within that triangle will require more and more work in the future. The triangle around us may change its shape and position surprisingly quickly. Maintaining our own room for manoeuvre will require that we monitor this dynamic with great.

To a degree, unpredictability is also increased by the fact that the great powers are not immune to internal conflicts either. The upcoming election year in the United States and the demonstrations in Moscow and Hong Kong are each in their own way making these dividing lines visible for all to see. The consequences are still unknown, but they will inevitably leave some kind of a mark on the leadership of these countries.

Direct contacts with all vertices of the triangle are invaluable to us in this situation. In these discussions, we will not be able to turn a great power away from a major strategic course it has already chosen. In other matters, however, there may be opportunities to exert influence.

Dialogue always gives us better scope to anticipate the next movements of the great powers, while maximising our own ability to react. And, above all, an open line of communication provides an opportunity to directly express our own views, ensuring that there is no ambiguity about our own position. At the same time, situations may arise in which we can facilitate dialogue between the great powers.

* * *

Rather than a triangle, I would much prefer to draw the image of world politics as a rectangle. One in which the European Union would be an equal global player with the other great powers. As part of a more influential union, our own position would also be strengthened. Unfortunately, however, the EU's geopolitical and security policy weight does not, for the time being, correspond to its economic power.

Let me be clear: I strongly support the strengthening of the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy, even at the risk that it would reduce the powers of the President of the Republic. Both as Presidency and as a regular member, we need to strive for a common European voice and joint European deeds.

In the future, we must also ensure that the UK remains a close part of the European security system, even after its departure from the EU. This will require creative solutions, particularly

if a no-deal departure really lies ahead. I myself have started to ponder whether Article 42.7 of the Lisbon Treaty could somehow be extended to cover the UK even after it has left the EU behind. After all, the aid and assistance obligation is a commitment between Member States, not union policy.

At the moment, however, we cannot build our own security on something that does not yet exist. Alongside EU membership, our Western cooperation is therefore based on a broad spectrum of complementary contacts, ranging from the NATO partnership to multilateral and bilateral arrangements, both with the United States and European countries. At this summer's Kultaranta Talks, I believe this was called a "tapestry" (kudelmä in Finnish). Regardless of the label attached to it, the way in which we have built this array of contacts constantly receives very positive feedback in the international arena. Strengthening our international position, this too.

* * *

As I have already said, open questions attached to the great-power triangle are overshadowing all parts of the world. Our own neighbourhood is no exception to this. The great powers now seem to be paying even more attention to the Arctic region than the Baltic Sea.

Alongside climate change, concern about Arctic security was another reason for our efforts to organise a summit of Arctic countries earlier this year. Our readiness to host the summit was a means of our foreign policy, not an end in itself. Although it has not yet been possible to convene the meeting, due to great-power tensions, the necessity for it has not disappeared.

A number of difficulties are associated with bringing together all eight Arctic countries. It is a lot easier to bring together smaller groups of like-minded Nordic countries around the situation of the Northern regions. It is well known that cooperation between Finland and Sweden has intensified at an astonishing rate in recent years. Alongside this, it will certainly also be useful to open new links with our common neighbour, Norway. I have called together a joint, informal meeting with Finnish, Swedish and Norwegian prime ministers as well as defence and interior ministers to for the beginning of September. The aim is to have, for the first time with this set-up, an unofficial exchange of views on security policy.

* * *

Cooperation with the new Government has started without problems during the summer. No changes are expected to the main features of our foreign and security policy line. Of course, some new areas of emphasis always arise with changes of government. Two clear priorities stand out from this government programme, Africa and climate change. Both are very important themes. You have already had a thorough discussion of both topics here in the context of yesterday's ministerial speeches. I shall therefore confine myself to briefly addressing each of them, expressly from the point of view of results.

With Africa and development policy now firmly on the Government's agenda, I would like to draw attention to, alongside their instruments, also to their effectiveness. I myself would support a strengthening of a common European approach also in this area. The current EU Presidency provides Finland with an opportunity for this.

As an objective, better coherence of national action is, of course, a good starting point, but it is even more important to ensure that EU Member States and the actors they fund do not engage even in conflicting policies unknown to each other. By combining their development and Africa policy forces better, European countries would certainly be able to achieve more results already with the resources they currently use. At the same time, the EU's foreign policy influence and standing would increase on a continent that is becoming increasingly important.

With regard to climate change, the Government's ambitious goals have been praised worldwide. I join in this praise: these goals are indeed worth presenting internationally. Very soon, however, questions about concrete deeds will begin to be asked. The first occasion will come at the end of September when I attend the Climate Action Summit, convened by Secretary General Guterres, in connection with the UN General Assembly Week.

In climate policy, the power of the example is strong. We cannot demand more from others until we have demonstrated that we can do it ourselves. Goals alone are not enough. Evidence of achieving them must also be obtained.

* * *

Your Excellencies, geopolitical tensions and pressures on the international treaty system have already led some to speak gloomily about the end of diplomacy. I strongly disagree with that. As circumstances become more difficult, the demand for skilled diplomacy only increases.

To you as professionals in this field, it is no news that skilled diplomacy is being carried out both in public and out of sight. There is a time and place for both approaches. There are situations where raising one's profile and visibility are important. There are also situations where it is wiser to present one's views in silence behind the scenes.

This does not mean avoiding difficult issues, but focusing on the results that are essential to us. If our international position and our security – or, for example, the human rights situation elsewhere – are improved by us criticising others publicly, then it is certainly worth doing so. Usually, however, we tend to achieve more by acting otherwise.

The more difficult the circumstances become, the more valuable Finnish diplomacy becomes for Finland. It is a task of which you can be proud. I wish you every strength in your important work.

Speech by President of the Republic of Finland Sauli Niinistö at the promotion and appointment of cadets on 30 August 2019

Esteemed Cadets,

I congratulate you on the completion of the Bachelor of Military Sciences degree. I hereby promote all you cadets holding the rank of second lieutenant and sub-lieutenant to the rank of officer and appoint you to a fixed-term position of a junior officer.

This is a special day in your career. You have completed your studies at the National Defence University and are now assuming your first duties. Officer training gives you excellent capabilities for serving as trainers and leaders of your troops.

The Finnish Defence Forces and the Border Guard are completely dependent on professionally qualified staff. Your employers have made a decades-long commitment to you. Similarly, you will be, throughout your career, engaged in enhancing Finland's defence capability and its future development.

You will begin your careers in the position of junior officers in a situation in which our defence capability is strong and border controls effective. At the same time, the world around us is changing, continually posing new challenges for us. Super power competition is intensifying and the geopolitical situation is difficult to predict. Military activity in Baltic Sea region remains at a highly level, and the importance of the Arctic region in the security policy context is growing.

The rules-based international order has been upset by serious disruptions. We need to make an effort to protect international cooperation. At the same time, however, we need to be prepared

for continued confrontation and uncertainty. As I have indicated elsewhere, it is us who are ultimately responsible for our own security and welfare.

Esteemed Young Officers,

Aside from training duties, some of you will begin your careers by securing and monitoring our borders while others will serve in key aviation and naval duties important to ensuring our territorial integrity. It reflects the wide range of roles for which you have been trained during the past three years.

Most of you will work as trainers of conscripts, who will subsequently transfer into the reserve and be assigned to their designated war-time units. The knowledge, skills and attitudes that you will be able to instil during conscript training will create the basis for efficient combat troops.

Young conscripts and female volunteers entering the national service come with different capabilities and from different backgrounds, yet all are equal in terms of their rights and responsibilities. Your role as trainers and educators is essential. By your own example, you will give your troops a solid professional skills base and instil a strong will to defend this country that will also be sustained in the reserve.

Our national defence concept is based on universal conscription that we have held onto in the face of global changes. And rightly so. It is a transparent, familiar, cost-efficient and highly functional model. But even the universal conscription system is evolving in response to the times. In recent years, the Finnish Defence Forces have improved preparedness, developed conscript and reservist training and enhanced the performance capabilities of both troops and technical systems. Ultimately, our capability and strength are based on efficient war-time reserves, of which you form the core as professional soldiers.

Rector of the Finnish National Defence University, lecturers and staff,

I thank you for a job well done. The degree of Bachelor of Military Sciences provides a sound basis for young officers to serve in this demanding profession. Thanks to your efforts, the skills and capabilities of the Finnish Defence Forces and the Border Guard will continue to be maintained at a high level.

Young Officers,

I congratulate you and your next of kin on this memorable day and wish you every success in your future duties

Speech by President of the Republic of Finland Sauli Niinistö at the Interparliamentary Conference for the CFSP and the CSDP in Helsinki, Kalastajatorppa, 5 September 2019

This autumn we are commemorating the outbreak of the Second World War eighty years ago. We must not forget the terrible devastation and human suffering caused by that war. But it is also important to remember what grew out of that tragedy. The spirit of “never again”, the seeds for European unity.

As my good colleague, the German Federal President Steinmeier said in Warsaw last weekend, “the united Europe is what saved us”. European integration essentially started out as a peace project, aiming to prevent another war. In this sense, security was of course at the core of the European project from the very beginning. And indeed, between the members of the European Union, the absence of war has prevailed.

Maintaining peace inside the Union is not a minor achievement. On the contrary, it is a prerequisite for everything else that we do. Yet for the European Union to thrive in the 21st century, its contribution to security needs to go beyond avoiding the horrors of the past. A

credible Union needs to show that it can address the present and future security concerns of its citizens. This requires unity. This requires strength.

* * *

Let me begin with unity. You have gathered at this conference to discuss the Common Foreign and Security Policy as well as the Common Security and Defense Policy of the European Union. Before even turning to foreign, security or defense policy, I want to stress the word “common”. I would like to challenge you to stop for a moment to think about a simple question. What do we, Europeans, have in common?

I firmly believe that if we take this question seriously, we can come up with a long list of issues that unite us. A list that easily outweighs those questions that divide us. Why is it, then, that the image of the European Union these days is so often one of disagreements and quarrelling?

I am afraid we, collectively, have ourselves to blame for this. Where there are problems between members, they naturally have to be dealt with. But if we constantly focus on the differences when we talk about our Union, it only makes us weaker, internally and externally. It turns into a self-fulfilling prophecy. It makes it more difficult for us to arrive at effective common policies. It makes it easier for others to try to divide us even further.

Instead, we should focus on all that we have in common. Our values, to be sure. But also our interests. In my thinking, the main argument for the objective of a common European voice has nothing to do with idealism. It is pure realism. In a world increasingly dominated by a great-power competition, even the largest of EU member states are small if they act on their own. The more united we are, the more forcefully we all can pursue our interests globally.

* * *

The outgoing High Representative, Madame Mogherini, will address you at this conference later today. In her speech to the EU Ambassadors earlier this week, she stated that “the world expects the European Union to play a leading role”. Although we have witnessed a diminishing demand for the export of our values, this is an important reminder. A stronger Europe is not only something that would benefit us Europeans. Many of our partners across the world would also like to see Europe live up to its full potential.

Whereas the world may expect the EU to play a leading role, however, we should have no illusions: the world will not stop to wait for it. In my own speech to the Finnish Ambassadors two weeks ago, I noted that the geopolitical picture of the world has started to resemble a triangle. With Washington, Beijing and Moscow as its corners, this triangle now makes its mark on all continents, in different constellations.

I would much rather draw this picture as a rectangle. With a strong European Union as its fourth corner, as an equal global player with the three others. For the time being, this is not the case. Europe is no longer shaping the world, we are being shaped by it – above all by the great-power triangle.

If we want to change this picture, as I think we should, the European Union has to earn its place at the tables that matter. The triangle will not turn into a rectangle on its own. Unity is the first requirement for our ability to make that change, but it is not sufficient. Unfortunately we are living in a world that respects hard power. In such a world, only the strong ones are listened to.

* * *

The good news is that Europe is now, at last, waking up to this reality. For a long time, I felt a bit lonely when calling for a stronger role for the European Union in the security and defense of our continent. In the past few years, I have been relieved to finally receive some company in

these efforts. Whether the objective is called a European Security and Defense Union, European strategic autonomy, or something else altogether, the main point is that these questions are now taken seriously.

With a series of new achievements, from the Permanent Structured Cooperation to the European Defense Fund, this is certainly an important part of the legacy of the Commission of Mr Juncker. I trust that the new Commission led by Madame von der Leyen will continue this work relentlessly. Now is the time to fill all the structures we have created with concrete deeds.

Ultimately, concrete European deeds can only come with committed political leadership from the member states. Therefore I have been particularly pleased by the entry to the scene of another good colleague, the French President Macron. I can wholeheartedly support all his initiatives aiming at a stronger European Union. I only hope that we would hear more in the same vein from other European heads of state and government – and from the parliaments that you represent.

* * *

In the case of Finland, we have long argued that taking care of our own national defense is valuable for two main reasons. It creates a credible threshold against a potential aggressor. And it makes us into a more interesting partner for others.

I cannot see why the same argument would not work for the European Union as a whole. A European Union capable of taking care of its own security is an important goal in its own right. But it is also a means to an end. It will be a European Union that is a more interesting partner for others, in security matters and beyond. It will be a European Union with more influence in the world.

* * *

Ladies and gentlemen, Mr Chairman,

I now look forward to continuing the discussion with you.

Speech by President of the Republic of Finland Sauli Niinistö at the Yalta European Strategy Conference Kyiv, Ukraine, 13 September 2019

President Zelensky, President Kaljulaid, ladies and gentlemen,

It is touching to be here among happy people, free people. Mr. Sentshov, it was a huge experience for me to see you alive. I have so often taken your case up at very different tables.

It is a pleasure for me to address this distinguished audience. As the theme of this conference is "happiness", I will of course have to begin by pointing out that Finland is considered to be the happiest country in the world. We may not always look like that. But we have the World Happiness Report of the World Economic Forum to prove it.

Comparing countries on something as intangible as happiness can sound odd, even unserious. However, I believe that our number one position in that report has a lot to do with our success in several other rankings. We have consistently been in the top three in global indexes measuring, for instance, the rule of law, the level of education, and the lack of corruption. In 2019, Finland was also ranked as the least fragile state in the world.

It is no coincidence that these things go hand in hand: the rule of law, education, low corruption, stability — and yes, happiness.

It was not self-evident, when the journey of an independent Finland began, that we would be able to enjoy these ingredients of happiness a hundred years later. Not only did we start off as a poor, rural country. We also went through a brutal and bloody civil war only a few months after gaining independence. And yet we became a stable democracy that withstood all the challenges of the 20th century. A competitive, modern economy fully integrated into the global markets. A society prepared to pull together.

* * *

This transformation could not have happened without the proper structures. Earlier this week in Helsinki, we celebrated the centenary of our Constitution Act. This constitution of 1919 turned Finland into a republic. A republic with strong institutions and strong fundamental rights for its citizens.

Luckily we have had an uninterrupted run with this solid form of government for a full century now. It is an invaluable foundation for the way we lead our lives today. But structures are not enough. Even the best of constitutions is not sufficient to guarantee a functioning society. It can only provide a framework. In order to fill that framework with content, the society itself, the people themselves, have to take responsibility for it.

For me, two key characteristics of the Finnish society stand out. One is trust. The other is a feeling of belonging. Maybe President Zelensky said it in other words: feeling to be present. Both of these elements require citizens to understand that they not only have rights, but also responsibilities. Other people's rights also have to be respected, not just one's own.

A society where people trust each other, a society people genuinely feel that they belong to, despite their differences, is also a society that is more resilient against external threats. This is at the heart of our concept of comprehensive security. For our strong national defense, military capabilities of course continue to matter. They make the threshold against a potential aggressor higher, and they make us into a more interesting partner for others. But in a world of hybrid warfare and alternative facts, other, less material assets are increasingly important, too. As I have often said, each citizen is a defender of our country — between his or her ears. What you accept, what you understand being false, is very important.

*

*

Ladies and gentlemen,

Since I have talked at length about the Finnish experience, allow me to make one thing clear: I am deeply reluctant to give unsolicited advice to anyone. Our own society is far from perfect. It, too, requires constant nurturing and improvement. But if there is an international interest in some kind of a Finnish model, this is the story I am always happy to share. At least for us, it has worked reasonably well.

Now, let me widen the perspective, from the case of Finland to larger geopolitical questions. I am sure that we will go deeper into them in the discussion that follows.

In fact, I believe that the same elements I highlighted earlier — trust and a feeling of belonging — are also vital components of a functioning international order. Even the best of institutions, even the best of treaties and agreements are not enough, if the members of the international community — all of us — are not willing to respect them. The framework has to be filled with content. It is our responsibility, as states, as global citizens.

At the moment, unfortunately, we are not fulfilling our responsibility. Precisely when a growing number of truly global challenges would urgently call for common responses, the rules-based international order is crumbling in front of our eyes. Multilateralism is overshadowed by great-

power competition. Confrontation prevails over cooperation. Unpredictability and disorder are gaining the upper hand.

Amid gloomy future scenarios, the good news is that there is nothing inevitable about them. The moderator of this session, Richard Haass, will recognize this quote from his book, *A World in Disarray*: "The rationale for statecraft, diplomacy and foreign policy more broadly is that [...] the nature of international order, the balance between [...] anarchy and society, can be changed for the better."

* * *

This is the business we are in: statecraft, diplomacy and foreign policy. This is what we collectively have to strive for: changing the balance for the better again. More society, less anarchy. We have to rebuild the trust that has been lost. We have to reconstruct the feeling of belonging, an understanding that the problems of the 21st century require global solutions.

I do not have any illusions about the difficulty of this task. Saving the international order will require a lot of hard work. It will be frustrating at times, and we will also suffer setbacks. But we don't really have a better alternative. We must try.

One thing is certain: we cannot possibly succeed in this task without diplomacy, without dialogue. Joining forces with like-minded friends and partners in defending the international order makes our voice stronger. But we do not have the luxury of only engaging those with whom we already agree.

* * *

I now look forward to continuing the discussion with you. Yesterday, while talking with President Zelensky, he made a challenge. Ukraine wants to compete with Finland for being the happiest country in the world. I welcome you to this friendly competition.

Statement by the President of the Republic of Finland, Sauli Niinistö, at the 74th General Debate of the United Nations General Assembly, New York, 24 September 2019

Mr. President, Secretary-General, Distinguished Delegates, Ladies and Gentlemen,

Let me congratulate Mr. Tijjani Muhammad-Bande for the election as the President of the 74th session of the General Assembly. You can count on Finland's strong support for your work in guiding this important body.

I would also like to thank the Secretary-General, Mr. António Guterres, for his tireless efforts in leading the United Nations.

* * *

I have been glad to note how the new President of the General Assembly has stressed a "trust deficit" as a key concern for the world today. I could not agree more. I believe trust to be a central pre-requisite for any functioning community – local or national, regional or global.

Without trust, even the best of institutions cannot deliver. Without trust in institutions, we are less capable of acting together to address the challenges of the future. And without trust in a sustainable future, we will not trust each other. This vicious cycle needs to be broken.

* * *

First, let me begin with trust in a sustainable future. Crucial questions of that trust are at the heart of two major summits here in New York this week. One on sustainable development in general, another on climate action in particular.

Under both headings, we already have the framework for the transformation we need. And yet, despite our joint commitment to the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the Paris Agreement, the results are far too meagre. Recent reports show that we are not nearly on track to achieve the goals we have commonly agreed.

Inability to keep our promises in matters of this magnitude will inevitably erode trust. Trust of citizens in their leaders, to be sure. But also trust between generations. And above all: trust of us all in our common future. Nothing less than the fate of our planet is at stake.

For yesterday's Climate Action Summit, the Secretary-General asked us to come with a plan, not with a speech. Indeed, a good plan is already more concrete than a speech. But it is only a beginning. What we really need, in order to build trust in our common future, are results. Deeds, not just promises. Action, not just targets.

* * *

The pressing need for action applies to all of the seventeen sustainable development goals. Still, goal number thirteen, Climate Action, stands out as the most urgent one. The rapidly growing impact of climate change also makes achieving the other SDGs more difficult.

The scientific evidence on climate change has been clear for a long time. But it is no longer just a question for future scenarios. Climate change is here already: Melting glaciers, large-scale forest fires, extreme weather events. Across the globe, from the Arctic to the Amazon.

Even if we were able to stop all of our CO₂ emissions tomorrow, we would have to live, for decades to come, with the climate change we have already caused. We are no longer able to avoid the climate crisis completely. We also have to achieve concrete results in adapting to the inevitable.

This should not distract us from what we can do to prevent further damage. We all have to accelerate our efforts. Reduce our emissions, increase our carbon sinks. We cannot afford to wait for others to move first. The climate crisis calls for leaders, not just followers.

* * *

As for Finland, we have recently set ourselves new climate targets. The Finnish government is committed to achieve carbon neutrality by 2035. And to be carbon negative soon after that. We have already banned the energy use of coal by 2029. We will stop using fossil oil in heating by 2030.

We are rightly proud of these targets. But targets are just a beginning. Only verifiable results matter. Only concrete deeds serve as a credible example to others.

I would like to draw your attention to one example. Finland and Chile are co-chairing the Coalition of Finance Ministers for Climate Action. The Helsinki Principles of this coalition are driving the systemic change we need. With concrete deeds, with the strong tools of the finance ministers. Taxation and budgeting, public investment and procurement – when these instruments work for climate action, the prospects for a carbon-neutral world are much better. There are now 40 committed members in this coalition. We warmly welcome new ones.

* * *

Another issue I want to raise is trust in institutions. We have all seen how rapidly that trust has evaporated in recent years. The whole concept of multilateralism is increasingly under threat: Threat from great-power competition. Threat from lack of respect for existing agreements. The entire rules-based order is endangered.

Passively complaining about the crisis of multilateralism will not help. Instead, we have to become more active and determined in defending it. The trust in institutions is ours to rebuild. The international order is ours to shape. We, together, are the United Nations.

The United Nations as an organization also bears a responsibility here. It has to show that it deserves the trust of its members. Finland has steadfastly supported the Secretary-General in his reform agenda. Again, the results are what matters.

The disappearing trust in institutions and regimes is particularly dangerous in the field of arms control. On nuclear weapons, we are actually losing the last elements of control altogether. With the collapse of the INF and the uncertain future of New START, the NPT Review Conference next year is now of utmost importance.

We should also be able to address other weapons of mass destruction, conventional weapons – and completely new weapon technologies. We can only manage these challenges together. Therefore Finland fully supports the Secretary-General's efforts to bring the disarmament agenda back to the core of the United Nations.

* * *

Thirdly, to conclude, I will turn to trust in each other. Trust between states, trust between individuals, is the fundamental basis for peace and security. In the absence of trust, the potential for conflict grows. And once conflicts have erupted, their resolution always requires rebuilding trust.

It is our collective duty to seek solutions to the many ongoing wars and conflicts in the Middle East, in Africa, in Ukraine, and elsewhere. At least equally important is to prevent new conflicts from breaking out in the first place. Finland has always emphasized the value of dialogue in its own diplomatic relations. We are also happy to provide our “good offices” for others.

Trust in each other is also closely linked to equality between genders and generations. The future of our planet lies on the shoulders of today's young women and men. The inclusion of women and youth in peace processes, conflict prevention and mediation has proven to be decisive.

* * *

We are approaching the 25th anniversary of the Beijing Declaration, the most progressive policy document ever for advancing the rights of women. Unfortunately, there is not much cause for celebration. We are deeply worried to see that sexual and reproductive health and rights are now being questioned. Finland remains strongly committed to advancing the rights of women.

Respect for universal human rights is the key to a peaceful and just world. Finland strongly believes in multilateral cooperation on human rights, with the Human Rights Council as its cornerstone. Accordingly, we have announced Finland's candidature to the Human Rights Council for the period from 2022 to 2024.

* * *

As the United Nations is entering its 75th anniversary, it could well be more important than ever. Our common global problems cry for common global solutions. Together, we are also better able to seize new global opportunities. There is no organization better placed to lead that work than the United Nations. To unleash its full potential, it is our responsibility to reduce the trust deficit.

President of the Republic Sauli Niinistö's New Year's Speech on 1 January 2020

My fellow citizens,

We are on the threshold of a new decade. The 2010s was a time of rapid change. The pace of change will continue to increase, but we can affect the direction it will take.

Unrest, instability and short-term thinking have characterised life both in Finland and the world at large. Counterforces to them must be created. We need more peace, stability and long-term thinking.

* * *

Late last year I was startled when I heard an interviewee on a street in London describing the opposing sides of the Brexit dispute: “we’ve learnt to hate each other”. When an issue, no matter how important, breeds hate towards those who think differently, we are heading for trouble. A culture of hate will not carry us far. It will lead to a fall.

I am increasingly concerned about how we in Finland treat one another. It is a matter of respecting each other, and ultimately maintaining social peace. And with it, our security.

Our way of public discussion has changed rapidly. It is increasingly rare to hear those holding opposite views seeking common ground. It is increasingly common to see existing divisions being fortified. Here are “we” who are right, over there are “they” who are wrong.

When there is no longer willingness to engage in a genuine dialogue, deliberate misunderstanding increases. When knowledge is meaningful only when it serves one’s own agenda, half-truths and even lies gain ground.

This is a development we need to end. The question is not only about a more pleasant atmosphere for those taking part in the dialogue. At stake is the single most important factor of Finland’s success. Mutual understanding.

Mutual understanding does not necessarily mean unanimity. There has always been room in this country for different opinions. Issues can be contested, and they should be. But disdain and belittling others does not help to find solutions to those contested issues. We can do better.

* * *

Society must guarantee a secure and peaceful life. Finland is a very permissive and open society; also in this respect a model. But there is also evil in the world which is not dispelled by mere kindness. The good needs to be defended resolutely if we want to preserve it. This is also what I have meant when talking about terrorism legislation.

The backbone of our social fabric is its service sector. People who carry out what our democracy wants. Far too many of them are exposed to daily harassment, threats, pressure, even violence. Once again today, they are obliged to attend to customers who harassed them just yesterday. Their work is no longer only professionally demanding, it is also mentally punishing. If those who provide care, education and security become exhausted, the functioning of our whole society is endangered. That we cannot afford.

Online shaming and hate speech are new concepts in public debate. However, our legislator has been far-sighted. For example, incitement to ethnic hatred and offences against personal reputation, dignity or privacy of the individual are already criminalised by law. A person committing a crime against another person is liable to prosecution. This has no connection to freedom of speech, let alone its limitation.

Finland has, correctly, underlined the rights of minorities, and protected them. The inviolability of every individual, then again, enjoys equal legal protection, irrespective of their perceived affiliation. And we are all individuals.

* * *

A new phenomenon has emerged in domestic politics and the parliamentary system. No government installed in office in this millennium has served a full term. The current government is the ninth appointed since 2003 and the Prime Minister the eighth. Full four-year terms that had become customary have been replaced by an average of less than two and a half years. At first glance, it could appear that this is due to a fragile parliamentary system or an unstable political situation.

But this is not the case. None of these governments fell on a motion of no confidence and not once has there been a political stalemate. Actually quite the contrary. Governments that have resigned mid-term have been quickly succeeded by a new one with more or less identical programmes and composition. Except for the Prime Minister who has been replaced.

The workload of the Prime Minister is demanding. And his or her person is under constant scrutiny. As the head of Government, he or she is the most visible person to answer to the public and supporters in defending decisions that are not always palatable to all. If, at the same time, the popularity or political support wanes, pressures start mounting. A single error or failure may be enough to trigger them.

I would once more like to draw attention to the fact that a Government works as a collegium. Decisions that are jointly made, are also jointly answered for. This indisputable joint responsibility has been overlooked to some extent, but bearing it in mind may both lighten the Prime Ministers' burden and encourage them in their efforts.

Even politics requires peace and quiet to focus on getting the job done. Political drama can be created instantly, whereas political results take their time.

* * *

Climate change is a major threat. Will it be fixed? Tools exist but are there those willing to use them? Every nation has set their objectives, Finland at the forefront. This is commendable. But objectives do not yet amount to action.

Few people, even in Finland, are familiar with the term "Helsinki Principles". They are closer to tangible action than just objectives. Less than a year ago, chaired by Finland, a group of finance ministers – currently numbering over 50 – agreed that climate impacts will be taken into account in all future budget and investment projects. Similar thoughts are quickly spreading among major corporations.

Change starts with the big players: states and business conglomerates. But we too – soon eight billion people, each with different consumption patterns – are another major player.

* * *

The unstable world situation shows no signs of settling down. In an increasingly complex world, the requirements imposed on Finland's foreign policy will grow.

In foreign policy, Finland does its utmost to promote peace, stability and long-term thinking. By supporting the common good on a broad front, we shoulder our share of responsibility for the world while at the same time advancing our own interests.

Ultimately, every nation forges its own destiny. Safeguarding our own position must continue to be the clear point of departure in Finland's foreign and security policy. Nobody else will do this.

* * *

This year a quarter of a century has passed since our accession to the European Union. For Finland, the EU remains the most important source of economic prosperity and stability.

What I find especially significant is that the debate on European security is finally advancing. While the cooperation is still only taking its first steps, it lies in our interest that it continues.

Amidst intensifying superpower competition, the new EU Commission has chosen to define itself as "geopolitical". This is positive. Only a strong Union can act on an equal basis with the United States, China and Russia, all keen to emphasize their power.

True enough, Europe is already a superpower in trade, economics, science and technology. They are areas which may shape tomorrow's geopolitics. As part of Europe, we are also involved in this process.

* * *

Man has always believed in the future. Been wrong repeatedly, and then made amends. And succeeded.

I wish you all a happy new year. God bless you!

Speech by President of the Republic of Finland Sauli Niinistö at the Ambassadors' Conference on 25 August 2020

Esteemed Heads of Missions, ladies and gentlemen,

We still have more than a third of this year left, but it has already felt quite long so far. Our everyday life has changed in a way and at a speed no one could anticipate in the beginning of the year. In the speech I gave at the opening of Parliament in early February, I could still express my hope that the coronavirus would not escalate into a pandemic.

It did not go that way. The impacts of the coronavirus pandemic and its prevention extend now simultaneously all around the globe. Reaching every continent, every state, every individual. We often talk about global challenges. This, if any, is such a challenge.

Therefore, we could also expect a global response. On one hand, we can see some encouraging signals. When the threat has been large enough, entirely exceptional measures have been launched in different parts of the world, exceptionally fast.

The problematic point, however, is that the global response has been a series of national responses. The capacity of the international community to take concerted action turned out to be regrettably weak, particularly in the beginning. When it came to the crunch, each country began taking care of its own only, as best they could, not giving much thought to the views of their neighbours or partners.

This is, of course, quite understandable, but, when seen as a precedent, also raises concerns. Are we to expect a similar reaction in future global crises as well? And have we already seen the same in relation to climate change? What does that tell us about the future of multilateral cooperation, which is of such great importance to us?

Although the coronavirus pandemic is anything but over, a lot of consideration has been given to how it will change the world. It was the theme of this year's Kultaranta Talks. And the question seems to be very much present at this Ambassadors' Conference as well.

However, it would seem that, at least as far as international policy is concerned, the talk about change may be misleading. Namely, nothing totally new seems to be emerging. It would rather appear that the pandemic is only strengthening and speeding up the already identified development trends. The great-power competition is accelerating. The rules-based system and the institutions and treaties that form its foundations are being tested at an increasing intensity.

I referred to the great-power competition already a year ago, when speaking to you. Worldwide, it is primarily a question of the confrontation between the United States and China – in terms of diplomacy and rhetoric, the economy and technology. This growing tension between the two great powers is becoming increasingly visible to us as well. Still, from the Finnish and European perspective, seeing it as bipolarity is a rather simplistic way of thinking. For us, it is also of great significance where Russia places itself in this setting.

And, for us, our own position is naturally of even greater importance. The worst-case scenario would be that Europe would have to choose sides between the great powers one issue at a time. This would be the worst option, which we must not allow to happen. A much better alternative is a strong Europe, one among the great powers, which can make its own decisions independently: at its own initiative, and not only forced into choosing its side by outsiders. In that case, natural allies can also be found.

As far as Russia is concerned, we should also remember that the competition between the two great powers poses a similar question to the EU and Russia: how to keep up with the way the world turns? By this, I am by no means suggesting that we should be naive. Even when our needs appear to be similar, we may draw quite opposite conclusions. But we should not categorically close our eyes from opportunities.

I quote: "Open discussion about the direction of the EU would have come about if changes required by the recovery package had been made through amendments to the EU treaties. However, the amendment process of the EU treaties regulating the operations of the Union is such a slow and, due to the requirement of national ratifications, uncertain path that it was not the chosen. There was a hurry after all. Thus, obstacles preventing the approval of the package were cleared by interpreting the articles of the treaties in a creative manner."

This is how Helsingin Sanomat described the creation process of the EU recovery package in its editorial on 29 July. The editorial also points out that the same approach – interpretation – has been the chosen method in the Union in other matters as well.

That view is difficult to deny. The Stability and Growth Pact for the eurozone was supposed to set limits for indebtedness and budget deficits. The "no bail-out" principle was supposed to be unambiguous. It was not foreseen that the European Central Bank would become the debt security holder for the Member States. The EU budget was not supposed to be financed by taking debt.

Did these things happen? The rules in the EU treaties remain unchanged, but the actual situation looks very different. Those key principles of the management of finances have lost power year by year. As a result of once-off reinterpretations, one time after another.

One cannot deny that some crises have emerged quite suddenly. The urgency has been great, and it has been essential to find a solution. And here, I am not at all evaluating the material content of the solutions, not even as regards the EU recovery package. But every

reinterpretation, made only once, has continued to live on. Interpretation has actually turned into an agreement.

Every advocate of the EU should be concerned about this; every situation where creative interpretation is used raises questions, doubts and criticism. In the long run, and when the same happens repeatedly, they begin to undermine the institution's legitimacy. This is something the EU should not expose itself to. Once we have tackled the coronavirus, it is time to return to the rules-based system.

When I am asked why the President of the Republic brings up these dangers of the road of interpretation, my answer is clear. Firstly, the key EU treaties are agreements between the Member States and therefore part of how an individual Member State defines its relationship to foreign powers.

Secondly, the EU's Common Foreign, Security and Defence Policies are progressing. We are part of an equation, where our external fate is easily measured against the EU. What if the road of interpretation is opened also in the EU's external relations? In such a manner that we first lay down major policy lines, which are then followed up with a wide interpretation of the policies.

The European Union is an essential frame of reference for Finland, also in terms of foreign and security policy. Globally, the EU distinctly represents matters we see as valuable: democracy, rule of law, multilateral rules-based system, compliance with agreements.

For us unwavering EU supporters, it is important that we can maintain our trust in European Union to be true to its word.

I want to remark that if we begin making wide reinterpretations of earlier agreements, it usually means that the strong ones are at their strongest. And the weak ones are at their weakest. The road of interpretation is also problematic from the perspective of international rules-based system.

We support this multilateral rules-based system with good reason. But do we understand sufficiently well what kind of pressures for change that system currently faces?

If the United States continues to withdraw and China continues to increase its presence, it cannot but affect the contents of cooperation as well. New areas of focus emerge, old ones are left aside. If we follow the road of interpretation, we must ask ourselves: what kind of a rules-based international order we end up supporting?

International institutions must naturally keep up with the times, be able to react to the world changing around it. It is equally evident that the capacity to function of various international organisations is not at its best right now. These difficulties are visible on a daily basis in two institutions of importance to us, the UN that just turned 75, and the 45-year-old OSCE.

But diluting their principles is hardly the right solution to the problems the institutions are facing. The principles of the UN and the OSCE are exactly the kind of common agreements I referred to earlier and, as such, basic pillars of our own security. Wide interpretations will weaken them, not make them stronger. The best way to defend the rules-based system is to systematically display its principles, even in hard times.

In recent weeks, we have followed the heated situation in Belarus with great concern. Due to reasons attributable to Belarus, the country's presidential elections at the beginning of August were not observed by the OSCE election. They failed to meet the international criteria in other respects as well. This started a dangerous circle. When the trust in the system collapses, the security may also be at risk.

The way in which demonstrators have been showing their discontent in Belarus has been touching and impressive. They have given no reason for aggression. For this reason as well, it has been incomprehensible that they have been subjected to acts of violence, arrests and threats. We can only hope that the way forward can be found in a peaceful manner, through national dialogue.

Artificial geopolitical arguments do nothing to help find a solution to the situation in Belarus. Dangerous signs of such approaches have also been heard. Therefore, I consider the kind of statements important in which both the EU and Russia have underscored the need for internal dialogue in Belarus and encouraged the parties to engage in such dialogue. Perhaps we could find a valuable, constructive role for the OSCE in supporting such a process. This possibility I discussed with both Chancellor of Germany Merkel and President Putin a few days ago.

I am also very concerned about the tensions building up within the UN. In the Security Council, the latest example of this is the dispute about the sanctions against Iran.

Earlier this year, both Russia and France made their own P5 initiatives to have a summit organised between the five permanent members of the Security Council. We have many good reasons to hope for a better dialogue between the heads of state of the P5. Nuclear weapons, and arms control in general, are among the most important of these reasons. If these nuclear powers fail to find mutual understanding and trust, even what remains of the agreement system controlling the weapons of mass destruction are threatened. It would be essential for the P5 countries to find each other even outside the arms control issues to ensure the operability of the UN system. However, the summit between the great powers must not lead to leaving aside the UN system. To be credible, the international rules-based system must comply with its own rules. Selecting the road of interpretation may totally erode the trust in the system. In such a case, security would also be at risk.

When the coronavirus pandemic broke out, I sent you all a letter that during such exceptional times as these the work done by your missions is particularly important. I continue to stand by these words. But I would like to add a complementary observation. When exceptional conditions get prolonged, they also make you realise more clearly what you are missing compared to the normal conditions – personal encounters with people.

Confidential talks are one of the basic tools of diplomacy. When opportunities for such talks become narrowed down due to the social distancing restrictions, it also threatens to narrow down our snapshot of the prevailing situation. Not everything can be replaced by technological solutions. But since the prospects of the exceptional circumstances ending any time soon seem non-existent, we cannot wait around for the normal conditions to return.

Because, right now, having a realistic up-to-date view of the world is extremely valuable. Behind the scenes of the coronavirus pandemic, many matters of fundamental nature are in motion. In the midst of an accelerating change, in its foreign policy Finland can no longer hold on to its own assumptions if we cannot be certain that they still hold true. If the established methods of gathering information no longer function, we must find new ones. And you must use your personal professional skills to interpret that information. In your reports, following the road of interpretation is necessary for us.

Statement by President of the Republic of Finland Sauli Niinistö at the 75th General Debate of the United Nations General Assembly 23 September 2020

Mr President, Secretary-General, Distinguished Delegates, Ladies and Gentlemen,

Let me congratulate Mr. Volkan Bozkir for the election as the President of the seventy-fifth session of the General Assembly. You can count on Finland's support, as you lead this important body during these exceptional times.

And the times are exceptional indeed. At the start of this year, nobody could have foreseen that we are not able to gather in New York this September. The COVID-19 pandemic has hit all of us hard. Extending around the globe, it is affecting every continent and state, all people, and all areas of life.

A pandemic is by definition a global challenge. It requires a global response. No country is able to combat this common enemy alone. No one is safe, until all are safe.

An effective global response can only come from all of us together. From the United Nations. I would like to reiterate our unwavering support for the UN system in general, and the World Health Organization in particular, for their efforts to manage the fight against the pandemic. I also would like to express my appreciation for the strong leadership Secretary-General António Guterres has shown during this crisis.

Although the COVID-19 pandemic is far from over, it has already taught us a number of important lessons. Firstly, it has shown that we have to take health security much more seriously. Before the next pandemic emerges, we need better prevention and better preparedness. In this work, the Global Health Security Agenda can provide the WHO with valuable support.

Secondly, it has unfortunately revealed how we are tempted to react to immediate threats – nationally, not internationally. When this pandemic broke out, our initial reaction was not to unite behind multilateral efforts. Instead of a much-needed global response, we witnessed a series of national responses. Faced with a completely new situation, this may have been understandable. But it does raise concerns on how we will be able to combat other global challenges.

Thirdly, however, and this is more encouraging: the past six months have also proven our capability to radical measures when needed. In order to contain the pandemic, governments, societies and individuals were suddenly prepared to change their behavior. As soon as the magnitude of the threat was perceived, unconventional solutions were sought.

This gives us hope. Where there is a will, there is a way.

We must not lose sight of the even more persistent existential threat to humanity. Climate change. Our lives may have been on lockdown this year, but climate change has not stopped for a moment. The urgency of bold and swift climate action is growing by the day. Our commitments to the Paris Agreement must prevail. We must redouble our efforts for their implementation.

We must make a virtue out of necessity. As the entire world now needs a recovery strategy, we have to make sure that we choose a road towards a sustainable future. Instead of returning to our unsustainable habits, we truly have to “Build Back Better and Greener”. The Secretary-

General's six principles for "Building Back Better" have our full support. All recovery measures must be assessed from the perspective of their climate and environment impacts. The Paris Agreement, the 2030 Agenda and the Convention on Biological Diversity need to guide our way forward.

Finland is ready to do its share. The Finnish Government stands firmly behind its aim to make Finland climate neutral by 2035, and thus the world's first fossil-free welfare society. We will continue to integrate sustainable development into our state budget. We are determined to transform Finland into a socially, economically and ecologically sustainable society during this decade.

And we continue to work actively in international partnerships. The Coalition of Finance Ministers for Climate Action, led by Finland and Chile, has grown to include more than 50 countries. This cooperation helps countries to integrate climate considerations into economic, fiscal and financial policies.

Precisely when the demand for global solutions is rising, our ability to provide them is weakening. Multilateralism suffers from inward-looking nationalism and great-power competition alike. The institutions we have built together over decades are under growing pressure. International agreements, norms and principles are increasingly challenged and interpreted in ways which weaken both their potential and their legitimacy. Ultimately, if respect for the commonly agreed rules disappears, there will be not much left of a rules-based order.

We need to reverse this trend. More than ever, we need effective multilateral cooperation. More than ever, we need the United Nations. It is not only the common responsibility of all of us – the member states – to make it stronger. It should be obvious that it is our common interest, too.

It is equally obvious that all international institutions need to adapt to changing circumstances. New actors and new technologies create new kinds of challenges. Old structures and old instruments alone will not be sufficient to respond to them. But discarding existing frameworks would create a dangerous vacuum.

Nuclear weapons are becoming a particularly worrying example. With one agreement after the other lapsing, we soon risk losing even the last elements of nuclear arms control. It would be of fundamental importance for the nuclear weapons states to find a way to build mutual understanding and trust. Also in this regard, we support the idea of a closer dialogue between the permanent members of the Security Council. And it does not stop at arms control. At the end of the day, the entire UN system cannot function unless the P5 countries are able to work together.

As any global crisis, the COVID-19 pandemic, too, can have negative effects on peace and security across the world. It can intensify existing conflicts, stall peace processes and wake up dormant tensions. But it can also offer opportunities for peace. The Secretary-General's call for a global ceasefire was a strong appeal for conflict parties to lay down their weapons. And as this year marks the 20th anniversary of Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security, we should further emphasize an inclusive approach to peacebuilding.

In addition to conflict resolution, we must invest more in conflict prevention. Every conflict avoided is one conflict less to be resolved in the future. Finland advocates the use of mediation for both purposes. We are ready and willing to offer our good services in this regard. Finland

also remains committed to the peacekeeping operations and special political missions of the UN.

For the rules-based order, the rule of law is essential. All steps towards its consolidation in international relations have meant progress for humanity. Silence and looking away only empower perpetrators and let them escape justice. We need to end impunity for the gravest crimes. This should apply to all, including the strong and the powerful.

No government should use the crisis as a pretext to violate human rights or to limit democratic and civic space. No government should adopt measures that undermine the respect of the rule of law and of international commitments.

The Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action, the most progressive document ever on the rights of women and girls, was adopted twenty-five years ago. Unfortunately, this anniversary is not the only reason why it is so topical this year. The pandemic has hit women particularly hard.

The harsh economic and social implications for women have reversed the progress achieved during the last decades. The attempts to undermine women's and girls' rights, especially sexual and reproductive health and rights, continue.

In order to get back on the right track, we must live up to the commitments we have made. In addition to the Beijing Declaration, this also applies to the Istanbul Convention, a groundbreaking legal instrument addressing violence against women.

For Finland, advancing women's and girls' rights and gender equality is of fundamental importance. In the Generation Equality process, Finland has a leading role in bridging the digital divide between genders.

In the broad value base of Finland's foreign and security policy, human rights are at the forefront. This, and our long-term commitment to promoting human rights, is why my country is seeking a seat at the Human Rights Council from 2022 to 2024.

At 75 years of age, the Charter of the United Nations remains a remarkable blueprint for the future – for a more peaceful, a more sustainable, and a more just world. But the promise comes with an important condition.

In its Article 2, the Charter states: “All Members, in order to ensure to all of them the rights and benefits resulting from membership, shall fulfill in good faith the obligations assumed by them.”

As much as our environment has changed over time, this principle continues to be true. Only fulfilled obligations lead to rights and benefits. *Pacta sunt servanda*. Agreements must be kept.

**President of the Republic of Finland Sauli Niinistö's speech at the News,
Communication and Information Wars media seminar, 15 October 2020**

Ladies and Gentlemen,

This seminar brings together professional journalists who worked in the Finnish Section of the BBC World Service. This year is the 80th anniversary of the start of the Section's work in London. In connection with the anniversary, a history *Täällä Lontoo. BBC:n suomalaistoimittajat idän ja lännen välisessä informaationsodassa (London Calling. The BBC*

Finnish Section in the Information War between the East and the West) has been published. The book covers the period up to 1997, when the work of the Finnish Section ended after 57 years.

An interesting title. One might ask, what would the title have been if the work of the BBC's Finnish Section had come to an end at the turn of last year? The information war has not disappeared. The front lines are different, of course, but the struggle for influence is still under way throughout the world or within different countries.

The atmosphere of social discussion in Finland has changed in recent years. In a flood of information and opinions, it has become challenging to stand out and gain attention. The mood today favours short, sharp and often harsh means of expression.

As the old saying goes "it is so, if it appears so". How then do things appear? It may be easier to influence appearance than to be categorical about whether an issue is or is not so. In other words, to make an issue appear as you intend. Such counter-realism paints an image that appears very different from the object being described.

For the media, the situation is challenging. How to approach an attention-grabbing online discussion. Does it pass the threshold for news? Or how to sharpen the news with a striking headline? Journalism is more than merely transmitting information. At the heart of journalism is evaluation, balance and professional handling of issues. It is also the assessment of whether an issue is worth reporting.

During my visit to Washington last autumn, it was obvious how divided the media field is in the United States. For and against positions are clear. The polarisation of politics has also divided the media field in a way that makes adhering to traditional journalistic values difficult.

In clashes between journalists, personal views are considered to be the only truth. Such an emphasis that one – or what is perceived to one's own side – is right easily leads to a situation where one's credibility as a communicator of information is compromised. Independence and testing one's own beliefs are the basic assumptions of a credible journalistic role. Lost credibility is difficult to regain.

In January, the Pew Research Center published a study on the state of the United States' media. Many media there are in a kind of limbo. If one side likes something, the other side hates it. In this research, no media channels exceeded an overall trust level of 50%. There are only three media channels that both Democrats and Republicans trust more than they do not trust. These channels are: Public Broadcasting Service PBS, BBC and the Wall Street Journal. The activities of two out of three of these are based on public funding.

These research results cast light on how important editorial principles and professional behaviour are. The book on the history of the Finnish Section also emphasises the principle of "two independent sources" followed by the BBC. The BBC appears to be ready even to suffer a short-term news loss in order to make sure that a breaking issue is correct. Apparently, this ethos still supports the reputation of the BBC.

The situation in Britain has also escalated. At the end of last year, I was startled to hear someone being interviewed on the streets of London describe the opposing factions of the Brexit debate: "We have learned to hate each other." When an issue inspires hatred towards someone who

thinks differently, we are heading in a bad direction. A culture of hatred destroys, it does not build.

If information is only significant when it serves one's own agenda, space is created for half-truths, even lies. This is not only about the kind of atmosphere that would be more pleasant for the parties to a debate. Loss of the ability to understand each other also plays a role. If polarisation permeates the whole of society, the success of the nation will be jeopardised.

Freedom of expression and freedom of the press are of prime importance. But at least as important is the responsibility that comes with freedom of expression. It goes hand in hand with honesty and truth.

