Universidade de Brasília

Instituto de Psicologia

Programa de Pós-Graduação em Psicologia Social, do Trabalho e das Organizações

Opting out of Democracy: Antecedents of Democratic Erosion in Brazil

Abandonando a Democracia: Antecedentes da erosão democrática no Brasil

Doutorado

Pedro Cardoso Alves

Brasília, DF

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Summary

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Abstract

The recent ascent of anti-democratic movements throughout the world in the form of far-right extremism has brought attention to the study of the mechanisms by which democracy is sustained. Our focus in this thesis was to further develop tools by which support for democratic forms of government could better measured and understood in the Brazilian context. To this end, our first endeavor was to adapt and assess a multidimensional ideology measure, dealing not with abstract left-right political positions, but grounded on policy and socio-economic issues that can be more readily interpreted, both by respondents and by researchers. We analyzed four samples (N = 202; N = 183; N = 173; N = 251) to provide evidence, through Exploratory and Confirmatory Factor Analyses, for the reliability of this measure and how it related to various political or social variables, including Personal Values, Political Efficacy, Behavioral Contagion, Informational Habits, Economic Security, Fear of Crime, Voting Intention and, notably, Democratic Support. Results indicated that both Cultural and Economic aspects of ideology correlated with most of these variables, serving as an indicator of political positions regarding predominant social and economic issues in various political groups. Lastly, we proposed a model to evaluate the effect of Personal Values, Political Ideology, Economic Security and Fear of Crime on Democratic Support, through Structural Equation Modeling, and found particularly strong correlations between economic variables and Democratic Support, as well as an overall stronger correlation between Cultural and Economic Ideology and support for democracy than compared to the left-right measurement.

Keywords: Democratic Support, Political Ideology, Personal Values, Political Psychology.

Resumo

O crescimento de movimentos antidemocráticos no cenário global, representados pelo avanço da extrema-direita, trouxe atenção para estudos sobre os mecanismos pelos quais se sustenta a democracia. Nosso foco, nessa tese, foi o aperfeiçoamento de ferramentas pelas quais pode-se aprofundar a compreensão e medição do Apoio à Democracia. Para este fim, primeiramente adaptamos e testamos uma medida multidimensional de ideologia política, tratando não do agrupamento abstrato em esquerda ou direita, mas nas questões socioeconômicas predominantes nas narrativas políticas e discursos populares no contexto brasileiro. Analisamos quatro amostras (N = 202; N = 183; N = 173; N = 251) no intuito de angariar evidências de validade, mediante Análises Fatoriais Exploratórias e Confirmatórias, para a medida, assim como para consolidar relações da variável com diversos outros fenômenos político-sociais, incluindo Valores Pessoais, Eficácia Política, Hábitos Informacionais, Segurança Econômica, Medo do Crime e, principalmente, Apoio à Democracia. Resultados ao longo dos três estudos demonstraram correlação entre os fatores Econômico e Cultural da ideologia política multidimensional com a maioria dessas variáveis. No último estudo, propomos um modelo para testar, por meio da modelagem por equações estruturais, o efeito de Valores Pessoais, Ideologia Política, Segurança Econômica e Medo do Crime sobre o Apoio à Democracia. Encontramos nessa análise a predominância de fatores econômicos sobre o Apoio à Democracia, assim como um potencial preditivo mais forte para os fatores Cultural e Econômico de Ideologia Política, se comparados à medida unidimensional baseada no posicionamento entre esquerda-direita.

Palavras-Chave: Apoio à Democracia, Ideologia Política, Valores Pessoais, Psicologia Política.

It is an unfortunate irony of Democracy that the very rights that allow its citizens to live in freedom and individuality may be used to call for the end of those rights for whomever authoritarian groups deem to be "enemy". Though in the past the call for authoritarianism was often associated with far-left socialist movements, in the past few years a populist far-right has taken up the mantle under the guise of a sort of conservative libertarianism, pushing for ever more authoritarian policies in many democratic countries, both developed and developing (Claassen, 2019; Inglehart & Norris, 2017).

Their argument for political and social reform varies from political context to political context, but its focal points remain the same; a return to tradition, the defense of religious dogma, the accusations that liberals or leftists aim to destroy familial institutions, the ever-present "communist threat" (Hunter & Power, 2019). Though they do not hold monopoly over their use of the establishment of a common enemy and the use of misinformation to manipulate the populace, they certainly have written a new chapter in the use of these strategies, utilizing online spaces and the massive flux of information which characterizes them (Turkle, 2008) to selectively bombard the discontent with reason to revolt (Herakova et al., 2017; Metzger et al., 2015).