Max Jakobson – who was also a Bush Finn – published *Finland – A Lone Wolf*, a guide to Finland for foreign readers. Jakobson concludes the book with the words: “Historical experiences reveal how little we know about the future. We can be certain only of one thing – something happens that no one had expected.”

For us Finns to be able to prepare for this unfathomable future, knowledge and understanding must be emphasised. If we do not have the means to perceive the impact that the great changes under way will have on our own lives, it will be impossible to live without anguish.

As citizens' level of knowledge and skills rises, they must have access to as accurate and correct information as possible as the basis for forming an opinion. Discussion aimed at developing society must not descend into point-scoring.

The writer William S. Burroughs described language as “a virus from outer space”. A virus first attaches itself to a carrier and then spreads from one carrier to another. In today's world of communication, words are spread rapidly and they make a mark more quickly than the coronavirus.

It is the task of journalists to ensure that among these word viruses there are also those who spread good words about good deeds.

The Finnish Section has ceased to exist as a journalistic unit, but work promoting quality journalistic culture is continued by the Bush Finns heritage association. I wish the association every success in this work.

Speech by President of the Republic of Finland Sauli Niinistö on the 150th anniversary of the birth of President J. K. Paasikivi, 27 November 2020

“The main task of our policy, now and in the future, is naturally to secure independence and the democratic order. As of yet we have not achieved certainty in both respects.”

This is how President of the Republic of Finland J. K. Paasikivi began his lengthy diary entry of 13 September 1948, also known as the “Paasikivi Programme”.

Of course, in over 70 years the conditions have changed significantly. Our whole society, its security and welfare, now rest on a substantially more solid basis. Paasikivi had a crucially important role to play in laying those foundations – also during the post-war “years of danger”, during the final stages of which the above-mentioned diary entry was made.

However, the new years are not without danger, either. Right now, our attention is focused on defeating the coronavirus pandemic. However, even today, we should not take independence

and the democratic order for granted. We must continue safeguarding both of them. In other words, our main task remains unchanged.

* * *

History never repeats itself as such. But as we are today celebrating the 150th birth anniversary of Juho Kusti Paasikivi – or rather Johan Gustaf Hellstén – the temptation to draw historical analogies is great.

It tells something about the subject of celebration. During his exceptionally long career, Paasikivi was an influential figure in numerous turning points of Finnish history, the kinds of moments we tend to rely on when seeking historical points of reference. Furthermore, Paasikivi himself was a thinker with deep knowledge of history. He was a man who understood and knew history, and readily sought lessons from the past to the present.

But it also tells something about our time. In the midst of great changes, there is again demand for a Paasikivi-like realism. It is again a topical question to consider Finland's position in the "conjunctures" of great power politics. And indeed, when studying the phases of Paasikivi's life from today's perspective, one notices again and again that one can identify some familiar features. Layers of new technologies and new actors have been added, but great power politics and geography are the issues we keep on going back to. The script and the casting change, but the stage remains the same.

* * *

Over several decades, Paasikivi also had various roles to play. From a senator during Finland's autonomy to prime minister in the early stages of independence. From a peace negotiator in Tartu to a banker in the crisis period of the world economy. Before and during the war years, from ambassador in Stockholm and Moscow to prime minister again. And finally, he became President of the Republic of Finland for the duration of the first decade of the Cold War.

As periods changed, it was not only Paasikivi's functions that transformed. The fundamental pillars of his policy, the partners and basic political assumptions considered as guarantors of Finland's position, were also in a constant state of flux. What you thought you could rely on just a moment ago, suddenly no longer carried you. Again, you had to turn to a new direction to seek support.

Maliciously, some people might call this kind of readiness for change opportunism. But as long as the objective remains fixed, it is statecraft and wisdom. This is a lesson we can draw from today, too. When the environment is shifting considerably, our set of instruments must also be able to change, if our own interest so requires. We should not cling to the old just for the sake of relying on something familiar. We must bear our main task on top of our minds.

* * *

I will still return to the two parts of the main task defined by Paasikivi. First, independence.

Right at the beginning of the new Government Report on Finnish Foreign and Security Policy, it defines the goal of Finland's foreign and security policy quite compactly: "[...] to strengthen Finland's international position, to secure its independence and territorial integrity, to strengthen Finland's security and prosperity and to ensure that the society functions efficiently."

This is the hard core of the whole report. And at the core of it lies securing Finnish independence. We can strengthen our international position only as an independent actor. Independence means the ability to bear the responsibility for our own security by ourselves. It is not the primary goal for anyone else but us.

By no means does it mean that we would prefer needing to act on our own. On the contrary, it is in our best interest to seek as extensive an international cooperation as possible. But the stronger and the more independent we are, the more attractive a partner we are to others.

* * *

Compared to the Paasikivi era, the European Union is a completely new instrument for boosting our security and prosperity. The founding members of the European Communities signed the Treaty of Rome a few months after Paasikivi died. It was not until almost 40 years later that Finland joined the Union.

Today, and for a good reason, we underscore the importance of the EU for the Finnish foreign and security policy as well. We have handed over some of our decision-making powers to the Union. However, the assumption is that we get more in return than what we give. It is a question of influence, or at least potential influence.

In the world of tightening great power competition, on their own, even the biggest European countries are not able to achieve alone what a strong European Union could jointly achieve. For smaller countries, the added value would be even bigger. In the world politics, we are living in an era in which power is held in high respect. If we are weak, we will be trampled underfoot by others, jointly and separately.

Unfortunately, so far, the Union has failed to fulfil its potential. There are heated debates about the semantics of “strategic autonomy” or “European sovereignty”, but concrete achievements are still far away.

We should do better. For Europe as well, independence, autonomy, means the ability to bear responsibility for our security on our own. It does not mean that we would deliberately want to act without others. If realised, this kind of European independence would also strengthen Finland’s independence.

* * *

The other half of the main task defined for Finland by Paasikivi at the time was securing our democratic system. I have often referred to the importance of the national spirit of belonging together. We are all provided support and security by our democratic system, our whole society. In return for this, we all contribute to the building and securing of that system, each in our own way.

I am, however, deeply concerned that this feeling of belonging together is beginning to break down. Do we have enough ability and will to reconcile differing views anymore? Taking care of common issues becomes increasingly difficult if we only have eyes for our own business. Or, if it is more important to underscore being right than to strive for the common goal.

I fear that the exceptional situation the pandemic keeps prolonging will make it even harder for us to encounter our fellow people. We must foster the mental proximity of our nation, particularly at a time of physical distance. The matter has a security policy dimension, too. An internally integrated society is difficult to break from the outside. With a nation already divided, it does not even require much of an effort.

* * *

On the other hand, the democratic system reminds me of the whole world order. In Paasikivi’s thinking, it had already been clear from the times of the unfortunate League of Nations that it required a strong international organisation to guarantee the realisation of justice between states. Finland finally became the member of the UN during Paasikivi’s final year as president.

Since then we have traditionally – and justifiably – been committed to the rules-based international order and multilateral system. However, I have recently begun asking myself whether we know for certain in the future what kind of an order and system we are endorsing.

As the global balance of political power is shifting, whose rules, norms and standards is multilateralism actually based on? Does that system still remain democratic in spirit?

For some time already, Germany and France have been building an alliance for multilateralism. The next president of the United States, on the other hand, is expected to take initiatives to enhance the cooperation between democracies. From our perspective, these are good news.

However, we still need to be careful about not widening the division lines. As global challenges are looming larger, we increasingly need global solutions. We cannot successfully take care of our common issues if we do not discuss also, and especially, with those who we disagree with the most.

* * *

I believe that, in our collective memory, we have built an image of J. K. Paasikivi as a somewhat pessimistic, even fatalistic person, as regards the fate of small nations. This was not fully the case, however. He did have faith in our own influence. Therefore, I want to end my address with two quotes, from the beginning and from the end of Paasikivi's term as president.

When he opened Parliament for the first time as the President of the Republic of Finland in February 1947, Paasikivi said: "It requires determined efforts from all of us to win our difficulties." Because the fact that we must always remember is that our future ultimately depends on ourselves, our own vigour and industriousness, the mental resilience and moral condition of our people."

In his final speech as the President of the Republic in March 1956, Paasikivi continued on the same theme as follows: "No matter how external conditions and world events may affect our destinies, the future of a nation, and particularly that of a small nation, ultimately depends on its moral and mental power, on how faithful it is to itself, to its ideals, to the basic values of its life as a nation. Without such mental strengths a nation cannot stand."

I believe so, too. I wish you a successful and inspiring anniversary seminar.

President of the Republic of Finland Sauli Niinistö's New Year's Speech on 1 January 2021

My fellow citizens,

I would like to extend my warmest thanks to all of you. So far, we have coped with the coronavirus pandemic rather well compared to many other countries. Particular thanks go to those who have worked to look after the health of others. This is something we achieved together, however. Finland has again proven its strength and resilience in a tight spot.

The coronavirus has put us all to the test. To highly varying degrees: some have faced irrevocable losses, while others have got off more lightly with only inconvenience in their normal daily lives.

However, this is an experience we all share. No one has remained unaffected.

Our future success also depends on each one of us. Even if we already feel tired, we must find the strength to go on.

The hardship is not over yet. While vaccines have already given us some hope, even in the best case the exceptional conditions will continue for several months. Complying with the restrictions is the only way of getting rid of the restrictions. The vaccines will only help if we get ourselves vaccinated.

Our shared future is built through the actions of each individual, here and now. Also this responsibility we share.

* * *

As we turn our backs to year 2020, we also leave behind the world that preceded it. There will be no going back to the life we had, even when we have overcome the coronavirus pandemic.

The game-changing transformation we are currently going through is difficult to fully understand as of yet. There is something we do know, however. We will face something new.

The pandemic has changed us. The way we live our lives was transformed in a heartbeat. It was bewildering to realise how vulnerable we are – and how far humankind is from being all-powerful. Each one of us has done some serious thinking, to take stock of ourselves and our resilience in an unfamiliar situation. Loneliness, as well, has unfortunately also become a familiar feeling for many of us. On the other hand, the shared hardship has also brought us closer together. It has made us realise how much we depend on each other and taking care of each other. I hope this is something that we will not forget.

However, the transformation is not only about the pandemic. Global warming continues to advance, even faster than was feared. Power relationships in international politics are in turmoil. In monetary economics, millions have become commonplace, and not only billions but also trillions, figures with 12 zeros, crop up more often. At the same time, new transitional technologies ranging from artificial intelligence to quantum computing are making a rapid breakthrough.

Facing a new situation offers us fresh opportunities to do things better and more wisely than before. Facing a new world may also feel frightening. However, trying to hang on to the something old that will not return would be much more dangerous.

* * *

We recall periods in our history when the goal of our shared effort was clear in our minds. We upheld a young democracy and brought Finland on the world map. We defended our country and paid war reparations. We rebuilt the economy and reformed our society. We based our welfare on a foundation of education and culture. We made it clear, through determined efforts, that we are part of the West.

At the previous turning points in our history, the old foundation never disappeared completely. We have been able to find a new direction by building on our strengths. Now, once again, we find ourselves at a new turning point. Each of us must ask ourselves: what defines today our common resolve in facing the new?

On Independence Day, I had an opportunity to talk to General Jaakko Valtanen. He had some wise words to say about the “sense of belonging”. “Is not a society in which the status and rights of an individual citizen are safeguarded worth defending?” he asked.

This sense of belonging, or inclusion, sums up many things in Finland whose value we sometimes overlook ourselves. They are often easier to see from the outside. It is not by accident that Finland is successful in international comparisons. A society like ours is indeed worth defending.

For those who have it, Finnish citizenship is precious capital. Someone who has been granted asylum in Finland is also in a better position than most people in the world. Discussing and even debating the extent of freedoms and rights enjoyed by all those who live in this country is quite justified. Less attention has been paid to the other side of the equation, duties and responsibility. When weighing these issues, the objective should be balancing the equation: without responsibility, the rights cannot be upheld, either. Finnish society is indeed worth taking responsibility of.

* * *

Recent discussions on security lead us to reflect on a certain dilemma of a civilised state, separate of individual cases. In brief, it is about giving protection to those against who we may need to protect others.

This raises difficult further questions. To what extent can everyone's safety and security be balanced against everyone's right to security? Or the other way around: can we put the security of entire society at risk by prioritising the rights of individuals?

This is what civilised European states are considering, and so far they have come to a wide variety of different conclusions.

A little over a year ago I was concerned over Finland ending up in a situation where we address security risks less firmly and have laxer legislation than our peer countries. We must constantly stay on top of the security situation, which is what we are now doing by renewing Finland's terrorism legislation.

Our feeling of security has also been eroded by new digital threats. Whether the target is Parliament or individual citizens' health data, the word 'data breach' is not strong enough to describe the problem. Cyber attacks threaten security; they are attacks against not only individuals but also our entire social order. We must improve our ability to foil them, also at the international level.

It has been said that the authorities look after our security, subject to their liability for acts in office. They certainly do what they can, each one within the framework of the applicable legislation. This framework shall be kept up to date. We should never have to acknowledge that our policies have been naive.

* * *

Another encounter on Independence Day has also stayed with me. The main message of the child group Biolapset from eastern Helsinki was 'catch the ball'. They were worried about climate change, and not without a good reason. The same concern has been strongly present in the messages I have received from children and young people throughout the year. We must be able to respond to this demand.

At the beginning of the year, we could never have imagined having to avoid close contacts and social interaction, limit our movements and walk around wearing face masks. All these impossibilities are commonplace today – to avoid the danger, we have modified our behaviour in ways that are difficult to believe. Could we learn something from this that would help us combat another danger, the threat of climate change? Because climate change is all about human behaviour.

We also have plenty to learn in other areas of life. While we are not all-powerful, we can still do many things. As we encounter the new situation, we should strive to do things better. This is what the pandemic has led us to. The need to take others into consideration in the way we

behave, willingness to help others, and an ability to adapt to exceptional conditions all build a more human society. Let us continue on that road.

I wish you all a happy New Year and God's blessing.

**Speech by President of the Republic of Finland Sauli Niinistö at the opening of
Parliament on 3 February 2021**

Madame Speaker, Honoured representatives of the Finnish nation,

When a year ago on the same occasion I referred to the coronavirus, I was only cautiously able to mention that the risk of a pandemic cannot be ruled out. Little did we know at that point. Unfortunately, soon after that the pandemic turned into reality.

We no longer lack knowledge concerning the disease and the virus. On the contrary, we are constantly getting more information about them, and vast amounts of data are readily available to anyone. Information has brought positive energy. Sharing it has enabled unforeseen international collaboration within the fields of science and health care. At the political level, co-operation has not gone as far.

But the diverse, partly even contradictory nature of information has also left us confused. Hardly anyone knows the absolute truth about what the best course of action would be.

It is difficult to live in the middle of uncertainty. It is tempting to hold fast to the idea that the information available to you is the best there is. Therefore, it is no wonder that some demand stricter restrictions while others require that even the existing restrictions be lifted, with equal amounts of conviction. And, indeed, we should discuss our options, but, while doing so, we should not lose sight of what is our common goal.

In Finland, for the time being, we have succeeded quite well in our battle against the coronavirus. Much better than in many other countries, even though our restrictions have been mild compared to them. In fact, it would seem that, in the last resort, we will find the most essential solutions between our ears. In the way we act in our everyday lives. When prolonged, the restrictions on our normal lives become hard and taxing. But getting ill or losing someone you love is even harder and even more taxing. Each and every one of us must still hold on and continue to bear our own share of the joint responsibility.

Honourable Members of Parliament, the power of the example you give is strong. Therefore, even in the midst of the differences between us, let us hold on to this message of joint responsibility. We will make it through only by sticking together. The message also gives us hope. Together, we are sure to make it through.

* * *

Over the past year, a small virus has also dominated the big picture of international politics. Societies have been locked down, but it has by no means stopped the world from turning. We must not let the other developments escape our attention.

As I said in my new year's address, we find ourselves at a new turning point in world politics as well. The great power relations and the multilateral system are seeking a new balance. As yet, we do not know how the pieces will settle next. But it is certain that we must stay alert in how we practice our foreign policy. In the midst of change, we must safeguard Finland's position. And in this respect too, we must bear the responsibility jointly, as institutions and as a nation.

We have been carefully and with concern following the recent events in Russia. They have been condemned repeatedly, both in Finland and in Europe. There has been reason to do so, and most recently more reasons appeared yesterday. But one-way declarations alone are not enough. We must also seek means that will affect the desired change.

In international politics as well, we need to have lines of communication especially with those with whom we disagree the most. When our own views rest on a solid basis, engaging in dialogue does not mean renouncing them. By engaging in dialogue, we show strength. It is not always possible to influence the other party, but it is even harder without dialogue. It is in our best interest that the European Union also engages in such direct and frank dialogue with Russia. Particularly now, when the Navalnyi case will draw a deep rift in the relations between Europe and Russia, which were not intact to begin with.

* * *

There are also positive tones in international politics. We recently received the confirmation that the New START treaty between the United States and Russia, set to expire the day after tomorrow, will be extended by five years. This does not even begin to solve all the problems related to nuclear arms control. Still, the fact that at least one of the treaties between the two largest nuclear powers remains in force gives hope that new negotiations can ensue. Finland continues to be prepared to offer its good services to support negotiations on strategic stability.

The signals we are hearing from Washington are promising. It seems that the idea of emphasising the power of example rather than the example of power, put forward by President Biden in his inaugural address, is beginning to gain momentum. The quick return to the climate agreement is a good start. Many others have also expressed their support for the multilateral system, most recently in the virtual Davos meeting.

The weight of their words is eventually measured with their deeds. Necessity demands cooperation also in the Arctic region, which is particularly important for Finland. The Arctic countries now need to nourish the seeds of co-operation. The reduction of black carbon and methane emissions would bring immediate results in our fight against climate change. Recovery of the radioactive waste from the bottom of the Arctic Sea would improve nuclear safety.

On their own, none of these joint efforts would change the world, but they would steer it in the right direction. If successful, they could broaden the horizons for other kind of co-operation as well, which is necessary even outside the Arctic region.

We can ourselves influence what actions Europe is to take, what is the power of Europe's example, what is Europe's weight in the changing world. On their own or dispersed, the European countries are weaker than they are when they stand together and united. That is another reason why I am concerned about what the coronavirus crisis with its disruptive disputes over vaccines is doing to Europe. As, at the same time, Great Britain has finally detached itself from the European Union, and the leadership of Germany will change, we are now seeking new balance in the power structures within Europe as well. Let us hope that we can close ranks. The example shown by the weak does not attract many followers.

* * *

Many people surely remember a picture from less than a month back: A man, carrying the House of Representatives Speaker's podium under his arm, with a bewildered smile on his face. The man, a father of five, had come from afar to express his opinion. When he shut his front door, he could hardly imagine that his absence from home would become much longer than expected. When posing for the photo, he did not seem to understand that he was participating in a revolt, thus disrupting his own and his family's life.

This is a tough story. A moment's ecstasy or the feeling of having just followed the crowd and doing what they did, as part of them or along with it, is not an acceptable explanation. Nor is the excuse that others urged me to do so.

This is also a very educational story. One must personally know when to stop and think – even for a brief moment. Maybe simply to ask oneself, what exactly am I involved in?

This is a very universally applicable lesson for everyone. It applies not only to political activity but also to forming gangs and social media groupings, even your actions when you are with your friends. When people agitate each other, mean words and contempt lead to hate and, at worst, to violence.

Finland is not immune to this danger either. We have recently learned about criminal actions that have ended in cruel killings, with the situation having gotten out of hand when a group of young people have attacked a single victim. At worst, the rise of political fanaticism has led to a murder attempt, and the assaults on people and obstruction of events we have been witnessing can already be considered serious symptoms.

We must nip the cycle of provocation and fanaticism in the bud. We must think for ourselves. Then there is no room for others to lead us to hate and violence. Then the power of example takes us towards something better.

* * *

Madame Speaker, Honoured representatives of the Finnish nation,

I congratulate the presidency for the support you have received. I wish you all success and wisdom in your demanding work for Finland. I declare the 2021 Parliament open.

Speech by President of the Republic of Finland Sauli Niinistö at the Crimea Platform in Kyiv on 23 August 2021

Mr President, Ladies and Gentlemen,

Let me begin with a quote: “Reaffirming their objective of promoting better relations among themselves and ensuring conditions in which their people can live in true and lasting peace free from any threat to or attempt against their security.”

This is the opening sentence of the Helsinki Final Act, signed in the Finnish capital in 1975. At the heart of that document are ten “principles guiding relations between states”, which begin with a familiar list: sovereignty, refraining from the threat or use of force, inviolability of frontiers, and territorial integrity. These principles are an essential foundation of the European security order, and we must be unwavering in defending them.

* * *

Mr President,

The establishment of the International Crimea Platform shows the determination of Ukraine, and you personally, to address the importance of these principles. And all of us gathered here today know that for Ukraine this is not just a question of principle, but a hard reality. I want to thank you, President Kaljulaid, for sharing your experiences about that.

Finland's support for Ukraine's independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity within its internationally recognized borders is firm. Finland supports international efforts to restore Ukraine's territorial integrity. Allow me to thank you, Mr President, for this important initiative, in which Finland naturally participates.

* * *

In addition to defending its letter, we should also revive the spirit of Helsinki. The willingness of adversaries to engage in dialogue despite their differences, could serve the future of our planet as a whole.

In order to tackle our common challenges, we need to shoulder our human responsibilities for the generations to come. In order to “ensure conditions in which our people can live in true and lasting peace”, we need to rebuild trust. In short, the world needs the Helsinki spirit.

Speech by President of the Republic of Finland Sauli Niinistö at the Ambassadors’ Conference on 24 August 2021

Esteemed Heads of Missions, ladies and gentlemen,

Over the past days and weeks, our attention has been fixed on the dramatic events in Afghanistan. Naturally, we knew to expect problems as the foreign presence in the country was reduced. But the speed at which the Taliban took over control of the country took us all by surprise. It is still too early to see the whole picture. Still, it is already clear that these sudden turns of events will have major consequences, both in concrete and symbolic terms, both immediate and long-lasting ones.

The foremost thing is, of course, the acute human distress and concern for what will happen next within the borders of Afghanistan. There is a great concern over the situation of women and girls and other groups in a vulnerable position in particular. We have a specific responsibility for the security of the locally hired people who have enabled our own operations in Afghanistan over the past years.

In Afghanistan, what collapsed extends well beyond the government in Kabul. What has happened forces the whole western world to face even broader, fundamental questions. If, after two decades of massive efforts, the outcome is this, what will be the future of big international crisis management operations, particularly of the kind of operations aimed at building nations and transforming societies in a larger scale? What kind of capacity does the West have to promote its values worldwide? Or is there even a will to do so anymore? Furthermore, what will all this mean for the world order?

* * *

The constellation in Afghanistan will inevitably reflect the great-power competition as well. It is unlikely that anyone, neither China nor Russia, would want Islamic extremists to seize power in an area near them. Furthermore, regional stability is not an insignificant matter to them either. But both Beijing and Moscow have surely come to the conclusion that what happened in Afghanistan showed that neither the United States nor the Western world as a whole can succeed in exporting their set of values. Whether the interpretation of the West being weak is right or wrong, the shadow of a doubt is difficult to shed.

The US also examines the world through the lens of great power competition. When US President Biden visited Europe in June, having a series of meetings, the priority given to China was conspicuous. The US hopes and requires that the allies and partners would now make bigger contributions in this respect, too. Another sign that the main opponent of the US has changed was the relatively constructive spirit in which the meeting between Biden and President Putin seems to have been held. Even though we did not witness the emergence of great mutual understanding, the two minds met: the will to avoid the continuous tightening of mutual relations turned out to be the lowest – but for the time being sufficient – common denominator. It tells a lot about our time that this can be considered one of the positive news over the past year.

In Europe, the rapid and rather unilateral withdrawal of the US troops from Afghanistan has raised questions. But have we noticed how invisible the EU has been during the crisis over the past few weeks? For a long time, I have been highlighting my concern over the erosion of Europe's status by the side of other centres of power. The forthcoming elections in the two biggest EU Member States all but make it easier for the European Union to strengthen its positions within the next year. The stepping down of the experienced German Chancellor Merkel after the German federal election in September will leave a large gap, and it will take time to have that gap filled. The French presidential election next spring, in the middle of the French EU presidency, will draw President Macron's attention to domestic affairs.

At the moment, the EU is preparing a document called the Strategic Compass to serve as a guideline for the EU security and defence activities. It is certainly necessary to discuss the role of Europe in the world. I have also personally insisted on the need for such a discussion. But a compass alone will not suffice if we are not even on the map. Reality rapidly runs over strictly worded condemning statements and well-meaning declarations. To be able to deal with the growing power political pressures independently, Europe needs force of its own. Force, then again, requires unity, determination, commitment to mutually chosen policies and executive capacity. Unfortunately, at the moment, the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy seriously lacks all of the above.

* * *

In 2025, 50 years have passed since the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe was held in Helsinki. Finland is certainly expected to commemorate that anniversary in one way or another. In my opinion, we should respond to those expectations with high ambition. Not by reminiscing on the past only, but by looking into the future.

Let us begin with the letter of Helsinki, or the CSCE Final Act of 1975. The ten principles set in the document were reconfirmed in the Charter of Paris in 1990. Those principles still form the best foundation for the European security order. They have not lost their importance, even though they have been both challenged and violated against over the years. As I said in the inaugural summit of the Crimea Platform in Kyiv yesterday, we must be unwavering in defending these common commitments in the future as well.

As the host of the original meeting, Finland has a special responsibility for the future of OSCE and its principles. In the anniversary year, we would be the most natural choice for OSCE chairmanship. When the OSCE Secretary General Schmid visits Helsinki later this week, we will certainly discuss the matter.

It should not depend on resources whether we bear this responsibility or not – if we could hold the chairmanship in 2008, why would we not be able to do so also in four years' time? And, right now, it is precisely responsibility that there is on the offer, not just ceremonial roles: Within the OSCE, there is a great need for both reaffirming the Helsinki principles and the restoration of the whole organisation's functioning capacity.

* * *

The OSCE chairmanship is a demanding task in itself. Still, we must not settle for the mere letter of Helsinki. Namely, in the middle of growing tensions and common problems, not only the OSCE region but the whole world is sorely in need of the spirit of Helsinki. 50 years ago, that spirit of Helsinki brought the great powers of the day around the same table to engage in dialogue with each other, in spite of their differences.

Now the great power positions are different, but the need for a dialogue is ever greater. The world is becoming divided into blocs, which may be quite understandable. But, ultimately, it

must be possible to have a dialogue across the blocs. Only together we can respond to the questions of war and peace, climate change and biodiversity loss, pandemics and the challenges of new technologies. It is a question of our common human responsibilities, in other words, of what kind of a world we leave to the next generations, of what each one of us can do to make our legacy a sustainable one, for the well-being of nature and humanity alike. Bearing this responsibility requires building trust, which at first also means finding the lowest common denominators.

This is the starting point, building of trust, from which I have been proposing the revitalisation of the Spirit of Helsinki at the global level. If successful, the initiative could even aim at holding a Helsinki Spirit Summit, a clearly separate meeting from the OSCE connection, with sufficiently broad representation by heads of states from different continents. It could result in a commitment made to practices and methods by which we attempt to fulfil our human responsibilities, together.

Now, it is good to focus on sounding what kind of responses this idea evokes in general. An open dialogue will gradually give us an idea of what different parties consider possible and what they consider impossible. A positive response would provide foundations for advancing to the next level. And even before that: the more we talk about the Helsinki Spirit, the closer we get to realising it.

In recent months, I have already had conversations on this matter with many of my colleagues. The discussions have been very encouraging, from Berlin to Moscow, from Washington to Beijing. In the coming autumn, I will have several opportunities to continue and deepen this discussion. Your Excellencies, I now wish that you would also bring forward the message of the Helsinki Spirit in the countries where you are stationed and listen with a keen ear how the message is received.

* * *

Combating climate change is one of the weightiest human responsibilities we have. That challenge we also have to address under the Helsinki Spirit. We were given an important reminder of the facts we are already very well aware of in the recent report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. The man-made climate change has spread extensively, is advancing rapidly and is getting increasingly stronger. It is no longer possible to fully stop the development, but we cannot continue like this. We need to take immediate action.

For quite some time, I have been speaking about the Arctic region as a forerunner in climate change. The danger of losing the whole world along with the Arctic region has increased. However, here in the north, we have potential for not only showing what the problems are but also for finding solutions to them. We must make the solution models more concrete. For example, it is easy to identify the immediate nature of fighting black carbon. It is also worth noting that the Finnish business sector is increasingly starting to see adaptation to climate change as an opportunity rather than merely a threat. I now call for everyone to adopt this same approach.

It is clear that the scale of climate change is global. Finland cannot solve climate change on its own. But to be believable and have a say in these matters – the possibilities of demanding stronger measures from the major emitters – we must take our own actions. Actions, not just objectives. We must live as we teach. We must also have concrete evidence of new climate actions when I represent Finland in the high-level meeting of the Glasgow Climate Change Conference at the beginning of November.

* * *

Many people hope that science and technology will save us. The coronavirus pandemic has shown that this hope is not totally unfounded. Even though we have experienced several disappointments and setbacks during the past 18 months, it is good to remember that we have never before been as hot on the heels of any pandemic as we have now. The vaccine development in particular has advanced at unprecedented speed. At the same time, we have seen the power of cross-border co-operation in the global science community. It has worked across national borders and ideologies.

However, rapid advances in science and technology do not bring about technical solutions only. They transform economies and societies, deeply affecting all of us. Not only our livelihoods but our whole lives are changing rapidly. New technologies enable all kinds of good things, but the problems and threats related to transformation are also starting to emerge.

No one can tackle these challenges alone. We need wide-ranging global co-operation. However, it hinders collaboration that technology is inseparably intertwined into the ongoing great power competition. Technology is both a platform for the competition and one of its main motives. The race is on as to whose technologies and whose standards will conquer the leading position. For a small country like Finland, which relies on an open economy and co-operation, this is a difficult situation.

The same problem applies to the whole of Europe. The future of our whole continent is defined by how capable we are of riding the crest of a wave of technological development. If we cannot keep up with the development, our global influence will erode even further. If we do not understand the meaning of technology in a profound and comprehensive manner, we have very little to contribute to international discussions. We must realise the connection between technology and foreign policy much better than we currently do. You, your Excellencies, have your own important share to play in increasing this understanding.

* * *

The human responsibilities I referred to earlier naturally also include human rights. Defending human rights has been an essential part of Finnish foreign policy for a long time. It seems clear that Finland will be elected as a member of the UN Human Rights Council for the next three years in the election to be held in October. It provides us with a platform we must use wisely. It is easy to draw up strictly worded declarations, but it is much harder to achieve real change. Succeeding in the latter is the real indicator of the success of our human rights policy.

Recently, the conflicting pressures of human rights and migration have made me go back to the speech I gave at the opening of Parliament in 2016. Back then, not many people liked my reference to the dilemma deeply related to our set of values – to the question whether the old treaties and agreements are applicable to totally different circumstances. Our standards are being tested to the utmost. We cannot blame any individual migrants for this. But migration challenges the EU to challenge its own principles. If it really comes to the crunch, can we adhere to the human rights agreements as we are making ourselves believe? And if we cannot, what will happen then? We have already seen how Europe protects itself with barbed wire and push-back methods. We have shifted from adhering to principles, through silent approval, to the path of interpretations.

The dilemma is once again going to become more acute as there are clear signs of migration picking up from areas other than Afghanistan as well. In addition, we have recently been forced to witness the very cynical way in which Belarus exploits migration as a means of putting pressure on Lithuania and the whole of Europe. Led by Germany and France, the discussion has already begun on how we could this time avoid the kind of development that generated the

crisis in 2015. Finland should also take active part in this debate. We must find a satisfactory balance between our principles and realities. A perfect balance is impossible to find.

* * *

Esteemed Heads of Missions,

It would be more pleasant if we did not need to face juxtapositions. But decision-making and bearing responsibility is not always pleasant. Ultimately, we all need to defend the Finnish society.

Statement by President of the Republic of Finland, Sauli Niinistö, at the 76th General Debate of the United Nations General Assembly, New York, 21 September 2021

Mr President, Secretary-General, Distinguished Delegates, Ladies and Gentlemen,

At the outset, I would like to congratulate Mr Abdulla Shahid for his election as the President of the seventy-sixth session of the General Assembly. I also want to congratulate Mr António Guterres for the re-election for his second term as Secretary-General. Both of you can count on Finland's full support for your important work.

Finland warmly welcomes the ambitious approach put forward in the Secretary-General's "Our Common Agenda". It is easy to agree with one of the key statements in that document: "In our biggest shared test since the Second World War, humanity faces a stark and urgent choice: a breakdown or a breakthrough."

We are indeed at a critical juncture. If humanity is to make the right choice, a breakthrough rather than a breakdown, we have to shoulder our human responsibilities. Responsibilities for our common future.

The task may seem daunting. The past year has witnessed continued and even growing turbulence in the world. Volatility and uncertainty may easily lead to despair. Common solutions may seem far out of reach.

At the same time, many trends highlight how interconnected our world is. The pandemic has had an impact on every one of us. The same will increasingly be true of climate change and emerging technologies alike. Conflicts no longer remain local or regional – they have consequences, direct or indirect, across the globe. All of these cross-border challenges are crying for a global response. With the right mindset, such a response is within reach.

In 1975, thirty years after the United Nations was founded, thirty-five heads of state and government gathered in the Finnish capital to sign the Helsinki Final Act. The letter of that document, still valid today, focused on security and cooperation in Europe.

But the spirit that arose from that meeting can have a more global significance, if we succeed in reviving and expanding it. A willingness of adversaries and competitors to engage in dialogue, to build trust, and to seek common denominators – that was the essence of the Helsinki Spirit. Its potential today is by no means limited to the OSCE area.

It is precisely that kind of a spirit that the entire world, and the United Nations, urgently needs. I am convinced that the more we speak about the Helsinki Spirit, the closer we get to rekindling it – and to making it come true. And that will bring us closer to solving our common challenges together.

* * *

Over a year and half since its beginning, we still live in the shadow of the COVID-19 pandemic. Fortunately, there is now some light at the end of the tunnel in many countries. Yet we should resist the temptation to think about health security on a national basis alone.

The scientific community has shown a better example than governments. To end this pandemic, the solution has to be global. For a global response to succeed, we need to ensure equitable access to effective remedies. Working through COVAX, Finland is strongly committed to vaccine solidarity.

Global action is also needed in order to be better prepared for future pandemics. It is high time to take concrete steps to improve our common health security beyond the current challenges.

To improve our resilience, we need a One Health approach. Enhancing international collaboration on research and development, and exchanging information on emerging threats is vital. We must ensure the effective functioning of the multilateral global health institutions, such as the World Health Organization.

We must also take pause to reflect upon the long-term ramifications of COVID-19. It has led to an increase in extreme poverty and inequality, and resulted in a deterioration of gender equality. It has seriously affected many countries' ability to reach the Sustainable Development Goals. We must intensify our efforts to ensure that the most vulnerable are not left further behind.

* * *

The pandemic has shown that a severe enough concern can push us to take unprecedented steps. In a very short order, we all have taken more extreme measures to change our behaviour than any one of us could have imagined before. What would be a sufficient wake-up call for us to do the same for the health of our planet?

With the 2030 Agenda, the Paris Climate Agreement and the Convention on Biological Diversity, we already have plenty of documents and roadmaps to rely on. But talk is not enough. We need to act, and the time for action is now.

The rapidly proceeding loss of biodiversity alone should be a cause for immediate global concern. In addition, we now know that climate change is proceeding even faster than was previously thought. According to the IPCC, we are likely to reach the 1.5 degrees temperature rise already in the early 2030s. It is not an exaggeration to say that we are facing a global climate emergency.

And yet, that urgency is still not reflected in our deeds. The Nationally Determined Contributions we, the signatories of the Paris Agreement, have made so far, may still put us on a track of a 2.7 degree temperature rise by the end of this century. The consequences for the planet, and for future generations, would be catastrophic.

We have to use the upcoming COP26 conference to put ourselves on a sustainable course. It is our common responsibility, that of governments and institutions, of companies and individuals, to step up. We need more ambitious emission reduction plans well ahead of the meeting in Glasgow. And we must speed up the ongoing transition away from fossil fuels.

To succeed, we need adequate climate financing. As a global community, we have to increase the quality, quantity and accessibility of climate finance, in particular to the Least Developed Countries and the Small Island Developing States.

We must also encourage finance ministers to take climate change into account in all of their decision-making. The Coalition of Finance Ministers for Climate Action, co-chaired by Finland

and Indonesia, has already more than sixty members. It currently focuses on green recovery, carbon pricing and biodiversity. We invite more countries to join the work of this coalition.

* * *

The dramatic events of Afghanistan in the past weeks have again reminded us of the fragility of peace and security. The humanitarian needs in Afghanistan are immense, and it is critical that we act together to ensure the access of humanitarian assistance to its people. The UN organizations staying on in Afghanistan play a key role here. And the international community must be steadfast on this: women and girls in Afghanistan must not be forgotten or made invisible.

Yet, unfortunately, Afghanistan is just one example. Conflicts, old and new ones, continue to cause human suffering across the world. The diplomatic toolbox of the Charter needs to be used to its full potential, to build peace where needed, and to prevent conflicts where possible.

For Finland, conflict prevention and mediation are strong priorities. We continue to be ready and willing to offer our good services for constructive dialogue in this regard.

* * *

In its foreign policy, Finland has long underscored the importance of the universal and binding nature of human rights. Our own experience is that a society flourishes when everyone has an active, equal and meaningful role in it.

Finland is a candidate to the UN Human Rights Council for the period from 2022 to 2024. As a member of the Council, we will do our best to make our human rights priorities work for the benefit of peace, stability and prosperity across the world.

In our human rights policy, we pay special attention to the rights of those in the most vulnerable situation, the ones most exposed to discrimination. Promoting the rights of persons with disabilities is a crosscutting priority for Finland.

Another key theme for us are the rights of all women and girls. The recently launched Generation Equality campaign, in which Finland co-leads the Action Coalition on Technology and Innovation, has an important role in mobilizing different actors for gender equality.

* * *

In an era of intensifying great-power competition and rapid technological progress, we are also faced with a serious risk of a new arms race. If the unravelling of the international arms control system is allowed to continue, it reduces predictability and increases the likelihood of unintended escalation.

That will make all of us less secure. We urgently need to remedy the situation.

The most important task is to uphold and strengthen the existing arms control architecture. But at the same time, we also need to think ahead with an open mind. We have to develop new solutions to respond to emerging challenges and technologies, by strengthening confidence-building, verification and transparency.

In nuclear arms control, Finland welcomes the extension of New START. Yet it is also clear that engagement between all the nuclear powers would be beneficial for global security.

* * *

The need to come together and to save the planet for the future generations has rarely been greater. For Finland, the UN system is at the core of the rules-based order we want to defend, and the multilateralism we want to strengthen.

No other organization has the same legitimacy or the same normative impact. No other organization gives hope to so many people for a better world. No other organization can deliver the future we want, and the future we deserve.

But the United Nations can only succeed if we, its members, want to come together and do what is needed and expected from us. That requires more dialogue. That requires more trust. That requires more Helsinki Spirit from all of us. In this spirit, Finland continues its unwavering support for the United Nations.

Keynote Speech by President of the Republic of Finland, Sauli Niinistö, at the FIIA Forum, Helsinki, 29 September 2021

Ladies and Gentlemen,

First of all, I would like to congratulate the Finnish Institute of International Affairs for its 60th anniversary. Finland needs an institute that is both Finnish and international.

The same demand also applies to our foreign and security policy. Finland needs a foreign and security policy that is both Finnish and international. We cannot, and do not want to, turn our backs on the world we live in, no matter how challenging the environment is.

But neither can we afford to forget our own national interests, not for one moment. More often than not, international and Finnish concerns go hand in hand, without contradictions. Yet there are also moments when we have to make difficult choices. Choices where the Finnish interests must prevail. We cannot delegate this responsibility to anyone else.

Recent experiences, from very different walks of life, speak volumes. Whether it was the pandemic or the refugee crisis, the immediate reactions to sudden international challenges have been very similar. National, not international. If others around us operate on the basis of their national interests, pure altruism from our side makes us more vulnerable.

Finland must not end up in a situation where, simultaneously, our assessment of internal and external security risks is less vigorous and our legislation less rigid than those of our peers. For good reason, we consider it self-evident that our Nordic friends are liberal democracies. We should also pay close attention to how seriously, and by what means, they address their security these days. Finland must not diverge from that path.

* * *

As many of you may know, my holistic view of Finland's security sees it as resting on four pillars. They are, first, the national defence and security; second, the Western integration and partnerships; third, the relationship with Russia; and fourth, the international system and comprehensive security.

Unlike real pillars, none of them is fixed in stone. They change and evolve over time. Like real pillars, however, they must form a coherent whole. If one weakens and cannot be strengthened, others have to be able to carry more of the weight on them. Such an active stability policy, as I have called it, requires constant care and attention.

* * *

Let me begin with the first pillar, our national defence and security. As I have often said, a credible defence has a twofold function. On the one hand, it raises the threshold against a potential aggressor. On the other, it makes us a more lucrative partner for others, particularly when interoperability is high.

A credible defence builds on adequate military capabilities and resources. Our past and future procurements for the different domains are necessary to make sure that our national capacity stays on top of emerging challenges.

But a credible defence cannot be built on hardware alone. It also stems from the very mindset of the population: a genuine will to defend one's own country. That will has traditionally been on a remarkably high level in Finland. That does not mean that we could take it for granted in the future. We must actively nurture that will in the coming generations.

Increasingly, that kind of a mindset is also a prerequisite for our security beyond the strictly military definition of the term. New technologies and the modern information space provide us with plenty of positive opportunities. At the same time, we need our entire population to be alert to the dangers and the risks they bring along. More than ever, our security is becoming the responsibility of each individual citizen.

* * *

Over the past years, Finland has consistently built a dense web of defence and security partnerships. Bilaterally, we work very closely with the United States, with Sweden and with Norway. Trilaterally, with the United States and Sweden on the one hand, with Sweden and Norway on the other, our statements of intent enable joint cooperation with the same key partners.

Our trilateral cooperation with Sweden and with Norway focuses on our common Northern environment. It was kicked off politically by an informal meeting I convened to Kultaranta two years ago. I have now been pleased to see that Sweden, Norway and Denmark have followed suit with a similar arrangement focusing on the region they share. Both endeavours are in line with the joint objectives of our Nordic defence cooperation, increasing our common security.

With a wider regional perspective, Finland has intensified its cooperation with France and the United Kingdom. We actively participate in the UK-driven Joint Expeditionary Force as well as in the French-led European Intervention Initiative.

As we have seen, most recently with the AUKUS announcement for the Indo-Pacific region, new kinds of multinational defence arrangements continue to proliferate. In the public discussion, new ad-hoc groups have sometimes been seen as undermining the credibility of existing alliances and unions. Sometimes one also hears veiled indications that a direct relationship with the United States is even more important than the relationship with NATO.

In my view, the broad variety of partnerships is a positive development. We will not automatically participate in all new initiatives that emerge. But those that serve our interests, will help us further improve our interoperability with chosen partners. And they are complementary reinforcements to the two essential components of the second pillar of our security: our EU membership and our close partnership with NATO.

As both institutions are now in the process of formulating their future approaches to security and defence – the European Union with its Strategic Compass, NATO with its Strategic Concept – we are entering a pivotal year. As an EU member, Finland will work actively on the inside: how do we shape the union into a more powerful global actor, one that better safeguards our interests in the midst of the great-power competition? As a NATO partner, Finland will keep a close eye on the development from the outside: how does the future Alliance look at its partnerships, and will the door for membership stay open?

* * *

Finland's relationship with Russia is longstanding and multifaceted. Over time, this relationship has experienced fluctuations, to put it mildly. But what has persisted for decades, is a shared commitment to seek working relations between neighbours. In the process, maintaining a functioning relationship with Russia – as functioning a relationship as possible at a given point in time – has become an important pillar supporting our own security.

Of course, this relationship has never operated in a vacuum. It is part and parcel of a wider European, and even a global setting. And unfortunately, we can now detect many worrisome trends here.

The relationship between the European Union and Russia has effectively withered away. The search for partnership has been replaced with growing suspicion and mutual recrimination. We have genuine differences – that should not be denied. For example, we will not accept the illegal annexation of Crimea, nor will we condone the continued recourse to a set of destabilising activities on the part of Russia.

Having said that, I urge everyone to look at the bigger picture. We are missing out on opportunities to handle common threats and challenges in Europe. The tradition of cooperative security is in danger of being lost. We run the risk of sleepwalking into an even bigger conflict than we have today.

A related cause for concern is the growing militarisation in Northern Europe. It goes without saying that we all must take good care of our own security. That is the duty of every state. At the same time, I do not believe that stable security or predictable relations between Russia and the West can, or should, be based on the force of armaments alone.

We also need dialogue with Russia. That is in no contradiction to firmness. Speaking from the Finnish experience, I can ensure you that both elements can fit in the same equation. Our relationship with Russia is based on an active, straightforward dialogue.

The same must be possible on a European level. In this respect, I note with particular regret how cooperation within the OSCE is effectively frozen.

* * *

The final pillar, the international system and comprehensive security, is common to the whole humanity. The most visible embodiment of this international community is the United Nations.

At the UN General Assembly last week, as usual, we heard many beautiful words in the statements of the heads of state and government. On a positive note, I conclude that we all want peace and security, stability and prosperity, and effective responses to common threats and challenges.

But words are not enough. They must urgently be turned into effective and common deeds. The problem is that even though we seem to share an analysis of a world increasingly in peril, there is no agreement concerning the way forward. Instead, we see a world divided into competing, possibly even conflicting blocs. As a result, we may use the same terms but mean entirely different things.

There is no denying that the world is in dire need of dialogue. But not any dialogue will do. Instead of the current dialogue of the deaf, we need one that genuinely reaches across the dividing lines. One that is mindful of our differences, but one that aims to build trust and seeks to find our common denominators.

This is where Finland wants to strengthen the international system and our common security. We remain committed to offering our good offices to facilitate processes that enhance global strategic stability. We also want to rekindle the Helsinki Spirit.

An important legacy of the original Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, held here in Helsinki in 1975, was the spirit of that meeting. The willingness of competitors and adversaries to sit at the same table, despite their disagreements. Such a spirit is in high demand today, on the global level.

We urgently need to respond to fundamental questions of war and peace, climate change and biodiversity loss, pandemics and the challenges of new technologies. We can only succeed in that together. It is a question of our common human responsibilities. What kind of a world will we leave to future generations?

Above all, these are not some distant global issues, somehow detached from our national interests. They are at the heart of our own security. And therefore, they reside at the very centre of Finland's foreign and security policy.

Opening speech by President of the Republic of Finland Sauli Niinistö at the seminar on demilitarisation and neutralisation of Åland in Mariehamn on 20 October 2021

Honourable Ambassadors, Ladies and Gentlemen, Kära ålänningar,

It is a great pleasure for me to open this Seminar today. Because of the stormy weather, flight to Åland was impossible. Unfortunately, I cannot join you physically to commemorate the Convention on the Non-fortification and Neutralisation of the Åland Islands, as part of celebrating the 100th anniversary of the Ålands' autonomy.

**

It was exactly one hundred years ago, when the representatives of Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Latvia, Poland, Sweden and the United Kingdom gathered together in Paris to sign this landmark Convention.

Over time, the Convention has only grown in relevance, becoming an important factor underpinning the Åland Islands' autonomy as well as regional security and stability.

Let me warmly congratulate the host, Ålands lagting, for organising this event. The seminar and its distinguished guests are a sign of the high international esteem in which both the Islands and the Convention are held.

**

According to the preamble to the Convention, it was signed "in order that these islands may never become a cause of danger from the military point of view".

To fully appreciate the sombre tone of these words, one needs to remember the history.

During the Crimean War in 1854-1856, the Islands had already become a focal point in a Europe-wide conflict, resulting in the demilitarisation of the Islands.

After Finland gained its independence in 1917, the question of Åland's status almost resulted in an open conflict between Finland and Sweden. The solution to this problem was found through international cooperation. The newly established League of Nations granted Finland sovereignty over Åland in 1921. At the same time, Finland made a commitment to guarantee the tradition of the Swedish language and wide self-government on the Islands – along with the historically rooted principles of neutrality and demilitarisation that were enshrined in international guarantees in the Åland Convention.

This combination of autonomy, neutrality and demilitarisation has a unique history that resulted in a unique solution. A solution that was – and is – based on openness, diplomacy and trust.

It is also a solution that has stood the test of time and has remained strong even during stormy circumstances.

We must all take heed of the firm international commitment to uphold and respect the Islands' status, and play our role in ensuring that the principles underpinning the Convention also remain robust in the future.

I am happy to note that an issue that was once in danger of generating conflict has been successfully resolved in a manner that is favourable to all.

The Åland Islands is a vibrant community and an important and enriching autonomous part of Finland. It is also one of the many bridges that bring Finland and Sweden increasingly close together. The memories of a threatening conflict are in the distant past.

At the same time, it is worth remembering that the Convention has a strong basis in international law. To succeed – not only in its own region but also globally – commitment to international law and rules-based international order is needed.

Unfortunately, adherence to our common principles cannot be taken for granted. On the contrary, upholding international order and legal principles requires constant work and care.

The Convention can also have an impact beyond the Baltic Sea Region. The rules-based international order and multilateral system are prerequisites for global security, and the Åland Convention is a part of this fabric.

Finland is fully committed to upholding international law and international security. But legal principles, however powerful and important, are not enough. The values that underpin them – a willingness of parties to engage in an open-minded dialogue, to build trust, and to seek common solutions – can have global significance.

If and when the order breaks down, or we are lacking in mutual trust and understanding, we need dialogue. In order to ensure that our people can live in true and lasting peace, we need to rebuild trust.

This is why Finland wants to strengthen the international system and our common security. This is why we need to revive the spirit of Helsinki, the spirit of dialogue that grew from the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, which was signed in Helsinki almost 50 years ago, in 1975.

**

The Åland Convention has been, and still is, a stabilising force for peace in the Åland region. It is not a historical relic but a living entity – and a very much needed regime in the Baltic Sea Region.

Today, the Convention will be discussed from many perspectives and from different points of view.

I am convinced that by doing so in a spirit of dialogue, cooperation and trust, we can not only commemorate the Convention in the way that it deserves but we can find new ways to strengthen the continued success of the Convention and the Åland Islands.

Speech by President of the Republic of Finland Sauli Niinistö in honour of the 225th anniversary of the Royal Swedish Academy of War Sciences in Stockholm on 12 November 2021

I want to warmly congratulate the Royal Swedish Academy of War Sciences for its 225-year journey. You have a long and honourable history. During this time, there have been several wars in Europe and in the North, but luckily also long periods of peace. Because my personal view is that, at its best, war science serves as a guarantor of peace.

Competence related to warfare technology, skills and tactics must be developed all the time. But lessons learned from war history also show that it has been possible to prevent and avoid conflicts by means of strategic competence and statesmanship, without compromising national interests. If we have to resort to taking up arms, we have already failed in the most important task.

Of course, this interpretation of mine is not academic or historical alone. The same principle applies to today's politics in practice. Fostering peace is also a sign of successful foreign, security and defence policy. But peace and security cannot be built upon passive wishful thinking. We need an active stability policy.

As regards Finland, I have described our stability policy as resting on four pillars. The first pillar is national defence and security – having a credible defence helps us raise the threshold against a potential outside attack. On the other hand, it also makes us a more attractive partner to others. The second pillar is Western integration and partnerships – our interoperability is further enhanced by a wide range of coalitions and initiatives. The third pillar is our relations with Russia – the firmness in defending our own interests and principles can be combined with a constructive dialogue and maintaining as functioning relations as possible at any given time. The fourth pillar consists of the international system and comprehensive security – it concerns the whole humanity. It concerns our common human responsibilities for the future of the planet.

Unlike real pillars, none of the above is carved in stone. They change and evolve over time. But just like real pillars, they must constitute an integrated whole. If one of them weakens and cannot be reinforced, the others must be able to carry a larger share of the weight resting upon them.

* * *

“Both louder and quieter alarm clocks are ringing. But their message is the same: it is time to wake up.” These were my words in the Rikskonferens Seminar in Sälen in the beginning of 2014. Very soon after, what happened in the Crimea and Ukraine must have been a wake-up call even to all of us.

The time of waking up is not over. Different kinds of alarm clocks keep on ringing, louder and louder. The accelerating great power competition is reflecting increasingly clearly on us in the Nordic region. The more traditional concerns over arms control have not lost their meaning. But now new transitional technologies have emerged alongside them, further complicating any arms control efforts. And such threats as climate change, biodiversity loss and pandemics are no longer mere distant future scenarios. They have rapidly become very topical problems.

In this 2020s reality, the whole post-World War II world order is about to change. It means that many of the patterns typical of the era following the Cold War no longer apply. It is clear that we are on the verge of a new era, if we have not already crossed the line.

* * *

This is not the first time Finland and Sweden have faced new eras together. We have been closely bound by fate for several centuries, in very different constellations: first as the eastern half of the same kingdom, then under Russian rule for slightly over a century, and now as an independent republic for over a hundred years. For Finland, this western connection has always

played a particularly important role. We have been bound together by constitutions and systems of government, social model and legal system, language and culture. The latest driver of our relations is the defence cooperation that has been advancing quickly over the past few years.

Over the past year, we in Finland have finalised both our Foreign and Security Policy Report and Defence Report. Both state clearly and directly that Sweden is Finland's closest bilateral partner. This starting point remains unchanged, regardless of the political composition of government. I last discussed the matter today with Prime Minister Löfven, and I am really looking forward to continuing the cooperation with his successor.

Both Government reports state that Finland will continue to deepen the foreign and security policy cooperation and defence cooperation with Sweden without any pre-set restrictions. Our defence cooperation covers times of peace, crisis and war. When we enhance our readiness and raise the military deterrent, we jointly strengthen both the security in the Baltic Sea region and our defence capability.

* * *

I would like to draw your attention to the fact that the enhanced defence cooperation between Finland and Sweden is not solely bilateral. We are also jointly involved in a whole range of new multilateral arrangements. They form a thickening fabric that strengthens regional stability and improves the defence capability. The trilateral structures we have, on one hand, with the United States and, on the other hand, with Norway are an important part of this entity. The tripartite discussions with the key ministers from Finland, Sweden and Norway – launched at an unofficial meeting in Kultaranta two years ago – will continue.

As regards larger groups of countries, we participate side by side in defence cooperation within the NORDEFECO framework. We also collaborate with other European partners, under the auspices of the European Intervention Initiative led by France, the Joint Expeditionary Force led by the United Kingdom and the Framework Nation Concept led by Germany.

And, naturally, the ties that bind us together through the EU membership and NATO partnership are particularly strong. Both institutions are currently in the process of clarifying their security and defence concepts for the coming years. The EU's Strategic Compass and NATO's Strategic Concept are closely linked to each other both in terms of scheduling and content.

Among the 27 EU Member States and within the NATO's 30+2 format we are the only countries in a similar position. It would therefore be advisable for Finland and Sweden to seek common ground also in this regard. One opportunity for this presented itself a few weeks ago when Secretary General Stoltenberg and the whole North Atlantic Council made their first joint visit to Finland and Sweden. Strengthening European security also serves our own interests, no matter whether it takes place under the auspices of the EU or NATO.

* * *

Ultimately, we are all responsible for our own security. That is a responsibility we cannot outsource to anyone else, not even to our closest partner. Therefore, Finland also makes its choices for guaranteeing credible defence on its own, from its own starting points. Even having the closest kind of collaboration does not mean that we would automatically follow the same schedule and same direction in every matter. But almost always the Finnish and Swedish interests coincide. And every time they do, we are certainly stronger together than either of us would be on our own.

The progress in defence cooperation between Finland and Sweden both in its strictly bilateral form and as part of other entities is an excellent matter. For its part, it testifies that we have

woken up to the need created by our changing environment. It is good to remain on this path of cooperation.

Our defence administrations are in contact with each other on a daily basis. When we learn to know our counterparts across the gulf and have continuous contact, this enhances our confidence in each other almost without us even noticing it. When we already have the connection, we automatically come to think about our neighbour even when we encounter new problems – could we perhaps find a common solution to this issue as well?

However, I want to remind you that military readiness alone is not enough. As the world changes, taking care of security is becoming to an increasing extent the responsibility of every individual citizen. Therefore, I am concerned about whether other walks of life have kept up with the defence cooperation. Are we taking the good relations between our countries too much for granted? Do we know each other well enough? Do we all have an obvious counterpart who we can turn to both under normal conditions and when push comes to shove, from Finland to Sweden, from Sweden to Finland? We should wake up to these questions as well.

* * *

When it comes to foreign and security policy cooperation, as I said earlier, we have declared that there are no pre-set restrictions for deepening it. Certainly, the connections between Helsinki and Stockholm are already diverse – the dialogue between state leaderships, foreign services and parliaments is close. But could we still find new impulses for making the deepening really happen, in addition to merely stating that there are no restrictions for it? Would there be more space for establishing common views, for making joint initiatives?

In the arena of internal security, I have long been paying attention to the risk of Finland going in a different direction than Sweden and the other Nordic Countries. I consider it important that Finland not end up in a situation where we address security risks less firmly and have laxer legislation than our peer countries. Nordic liberal democracies must have a shared view of how seriously they take their own security and what kind of means they use to take care of it. As the threat scenarios in the fields of terrorism, cyber and hybrid threats are the same for us all, there might be room for more frequent exchange of information and harmonising our countermeasures.

Our experiences of the pandemic have been very different. Despite our different practices, the lessons learned have many similarities. We should share them. We must also take care of crisis readiness extending beyond the conditions created by the pandemic. I have noted with satisfaction that a crisis readiness training programme provided by the Swedish Defence University and the Finnish Security Committee is already being implemented under the ‘Hanaholmen Initiative’.

* * *

In 1796, among the founders of the Royal Swedish Academy of War Sciences there were quite a few persons born in Finland. One of them was officer Otto Carl von Fieandt, a distinguished cartographer, originally from the Kyyhkylä Manor near Mikkeli.

Cartography already played an important role in the 18th century war sciences. However, the term geopolitics that emphasises the connection between geography and international politics – why not war sciences as well – was not coined until one century later. The concept has its roots in Sweden. Rudolf Kjellén, who was influential as Professor and Member of Parliament in Gothenburg, Uppsala and Stockholm in the late 19th and early 20th century, is considered the father of the term “geopolitics”.

The term created by him came to stay. In recent years, there has been a lot of talk about the return of geopolitics. A more accurate assessment would probably be that it never went away in the first place.

There is no dispute that traditional geopolitics is very much alive again, but it has also found new manifestations. Power is now being used by a larger number of actors than before. And these actors also have new technologies and new methods in their hands. In the world of the 2020s, the geopolitical realities remain the same, but the threat scenarios change. In the Cold War era, we got used to living under the balance of terror. Now the balance is shaking. By any means, I do not want to predict mere terror for our future, but I am very much afraid that the times ahead of us will be increasingly difficult.

We must get prepared for the difficult times by strengthening our own resilience. Finland does this with the help of the two first pillars. National defence and international partnerships are means to the same end, in a mutually supportive manner.

The strength of our national defence lies in both quantity and quality. By calling its trained reserves to service, Finland would have more men and women in arms than Germany with its more than 15 times bigger population. With our current and future military acquisitions, we ensure that we have the materiel required for responding to the changing challenges. And most importantly, credible defence is based on the willingness of our citizens to defend their country, which has been traditionally high in Finland. That willingness must be actively boosted also among the future generations.

* * *

Ers Kungliga Högheter, herr statsråd, ärade ledamöter och gäster,

However, defence alone is not enough. We must actively do the best we can to steer the development in the rest of the world on a better and more stable path. In Finland, we do that with the help of the two latter pillars, both by taking care of our relations with Russia and by influencing the state of the whole international system.

As tensions rise, the need for preventing conflicts, building confidence and strengthening dialogue increases. The need to find common denominators to ensure that dialogue across division lines can continue is growing rapidly. This is what my initiative about extending the Helsinki Spirit to a global level is all about.

The letter of Helsinki, the commonly agreed principles of the CSCE Final Act of 1975, remain a valid foundation for a cooperation-based security system of our continent. During its OSCE Chairpersonship over the past year, Sweden has been doing valuable work for implementing these values. I have considered it natural that Finland would offer to carry this responsibility of the chairpersonship in 2025, while we celebrate the 50th anniversary of the OSCE.

But, at this moment, there would be a lot broader demand for the Helsinki Spirit, which also derives from the same source. Despite all conflicts and confrontations, in the middle of the Cold War, we succeeded in sitting around the same table and seeking mutual understanding in matters concerning our common security. We desperately need to rekindle this kind of a spirit. Not only within the OSCE area, but all around the world. With this matter we cannot afford to wait until 2025. We must make every effort to build confidence right here and now.

Without confidence, there is no security. And without security, war sciences will not be able to carry out their most important task, to strengthen world peace.

Speech by President of the Republic of Finland Sauli Niinistö at the 60th anniversary of the National Defence Course Association on 18 November 2021

Distinguished guests, Ladies and Gentlemen,

I want to warmly congratulate the National Defence Course Association on its 60th anniversary. Over the years, the association has built a status as a unique forum for discussions on comprehensive security and security policy. Most of those who complete a national defence course join the association to keep up the interaction that began on the course and discussion on the themes addressed.

Comprehensive security approach has been one of Finland's strengths for a long time. When our security environment changes, it is increasingly important to critically analyse the various areas of comprehensive security, and to maintain and develop the practical operating conditions. Ensuring our security in a broad-based manner is a task we cannot outsource to anyone else.

Over the last decade, we have entered an era of growing uncertainty in the world politics. The great power competition is intensifying. The arenas and methods of influencing have expanded considerably from what they used to be.

The settings of great power politics involve the need to display, and to use, national capabilities in various ways. Over the past few days, we have been discussing the issue of hybrid influencing a lot, and for a good reason. The military show of force is expanding more and more into the cyber dimension, where the arms race has continued for a long time. Alongside these, people are now also talking about the space environment. Safeguarding the peaceful use of space is a concrete, and currently also a topical challenge. From the Finnish perspective, the importance of the space domain is increasing, as stated in the new Government's Defence Report.

The rate at which everything is developing brings its own additional challenges. The technological progress has been extremely rapid over the past 20 years. It is wise to prepare for an even faster pace of development in the future. From Finland, keeping up with the advances requires long-term dedication, good foresight, and efficient and quick responses when the situation so requires.

The talk about technological revolution must not remain at the verbal level only. Technology is an increasingly central element both in the economy and security. It is of prime importance for us to ensure that our industrial foundations and competence are robust enough. Artificial intelligence, robotics and other new technologies affect not only our societies but also all areas of national defence. We must take good care of our national capabilities. We also need to keep on assessing their condition at all times. If we detect any shortcomings, we must take active measures to remedy them.

The impacts of new technologies are still partly hidden. However, it is clear that the traditional security concepts will not remain unchanged. This is a field in which the National Defence Course Association also has a lot of work to do.

In spring 2016, when I spoke at the spring meeting of the Finnish National Defence Course Association, one of the key issues of the day was bringing peace to the arc of conflict. At that point, we had already seen the rapid escalation of the Ukrainian conflict, and Europe was engaged in a heated debate about large-scale flow of migrants that had begun in 2015.

Since then, the geopolitical change has gained even more momentum. The bloc politics is making a return, although efforts to prevent it from getting totally out of control can also be seen. Some shifting can also be detected within the Western circles, and, as the geopolitical priorities change, new security political coalitions also emerge. We saw an example of this in

September, when the United States, the United Kingdom and Australia declared a trilateral security pact AUKUS.

Europe is also searching for its own place. Within the EU, the debate on the future of the cooperation on security and defence has begun. This debate on the EU strategic compass will culminate during the French EU presidency in the first half of 2022. It is in both Finland's and the whole Europe's interest that this debate leads to a better functioning and more integrated Union.

The need for this is now greater than ever. Today, Europe is being challenged more directly on our external borders than before. The most recent phenomenon we have encountered is the Belarussian hybrid operation on the eastern border of the EU aimed at weakening the unity of our continent and putting the European values and attitudes to a real test. The operating methods of authoritarian states strike at the very core of the values and principles of the democratic and liberal Western Europe, both challenging and exploiting them. How do we respond to this challenge?

At the international and EU level, the discussion about the functionality of the existing international agreements and commitments has now begun. I do not want to predict the outcome of this discussion, but it is clear that the theory and practice must not become too distanced from each other in these matters either.

Nationally, the pressure to review our own legislation in rapid succession has increased. I welcome the opportunity. For many years, I have been drawing attention to the need to raise our readiness with a view to different, even quite surprising situations. The events we have been witnessing this autumn have shown that quick, unexpected developments are possible. Finland is not isolated from this reality.

In addition to these acute needs to change our legislation, I believe a fundamental review of our emergency powers legislation would also be necessary. I consider it important that the review be not only fundamental but also proactive. If we now brush aside the need for a more comprehensive reform or continue the otherwise very leisurely consideration of the matter, sooner or later, we will need to have same discussion in the midst of a hurry and crisis.

The emergence of challenges and threats is not limited within the European borders. Despite our common mitigation endeavours, climate change is advancing, while biodiversity is declining at a threatening pace. These are matters of life and death shared by the whole humanity, and, as time goes by, they will constitute the root causes for growing security threats against Finland.

We cannot think that the concerns of others or crises that seem to be far away from us would not concern us. On the contrary, we must carefully follow what kind of impacts other recent global crises will have on us. In addition to the collapse of the government of Afghanistan, we have been witnessing, for example, how the instability in Ethiopia is escalating into a state of war. We are not yet aware of all the ramifications, but in Europe we need to be prepared for many kinds of consequences. During the evacuation operation from Afghanistan, estimates about a potential new flow of migrants were already made. This shows how a wide variety of events have an impact on our security environment.

In addition to building readiness, we also need other methods. At all times, even under uncertain conditions, we need active stability policy and international dialogue. Dialogue at even a very minimum level and finding common denominators are necessary for ensuring the prerequisites of our own security.

In this time and age, I have considered this kind of discussion, aimed at fostering and building the Spirit of Helsinki, very important. Businesslike relations in every direction serve the purpose of Finnish security, social stability and the well-being of Finnish people. At the same time, we need to make use of every opportunity to exert influence available to us. Finland must also bear its responsibility for finding solutions to the challenges shared by the whole of humanity.

The idea that “the national defence course is never over” is an essential part of the national defence courses. The same applies to safeguarding security in society at all its levels. For six decades, the national defence course activities have been playing their own important role in building confidence between the various stakeholders of Finnish society and creating a culture of cooperation.

And if work for ensuring Finland’s security and well-being is never done, that is also something no one can manage on their own. In the last resort, security is an issue that concerns all of us Finns. In my opinion, therein lies the hard core of comprehensive security approach and, at the same, Finland’s security.

Speech by President of the Republic of Finland Sauli Niinistö at the Körber Foundation Event “International Dialogue Revisited: The Spirit of Helsinki in an Age of Great-Power Competition”, 22 November 2021

President Steinmeier, dear Frank-Walter, Dr. Paulsen, Ladies and Gentlemen,

I want to begin by congratulating the Körber Foundation for the 60th anniversary of the Bergedorf Round Table format. President Steinmeier already mentioned your slogan of “talking to each other, not about one another”. I, too, find that impressive. That principle has stood the test of time.

In fact, genuine international dialogue has become even more valuable in this day and age. At the risk of sounding melodramatic: our common future is at stake. We are faced with an increasing amount of truly common challenges. Wicked problems that not even the strongest ones of us can solve alone.

Safeguarding peace and security. Ensuring the sustainability and welfare of our planet. These are, in my view, our most urgent human responsibilities. We can only shoulder these responsibilities by working together.

The demand for common solutions is on the rise. And yet, at the same time, we have severe problems on the supply side. Our ability to carry our responsibility for future generations is seriously hampered by the growing tensions in the world.

Let me be clear: I do not expect these tensions to disappear any time soon. On the contrary, dividing lines between great powers may well only become stronger in the coming months and years. That will have its unfortunate impacts on all of us. It will require firmness and resilience from all of us.

But if we want to prevent these disagreements from spiralling out of control, there is no alternative to dialogue. At the end of the day, we cannot have sustainable security without at least a certain degree of trust. And trust is extremely difficult to build if we do not talk to each other. Discussions among the like-minded are not enough. Dialogue is particularly important with those with whom we agree the least.

This is the essence of my initiative for reviving the Helsinki Spirit. Trying to locate common denominators, however small they may be at first. Building trust.

* * *

The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, and its Summit in Helsinki in 1975, was one of the turning points in the history of the Cold War and détente. But its significance is not only historical.

I believe there are three separate legacies from that same source, the original CSCE, that can help us safeguard peace and security in the future. In Europe, in other regions, and globally. I call these legacies the letter, the model, and the spirit of Helsinki. My main focus is on the spirit, but let me say a few words about the two others, too.

First, the letter. With that I mean the text of the Helsinki Final Act. With its ten principles guiding relations between states, that document continues to be the only available foundation for cooperative security in Europe, for a European security order.

To name a few examples of those ten commitments: refraining from the threat or use of force, inviolability of frontiers, territorial integrity of states, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. Although these principles have been breached, they are not broken. We must be unwavering in defending them. As the guardian of the letter of Helsinki, the OSCE is in a difficult, but crucially important position.

With the 50th anniversary of the Final Act approaching in 2025, we must use that moment for more than just remembering the past. We need to take responsibility for the future of our continent. Finland stands ready to do its part. Therefore, at the end of last week, together with the Finnish government, we formally decided to put Finland forward as a candidate for the OSCE Chairmanship in 2025.

Second, the model. We in the OSCE area often only see the problems the organization is currently struggling with. But in some other regions, the perspective is different. In their eyes, the achievements and the potential of the model outweigh the challenges.

Over the years, there has been a consistent interest in the CSCE model from across the world, from the Korean Peninsula to the Gulf area. Could something similar, a structure of different baskets and a set of confidence-building measures, be emulated in a different time and in a different region? I believe it could.

If others see the Helsinki model as conducive to cooperative security and stability in their regions, we must support that. Finland has often facilitated these kinds of discussions. Finnish activities on this front continue, mainly behind the scenes, in so-called Track 2 discussions between experts. And if these conversations are fruitful, at some point they may also rise to a higher political level.

* * *

As important as the letter is for Europe, and as much promise as the model can hold for other regions, it is the spirit of Helsinki that I want to emphasize as a global necessity. The Helsinki Spirit is more than documents and agreed principles. The Helsinki Spirit is more than institutions and structures.

The Helsinki Spirit is a mindset. And more than that: it is a working method to overcome divisions and mistrust. It is a willingness to engage in genuine dialogue, even with adversaries and competitors. It is a desire to seek common denominators, even in the midst of fierce disagreements. It is a determination to build trust, even when divisions between blocs run deep.

If it was possible to generate that kind of a mindset in the middle of the Cold War, it cannot be impossible today. Right now, we do not need another summit somewhere in the distant future. The task is much more urgent. We need to work on the Helsinki Spirit right here and now.

Because the dangers are also here and now. Peace in Europe is not assured. Finding a solution to our common threats and challenges is not guaranteed. When I look around, I see a world in great peril.

* * *

The Helsinki Spirit approach is not geographically limited. In the past months, I have engaged my colleagues from across the world on this general thinking – from Washington to Beijing, from Moscow to Berlin. I haven't yet heard anyone say "no" to the need for more Helsinki Spirit in today's world. Quite on the contrary: the feedback has been overwhelmingly positive.

Those conversations have been a good start. Now is the time to turn a somewhat abstract idea into something more concrete. I believe that one area where there is a particular need for the Helsinki Spirit is the intersection of traditional arms control and new technologies.

During the Cold War, arms control negotiations served a double purpose. Their direct results, the concrete arms limitations and the confidence-building measures, made the world safer. But arms control also had an indirect effect. The trust created between the negotiators in their special field flowed into the general relationship between the superpowers. It created a virtuous cycle.

Now we face a dual challenge. First, precisely those arms control agreements reached during the Cold War are rapidly disappearing. This leads to the old dangers, of conventional and nuclear weapons alike, re-emerging. But second, while we urgently need to revive the old mechanisms, the rapid technological development is making those mechanisms increasingly irrelevant.

With President Steinmeier, we have discussed the importance of trust several times in the past. Earlier today, we had a chance to dive deeper into the potential of the Helsinki Spirit in general, and to themes of arms control and new technologies in particular. First between the two of us, then in a broader conversation drawing from insights delivered by a few experts from Finland and Germany. I am certain that we can work together on these issues in the months ahead.

In another partnership, we are looking at ways to combine the Helsinki Spirit approach with the Our Common Agenda process at the United Nations. I had a promising conversation with Secretary General Guterres on this at the UN General Assembly in New York in September, and our teams have continued developing the cooperation since. Also here, the focus is on peace and security, arms control and emerging technologies, conflict prevention and building trust. As the UN plans to develop a new agenda for peace, I sincerely believe that we can use the Helsinki Spirit to reduce strategic risks on the global level.

The arms control field is now much more complex than it was in the 1970s. New technologies from artificial intelligence to drones are changing the picture completely. Their proliferation is far more difficult to control, their use far more difficult to reliably trace. With a growing number of actors and a far less predictable landscape, building trust becomes even more difficult. Yet build it we must.

* * *

There are many tensions that draw deep lines between nations and peoples. Despite that, we have our common human responsibilities. Safeguarding peace and security. Ensuring the sustainability and welfare of our planet. Are we willing to accept this responsibility?

"The Case for a Stronger Europe in a Harder World" – Speech by President of the Republic of Finland Sauli Niinistö at the Humboldt University, Berlin, 23 November 2021

Ladies and gentlemen,

”It will take twenty years before we arrive at a common foreign policy, let alone a common security policy, of the Europeans. But step by step we will have to come to it.”

This quote is from the first Humboldt Speech in this series. In November 2000, former Federal Chancellor Helmut Schmidt spoke here about the “self-assertion of Europe in the new century”. We now know that twenty years were not enough. On paper, a common foreign and security policy of the European Union does exist. In practice, however, there is still a long way to go.

Helmut Schmidt was famously of the view that people with visions should seek medical help. But when he outlined the major challenges facing us in the new century, his speech twenty-one years ago was nothing short of visionary. Population growth, climate change, regional and local wars – all of them leading to mass migration. New states rising to become world powers, and the global impacts of financial markets and emerging technologies – all of them underscoring the fact that no European nation can thrive on its own. This list put forward by Schmidt remains extremely topical today.

If anything, the need for a more self-assertive Europe has only become more obvious. The world surrounding us has become harder, in both senses of the word.

It is more complicated – with an increasing amount of powerful actors, with an increasing variety of technologies and methods at their disposal. And it is more ruthless – a place where beautiful statements about values and principles are often overshadowed by cynical acts creating facts on the ground.

In such a world, individual European states, even the largest ones, will not carry much weight on their own. A stronger Europe is in the interest of us all.

* * *

What does a stronger Europe mean, then? Different Europeans see the strengths of the European Union through different lenses. For some, the EU is predominantly an economic community, one that has grown from the original EEC of the Six to the world’s largest Single Market. For others, the emphasis is on the EU as a community of values, one that is based on democracy, the rule of law, and human rights.

Both of these assets, our economy and our values, are indeed fundamental components of Europe’s success. They have been that in the past, they will be that in the future. External challenges must not stop us from nurturing these strengths at home. If these foundations begin to fray or to disintegrate, any ability of ours to project power beyond our borders will vanish.

Neither should we shy away from being outspoken on how we seek to provide a better life for our own citizens. I believe that this narrative still has receptive audiences across the globe. Many continue to see the European model as an example worth following in their own countries.

But we must understand one important distinction here. The time for imposing a set of ready-made patterns on others is over – if there ever was such a time. Because if we are honest, the results of such a policy have never been impressive. Exported values can only have a lasting impact if the receiving end genuinely believes in them.

* * *

Unfortunately, in the world of today, not even the most affluent of economies, not even the noblest of values, will be enough. The world has become a more acrimonious and dangerous place. And the world increasingly respects power.

Therefore, we also need the European Union to take a much stronger role as a security community. Internally, we need a Europe that protects its citizens. Externally, we need a Europe that protects its interests.

From today's perspective, we often forget that European integration did not begin with the economy and values alone. Peace and security were present at the creation. After the immeasurable suffering brought about by the Second World War, the key objective of European integration was to make another war between the members of the same community impossible. Economic integration was a means to an end. As a peace project, it has been remarkably successful.

In the field of security and defense, however, the track record has been more modest over the years. Ever since the failure of the European Defence Community in the early 1950s, the majority of EU members have mainly looked to NATO as the ultimate guarantee of their security.

A strong Atlantic alliance continues to be imperative for our security, and Finland highly values its close partnership with NATO. Much can also be done with new ad-hoc coalitions and initiatives led by Germany, the UK and France. Finland, for its part, has actively been developing its dense network of bilateral, trilateral and multilateral defense arrangements.

But at the same time, shouldn't Europe as a whole be able to punch according to its own weight, too? There must be no doubt about European potential in security and defense. If we rely on the data compiled by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, already now the 27 EU members, put together, spend almost as much on defense as China, and almost four times as much as Russia. I also want to stress that if it fulfils its potential, the European Union is a more complete security actor than any other. Its toolbox covers a full range of assets, from civilian to military, and from diplomacy to crisis management. The tools are in place, but often the will to use them is not. This potential must be harnessed.

In the 21st century, security does not have to be, or rather, it must not be a zero-sum game. This should be true even for competitors and adversaries. It should be self-evident for partners and allies.

If we Europeans are able to shoulder more responsibility for our own security, that should only strengthen the transatlantic bond. If the European Union develops its capacity for action, that will only benefit NATO, too, given the large overlap in memberships between the two institutions.

* * *

The time for strengthening Europe is now. The urgency is in large part due to the external pressures on us. They are rapidly growing from many directions simultaneously.

On the geopolitical front, the balance of power in the world is changing. The great-power competition between the United States and China increasingly has repercussions on our shores, too. The global focus is shifting towards the Indo-Pacific region, at least in part at the expense of Europe. Without the power, both economic and military, to support our diplomacy, no amount of negotiating skills can prevent a further weakening of the European impact on the global level.

Russia's proximity and military power makes it a force always to be reckoned with for Europe. For Finland, maintaining a functioning bilateral relationship with Russia is essential. But a constructive dialogue is in no contradiction with firmly defending our interests and principles in that relationship. The same should be possible for the European Union, too. Refusing to interact with Russia does not strengthen the EU, it only makes it look weaker and less relevant.

During the past weeks, we have witnessed very worrying developments at the borders between Belarus and EU member states. Instrumentalising migrants, pushing them to cross the border, is a textbook example of a hybrid operation. As such, it forces us to face some very difficult questions.

Faced with malicious hybrid activities like this, can we hold on to our values and our security concerns simultaneously? I believe we need a frank European discussion about this. Without one, we will be even more vulnerable to further attacks. Instead of allowing these wedges to be driven between us, we need a firm and common European reaction.

* * *

Fellow Europeans,

I will say this again: The time for strengthening Europe is now. In addition to the many dark clouds on the external horizon, there is also a more positive internal reason for this urgency. The questions concerning security and defense are finally getting the attention they deserve in the EU.

The aspiration for a stronger Europe was laid out already in the EU's Global Strategy five years ago. There has since then been no shortage of declarations towards the same objective: a Europe that protects. But to be fair, a lot has been achieved in the intervening years, too. In addition to the External Action Service as a tool for our common diplomacy, we now also have a set of instruments to improve our common capabilities.

Acronyms like PESCO, CARD or EDF may sound terribly technical and bureaucratic. Their immediate impact on our security may seem limited. But if we take a longer view, the change is remarkable. The ways in which we look at defense spending, interoperability and industrial cooperation together would have been unimaginable at the beginning of this century.

In the coming months, we have an opportunity to take the next steps, or hopefully even leaps, forward. Commission President Ursula von der Leyen has talked about the need for a European Defence Union. An EU Defence Summit is planned for next year. And we are, together, preparing a Strategic Compass for the EU.

We must use this momentum wisely and decisively. At its worst, of course, the Strategic Compass will only become yet another statement of intent. At its best, however, it can be used as a vehicle to genuinely make Europe stronger.

The problem for Europe has never been a lack of institutions or initiatives. What we have lacked has been a shared analysis of the threats we face. What we have lacked has been a strong political will to address those threats effectively together. I call upon all Europeans to seize the opportunity to correct these shortcomings now.

I am afraid that the world we live in will continue to become harder to comprehend, harder to operate in, and harder to manage. As individual nation-states, we will have to navigate these difficult waters in any case – on our own, in different partnerships, as parts of the international system.

But if we cannot rely on a common European approach, our task will be much more daunting. Positioning ourselves credibly on the changing geopolitical map, responding effectively to conventional and hybrid threats, staying on top of emerging and disruptive technologies – all of this is much more difficult, if not impossible, if we try to achieve it alone. Our security and our prosperity is at stake. We do not have another twenty years to wait. The time for a stronger Europe really is now.

President of the Republic of Finland Sauli Niinistö's New Year's Speech on 1 January 2022

My fellow citizens,

“My perhaps somewhat outdated understanding of the mutual relations between us people is that we need more good will, more willingness to understand one another and more humility before higher values.” These are the words of Nobel laureate Frans Emil Sillanpää, and his message remains as topical today as it was when he wrote them.

During the past year, there have been heated debates in Finland about the pandemic. And currently, for a good reason, security policy is emerging as a topic of discussion.

We should not shy away from differences of opinion. We can think of many different ways to address challenging situations. The expression of opinions is a sign of a well-functioning democracy. But we must not stop wanting to understand that someone else may see a matter differently from us. Otherwise, deep discord may arise. For a nation, fierce discord may be more dangerous than the challenge in itself.

The beginning of a new year is a time of promises and hope. At the turn of this year, the promise of seeking the common good is of particular importance.

* * *

The third year of the coronavirus pandemic is about to begin. The disease has turned out to be a persistent and cunning opponent. It has been difficult to keep up with the rapidly spreading pandemic. And it has been impossible to get ahead of it.

The time of living more freely did not open up quite the way we had hoped for. Two vaccinations and the COVID-19 passport created a sense of safety, which was, however, eaten away by time. When the virus changed its form, the disease took even more room than before.

It is understandable that people are frustrated with the continuous setbacks. We all feel the same. The fear for our own health or that of our loved ones is consuming us. Many people are worried about their finances and their livelihood. The virus, however, does not care about our weariness or our feelings. Now we are asked to be resilient over and over again.

In spring 2020, the virus appeared as a common enemy that we are all fighting against together. In Finland, we saw a lot of people helping each other and caring for others. Good will reigned, and it spread widely.

Now the feel is different. It is, of course, understandable that things we have not experienced before provoke different opinions, both on the dangers of the pandemic and on the ways of protecting ourselves from it. However, the differing opinions have begun to turn into quarrelling and spreading of ill will. A factor that unites us – the efforts to protect our health – should not be allowed to become the source of a quarrel.

* * *

However, I believe we can all agree about one thing: this disease is spreading. It is highly contagious and spreads widely. It infects people, with effects ranging from mild symptoms to fatal consequences. I do not believe that anyone would deliberately take on any illness to bear or to spread.

Someone may still think that, in their case, the risk is not that high. And be indifferent. In other words, fail to take precautions, to take the vaccination or to wear a mask. But when taking the risk, no one takes it only on their own behalf. And no one knows in advance where their chain of transmission may lead.

No maelstrom lasts forever. The promise of a better tomorrow stems from the power of science and healthcare. A multitude of lives has already been saved.

The specialists in science and healthcare have been sharing their competence worldwide. Governments should also enhance their cooperation. We can beat this plague together.

* * *

The great power politics are currently in a rapid state of flux. The post-Cold-War era is definitely over. The characteristics of a new era are only beginning to take shape. But every time the shape of geopolitics changes, the impacts are also felt by countries smaller than the great powers. Sometimes particularly by them.

The conflict on the borders of Ukraine is on the verge of getting deeper. Tensions have also been building up as regards European security. The change has been rapid. Still last summer, following President Biden's trip to Europe, the primary cause of concern seemed to be China. After Presidents Biden and Putin met in Geneva, it was assumed that the United States and Russia were in a process of building lines of communication. The polite host, Europe, was mainly listening.

Now the feel is different. The ultimatums Russia gave to the U.S. and NATO in December concern Europe. They are in conflict with the European security order. Spheres of interest do not belong to the 2020s. The sovereign equality of all states is the basic principle that everyone should respect.

Ultimately, patience, responsibility and dialogue are the only roads forward. It is not possible to build a sustainable future by threatening with the use of armed force or other kinds of violence. Accordingly, the response to the Russian demands has been the offer of dialogue. Finland has also made efforts to promote and continue dialogue for its own part.

We must, however, be careful about what is being talked about and with whom. Many Europeans have asked, and not for the first time: are we being discussed without us being included? Even though the challenge was presented to the U.S. and NATO, in this situation Europe cannot just listen in. The sovereignty of several Member States, also Sweden and Finland, has been challenged from outside the Union. This makes the EU an involved party. The EU must not settle merely with the role of a technical coordinator of sanctions.

* * *

International tensions cause concern in many Finns as well. European security also involves Finnish security. In an open society, there is always room for discussion and different opinions, no matter whether they concern the dangers of the situation or the ways of protecting ourselves from them.

We can all agree that the situation is serious. A factor that unites us – the security of Finland – should not be allowed to become the source of a quarrel. Let us keep trying to understand that someone else may see the matter differently from us.

In my opinion, when it comes to Finland, the situation is clear. Finland's foreign and security policy line remains stable. It has been built to last even difficult times. In the fast-paced world, it is more valuable than ever to know when to hurry, and when to have patience.

National security, self-determination and room to manoeuvre are just as important to small nations as to big ones. While taking care of these fundamentals, we are also safeguarding Finland's international status.

And let it be stated once again: Finland's room to manoeuvre and freedom of choice also include the possibility of military alignment and of applying for NATO membership, should we

ourselves so decide. NATO's business is the so-called Open Door policy, the continuance of which has been repeatedly confirmed to Finland, also publicly.

Presidents Biden and Putin talked with each other again the day before yesterday. We may be somewhat wiser in mid-January, when we see what will follow from the negotiation contacts between Russia, the U.S. and NATO. For Finland, it is important that also the OSCE is involved in this series of meetings.

We should maintain hope, but not succumb to mere wishful thinking. In times like this, Henry Kissinger's lessons also come to mind. According to his cynical statement, whenever avoidance of war has been the primary objective of a group of powers, the international system has been at the mercy of its most ruthless member. This principle may also be put to the test in the dialogue due to start in the second week of January.

* * *

I belong to the generations born after the Second World War. To those generations for whom the circumstances have been getting better all the time. Knowing this, you end up looking at yourself: when you have been given a lot, you cannot leave only a little behind you.

Climate change, loss of biodiversity, and becoming burdened with material, financial debt are signs of how we are living at the expense of the future. That cannot be the legacy our generations leave to the next ones. Let us change it.

Young people today are being tested. The pandemic has robbed them of a disproportionate part of their life. The growing social malaise, drop in physical condition and the stagnation in the level of education are worrying signs. The parents, all of us, should hear the young people out. Sometimes already that can help. Understanding and support showed by an adult is a great gift to a young person.

Young people also have a lot to say. Activity is always a sign of a spark of life. Indifference among young people is a serious warning sign of a waning spirit. The happiest county in the world can only be satisfied when it offers its youth perspectives of hope.

* * *

A lot of things are also well. I want to thank you already in advance for having "more good will, more willingness to understand one another and more humility before higher values" this year, as Taata Sillanpää wished. Then things will be even better. I wish you all a happy New Year and God's blessing.

Statement by President of the Republic of Finland Sauli Niinistö at the International Inaugural Summit "Grain from Ukraine" on 26.11.2022

Dear Mr President, ladies and gentlemen. Thank you for organizing this timely Summit.

Let me first convey message of solidarity from Finland to all Ukrainians. Russia is targeting Ukrainian cities, destroying infrastructure that is providing people energy, water and heating. We have followed with shock as Ukrainian cities have been plunged into cold and darkness. But we are inspired by the Ukrainians' courage and determination to fight for their freedom and to repair what has been destroyed.

The international law sanctions deliberate targeting of civilians. During Russia's illegal invasion, we have witnessed systematic violations of humanitarian law. It is important that those responsible will be held accountable.

Finland has strongly condemned Russia's illegal invasion of Ukraine from the very beginning. Finland firmly supports Ukraine's independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity. We continue our humanitarian, material and military assistance, as long as needed.

Mr President,

Russia's illegal invasion of Ukraine has a major impact on global food security. The rise in the price of grain caused by the invasion has seriously weakened food security for those most vulnerable. The Food and Agriculture Organisation and the World Food Programme have estimated that over 200 million people suffer from acute food insecurity in 53 countries. This is a global crisis. Russia has systematically destroyed Ukraine's agricultural infrastructure and prevented the export of grain. We strongly condemn this. We also must actively combat disinformation disseminated by Russia, claiming that the food crisis is caused by the sanctions imposed by the West. The truth is that Russia alone is responsible for the human suffering caused by its actions.

The UN brokered the Black Sea Grain Initiative to resume Ukrainian grain exports. I also commend the crucial efforts of Türkiye in this regard. It is important to continue the shipping of grain, increase volumes and stabilise the market. The Solidarity Lanes created by the European Union facilitate grain and agricultural shipments from Ukraine.

I welcome Ukraine's initiative to launch Grain from Ukraine Program. Mr President, thank you for your leadership and initiative.

Finland has made a contribution of approximately 7 million euros through World Food Program for grain shipment from Ukraine to Somalia. The Horn of Africa suffers from particularly severe drought. More than 20 million people are in need of food aid.

It is important to join our forces in this effort of global dimensions. Thank you.

Speech by President of the Republic of Finland Sauli Niinistö at the opening of the 242th National Defence Course on 7 November 2022

Ladies and Gentlemen

National Defence Course number one took place in the spring of 1961, just before the building of the Berlin Wall. Since then, we have lived through three decades of Cold War, and then three post-Cold War decades. Now we have moved on to something new that is still very unpredictable.

Today, you are starting your course in an exceptionally tense world situation. The atmosphere is even chillier than during the Cold War. Russia's invasion of Ukraine brought war to Europe. The situation in the Korean peninsula is once again sensitive. Tensions between the United States and China are growing. In the midst of energy and economic concerns, Europe as a whole is facing a difficult winter.

In more peaceful times, the national defence courses have sometimes had to use a great deal of imagination to create sufficiently difficult crisis scenarios. That is certainly not the case now. There are plenty of problems in the real world to solve.

* * *

We are undoubtedly living in dangerous times. Focusing on threats and risks is now not only understandable, but also necessary. We need to be vigilant in detecting real hazards. We need to be alert in identifying potential threats. Even those that seem very unlikely.

When we, as a society, prepare for the future, we must immediately fix anything that may still lay loose. Potential vulnerabilities need to be identified and patched up. However, threat

identification must be just a tool, not an end in itself. Over-emphasising threats will only lead us to end up doing our opponents' work for them. Fuelling uncertainty will not increase our security.

And most importantly: there is no reason for uncertainty. There is no direct military threat to Finland. Our security is in a good shape, our level of preparedness is high. I would like us to talk much more about all the things that make us feel secure, not just the dangers.

As the order number already indicates, your course is part of a long tradition. It is at a time like this that the value of national defence courses becomes even more apparent. Your backgrounds and life experiences are different. But the goal is common. National defence, Finland's security. That is what you are here to strengthen together. Building our much-talked-about resilience, our crisis resistance. And showing what it consists of.

Because that resilience is not about abstract top-level structures. It is about people. Very practical and everyday things we do together, in all walks of life. And, above all, about a mindset.

That we can and dare to lean on each other's strengths. That we can and dare to trust each other. And that we have the courage and determination to face challenges and threats. When we can do this, Finland as a nation can trust in itself. Together we are strong, in all kinds of times, and we will overcome any difficulty.

* * *

The dramatic developments of the past year have sparked a debate also in Finland about whether something should have been done earlier and in a different way. Should our relations with Russia have been handled differently? Should we have applied for membership of NATO earlier?

Of course, there is always room for self-criticism. It is good that we look for mistakes in our past. And where missteps can be pointed out, lessons should be learned. But also self-criticism should only be a tool, not an end in itself.

I would like to draw attention to the fact that we have not been subject to much criticism from the outside. Instead, we have received all the more appreciation. In the field of diplomacy, for our clear-cut and straightforward communication with Russia. In the field of defence, for both our conscription system and the performance of our Defence Forces. In terms of comprehensive security, both for our preparedness and for our culture of working together.

Our strengths are thus widely recognised and acknowledged. There has been outright amazement elsewhere at how ready Finland is to become a NATO member. Even the voices that were still heard in the spring, doubting that Finland would simply seek the protection of NATO's wings, have changed as the facts have come to light. As a member of NATO, Finland is seen as strengthening the Alliance as a whole. This confidence is also reflected in the historic speed of the ratification process.

I have gained the impression that Finland is appreciated precisely because we do not always make a big deal of what we do, we just do it. If necessary, with a minimum of noise, but always reliably and thoroughly. What has worked before our NATO membership could also be a good guideline during membership. Less noise, more action. It has become very clear to me that this is what is expected of us.

* * *

The decision to apply for NATO membership is a fundamental change in Finland's political history. But it doesn't change everything. NATO membership will be part of our foreign and

security policy, not other way round. But despite the fact that our NATO partnership has grown ever closer over the years, the decisive step we are now taking is a big one. Concretely as well as mentally. Finland will become a militarily allied country.

There seems to be a great enthusiasm now in Finland for us to take also new steps while this current phase is still in progress. Some would like to define Finland's future NATO profile in advance. Others, on the other hand, present ideas about things that should be placed in Finland in the future.

I personally think it is important that we focus on the current accession process. Which, as I said, is a major change in itself. Finland has applied for NATO membership, no more, no less. When applying for membership, other countries have not made any specific demands or restrictions in advance, and neither does Finland. Finland's profile as a NATO member will naturally evolve over time, according to changing circumstances, through practical work and our national decision-making.

As a member of NATO, we will have additional security both from the common deterrence and the common defence of the Alliance. As a member, Finland contributes to the development of both. It is important to understand that nuclear weapons are an essential part of NATO's deterrence. We certainly still have a lot to learn about the nature of nuclear deterrence; we will only participate in the discussions on it as members. But it is clear that for NATO, nuclear weapons are specifically an instrument of prevention, not an end in themselves. I recall the joint statement by all the permanent members of the UN Security Council at the beginning of this year: a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought.

In recent days, talk about nuclear weapons has rapidly become commonplace, also in Finland. I consider this a dangerous development. Let me make it clear: even if we do not impose any restrictions on our membership of NATO in advance, Finland has no intention whatsoever of bringing nuclear weapons onto its soil. Nor have I seen any indication that anyone is offering them to us.

* * *

Russia's war of aggression in Ukraine has forced us to adapt to a new reality. We are living in a time of war in Europe. Unfortunately, there is no end in sight for that. Ukraine has every right and every justification to defend itself. Russia has no right and only wrong reasons to attack. So far, there is no sign that either side is prepared to give in on its premises.

Finland's position is clear. It is not for outsiders to dictate conditions to Ukraine, which is fighting for its own territorial integrity, within its internationally recognised borders. The decision to continue the defence is that of Ukraine, and of Ukraine alone. As part of the Western community, Finland will continue to support Ukraine and the people of Ukraine as long as it is needed.

However, there is also a danger in the way in which war talk has become commonplace in the past year. It should not be forgotten that every day that the war is going on means death of people. Continued war will not bring sustainable security to anyone. Only peace can do that.

Even in times like these, we must be able to and dare to talk about peace. It is certainly not about appeasement of an aggressor who blatantly violates international law. It is not about being gullible, it is not about being soft, it is not about being naive. It is not about us losing our preparedness. It is about the ultimate goal being to bring about peace, to stop the killing. That is where all wars end in due course.

There is reason to explore conditions for peace also beyond the war front. It is through diplomacy that space is created for these seeds of peace. That is why I have welcomed the

efforts of French President Macron and German Chancellor Scholz to maintain a dialogue, or at least the possibility of one, also with Moscow. Peace is such an important goal that we should spare no effort to achieve it. Peace is worth all efforts, even those that turn out to be futile. That too is national defence.