In the USA, considered for decades a bastion of democracy, the far-right pushed the masses to invade the Capitol to maintain Trump in power. In Brazil, Bolsonaro and his allies constantly bombard social media with fake news (Hunter & Power, 2019), bringing thousands to the streets to ask for the end of Congress and the Supreme Court, or even a new military dictatorship outright. Polarization dominates political discourse, with each side blaming the other for all social and economic woes that the nation faces, and violence escalate as we approach the 2022 elections, culminating in various attacks to the rallies promoted by the opposition.

In this context, where policies more closely relate with faces and names rather than national projects, Brazil lives two crises, one of its economy, the other of its very political system. However, perhaps more important than the phenomenon itself, is the fact that so many of those who defend democracy, both in the political institutions and elsewhere, were so blindsided by this authoritarian uprising (Claassen, 2019; Inglehart & Norris, 2017; Stolle et al., 2019). Many research initiatives throughout the world (Azevedo et al., 2019; Feldman et al., 2018; Feldman & Johnston, 2014) aim precisely to contribute to filling in that gap of foresight, be it in expanding political theory or in offering to refine the tools we use to measure political phenomena. This thesis focuses on the latter, though we also aim to provide examples of the practical Applications of the measure on each step of the way.

To that end, multiple studies were conducted to formulate a more detailed measure of ideology, aiming to more clearly evaluate attitudes related to political issues that are present outside of the scope of "political elites" (Feldman et al., 2018), as opposed to the more abstract left-to-right continuum (Azevedo et al., 2019; Bakker, 2016; Ellis & Stimson, 2012; Feldman & Johnston, 2014). We also evaluate the impact of ideological attitudes, and various other factors, including Political Efficacy, Informational Habits, Behavioral Contagion, Personal Values, and Economic Security, on Political Participation, Voting Intention, and, especially, Democratic Support. We conducted three studies to that effect:

In the first, "Believing in Change: Impact of Political Efficacy over Political Participation", we gather preliminary evidence of validity for a multidimensional ideology measurement, divided into Cultural and Economic ideologies. As well as evaluate the mediating effect of Political Efficacy (Ardévol-Abreu et al., 2017) on the relationship between Ideology, Informational Habits (Herakova et al., 2017; Metzger et al., 2015) and Behavioral Contagion (Carneiro, 2015) and Political Participation, both in day-to-day interactions (latent) and

through more institutional means (manifest; Ekman & Amnå, 2012; Feezell, 2016). In this study we focus on the interaction between digital and physical spaces and the impacts of cyberculture and social media on informing and facilitating political action (Mazzotti & Campos, 2014; Stepanova, 2011). In effect, this study focuses on better understanding the contemporary sociopolitical context and establishing which social issues are relevant to voters in the Brazilian political scenario.

The second, "Measuring Political Ideology: Validity Evidence for a Two-Factor Model", we focus gathering supporting evidence of validity and reliability for the two-factor model of ideology through exploratory and confirmatory factor analysis. On a more practical note, this study also tests the correlation between these two ideological factors and both Personal Values and Voting Intention, mapping the relationship between ideological attitudes and personal beliefs, left-to-right ideology, and voting intention throughout the political spectrum. Thus, we establish a more robust base of evidence corroborating the use of the multidimensional scale (Feldman & Johnston, 2014) and evaluate its relation to diverse ideological groups, ranging from self-identified socialists to supporters of the far-right movement represented by Bolsonaro.

The third, "Opting out of Democracy: Antecedents of Democratic Erosion in Brazil", we aim to provide a baseline model of the correlation between Personal Values, Political Ideology (both multi and one-dimensional), Economic Security (Wroe, 2015) and Fear of Crime (Garofalo & Laub, 1978; Barni et al., 2015) and Democratic Support (Claassen, 2019; Inglehart & Norris, 2017). We do so by conducting Structural Equation Modeling to test the fit of the model, providing preliminary evidence for how each antecedent variable relates to an overall support for democratic forms of government. This last study aims not only to include Cultural and Economic ideologies in a working model for Democratic Support, but

also to evaluate to what extent the current economic crisis in Brazil may be relevant to the rise of antidemocratic movements.