* * *

Dear National Defence Course participants,

When I last spoke at a similar event in autumn 2018, I said that I knew from my own experience the scale of the challenge that awaits you here. This will certainly be the case this time, too. But perhaps now it is even clearer how important things are putting you on the spot. I would like to wish you a very rewarding course in national defence.

Speech by President of the Republic of Finland Sauli Niinistö at the 74th Session of the Nordic Council in Helsinki on 1 November 2022

Kuva: Hanne Salonen/Eduskunta, Foto: Hanne Salonen/Riksdagen, Photo: Hanne Salonen/Parliament

Esteemed Speakers, Dear Ministers and Members of the Nordic Council, Ladies and Gentlemen,

My warmest congratulations to the Nordic Council on the occasion of its 70th anniversary. And a warm welcome to Finland to all of you who have come to the Council meeting.

The Nordic countries are regarded as pioneers in many sectors. And that is what we are, at least in our mutual cooperation. Throughout the decades, we have been determined to strengthen our Nordic family. Our cooperation has deepened under different political circumstances and even in tense global political situations. Over the years, we have developed into one of the most integrated regions in the world.

The Nordic Council was founded in 1952 in the middle of the Cold War. Although Finland was not formally a member in the early years, cooperation was close. We knew we had the support of other Nordic countries. When we joined the Council in 1955, we were warmly welcomed. At the first session of the Nordic Council, which Finland attended in 1956, Council President Bertil Ohlin said: "It felt as if a chair was empty when Finland was not here." For Finland, the Nordic countries were then, and still are, the closest group of friends and international reference group.

Now, 70 years after the Nordic Council was founded, the atmosphere in world politics is even chillier than during the Cold War. Russia's brutal invasion of Ukraine brought war to Europe. All the Nordic countries have strongly condemned Russia's actions. All the Nordic countries stand firmly behind Ukraine as it fights for its freedom and for our common values.

In recent weeks, the war has again entered a new phase. Russia has stepped up the destruction of Ukrainian cities and infrastructure, with no regard for civilian suffering or the rules of war. Although Ukraine is fighting back bravely and has made significant progress, it is difficult to see an end to the war.

Our security environment has also changed fundamentally. At the end of last year, we recognized the change as Russia called for a halt to NATO expansion. Finland saw this as an attempt to deny our freedom of choice. Immediately after Russia made its demand, I gave a

statement in response, stating: “Maintaining a national room to manoeuvre and freedom of choice is the foundation of Finland’s foreign, security and defence policy. This also includes the possibility of military alignment and applying for NATO membership.” Our decision finally matured after Russia started its attack on Ukraine.

The process of confirming Finland’s and Sweden’s NATO membership has proceeded at an historic pace: in four months, as many as 28 allies have ratified our membership, the Nordic countries among the first. With Turkey and Hungary, we have a good dialogue. I am confident that the remaining ratifications will be completed. As I have said: We started down this path together with Sweden, and together we will continue.

Over the course of this year, I have often been asked what the membership of Finland and Sweden in NATO means for Nordic cooperation. I think the answer is clear: our cooperation will deepen further. We already have extensive cooperation between the Nordic countries in the field of security and defence. Our interests are often similar and our capabilities are strong and complementary. When Finland and Sweden join NATO, there will no longer be empty Nordic chairs in the NATO Council either. Together, we are strong security providers in our own region and beyond. In the future, we will strive to ensure that the whole Alliance benefits from our cooperation.

We share the same security environment also with the Baltic States. I would like to see the well-functioning NB8 cooperation aiming increasingly at security. Cooperation between parliaments is already close, but I would encourage you to further strengthen contacts and the exchange of information and views, for example between key committees.

We are living in dangerous times. Sabotage of gas pipelines and drones flying near strategic targets are examples of hybrid attacks that we need to be prepared for today. Our exchange of information is continuous. We have intensified our cooperation in the areas of security of supply and crisis preparedness. This must continue. Our critical infrastructure crosses national borders in many sectors. We must work together to protect it. When we prepare together, our security is strongest.

As stated in Finland’s Presidency Programme of the Nordic Council, security is the foundation of all wellbeing. Last spring, we took decisions and measures to strengthen our security.

But our wellbeing is challenged also by other means. Rising energy prices and interest rates, as well as accelerating inflation, worry our citizens. And for good reason. This winter, more and more people will have to make difficult choices to reduce their consumption. More and more people are worried about making ends meet.

Russia is using its energy weapon in the hope that our resilience is the first to break. That Western unity would begin to crack and our support Ukraine to falter. This is where it makes a miscalculation. History has shown that, both as individuals and as nations, we find strength in ourselves in difficult situations. Together and alone, we can do things we may not have even known we could do. The Ukrainians are the ultimate example of this. The challenges we face are small compared to what Ukraine faces. I firmly believe that our backbone will hold.

As I said about a week ago when I visited Iceland, I had thought that Nordic cooperation had already reached a perfect level. But during last spring I learned that there is a level that is even better than perfect. The difficult times have brought the North together in an unprecedented way. Contacts between the Nordic countries have been close.

I myself have visited all the Nordic countries in the past six months. And every few days we have picked up the phone to exchange information and ideas with a Nordic colleague. This has been valuable.

I hope that we will seize this opportunity – the Renaissance of Nordic cooperation – to strengthen what we have and create something new. Even the perfect can be improved.

I have often thought that in many ways the Nordic countries are seen as ideal societies in the world. We are known for our strong democracy, equality and prosperity. Whether it is stability, freedom, a sense of security or happiness, we are at the top of the statistics. We are trusted. There seems to be a perception that everything that comes from the Nordic countries must be good. Should we make even better use of this Nordic brand?

In the international arena, we work to strengthen the rules-based system, to promote an ambitious climate policy and equality. Instead of doing things alone, could we rely more on the Nordic brand in our politics?

In business, our companies are often competitors with each other. But in the new technologies sector in particular, we are up against large companies that operate under different rules, with different values. In the 5G and quantum technology markets, reliability is a hard asset. Should we first look at where we have synergies?

There are plenty of examples, and a lot is already being done. But the full potential of the Nordic brand has not yet been realised. Together, we could do even more good by being even more active. Here, The Nordic Council can act as an accelerator and catalyst. After all, it does seem that everything that comes out of the Nordic countries is good.

I would like to raise one more topic that the Nordic countries have traditionally been strong advocates of: peace. Some years ago, the Nordic Council of Ministers published a report on the Nordic peace brand. This is a part of our brand that we should not lose. After all, only peace is the basis for sustainable security. It is also worth remembering what President Biden said when I visited Washington in March. He said that President Obama used to say: “We’d be alright if we left everything to the Nordic countries, everything would be fine.” I think we agree.

This year, as we celebrate the Nordic Council’s special anniversary, our unity, cooperation and closeness is perhaps more important than ever. I would like to thank you for the important work you are doing for our Nordic family and for strengthening our common handprint in our region and in the world. I wish you a rewarding session week, good discussions and many new ideas.

Thank you.

Speech by President of the Republic of Finland Sauli Niinistö at the dinner held on 19 October 2022 in honour of the State Visit to Iceland

Your Excellency, Mr. President – dear Guðni,

Dear Ms. Read – dear Eliza,

Ladies and Gentlemen,

on my own and on my wife’s behalf, I want to express our deepest gratitude for the invitation to visit your beautiful country. We made our first state visit to Iceland over nine years ago. We will never forget that. Throughout these years, I have very much enjoyed the close and easy co-operation between Finland and Iceland.

Finland and Iceland truly have a lot in common. We are both part of the Nordic family, but the others find our languages impossible to understand. That might be the reason why we understand each other. We share a peculiar, dark sense of humor that the others may also have difficulties in comprehending. But we have a very, very light mind. We find solace and inspiration in literature. I have been told that Iceland is the only country that beats Finland in the number of books annually published per capita.

As we celebrate 75 years of Finnish-Icelandic diplomatic relations, the bond between our countries is strong and getting ever stronger.

There is a saying that you never really know who your friends are until the ice breaks. After Russia's brutal invasion of Ukraine on the 24th of February, Europe's security order has been on thin ice. In this new reality, Finland and Sweden decided to apply for NATO membership. I want to thank Iceland for having been among the first ones, maybe even the first, to ratify our NATO membership, along with the other Nordic friends.

It was with much appreciation that I noted your words, Guðni, at the opening of the Althing: "But now, as then, our peace and security are predicated upon other nations also enjoying peace and security. Hence we support the decision of our fellow-Nordic nations, Finland and Sweden, to join NATO." Thank you for this.

Truly, to build lasting peace and security, we need each other. The Nordics are one of the most integrated regions in the world. But thus far, we have had differing approaches to security. This is about to change. When we are all NATO members, I believe that we will see a lot of Nordic cooperation within the Alliance. And that gives room for our co-operation in different areas, when we feel safe.

"If one looks at the glacier for long enough, words cease to have any meaning on God's earth." These words from Halldór Laxness' masterpiece "Under the Glacier" sprang to my mind when embarking on this trip. Tomorrow we will visit the Langjökull Glacier. This beautiful glacier is retreating rapidly. It is our common responsibility to protect our arctic nature, to make sure that the future generations still have glaciers to marvel at. Climate and the Arctic are important priorities for both Finland and Iceland and I look forward to intensifying co-operation also on these topics.

But now, please join me in raising a toast to the close and warm relationship between our countries, and people. Let us continue to strengthen and deepen our co-operation.

Keynote speech by President of the Republic of Finland Sauli Niinistö at the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs in Oslo on 10 October 2022

Prime Minister Støre, dear Jonas, Director Sverdrup, Ladies and Gentlemen,

It is a great pleasure for me to return to Oslo, to NUPI, and to Litteraturhuset. One day shy of ten years ago, during my state visit to Norway, I also shared the stage with Director Sverdrup here.

What a difference a decade makes. Back then, the thought of a full-scale war in Europe would have seemed unimaginable. And if we are honest, I don't think that there were many people in the room then who would have expected Finland to join NATO.

We are now living in a new reality. That reality is, of course, most dramatically felt in Ukraine, every single day. Although Ukraine is making heroic progress in reclaiming its territory, the suffering of the Ukrainian people continues. The end of the war – Russia’s brutal war of aggression against a sovereign country, against its neighbour – is unfortunately nowhere in sight. The news this morning are a case in point: the indiscriminate attacks on Kyiv and other cities in Ukraine.

I believe that Finland and Norway, two countries that also share a border with Russia, feel particularly strongly about this. Finland, like Norway, together with the whole EU and our other partners, has firmly condemned Russia’s acts. Finland, like Norway, has been steadfast in its support to Ukraine ever since the start of the war. Finland will continue its assistance to Ukraine and the Ukrainian people for as long as it is needed.

The effects of the war, however, don’t stop in Ukraine. The security situation in all of Europe is more precarious than it has been for a very long time. If we needed a reminder of the dangers for us here in the North of Europe, we recently received one. The explosions in the Baltic Sea two weeks ago, leading to gas leaks in the Nord Stream pipelines, need to be thoroughly investigated. Those events have reminded us of the need to bolster the security of our critical infrastructure. They have also reminded us of the myriad possibilities in which this crisis may escalate, horizontally or vertically, with unforeseen consequences.

One thing is certain. In the coming months, our resilience will be severely tested. There are dangerous scenarios that we can and should anticipate. There are wicked surprises that we need to prepare for. Whatever Russia does next, however difficult the energy crisis will turn out to be, unity must be our response.

I am convinced that we will pass this test. But it will not happen automatically. Maintaining our unity, maintaining our resilience, will require constant efforts from every single one of us. We must be vigilant. We must be ready for hard choices. And we must make them by sticking together.

* * *

Dear friends,

For us Nordics, this should be a natural instinct. Because fortunately, in this new reality, some basic truths have remained unchanged. Or rather: they have been even further strengthened by the changes around us. As I said in my speech here in 2012, Finland and Norway belong to one Nordic family. As I said here then, we are welded together by sheer geography. And as I said here then, there is still room for the Nordic countries to strengthen their common profile in the eyes of the world.

There are still two countries that have not yet ratified the NATO membership of Finland and Sweden. It is up to Hungary and Türkiye to decide whether they are ready to proceed and join the 28 allies who have already given their green light. Based on the good and constructive conversations we have had with both countries, on various levels, I am confident that it will happen in due course.

When Finland, together with Sweden, eventually becomes a NATO member, our one Nordic family will finally be welded together by a common Alliance, too. It will bring an important additional ingredient to the already powerful Nordic model. A common approach to security. The Nordic brand will become even stronger. We should think how we could make better use of that globally, too.

When Finland becomes a NATO member, the most important value added to our security will be the preventive effect of the Alliance’s joint deterrence. As a NATO member, Finland will

participate in the planning and development of that deterrence. It will provide the kind of protection we would not have outside NATO.

Of course, NATO membership is also of major significance in case that this preventive effect is not enough. As a NATO member, Finland will participate in the planning and, if necessary, implementation of the joint defence.

The bottom line is that Finland is seeking to become a NATO member, full stop. Nothing more, nothing less. We don't have any particular requests or reservations that we would be setting as preconditions for our membership. The Finnish profile in NATO will develop naturally over time and according to changing circumstances.

When the whole Nordic family belongs to NATO, I believe that we will see a lot of Nordic cooperation within the Alliance. That comes naturally, given our Nordic identity and mindset. More often than not, our interests and approaches will align.

But let me stress this: Finland is not seeking to build any kind of a regional bloc within NATO. We will look at the Baltic Sea region as a whole. We will look at the Alliance as a whole. We are not just asking what NATO can do for us. We are also thinking what we can do for NATO, committing to the security of the whole Alliance, of all Allies.

* * *

Ladies and Gentlemen,

As big a step as NATO membership is for Finland, not everything will change. We are not starting from scratch. Although our security environment is changing dramatically, the basic contours of Finland's foreign and security policy remain intact. They just need to be adapted to the new reality.

We have never wanted to increase tensions. But we have always made sure that we are also ready for more difficult circumstances. We may not have made the loudest of public statements. Instead, it is our silent but robust deeds that have made the difference. And we are prepared now.

We are now benefiting from the fact that we never let our guard down in the past decades. Our defence is in good shape and we are increasingly investing in it. NATO membership does by no means mean that we could start neglecting our own national defence. Just the opposite.

Finland's membership will double the border NATO currently shares with Russia. For both Finland and NATO, it is of utmost importance that Finland will continue to primarily take care of defending its own territory. When coordinated with the joint planning of the Alliance, fulfilling this task has a stabilising effect that will enhance security in Northern Europe as a whole.

Over the years, Finland has built a dense web of Western defence and security partnerships. Although all eyes in our domestic debate are now on NATO, we must not forget the importance of these other cornerstones of our security. The EU as a more effective global actor, also in the field of foreign and security policy, is in our core interest. And the further development of EU-NATO cooperation is now even more significant for us than before.

Also as NATO members, we want to advance further our bilateral and multilateral partnerships, in Europe and across the Atlantic. As was recently announced, we are opening negotiations on a Defence Cooperation Agreement with the US – a similar agreement to the one that Norway has. I have been delighted to see how steadily our bilateral defence cooperation with Norway has developed, with a particular focus on the North and the Arctic. The importance of that cooperation will only grow with our NATO membership.

As we know, all five Nordics are joined in various multilateral defence arrangements, from NORDEFECO to the UK-led JEF. I want to note Denmark's evolving position in EU and on other defence cooperation, which brings in a welcome new dynamism also from the Southern part of the Nordics.

And we should not forget the trilateral cooperation between Finland, Sweden and Norway, either. Already in 2019, I convened the prime, defence and interior ministers of the three countries to my summer residence Kultaranta to intensify this connection. In a changed situation, with different ministers in office in all three countries, I believe we would all benefit from continuing this conversation soon.

* * *

Dear friends,

Finally, as I mentioned in the beginning, Finland and Norway share one particular element that will always be a major factor for our security. We have a common neighbour, Russia. And I believe we also share a common approach to that neighbour.

As for Finland, we have never been naïve about this. Neither have you. Our idea has been to maintain as functioning a relationship with Russia as possible at a given point in time. Simultaneously, I have always repeated the old Finnish wisdom that the Cossack takes everything that is loose.

At this point in time, any kind of functioning relationship with Russia seems like a very distant prospect. Instead, we need to focus on fixing anything that may still lay loose.

But we also need to remember that Russia will not disappear. It will continue to be our neighbour, even if there is no turn for the better. Finland can never afford to ignore it. NATO membership will not change that reality. In this, too, I think there is a lot Finland and Norway can learn from each other.

I now very much look forward to continuing our conversation, here on this stage, later during this visit, and in the months and years ahead.

Keynote address by President of the Republic of Finland Sauli Niinistö at the Helsinki Security Forum, 30 September 2022

Ladies and Gentlemen,

Let me begin by stating the obvious: the security situation in Europe is dangerous. We all know this. We all know why this is so. But every now and then it is still necessary to stop and think where we have landed. To repeat the facts. So that we don't grow used to them. So that we don't begin to think of this as normal.

Russia, a permanent member of the UN Security Council, is waging a brutal war of aggression against Ukraine, a sovereign country. It has started a mobilization, however partial that is. It is talking increasingly loosely about the use of nuclear weapons. In outright contempt of international law, it has arranged sham referendums in areas it has occupied from its neighbour. And as President Putin has just declared moments ago, it is using those illegitimate results to claim that these areas are now part of the Russian Federation. Finland, together with the whole EU and our other partners, has firmly condemned these acts.

But yet this is the reality we now live in. A reality that should have been unthinkable in this day and age. A reality for which the people of Ukraine are paying the highest price. In the past weeks, Ukraine has made significant and heroic progress in reclaiming its territory. As welcome

as these developments have been, the suffering of Ukraine continues. In lives lost, in traumatic experiences endured, in infrastructure destroyed. And unfortunately, the end of this war is nowhere in sight.

Finland has been steadfast in its support to Ukraine ever since the start of the war. As part of the Western community, Finland will continue its assistance to Ukraine and the Ukrainian people for as long as it is needed.

But the impacts of this new reality are not limited to Ukraine. Russia's war has deep, extensive and long-term implications for all of us. In Finland, in Northern Europe, in Europe as a whole, and in the world.

* * *

Dangerous times must not lead to paralysis. We have to be able to act decisively to meet the demands of the new reality. In the case of Finland, the track record of the past year speaks for itself. We have been quick on our feet, bringing about a fundamental change in our foreign and security policy in the midst of a major crisis.

At the start of this year, in my New Year's speech, I said that we must know "when to hurry, and when to have patience". Since then, we have done both.

On the one hand, everything has proceeded at a remarkable pace. The key trigger was of course the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February. A few days before that, in Munich, I told the CNN that on Finland's NATO membership, much depended on what Russia would do in Ukraine. When Russia did what it did, the Finnish citizens, and us decision-makers as Finnish citizens, too, drew the necessary conclusions. Seven months later, Finland and Sweden have applied for NATO membership, and 28 countries out of 30 have already ratified our membership.

On the other hand, we have needed patience as well. A decision of this magnitude had to be carefully considered. I have referred to our domestic NATO process as a triumph of democracy.

During the spring, I considered it important to ensure that this decision was firmly anchored to the Finnish society, as widely as possible. Making sure that the decision will last, not only through the flood of emotions in the early weeks of the war, but also beyond future elections. Major changes must stand the test of time.

In our international relations, the process has also been a triumph of diplomacy. Only a week after the Russian invasion began, I was in Washington, sounding out the US views on the next steps, both in the White House and in Congress. In the following weeks and months, together with the government, we actively prepared the ground for NATO membership with all our future allies.

That work has borne fruit, in the form of the exceptionally rapid ratifications, and in the form of bilateral security assurances. And the work continues. Based on the good and constructive conversations we have had with Hungary and Türkiye, on various levels, I am confident that the two outstanding ratifications will follow in due course.

* * *

When Finland eventually becomes a member of NATO, the most important value added to our security will be the preventive effect of the Alliance's joint deterrence. As a NATO member, Finland will participate in the planning and development of that deterrence. It will provide the kind of protection we would not have outside NATO.

Of course, NATO membership is also of major significance in case that this preventive effect is not enough. As a NATO member, Finland will participate in the planning and, if necessary, implementation of the joint defence.

The bottom line is that Finland is seeking to become a NATO member, full stop. Nothing more, nothing less. We don't have any particular requests or reservations that we would be setting as preconditions for our membership. The Finnish profile in NATO will develop naturally over time and according to changing circumstances. We are not just asking what NATO can do for us. We are also thinking what we can do for NATO, contributing to the security of the whole alliance.

As big a step as NATO membership is for Finland, not everything will change. We are not starting from scratch. Although our security environment is changing dramatically, the basic contours of Finland's foreign and security policy remain intact. They just need to be adapted to the new reality.

We have never wanted to increase tensions. But we have always made sure that we are also ready for more difficult circumstances. We may not have made the loudest of public statements. Instead, we have decisively built our strong defence, which has been widely respected. And we are prepared now.

When I last spoke at an event hosted by the Finnish Institute of International Affairs, almost exactly a year ago, I revisited the four pillars on which Finland's security rests. I said that these pillars change and evolve over time, and that if one weakens and cannot be strengthened, others will have to be able to carry more weight on them. This is exactly what is now happening.

First, our national defence. We are now benefitting from the fact that we never let our guard down in the past decades. Our defence is in good shape to begin with, and we are increasingly investing in it. NATO membership does by no means mean that we could start neglecting our own national defence. Just the opposite.

Finland's membership will double the border NATO currently shares with Russia. For both Finland and NATO, it is of utmost importance that Finland will continue to primarily take care of defending its own territory. When coordinated with the joint planning of the alliance, fulfilling this task has a stabilising effect that will enhance security in Northern Europe as a whole.

Second, our dense web of Western defence and security partnerships. In these dramatically changed circumstances, these partnerships have paid off. Although all eyes are now on NATO, we must not forget the importance of our EU membership as another cornerstone of our security. The EU as a more effective global actor, also in the field of foreign and security policy, is in our core interest. And the further development of EU-NATO cooperation is now even more significant for us than before.

Also as NATO members, we want to advance further our bilateral and multilateral partnerships, in Europe and across the Atlantic. As the most recent example, as was announced yesterday, we will open negotiations on a Defence Cooperation Agreement with the US.

Third, our relationship with Russia. This is of course the pillar that has collapsed, and we therefore need to rely even more on the others. I want to stress that we have never been naïve about this. The idea has been to maintain as functioning a relationship with Russia as possible at a given point in time. Simultaneously, I have always repeated the old Finnish wisdom that the Cossack takes everything that is loose.

At this point in time, any kind of functioning relationship with Russia seems like a very distant prospect. Instead, we need to focus on fixing anything that may still lay loose. But we also need to remember that Russia will not disappear. It will continue to be our neighbour, even if there is no turn for the better. Finland can never afford to ignore it.

Fourth, the international system and our common challenges. Fresh from the UN General Assembly last week, it is clear that we need to pay even more attention to this pillar. At the same time when political divisions are deepening, the demand for global solutions is becoming more and more urgent. As I said in New York, difficult times call for more diplomacy, not less. We must build and strengthen peace and prevent conflicts wherever possible. And we must find sustainable solutions to other global threats and challenges.

* * *

In the near future, we are moving into an uncharted territory. There are dangerous scenarios that we can and should anticipate. There are wicked surprises that we need to prepare for.

The most recent warning signs are the explosions in the Baltic Sea this week, leading to gas leaks in the Nord Stream pipelines. These events need to be investigated thoroughly. Already now, they remind us of the myriad possibilities in which this crisis can escalate, horizontally or vertically, with unforeseen consequences.

One thing is certain. In the coming months, our resilience will be severely tested. Whatever Russia does next, however difficult the energy crisis will turn out to be, unity is our response. In Finland, in Europe, in the world.

I am convinced that we will pass this test. But it will not happen automatically. Maintaining our unity, maintaining our resilience, will require constant efforts from every single one of us. We must be vigilant. We must be ready for hard choices. And we must make them by sticking together.

* * *

Finally, I want to remind us all of the importance of the longer view. Even in times of an acute crisis we must not lose sight of the long-term objective. It is now very difficult to see how and when the current war will end. But history teaches us that at some point all wars do end. What kind of a security order are we aiming at when this is over?

Post-war security orders always have their roots already in the time of the conflict that they follow. The foundations for the League of Nations were laid while the First World War was still raging. The same applies to the United Nations and the Second World War. The CSCE, the precursor of the OSCE, was convened at the height of the Cold War.

The League of Nations ultimately failed, but the UN and the OSCE still exist, despite being severely challenged. It is in our core interest to continue bolstering these essential institutions as the basis of any future security order. But are we again at such a watershed moment in history where we need to think about something completely new, too?

At the end of the day, peace is the fundamental ingredient of any sustainable security. Peace is such an important objective that we should spare no efforts in trying to achieve it. So important, that even efforts that turn out to be futile are worth making.

I hope that this Helsinki Security Forum is able to develop some new ideas on these matters. And I want to wish you all a successful conference

Statement by President of the Republic of Finland Sauli Niinistö at the 77th General Debate of the United Nations General Assembly, New York, 20 September 2022

Mr President, Secretary-General, Distinguished Delegates, Ladies and Gentlemen,

I would like to start by congratulating Mr. Csaba Kőrösi for his election as the President of the seventy-seventh session of the General Assembly. I also want to thank Secretary-General

António Guterres for his determined and skillful leadership of the United Nations. You can both count on Finland's steadfast support for your important work during these exceptional times.

As the topic of this session states, the challenges we are facing are interlocking. Russia is waging a brutal war in Ukraine. The ripple effects of that war are already far-reaching and severe. They are compounding the pre-existing problems faced by the international community.

A triple crisis of energy, food security and finance is weighing especially heavily on vulnerable countries. Countries that are already suffering the most from the climate crisis and the covid-19 pandemic.

This truly is a watershed moment. As we gather here, we have an important opportunity to engage in dialogue and to find solutions. To understand the concerns of those most in need.

As difficult as it may seem, now is the time to show global solidarity and strengthen multilateral cooperation. The international community can and should emerge stronger from these crises.

Russia's cruel and unprovoked war on Ukraine has now been raging for seven months. It has brought immense sorrow and destruction to the sovereign lands of Ukraine. Russia's use of force is in blatant violation of the Charter of the United Nations. It is an act of aggression, as determined by this very Assembly.

Ukraine is exercising its inherent right to self-defence. And judging by the recent reports from the battlefields, it is doing that with admirable courage, strength and efficiency.

We, the international community, members of this General Assembly, might not always see eye to eye. We have our differing views. But it is our common obligation to uphold the international rules-based order. We can't accept, condone or normalize grave violations of international law and human rights. A world where impunity prevails is unjust, unstable and dangerous. For all of us.

There was a global food crisis even before the Russian invasion to Ukraine. More than 800 million people in the world were chronically hungry. The war further worsens this calamity.

I would like to commend the UN Secretary-General and the President of Türkiye for their tireless efforts to reach an agreement to secure Ukrainian grain transports. If implemented as foreseen, it will have a major impact on the lives of tens of millions of people in need.

In order to respond to the wider challenges of global food security, we need collective action. The goal must be sustainable, inclusive and fair food systems. We also have to accelerate the implementation of other Sustainable Development Goals. We can't afford to leave anybody behind.

Last year in this hall, I noted that it is not an exaggeration to say that we are facing a global climate emergency. This summer has proven it: we have seen extreme drought and heat waves across the globe. From the Horn of Africa to Europe, from China to the US. The magnitude of the catastrophe caused by the floods in Pakistan is not yet fully visible but the destruction is already tremendous.

These are not isolated or local events. They are, once again, a reminder that climate change is an existential threat to the human kind. We are on the verge of very dangerous tipping points.

This calls for urgent action on two fronts. First, we must change our course before it is too late. Second, we need to help those urgently suffering and support those with fewer resources to deal with this threat.

Besides mitigating climate change, we must adapt to it. In particular, we must honor the commitment of doubling adaptation finance made at the COP26 in Glasgow.

And I want to underline this: Fighting climate change and taking care of the economy are not contradicting each other. Green transition has a tremendous potential to create jobs, innovations and economic growth. But it has to be done fairly.

The alarming loss of the variety of life on our planet should also be a cause for grave concern to all of us. We are on the brink of mass extinction, or perhaps already there. Again, we need to change course. Urgently.

We humans can only thrive and survive if we learn to co-exist with all the other species. We need to halt and reverse biodiversity loss by 2030. To this end, the COP15 in Montreal in December will be essential.

Defending human dignity is a fundamental task of the UN. It is up to us – the Member States – to live up to this task. Despite our failures, we have also accomplishments to build on. The UN Human Rights Council has shown determination. It has worked to ensure accountability for the horrendous acts against civilians in Ukraine and Syria. It has raised its voice in support of women and girls in Afghanistan.

I want to thank those who supported Finland's membership of the Human Rights Council. As a member, Finland acts to bring justice to the victims of human rights violations. Finland remains a staunch supporter of the work of the International Criminal Court in investigating all grave violations of human rights and international humanitarian law.

The number of conflicts in the world is the highest since the Second World War. One quarter of humanity lives in conflict-affected countries. We must not ignore or forget Afghanistan, Myanmar, Syria, Yemen and other countries where human rights or the conditions for living a decent life are under threat.

Increasing geopolitical tensions as well as the impacts of climate change and the pandemic are making conflicts more complex and prolonged. Ordinary people bear the brunt. For the first time in its history, the UNDP's Human Development Index has declined for two consecutive years. We simply can't let this continue.

In this turbulent world, those who stoke the flames of conflict bear a special responsibility. But we all must ask ourselves: Have we done all we can to avert violence? Have we done what we can to make a positive change?

Difficult times call for more diplomacy, not less. We must build and strengthen peace and prevent conflict wherever possible. That is the very core of the United Nations.

We also have to be able to respond to emerging risks to peace and security. Move from hindsight to foresight. The Secretary General's report Our Common Agenda provides us a blueprint for more effective multilateralism – paving a way to solutions to current and future global problems, strengthening peace. It really is our common agenda, and Finland wholeheartedly supports its implementation.

In the current security environment the international arms control architecture is increasingly challenged. On the one hand, political tensions erode the functioning of the existing architecture. On the other hand, new technologies create new risks. But we can't let arms control fail. On the contrary: it needs to be strengthened.

For decades arms control has provided stability and predictability into great power relationships and international relations. To quote Dag Hammarskjöld: “disarmament is never the result only of the political situation; it is also partly instrumental in creating the political situation.”

The two biggest nuclear weapon states have a unique responsibility to advance nuclear arms control and disarmament. The others need to follow suit. It is in the interest of all of us that progress in nuclear arms control and disarmament continues beyond the New START Treaty. We call on the United States and the Russian Federation to continue their dialogue on strategic stability with a view of achieving further cuts in their nuclear arsenals.

The interlocking global challenges demonstrate that more than ever we need a renewed commitment on multilateralism, with the United Nations at its core.

We must not become indifferent or apathetic in the face of these multiple crises. We must not get used to violations of international law and human rights. Not close our eyes to the growing needs of the vulnerable. Not sleepwalk into a climate and biodiversity catastrophe. Nor should we lose sight of hope: There is still time to act

Speech by President of the Republic of Finland Sauli Niinistö at the Crimea Platform Summit on 23 August 2022

Mr President, Ladies and Gentlemen,

I would like to join my colleagues in thanking President Zelenskyy for convening this summit. Since our first gathering in Kyiv last August, the situation has worsened dramatically. Accordingly, the objectives of this platform have become even more important.

Russia’s war of aggression and the ongoing invasion of Ukraine are grave breaches of international law. As part of the European Union and in coordination with our transatlantic partners, Finland’s response has been firm. Our political, economic, military and humanitarian support to Ukraine has been strong. The support will continue, for as long as needed.

At the same time, we call on Russia to cease its military actions immediately and unconditionally. We call on Russia to withdraw all its troops and equipment from the entire territory of Ukraine, including the illegally annexed Crimean peninsula.

* * *

Finland’s commitment to Ukraine’s independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity within its internationally recognized borders is unwavering. Finland supports international efforts to restore Ukraine’s territorial integrity. All Ukrainians, including the Crimean Tatar people, need to fully enjoy their right to self-determination.

I would like to congratulate Ukraine for its European Union candidate status. Ukraine belongs to the European family. Finland firmly supports Ukraine’s European path and the reforms to which Ukraine has committed itself.

* * *

Mr President,

On behalf of the people of Finland, I send my best wishes to the people of Ukraine on the eve of your national day. Your brave fight for freedom and for European values and principles deeply touches us. Ordinary Finns have shown exceptional eagerness to help you, Ukrainians.

I look forward to continuing to strengthen our partnership and cooperation. Finland stands with Ukraine.

Speech by President of the Republic of Finland Sauli Niinistö at the Ambassadors' Conference on 23 August 2022

Esteemed Heads of Missions, ladies and gentlemen,

After a long interval, we meet again in the same physical location. Now that the pandemic finally allows it, this format is again familiar and safe. But the world around us is anything but.

Even though a state of peace prevails in Finland, we have been living in a time of war in Europe for six months. The impacts of the war of aggression Russia is waging in Ukraine are immense. Their depth, extent and longevity is difficult to exaggerate. A return to the old and familiar is nowhere in sight, for any of us. Not for Finland, not for Europe, not for the world.

Now, if not before, the old truth has become clear: the essential task of our foreign policy is taking care of Finnish security. This has also been the case for the past year, and it will remain so in the future. Faced with the unknown, we must strengthen our security with determination and on a long-term basis. It is our common mission.

* * *

“You can get used to anything, but this is something I don't want to get used to.” These were the words of a nurse in the Ukrainian city of Mykolaiv to Helsingin Sanomat last week. This message is important also outside the borders of Ukraine. We must not let the evil paralyse us. We must not grow used to the evil.

The highest price for the cruel war waged by Russia is paid by the people of Ukraine. The extent of human casualties and material destruction growing day by day is something very few of us thought we would need to witness in Europe in the 21st century. Someone watching from afar can never fully understand the cruelty and finality caused by war. What if, tomorrow morning, the neighbouring building is suddenly in ruins and its residents, who we just spoke with yesterday, no longer exist?

It has, however, come as a surprise – not only to Russia but to most Western observers as well – how strong the Ukrainian defence capability has been. It is based on both mind and matter. Ukraine has shown us what can be achieved when you combine an unwavering will to defend one's country with military capabilities.

To survive, Ukraine has sorely needed foreign assistance. And assistance it has also received. As part of the Western community, Finland's own support to Ukraine has been strong. In addition to political, financial and humanitarian support, we have also exported defence materiel to a country at war.

Later today, I will participate in the Crimea Platform Summit, hosted for the second time by President Zelensky. A year ago, we met in Kyiv, today the whole summit is held remotely. My message is clear: Finland does not forget that Ukraine is fighting not only for its own freedom but also for European values and principles. Our support for Ukraine and the Ukrainian people will continue for as long as necessary.

* * *

At the end of last year, we woke up to the strengthening of the spheres of influence-based thinking in Russia. According to Russia, military non-alignment was no longer up to Finland and Sweden's own free will. Already in my New Year's speech, I said that we must know “when to hurry, and when to have patience”.

It has been only six months since Russia invaded Ukraine. In that time, Finland and Sweden have applied for NATO membership, and 23 countries out of 30 have already ratified our membership. The heavily criticised policy, often also referred to as the ‘NATO option’ – Finland maintaining an option to apply for NATO membership – has proven its usability. That is exactly the option we are now exercising. With hurry.

But we needed patience as well. I cannot see it as a bad thing that we carefully considered a decision of this magnitude. During the spring, I found it important to ensure that this decision was anchored to the Finnish society as extensively as possible. And in such a manner that it will last not only through the flood of emotions in the early weeks of the war but also across future parliamentary terms. Even though the time we are living requires us to react rapidly to any matter, we cannot build our national security on fleeting emotions. Major changes must stand the test of time.

During the spring, profound groundwork for the membership application was also laid internationally. The influencing practised in Brussels and in all NATO member states has borne fruit, both in the form of strong expressions of support before the Madrid Summit and in the exceptionally rapid ratifications afterwards. I want to extend my warmest thanks for the work you and the foreign missions you are leading have done for this cause.

As we all know, there were also some surprises. The demands presented by Türkiye in May came very close to halting the progress of our entire NATO membership process. In Madrid, we eventually found a solution that enabled it to go forward. For its own part, Finland will stand by what was agreed with Sweden and Türkiye. We will do so in accordance with our own legislation and with international agreements.

The discussion on closer security cooperation will continue with Türkiye and Sweden between officials before the turn of the month. Time will tell, when Türkiye will be ready to go forward with the national ratification. We still need patience.

* * *

We will not be members of NATO until the last ratification is finalised. But the position in which we find ourselves for the time being already strengthens our status considerably. One NATO country after another has confirmed for its part that they want Finland and Sweden as their allies. It also signifies that we are regarded worth the protection provided by Article 5 and NATO’s nuclear deterrent. The signals from Washington, London, Paris, Berlin and other capitals have been loud and clear even before the membership becomes realised. The message has certainly been heard.

When Finland eventually becomes a member of NATO, it is precisely the preventive effect of the joint deterrent that is the most significant addition to our security. As a NATO member, Finland will participate in the planning and building of the deterrent maintained by the alliance. It will provide the kind of protection we would not have outside NATO.

Of course, NATO also bears major significance in case the preventive effect is not enough. As a NATO member, Finland will participate in the planning and, if necessary, implementation of the joint defence. As we determine together what will be Finland’s contribution to the joint defence, we also ensure that our national defence is coordinated with that of our allies in as effective manner as possible.

Namely, by no means does NATO membership mean that we could start neglecting our own national defence. Just the opposite. Finland’s membership will double the border NATO currently shares with Russia. For both Finland and NATO, it is of utmost importance that Finland will continue to primarily take care of defending its own territory. Ensuring that the

Nordic area will hold under any circumstances. When coordinated with the joint planning of the alliance, fulfilling this task has a stabilising effect that will enhance the security in Northern Europe as a whole. Our membership will also bring the Nordic countries ever closer together.

Nor does NATO membership mean that we could shift responsibility across the Atlantic. With Finland and Sweden joining NATO, we are taking steps towards “a more European NATO”, which I already referred to back in 2005. There is reason to assume that the US will require that Europe – and the European Union – increase their share of the responsibility for the continent’s security. Ensuring that Europe will hold even in case of a global crisis.

Our position has become stronger, but the world situation is increasingly disquieting. The war, currently limited within the borders of Ukraine, may spread. Other conflicts, competing over the global attention of NATO countries, may also emerge in other parts of the world – say, in the Pacific. If, at that point, someone were to begin measuring for real how the Nordic countries and Europe will hold, that would also put Finland to a very concrete test.

NATO membership is undeniably a major turning point in Finland’s political history. As a defensive alliance, NATO is not merely military in nature but also very much a political alliance. But we should not overemphasise its meaning either. Finland’s NATO policy will become part of Finland’s foreign, security and defence policy. Nothing more than that. Also in the future, the policy will be led as laid down in the Finnish Constitution.

All in all, we should keep in mind that Finland’s NATO membership is without detriment to anyone. Security is not a zero-sum game. At the same time, we should also remember that the NATO membership will not make Finland any bigger than it is.

Unity is a national resource and the basic pillar of security. The problems threatening the economy and the energy sector will come to challenge the resilience of Finnish people. At the same time, our society’s capability and willingness to maintain cohesion and control over the situation will also be put to test. Security is not only an external matter but also an internal one.

* * *

Since the beginning of our recorded history, our eastern neighbour has been there, in one form or another, both in bad days and in better days. Russia will continue to be there, even if there were no turn for the better. We do know something about what it is like across the eastern border, maybe more than many others. We must not forget that.

In this position of mine, I have kept in mind the centuries old wisdom: the Cossack takes everything that is left loose. It applies equally to material things and to freedom of action. This was also the case when, at the end of last year, Russia was demanding that the expansion of NATO must stop. We fixed that matter.

I have a habit of saying that each and every Finn is a defender of our country, at least between their ears. In these times, strong efforts are being made to influence our opinions. When receiving and sharing information, we need to be both patient and rational.

Russia is now engaged in an illegal war of aggression against Ukraine. Finland’s position on the matter is crystal clear: we unequivocally condemn it. We oppose Russia’s actions by the means of sanctions we have imposed together with other EU Member States. Finland demands that all war crimes be investigated and those guilty of the crimes be held responsible.

Under the prevailing circumstances, there is not much left of our earlier relationship with Russia. The trust is gone, and there are nothing in sight on which to base a new beginning. This is not the right time to build connections. On the contrary: we must very carefully reconsider any dependencies that could be used against us. Nothing must be left loose.

However, this is not the right time to totally sever all connections either. There are still practical matters, the management of which is in our own interest. We should also hold channels of discussion open for the future, even if we do not actively use them for the time being.

People are now demanding a debate on how to arrange our future relationship with Russia, both in the EU and in Finland. Many people want to take firm and strict positions. And there are also those holding very soft views. A balanced line of policy requires, first and foremost, that we remain consistently firm. We must make our own views and limits clear and act accordingly.

There are a lot of Russian people living permanently in Finland, for family reasons alone. It is clear to us that we condemn Russia's actions and those supporting them, but hatred is another matter. It has never generated anything good. We can defend our security and values firmly even without hatred.

* * *

In these uncertain times, it is understandable that we focus on things that are near, both in terms of geography and time. But we still need to see further.

Russia's war in Ukraine is reflected as global instability in all continents. In the coming months, the energy crisis will test the resilience of Europe, and the impacts of the food crisis are already affecting the product selection and prices. But the acute distress experienced by already fragile societies outside Europe is much higher than ours. When basic needs are not met, unrest will grow – and the turmoil will not stop at national borders. Stopping this spiral is a major challenge for the whole international system. That is why the joint efforts of the UN Secretary-General Guterres and Turkish President Erdogan over the past few weeks are worthy of support.

It is also highly disquieting that several difficult geopolitical issues familiar from the past have become activated at the same time. They may be indirectly linked to the Russian military activities, but – whether talking about the relations between Serbia and Kosovo or the varied conflicts in the Middle East – there is enough internal driving force behind each of them as well. From the perspective of global peace and security, it would be particularly destructive if the tensions in the Taiwan Strait were to erupt into full blaze.

* * *

Last year, in this very same event I talked about human responsibilities, in other words, of what kind of a world we will leave to the next generations. And about what each one of us can do to make our legacy a sustainable one, both for human beings and nature.

The global turmoil may have made many of us forget about these responsibilities, but they have not gone anywhere. Climate change is progressing, as the dramatic news from this summer have shown us. Forests are ablaze, rivers are running dry, heat records are being broken. Climate change is not happening far away in the future or in other far-off continents, but it is taking place right here and now, also in Europe. As the loss of biodiversity is also accelerating at the same time, our whole ecosystem is falling into a deeper and deeper crisis.

We should avoid any artificial polarizations. Even in the face of the energy crisis ahead of us, we should not contrast the economy and nature. We must be able to take care of both.

At the same time, technology is advancing at an increasingly rapid pace. This generates new solutions that we must boldly embrace. We must ensure that Finland and the Western community remain on top of technological development. And that we can shape the landscape opening ahead us in accordance with our values.

Technological development also generates new wicked challenges and threats. Many new technologies entail major potential for danger, and the situation should not be made worse by

thinking about it as a zero-sum game. We must avoid letting the spirit of technological arms race spread into the world.

The wide agenda of climate, environmental and technology issues is an essential part of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs' job description. Esteemed Heads of Missions, you have an important task in tackling these issues. I encourage you to keep on examining these themes as well.

People with all their hopes, intentions and fears are not detached from this reality. We have lost a lot of time, but humanity still has time to solve its great challenges, if only we want to do so together. We must not waste this opportunity for the sake of mutual grudges or mistrust.

What combines all these challenges is that none of them can be solved by using weapons. Or by anyone on their own. What we need are sincere efforts to cross division lines and to find functional and just solutions. In one word: we need diplomacy.

Statement by President of the Republic of Finland Sauli Niinistö at the NATO Summit in Madrid on 29 June 2022

Secretary General, dear colleagues,

Last night we took another important step towards Finland and Sweden's membership in NATO. The trilateral memorandum we signed together with Türkiye opens the way for our accession. I want to thank you all, giving so stable support to us. It has been most crucial.

Now we can focus on the future. I assure you that Finland will do its best to strengthen the Alliance.

And there is an urgent need for that: for making this Alliance stronger. It begins in Europe. With Russia's illegal invasion of Ukraine, our security environment has changed dramatically.

I know that the Allies already spoke with President Zelensky this morning. The bravery of the Ukrainian people has touched us deeply. As Ukraine defends its independence, its sovereignty, and its freedom, it also defends our common values. We must therefore be unwavering in our support to Ukraine. Finland is currently preparing its seventh package of military aid to Ukraine. Maintaining our unity is crucial. It is our strongest asset.

The consequences of the war Russia is waging in Ukraine are profound. And they are global. The whole foundation for international peace and security is severely undermined. A major food security crisis is emerging. Our economic resilience is tested.

When we take a global view on security, we immediately encounter China. I still believe that China could, if it so chooses, play a constructive role in ending the war in Ukraine. But we also need to talk about our long-term reaction to the growing regional and global impact of China. I welcome the opportunity to exchange views today with likeminded partners from the Asia-Pacific region.

The whole world is in turmoil. For a firm defence of our common values, we need partners beyond the Euro-Atlantic area. What applies to NATO, also applies to a larger community. Together we are stronger.

Speech by President of the Republic of Finland Sauli Niinistö at the Finnish Defence Forces' Flag Day parade in Helsinki on 4 June 2022

Esteemed war veterans and lottas, ladies and gentlemen,

“Finland is a good country. It is the best for us Finns. It is a country worth defending, and its only defender is Finland’s own people.”

In these words, Infantry General Adolf Ehrnrooth emphasised the calm but unwavering national feeling. Its message is timeless: We are, in all circumstances, responsible for defending our country. This will continue to be the case, although as a member of a defence alliance we would receive support from allies.

An important foundation for Finland’s defence is the strong will of citizens to defend their country. It is now at a higher level than before. Interest in refresher training and voluntary national defence is growing. This will, and the preparedness and capability based on it, must continue to be nurtured. In this work, the Defence Forces and voluntary national defence as well as the civic activities supporting their preparedness have an important role to play.

Part of preparedness is the effort to maximise one’s own security. This is without detriment to anyone. This is how Finland has acted this spring when it decided to apply for NATO membership. The increased national will and debate over our security solution during the spring have shown the strength of Finnish democracy. This creates a strong foundation for the future at this uncertain time for the world.

As Finland seeks protection, it is also ready to provide it. A defence alliance is a commitment in which one accepts responsibility for the security of all allies. Finland does not shy away from this principle; we take it seriously. At the same time, we can expect a similar understanding of our vital security interests.

Our defence, which is based on conscription and extensive reserves, is now of global interest. We have decided to invest in fighter aircraft and to significantly increase the defence budget. These important decisions will further strengthen our defence to meet the demands of our changed security environment. Resources must continue to be secured.

For many years, our Defence Forces have intensified international cooperation. Diverse training and exercises and the development of equipment compatibility have laid the foundation for the direction we have now taken towards NATO membership. Our actions are valued worldwide. We are a familiar and reliable partner. In this sense, applying to NATO is not a big leap for Finland, but the next, natural step. I am convinced that a reliable partner will be even more reliable as a NATO member.

I would like to thank Finnish Defence Forces and all those serving in the Defence Forces for the valuable work that you do for your country. I also want to thank all Finns for the fact that our preparedness to face any efforts to undermine our security is so high today. We know and remember that Finland is a country worth defending. Together, we have ensured our security to date, and together we will also do the same tomorrow.

I wish you all a very good Defence Forces’ Flag Day.

President Niinistö’s statement in the White House following the discussions with the President of the United States and the Prime Minister of Sweden on 19 May 2022

Mr. President, it is a great pleasure and honour to be standing here today together with you, together with the Swedish Prime Minister Magdalena Andersson. We are here for a very good reason. Together we are taking a historic step by seeking to join the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation.

Finland has made its decision after a rapid but a very thorough process. The process has once again revealed the strength of Finnish democracy. Starting from the strong public support, the

decision was made with an overwhelming parliamentary majority and it also enjoys huge, strong popular support.

I want to thank you, Mr. President, for your steadfast support throughout this process. In early March, I visited the White House and you encouraged us to go further. That was of vital importance in the process.

Your statement yesterday and our trilateral meeting today are testimony to the enduring commitment the United States has made to European and transatlantic security.

I want to assure you that Finland will become a strong NATO ally. We take our security very seriously. The Finnish armed forces are one of the strongest in Europe. We have also consistently invested in developing our capabilities. The Finns' willingness to defend their country is one of the highest in the whole world. We are ready to contribute to the security of the whole Alliance: making the commitment to mutual security guarantees that being a NATO ally entails.

Now that we have taken this first decisive step, it is time for NATO allies to weigh in. We hope for strong support from all allies, and for a swift ratification of our membership once it is agreed. I believe that the United States can set a crucially important example to others.

The Turkish leadership has recently expressed concerns about our membership application. I want to address these concerns today. Finland has always had broad and good bilateral relations to Turkey. As NATO allies, we will commit to Turkey's security just as Turkey will commit to our security. We take terrorism seriously, we condemn terrorism in all its forms, and we are actively engaged in combatting it. We are open to discussing all the concerns Turkey may have concerning our membership in an open and constructive manner. These discussions have already taken place, and they will continue in the next days.

On the 24th of February, I said that the masks have fallen and we see only the cold faces of war. Russia's war in Ukraine has changed Europe and our security environment. Finland takes the step of NATO membership in order to strengthen not only its own security, but also in order to strengthen wider transatlantic security. This is not away from anybody. Like you, Mr. President said, NATO is protective, defensive, not a threat to anybody. At the same time, we must not forget that at this very moment the brave people of Ukraine are fighting not only for their own freedom and democracy but for our common security. Finland, together with the EU and the United States stands firmly behind Ukraine.

So Mr. President, once again, I want to thank you for making history with us.

Speech by President of the Republic of Finland Sauli Niinistö at the Swedish Parliament on 17 May 2022

Your Majesties, Mr Speaker, Ladies and gentlemen!

It is an honour to speak to you here at the Riksdag today.

Sweden and Finland are about to take historic steps. Together. Very shortly, we will officially announce in Brussels our will to initiate membership discussions with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

Sweden's and Finland's NATO membership would enhance not only our own security, but also that of the whole alliance. It is without detriment to anyone. Our membership would strengthen the responsible, strong and stable Nordic region on the northern edge of NATO.

We are taking these historic steps in the shadow of a brutal war. Last December launched a chain of events that fundamentally changed our security environment. This forced us to reassess our security policy.

With its requirements about stopping NATO enlargement, Russia strived to narrow our freedom of choice and our sovereignty. This put us in a new position. Russia's major offensive against Ukraine made it clear that it is once again ready to use armed force in its immediate areas to achieve its goals. These combined factors showed the impermanence of our traditional position.

The transatlantic community has stood strong and united in its support to Ukraine and its response to Russia. The bravery of the Ukrainian people has touched us deeply. The suffering of civilians has shocked us all. We support Ukraine, defending its independence and freedom, and we help those fleeing the horrors of war. Those liable for war crimes must be held accountable for their actions.

Before the Russian attack, having a major war in the 2020s Europe appeared almost impossible to imagine. Many people believed that the memories of the generations who had lived through war belonged to history, we took peace for granted. The 24th day of February broke that peace.

At the same time, our trust in the traditional ways of ensuring our security and maintaining our relations with Russia broke. Our old policies are no longer compliant with the new situation.

Even though our security policy solution changes, the goals of the Finnish foreign and security policy remain unchanged. Alongside securing Finnish security, we want to strengthen multilateral co-operation, bear global responsibility and build peace.

Our solution does not change geography. Also in the future, Finland wants to take care of the practical questions arising from being a neighbour of Russia in a correct and professional manner. Security is not a zero-sum game. The Finnish people looking at Russia across the border are the same as they were before.

“There are times in world history when it is far wiser to act than to hesitate. There is some risk involved in action—there always is. But there is far more risk in failure to act.” These were the words of U.S. President Harry S. Truman when he spoke to the Congress in March 1948. Truman spoke to the Congress about the role of the United States in supporting security and freedom of Europe. The idea of NATO had already been born.

The state leaders of Sweden and Finland have now considered the risk of inaction to be higher than the risk of taking action. Months of intense work have led to similar decisions. We share the same security environment, our interests are similar and the security policies pursued by us have been largely similar for a long time. I greatly value our countries still advancing together, hand in hand, even in this important decision.

We are now faced with a common challenge. In recent days, Turkey's statements have changed and hardened very quickly. I am sure, however, that we will solve the situation through constructive discussions.

As part of NATO, Sweden and Finland will position themselves in the same zone with our close partners Norway, Denmark and Iceland. The Nordic Countries, which stand strong together in so many areas, will soon form a strong northern European quintet in NATO as well. In addition to democracy and well-being, security is increasingly becoming one of the basic pillars of our joint Nordic model.

Our close co-operation with the Baltic countries will also gain new security dimensions. Our NATO membership will bring depth to the defence of our own countries and the defence of the whole Northern Europe. At the same time, the security and stability of the entire Baltic Sea region will be strengthened. In the event of crisis, we can trust our neighbours for support, solidarity and functioning lines of supply.

Responsible, strong and stable. These words summarise our joint Nordic model. The Nordic Countries have always assumed responsibility. As part of the European Union, Sweden and Finland have given a strong contribution to the stability and well-being within the Union and supported their partners in times of trouble. As part of the international community, we are pioneers in seeking solutions to global challenges, such as climate change.

In the Baltic Sea region, our contribution to ensuring security is strong. As NATO members, our primary task will continue to be to secure our own territories. But at the same time, we are committed to taking responsibility for the security of our allies. This will further strengthen our contribution to the Euro-Atlantic security.

The Nordic Countries are strong in every meaning of the word. Our military strength is among the most advanced in Europe and our capabilities complement each other. The threshold for any military action against us is already very high.

But strength is not generated by force alone. It also requires resilience. And that is something our Nordic Countries are famous for. Globally, we are among the world leaders in technological development. Our economies rest on solid foundations and they are resilient in the event of crisis. We have strong freedom of speech and our citizens have been inoculated against many forms of information influencing. We take care of our citizens.

Our stability is backed up by a strong democracy. At a time when democracy is weakening globally, the Nordic Countries stand out from the crowd. In the annual Democracy Index, in 2021, five of the six leading countries were Nordic countries. Ultimately, a strong democracy is the best guarantee of security. That we must ensure even in the future.

Now that we have made our decision, the power will be handed over to NATO and its current member countries for a while. We hope that all Member States will give their strong support. We expect to sign the accession protocols soon, after which we hope for swift ratification by national parliaments of the member countries.

Over the past few weeks, together and separately with Prime Minister Andersson, we have conducted discussions with the allied countries to secure support for our membership. Our membership enjoys wide support among NATO countries. With our strong defence, and societal and political stability, we are considered to enforce the alliance.

We have also received strong statements of support for duration of the membership process. The support of our allies is important, and we are grateful for that. At the same time, I underscore that our primary source of security even in this situation is our strong defence systems and the strength of our societies. Our strong and stable societies will withstand.

Finally, I would like to thank Prime Minister Andersson for close co-operation and valuable exchange of ideas over the past few months. Sweden and Finland share a history dating back hundreds of years. We are united by geography, values, language and culture. Co-operation between our countries has always been close. Still, hardly ever has the connection between our

state leaders been as close as it has been lately. We have discussed with each other almost every week.

I also want to extend my thanks to all ministers, members of parliament and officials who have travelled this road together with your colleagues in the neighbouring country, exchanging views. I believe that this valuable and close connection will last and continue to strengthen. This past spring has revealed its value and immeasurable potential to us all. Thank you.

**Speech by President of the Republic of Finland Sauli Niinistö at the opening of
Parliament on 2 February 2022**

Mr Speaker, Honoured representatives of the Finnish nation,

We live in a country cited as the happiest country in the world. And indeed, a lot of things are well here. This is a good thing to remind ourselves of every now and then. Gratitude is not known as a particularly Finnish virtue, but we owe a great deal of thanks to those who have built our well-being and those protecting it. In my opinion, this includes all Finnish people.

Of course, there is also always room for improvement. Building a society, no matter how stable it is, requires constant effort. On the other hand, defending common achievements, no matter how widely celebrated they are, requires constant vigilance.

The time we live in does not make the task easy. But it does make the task necessary. We have serious concerns, both domestically and internationally. The coronavirus continues to test us. The threat of war is growing at the borders of Ukraine, and Russia is challenging the foundations of European security. And, behind these urgent problems, the common threats and challenges mankind is faced with, such as climate change and biodiversity loss, are left without the attention they would require.

Before these challenges, we are all accountable. This means particularly us, the people entrusted with the power to make decisions. But each and every one of us is a doer – some in a bigger, others in a smaller role – everyone according to their capacities. The truth is that the condition in which a country is and the capacities it has stem from its people. Sometimes it is also advisable to change the scale: to shift the focus from the strict consideration of our personal rights to that of our common rights.

* * *

Our fears of a low voter turnout were proven right by the county elections. The hastiest have wanted to interpret the result as a sign of a crisis of Finnish democracy. A better description might be: the beginning is always hard. Furthermore, with the coronavirus pandemic tightening its grip again, the circumstances were far from easy for both the candidates and the voters.

The newly elected members of county councils will start their work for building the new well-being services counties. If, and hopefully when, they succeed in their work, our well-being will improve. And where well-being improves, citizens will also have more trust and interest in common issues. Trust is the basis on which the community is built. The new counties and elected council members have been vested with a great responsibility.

Ultimately, however, the persons responsible are found in this plenary hall. The well-being services counties are reliant on state funding. And you are the ones who make the decisions on how it is used. But pressing a button in this hall does not bring money nor wealth. Finland needs both economic growth and balancing of public finances. One of the promises of the health and social services reform was that it will help in reaching the latter goal. We also have the right to expect it to deliver on that promise.

* * *

The geopolitical situation has changed rapidly. The list of demands presented by Russia in December aims at a fundamental change in the structures of European security.

Even though there is no military threat against Finland, the situation also touches us deeply. The increasing military tension on the Ukrainian borders is reflected over the whole of Europe. No one can close their eyes to the situation. This kind of attention is also the thing Russia is seeking.

Those Russian demands that are shaking the foundations of the European security order have been decisively turned down. However, diplomacy is still needed. Regarding the situation in Ukraine, the Normandy talks continue, still aiming at promoting the Minsk agreement. We can probably also find substance for continuing negotiations on arms control and risk reduction.

The idea at the core of diplomacy is to find a feasible solution to an impossible situation. At the moment, this is something we all need to seek with vigour and promote with the best of our ability.

In spite of the growing tensions, Finland's international position is good. This has been confirmed by the many discussions I have had recently. We have determined in building partnerships and maintaining functional neighbourly relations. And we will continue to do so in the future. That is what I mean when I refer to the stability of Finland's foreign policy line.

In this situation, Finland's first and foremost line of defence is found within the national borders – and between the ears of the people living here. We must be able to trust one another, to trust each of us to do our share, according to our abilities and capacities.

Differing opinions and even heated debates are part of both international politics and national democracy. In our conversations, we should keep trying to understand that someone else may see the matter differently from us. But there are matters that must be solved. And that can happen only if we stand by the jointly agreed rules.

* * *

Even though we are not living under emergency conditions, the prevailing conditions are still exceptional in many ways. If we are wise, we prepare ourselves for the possibility of exceptional circumstances becoming a recurring experience.

In recent years, we have seen new phenomena in our security environment that give rise for reviewing our national preparedness. One example of such operations is a large-scale entry to the country organised by external hostile parties.

I have already earlier expressed my concern for how the security situation requires us to remain well informed at all times. Whether we are talking about hybrid threats or other forms of large-scale influencing, the challenge for Finland is clear. Foresight and vigilance are also required in legislative work. Being lulled into doing things the way they have always been done may make us an attractive target for various forms of influencing or other action.

It is noteworthy that, in the time we are living, we can detect significant amounts of effort aimed at protecting ourselves. Our close partners, the Nordic Countries, are enhancing their legislation related to national security and improving the resilience of their societies. We have woken up to the fact that one part of being focused on human rights also means protecting our own citizens from evil.

The reform of the Emergency Powers Act, which has finally been launched in parliamentary co-operation, is a necessary initiative in this time and age. However, the outside world and its events will not necessarily wait until we have taken the time to put our preparedness and laws into order. It is not wise to make haste slowly in all matters.

* * *

Mr Speaker, Honoured representatives of the Finnish nation,

Today, I have reminded you of the exceptionally heavy responsibility resting upon us all in these times. At the same time, I also want to thank Finnish people for all the sacrifices these past two months have demanded from all of us.

Furthermore, I want to thank Parliament for the great work you have been doing over the past year. Parliament has convened for extraordinary sessions and maintained a readiness to rapidly enact laws for managing the coronavirus epidemic and reacting to other new situations. The Speakers have honourably fulfilled their duties under Speaker Vehviläinen.

I congratulate the Speakers for the support you have received. I wish you all success and wisdom in your demanding work for Finland. I declare the 2022 Parliament open.

President of the Republic of Finland Sauli Niinistö's New Year's Speech on 1 January 2022

My fellow citizens,

“My perhaps somewhat outdated understanding of the mutual relations between us people is that we need more good will, more willingness to understand one another and more humility before higher values.” These are the words of Nobel laureate Frans Emil Sillanpää, and his message remains as topical today as it was when he wrote them.

During the past year, there have been heated debates in Finland about the pandemic. And currently, for a good reason, security policy is emerging as a topic of discussion.

We should not shy away from differences of opinion. We can think of many different ways to address challenging situations. The expression of opinions is a sign of a well-functioning democracy. But we must not stop wanting to understand that someone else may see a matter differently from us. Otherwise, deep discord may arise. For a nation, fierce discord may be more dangerous than the challenge in itself.

The beginning of a new year is a time of promises and hope. At the turn of this year, the promise of seeking the common good is of particular importance.

* * *

The third year of the coronavirus pandemic is about to begin. The disease has turned out to be a persistent and cunning opponent. It has been difficult to keep up with the rapidly spreading pandemic. And it has been impossible to get ahead of it.

The time of living more freely did not open up quite the way we had hoped for. Two vaccinations and the COVID-19 passport created a sense of safety, which was, however, eaten away by time. When the virus changed its form, the disease took even more room than before.

It is understandable that people are frustrated with the continuous setbacks. We all feel the same. The fear for our own health or that of our loved ones is consuming us. Many people are worried about their finances and their livelihood. The virus, however, does not care about our weariness or our feelings. Now we are asked to be resilient over and over again.

In spring 2020, the virus appeared as a common enemy that we are all fighting against together. In Finland, we saw a lot of people helping each other and caring for others. Good will reigned, and it spread widely.

Now the feel is different. It is, of course, understandable that things we have not experienced before provoke different opinions, both on the dangers of the pandemic and on the ways of protecting ourselves from it. However, the differing opinions have begun to turn into quarrelling and spreading of ill will. A factor that unites us – the efforts to protect our health – should not be allowed to become the source of a quarrel.

* * *

However, I believe we can all agree about one thing: this disease is spreading. It is highly contagious and spreads widely. It infects people, with effects ranging from mild symptoms to fatal consequences. I do not believe that anyone would deliberately take on any illness to bear or to spread.

Someone may still think that, in their case, the risk is not that high. And be indifferent. In other words, fail to take precautions, to take the vaccination or to wear a mask. But when taking the risk, no one takes it only on their own behalf. And no one knows in advance where their chain of transmission may lead.

No maelstrom lasts forever. The promise of a better tomorrow stems from the power of science and healthcare. A multitude of lives has already been saved.

The specialists in science and healthcare have been sharing their competence worldwide. Governments should also enhance their cooperation. We can beat this plague together.

* * *

The great power politics are currently in a rapid state of flux. The post-Cold-War era is definitely over. The characteristics of a new era are only beginning to take shape. But every time the shape of geopolitics changes, the impacts are also felt by countries smaller than the great powers. Sometimes particularly by them.

The conflict on the borders of Ukraine is on the verge of getting deeper. Tensions have also been building up as regards European security. The change has been rapid. Still last summer, following President Biden's trip to Europe, the primary cause of concern seemed to be China. After Presidents Biden and Putin met in Geneva, it was assumed that the United States and Russia were in a process of building lines of communication. The polite host, Europe, was mainly listening.

Now the feel is different. The ultimatums Russia gave to the U.S. and NATO in December concern Europe. They are in conflict with the European security order. Spheres of interest do not belong to the 2020s. The sovereign equality of all states is the basic principle that everyone should respect.

Ultimately, patience, responsibility and dialogue are the only roads forward. It is not possible to build a sustainable future by threatening with the use of armed force or other kinds of violence. Accordingly, the response to the Russian demands has been the offer of dialogue. Finland has also made efforts to promote and continue dialogue for its own part.

We must, however, be careful about what is being talked about and with whom. Many Europeans have asked, and not for the first time: are we being discussed without us being included? Even though the challenge was presented to the U.S. and NATO, in this situation Europe cannot just listen in. The sovereignty of several Member States, also Sweden and Finland, has been challenged from outside the Union. This makes the EU an involved party. The EU must not settle merely with the role of a technical coordinator of sanctions.

* * *

International tensions cause concern in many Finns as well. European security also involves Finnish security. In an open society, there is always room for discussion and different opinions, no matter whether they concern the dangers of the situation or the ways of protecting ourselves from them.

We can all agree that the situation is serious. A factor that unites us – the security of Finland – should not be allowed to become the source of a quarrel. Let us keep trying to understand that someone else may see the matter differently from us.

In my opinion, when it comes to Finland, the situation is clear. Finland's foreign and security policy line remains stable. It has been built to last even difficult times. In the fast-paced world, it is more valuable than ever to know when to hurry, and when to have patience.

National security, self-determination and room to manoeuvre are just as important to small nations as to big ones. While taking care of these fundamentals, we are also safeguarding Finland's international status.

And let it be stated once again: Finland's room to manoeuvre and freedom of choice also include the possibility of military alignment and of applying for NATO membership, should we ourselves so decide. NATO's business is the so-called Open Door policy, the continuance of which has been repeatedly confirmed to Finland, also publicly.

Presidents Biden and Putin talked with each other again the day before yesterday. We may be somewhat wiser in mid-January, when we see what will follow from the negotiation contacts between Russia, the U.S. and NATO. For Finland, it is important that also the OSCE is involved in this series of meetings.

We should maintain hope, but not succumb to mere wishful thinking. In times like this, Henry Kissinger's lessons also come to mind. According to his cynical statement, whenever avoidance of war has been the primary objective of a group of powers, the international system has been at the mercy of its most ruthless member. This principle may also be put to the test in the dialogue due to start in the second week of January.

* * *

I belong to the generations born after the Second World War. To those generations for whom the circumstances have been getting better all the time. Knowing this, you end up looking at yourself: when you have been given a lot, you cannot leave only a little behind you.

Climate change, loss of biodiversity, and becoming burdened with material, financial debt are signs of how we are living at the expense of the future. That cannot be the legacy our generations leave to the next ones. Let us change it.

Young people today are being tested. The pandemic has robbed them of a disproportionate part of their life. The growing social malaise, drop in physical condition and the stagnation in the level of education are worrying signs. The parents, all of us, should hear the young people out. Sometimes already that can help. Understanding and support showed by an adult is a great gift to a young person.

Young people also have a lot to say. Activity is always a sign of a spark of life. Indifference among young people is a serious warning sign of a waning spirit. The happiest county in the world can only be satisfied when it offers its youth perspectives of hope.

* * *

A lot of things are also well. I want to thank you already in advance for having “more good will, more willingness to understand one another and more humility before higher values” this

year, as Taata Sillanpää wished. Then things will be even better. I wish you all a happy New Year and God's blessing.

ANEXO 2 – REPRESENTAÇÕES EXPORTADAS DO SOFTWARE MAXQDA 2021

Cooperação em defesa

Documento	Segmentos codificados
Report on Security Environment Change 22, P. 18	In the current security situation, the importance of defence cooperation has been further emphasised, especially in increasing Finland's situation awareness. The development of defence cooperation will be pursued as outlined in the Government's Defence Report. One of the objectives of defence cooperation is to develop ability to act together with Finland's key partners including in times of crisis. This strengthens Finland's security and creates prerequisites for coordinating and combining activities, according to separate decisions.
Report on Security Environment Change 22, P. 22	There is an obvious need for closer bilateral and multilateral cooperation on preparedness and comprehensive security.
Report on Security Environment Change 22, P. 25	Strengthening these forms of cooperation will increase the security of Finland and its neighbouring areas.
Report on Security Environment Change 22, P. 18	Defence cooperation with groups of countries and bilateral partners will be intensified. Cooperation increases the likelihood of receiving assistance in a crisis situation and raises the threshold for military action against Finland
Report on Security Environment Change 22, P. 25	Bilateral and multilateral defence cooperation promotes Finland's objective to prevent various crises. It also develops the capability to work together with partner countries in the event of a crisis when necessary and subject to a separate decision.
Report on Security Environment Change 22, P. 18	. The defence cooperation structures or arrangements in which Finland is involved are not a security solution similar to collective defence and do not include security guarantees or obligations. It must be possible to defend Finland using national capabilities.
Discursos 2022, Pos. 330	our Defence Forces have intensified international cooperation. Diverse training and exercises and the development of equipment compatibility have laid the foundation for the direction we have now taken towards NATO membership. Our actions are valued worldwide
Defence Report 2021, P. 46	The objective of trilateral cooperation between Finland, Sweden and Norway is to create prerequisites to execute military operations in times of crisis and conflict, if separately decided
Discursos 2022, Pos. 193	Second, our dense web of Western defence and security partnerships. In these dramatically changed circumstances, these partnerships have paid off. Although all eyes are now on NATO, we must not forget the importance of our EU membership as another cornerstone of our security. The EU as a more effective global actor, also in the field of foreign and security policy, is in our core

	interest. And the further development of EU-NATO cooperation is now even more significant for us than before.
Defence Report 2021, P. 22	International defence cooperation supports maintaining defence capability, and its importance for Finland's defence has increased
Defence Report 2021, P. 28	International defence cooperation strengthens Finland's defence capability. Cooperation improves operational readiness, strengthens threat prevention, raises the threshold against military activity directed at Finland, and creates prerequisites for providing and receiving political and military assistance if needed.
A Stronger North 2018, P. 18	In the case of the Nordic five, there is also another, newer and less established format for cooperating with the US. This so-called N5+1 or N5+US cooperation was initiated during the presidency of Barack Obama, reflecting Obama's interest in the Nordic welfare mode
Discursos 2021, Pos. 234	I would like to draw your attention to the fact that the enhanced defence cooperation between Finland and Sweden is not solely bilateral. We are also jointly involved in a whole range of new multilateral arrangements.
Defence Report 2021, P. 45	Bilateral and multilateral defence cooperation advances Finland's objectives to prevent different crises. It also improves the ability to act together with partner countries during a crisis if a decision to cooperate is made.
A Stronger North 2018, P. 18	Apart from the above-mentioned formats, the NB8 countries as a group also cooperate with the US in a framework called Enhanced Partnership in Northern Europe (e-PINE or sometimes De-PINE when defence issues are included). This framework was initiated by the US in 2003 and brings together civil servants from the NB8 and the US to address issues related to security and resilience, such as cyber security, terrorism and human trafficking.
Discursos 2022, Pos. 159	And we should not forget the trilateral cooperation between Finland, Sweden and Norway, either. Already in 2019, I convened the prime, defence and interior ministers of the three countries to my summer residence Kultaranta to intensify this connection.
Discursos 2022, Pos. 157	Also as NATO members, we want to advance further our bilateral and multilateral partnerships, in Europe and across the Atlantic. As was recently announced, we are opening negotiations on a Defence Cooperation Agreement with the US – a similar agreement to the one that Norway has. I have been delighted to see how steadily our bilateral defence cooperation with Norway has developed, with a particular focus on the North and the Arctic. The importance of that cooperation will only grow with our NATO membership.
Discursos 2022, Pos. 194	Also as NATO members, we want to advance further our bilateral and multilateral partnerships, in Europe and across the Atlantic. As the most recent example, as was announced yesterday, we will open negotiations on a Defence Cooperation Agreement with the US.
Discursos 2022, Pos. 359	Alongside securing Finnish security, we want to strengthen multilateral co-operation, bear global responsibility and build peace.
Discursos 2021, Pos. 334	A strong Atlantic alliance continues to be imperative for our security, and Finland highly values its close partnership with NATO. Much can also be done with new ad-hoc coalitions and initiatives led by Germany, the UK and France. Finland, for its part, has actively been developing its dense network of bilateral, trilateral and multilateral defense arrangements.
Discursos 2019, Pos. 123	our Western cooperation is therefore based on a broad spectrum of complementary contacts, ranging from the NATO partnership to multilateral

	and bilateral arrangements, both with the United States and European countries. At this summer’s Kultaranta Talks, I believe this was called a “tapestry” (kudelma in Finnish). Regardless of the label attached to it, the way in which we have built this array of contacts constantly receives very positive feedback in the international arena. Strengthening our international position, this too.
Discursos 2021, Pos. 244	When it comes to foreign and security policy cooperation, as I said earlier, we have declared that there are no pre-set restrictions for deepening it.
Inclusive and competent Finland_2019_WEB, P. 99	We will expand bilateral and regional defence cooperation with Sweden, develop transatlantic cooperation and step up regional cooperation with Norway during this term of government.
Discursos 2018, Pos. 197	We have also taken steps to further strengthen our network of bilateral relationships. We have recently signed bilateral cooperation documents with almost ten countries. With Sweden and the United States we even have a trilateral cooperation paper. These memoranda of understanding and letters of intent do not provide us with treaty obligations any more than security guarantees, but they facilitate practical cooperation in the event of a crisis.
Discursos 2021, Pos. 240	The progress in defence cooperation between Finland and Sweden both in its strictly bilateral form and as part of other entities is an excellent matter.
Government Report 2020, P. 31	The objectives of the cooperation with Sweden are to strengthen the security of the Baltic Sea region as well as the defence capacities of Finland and Sweden
Defence Report 2021, P. 45	The countries’ defence cooperation includes operational planning for all situations. An example of this is the inherent right to collective self-defence as stated in Article 51 of the UN Charter. Additionally, areas of deepening cooperation include situational picture cooperation, common use of logistics and infrastructure, Host Nation Support arrangements, surveillance and protection of territorial integrity, and defence industry and materiel cooperation. The purpose of cooperation is to lay long-term foundations in Finland and Sweden for military cooperation and combined operations in all circumstances. There are no pre-set limits to deepening this defence cooperation.
Report on Security Environment Change 22, P. 21	The changed security situation underlines the importance of Finnish-Swedish defence cooperation for strengthening the defence of both countries and ensuring security in the Baltic Sea region.
Report on Security Environment Change 22, P. 23	The United States is an important and close partner of Finland, and defence cooperation with the US improves Finland’s defence capability.
Report on Security Environment Change 22, P. 24	The United Kingdom and Finland are close partners and are engaged in long-term and close cooperation in the security and defence sectors. B
Report on Security Environment	Sweden is Finland’s closest bilateral partner. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has further intensified and emphasised cooperation between Finland and Sweden, also in international contexts, and contacts are active at all levels. I

Change 22, P. 21	
Discursos 2021, Pos. 231	Over the past year, we in Finland have finalised both our Foreign and Security Policy Report and Defence Report. Both state clearly and directly that Sweden is Finland's closest bilateral partner.
Report on Security Environment Change 22, P. 23	Many of the current capabilities of the Finnish Defence Forces have been built in cooperation with the United States, and cooperation will continue, for example, in the maintenance and further development of these capabilities, but also in the development of new capabilities
Defence Report 2021, P. 22	International defence cooperation supports maintaining defence capability, and its importance for Finland's defence has increased
Discursos 2021, Pos. 246	I have noted with satisfaction that a crisis readiness training programme provided by the Swedish Defence University and the Finnish Security Committee is already being implemented under the 'Hanaholmen Initiative'.
Report on Security Environment Change 22, P. 23	Finland and the United States have introduced further measures to deepen their bilateral defence cooperation
Government_report 2016, P. 24	Cooperating with the United States, both bilaterally and within the framework of NATO, is needed for Finland's national defence
Discursos 2021, Pos. 232	Both Government reports state that Finland will continue to deepen the foreign and security policy cooperation and defence cooperation with Sweden without any pre-set restrictions. Our defence cooperation covers times of peace, crisis and war. When we enhance our readiness and raise the military deterrent, we jointly strengthen both the security in the Baltic Sea region and our defence capability.
Government_report 2016, P. 20	Bilateral and multilateral defence cooperation is an important part of maintaining, developing and using Finland's defence capacity, and deterrence. Also the capability to receive military assistance is an important part of defence development. The measures needed for receiving assistance will be extensively considered in developing the government's preparedness.
Discursos 2021, Pos. 237	Among the 27 EU Member States and within the NATO's 30+2 format we are the only countries in a similar position. It would therefore be advisable for Finland and Sweden to seek common ground also in this regard. One opportunity for this presented itself a few weeks ago when Secretary General Stoltenberg and the whole North Atlantic Council made their first joint visit to Finland and Sweden. Strengthening European security also serves our own interests, no matter whether it takes place under the auspices of the EU or NATO.
Discursos 2022, Pos. 157	Also as NATO members, we want to advance further our bilateral and multilateral partnerships, in Europe and across the Atlantic. As was recently announced, we are opening negotiations on a Defence Cooperation Agreement with the US – a similar agreement to the one that Norway has. I have been delighted to see how steadily our bilateral defence cooperation with Norway has developed, with a particular focus on the North and the Arctic. The importance of that cooperation will only grow with our NATO membership.
Report on Security	. The planning, building and practicing of interoperability during peacetime is intended to ensure that Finland and Sweden can together take pre-planned

Environment Change 22, P. 21	defensive action based on achieved capabilities in all conditions, as decided separately.
Defence_Report 2017, P. 19	. Finland and Sweden will deepen their mutual cooperation which is being developed to facilitate operational planning in all situations. Examples of these may include the protection of territorial integrity or exercising the inherent right of collective self-defence pursuant to Article 51 of the UN Charter. No predetermined limits will be set on deepening the bilateral defence cooperation
Defence Report 2021, P. 28	. Cooperation during peacetime is a foundation for cooperation during emergency conditions. The trust required in defence cooperation is built through steady and long-term efforts. In bilateral cooperation, the focus is on countries that would be, from the perspective of Finland's defence, significant actors in Northern Europe and in the Baltic Sea region during a crisis.

Adesão à OTAN

Documento	Segmentos codificados
Report on Finland's Accession to NATO 15.05.22, P. 4	there is no conflict between the North Atlantic Treaty and the treaties concerning the Åland Islands.
Assessment on NATO membership 2016, P. 37	the issue of membership, largely along party lines. Despite Spain's joining the Atlantic Alliance in 1982, there was widespread disagreement and the implementation of its full participation was put on hold. The matter was put to a referendum in 1986, with 52.5% voting in favour, notwithstanding the backdrop of negative opinion polls. The pace of accession was clearly dictated by the political decision-making process not by technical obstacles. Time was not of the essence.
Government Report 2020, P. 28	s. From the perspective of Finland's security, it is essential that NATO continue its Open Doors Policy, i.e. that NATO keep its membership open to all the states that meet the NATO requirements.
Defence_Report 2017, P. 18	While carefully monitoring the developments in its security environment, Finland maintains the option to seek NATO membership. As Finland keeps developing its defence capability, it continues to take into account the prospects for defence cooperation and interoperability, and ensures the elimination of any practical impediments to a possible membership in a military alliance.
Discursos 2022, Pos. 189	We have never wanted to increase tensions. But we have always made sure that we are also ready for more difficult circumstances. We may not have made the loudest of public statements. Instead, we have decisively built our strong defence, which has been widely respected. And we are prepared now.
Assessment on NATO membership 2016, P. 37	The transition period from the current security regime to possible NATO membership would have to be the object of careful diplomatic and political preparation
Discursos 2022, Pos. 71	The decision to apply for NATO membership is a fundamental change in Finland's political history. But it doesn't change everything. NATO membership will be part of our foreign and security policy, not other way round. But despite the fact that our NATO partnership has grown ever closer

	over the years, the decisive step we are now taking is a big one. Concretely as well as mentally. Finland will become a militarily allied country.
Ratkaisujen Suomi_EN_YH DISTETTY_netti, P. 37	The Government will prepare a Report on Finnish Security and Defence Policy and, in connection with its preparation, assess the effects of Finland's possible NATO membership.
Report on Finland's Accession to NATO 15.05.22, P. 4	The Government proposes that the President of the Republic of Finland decide, pursuant to section 93, paragraph 1 of the Constitution of Finland, that Finland will apply for membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) after Parliament has been heard.
Report on Security Environment Change 22, P. 13	Support for NATO membership has risen significantly in both Sweden and Finland. In Finland, citizens' initiatives to join NATO have been submitted to Parliament.
Report on Security Environment Change 22, P. 28	Should Finland become a NATO member, it would continue to maintain and develop its own strong national defence capability as well as its bilateral and multilateral defence cooperation. Finland would continue to decide on the principles governing the implementation of its military national defence. NATO membership would not mean that general conscription would be discontinued
Report on Security Environment Change 22, P. 30	Russia is likely to adhere to its demands concerning European security and keep them on the agenda in the future. In a situation where Russia aims to build a sphere of influence through demands and military means, failing to react to the changes in the security environment could lead to changes in Finland's international position and a narrowing of Finland's room for manoeuvre.
Assessment on NATO membership 2016, P. 34	One option is to adhere to what is absolutely required to be a full member but nothing beyond that requirement:
Assessment on NATO membership 2016, P. 36	Not unlike Finland (and Sweden), the population of Spain was divided on
Report on Security Environment Change 22, P. 15	Maintaining a national room to manoeuvre and freedom of choice are integral parts of Finland's foreign, security and defence policy. This retains the option of joining a military alliance and applying for NATO membership. The decisions are always considered in real time, taking account of the changes in the international security environment. Interoperability achieved through cooperation ensures the elimination of any practical impediments arising to a potential membership.
Defence Report 2021, P. 44	Maintaining a national room to manoeuvre and freedom of choice are also integral parts of Finland's foreign, security and defence policy. This retains the option of joining a military alliance and applying for NATO membership. The decisions are always considered in real time, taking account of the changes in the international security environment. Interoperability achieved through cooperation ensures the elimination of any practical impediments to arising to a potential membership.
Report on Security	If Finland applied for NATO membership, it should be prepared for extensive efforts to exercise influence and risks that are difficult to anticipate, such as

Environment Change 22, P. 29	increasing tensions on the border between Finland and Russia. Finland will strengthen its preparedness for becoming a target of wide-ranging hybrid influence activities and in order to prevent and respond to such efforts to exercise influence.
Assessment on NATO membership 2016, P. 45	Good offices, mediation or development policy are not variables which are tied to a country's status in terms of collective defence
Discursos 2022, Pos. 191	First, our national defence. We are now benefitting from the fact that we never let our guard down in the past decades. Our defence is in good shape to begin with, and we are increasingly investing in it. NATO membership does by no means mean that we could start neglecting our own national defence. Just the opposite.
Discursos 2022, Pos. 155	Finland's membership will double the border NATO currently shares with Russia. For both Finland and NATO, it is of utmost importance that Finland will continue to primarily take care of defending its own territory. When coordinated with the joint planning of the Alliance, fulfilling this task has a stabilising effect that will enhance security in Northern Europe as a whole.
Discursos 2022, Pos. 192	Finland's membership will double the border NATO currently shares with Russia. For both Finland and NATO, it is of utmost importance that Finland will continue to primarily take care of defending its own territory
Discursos 2022, Pos. 285-286	Finland's NATO policy will become part of Finland's foreign, security and defence policy. Nothing more than that. Also in the future, the policy will be led as laid down in the Finnish Constitution. All in all, we should keep in mind that Finland's NATO membership is without detriment to anyone. Security is not a zero-sum game. At the same time, we should also remember that the NATO membership will not make Finland any bigger than it is.
Report on Security Environment Change 22, P. 28	Finland would aim to continue to maintain functioning relations with Russia in the event it becomes a NATO member.
Discursos 2022, Pos. 149	Finland is not seeking to build any kind of a regional bloc within NATO. We will look at the Baltic Sea region as a whole. We will look at the Alliance as a whole. We are not just asking what NATO can do for us. We are also thinking what we can do for NATO, committing to the security of the whole Alliance, of all Allies.
Report on Security Environment Change 22, P. 29	Close cooperation between Finland and Sweden during possible accession processes would be important. Simultaneous accession processes could also facilitate preparation for and response to Russia's possible reaction.
Discursos 2022, Pos. 152	As big a step as NATO membership is for Finland, not everything will change. We are not starting from scratch. Although our security environment is changing dramatically, the basic contours of Finland's foreign and security policy remain intact. They just need to be adapted to the new reality.
Discursos 2022, Pos. 188	As big a step as NATO membership is for Finland, not everything will change. We are not starting from scratch. Although our security environment is

	changing dramatically, the basic contours of Finland's foreign and security policy remain intact. They just need to be adapted to the new reality.
Report on Security Environment Change 22, P. 27	As a member, Finland would participate in NATO's security policy consultations and the development of NATO's role as a foreign and security policy actor, as well as commit to the Alliance politically. The relations between NATO and Russia would also become a part of Finland's relationship with Russia.
Assessment on NATO membership 2016, P. 34	Another is to choose to add on other features to its membership, as is the case today for Poland and the Baltic States, for instance, which are requesting a permanent foreign NATO presence on their territory
Report on Security Environment Change 22, P. 29	. It is important for a country interested in joining NATO to hold preliminary discussions with NATO member countries. This spring, the Finnish state leadership has discussed the changes in the security environment with partners.

Vantagens da Adesão à OTAN

Documento	Segmentos codificados
Assessment on NATO membership 2016, P. 30	despite their lack of prominence in post-Cold War NATO discourse, nuclear weapons remain an underpinning of NATO's deterrence, with their ability to counter escalatory moves by a Russia which has in recent years placed increasing importance on its nuclear arsenal (see Chapter II).
Discursos 2022, Pos. 144	When Finland, together with Sweden, eventually becomes a NATO member, our one Nordic family will finally be welded together by a common Alliance, too. It will bring an important additional ingredient to the already powerful Nordic model. A common approach to security. The Nordic brand will become even stronger. We should think how we could make better use of that globally, too.
Discursos 2022, Pos. 185-186	When Finland eventually becomes a member of NATO, the most important value added to our security will be the preventive effect of the Alliance's joint deterrence. As a NATO member, Finland will participate in the planning and development of that deterrence. It will provide the kind of protection we would not have outside NATO. Of course, NATO membership is also of major significance in case that this preventive effect is not enough. As a NATO member, Finland will participate in the planning and, if necessary, implementation of the joint defence.
Discursos 2022, Pos. 280	When Finland eventually becomes a member of NATO, it is precisely the preventive effect of the joint deterrent that is the most significant addition to our security. As a NATO member, Finland will participate in the planning and building of the deterrent maintained by the alliance. It will provide the kind of protection we would not have outside NATO.
Discursos 2022, Pos. 145	When Finland becomes a NATO member, the most important value added to our security will be the preventive effect of the Alliance's joint deterrence. As a NATO member, Finland will participate in the planning and development of that deterrence. It will provide the kind of protection we would not have outside NATO.

Discursos 2022, Pos. 330	We are a familiar and reliable partner. In this sense, applying to NATO is not a big leap for Finland, but the next, natural step. I am convinced that a reliable partner will be even more reliable as a NATO member.
Discursos 2022, Pos. 126	Truly, to build lasting peace and security, we need each other. The Nordics are one of the most integrated regions in the world. But thus far, we have had differing approaches to security. This is about to change. When we are all NATO members, I believe that we will see a lot of Nordic cooperation within the Alliance. And that gives room for our co-operation in different areas, when we feel safe.
Report on Finland's Accession to NATO 15.05.22, P. 3	Through NATO membership, Finland would be part of NATO's collective defence and, thus, would be covered by the security guarantees enshrined in Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. The deterrent effect of Finland's defence would be considerably stronger than it is at present.
Report on Security Environment Change 22, P. 28	Possible membership would improve Finland's military security of supply and the overall crisis preparedness of society.
Discursos 2022, Pos. 97	Over the course of this year, I have often been asked what the membership of Finland and Sweden in NATO means for Nordic cooperation. I think the answer is clear: our cooperation will deepen further. We already have extensive cooperation between the Nordic countries in the field of security and defence. Our interests are often similar and our capabilities are strong and complementary. When Finland and Sweden join NATO, there will no longer be empty Nordic chairs in the NATO Council either. Together, we are strong security providers in our own region and beyond.
Discursos 2022, Pos. 366	Our close co-operation with the Baltic countries will also gain new security dimensions. Our NATO membership will bring depth to the defence of our own countries and the defence of the whole Northern Europe. At the same time, the security and stability of the entire Baltic Sea region will be strengthened. In the event of crisis, we can trust our neighbours for support, solidarity and functioning lines of supply.
Discursos 2022, Pos. 146	Of course, NATO membership is also of major significance in case that this preventive effect is not enough. As a NATO member, Finland will participate in the planning and, if necessary, implementation of the joint defence.
Assessment on NATO membership 2016, P. 40	NATO policy and requirements are generally congruent with the needs of Finnish defence policy
Discursos 2022, Pos. 369	In the Baltic Sea region, our contribution to ensuring security is strong. As NATO members, our primary task will continue to be to secure our own territories. But at the same time, we are committed to taking responsibility for the security of our allies. This will further strengthen our contribution to the Euro-Atlantic security.
Report on Security Environment Change 22, P. 27	For Finland, the most significant effect of its possible NATO membership would be that Finland would be part of NATO's collective defence and be covered by the security guarantees enshrined in Article 5. The deterrent effect of Finland's defence would be considerably stronger than it is at present, as it would be based on the capabilities of the entire Alliance.

Discursos 2022, Pos. 343	Finland takes the step of NATO membership in order to strengthen not only its own security, but also in order to strengthen wider transatlantic security.
Assessment on NATO membership 2016, P. 41	Finland as a member of NATO could draw on allied solidarity to buttress Finland's defence in the form of prepositioned materiel and the more or less sustained presence of allied forces, with a view to reducing the risk of Russian miscalculation.
Assessment on NATO membership 2016, P. 43	Finland alone or with Sweden would have the opportunity of exploiting its competitive advantage and thus be able to punch above its weight in the Alliance. Three areas (but others may exist as well) come to mind: • Intelligence on Russia's eastern approaches, from the White Sea southwards
Discursos 2022, Pos. 282	Ensuring that the Nordic area will hold under any circumstances. When coordinated with the joint planning of the alliance, fulfilling this task has a stabilising effect that will enhance the security in Northern Europe as a whole. Our membership will also bring the Nordic countries ever closer together.
Assessment on NATO membership 2016, P. 43	Cyberdefence is another, already well-recognised area of Finnish expertise. Its ongoing participation in NATO's Centre of Excellence in Tallinn sets a significant precedent in this regard.
Report on Finland's Accession to NATO 15.05.22, P. 3	By joining NATO, Finland would strengthen its own security in the changed operating environment. Finland's membership in NATO would strengthen stability and security in the Baltic Sea region and Northern Europe. The threshold for using military force in the Baltic Sea region and Finland's neighbouring areas would rise.
Discursos 2022, Pos. 365	As part of NATO, Sweden and Finland will position themselves in the same zone with our close partners Norway, Denmark and Iceland. The Nordic Countries, which stand strong together in so many areas, will soon form a strong northern European quintet in NATO as well.
Discursos 2022, Pos. 74	As a member of NATO, we will have additional security both from the common deterrence and the common defence of the Alliance. As a member, Finland contributes to the development of both.
Report on Finland's Accession to NATO 15.05.22, P. 3	As a member of NATO, Finland would participate in making decisions on security policy issues that are of key importance to Finland. The combination of a strong national defence capability and NATO membership would be a credible security solution
Discursos 2022, Pos. 281	As a NATO member, Finland will participate in the planning and, if necessary, implementation of the joint defence. As we determine together what will be Finland's contribution to the joint defence, we also ensure that our national defence is coordinated with that of our allies in as effective manner as possible.
Assessment on NATO membership 2016, P. 40	: Finland would be part of the overall benchmarking process between the members, and a measure of coherence could be established between Finnish defence preparations and the collective and individual preparations of NATO and its members.

Apoio da Finlândia à Ucrânia

Documento	Segmentos codificados
-----------	-----------------------

Discursos 2022, Pos. 343	we must not forget that at this very moment the brave people of Ukraine are fighting not only for their own freedom and democracy but for our common security. Finland, together with the EU and the United States stands firmly behind Ukraine.
Discursos 2022, Pos. 258-259	Your brave fight for freedom and for European values and principles deeply touches us. Ordinary Finns have shown exceptional eagerness to help you, Ukrainians. I look forward to continuing to strengthen our partnership and cooperation. Finland stands with Ukraine.
Discursos 2014, Pos. 87	We condemn any and all violations of the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Ukraine. We have been involved in setting up sanctions imposed by the EU on Russia.
Discursos 2022, Pos. 217	Ukraine is exercising its inherent right to self-defence. And judging by the recent reports from the battlefields, it is doing that with admirable courage, strength and efficiency.
Discursos 2022, Pos. 77	Ukraine has every right and every justification to defend itself. Russia has no right and only wrong reasons to attack
Discursos 2022, Pos. 355	The transatlantic community has stood strong and united in its support to Ukraine and its response to Russia. The bravery of the Ukrainian people has touched us deeply. The suffering of civilians has shocked us all. We support Ukraine, defending its independence and freedom, and we help those fleeing the horrors of war. Those liable for war crimes must be held accountable for their actions.
Discursos 2022, Pos. 316	The bravery of the Ukrainian people has touched us deeply. As Ukraine defends its independence, its sovereignty, and its freedom, it also defends our common values. We must therefore be unwavering in our support to Ukraine. Finland is currently preparing its seventh package of military aid to Ukraine.
Discursos 2022, Pos. 103	Russia is using its energy weapon in the hope that our resilience is the first to break. That Western unity would begin to crack and our support Ukraine to falter. This is where it makes a miscalculation. History has shown that, both as individuals and as nations, we find strength in ourselves in difficult situations. Together and alone, we can do things we may not have even known we could do. The Ukrainians are the ultimate example of this. The challenges we face are small compared to what Ukraine faces. I firmly believe that our backbone will hold.
Discursos 2022, Pos. 292	Russia is now engaged in an illegal war of aggression against Ukraine. Finland's position on the matter is crystal clear: we unequivocally condemn it. We oppose Russia's actions by the means of sanctions we have imposed together with other EU Member States. Finland demands that all war crimes be investigated and those guilty of the crimes be held responsible.
Discursos 2022, Pos. 47	Russia has systematically destroyed Ukraine's agricultural infrastructure and prevented the export of grain. We strongly condemn this. We also must actively combat disinformation disseminated by Russia, claiming that the food crisis is caused by the sanctions imposed by the West. The truth is that Russia alone is responsible for the human suffering caused by its actions.
Discursos 2022, Pos. 43	Let me first convey message of solidarity from Finland to all Ukrainians.
Discursos 2022, Pos. 136	I believe that Finland and Norway, two countries that also share a border with Russia, feel particularly strongly about this. Finland, like Norway, together with the whole EU and our other partners, has firmly condemned Russia's acts.

	Finland, like Norway, has been steadfast in its support to Ukraine ever since the start of the war. Finland will continue its assistance to Ukraine and the Ukrainian people for as long as it is needed.
Discursos 2021, Pos. 70	Finland's support for Ukraine's independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity within its internationally recognized borders is firm. Finland supports international efforts to restore Ukraine's territorial integrity.
Discursos 2022, Pos. 78	Finland's position is clear. It is not for outsiders to dictate conditions to Ukraine, which is fighting for its own territorial integrity, within its internationally recognised borders. The decision to continue the defence is that of Ukraine, and of Ukraine alone. As part of the Western community, Finland will continue to support Ukraine and the people of Ukraine as long as it is needed.
Discursos 2022, Pos. 254	Finland's commitment to Ukraine's independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity within its internationally recognized borders is unwavering. Finland supports international efforts to restore Ukraine's territorial integrity. All Ukrainians, including the Crimean Tatar people, need to fully enjoy their right to self-determination.
Discursos 2022, Pos. 45	Finland has strongly condemned Russia's illegal invasion of Ukraine from the very beginning. Finland firmly supports Ukraine's independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity. We continue our humanitarian, material and military assistance, as long as needed.
Discursos 2022, Pos. 174	Finland has been steadfast in its support to Ukraine ever since the start of the war. As part of the Western community, Finland will continue its assistance to Ukraine and the Ukrainian people for as long as it is needed.
Discursos 2022, Pos. 270	Finland does not forget that Ukraine is fighting not only for its own freedom but also for European values and principles. Our support for Ukraine and the Ukrainian people will continue for as long as necessary.
Discursos 2022, Pos. 269	As part of the Western community, Finland's own support to Ukraine has been strong. In addition to political, financial and humanitarian support, we have also exported defence materiel to a country at war.
Discursos 2022, Pos. 251-252	As part of the European Union and in coordination with our transatlantic partners, Finland's response has been firm. Our political, economic, military and humanitarian support to Ukraine has been strong. The support will continue, for as long as needed. At the same time, we call on Russia to cease its military actions immediately and unconditionally. We call on Russia to withdraw all its troops and equipment from the entire territory of Ukraine, including the illegally annexed Crimean peninsula.
Discursos 2022, Pos. 92	. Russia's brutal invasion of Ukraine brought war to Europe. All the Nordic countries have strongly condemned Russia's actions. All the Nordic countries stand firmly behind Ukraine as it fights for its freedom and for our common values.

Cooperação com Países Nórdicos

Documento	Segmentos codificados
-----------	-----------------------

A Stronger North 2018, P. 25	the value of Nordic cooperation for the individual Nordic states continues to be largely defined by whether and how it can supplement their engagement in the EU and/or NATO.
A Stronger North 2018, P. 25	the balance in Nordic foreign and security policy cooperation has tilted in favour of hard security in the Nordic-Baltic region.
A Stronger North 2018, P. 25	the annexation of Crimea by Russia in 2014 and the subsequent war in Eastern Ukraine, Nordic foreign and security policy cooperation has gained a new sense of purpose and relevance. All Nordic states have been increasingly interested in Nordic foreign and security policy cooperation, and the different Nordic formats are now seen as an important channel for sharing information and exchanging views about developments that affect the Nordic-Baltic region and its security.
A Stronger North 2018, P. 25	the Nordic foreign and security policy agenda has gradually shifted, with issues of regional security turning into a priority area. Hence, among the key topics of Nordic foreign ministers' meetings since 2014 have been the Ukraine crisis, Russia's foreign and security policy posture as well as the security situation around the Baltic Sea. Debates about Russia's role in Syria or possible changes in the transatlantic relations have also been conducted with their implications for regional security in mind.
A Stronger North 2018, P. 47	since 2014, the trend in defence policy has shifted from expeditionary operations to territorial and collective defence-type capabilities. Correspondingly, the geographic focus of this cooperation has also shifted from expeditionary operations abroad to the Baltic Sea region
A Stronger North 2018, P. 56	community is important but still does not form the primary political community for any of the Nordic countries. It is rather seen to complement the main "alliances", which in the case of Denmark, Norway and Iceland is NATO, and in the case of Finland and Sweden the EU.
A Stronger North 2018, P. 24	While there was no significant qualitative leap in Nordic foreign and security policy cooperation, the changing external environment did bring new momentum into the cooperation.
Discursos 2022, Pos. 148	When the whole Nordic family belongs to NATO, I believe that we will see a lot of Nordic cooperation within the Alliance. That comes naturally, given our Nordic identity and mindset. More often than not, our interests and approaches will align.
A Stronger North 2018, P. 20	When it comes to NATO, there is no Nordic cooperation as such. However, the Nordic NATO members – especially Norway – have acted as an important access point for non-members Finland and Sweden, both of which currently cooperate very closely with NATO.
Discursos 2022, Pos. 126	Truly, to build lasting peace and security, we need each other. The Nordics are one of the most integrated regions in the world. But thus far, we have had differing approaches to security. This is about to change. When we are all NATO members, I believe that we will see a lot of Nordic cooperation within the Alliance. And that gives room for our co-operation in different areas, when we feel safe.
A Stronger North 2018, P. 23	The same factors are also of importance in the area of foreign and security policy. Officials from the different Nordic countries frequently highlight shared values and a strong sense of mutual trust as the basis for Nordic cooperation. The sense of commonality and shared values between the Nordic states is also reflected in the very high levels of public support for Nordic cooperation,

	including Nordic foreign, security and defence policy cooperation. From the point of view of the policy-makers, the strong public support for Nordic foreign and security policy means that anything done under the Nordic label is bound to enjoy a considerable degree of legitimacy.
A Stronger North 2018, P. 51	The flexibility is certainly an asset. However, the divide with regard to the differing NATO affiliations within NORDEFECO directs the development into two parallel lanes, reinforcing the division between the Nordic allied countries on the one hand, and the non-allied on the other. This is part of the motivation for the Finnish-Swedish bilateral linkage in defence cooperation, which has strengthened in recent years. To some extent, this divide might challenge NORDEFECO's effectivity as a multilateral framework. After all, bilateral cooperation is often stronger and easier than engaging all of the members.
A Stronger North 2018, P. 14	The drawback of informality is the somewhat non-committal nature of Nordic foreign and security policy cooperation, which is reflected in its output: Nordic foreign and security policy seldom translates into binding commitments, joint positions or far-reaching coordination of national policies. Instead, the cooperation is primarily about sharing information, exchanging views and analysing current events and developments jointly.
A Stronger North 2018, P. 22	The NC's interest in foreign and security policy has also increased considerably. In its session in Helsinki in 2017, the NC published a new 5-year international strategy for the years 2018– 2022. 28 In the strategy, the NC takes on its traditional role as impulse-giver by formulating proposals that are directed at the Nordic governments and the NCM. The strategy pushes the Nordic countries to cooperate more closely together on “international affairs, defence and security, including civil defence, which contributes to the general level of security”. It also argues that Nordic countries should increase their consultations ahead of meetings in different international fora, continue their traditional efforts in peace-making and civilian crisis management, engage more strongly in Nordic branding and ensure that more Nordic embassies and representatives abroad share premises
A Stronger North 2018, P. 14	Recent changes in the Nordic states' immediate security environment as well as a broader international landscape have given a new sense of purpose to Nordic cooperation on foreign and security policy, turning questions of regional security into a priority area.
A Stronger North 2018, P. 14	Nordic foreign and security policy cooperation takes place outside the institutional structures of Nordic cooperation and is therefore referred to as informal cooperation. The informal nature of the cooperation is highly valued by most participants, as it allows a high level of flexibility and pragmatism, both of which are considered key characteristics of Nordic foreign and security policy cooperation.
Government_report 2016, P. 23 - 24	Nordic foreign and security policy cooperation is of key importance to Finland. By acting in unison the Nordic countries can strengthen security in their 22 neighbourhood, and increase their influence in international questions.
A Stronger North 2018, P. 24	Nordic states individually and collectively played an important role in supporting the accession of the three Baltic states into the EU and NATO, which gave a sense of purpose to Nordic cooperation. ³³ Nevertheless, post-Cold War Nordic foreign and security policy has taken place in the shadow of the EU and NATO, with one or the other forming the most important framework for international engagement for all five Nordic states. Nordic

	cooperation in all its variants has generally been seen as a supplementary form of cooperation at best
A Stronger North 2018, P. 23	Moreover, Nordic cooperation in foreign and security policy matters has been strongly shaped by external factors. During the Cold War years, Nordic foreign and security policy cooperation
Discursos 2019, Pos. 127	It is well known that cooperation between Finland and Sweden has intensified at an astonishing rate in recent years. Alongside this, it will certainly also be useful to open new links with our common neighbour, Norway. I have called together a joint, informal meeting with Finnish, Swedish and Norwegian prime ministers as well as defence and interior ministers to for the beginning of September. The aim is to have, for the first time with this set-up, an unofficial exchange of views on security policy.
A Stronger North 2018, P. 18	In the case of the Nordic five, there is also another, newer and less established format for cooperating with the US. This so-called N5+1 or N5+US cooperation was initiated during the presidency of Barack Obama, reflecting Obama's interest in the Nordic welfare mode
Government Report 2020, P. 31	In an unstable international operating environment, wide-ranging Nordic cooperation is increasingly important.
A Stronger North 2018, P. 26	In Finland, the interest in Nordic foreign, security and defence policy cooperation has increased during the last 10 years and especially since the Ukraine crisis, which provided a strong incentive for Finland to further strengthen its multi-layered network of foreign, security and defence policy partnerships
A Stronger North 2018, P. 18	In 2014, the foreign ministers of the NB8+V4 countries issued a joint statement condemning Russian actions in Ukraine and Crimea. 18
A Stronger North 2018, P. 26	However, during its one-year period at the helm of Nordic foreign and security policy cooperation, Finland proposed the idea of having a 'living document' of priorities for the cooperation. These priorities, compiled under Finland's leadership, included migration; cooperation between the EU and NATO; cooperation between NATO and Finland and Sweden (28+2); dialogue between the Nordic states and the US; European security and defence in the context of Brexit; cooperation in UN matters; and countering violent extremism.
Discursos 2022, Pos. 90	For Finland, the Nordic countries were then, and still are, the closest group of friends and international reference group.
Inclusive and competent Finland_2019_WEB, P. 99	Finland will continue to take actively in Nordic cooperation within the framework of Nordefco. The focus in Nordefco cooperation is on situation awareness cooperation, and on training and exercises.
A Stronger North 2018, P. 24	Finally, at the regional level, the Nordic states were faced with at least three notable trends. First, there were strong indications pointing to a shift in the strategic focus of US foreign and security policy, with the so-called rebalance or pivot towards Asia and away from Europe. In the Nordic region, this was most acutely felt when the US withdrew its military personnel from Iceland in 2006. Secondly, the Nordic states were taking note of Russia's aspirations to modernise its weaponry, as well as Russia's more assertive behaviour in its neighbouring regions. And thirdly, all Nordic states considered that the strategic importance of their own immediate surroundings, that is, the Arctic and the Nordic-Baltic region, was increasing. 37 Taken together, these developments

	motivated the Nordic foreign ministers to commission the Stoltenberg Report with practical proposals for deepening foreign, security and defence policy cooperation
A Stronger North 2018, P. 55	Due to historical experiences and identities, the Nordic
Government_report 2016, P. 23	Defence cooperation with Sweden aims at strengthening the security of the Baltic Sea region as well as the defence capacities of Finland and Sweden. Joint action also raises the threshold against incidents and attacks. It contributes to more robust security in the region.
Government_report 2016, P. 23	Cooperation under the auspices of NORDEFECO (Nordic Defence Cooperation) will be intensified. I
Discursos 2021, Pos. 235	As regards larger groups of countries, we participate side by side in defence cooperation within the NORDEFECO framework.
Discursos 2022, Pos. 142	As I said in my speech here in 2012, Finland and Norway belong to one Nordic family. As I said here then, we are welded together by sheer geography. And as I said here then, there is still room for the Nordic countries to strengthen their common profile in the eyes of the world.
A Stronger North 2018, P. 18	Apart from the above-mentioned formats, the NB8 countries as a group also cooperate with the US in a framework called Enhanced Partnership in Northern Europe (e-PINE or sometimes De-PINE when defence issues are included). This framework was initiated by the US in 2003 and brings together civil servants from the NB8 and the US to address issues related to security and resilience, such as cyber security, terrorism and human trafficking.
Discursos 2022, Pos. 159	And we should not forget the trilateral cooperation between Finland, Sweden and Norway, either. Already in 2019, I convened the prime, defence and interior ministers of the three countries to my summer residence Kultaranta to intensify this connection.

Necessidade de Alteração da PESCO

Documento	Segmentos codificados
Discursos 2017, Pos. 278-279	oday, we have grown used to many things that the EU brings us. We do not always even notice how much the EU touches our lives in a positive way. At the same time we must work hard to rectify the problems and shortcomings. I firmly believe that any Union worthy of the name must play a strong role in ensuring the security of its citizens.
Discursos 2019, Pos. 158	Yet for the European Union to thrive in the 21st century, its contribution to security needs to go beyond avoiding the horrors of the past. A credible Union needs to show that it can address the present and future security concerns of its citizens.
Discursos 2021, Pos. 252-253	We must get prepared for the difficult times by strengthening our own resilience. Finland does this with the help of the two first pillars. National defence and international partnerships are means to the same end, in a mutually supportive manner. The strength of our national defence lies in both quantity and quality. By calling its trained reserved to service, Finland would have more men and women in arms than Germany with its more than 15 times bigger population. With our

	current and future military acquisitions, we ensure that we have the materiel required for responding to the changing challenges. And most importantly, credible defence is based on the willingness of our citizens to defend their country, which has been traditionally high in Finland. That willingness must be actively boosted also among the future generations.
Discursos 2019, Pos. 120-121	Unfortunately, however, the EU's geopolitical and security policy weight does not, for the time being, correspond to its economic power. Let me be clear: I strongly support the strengthening of the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy, even at the risk that it would reduce the powers of the President of the Republic. Both as Presidency and as a regular member, we need to strive for a common European voice and joint European deeds.
Discursos 2018, Pos. 131	There is now also a fresh discussion about the Article 42(7) of the EU's Lisbon Treaty. For those of you not familiar with the treaty, this article declares that member states have an "obligation of aid and assistance by all the means in their power" if another member is under attack. I am glad that we are finally beginning to address what that would mean in a crisis situation. A core task of any union is to protect its own citizens.
Discursos 2017, Pos. 14	The EU certainly needs reform and must focus on activities which generate added value for its people. An example of this, which comes to mind, is guaranteeing national security.
Discursos 2019, Pos. 168	If we want to change this picture, as I think we should, the European Union has to earn its place at the tables that matter. The triangle will not turn into a rectangle on its own. Unity is the first requirement for our ability to make that change, but it is not sufficient. Unfortunately we are living in a world that respects hard power. In such a world, only the strong ones are listened to.
Discursos 2021, Pos. 346	I will say this again: The time for strengthening Europe is now
Discursos 2018, Pos. 157	I have often posed the question: what is a union that does not guarantee the security of its citizens? The EU must assume more responsibility for this in the future. Finland, alongside France, belongs to the core group that wants to broadly strengthen the European security and defence policy. Tomorrow, our countries will issue a joint statement on European defence. We consider your European Intervention Initiative to be an important part of this development. Alongside this, it is also natural to intensify our bilateral defence policy cooperation.
Discursos 2018, Pos. 184	I have long been worried about the state of the European security policy. In recent years, significant progress has finally been made in the defence cooperation of the EU, in terms of both funding and the so-called permanent structured cooperation. References to a European army can easily lead to misunderstandings. The real point is that 28 national armies already exist within the European Union and there is scope for enhanced cooperation between them.
Discursos 2017, Pos. 170-171	Finland's approach is very straightforward: We see a lot of untapped potential in EU defence co-operation. We view the EU as a security community that is built on solidarity and mutual dependence. We want the EU to be ambitious but at the same time we believe that taking small and concrete steps is the best way forward. We want the future arrangements to be open and inclusive but not to the point of the lowest common denominator. And finally, we want to help the EU and NATO to work better together to ensure an inter-locking and not an inter-blocking system of security in Europe.

Discursos 2021, Pos. 82	But have we noticed how invisible the EU has been during the crisis over the past few weeks? For a long time, I have been highlighting my concern over the erosion of Europe’s status by the side of other centres of power.
Discursos 2017, Pos. 165	At the same time it is becoming increasingly clear that we, as Europeans, have to devote more attention to our own security.
Discursos 2021, Pos. 83	At the moment, the EU is preparing a document called the Strategic Compass to serve as a guideline for the EU security and defence activities. It is certainly necessary to discuss the role of Europe in the world. I have also personally insisted on the need for such a discussion. But a compass alone will not suffice if we are not even on the map. Reality rapidly runs over strictly worded condemning statements and well-meaning declarations. To be able to deal with the growing power political pressures independently, Europe needs force of its own. Force, then again, requires unity, determination, commitment to mutually chosen policies and executive capacity. Unfortunately, at the moment, the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy seriously lacks all of the above.
Discursos 2018, Pos. 125-127	And it goes both ways: I believe that doing more together on security is the best way to strengthen that spirit. * * * The EU has plenty of tools to provide its members with soft security. Hard security and defence is where the Union has been slower to deliver. Ever since the failed attempt to create a European Defence Community in the 1950s, NATO has been the uncontested foundation for the collective defence of its members.

Cooperação com a União Europeia

Documento	Segmentos codificados
Assessment on NATO membership 2016, P. 28	t Lisbon Treaty of European Union, in Article 42.7: “If a Member State is the victim of an armed aggression on its territory, the oth-er Member States shall have towards it an obligation of aid and assistance by all means in their power”. Finland is naturally bound by this commit-ment, which sets a distinct precedent vis-à-vis its previous policies of neu-trality and non-alignment.
Report on Security Environment Change 22, P. 19	The European Union is Finland’s most important frame of reference, community of values and security community. Finland is responding to Russia’s actions as part of the Union.
Report on Security Environment Change 22, P. 20	The EU has intensified its cooperation in defence issues since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. It is important for Finland that the EU now focuses not only on crisis management and training operations outside its territory but increasingly on supporting the defence of the Member States, developing military capabilities and the basis for European defence industries and technologies, and ensuring the security of citizens.
Report on Security Environment Change 22, P. 19	The more unified and stronger the EU is, the more secure is Finland’s position.

Discursos 2022, Pos. 193	Second, our dense web of Western defence and security partnerships. In these dramatically changed circumstances, these partnerships have paid off. Although all eyes are now on NATO, we must not forget the importance of our EU membership as another cornerstone of our security. The EU as a more effective global actor, also in the field of foreign and security policy, is in our core interest. And the further development of EU-NATO cooperation is now even more significant for us than before.
Discursos 2021, Pos. 353	Positioning ourselves credibly on the changing geopolitical map, responding effectively to conventional and hybrid threats, staying on top of emerging and disruptive technologies – all of this is much more difficult, if not impossible, if we try to achieve it alone. Our security and our prosperity is at stake. We do not have another twenty years to wait. The time for a stronger Europe really is now.
Discursos 2016, Pos. 243	Membership of the European Union is of key importance to Finland’s security policy.
Discursos 2016, Pos. 246	Let me cite an example: There has long been talk of establishing a permanent military headquarters to strengthen the EU’s own planning and command capabilities. Now, it should simply be established. Many other issues deserve our continued attention – including cooperation on defence materiel and measures to promote security of supply.
Discursos 2020, Pos. 164	In the world of tightening great power competition, on their own, even the biggest European countries are not able to achieve alone what a strong European Union could jointly achieve. For smaller countries, the added value would be even bigger.
Discursos 2021, Pos. 173	In my view, the broad variety of partnerships is a positive development. We will not automatically participate in all new initiatives that emerge. But those that serve our interests, will help us further improve our interoperability with chosen partners. And they are complementary reinforcements to the two essential components of the second pillar of our security: our EU membership and our close partnership with NATO.
Discursos 2017, Pos. 90	For Finland, the EU is of particular relevance. I have been raising EU defence co-operation to the debate for over a decade. My starting point is this: The EU is hardly a true union if it does not play its part in ensuring the security of its own citizens.
Defence Report 2021, P. 42	Finland supports strengthening the EU’s security and defence policy and actively participates in the framing of the EU’s common defence policy. It is in Finland’s interest that the EU is able to defend its interests, promote stability in its neighbouring regions and to support the defence of Europe, as stated in the Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy. Finland is ready to provide and receive assistance in accordance with the European Union’s mutual assistance clause (TEU Article 42 paragraph 7) and solidarity clause (TFEU Article 222). Requesting and providing assistance is based on a national decision. Finland also participates in the exercises related to the application and implementation of these articles.
Discursos 2022, Pos. 156	Finland has built a dense web of Western defence and security partnerships. Although all eyes in our domestic debate are now on NATO, we must not forget the importance of these other cornerstones of our security. The EU as a more effective global actor, also in the field of foreign and security policy, is in our core interest. And the further development of EU-NATO cooperation is now even more significant for us than before.

Discursos 2016, Pos. 244	Discussions on strengthening EU defence cooperation have intensified in many countries – this is not important to Finland only. Finland must make a strong contribution to this development effort – we can only gain by the process.
Discursos 2019, Pos. 110	Being part of an alliance or a group of countries is not an end in itself, but a means. Initiatives, meetings and statements are not ends in themselves, but means. What is decisive is the results achieved through these instruments. Do they lead to desired change or not? Do they strengthen our international position and our security or not?
Discursos 2021, Pos. 174	As an EU member, Finland will work actively on the inside: how do we shape the union into a more powerful global actor, one that better safeguards our interests in the midst of the great-power competition?

Neutralidade Tradicional

Documento	Segmentos codificados
Inclusive and competent Finland_2019_ WEB, P. 98	ur foreign and security policy aim is to prevent Finland from becoming party to a military conflict.
Discursos 2015, Pos. 72	n these challenging circumstances, Finland will remain an open member of the world community and a proactive builder of international cooperation. Of course, we will attend to our own security and interests, but without turning inwards to protect those alone.
Discursos 2016, Pos. 101	inland is a force for stability in the region, based on its own foreign and security policy which includes a credible national defence, cooperation with the EU, NATO and the Nordic countries, and dialogue with Russia.
Discursos 2015, Pos. 139-140	has been passed down the generations: “A nation should only trust in itself.” As we know, Snellman’s article has long formed part of the intellectual legacy on which our foreign policy is based. Paasikivi read it, as did Kekkonen. However, I would not interpret Snellman’s underlying message as favouring an isolationist stance such as neutrality, much less nationalistic chauvinism. Snellman’s enduring idea was that, in our own calculations, we need to take full account of the deepest principles of international politics. We need to be critical of our own position, weighing up our options several moves ahead. Failure to do so and acting on the basis of appearances or emotions paves the way, at worst, to what Snellman called the “fate of the frivolous.”
Discursos 2017, Pos. 25	great tradition in foreign policy was also established. Whether we name it after Paasikivi, Kekkonen, or both, its orientation and aim was towards the West, but necessarily sought to secure our existence alongside our neighbour, the Soviet Union, which later dissolved. The door opened to Europe and to the European Community, whose goals and values we felt very much at home.
Discursos 2016, Pos. 122-123	With respect to our security policy, I have often referred to the four-pillar model. All of these pillars – defence capability, western integration, relations with Russia and international law – are discussed in the report. Peace and security are the aim of our active, stability-focused policy, which depends on both dialogue and preparation. Finland and Sweden are united in highlighting the importance of international law and consensus, especially the security of small countries.

Government_report 2016, P. 19	When it comes to the present state and the potential of Finland's foreign and security policy environment, Finland does not have the option or desire to isolate itself. As a Member State of the European Union Finland could not remain an outsider should threats to security emerge in its vicinity or elsewhere in Europe.
Discursos 2021, Pos. 188	We remain committed to offering our good offices to facilitate processes that enhance global strategic stability. We also want to rekindle the Helsinki Spirit.
Discursos 2015, Pos. 94	We must take a broad view and promote the building of a world in which ground rules based on international law and cooperation between equals have the strongest possible basis.
Government_report 2016, P. 19 - 20	To prevent armed attacks, Finland maintains a national defence capacity tailored to its security environment and continues defence cooperation with others. Finland also maintains a credible national border security system. Preparedness for the demands posed by the security environment and strengthening security in Finland's immediate vicinity requires intensified cooperation and actively influencing various actors. Close cooperation in normal times makes it possible to continue it in emergency conditions as well.
Discursos 2015, Pos. 93	This is worth remembering now, at a time when the security policy situation has once again become more tense in Europe.
Discursos 2021, Pos. 291	This is the essence of my initiative for reviving the Helsinki Spirit. Trying to locate common denominators, however small they may be at first. Building trust.
Discursos 2020, Pos. 155	This is a lesson we can draw from today, too. When the environment is shifting considerably, our set of instruments must also be able to change, if our own interest so requires. We should not cling to the old just for the sake of relying on something familiar. We must bear our main task on top of our minds.
Discursos 2016, Pos. 73	There is no quick fix for securing the stability of Northern Europe. We need dialogue. We need greater transparency. We also need mechanisms for preventing clashes. By maintaining open links with both west and east, Finland and Sweden have credibility in this regard. Indeed, Finland has sought to bring these links together.
Discursos 2022, Pos. 242	The two biggest nuclear weapon states have a unique responsibility to advance nuclear arms control and disarmament. The others need to follow suit. It is in the interest of all of us that progress in nuclear arms control and disarmament continues beyond the New START Treaty. We call on the United States and the Russian Federation to continue their dialogue on strategic stability with a view of achieving further cuts in their nuclear arsenals.
Discursos 2016, Pos. 64	The stability and security of our own neighbourhood, the Baltic Region and Northern Europe are Finland's key project – to borrow a term from the Government Programme – in foreign and security policy. That is where most is at stake for Finland.
Discursos 2017, Pos. 233	The second is how during the Second World War, Finland was the only European country that fought the Soviet Union that was not occupied. We cherish our independence. I am tempted to add that our foreign and security policy ever since has been aimed at ensuring that there will not be a Third World War.
Discursos 2015, Pos. 105-106	The question I find myself pondering is can we afford to spend next decade or even more wrapped in a cold battle, matching each time the opponent's efforts to gain the upper hand in a spiraling conflict. Can we gain something if either

	<p>party suffers, if lives are lost or if our economies already troubled in many countries have to face years of sanctions and countersanctions? The answer to those questions is that we can't. Neither Europe nor Russia – not to even mention the people of Ukraine – will gain from this situation and this troubled relation. We need to stop the situation from worsening. The most urgent task is to end violence in Ukraine.</p>
Defence_Report 2017, P. 16	The primary aim of Finland's foreign and security policy is to avoid becoming a party to a military conflict. Finland will independently make decisions on security and defence policy. Finland pursues an active policy of stability to prevent military threats. This policy is supported by maintaining a national defence capability. Finland will actively and extensively strengthen its international defence cooperation and other networking as well as develop the abilities to provide and receive international assistance.
Government_rep ort 2016, P. 9	The primary aim of Finland's foreign and security policy is to avoid becoming a party to a military conflict.
Discursos 2016, Pos. 140	The pillars of our security will not remain strong without constant care, but they require an active policy aimed at maintaining stability.
Government_rep ort 2016, P. 30	The objective is that the mediation capacity support the achievement of Finland's foreign policy goals.
Assessment on NATO membership 2016, P. 54	The most important explanation remains history, the legacy of having survived the war, and avoiding occupation.
Discursos 2018, Pos. 85	The lesson of 1918 is that the most important task of a nation is to ensure its own integrity and stability. Participatory patriotism is therefore just as important today as it was a hundred years ago, and we are all responsible for it. I encourage you, ladies and gentlemen, to take the responsibility.
Discursos 2016, Pos. 125	The first pillar in my model has been a strong and credible national defence. We believe that strong armed forces prevent conflict by raising the threshold for aggression. It is perhaps less frequently recognised that they also create interest in partnerships. In this way, a strong defence capability provides options in the unlikely event of deterrence proving insufficient.
Discursos 2015, Pos. 125	The Ukraine conflict is in its second year and shows no sign of ending. A tool – the Minsk Agreements – has been found for handling the crisis. The implementation of these agreements would clear a path, at least to ending military activities and pacifying the situation. I have been as active as I can in supporting such a process – naturally, in cooperation with our many partners.
Discursos 2015, Pos. 108	The Minsk peace plan is the only available roadmap towards the peaceful resolution of the conflict in Eastern Ukraine and Crimea. We should all support the plan, and even more important is that the plan is fully implemented.
Report on Security Environment Change 22, P. 16	The primary goal of maintaining defence capability is to deter the use of military force or the threats of using military force
Discursos 2015, Pos. 92	Seventy years have just passed since the last military operations on Finnish soil during the Second World War were finally wound up. In other words, Finland has enjoyed peace for seventy years. More than this, it has also developed into one of the world's most successful nations. A foreign policy well-framed to

	meet all of Finland's fundamental needs has been an indispensable part of, and has set the scene for, this success story. This will continue to be the case.
Discursos 2022, Pos. 103	Russia is using its energy weapon in the hope that our resilience is the first to break. That Western unity would begin to crack and our support Ukraine to falter. This is where it makes a miscalculation. History has shown that, both as individuals and as nations, we find strength in ourselves in difficult situations. Together and alone, we can do things we may not have even known we could do. The Ukrainians are the ultimate example of this. The challenges we face are small compared to what Ukraine faces. I firmly believe that our backbone will hold.
Discursos 2015, Pos. 48	Russia is a superpower that will remain our neighbour, and we will remain Russia's neighbour. In geographical terms, one cannot choose one's neighbours, and so neighbourhood relations must be taken care of for better or for worse.
Defence_Report 2017, P. 17	Peacetime cooperation lays the foundation for cooperation during crises. Trust, a necessary requisite for defence cooperation, is established through tenacious and enduring action. By means of a wide network of partners Finland develops such arrangements that can be utilised to receive all possible assistance already at the onset of a potential crisis.
Discursos 2015, Pos. 65	On the other hand, I regard it as important that we do not allow the crisis to spill over into new areas and sectors. We must also nurture our cooperation and contacts of various kinds. I think that this involves areas such as contacts between citizens and Arctic cooperation, which cover a range of common interests.
Discursos 2016, Pos. 90	On a number of occasions I have explained Finland's foreign and security policy using the so called "four pillars model". National defence and security, western integration, relations with Russia and international law together with global efforts to tackle the fundamental challenges of the mankind are the pillars of our stability-oriented policy.
Discursos 2015, Pos. 63-64	Now is the time for cool-headed analysis and thinking, and the step-by-step diplomacy that follows. In any case, containing and resolving the Ukraine conflict represent the first step in this process.
Discursos 2016, Pos. 26-27	Neither of our countries is in a military alliance. Together, we have strong links with both west and east, which gives both countries a special status. This also creates opportunities for engaging in important work to promote the security and stability of Northern Europe. It would therefore be logical to continue extending our cooperation on foreign and security policy. It is in the interests of both countries to promote our security on a cooperative basis, with a view to developing confidence-building measures.
Government_report 2016, P. 30	Mediation and dialogue processes encompass a progressively important focus area in Finland's foreign and security policy. Mediation and dialogue pave the way for longer-term peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction; the ultimate objectives being a lasting peace, rule of law and stable societal development.
Discursos 2015, Pos. 104	Maintaining the lines of communication and dialogue open is very important.
Discursos 2015, Pos. 9-10	It is vital to find a peaceful solution in Ukraine, and it is equally vital to interrupt the vicious circle of confrontation. Therefore Finland supports and actively seeks ways of finding a solution.

	Russia has always been and will always be Finland's neighbour. We will continue to maintain close dialogue. We aim to facilitate any efforts to resolve the conflict and to pursue all forms of cooperation possible under these circumstances. Russia is well aware that Finland is and will remain part of the West.
Discursos 2016, Pos. 229	It is not in Finland's interests to stir up confrontation. A wise person asks whether there are means of alleviating confrontation. This is called dialogue, or diplomacy. It is also Finland's long-term foreign and security policy. It is also my policy.
Discursos 2022, Pos. 397	In spite of the growing tensions, Finland's international position is good. This has been confirmed by the many discussions I have had recently. We have determined in building partnerships and maintaining functional neighbourly relations. And we will continue to do so in the future. That is what I mean when I refer to the stability of Finland's foreign policy line.
Discursos 2016, Pos. 23-24	In last year's speech, I said that Finland would pursue an active policy of promoting stability. In terms of our foreign policy, our relationships with Sweden and Russia, the Nordic framework and cooperation within the EU and with NATO countries are in a key position. A policy promoting stability has good prospects of succeeding in the Baltic Region. The various states have no territorial claims on each other and their internal political situations are stable. Despite the fact that tensions from further afield are having an impact, no spontaneous crises are threatening to break out in the region.
Discursos 2018, Pos. 104-105	In conflict prevention, mediation is an invaluable tool. It is vital for the future of mediation that experience gained in the past is passed on to future mediators. It was an honour for my country to host the meeting of the Secretary-General's High-Level Advisory Board on Mediation in June in Finland. We remain strong supporters of the mediation activities of the UN and other actors. Where appropriate, Finland also continues to offer its good services to facilitate concrete discussions between parties, from Track-2 negotiations to high-level meetings.
Discursos 2020, Pos. 104	In addition to conflict resolution, we must invest more in conflict prevention. Every conflict avoided is one conflict less to be resolved in the future. Finland advocates the use of mediation for both purposes. We are ready and willing to offer our good services in this regard.
Discursos 2015, Pos. 109	If we do not act again to build mutual understanding, if we fail to learn from our mistakes, and if we fail to construct that bridge again, we might see more anniversaries of mistrust than I care to predict.
Discursos 2019, Pos. 13	If the arms control treaties formulated during the Cold War collapse, we have to strive for the creation of new ones to replace them. Finland stands ready to offer its good services to build contacts for negotiation. We will take this message forward also during the beginning year.
Discursos 2018, Pos. 79	I have talked about participatory patriotism. The sense that this country and community are mine because I, too, am part of them. I enjoy the support and protection provided by my country, and in return, I participate to the best of my abilities in its construction and defence. Implanting this sense into people's minds in the early decades of Finnish independence has been the foundation for our success.
Discursos 2018, Pos. 206	Here in Finland, we have provided our diplomatic "good services", and in recent years they have been in demand. In my next meetings with the leaders of

	the great powers I will raise disarmament issues and Finland's readiness to facilitate the commencement of a new round of negotiations.
Discursos 2018, Pos. 27	Fortunately, there is always room for small actors between the major powers. Finland is more than pleased to provide good services when required. Finland is also active in supporting stability and dialogue in the Baltic Sea area, Arctic areas and also globally.
Discursos 2021, Pos. 138	For Finland, conflict prevention and mediation are strong priorities. We continue to be ready and willing to offer our good services for constructive dialogue in this regard.
Inclusive and competent Finland 2019 WEB, P. 99	Finland will pursue an active policy of stability to prevent military threats and will not allow its territory to be used for hostilities against other countries
Report on Security Environment Change 22, P. 16	Finland will continue its support for negotiations between Ukraine and Russia for achieving peace. In addition to high-level contacts, the promotion of dialogue at other levels will continue
Defence Report 2017, P. 15	Finland strengthens its national defence and intensifies international defence cooperation as a militarily non-aligned country
Government Report 2020, P. 49	Finland promotes peace and stability by means of conflict prevention, mediation and peacebuilding. In this work, Finland uses its whole mediation capacity, which will be further strengthened.
Government Report 2020, P. 50	Finland produces security and bears international responsibility for the maintenance of peace and security by participating in international crisis management. Crisis management is a central foreign and security policy instrument used for supporting conflict resolution, stabilisation of post-conflict situations and building of safe societies.
Discursos 2017, Pos. 206	Finland is dynamic and proactive with regard to supporting stability in northern Europe. Last summer's proposal concerning flight safety over the Baltic Sea is one example. As a result, the work of the International Civil Aviation Organization's Baltic Sea project team has been reactivated, and new measures to improve flight safety in the region were agreed upon in a spirit of cooperation. It is worth noting that both NATO and Russia have participated constructively in the project team's work. At the same time, support has been provided for activating dialogue in a NATO-Russia council.
Discursos 2019, Pos. 232	Finland has always emphasized the value of dialogue in its own diplomatic relations. We are also happy to provide our "good offices" for others.
Discursos 2021, Pos. 48	Finland continues to be prepared to offer its good services to support negotiations on strategic stability.
Discursos 2015, Pos. 154	Despite the nature of the economic and – to some extent – security challenges we face, we can overcome them. History allows us no rest, but sets new slopes before us, which we must climb. Previous generations have done the work necessary to raise themselves, and we aim to do no worse.
Crisis management 2021, P. 9	Crisis management is a key instrument in Finland's foreign, security and defence policy that promotes security in the host country and globally. Crisis management supports resolving of conflicts, post-conflict stabilisation and building of safe societies. Participation in crisis management also enhances the security of Finnish people. Finland's participation in crisis management is part of our burden-sharing within the international community and of our profile as a

	UN, EU and OSCE Member State, a NATO partner and in relation to key countries with strong capabilities in crisis management
Discursos 2021, Pos. 46	By engaging in dialogue, we show strength. It is not always possible to influence the other party, but it is even harder without dialogue. It is in our best interest that the European Union also engages in such direct and frank dialogue with Russia.
Discursos 2020, Pos. 151	But it also tells something about our time. In the midst of great changes, there is again demand for a Paasikivi-like realism. It is again a topical question to consider Finland's position in the "conjunctures" of great power politics. And indeed, when studying the phases of Paasikivi's life from today's perspective, one notices again and again that one can identify some familiar features. Layers of new technologies and new actors have been added, but great power politics and geography are the issues we keep on going back to. The script and the casting change, but the stage remains the same.
Discursos 2022, Pos. 214	As we gather here, we have an important opportunity to engage in dialogue and to find solutions. To understand the concerns of those most in need.
Crisis management 2021, P. 27	As stated in the Government Report on Finnish Foreign and Security Policy 2020, crisis management is a central foreign and security policy instrument for supporting conflict resolution, stabilisation of post-conflict situations, protection of civilians and building of safe societies. By participating in crisis management operations, we contribute to the promotion of democracy, good governance and human rights, including the rights of women and girls, and the prevention of sexual violence in conflict situations. The security provided by crisis management extends beyond the borders of the target countries. By being involved in international crisis management, we bear our responsibility for international peace and security, and enhance the security of Finnish people.
Defence Report 2021, P. 12	An important objective of the Finnish foreign and security policy is to take national action and to engage in international cooperation in order to prevent the emergence of armed conflicts and situations endangering Finland's security and society's ability to act, and of Finland ending up a party to a military conflict
Government report 2016, P. 19	Active participation in international cooperation advances Finland's interests and is a part of Finland's global burden-sharing. Finland is a country which does not belong to any military alliance. Finland actively and extensively intensifies its international networking. Finland maintains the option to seek membership in a military alliance
Defence Report 2021, P. 12	A strong national defence capability is a key prerequisite for achieving the goals of Finland's foreign and security policy. Finland is a militarily non-aligned state which maintains a credible national defence capability. By maintaining its defence capability, Finland prevents the use of military force against Finland, shows readiness to respond to the use or the threat of use of military force, and the capacity to repel any attacks against our country. To strengthen its own defence capability, Finland participates in international foreign, security and defence policy cooperation, which has been increasing and getting deeper in recent years.
Discursos 2021, Pos. 90-91	50 years ago, that spirit of Helsinki brought the great powers of the day around the same table to engage in dialogue with each other, in spite of their differences. Now the great power positions are different, but the need for a dialogue is ever greater. The world is becoming divided into blocs, which may be quite understandable. But, ultimately, it must be possible to have a dialogue across

	the blocs. Only together we can respond to the questions of war and peace, climate change and biodiversity loss, pandemics and the challenges of new technologies.
--	--

Cooperação com a OTAN

Documento	Segmentos codificados
A Stronger North 2018, P. 30	they have been invited by NATO to attend meetings dealing specifically with the security situation in the Nordic-Baltic region, thus giving rise to the so-called '28+2' format.
Discursos 2019, Pos. 123	our Western cooperation is therefore based on a broad spectrum of complementary contacts, ranging from the NATO partnership to multilateral and bilateral arrangements, both with the United States and European countries. At this summer's Kultaranta Talks, I believe this was called a "tapestry" (kudelmä in Finnish). Regardless of the label attached to it, the way in which we have built this array of contacts constantly receives very positive feedback in the international arena. Strengthening our international position, this too.
Discursos 2014, Pos. 233	n active NATO partnership is important to both Finland and Sweden. We also have good reason to engage in close cooperation in developing our partnership with NATO. For Finland this forms part of our cooperative security. Although membership of NATO remains a possible solution, we have no plans to seek membership.
A Stronger North 2018, P. 27	in Nordic Defence cooperation improves security. 43 That figure is growing, having been 79% in 2016 and 74% in 2015. Nordic defence cooperation therefore ranks ahead of EU defence cooperation (70% in 2017), as well as the idea of Finnish membership of NATO (only 29% in 2017). 4
Discursos 2019, Pos. 110	eing part of an alliance or a group of countries is not an end in itself, but a means. Initiatives, meetings and statements are not ends in themselves, but means. What is decisive is the results achieved through these instruments. Do they lead to desired change or not? Do they strengthen our international position and our security or not?
Defence_Report 2017, P. 18	While carefully monitoring the developments in its security environment, Finland maintains the option to seek NATO membership. As Finland keeps developing its defence capability, it continues to take into account the prospects for defence cooperation and interoperability, and ensures the elimination of any practical impediments to a possible membership in a military alliance.
Government_report 2016, P. 26	While carefully monitoring the developments in its security environment, Finland maintains the option to seek NATO membership.
A Stronger North 2018, P. 20	When it comes to NATO, there is no Nordic cooperation as such. However, the Nordic NATO members – especially Norway – have acted as an important access point for non-members Finland and Sweden, both of which currently cooperate very closely with NATO.
Discursos 2017, Pos. 89	We want to send a strong signal that we take security very seriously. We work closely with our partners in NATO and our bilateral defence co-operation with Sweden is progressing rapidly.
Discursos 2017, Pos. 53	We have been at the heart of a NATO Summit for the first time, which sends a strong signal

Discursos 2016, Pos. 228	The truth is that our western military cooperation is already much more extensive than before and that this will continue. Finland engages in such military cooperation only on the basis of its own points of departure and needs. Finland will develop its military preparedness and interoperability not only to form a deterrent and threshold for intruders but also to be an attractive partner should the worst happen. This will also serve the development of Finland's own defence.
Government_report 2016, P. 14 - 15	The presence and action of NATO brings security to the region. As a result of the changing environment cooperation in transatlantic and NATO contexts as well as Nordic consultation and, in particular, cooperation between Finland and Sweden are intensifying.
A Stronger North 2018, P. 51	The flexibility is certainly an asset. However, the divide with regard to the differing NATO affiliations within NORDEFECO directs the development into two parallel lanes, reinforcing the division between the Nordic allied countries on the one hand, and the non-allied on the other. This is part of the motivation for the Finnish-Swedish bilateral linkage in defence cooperation, which has strengthened in recent years. To some extent, this divide might challenge NORDEFECO's effectivity as a multilateral framework. After all, bilateral cooperation is often stronger and easier than engaging all of the members.
Government Report 2020, P. 32	The cooperation between Finland and NATO has been deepened.
Government_report 2016, P. 26	The continual development of military cooperation with NATO is one of the key elements through which Finland maintains and develops its national defence and the capabilities for defending its territory.
Government Report 2020, P. 30	The EU-NATO cooperation must benefit both parties and be of complementary nature. The development of the EU security and defence cooperation benefits also NATO as it enhances European security and capabilities. Particularly beneficial areas of cooperation include the hybrid and cyber matters, issues related to digitalisation and disruptive technologies, such as AI, and the promotion of military mobility.
Discursos 2018, Pos. 189	Taking part in these exercises is a valuable opportunity for our troops to develop their skills and to enhance their interoperability. It also allows us to practice providing and receiving international assistance, in line with our newly enacted legislation. Let me stress, however, that these exercises are field training of military capabilities, nothing less, nothing more. They should not be used to draw conclusions on security policy.
Discursos 2022, Pos. 351	Sweden's and Finland's NATO membership would enhance not only our own security, but also that of the whole alliance. It is without detriment to anyone. Our membership would strengthen the responsible, strong and stable Nordic region on the northern edge of NATO.
Discursos 2016, Pos. 25	Sweden and Finland are special partners of NATO. Our intensifying military cooperation is going well and is highly valued in both countries. However, we can do more.
Defence Report 2021, P. 43	Participation in demanding NATO exercises and crisis management develops Finland's own capabilities and interoperability with partners.
Discursos 2015, Pos. 148	Our western cooperation is broadening, particularly in the development of our defence cooperation with Sweden and within the framework of our partnership with NATO. We are also maintaining our communication channels with Russia at all levels and engaging in cooperation wherever possible and useful.

Discursos 2018, Pos. 188	NATO's role as the guarantor of European security, as well as its presence in the Baltic Sea region, is an important source of stability. Given their largely overlapping memberships, strengthening the EU's defence will as a by-product also strengthen NATO.
Government Report 2020, P. 33	Interoperability achieved through cooperation ensures the elimination of any practical impediments arising to a potential membership.
Discursos 2017, Pos. 280	In the field of security the Enhanced Opportunities Partnership with NATO is very important for Finland. And like Poland, we also want to develop cooperation between the EU and NATO.
Discursos 2021, Pos. 173	In my view, the broad variety of partnerships is a positive development. We will not automatically participate in all new initiatives that emerge. But those that serve our interests, will help us further improve our interoperability with chosen partners. And they are complementary reinforcements to the two essential components of the second pillar of our security: our EU membership and our close partnership with NATO.
A Stronger North 2018, P. 26	However, during its one-year period at the helm of Nordic foreign and security policy cooperation, Finland proposed the idea of having a 'living document' of priorities for the cooperation. These priorities, compiled under Finland's leadership, included migration; cooperation between the EU and NATO; cooperation between NATO and Finland and Sweden (28+2); dialogue between the Nordic states and the US; European security and defence in the context of Brexit; cooperation in UN matters; and countering violent extremism.
Report on Security Environment Change 22, P. 26	Finland's current partnership with NATO means close and deep cooperation. Finland develops its partnership with NATO from its own premises and interests, and effectively employs the partnership tools and cooperation programmes provided by NATO, to strengthen its national defence capabilities
Inclusive and competent Finland_2019_WEB, P. 100	Finland takes part in NATO's Article 5 exercises as a partner country.
Government Report 2020, P. 33	Finland effectively employs the partnership tools and cooperation programmes provided by NATO to strengthen its national defence capabilities, and engages in wide-ranging, pragmatic and mutually beneficial partnership cooperation with NATO.
Defence Report 2021, P. 43	Finland develops its partnership with NATO from its own premises and interests, and effectively employs the partnership tools and cooperation programmes provided by NATO, to strengthen its national defence capabilities.
Government Report 2020, P. 33	Cooperation increases predictability and stability in the region
Government Report 2020, P. 17	Cooperation aimed at understanding and preventing hybrid influencing and improving crisis resilience has been increased. The European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats, established at Finland's initiative and based in Helsinki, is an important cooperation platform that supports the EU, NATO and their Member States in countering hybrid threats
Discursos 2015, Pos. 51	Close international cooperation has been an essential part of our security and defence policy in the past electoral period, and it will continue to be so. The nature of this cooperation will shift as circumstances change, and in addition to

	crisis management, joint exercises and the maintaining of performance capabilities will also become increasingly important. Finland should participate in this cooperation on our own terms, without excluding any of our options.
A Stronger North 2018, P. 26	Characteristic of Finland are the high levels of both political and public support for Nordic cooperation. An annual survey by the Advisory Board for Defence Information (ABDI), a permanent parliamentary committee, measures opinions on foreign and security policy and defence. The 2017 survey showed that 83 per cent of Finns believe that Finland's participation
Discursos 2021, Pos. 174	As a NATO partner, Finland will keep a close eye on the development from the outside: how does the future Alliance look at its partnerships, and will the door for membership stay open?
Discursos 2018, Pos. 192-194	And despite our close partnership with NATO, political boundaries remain, on both sides. We are not a NATO member. In the exercise, "on the map", we behave exactly as we would in real situations. This means that Finland does not participate either in Article 5 decision making or in its implementation. In line with the position adopted by the Finnish parliament, we take care of our own territory and will not allow it to be used for hostile purposes against third parties. Finland can be entered by invitation only. The joint exercises are a way of ensuring that none of the parties – NATO members, Sweden or Finland – is under any illusions of how each would behave in the event of a crisis. This increase in predictability serves to enhance the stability in our region. There is nothing automatic about Finland's participation in exercises. Decisions are taken based on a comprehensive foreign and security policy assessment.
Discursos 2021, Pos. 334	A strong Atlantic alliance continues to be imperative for our security, and Finland highly values its close partnership with NATO. Much can also be done with new ad-hoc coalitions and initiatives led by Germany, the UK and France. Finland, for its part, has actively been developing its dense network of bilateral, trilateral and multilateral defense arrangements.
Defence Report 2021, P. 44	. Promoting political dialogue with NATO is important to Finland.
Government report 2016, P. 25	. It is important to Finland that NATO continue its Open Doors Policy, i.e. that NATO membership remains open to all those European states that have the capacity and qualifications to advance the goals of the North Atlantic Treaty.
Report on Security Environment Change 22, P. 26	. In the changed security environment, the strategic importance of Northern Europe has increased, which is why NATO has opened new avenues for cooperation for Finland and Sweden. Dialogue and practical military cooperation on the security situation in the Baltic Sea region increase Finland's opportunities to influence its security environment and improve predictability and stability in the region. After Russia's invasion of Ukraine, Finland and Sweden have deepened their bilateral cooperation and enhanced their contacts with NATO to improve their shared situation awareness.
Defence Report 2021, P. 43	. In Finland-NATO cooperation, it is taken into account that partnership cooperation neither includes any Article 5 based security guarantees nor obligations.
Defence Report 2021, P. 43	. Dialogue on the security situation of the Baltic Sea region and practical military cooperation improve Finland's possibilities to influence its security environment, and increase predictability and stability in the region.

Defence_Report 2017, P. 18	. Cooperation with NATO is important in developing the European defence cooperation. Finland must be active in advancing any opportunities for cooperation in the EU and NATO
----------------------------	---

Impactos do Conflito na Ucrânia

Documento	Segmentos codificados
Discursos 2014, Pos. 28	the impact of the conflict on Europe's security policy environment will also affect us in Finland.
Discursos 2014, Pos. 85	While the conflict is a regional one, it has implications for all of Europe and for international politics as a whole. It also has implications for us.
Discursos 2022, Pos. 137	The effects of the war, however, don't stop in Ukraine. The security situation in all of Europe is more precarious than it has been for a very long time. If we needed a reminder of the dangers for us here in the North of Europe, we recently received one. The explosions in the Baltic Sea two weeks ago, leading to gas leaks in the Nord Stream pipelines, need to be thoroughly investigated. Those events have reminded us of the need to bolster the security of our critical infrastructure. They have also reminded us of the myriad possibilities in which this crisis may escalate, horizontally or vertically, with unforeseen consequences.
Discursos 2014, Pos. 60	The crisis in Ukraine has a deep impact on the security of Europe. We have not experienced such breakdown since the tragedy of the Balkan wars
Discursos 2014, Pos. 96	The Ukrainian conflict has prompted concern and discussion in many countries concerning the sufficiency of their national defence policies. The pressures are undoubtedly greatest on those countries that have not maintained their national defence well. Finland is not among them.
Discursos 2022, Pos. 47	Russia's illegal invasion of Ukraine has a major impact on global food security. The rise in the price of grain caused by the invasion has seriously weakened food security for those most vulnerable.
Discursos 2016, Pos. 118	Russia's annexation of Crimea from Ukraine and the conflict in Eastern Ukraine are having a broad impact, including here in the Baltic Sea region and Northern Europe.
Discursos 2014, Pos. 94	It is through this broader picture – the opposition between Russia and the EU and uncertainty in security policy – that the Ukrainian crisis has implications for Finland.
Discursos 2014, Pos. 119	Finding solutions and providing support are now the most important priorities. At the same time, we must also assess what all of this means – and what it does not mean – for Finland.
Discursos 2022, Pos. 394	Even though there is no military threat against Finland, the situation also touches us deeply. The increasing military tension on the Ukrainian borders is reflected over the whole of Europe. No one can close their eyes to the situation. This kind of attention is also the thing Russia is seeking.

Mudanças no Contexto Geopolítico e de Segurança

Documento	Segmentos codificados
-----------	-----------------------

Discursos 2015, Pos. 60	we have become used to repeating that European security policy has entered difficult times due to the Ukraine conflict and Russia's widely condemned actions. We have nothing to add to such an assessment today. Although we have the Minsk Agreement, the violence has not ended.
Discursos 2015, Pos. 12	we face the challenge of safeguarding a credible defence in changing circumstances and against the emergence of unexpected threats. This will not be possible without substantial extra investment.
Discursos 2016, Pos. 46	the international system is in transition.
A Stronger North 2018, P. 25	the balance in Nordic foreign and security policy cooperation has tilted in favour of hard security in the Nordic-Baltic region.
A Stronger North 2018, P. 25	the annexation of Crimea by Russia in 2014 and the subsequent war in Eastern Ukraine, Nordic foreign and security policy cooperation has gained a new sense of purpose and relevance. All Nordic states have been increasingly interested in Nordic foreign and security policy cooperation, and the different Nordic formats are now seen as an important channel for sharing information and exchanging views about developments that affect the Nordic-Baltic region and its security.
A Stronger North 2018, P. 25	the Nordic foreign and security policy agenda has gradually shifted, with issues of regional security turning into a priority area. Hence, among the key topics of Nordic foreign ministers' meetings since 2014 have been the Ukraine crisis, Russia's foreign and security policy posture as well as the security situation around the Baltic Sea. Debates about Russia's role in Syria or possible changes in the transatlantic relations have also been conducted with their implications for regional security in mind.
Defence Report 2021, P. 15	Increased military activity in the Baltic Sea region is a sign of increased tensions in international security. The significance of North Atlantic sea lines of communication and of Finland's neighbouring Arctic regions is growing, and military activity in the area has increased.
Report on Security Environment Change 22, P. 10	n. Russia's aggression against Ukraine has further destabilised the situation in the EU's eastern neighbourhood
Discursos 2020, Pos. 80	n the midst of an accelerating change, in its foreign policy Finland can no longer hold on to its own assumptions if we cannot be certain that they still hold true. If the established methods of gathering information no longer function, we must find new ones. And you must use your personal professional skills to interpret that information
Discursos 2014, Pos. 104	it is useful to remember the big picture, including the lessons taught by the harsh teacher known as history regarding the undercurrents of security policy and the policies of the great powers in particular. The issue of NATO membership cannot be evaluated just by tallying pros and cons on a spreadsheet. We can also not just look at legal details and rules; after all, NATO is not a district court.
Discursos 2016, Pos. 81	international system is in deep transition. Transition in international life usually entails rising pressures, crises and even conflicts. It often means also surprises
Discursos 2015, Pos. 70	his means that rather than merely wondering how to export its values and models of governance, Europe must also consider how to defend them at home.

	The situation is now more complex and the certainties of the 1990s are behind us. Repeating past glories will not be enough – we also need a new approach.
Discursos 2015, Pos. 143	These pillars are ever-changing – they are weakened or strengthened by events. They also continually interact. The more pillars on which we rest, the stronger they are from our viewpoint, and the better the balance between them the stronger a position Finland is in.
Discursos 2016, Pos. 218	We have a habit of saying that each and every Finn is a defender of our country. In the unpredictable times we are living, our national will to defend ourselves is not merely old-fashioned rhetoric.
Discursos 2015, Pos. 104	Tension has risen to an unwelcome level between the West and Russia.
A Stronger North 2018, P. 30	defence policy networks, including their bilateral cooperation and the Nordic format
Defence Report 2021, P. 16	and has developed their operating procedures by incorporating combat experiences from recent operations. The ability to make rapid decisions and the high readiness of its armed forces enables Russia to carry out rapid and unexpected operations. Different methods, such as prolonging conflicts, are used to achieve desired goals
Discursos 2014, Pos. 98	With hybrid warfare, we are facing a substantial change in military operations. The boundary between actual war and other exercise of power is becoming blurred. Means of cyber war and information war are becoming increasingly important. It is now possible to fight a war without actually being at war. At the same time, conflict escalation is setting new speed records, as we saw for instance in the Crimea.
Inclusive and competent Finland 2019 WEB, P. 98	While there is no direct threat against Finland at the moment, sudden changes in the security environment are possible.
A Stronger North 2018, P. 24	While there was no significant qualitative leap in Nordic foreign and security policy cooperation, the changing external environment did bring new momentum into the cooperation.
Discursos 2014, Pos. 29-30	We need to identify and react to changes – in situations where we have been unable to anticipate them. While it is important to note changes during the phase in which they occur, our attention should also focus on issues that seem to be remaining constant
Discursos 2022, Pos. 58	We are undoubtedly living in dangerous times.
Discursos 2022, Pos. 99	We are living in dangerous times. Sabotage of gas pipelines and drones flying near strategic targets are examples of hybrid attacks that we need to be prepared for today. Our exchange of information is continuous. We have intensified our cooperation in the areas of security of supply and crisis preparedness. This must continue. Our critical infrastructure crosses national borders in many sectors. We must work together to protect it. When we prepare together, our security is strongest.
Discursos 2015, Pos. 7	War is no longer only news from far-off lands; it is reality in today's Europe.
Discursos 2022, Pos. 55	Today, you are starting your course in an exceptionally tense world situation. The atmosphere is even chillier than during the Cold War. Russia's invasion of Ukraine brought war to Europe. The situation in the Korean peninsula is once

	again sensitive. Tensions between the United States and China are growing. In the midst of energy and economic concerns, Europe as a whole is facing a difficult winter.
Discursos 2021, Pos. 273	Today, Europe is being challenged more directly on our external borders than before. The most recent phenomenon we have encountered is the Belarussian hybrid operation on the eastern border of the EU aimed at weakening the unity of our continent and putting the European values and attitudes to a real test.
Discursos 2016, Pos. 91	Those pillars form a whole whose parts need to be in the right balance with respect to challenges of our time. Pillars need continuous maintenance, rebalancing and adjustments. This is happening right now as we are preparing the next White Book on Finland's Foreign and Security Policy.
Discursos 2016, Pos. 135	This year is another in which events have flown by, from one surprise development to another. More now happens in a week than once occurred in an entire year.
Discursos 2019, Pos. 113-114	This triangle, with Washington, Beijing and Moscow at its vertices, is now making its mark on the entire international security situation. And the tensions between the great powers are not limited to crisis areas. From the vertices of the triangle, strengthening cross-pressures are being directed at the European Union within it. These pressures are also beginning to be felt in EU Member States.
Report on Security Environment Change 22, P. 31	This requires that we adapt our concept for comprehensive security to the current security situation. Effective prevention of hybrid influence activities is based on the deterrent effect created through preparedness and other activities of society as a whole and all branches of government. Ensuring high-level comprehensive security is a key element in creating a preventive effect.
Discursos 2020, Pos. 155	This is a lesson we can draw from today, too. When the environment is shifting considerably, our set of instruments must also be able to change, if our own interest so requires. We should not cling to the old just for the sake of relying on something familiar. We must bear our main task on top of our minds.
Report on Security Environment Change 22, P. 22	There is an obvious need for closer bilateral and multilateral cooperation on preparedness and comprehensive security.
Discursos 2017, Pos. 225	The world, and its geopolitics, are changing at an increasing pace. It almost seems like we're in a tunnel – one which perhaps promised a way out yesterday but one that is ending up becoming a dead-end of today.
Report on Security Environment Change 22, P. 12	The war that Russia started in Ukraine will affect the security of Europe and Finland both in the short and long term
Discursos 2022, Pos. 386	The threat of war is growing at the borders of Ukraine, and Russia is challenging the foundations of European security.
Defence Report 2021, P. 14	The security situation in the neighbouring areas of Finland and Europe is unstable and difficult to predict. The international rules-based system, international law, and commonly agreed principles have been questioned and challenged. This has a negative effect especially on the position of small states.

Defence_Report 2017, P. 9	The security situation in Finland's vicinity has deteriorated following the occupation of Crimea and the conflict in eastern Ukraine. Military tension has risen in the Baltic Sea region, and insecurity has grown far and wide.
Report on Security Environment Change 22, P. 11	The security situation in Europe and in Finland is more serious and more difficult to predict than at any time since the Cold War. The change in the security situation is expected to be long-lasting. Russia's demands and military actions that purport to change the European security architecture also affect Finland's room for manoeuvre in foreign, security and defence policy.
Government report 2016, P. 13	The security policy environment of Finland, a member of the western community, has transformed. A more tense security situation in Europe and the Baltic Sea region will directly impact Finland. The use or threat of military force against Finland cannot be excluded.
Government report 2016, P. 13	The security of Europe and the Baltic Sea region has deteriorated.
Report on Security Environment Change 22, P. 49	The risks and threats associated with the vulnerabilities of infrastructure critical to the functioning of society have increased as a result of changes in the security environment in recent years.
Government Report 2020, P. 13	The relations between great powers have changed rapidly, which has significantly complicated cooperation within the rules-based international system, and, for its part, deteriorated the security in the areas in the vicinity of Finland and Europe.
Discursos 2016, Pos. 232	The recent crises have challenged our notions of traditional warfare. We have witnessed systematic operations exploiting the vulnerabilities of the targeted state. A wide range of hybrid threats are employed: information-based operations, pressure by economic or technological means, unmarked armed forces and cyber warfare – and the range of means will continue to expand.
Discursos 2016, Pos. 221	The reality is different. Even we in Europe have witnessed this over the last few years. We have cherished the idea of an arc of stability around us, but that arc has started to disintegrate.
Discursos 2016, Pos. 145	The rapid rapprochement between Turkey and Russia represents a major geopolitical change. While it does not necessarily amount to a stable alliance, even a tactical rapprochement poses
Government Report 2020, P. 13	The operating environment of Finnish foreign and security policy is in an intense state of flux
Defence Report 2021, P. 18	The operating environment of Finnish defence will remain tense and unpredictable
Defence Report 2021, P. 26	The operating environment of Finnish defence will remain tense and unpredictable.
Discursos 2016, Pos. 143	The most recent escalation in Crimea showed that matters could again take an unexpected turn for the worse.
Report on Security Environment Change 22, P. 11	The military situation in Finland's neighbouring areas is currently calm, and Finland is not facing an immediate military threat. However, Finland must be prepared for the use or the threat of use of military force against it as well as political pressure.
Defence_Report 2017, P. 33	The military operating environment is in flux. The consequences of this change are estimated to continue for a long time.

Defence_Report 2017, P. 16	The increasingly tense security situation in Europe and the Baltic Sea region has repercussions on Finland. Despite the increasingly tense international situation Finland is not under any immediate military threat. Nonetheless, Finland must prepare for the use or threat of military force against it.
Government Report 2020, P. 37	The importance of societal crisis resilience for the Finnish security is becoming emphasised in the rapidly changing operating environment
Discursos 2022, Pos. 19	The great power politics are currently in a rapid state of flux. The post-Cold-War era is definitely over. The characteristics of a new era are only beginning to take shape. But every time the shape of geopolitics changes, the impacts are also felt by countries smaller than the great powers. Sometimes particularly by them.
Report on Security Environment Change 22, P. 18	The grave deterioration of the security situation and the possible continuation of the situation highlight the need to accelerate the reform.
Discursos 2022, Pos. 393	The geopolitical situation has changed rapidly. The list of demands presented by Russia in December aims at a fundamental change in the structures of European security.
Government Report 2020, P. 21	The development in Europe's neighbourhood also remains unstable.
Report on Security Environment Change 22, P. 15	The decisions are always considered in real time, taking account of the changes in the international security environment.
Report on Security Environment Change 22, P. 21	The changed security situation underlines the importance of Finnish-Swedish defence cooperation for strengthening the defence of both countries and ensuring security in the Baltic Sea region.
Defence_Report 2017, P. 23	The changed security environment of the Baltic Sea and Finland's dependency on shipping require versatility, survivability and high readiness from the maritime defence.
Discursos 2019, Pos. 54	The beautiful post-Cold War world, in which we would all have liked to believe, has quickly taken on darker tones.
Discursos 2018, Pos. 115	The balance of power is changing. The credibility of institutions is being tested. And completely new challenges pile up on top of existing ones.
Discursos 2015, Pos. 9	The Ukrainian crisis has led to a new polarisation between the West and Russia. The increased tensions are reflected in Finland's neighbouring areas, even though we are not under threat.
Ratkaisujen Suomi_EN_YH DISTETTY_net ti, P. 37	The Government takes into account that the security situation in Europe and the Baltic Sea region has deteriorated, particularly as a result of the Ukraine crisis.
Discursos 2016, Pos. 118	The European security system created at the end of the Cold War has sustained considerable damage and is under unrelenting pressure

Report on Security Environment Change 22, P. 16	The Defence Forces will immediately launch the procurement process for additional defence materiel. This will supplement the shortcomings that have formed over a longer period of time and respond to the changes in the operating environment brought about
Discursos 2016, Pos. 101	Tensions are higher in the Baltic Sea region than they have been for many years. We are following the tone of pronouncements and watching military developments with concern.
Report on Security Environment Change 22, P. 21	Sweden is Finland's closest bilateral partner. Russia's invasion of Ukraine has further intensified and emphasised cooperation between Finland and Sweden, also in international contexts, and contacts are active at all levels. I
Defence Report 2021, P. 15	Sweden and Norway are strengthening their total defence to ensure a credible warfighting capability
Report on Security Environment Change 22, P. 39	Society must prepare for the fact that the measures that have been and that will be taken due to Russia's invasion of Ukraine will be felt in the daily life of everyone who lives in Finland, potentially over the long-term.
Discursos 2015, Pos. 6	So, we have moved from fine-tuning back to fundamental issues, and we must calibrate our actions and objectives accordingly.
Discursos 2021, Pos. 271	Since then, the geopolitical change has gained even more momentum. The bloc politics is making a return, although efforts to prevent it from getting totally out of control can also be seen. Some shifting can also be detected within the Western circles, and, as the geopolitical priorities change, new security political coalitions also emerge. We saw an example of this in September, when the United States, the United Kingdom and Australia declared a trilateral security pact AUKUS.
Discursos 2022, Pos. 77	Russia's war of aggression in Ukraine has forced us to adapt to a new reality. We are living in a time of war in Europe.
Report on Security Environment Change 22, P. 16	Russia's large-scale aggression highlights the necessity of a credible defence capability in a situation where military aggression would have to be repelled by national forces, at least initially
Report on Security Environment Change 22, P. 38	Russia's invasion of Ukraine has given rise to concern and insecurity among citizens, but also to a will to defend and promote the values of democracy on every level of society, from daily life to politics and national defence
Report on Security Environment Change 22, P. 39	Russia's invasion of Ukraine has further strengthened the will of the Finnish people to defend the country, which can be seen, for example, in the increased interest in voluntary national defence training.
Report on Security Environment	Russia's invasion of Ukraine has also affected international cooperation, for example within the UN, further aggravating value-based polarisation between countries. It is expected that in future, cooperation will take place in more

Change 22, P. 36	limited configurations among participants with a shared set of values and respect for democracy rooted in human rights and a rules-based approach.
Report on Security Environment Change 22, P. 46	Russia's invasion of Ukraine has abruptly changed the operating environment with regard to military security of supply
Defence Report 2021, P. 15	Russia maintains significant conventional warfighting capabilities in Finland's neighbouring areas and has, during the past few years, increased its military capacity in particular in its western region. It has continued the modernisation of its armed forces,
Report on Security Environment Change 22, P. 30	Russia is likely to adhere to its demands concerning European security and keep them on the agenda in the future. In a situation where Russia aims to build a sphere of influence through demands and military means, failing to react to the changes in the security environment could lead to changes in Finland's international position and a narrowing of Finland's room for manoeuvre.
Discursos 2016, Pos. 22	Rising international tensions have also been reflected in Finland's neighbourhood. Both Russia and NATO have increased their military presences in the Baltic Sea Region.
A Stronger North 2018, P. 14	Recent changes in the Nordic states' immediate security environment as well as a broader international landscape have given a new sense of purpose to Nordic cooperation on foreign and security policy, turning questions of regional security into a priority area.
Government_report 2016, P. 10	Rapid and unpredictable changes are the hallmark of Finland's transformed foreign and security policy environment.
Discursos 2019, Pos. 195	Precisely when a growing number of truly global challenges would urgently call for common responses, the rules-based international order is crumbling in front of our eyes. Multilateralism is overshadowed by great-power competition. Confrontation prevails over cooperation. Unpredictability and disorder are gaining the upper hand.
Discursos 2021, Pos. 265	Over the last decade, we have entered an era of growing uncertainty in the world politics. The great power competition is intensifying.
Discursos 2014, Pos. 191	Our security environment has changed. A new dimension has been added: cyber security. Our key functions are more and more dependent on information technology and data networks. Cyber influence forms a part of the picture of future conflicts separately or alongside other ways of applying pressure or using force. While the cyber dimension is not pervasive, it is present.
Discursos 2022, Pos. 95	Our security environment has also changed fundamentally.
Discursos 2016, Pos. 202-203	One field where steps forward should be taken is security. The EU is hardly worthy of the name union if it cannot protect its own people. The security situation in Europe has taken a dramatic turn for the worse. Breaches of international law and norms are never good news for small countries. The stability of the Baltic Sea region is a common and vital interest for both of us. Although our security policy solutions are not identical, we share the same concerns.
Discursos 2014, Pos. 101	On the other hand, it is neither possible to create a credible 'hermit defence' model. Modern technology alone prevents such isolationism. International cooperation and building a network to support that cooperation is a natural approach for modern national defence solutions.

Discursos 2017, Pos. 201-202	On the contrary, the world is extremely volatile right now. Serious conflicts continue in Europe's neighbouring areas. The Ukraine conflict is stuck in its own instability: ceasefires do not last and implementation of the Minsk agreement is not progressing. The parties involved are blaming each other, and it is hard to find any signs of positive development.
Discursos 2022, Pos. 343	On the 24th of February, I said that the masks have fallen and we see only the cold faces of war. Russia's war in Ukraine has changed Europe and our security environment
Discursos 2015, Pos. 50	Now we face a new challenge: ensuring the up-to-date performance of our national defence capability.
Discursos 2017, Pos. 9-10	Much has also occurred in our shared Baltic Sea region. Geopolitics is said to have returned, if it ever really left our neighbourhood. Tension has certainly increased in our region. I think that such tension reflects the cold winds blowing through the wider, international scene
Defence_Report 2017, P. 11	Military activity has intensified in the Baltic Sea region
Government_report 2016, P. 10	Many drivers of change in our operating environment are opening opportunities for advancing our international objectives. The recent changes in our operating environment have also created new threats and instability. From the European perspective the international security situation has deteriorated in recent years
Discursos 2022, Pos. 353	Last December launched a chain of events that fundamentally changed our security environment. This forced us to reassess our security policy.
Discursos 2017, Pos. 85	Increased tensions, arms races and rise of terrorism show no signs of abating.
Discursos 2021, Pos. 228	In this 2020s reality, the whole post-World War II world order is about to change. It means that many of the patterns typical of the era following the Cold War no longer apply. It is clear that we are on the verge of a new era, if we have not already crossed the line.
Discursos 2017, Pos. 71	In these documents we have sought to portray a clear-eyed reading of our changing security environment while combining it with a can-do attitude towards charting a course forward for the country and indeed the wider European region.
Discursos 2021, Pos. 251	In the world of the 2020s, the geopolitical realities remain the same, but the threat scenarios change. In the Cold War era, we got used to living under the balance of terror. Now the balance is shaking. By any means, I do not want to predict mere terror for our future, but I am very much afraid that the times ahead of us will be increasingly difficult.
Report on Security Environment Change 22, P. 17	In the changed operating environment, the importance of the Border Guard in the surveillance and safeguarding of territorial integrity and national defence tasks is emphasised. The military capability of the Border Guard and border troops will be improved.
Discursos 2016, Pos. 65	In terms of security policy, tensions grew in this region when Russia engaged in power politics in Ukraine, in breach of international law. From a wider perspective, this also concerns Russia's increased military capacity and the frequently made observation that it now has a lower threshold for resorting to military force. In addition, mention has been made of the use of nuclear weapons in a manner never heard during the Cold War, or at least in its final stages.

Report on Security Environment Change 22, P. 15	In response to the changed security situation, Finland will in any case have to strengthen its security and defence capability and intensify long-term cooperation with key partners. The emphasis is on ensuring security, sovereign decision-making, room for manoeuvre and society's capacity to function. Finland makes its foreign and security policy decisions independently.
Discursos 2022, Pos. 402	In recent years, we have seen new phenomena in our security environment that give rise for reviewing our national preparedness. One example of such operations is a large-scale entry to the country organised by external hostile parties.
A Stronger North 2018, P. 10	In recent years, the international environment around the Nordic states has undergone even greater changes. The annexation of Crimea by Russia in 2014 and the subsequent war in Eastern Ukraine shook the European security order, resulting in a serious political stalemate between Russia and the western community of states
Discursos 2018, Pos. 173	In international relations we clearly find ourselves in an era of growing instability and uncertainty. Many elements of stability that we mistakenly thought of as permanent are shaking. Many factors creating instability that we thought we had left behind are coming back. At the same time, new dangers are on the rise. Many of the old truths no longer hold, but the visibility towards the future is limited.
Discursos 2016, Pos. 231	I would like to mention a key theme, namely Finland's preparedness in the face of a fast-changing security environment
Discursos 2017, Pos. 85	I take it that we can all agree that Europe is not as stable and secure as we would like it to be.
Discursos 2016, Pos. 53	I could continue talking about conflicts and sources of instability for even longer. The fundamental issue is to realise that they are unlikely to stop impacting on life in Europe and its development for some time to come.
Discursos 2014, Pos. 106	I consider it obvious that in the long term Europe must take a completely different approach to security matters. There are already growing pressures towards this, if only because there are also fires burning to the south of the EU, not just to the east. The turmoil in northern Africa and the Middle East that followed the Arab Spring is a phenomenon whose dimensions and impact on Europe are not yet clear.
Government Report 2020, P. 37	Hybrid influencing is linked with the deteriorated security situation in Europe
Discursos 2014, Pos. 99	However, we too need to reappraise our national defence according to the spirit of the times, in terms of both capability and readiness.
Discursos 2021, Pos. 240	For its part, it testifies that we have woken up to the need created by our changing environment. It is good to remain on this path of cooperation.
Report on Finland's Accession to NATO 15.05.22, P. 3	Following Russia's invasion of Ukraine, a fundamental change has taken place in the security and operating environment of Finland and Europe. J
Report on Security Environment Change 22, P. 8	Following Russia's invasion of Ukraine, a fundamental change has taken place in the security and operating environment of Finland and Europe

Inclusive and competent Finland_2019_WEB, P. 98	Finland's security environment has become more unstable, and the change is expected to be long-lasting. The strategic significance of the Baltic Sea region in military terms has grown and military activities have intensified
Defence_Report 2017, P. 6	Finland's military operating environment has changed. Military activity and military tensions have increased in the Baltic Sea region. The early-warning period for military crises has become shorter and the threshold for using force has lowered. As a result of the increasingly complex nature of war a wide range of measures could be used against Finland. The demands on defence have grown. Finland must prepare for the use of military force, or threat thereof, against it
Defence_Report 2017, P. 16	Finland's defence is being developed to satisfy the growing demands of the operating environment. Finland must be able to resist military pressure and a rapidly escalating military threat, and repel a large-scale attack.
Government Report 2020, P. 21	Finland's security environment has become more unstable, and the change is expected to be long-lasting.
Discursos 2014, Pos. 95	Finland faces no military threats. Our neighbouring regions are stable. Finland is also not a security vacuum, and we cannot afford to become one. We are managing this both nationally and internationally.
Discursos 2015, Pos. 58	Europe's more difficult security situation
Defence_Report 2017, P. 25	Early warning of military threats against Finland calls for sophisticated intelligence and surveillance capability and international cooperation
Discursos 2015, Pos. 45	During the past year, the Ukraine crisis and Russia's actions have destabilised the security situation of the eastern fringes of Europe. Thousands of people have been killed, the stability of security policy has been compromised, and key principles of international law have been violated.
Government_report 2016, P. 13	During the past decades the foundation of the security system in our neighbourhood has been cooperation that was based on the principles of shared security as well as arms reduction treaties and confidence-building measures. During the past ten years or so Russia, through its actions and interpretations, has challenged the essence of the security regime to an extent, and has destabilised it. The West and Russia have very different opinions on how to restore stability to the security regime.
Defence Report 2021, P. 26	Despite the increasingly tense international situation, Finland is not under any immediate military threat. Nonetheless, Finland must prepare for the use or the threat of use of military force against it.
Discursos 2015, Pos. 46	Circumstances have forced us to reorient ourselves from a European expansive policy of values to a defensive security policy.
Defence Report 2021, P. 18	Changes in the security environment challenge the resilience of the entire Finnish society.
Defence Report 2021, P. 41	Changes in the operating environment have resulted in defence cooperation becoming more focused on issues relating to the security situation of the neighbouring area, changes to the threat environment and military capabilities, situational awareness, and cooperation during crisis situations
Government_report 2016, P. 13	Changes in the international security environment, the return of Russia to thinking in terms of power politics, including its internal development, the growth of its military potential and increasing military activity challenge the

	very foundations of the European security regime and create instability in Finland's operating environment.
Report on Security Environment Change 22, P. 34	Changes in the foreign and security policy environment are also reflected in the cyber environment. Russia is conducting cyber attacks as part of its aggression against Ukraine and is likely to expand its cyber and information operations from Ukraine to the west
Defence Report 2021, P. 21	Changes in Finland's operating environment have required that the Defence Forces create a more comprehensive situational awareness, ensure sufficient early warning and support for decision-making, adjust readiness, as well as maintain a strong and credible defence capability
Report on Finland's Accession to NATO 15.05.22, P. 3	By joining NATO, Finland would strengthen its own security in the changed operating environment.
Report on Security Environment Change 22, P. 16	By allocating additional resources to defence, Finland's defence capability will be developed on an accelerated timetable to meet the increased demands of the operating environment
Discursos 2020, Pos. 151	But it also tells something about our time. In the midst of great changes, there is again demand for a Paasikivi-like realism. It is again a topical question to consider Finland's position in the "conjunctures" of great power politics. And indeed, when studying the phases of Paasikivi's life from today's perspective, one notices again and again that one can identify some familiar features. Layers of new technologies and new actors have been added, but great power politics and geography are the issues we keep on going back to. The script and the casting change, but the stage remains the same.
Discursos 2019, Pos. 144	At the same time, the world around us is changing, continually posing new challenges for us. Super power competition is intensifying and the geopolitical situation is difficult to predict. Military activity in Baltic Sea region remains at a highly level, and the importance of the Arctic region in the security policy context is growing.
Discursos 2015, Pos. 89	At the moment, we can only say for sure that, during a parliamentary term, circumstances change in ways that we cannot predict. This brings us to a question: should we not view it as natural that the Government will present Parliament with a new programme if the underlying assumptions of the previous one have changed and a new direction needs to be taken? Should we not, therefore, break the taboo of the unalterable Government programme? Facing up to reality is a sign of strength, not of weakness.
A Stronger North 2018, P. 24	At the global level, the gradual weakening of multilateral institutions (most importantly the UN) at the cost of new informal forums (such as the G20) presented a worrying trend from the point of view of small states, such as the five Nordics, which have traditionally strongly relied on and supported multilateral institutions. ³⁴
Discursos 2015, Pos. 121-122	At the Kultaranta talks in the early summer, I commented that the international system is now undergoing a profound transformation marked by major uncertainty and accumulating problems. That is the situation in which we now find ourselves.

	Everywhere we look, textbooks on political realism are being re-opened. In Finland, such books were never quite closed. Our history saw to that.
Discursos 2019, Pos. 112	As you well know, the global situation has become highly unstable.
Report on Security Environment Change 22, P. 18	As a result of the changes in the operating environment, defence cooperation has in recent years focused more strongly on issues in neighbouring areas related to the security situation, evolving threat environments, military capabilities, situation awareness and cooperation in crisis situations.
Report on Security Environment Change 22, P. 28	As a result of Russia's aggression, NATO is currently assessing ways to strengthen its deterrence and defence and the arrangement for collective defence within the Alliance.
Discursos 2021, Pos. 44	As I said in my new year's address, we find ourselves at a new turning point in world politics as well. The great power relations and the multilateral system are seeking a new balance. As yet, we do not know how the pieces will settle next. But it is certain that we must stay alert in how we practice our foreign policy. In the midst of change, we must safeguard Finland's position. And in this respect too, we must bear the responsibility jointly, as institutions and as a nation.
Discursos 2016, Pos. 233	Although our model is up to date, we need to be capable of upgrading it continuously.
Report on Security Environment Change 22, P. 16	. Through proactive diplomacy, for which sufficient resources must be secured, Finland must prepare for and respond to changes in foreign and security policy.
Defence Report 2021, P. 15	. The Baltic countries have continued strengthening their own national defence capabilities and NATO's collective defence
Report on Security Environment Change 22, P. 26	. In the changed security environment, the strategic importance of Northern Europe has increased, which is why NATO has opened new avenues for cooperation for Finland and Sweden. Dialogue and practical military cooperation on the security situation in the Baltic Sea region increase Finland's opportunities to influence its security environment and improve predictability and stability in the region. After Russia's invasion of Ukraine, Finland and Sweden have deepened their bilateral cooperation and enhanced their contacts with NATO to improve their shared situation awareness.
Inclusive and competent Finland_2019_WEB, P. 99	. Changes in the security situation require the maintenance of a high level of readiness and continuous development of capabilities. L

Ameaça Russa

Documento	Segmentos codificados
Discursos 2021, Pos. 178	we will not accept the illegal annexation of Crimea, nor will we condone the continued recourse to a set of destabilising activities on the part of Russia.

A Stronger North 2018, P. 25	the balance in Nordic foreign and security policy cooperation has tilted in favour of hard security in the Nordic-Baltic region.
A Stronger North 2018, P. 25	the Nordic foreign and security policy agenda has gradually shifted, with issues of regional security turning into a priority area. Hence, among the key topics of Nordic foreign ministers' meetings since 2014 have been the Ukraine crisis, Russia's foreign and security policy posture as well as the security situation around the Baltic Sea. Debates about Russia's role in Syria or possible changes in the transatlantic relations have also been conducted with their implications for regional security in mind.
Report on Security Environment Change 22, P. 10	n. Russia's aggression against Ukraine has further destabilised the situation in the EU's eastern neighbourhood
Futures_Review 2018, P. 11	n. China and Russia are challenging the Western unity and ability to act.
Report on Security Environment Change 22, P. 16	n addition to monitoring and safeguarding Finland's territorial integrity and ensuring continued preparedness, preparations must be made for a situation similar to the ongoing war in Ukraine where the scale, duration and multidimensional nature of the crisis pose a greater challenge to the defence capability than previously estimated.
Discursos 2022, Pos. 21	he ultimatums Russia gave to the U.S. and NATO in December concern Europe. They are in conflict with the European security order. Spheres of interest do not belong to the 2020s. The sovereign equality of all states is the basic principle that everyone should respect.
Defence Report 2021, P. 16	and has developed their operating procedures by incorporating combat experiences from recent operations. The ability to make rapid decisions and the high readiness of its armed forces enables Russia to carry out rapid and unexpected operations. Different methods, such as prolonging conflicts, are used to achieve desired goals
Government Report 2020, P. 35	a. Finland must be able to assess Russia's internal development and foreign and security policy actions with high accuracy. This requires the maintenance of robust expert knowledge on Russia.
Discursos 2014, Pos. 64	Yet the voice of this important body should have been even stronger, condemning Russia's actions and charting a way towards ending violence and restoring peace. When the territorial integrity of a Member State is violated and it loses control over a part of its own area through an illegal annexation, the Member State should be able to turn to the United Nations for justice and remedy.
Assessment on NATO membership 2016, P. 17	With the growing risk of military accidents and the escalation of military activities, the security of countries such as Finland located in the immediate vicinity of Russian strategic regions is becoming vulnerable.
Discursos 2022, Pos. 354	With its requirements about stopping NATO enlargement, Russia strived to narrow our freedom of choice and our sovereignty. This put us in a new position. Russia's major offensive against Ukraine made it clear that it is once again ready to use armed force in its immediate areas to achieve its goals. These combined factors showed the impermanence of our traditional position.

Discursos 2014, Pos. 228	What are the true capabilities of Russia's armed forces? And what about the efficiency of its arms industry? We must also bear Russia's size in mind
Discursos 2015, Pos. 108	We need also Russia to carry its responsibility to secure peace and honor those decisions made here, in this very house in 1975.
Discursos 2021, Pos. 45	We have been carefully and with concern following the recent events in Russia. They have been condemned repeatedly, both in Finland and in Europe. There has been reason to do so, and most recently more reasons appeared yesterday
Discursos 2015, Pos. 8	We condemned Russia's illegal annexation of Crimea as soon as it happened and then condemned Russia's actions in eastern Ukraine. We have done this in the EU context but have also made this clear in our direct contacts with Russia.
Futures_Review 2018, P. 13	To the east of the EU, Russia shows no signs of changing its confrontational and revisionist approach. Tensions between Russia and the West may remain high for a long time to co-me.
Discursos 2014, Pos. 138	This crisis and – I believe we must say it openly – Russia's actions in particular, have rapidly subjected Europe's security system to intense pressure and damage.
Report on Security Environment Change 22, P. 9	The war started by Russia jeopardises the security and stability of the whole of Europe.
Report on Security Environment Change 22, P. 10	The war against Ukraine shows even more clearly that the use of force is a key part of Russia's range of instruments and that it is ready to use extensive military force against civilian targets to pursue its political goals. Russia has shown that it can also use chemical weapons.
Discursos 2022, Pos. 386	The threat of war is growing at the borders of Ukraine, and Russia is challenging the foundations of European security.
Discursos 2022, Pos. 23	The sovereignty of several Member States, also Sweden and Finland, has been challenged from outside the Union.
Discursos 2022, Pos. 263	The impacts of the war of aggression Russia is waging in Ukraine are immense
Government Report 2020, P. 24	The impacts of Russian power politics are reflected on the Baltic Sea region, where the negative cycle created by Russia has intensified tensions and increased military activity.
Report on Security Environment Change 22, P. 9	The aggression violates Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity and poses a serious threat to international peace and security.
Report on Security Environment Change 22, P. 13	The aggression by Russia, a permanent member of the UN Security Council, is a blatant violation of international law and an assault against the multilateral rules-based order. The UN Charter prohibits the use of force or the threat thereof against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state. Through its actions, Russia has also shown serious disregard for international humanitarian law.
Report on Security Environment Change 22, P. 11	The Russian invasion of Ukraine has long-term effects on the security environment in Europe and Finland's neighbouring areas. Russia has shown that it does not respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of states, and it has violated the UN Charter and breached the European security order.

Discursos 2022, Pos. 251	Russia's war of aggression and the ongoing invasion of Ukraine are grave breaches of international law.
Discursos 2022, Pos. 299	Russia's war in Ukraine is reflected as global instability in all continents. In the coming months, the energy crisis will test the resilience of Europe, and the impacts of the food crisis are already affecting the product selection and prices.
Report on Security Environment Change 22, P. 16	Russia's large-scale aggression highlights the necessity of a credible defence capability in a situation where military aggression would have to be repelled by national forces, at least initially
Discursos 2022, Pos. 216	Russia's cruel and unprovoked war on Ukraine has now been raging for seven months. It has brought immense sorrow and destruction to the sovereign lands of Ukraine. Russia's use of force is in blatant violation of the Charter of the United Nations. It is an act of aggression, as determined by this very Assembly.
Discursos 2022, Pos. 135	Russia's brutal war of aggression against a sovereign country, against its neighbour
Report on Security Environment Change 22, P. 32	Russia's aggression against Ukraine has led to a strong segregation of information environments. Russia aims to influence the formation of opinions both in Russia and abroad, and it creates a narrative to justify its actions. Russia's information influence activities in western countries have proven less effective than expected
Discursos 2014, Pos. 53	Russia's actions have damaged international security and co-operation especially in Europe.
Government Report 2020, P. 19	Russia, on the other hand, has weakened security by taking actions in violation of the international law and having employed military force.
Discursos 2022, Pos. 172	Russia, a permanent member of the UN Security Council, is waging a brutal war of aggression against Ukraine, a sovereign country. It has started a mobilization, however partial that is. It is talking increasingly loosely about the use of nuclear weapons. In outright contempt of international law, it has arranged sham referendums in areas it has occupied from its neighbour. And as President Putin has just declared moments ago, it is using those illegitimate results to claim that these areas are now part of the Russian Federation. Finland, together with the whole EU and our other partners, has firmly condemned these acts.
Defence Report 2021, P. 15	Russia maintains significant conventional warfighting capabilities in Finland's neighbouring areas and has, during the past few years, increased its military capacity in particular in its western region. It has continued the modernisation of its armed forces,
Discursos 2022, Pos. 212	Russia is waging a brutal war in Ukraine. The ripple effects of that war are already far-reaching and severe. They are compounding the pre-existing problems faced by the international community.
Discursos 2022, Pos. 103	Russia is using its energy weapon in the hope that our resilience is the first to break. That Western unity would begin to crack and our support Ukraine to falter.
Defence Report 2021, P. 14	Russia is seeking to strengthen its position and to weaken the unity of Western actors. It is still aiming at a sphere-of-influence-based security regime in Europe. Additionally, the use of military force remains a central tool for Russia, and using force or threats of using military force cannot be ruled out.

Government Report 2020, P. 24	Russia is raising the readiness level of its troops and enhancing its capacity to rapidly concentrate additional forces to an area
Discursos 2022, Pos. 292-293	Russia is now engaged in an illegal war of aggression against Ukraine. Finland's position on the matter is crystal clear: we unequivocally condemn it. We oppose Russia's actions by the means of sanctions we have imposed together with other EU Member States. Finland demands that all war crimes be investigated and those guilty of the crimes be held responsible. Under the prevailing circumstances, there is not much left of our earlier relationship with Russia. The trust is gone, and there are nothing in sight on which to base a new beginning. This is not the right time to build connections. On the contrary: we must very carefully reconsider any dependencies that could be used against us. Nothing must be left loose.
Discursos 2014, Pos. 228	Russia is modernising its armed forces: something which has been a long-term objective.
Government Report 2020, P. 23	Russia has weakened the security of our neighbouring areas and Europe by illegally annexing Crimea and by keeping up the conflict it started in Eastern Ukraine. Russian operations in areas like Georgia, Ukraine and Syria show that the country has lowered its threshold to use military force. Because of Russian actions, the security policy situation has become more tense, and the EU-Russia relations have deteriorated. Russia is still aiming at a sphere-of-influence-based security regime in Europe.
Discursos 2022, Pos. 47	Russia has systematically destroyed Ukraine's agricultural infrastructure and prevented the export of grain. We strongly condemn this. We also must actively combat disinformation disseminated by Russia, claiming that the food crisis is caused by the sanctions imposed by the West. The truth is that Russia alone is responsible for the human suffering caused by its actions.
Report on Security Environment Change 22, P. 10	Russia has stated that it could use nuclear weapons in a situation where it feels that its existence is threatened. Since the start of the war of aggression against Ukraine, Russia has repeatedly highlighted its preparedness to use nuclear weapons
Government_report 2016, P. 16	Russia has mostly abandoned the cooperation-based security thinking. Rather, it now challenges the European security system. Russia has publicly promoted its goal of a sphere-of-influence-based security regime and demonstrated the will and capacity to employ military force in prosecuting its objectives. R
Discursos 2018, Pos. 137	Russia has been doing it aggressively, flexing its military muscles, and also using them, as we have seen in Ukraine and Syria.
Assessment on NATO membership 2016, P. 16	Russia currently challenges the legitimacy of the post-Cold War international order, the governance of which (including the OSCE and the Council of Europe) it perceives as embodiments of Western hegemony
Report on Security Environment Change 22, P. 9	Russia also paved the way for its invasion by means of sustained information campaigns against Ukraine and the West. The aim was to shape public opinion through threat scenarios and historico-political narrative. Russia did not achieve its objectives with these means and launched a full-scale military offensive against Ukraine on several fronts.
Government_report 2016, P. 13	Russia annexed the Crimean Peninsula and created the crisis in eastern Ukraine. A vicious circle has evolved, resulting in increased tension and military activity in the Baltic Sea region. In recent years Russia has also increased its military

	footprint and activity in the Arctic, where the situation, so far, has remained relatively stable. Russia uses a wide range of military and non-military instruments in advancing its interests.
Discursos 2016, Pos. 19	Our understanding of security has changed. We only woke up to war when it was upon us in Europe, where Russia's reprehensible actions in Crimea and Ukraine disrupted our oasis of peace.
Discursos 2017, Pos. 87	Our joint co-operation platform, the OSCE, struggles as key commitments have been breached: The annexation of Crimea by Russia was a heavy blow.
Discursos 2022, Pos. 201	One thing is certain. In the coming months, our resilience will be severely tested. Whatever Russia does next, however difficult the energy crisis will turn out to be, unity is our response. In Finland, in Europe, in the world.
Discursos 2022, Pos. 171	Let me begin by stating the obvious: the security situation in Europe is dangerous. We all know this. We all know why this is so.
Discursos 2022, Pos. 300	It is also highly disquieting that several difficult geopolitical issues familiar from the past have become activated at the same time. They may be indirectly linked to the Russian military activities, but – whether talking about the relations between Serbia and Kosovo or the varied conflicts in the Middle East – there is enough internal driving force behind each of them as well.
Discursos 2014, Pos. 22-23	In this situation, citizens pinned their hopes for change on the European Union and the association and free trade agreement it offered. The reforms required and the possibilities offered by the agreement seemed to point the way towards, and perhaps represented the only opportunity for, a better future. However, this development was in powerful contrast to the view taken of the matter by, and the perceived interests of, Ukraine's eastern neighbour, Russia.
Discursos 2022, Pos. 290	In this position of mine, I have kept in mind the centuries old wisdom: the Cossack takes everything that is left loose. It applies equally to material things and to freedom of action. This was also the case when, at the end of last year, Russia was demanding that the expansion of NATO must stop. We fixed that matter.
Discursos 2022, Pos. 138	In the coming months, our resilience will be severely tested. There are dangerous scenarios that we can and should anticipate. There are wicked surprises that we need to prepare for. Whatever Russia does next, however difficult the energy crisis will turn out to be, unity must be our response.
Report on Security Environment Change 22, P. 14	In international relations, trust in Russia has collapsed
A Stronger North 2018, P. 18	In 2014, the foreign ministers of the NB8+V4 countries issued a joint statement condemning Russian actions in Ukraine and Crimea. 18
Defence Report 2021, P. 16	During the last few years, Russia has positioned some of its most technologically advanced weapons systems and increasingly more capable forces close to Finland. It regularly conducts joint service exercises, and its ability to project military force in a swift and surprising manner has improved. Long-range weapon systems, such as cruise missiles, enable Russia to extend its military capabilities beyond its borders, and restrict the freedom of action of other actors. Russia conducts exercises and operates actively outside its territory, which could escalate tensions. Furthermore, it has strengthened its strategic nuclear deterrent, and hardened its nuclear rhetoric.

Discursos 2022, Pos. 175	But the impacts of this new reality are not limited to Ukraine. Russia’s war has deep, extensive and long-term implications for all of us. In Finland, in Northern Europe, in Europe as a whole, and in the world.
Discursos 2014, Pos. 229	Both the country’s domestic policy and its actions abroad have raised concerns and some justified criticism in Europe. A focus on conservative values in Russia – and perhaps movement in the opposite direction in the West – has begun to open up a clearer mental gulf between the two regions. This has been exacerbated by the nature of Russia’s foreign policy. Concerns about this are justified.
Discursos 2022, Pos. 95	At the end of last year, we recognized the change as Russia called for a halt to NATO expansion. Finland saw this as an attempt to deny our freedom of choice. Immediately after Russia made its demand, I gave a statement in response, stating: “Maintaining a national room to manoeuvre and freedom of choice is the foundation of Finland’s foreign, security and defence policy. This also includes the possibility of military alignment and applying for NATO membership.” Our decision finally matured after Russia started its attack on Ukraine.
Discursos 2022, Pos. 315	And there is an urgent need for that: for making this Alliance stronger. It begins in Europe. With Russia’s illegal invasion of Ukraine, our security environment has changed dramatically.
Discursos 2015, Pos. 178	All illegal measures, like the annexation of Crimea to Russia, cannot and must not be accepted.
Discursos 2016, Pos. 180	All illegal actions, including the annexation of Crimea to Russia, are to be condemned.
Discursos 2022, Pos. 124	After Russia’s brutal invasion of Ukraine on the 24th of February, Europe’s security order has been on thin ice.
Discursos 2022, Pos. 272	According to Russia, military non-alignment was no longer up to Finland and Sweden’s own free will. Already in my New Year’s speech, I said that we must know “when to hurry, and when to have patience”.
Assessment on NATO membership 2016, P. 53	. The unexpected and unprovoked breach of the border regime in Northern Finland in late 2015 is an example of Russia’s propen-sity to create a problem, then leverage it and offer to manage it without necessarily solving it. Russian reactions could also include increased pres-sure on the borders with the Baltic States. An attempt to politically acti-vate the ethnic Russians living in Finland may also be considered
Discursos 2022, Pos. 92	. Russia’s brutal invasion of Ukraine brought war to Europe. All the Nordic countries have strongly condemned Russia’s actions. All the Nordic countries stand firmly behind Ukraine as it fights for its freedom and for our common values.
Defence Report 2021, P. 16	. Russia has illegally annexed Crimea and maintained the conflict it started in Eastern Ukraine. In the spring of 2021 Russia concentrated a large number of military forces in Crimea and on its border with Ukraine. Its activities, for example, in Georgia, Ukraine and Syria demonstrate that the threshold for threatening to use or using military force to try and reach a political goal has lowered.
Assessment on NATO membership 2016, P. 52	. During the last fifteen years, Russia has turned into a unsat-ified power, questioning post-Cold War arrangements in Europe and even the norms and principles of the Helsinki Final Act of 1975 and the Paris Charter of 1990. Russia considers itself disadvantaged by the state of affairs in Europe. The view that Russia is not just another European state is largely shared by the Russian

	elite. This sets Russia apart and leads to a revisionist stand demanding a renegotiation of European security structures and even demanding the recognition of spheres of special interest, in other words a veto over developments that impinge on Russia's interests
--	--

Necessidade de Mudança na Política Externa Finlandesa

Documento	Segmentos codificados
Discursos 2022, Pos. 358	our trust in the traditional ways of ensuring our security and maintaining our relations with Russia broke. Our old policies are no longer compliant with the new situation.
Discursos 2014, Pos. 208	it is time to spring to our feet.
Discursos 2014, Pos. 216	We should be continuously oriented towards securing and reactivating cooperation.
Discursos 2014, Pos. 118-119	We place a lot of focus on how our actions appear from the outside. What we should now focus on is what our actions lead to, for we live in troubled times. The severe crisis in Ukraine continues.
Discursos 2014, Pos. 228	We must pay close attention to this transformation, while taking a broad perspective.
Discursos 2015, Pos. 5	We have seen that Europe is not the haven of peace that we imagined it to be. The Ukrainian conflict and Russia's actions in it proved otherwise.
Discursos 2015, Pos. 150	This theme is directly linked to the EU's obligations of mutual assistance. Some view such obligations as not worth the paper they are printed on. Some also believe that they oblige Finland to help defend other countries, such as the Baltic nations, if necessary. While this is all very interesting, it is a little odd to note that the same people seem to hold both opinions at once. There is clearly no point in exaggerating the EU's mutual assistance obligations. But this does not mean that we should not seek to strengthen them.
Discursos 2016, Pos. 67-69	This change has been noted by Finland and Sweden, the two non-NATO countries of Northern Europe. The foreign and security policy of these two countries is extensively integrated. Both are strengthening their national defence and mutual defence cooperation. Both Finland and Sweden extensively engage in international cooperation. This applies to our NATO partnership as well as cooperation with the United States. There will also be an opportunity to emphasize transatlantic relations when we meet at the Nordic-US Leaders' Summit hosted by President Obama in May. Finland is therefore reacting, but not overreacting. That is, of course, just my opinion: some believe that we have already overreacted, while others think the opposite. But we can all at least agree that we are reacting. Why are we acting in this way? First, the increase in tension is having negative impacts, but not to the extent that they have become uncontrollable in scope or have forced a complete reappraisal of the situation. We are not yet out of options.
Discursos 2022, Pos. 363	The state leaders of Sweden and Finland have now considered the risk of inaction to be higher than the risk of taking action.
Discursos 2014, Pos. 122	Our country now needs confidence and courage.

Discursos 2015, Pos. 13	Our Western partnership is one of the pillars of our security. Membership of the EU is an important security solution for Finland, even if it is not a defence solution.
Discursos 2014, Pos. 120	One conclusion is obvious. We must take care of our own defence capability. This requires investment, perhaps greater than we have so far discussed.
Discursos 2014, Pos. 189	No defence co-operation can replace national defence, nor is it intended to. However, through co-operation national defence will become stronger. The national and the international aspects are mutually supportive.
Discursos 2019, Pos. 115	Maintaining, our international position, let alone strengthening it, within that triangle will require more and more work in the future. The triangle around us may change its shape and position surprisingly quickly. Maintaining our own room for manoeuvre will require that we monitor this dynamic with great.
Discursos 2015, Pos. 14	Ever since I took office, I have stressed the importance of bilateral defence cooperation with Sweden. We are pursuing this together, step by step. Both governments are highly committed to the effort, and we are expecting new practical applications to emerge in the year now beginning. We have taken our NATO partnership to a new level and continue to pursue this angle. It goes without saying that we can always apply for NATO membership, if we wish to do so.
Discursos 2014, Pos. 122	Encouragement is needed, even if this means encouragement to do things differently.
Discursos 2022, Pos. 177	Dangerous times must not lead to paralysis. We have to be able to act decisively to meet the demands of the new reality. In the case of Finland, the track record of the past year speaks for itself. We have been quick on our feet, bringing about a fundamental change in our foreign and security policy in the midst of a major crisis.

Relações com a Rússia

Documento	Segmentos codificados
Government Report 2020, P. 28	Well-functioning neighbourly relations with Russia are important to Finland.
Discursos 2021, Pos. 181	We also need dialogue with Russia. That is in no contradiction to firmness. Speaking from the Finnish experience, I can ensure you that both elements can fit in the same equation. Our relationship with Russia is based on an active, straightforward dialogue.
Discursos 2016, Pos. 72	Together with the Government, we have sought to keep our channels of dialogue with Russia – including its national leaders – open in a transparent and responsible manner. This was the case during the Easter week, when I met with President Putin in Moscow. It is better to talk to one another than ignore each other. It is better to seek cooperation wherever possible. It is better to try to take care of problems than leave them unresolved. Such is Finland’s neighbouring area policy in all directions. Looking in one direction does not prevent us from turning towards the others – even if some, who have lost their maps and compasses, clearly fear this.

Discursos 2017, Pos. 54	Thirdly, there is our relationship with Russia, which has always been an inevitable and essential priority for us. We have no bilateral problems in this regard and have no interest in creating such problems
Discursos 2022, Pos. 195	Third, our relationship with Russia. This is of course the pillar that has collapsed, and we therefore need to rely even more on the others. I want to stress that we have never been naïve about this. The idea has been to maintain as functioning a relationship with Russia as possible at a given point in time. Simultaneously, I have always repeated the old Finnish wisdom that the Cossack takes everything that is loose.
Ratkaisujen Suomi_EN_YH DISTETTY_net ti, P. 37	The improvement of relations between Russia and the EU would reinforce the security and economy of Europe as a whole. This cooperation must be based on respect for international law and international commitments. Russia is an important neighbour for Finland. Finland complies with the European Union's common positions on Russia and also maintains diverse bilateral relations.
Government_re port 2016, P. 24	The EU's common positions on Russia form the basis for Finland's action. Improved cooperation between the EU and Russia would strengthen the security and economy of all of Europe; Russia's isolation does not serve anyone's interests
Discursos 2015, Pos. 94	So too is nurturing our relations with Russia.
Discursos 2022, Pos. 289	Since the beginning of our recorded history, our eastern neighbour has been there, in one form or another, both in bad days and in better days. Russia will continue to be there, even if there were no turn for the better. We do know something about what it is like across the eastern border, maybe more than many others. We must not forget that.
Discursos 2021, Pos. 341	Russia's proximity and military power makes it a force always to be reckoned with for Europe. For Finland, maintaining a functioning bilateral relationship with Russia is essential. But a constructive dialogue is in no contradiction with firmly defending our interests and principles in that relationship. The same should be possible for the European Union, too. Refusing to interact with Russia does not strengthen the EU, it only makes it look weaker and less relevant.
Report on Security Environment Change 22, P. 11	Russia has announced that it has added Finland and all other EU Member States to the list of "unfriendly countries". Russia's invasion of Ukraine has wide-ranging effects on the bilateral relations and cooperation between Finland and Russia. However, efforts have been made in bilateral relations to maintain the necessary channels for cooperation related to matters such as border security, crime prevention, migration issues, transport and security of supply in accordance with the sanctions.
Discursos 2015, Pos. 48	Relations between Finland and Russia have not been unaffected by the broader tensions that I just described, especially as far as the economy is concerned. However, it would not be in anyone's interests – least of all our own – for us to deliberately undermine our mutual relations.
Discursos 2014, Pos. 32	Overall security also involves fostering good relations with our neighbours and maintaining a credible defence, built within the context of the circumstances in which we find ourselves.
Discursos 2021, Pos. 176	Over time, this relationship has experienced fluctuations, to put it mildly. But what has persisted for decades, is a shared commitment to seek working relations between neighbours. In the process, maintaining a functioning

	relationship with Russia – as functioning a relationship as possible at a given point in time – has become an important pillar supporting our own security.
Discursos 2014, Pos. 89	It is clear to me that it is vital to keep communication channels open between different parties. That, after all, is what diplomacy is all about. And diplomacy is essential for understanding the views and actions of the parties involved in a crisis, which in turn is vital for achieving any steps towards a peaceful solution. This is essentially why I went to Russia and Ukraine the week before last.
Discursos 2022, Pos. 67	Instead, we have received all the more appreciation. In the field of diplomacy, for our clear-cut and straightforward communication with Russia.
Discursos 2014, Pos. 155	In order to prevent further escalation of the crisis diplomacy and dialogue between all parties involved are very much needed.
Discursos 2022, Pos. 294	However, this is not the right time to totally sever all connections either. There are still practical matters, the management of which is in our own interest. We should also hold channels of discussion open for the future, even if we do not actively use them for the time being.
Discursos 2016, Pos. 101	History and geopolitics explain the level of concern in the Baltic countries and the desire for a stronger NATO presence.
Report on Security Environment Change 22, P. 28	Finland would aim to continue to maintain functioning relations with Russia in the event it becomes a NATO member.
Government Report 2020, P. 34	Finland maintains functioning and close relations with Russia in sectors of key importance for Finland and the EU
Government_report 2016, P. 24 - 25	Finland aims to maintain stable and well-functioning relations with Russia. In addition to economic cooperation, collaboration in Arctic and climate questions, for example, remains important. Finland's energy cooperation with Russia is broad and must be interconnected with the development of the EU's Energy Union. Regional and cross-border cooperation with Russia in northern 23 Europe continues at the practical level, which is in the interests of Finland. It is important to support the civil society and direct contact between citizens
Discursos 2016, Pos. 76	Europe has fallen into what are in many ways difficult and uncertain times. In historical terms, however, this is not an exceptional state of affairs. Only those whose sense of history is limited to the last couple of decades view our times as unusual. Nations that take care of themselves and each other can cope and thrive even now, just as they have done before.
Discursos 2017, Pos. 211	Based on my own discussions with President Putin in Savonlinna, I believe that although Russia remains inflexible on many issues, it is now looking for a more constructive approach in others. This particularly applies to the improvement of flight safety over the Baltic Sea and the problem of black carbon in the Arctic region. The Northern Dimension and its objectives are another such area.
Discursos 2022, Pos. 196	At this point in time, any kind of functioning relationship with Russia seems like a very distant prospect. Instead, we need to focus on fixing anything that may still lay loose. But we also need to remember that Russia will not disappear. It will continue to be our neighbour, even if there is no turn for the better. Finland can never afford to ignore it.
Discursos 2022, Pos. 163-165	As for Finland, we have never been naïve about this. Neither have you. Our idea has been to maintain as functioning a relationship with Russia as possible

	<p>at a given point in time. Simultaneously, I have always repeated the old Finnish wisdom that the Cossack takes everything that is loose.</p> <p>At this point in time, any kind of functioning relationship with Russia seems like a very distant prospect. Instead, we need to focus on fixing anything that may still lay loose.</p> <p>But we also need to remember that Russia will not disappear. It will continue to be our neighbour, even if there is no turn for the better. Finland can never afford to ignore it. NATO membership will not change that reality. In this, too, I think there is a lot Finland and Norway can learn from each other.</p>
Discursos 2022, Pos. 360	Also in the future, Finland wants to take care of the practical questions arising from being a neighbour of Russia in a correct and professional manner. Security is not a zero-sum game. The Finnish people looking at Russia across the border are the same as they were before.

Segurança e Defesa Finlandesa

Documento	Segmentos codificados
Discursos 2017, Pos. 72	“Finland actively improves the stability of security in its vicinity” and does so by pursuing “an active policy of stability to prevent military threats.”
Discursos 2019, Pos. 150	ur national defence concept is based on universal conscription that we have held onto in the face of global changes. And rightly so. It is a transparent, familiar, cost-efficient and highly functional model. But even the universal conscription system is evolving in response to the times. In recent years, the Finnish Defence Forces have improved preparedness, developed conscript and reservist training and enhanced the performance capabilities of both troops and technical systems. Ultimately, our capability and strength are based on efficient war-time reserves, of which you form the core as professional soldiers.
Report on Security Environment Change 22, P. 17	the storage volumes of munitions in particular will be increased. The Defence Forces’ production of explosives will also be developed. As of 2022, the number of reservists participating in refresher training will be increased.
Discursos 2014, Pos. 20	responsibility for security involves all of us – the authorities, companies and organisations, you and me
Discursos 2018, Pos. 173	n these circumstances, protecting Finland’s security requires particular vigilance.
Report on Security Environment Change 22, P. 16	n addition to monitoring and safeguarding Finland’s territorial integrity and ensuring continued preparedness, preparations must be made for a situation similar to the ongoing war in Ukraine where the scale, duration and multidimensional nature of the crisis pose a greater challenge to the defence capability than previously estimated.
Discursos 2020, Pos. 31	ltimately, every nation forges its own destiny. Safeguarding our own position must continue to be the clear point of departure in Finland’s foreign and security policy. Nobody else will do this.
Discursos 2019, Pos. 85	hroughout my term in office, I have regularly engaged the leaders of all parliamentary parties in discussions on foreign and security policy. Our thinking on Finland’s international position and the main pillars of Finland’s

	security is well aligned. I am therefore confident that the successful cooperation in leading Finland's foreign policy continues also with the new government.
Discursos 2017, Pos. 49-50	<p>e need to build our security in all places and in all ways.</p> <p>The steps taken can be small, as in the effort to lessen tensions by improving air safety in the Baltic Sea area; or larger such as in the idea of holding an Arctic Council summit in Finland; or even broader, as in our activities in international organisations, peace mediation and development cooperation.</p>
Discursos 2014, Pos. 34	credible national defence is and will remain one of the cornerstones of our security. The issue is not one of how big a war Finland is capable or incapable of winning; it is much more a question of our defence forming a strong deterrent, under any circumstances, to the possible use of military force or intimidation against us. A military defence must have a firm basis.
Discursos 2017, Pos. 158	Each and every Finn is a defender of our land, particularly during this time of changing threats.
Discursos 2017, Pos. 149-151	<p>With respect to our security, I have often referred to the four pillar model. These too are topical today. Our pillars are national defence and security, western integration, relations with Russia, and the international system, particularly its structure, rule-based nature and manageability. These are not static pillars, but develop over time. They also continuously interact. The better the balance between these pillars, the more stable Finland's situation is.</p> <p>We will have to endure a period of global instability for some time. This obliges us to attend to our strongest cornerstone – a credible national defence. Our defence forces have succeeded in completing major reforms in recent years. However, you cannot upgrade an operating system in one go, but have to work on it continuously. This will require both resources and a vision of how our defence should be developed.</p> <p>In everything we do, we should bear in mind that strong defence forces present a threshold to a potential enemy, while attracting our friends to engage in cooperation.</p>
Discursos 2019, Pos. 109	Whether circumstances are favourable for us or not, the main objective of Finland's foreign and security policy remains the same. It is strengthening our international position and ensuring our security. This is what we are most able to influence through our own actions. Succeeding in this is the measure of our policy's success.
Discursos 2018, Pos. 63	What is security? Security is trust in people, the community and social structures. Public trust in the decision-makers and authorities to treat us properly and being able to respond to global changes. Public trust in the professional competence of a police officer, fire fighter or nurse. Furthermore, security means the maintenance of national defence and security of supply.
Inclusive and competent Finland 2019 WEB, P. 99	We will maintain a defence capability that is abreast of the changes in the operating environment and we will secure the required conditions for development by ensuring sufficient resources for the defence administration
Discursos 2017, Pos. 73	We want to send a strong message that we take our national security very seriously.
Discursos 2022, Pos. 340	We take our security very seriously. The Finnish armed forces are one of the strongest in Europe. We have also consistently invested in developing our capabilities. The Finns' willingness to defend their country is one of the highest in the whole world.

Discursos 2015, Pos. 146	We need to strengthen and modernise our defences. The same is true of our internal security and intelligence capabilities. We cannot leave them to languish in a bygone era. Defence is about intent and actions. Our key line of defence always lies between the ears of Finns. Each and every Finn is a defender of his or her country.
Discursos 2019, Pos. 145	We need to make an effort to protect international cooperation. At the same time, however, we need to be prepared for continued confrontation and uncertainty. As I have indicated elsewhere, it is us who are ultimately responsible for our own security and welfare.
Discursos 2015, Pos. 152	We must therefore build Finland's security and success on a holistic basis, rather than solely in a piecemeal manner. That is why such a task belongs to our entire foreign policy administration, regardless of the sector in question. All have their own tasks, but the same objective.
Discursos 2014, Pos. 97	We must continue to maintain a credible national defence. The Finnish Defence Forces have implemented significant cost-cutting and efficiency measures, but we have now come to the point where less is no longer more. We need to increase our defence spending in the future so that we can allow for our immediate further needs and long-term challenges.
Discursos 2021, Pos. 256-257	We must actively do the best we can to steer the development in the rest of the world on a better and more stable path. In Finland, we do that with the help of the two latter pillars, both by taking care of our relations with Russia and by influencing the state of the whole international system. As tensions rise, the need for preventing conflicts, building confidence and strengthening dialogue increases. The need to find common denominators to ensure that dialogue across division lines can continue is growing rapidly. This is what my initiative about extending the Helsinki Spirit to a global level is all about.
Discursos 2014, Pos. 32	We have sought to build Finland's security on a holistic basis.
Discursos 2014, Pos. 96	We have never fully excluded the possibility of the deployment of military power in Europe, and therefore we have continued to maintain a credible national defence instead of focusing on crisis management.
Discursos 2017, Pos. 88	We have also taken steps to enhance our own security. We are investing into our armed forces, in particular by enhancing readiness and rapid reaction. We are passing new legislation to ensure that we have all the means necessary to protect ourselves. We also contribute to increasing our common resilience towards hybrid threats.
Discursos 2016, Pos. 249	We have a good security status, which we are further strengthening in many respects. In this, we will need to use our national strengths, engage in strong international cooperation and be ready to invest in our common security.
Discursos 2020, Pos. 159-160	We can strengthen our international position only as an independent actor. Independence means the ability to bear the responsibility for our own security by ourselves. It is not the primary goal for anyone else but us. By no means does it mean that we would prefer needing to act on our own. On the contrary, it is in our best interest to seek as extensive an international cooperation as possible. But the stronger and the more independent we are, the more attractive a partner we are to others.
Discursos 2022, Pos. 154	We are now benefiting from the fact that we never let our guard down in the past decades. Our defence is in good shape and we are increasingly investing in

	it. NATO membership does by no means mean that we could start neglecting our own national defence. Just the opposite.
Report on Security Environment Change 22, P. 17	Voluntary national defence will be strengthened as part of the development of local defence and the training of reserves. The efficiency of the National Defence Training Association's activities will be increased in 2022 by doubling the number of training days, by developing the conditions for firearms training and by launching a legislative reform. At the same time, the opportunities for citizens to participate in national defence will be improved and the use of reservist trainers in the Defence Forces' voluntary exercises and refresher training will be increased.
Discursos 2022, Pos. 287	Unity is a national resource and the basic pillar of security. The problems threatening the economy and the energy sector will come to challenge the resilience of Finnish people. At the same time, our society's capability and willingness to maintain cohesion and control over the situation will also be put to test. Security is not only an external matter but also an internal one.
Discursos 2016, Pos. 71	Under no circumstances can Finland's foreign and security policy rest on a single pillar; it must form a whole whose parts are in the right balance with respect to the challenges of our time. National defence and security, western integration, relations with Russia and international law – the pillars of our stability-oriented policy – are all important
Discursos 2014, Pos. 84	Ukrainian crisis is a savage reminder that security – even the security of entire nations – should never be taken for granted or considered axiomatic. Not even in Europe.
Defence Report 2021, P. 18	Thus, Finland must maintain the ability to deter aggression, and, to defend itself in all domains
Report on Security Environment Change 22, P. 31	This requires that we adapt our concept for comprehensive security to the current security situation. Effective prevention of hybrid influence activities is based on the deterrent effect created through preparedness and other activities of society as a whole and all branches of government. Ensuring high-level comprehensive security is a key element in creating a preventive effect.
Discursos 2016, Pos. 71	These constitute an active defence.
Defence Report 2017, P. 14	There lies an imbalance between the requirements for defence development and the present level of resources. Without any corrective action Finland's defence would degrade.
Discursos 2014, Pos. 86	Then, further down the road, we must rebuild the security that has been lost. To consider what would be the alternative to such a development makes one pause for thought.
Discursos 2014, Pos. 35-36	Then again, willingness and equipment may not be enough to retrieve the situation if we rely on poor tactics. While it is true that we Finns have the will to defend ourselves, the question remains as to whether we have the money.
Defence Report 2021, P. 20	The wartime strength of the Defence Forces has been increased to 280,000, and readiness on land, at sea and in the air has been improved.
Defence Report 2021, P. 31	The usability of regular personnel as well as of conscripts and reservists in readiness-related duties will be improved by creating new operating procedures and by evaluating the necessity of legislative revisions. It must be possible to rehearse the regulation of defence readiness more flexibly and extensively.
Defence Report 2021, P. 21	The training of conscripts and reservists has been enhanced to meet the changes in the operating environment and in society, and to utilise the possibilities

	presented by evolving technology. Voluntary national defence training and the legislation regulating it have been updated. While preparing the reform of local defence, we have identified the possibilities and needs to use our sizeable reserve more effectively. In the future, local defence will have a significant role in responding to broad-spectrum influencing.
Defence Report 2021, P. 37	The strength of the local forces will be increased starting in 2025, by transforming most of the regional forces into local forces. At the same time, the local forces will be given new tasks and the standards will be raised. With this change, the local forces will include more units that can be used for combat in rapidly escalating situations
Defence Report 2021, P. 20	The readiness and capabilities of Finnish defence have been developed according to the guidelines set in the previous Government Defence Report, to reflect changes in the operating environment.
Defence Report 2021, P. 29	The primary goal of maintaining defence capability is to deter the use of military force or the threats of using military force. Effective prevention is built on deterrence that is created by all of society and all administrative branches through different activities and preparations. T
Report on Security Environment Change 22, P. 17	The number of personnel in the Defence Forces will be increased. The increase in the number of personnel by 500 person-years, as outlined in the Government's Defence Report, will be accelerated
Report on Security Environment Change 22, P. 17	The number of reservists participating in refresher training will be raised above the level stated in the Government Programme. Refresher training improves, in particular, the readiness to establish wartime troops, the command of combat troops and use of fires, and the interoperability of different branches. Operational troops, local troops undergoing reform and Border Guard troops will be called to refresher training.
Defence Report 2021, P. 54	The more demanding capability requirements call for more personnel resources. In addition to developing joint and service-specific capabilities, additional resources are needed for skills related to new technologies, the development of cyber, space and information capabilities, and for implementing the military intelligence legislation.
Defence Report 2021, P. 24	The military defence of Finland is dependent on society's infrastructure, and Finland's military defence uses the services of its partners in all security situations
Government Report 2020, P. 37	The key to strengthening resilience is the maintenance of strong national defence capability and internal security, which are enhanced by means of foreign and security policy.
Government Report 2020, P. 27	The key elements of Finland's security are societal crisis resilience – security of supply included – strong national defence capability, the united and operational European Union and close international foreign, security and defence policy cooperation.
Report on Security Environment Change 22, P. 18	The grave deterioration of the security situation and the possible continuation of the situation highlight the need to accelerate the reform.
Discursos 2015, Pos. 94	The goal of Finland's foreign policy aims at securing our independence, security and wellbeing in all situations

Defence Report 2021, P. 31	The force structure of the Defence Forces will be reformed during the reporting period. The previously used concept of regional forces will be discontinued as local defence is reformed. In the future, the wartime units of the Defence Forces will be divided into operational forces and local forces. Local forces are used to create a nation-wide defence capability, to enable the effective use of operational forces, and to safeguard functions vital to society and defence. The reform increases the readiness and capabilities of local forces. The operational forces are used to create the focus of main efforts of defence, and for fast-paced, more demanding combat operations.
Discursos 2014, Pos. 20	The comprehensive defence and security model built in Finland over past decades forms the basis of this idea.
Defence Report 2021, P. 20	The Finnish Defence Forces' most important task is the military defence of Finland. Defence capability is maintained in a way that meets the requirements of the operating environment.
Defence Report 2021, P. 26	The Duties of the Finnish Defence Forces 1) the military defence of Finland 2) providing support for other authorities 3) participating in providing international assistance, participating in territorial surveillance cooperation and in other types of international activities 4) participating in international military crisis management and military tasks in international crisis management.
Report on Security Environment Change 22, P. 16	The Defence Forces will immediately launch the procurement process for additional defence materiel. This will supplement the shortcomings that have formed over a longer period of time and respond to the changes in the operating environment brought about
Defence Report 2021, P. 24	The Defence Forces has developed its capability to monitor the information environment, protect against information influencing, and created prerequisites for operations in the information domain. Information defence has become a part of the normal activity of the Defence Forces.
Defence Report 2021, P. 53	The Defence Forces Reform of 2012–2015 reduced the number of personnel employed by the Finnish Defence Forces to meet the tight budgetary demands of the time. Furthermore, the reduction was implemented during a lower threat level security
Discursos 2017, Pos. 260-263	The Centre of Excellence highlights three central issues in Finnish security policy. Firstly, it shows that Finland is a producer and not a consumer of security. Secondly, we take a comprehensive approach to security. This is a must for a small a nation but it also reflects the changing nature of threats we face. Thirdly, it highlights our determination to produce security in close co-operation with our partners.
Defence Report 2021, P. 39	The current conscription system does not require significant reforms from the perspective of military national defence. However, changes related to the operating environment, population, society and technology will require developing the conscription system.
Discursos 2018, Pos. 176-178	That is what Finland's active stability policy is about. The policy applies to all of the four pillars that our security rests on: our national defence, our Western integration and partnerships, our relations with Russia, and the international rules-based order – we must attend to all of these pillars equally. Each pillar would of course be worthy of a speech in its own right. Our defence capability, based on general conscription, continues to evolve all the time. Our defence forces are already in good readiness and Finns rank number one in

	<p>Europe for their willingness to defend their country. The major procurements that lie ahead will further bolster our defence capacity. This has a twofold effect on our national security: on the one hand, it maintains a high threshold against potential aggressors and on the other, it makes us a more significant partner. With regard to our relations with Russia, we stand firm in our support of the EU sanctions. They are measures that we jointly decided to put in place. However, at the same time a clear and working dialogue with Russia is needed, both on bilateral issues with our neighbour and on matters of international security. This dialogue has functioned.</p>
Report on Security Environment Change 22, P. 30	Russia is likely to adhere to its demands concerning European security and keep them on the agenda in the future. In a situation where Russia aims to build a sphere of influence through demands and military means, failing to react to the changes in the security environment could lead to changes in Finland's international position and a narrowing of Finland's room for manoeuvre.
Discursos 2017, Pos. 48	Our security policy can have only one objective – how best to ensure a secure life for Finnish people.
Discursos 2016, Pos. 242	Our national defence and security form just one of the four pillars on which our security rests. The others are western integration and partnerships, well-functioning relations with Russia, and the international system and broad-based security.
Discursos 2022, Pos. 329	Our defence, which is based on conscription and extensive reserves, is now of global interest. We have decided to invest in fighter aircraft and to significantly increase the defence budget. These important decisions will further strengthen our defence to meet the demands of our changed security environment. Resources must continue to be secured.
Discursos 2022, Pos. 28-29	National security, self-determination and room to manoeuvre are just as important to small nations as to big ones. While taking care of these fundamentals, we are also safeguarding Finland's international status. And let it be stated once again: Finland's room to manoeuvre and freedom of choice also include the possibility of military alignment and of applying for NATO membership, should we ourselves so decide. NATO's business is the so-called Open Door policy, the continuance of which has been repeatedly confirmed to Finland, also publicly.
Discursos 2022, Pos. 282	Namely, by no means does NATO membership mean that we could start neglecting our own national defence. Just the opposite. Finland's membership will double the border NATO currently shares with Russia. For both Finland and NATO, it is of utmost importance that Finland will continue to primarily take care of defending its own territory.
Discursos 2016, Pos. 239	Much has already been done. Above all, we have in many ways improved the readiness of our Defence Forces. We have improved our defence zone surveillance, particularly in sea areas and airspace. We have improved our troop mobilisation. A new legal interpretation has improved the availability of conscripts for various missions. Legislative amendments have expedited the recruitment of reservists. We have improved the material readiness of our rapid reaction forces. In addition, we have improved the skills of our troops through exercises.
Defence Report 2021, P. 27	Military national defence is an integral part of society. The conscription-based defence solution is built on a strong will to defend the country, which is sustained and fostered as a part of comprehensive security. At the core of the

	will to defend the country is sufficient national unity and the belief that Finland and the Finnish way of life are worth defending.
Defence Report 2021, P. 54	Maintenance and further development of a defence capability that meets the changes in the operating environment will be ensured.
Discursos 2015, Pos. 141	Looking at our current position, it is clear that, in pursuit of our national security, we need continual evaluation and practical steps.
Defence Report 2021, P. 37	Local defence is being developed into a military capability encompassing the entire country, which will for its part contribute to preventing and combating broad-spectrum influencing. Local forces will create a national network that is able to participate in versatile and demanding cooperation with other authorities. The local defence units can be used to assist in mobilisation; for combat; for infrastructure protection, and for supporting other authorities and society. They can be used to protect infrastructure vital to defence and society, and they can participate in restoring services after disruptions, together with the authorities and other actors
Government Report 2020, P. 37	Joint preparedness, planning, training and execution are implemented in accordance with the principle of comprehensive security, where the vital functions of society are secured through extensive cooperation between various stakeholders
Discursos 2016, Pos. 219	It is good that Finns share this idea. Eight out of ten Finns are ready to defend their country. This is high by international standards and sends a strong message to the world around us.
Discursos 2018, Pos. 198	Indeed, this is the very purpose of our entire international defence cooperation. We don't put all our eggs in one basket. We maintain a broad range of partners
Discursos 2020, Pos. 80	In the midst of an accelerating change, in its foreign policy Finland can no longer hold on to its own assumptions if we cannot be certain that they still hold true. If the established methods of gathering information no longer function, we must find new ones. And you must use your personal professional skills to interpret that information. In your reports, following the road of interpretation is necessary for us.
Discursos 2021, Pos. 282	In the last resort, security is an issue that concerns all of us Finns. In my opinion, therein lies the hard core of comprehensive security approach and, at the same, Finland's security.
Discursos 2022, Pos. 67	In the field of defence, for both our conscription system and the performance of our Defence Forces. In terms of comprehensive security, both for our preparedness and for our culture of working together.
Report on Security Environment Change 22, P. 17	In the changed operating environment, the importance of the Border Guard in the surveillance and safeguarding of territorial integrity and national defence tasks is emphasised. The military capability of the Border Guard and border troops will be improved.
Discursos 2019, Pos. 174	In the case of Finland, we have long argued that taking care of our own national defense is valuable for two main reasons. It creates a credible threshold against a potential aggressor. And it makes us into a more interesting partner for others.
Discursos 2016, Pos. 161-162	In addition to the external pillars, the strength of Finland's own national pillar is a key source of national security. A credible national defence forms an important part of this. We have learned to think that a credible defence creates a threshold and deterrent for intruders. It is equally important that, if a serious crisis should break out, a credible Finnish defence provides also strong incentives for partnership.

	<p>However, security is not based on weapons alone. Finland's social solidarity and everyday security for citizens is another important constituent of our national pillar. Our pillar rests on a solid foundation. In international comparisons, Finland is an exceptionally safe, peaceful and developed country. Several international rankings list Finland as one of the world's most stable and advanced societies. For example, the Fund for Peace Index has once again rated Finland as a sustainably stable state – and, as such, the only one of its kind in the world.</p>
Government Report 2020, P. 37	<p>In military security of supply, the emphasis lies on securing the operational capacity of the key capabilities.</p>
Defence Report 2021, P. 29	<p>If deterrence fails, attacks will be repelled. In such a case, efforts will continue to be made to prevent the situation from deteriorating further, by creating thresholds that the attacker estimates to be too costly to cross. It must be possible to defend Finland using national capabilities.</p>
Discursos 2015, Pos. 143	<p>I view Finland's security as a holistic entity, resting on several pillars. These pillars are national defence and security, western integration, relations with Russia, and the international system, particularly its structure, rule-based nature and manageability.</p>
Discursos 2014, Pos. 101	<p>I said to this very gathering one year ago that we cannot outsource Finland's national defence.</p>
Discursos 2021, Pos. 223-224	<p>I have described our stability policy as resting on four pillars. The first pillar is national defence and security – having a credible defence helps us raise the threshold against a potential outside attack. On the other hand, it also makes us a more attractive partner to others. The second pillar is Western integration and partnerships – our interoperability is further enhanced by a wide range of coalitions and initiatives. The third pillar is our relations with Russia – the firmness in defending our own interests and principles can be combined with a constructive dialogue and maintaining as functioning relations as possible at any given time. The fourth pillar consists of the international system and comprehensive security – it concerns the whole humanity. It concerns our common human responsibilities for the future of the planet.</p> <p>Unlike real pillars, none of the above is carved in stone. They change and evolve over time. But just like real pillars, they must constitute an integrated whole. If one of them weakens and cannot be reinforced, the others must be able to carry a larger share of the weight resting upon them.</p>
Discursos 2022, Pos. 291	<p>I have a habit of saying that each and every Finn is a defender of our country, at least between their ears. In these times, strong efforts are being made to influence our opinions.</p>
Discursos 2016, Pos. 234	<p>I believe that Finland's preparedness to respond to potential threats is based on an equation with three variables: accurate and real-time situational awareness, appropriate competences and sufficient capabilities.</p>
Defence Report 2021, P. 20	<p>General conscription, a strong will to defend the country, and sufficient national unity are the foundations of Finland's defence capability</p>
Discursos 2015, Pos. 52	<p>Foreign policy will continue to be at the forefront of ensuring Finland's national security, but a credible national defence is its vital ally.</p>
Discursos 2022, Pos. 191	<p>First, our national defence. We are now benefitting from the fact that we never let our guard down in the past decades. Our defence is in good shape to begin with, and we are increasingly investing in it. NATO membership does by no</p>

	means mean that we could start neglecting our own national defence. Just the opposite.
Discursos 2016, Pos. 204	Finland's security rests on four pillars – our own defence capability; Western integration and partnership with NATO, US and bilaterally with Sweden and the United States; dialogue with Russia; and international governance and law. They are all important. Finland will not be a passive bystander. On the contrary, our aim is to pursue an active foreign and security policy aimed at fostering regional security and stability.
Defence Report 2021, P. 18	Finland's military national defence and comprehensive security will be increasingly more intertwined.
Ratkaisujen Suomi_EN_YH DISTETTY_net ti, P. 37 - 38	Finland's defence is based on general conscription and defence of the entire territory of the nation. Finland will ensure a credible defence in all circumstances. Finland will uphold its national technological know-how related to a broad spectrum of key military capabilities, sufficient security of supply and the defence industry. The Government will raise the defence appropriations in accordance with the proposal of the parliamentary working group report on long-term defence challenges, published in 2014 (Puolustuksen pitkän aikavälin haasteet). The Government will decide on the replacement of the Navy's battle vessel capability and launch a project to replace the capability of Hornet aircraft. The Government will make sure that a sufficient number of military refresher courses are organised. In addition, the preconditions for voluntary exercises and reservists' independent training will be secured
Report on Security Environment Change 22, P. 16	Finland's defence capability has been developed on a long-term, systematic and comprehensive basis. Russia's invasion of Ukraine has, for its part, proved that the basis on which we have developed our defence capabilities is right. Russia's large-scale aggression highlights the necessity of a credible defence capability in a situation where military aggression would have to be repelled by national forces, at least initially.
Inclusive and competent Finland_2019_WEB, P. 98	Finland will secure a credible national defence and ensure that sufficient resources are available. Finland's defence capability is based on general conscription, a trained reserve, the defence of the entire country and a strong will for national defence.
Government Report 2020, P. 28	Finland will not allow the use of its territory for hostile purposes against other states. Close international defence cooperation and the option to provide and receive international assistance will remain an important part of Finland's defence capability.
Discursos 2018, Pos. 134	Finland takes its own defence very seriously. After the end of the Cold War, we never let our guard down. Our citizens' will to defend their country is the strongest in Europe. Maintaining a strong national defence sends two powerful messages. It is a threshold against potential aggressors. And it makes us a more interesting partner. This is evident in our close bilateral cooperation with many NATO countries, including the US.
Discursos 2015, Pos. 11	Finland pursues an active policy of stability intended to ensure stability in northern Europe and contribute to decreasing broader confrontation.
Report on Security Environment Change 22, P. 18	Finland needs a strong national defence capability in all situations and in all security policy solutions.

Discursos 2014, Pos. 233	Finland must ensure that a credible defence for the entire country is in place. Compulsory military service will remain at the core of Finland's defence system
Defence Report 2021, P. 27	Finland maintains a credible national defence and ensures that defence has sufficient resources. General conscription, a trained reserve, defending the entire country, and a high will to defend the country will continue to be the foundations of Finland's defence.
Discursos 2015, Pos. 12	Finland is one of the few European countries that continued to see military conflict as a potential threat even after the end of the Cold War and therefore maintained an appropriate defence capacity. This has proved to be a sustainable solution.
Discursos 2018, Pos. 64	Finland is now more prepared to react to the increasingly complex security environment. Many legislative projects have moved forward and improved our preparedness.
Discursos 2014, Pos. 99	Finland is not too poorly off in this respect, because we focus on a strong comprehensive security approach and close cooperation between the various authorities.
Government Report 2020, P. 27	Finland is a militarily non-aligned state which maintains a credible national defence capability. By maintaining its defence capability, Finland prevents the use of military force against Finland, shows readiness to respond to the use or the threat of use of military force, and the capacity to repel any attacks against our country. To strengthen its own defence capability, Finland participates in international foreign, security and defence policy cooperation, which has been increasing and getting deeper in recent years.
Discursos 2021, Pos. 239	Finland also makes its choices for guaranteeing credible defence on its own, from its own starting points. Even having the closest kind of collaboration does not mean that we would automatically follow the same schedule and same direction in every matter.
Discursos 2022, Pos. 264	Faced with the unknown, we must strengthen our security with determination and on a long-term basis. It is our common mission.
Defence Report 2021, P. 33	During this reporting period, the Navy will introduce a new anti-ship missile system, torpedoes that strengthen its anti-surface and anti-submarine warfare capability, and modernised mines. The new systems will enable regional sea control.
Discursos 2015, Pos. 49	Developments in recent years have shown that Finland has made the appropriate fundamental decisions as far as upholding our national defence capacity is concerned.
Discursos 2015, Pos. 141	Despite our global obligations, we are unconditionally and primarily responsible for our own country and its future.
Defence Report 2021, P. 57	Defence readiness will be maintained. The defence system will be developed to better meet the current and future changes in warfare, threats and the operating environment. Local defence will be reformed. The importance of interagency cooperation and the role of reservists will grow. A well-functioning, up-to-date and developing conscription system is the foundation of Finland's defence.
Defence_Report 2017, P. 33	Defence readiness will be improved.
Defence Report 2021, P. 26	Defence readiness and military capability for repelling attacks must meet the requirements of the operating environment. Finland's defence rests on the deterrence function of a robust military capability that is supported by the entire society. The importance of a strong deterrence function – dissuading an

	adversary from using military force against Finland – is accentuated in the current, unpredictable operating environment where the early warning period for military crises has shrunk and the threshold for using military force has been lowered.
Discursos 2017, Pos. 154-155	Consistency has been another strength of Finland’s defence. An example of this is the manner in which respect for compulsory military service has been the common thread running through a number of defence reforms. The cornerstone of our defence therefore remains strongly in place – and will continue to do so. Compulsory military service has a strong societal role, as well as a defensive aspect. It brings together a diverse range of Finns – from different parts of the country, different backgrounds and with different ideas – who then learn how to get along with each other
Discursos 2017, Pos. 153	Compulsory military service has been the undoubted cornerstone of Finland’s defence during the entire period of independence.
Discursos 2021, Pos. 264	Comprehensive security approach has been one of Finland’s strengths for a long time. When our security environment changes, it is increasingly important to critically analyse the various areas of comprehensive security, and to maintain and develop the practical operating conditions. Ensuring our security in a broad-based manner is a task we cannot outsource to anyone else.
Defence Report 2021, P. 21	Changes in Finland’s operating environment have required that the Defence Forces create a more comprehensive situational awareness, ensure sufficient early warning and support for decision-making, adjust readiness, as well as maintain a strong and credible defence capability
Defence_Report 2017, P. 13	Carrying out the tasks of the Defence Forces requires higher readiness in land, maritime, air and cyberspace operations as well as better long-range strike capability. There are shortcomings in the regional coverage and survivability of intelligence and surveillance, command and control, and logistic systems. The changed security environment and technological advances, among other things, have highlighted the need for legislative review as regards the authorities being able to carry out their duties
Report on Security Environment Change 22, P. 16	By allocating additional resources to defence, Finland’s defence capability will be developed on an accelerated timetable to meet the increased demands of the operating environment. A credible defence capability requires up-to-date and usable defence materiel that meets the battlefield requirements, sufficient reserves of munitions and spare parts, sufficient competence of the Defence Forces personnel and reservists, and the strong will of the entire nation to defend the country.
Discursos 2021, Pos. 166	But a credible defence cannot be built on hardware alone. It also stems from the very mindset of the population: a genuine will to defend one’s own country. That will has traditionally been on a remarkably high level in Finland.
Defence Report 2021, P. 57	Broad-spectrum influencing challenges the crisis resilience of society, defence readiness and maintenance of defence capability. This requires that the national model of comprehensive security is updated and defence is developed accordingly.
Discursos 2022, Pos. 62-63	Because that resilience is not about abstract top-level structures. It is about people. Very practical and everyday things we do together, in all walks of life. And, above all, about a mindset. That we can and dare to lean on each other’s strengths. That we can and dare to trust each other. And that we have the courage and determination to face challenges and threats. When we can do this, Finland as a nation can trust in

	itself. Together we are strong, in all kinds of times, and we will overcome any difficulty
Discursos 2016, Pos. 139	As you know, I take a holistic view of Finland's security status, seeing it as resting on four pillars. They are national defence and security, western integration and partnerships, well-functioning relations with Russia and the international system and comprehensive security.
Discursos 2021, Pos. 161-162	As many of you may know, my holistic view of Finland's security sees it as resting on four pillars. They are, first, the national defence and security; second, the Western integration and partnerships; third, the relationship with Russia; and fourth, the international system and comprehensive security. Unlike real pillars, none of them is fixed in stone. They change and evolve over time. Like real pillars, however, they must form a coherent whole. If one weakens and cannot be strengthened, others have to be able to carry more of the weight on them. Such an active stability policy, as I have called it, requires constant care and attention.
Discursos 2018, Pos. 171-172	As I have said before, every Finn is a defender of our country, at least between the ears. * * *
Discursos 2021, Pos. 164	As I have often said, a credible defence has a twofold function. On the one hand, it raises the threshold against a potential aggressor. On the other, it makes us a more lucrative partner for others, particularly when interoperability is high.
Inclusive and competent Finland_2019_WEB, P. 98	Apart from the changes in the military environment, ageing materiel is another challenge. Finland's defence will face an extraordinary situation in the 2020s when the main weapon systems of two Services will be phased out almost simultaneously.
Discursos 2022, Pos. 60	And most importantly: there is no reason for uncertainty. There is no direct military threat to Finland. Our security is in a good shape, our level of preparedness is high.
Discursos 2022, Pos. 326	An important foundation for Finland's defence is the strong will of citizens to defend their country. It is now at a higher level than before. Interest in refresher training and voluntary national defence is growing. This will, and the preparedness and capability based on it, must continue to be nurtured
Report on Security Environment Change 22, P. 39	A sufficient level of national unity and the experience that Finland and the Finnish way of life are worth defending are at the core of the will to defend the country. Military national defence is an integral part of Finnish society. Finland's defence solution is based on conscription and relies on a strong will to defend the country, which is maintained and developed as part of comprehensive security. The will to defend the country is also based on comprehensive defence and comprehensive security and strengthens the resilience of Finnish society.
Discursos 2019, Pos. 190	A society where people trust each other, a society people genuinely feel that they belong to, despite their differences, is also a society that is more resilient against external threats. This is at the heart of our concept of comprehensive security. For our strong national defense, military capabilities of course continue to matter. They make the threshold against a potential aggressor higher, and they make us into a more interesting partner for others. But in a world of hybrid warfare and alternative facts, other, less material assets are increasingly important, too. As I have often said, each citizen is a defender of our country — between his or her ears.

Defence Report 2021, P. 15	. The role of traditional military capabilities remains central in Finland's security environment
Report on Security Environment Change 22, P. 18	. It must be possible to defend Finland using national capabilities.
Defence Report 2021, P. 20	. Finland must be able to monitor all domains and, if necessary, be able to launch necessary defence measures.
Government Report 2020, P. 37	. Finland must also be prepared for hybrid influencing practised under the guise of, for example, migration, and different crisis situations or reinterpretations of history. It must be ensured that no such internal dividing lines emerge in society that external actors could exploit. Similarly, it must be ensured that external influencing does not create new dividing lines. Preparedness for diversified hybrid threats requires a shared situational picture and comprehensive development of foresight.
Inclusive and competent Finland 2019 WEB, P. 99	. Changes in the security situation require the maintenance of a high level of readiness and continuous development of capabilities. L
Defence Report 2021, P. 40	, it is possible to ensure that conscription remains the effective and generally accepted foundation of defence.
Defence Report 2017, P. 29	the strong defence will of the Finns lays the foundation for the defence capability.
Assessment on NATO membership 2016, P. 54	The will to defend the country reflects historical identities and their role in security and defence policy. The Finnish will to defend the country has always been extremely high, reaching levels of around 80%
Defence Report 2021, P. 41	The national defence awareness of young people will be improved. The Parliamentary Committee on National Defence Obligation and Conscription is looking into the possibilities of using the public education system to increase young people's knowledge about matters relating to comprehensive security, the national defence obligation and general conscription. The Defence Forces will develop its messaging targeted at young people as part of reforming call-ups.
Assessment on NATO membership 2016, P. 54	The most important explanation remains history, the legacy of having survived the war, and avoiding occupation. The unbroken military tradition perpetuated in the form of conscription, which covers almost eighty per cent of the male population, has in popular terms kept the tradition alive
Assessment on NATO membership 2016, P. 54	The high level of readiness to defend Finland has been well documented in polls conducted systematically for decades. It has not fluctuated to any great degree because of changes in the security political situation in Northern Europe. However, the recent developments in Russia and its aggressive posture are factors that influence this will to defend.
Defence Report 2021, P. 41	The electronic services of the Defence Forces that are currently being developed will make it easier for conscripts and reservists to contact the Defence Forces in matters related to their service. All of these measures also seek to maintain the will to defend the country.

Report on Security Environment Change 22, P. 39	Russia's invasion of Ukraine has further strengthened the will of the Finnish people to defend the country, which can be seen, for example, in the increased interest in voluntary national defence training.
Assessment on NATO membership 2016, P. 54	It is difficult to see any direct linkage between NATO membership and the will to defend
Defence Report 2021, P. 40	By increasing the number of women, we will deepen the societal impact of national defence and improve the will to defend the country, and increase equality and non-discrimination.
Report on Security Environment Change 22, P. 39	A sufficient level of national unity and the experience that Finland and the Finnish way of life are worth defending are at the core of the will to defend the country. Military national defence is an integral part of Finnish society