Through each of these three studies, we move from the attempt to understand how the digital landscape in contemporary hybrid spaces changed or heightened political attitudes and behaviors, to what extent these ideological attitudes may impact voting preference, to, finally, how these and other variables may help to understand the authoritarian shift in political discourse. All the while aiming to provide a solid base for the future use of more complex measurements of ideology in the Brazilian context.

Believing in Change: Impact of Political Efficacy over Political Participation

Acreditando na Mudança: Impacto da Eficácia Política na Participação Política

Abstract

With the advent and spread of the internet, traditional institutionalized political participation has become but a part of a country's political interaction, contemporary participation is fluid and constant, it habits the everyday conversations, posts, and tweets. Nonetheless, we argue that believing in the impact of one's actions over the political scenario remains essential to driving democratic attitudes and behaviors, and that many factors correlated with traditional political participation remain relevant regarding these subtler interactions. This study aimed to better understand the variables involved in these processes, such as political ideology, behavioral contagion, political efficacy, and informational habits. To this end, we adapted measures relating to these variables to the Brazilian context, testing each through Exploratory Factor Analysis, and ran mediation analysis to evaluate the effect of Political Efficacy in the relationship between antecedent variables and Political Participation. Results indicated that partial mediation was present, corroborating the hypothesis that belief in the effectiveness of political behavior facilitates the transition between beliefs and attitudes and initiating political action, be it in day-to-day behavior or interaction with political institutions.

Keywords: Political Ideology, Political Efficacy, Political Participation, Behavioral Contagion, Internet.

Advancements in information technologies around the world have brought to focus new ways in which individuals interact with the social and political context around them. The increased access to mass media tools allows a much wider range of people to actively participate in

politics in their day-to-day lives. Though technological advancements are fast-paced, availability and the know-how necessary to use these tools grow at a much slower rate. This deficit creates fertile grounds for the misuse of the internet, especially in the political context, making it hard to discern fact from fake news and, subsequently, how, or why one should strive to change their political context.

Not all use of information technology has been negative, multiple examples exist that show how these tools can be used in defense of democracy, from the Arab Spring (Castells, 2013; Mazzotti & Campos, 2014), to the multitude of fact-checking websites that aim to better inform citizens. However, these assume that users have the necessary skills, as well as the drive, to search for validated information and correct their opinions when proven wrong. Brazil is no exception to the dangers and benefits of these innovations, which have been at the forefront of much of the political turmoil in the country since the 2018 presidential pre-elections (Ferreira, 2018).

Considering this hybrid context (digital and physical; Mazzotti & Campos, 2014; Stepanova, 2011), we aim to better understand how the belief in one's ability to change politics affects the relation between ideological attitudes, informational habits and behavioral contagion, and individual political behaviors both manifest (voting, protests, etc.) and latent (online behaviors, day-to-day discussions, etc.).

Political Participation

Though political participation is a broad concept that encompasses a multitude of behaviors, it can be broadly defined as the interaction between individuals or groups and their political context, be it through traditional institutions (manifest) or day-to-day interactions in physical and digital spaces (latent; Ekman & Amnå, 2012; Feezell, 2016). More precisely, manifest political participation encompasses the interaction between individuals or groups and the

political and economic institutions in which sociopolitical power is centralized. Meanwhile, latent political participation refers to the interactions between individuals or groups and either other individuals or groups or non-political institutions. Manifest forms of participation include voting, campaigning, protesting, and boycotting, while latent forms include discussing politics with peers, recycling and donating to charity.

Of the two, latent political participation is likely the most common (Ekman & Amnå, 2012; Feezell, 2016), especially considering the growing access to social media. The impact latent forms of participations may be less self-evident; however, they require considerably less time and effort than most forms of manifest participation, allowing for a constant influx of political activity outside of electoral periods and major protests (Bimber, 2016). To drive political change protests, voting and other forms of manifest participation are still essential, but what happens between these periods of heightened political activity, and how daily behaviors impact public opinion, is paramount to understanding how citizens engage with politics in any given political context (Ekman & Amnå, 2012).

Political Efficacy

Characterized as a measure of trust of the political process and perceived capacity to influence political outcomes, political efficacy is often linked to voter turnout and various forms of political participation (West, 2017). Though other forms of political efficacy are present in literature, we focus on what is commonly referenced as internal political efficacy. This form of political efficacy can be defined as the beliefs and attitudes that reflect to what degree an individual or group feels they can exert control over political and social events which affect their lives (Caprara & Vecchione, 2018).

These beliefs are affected by multiple contextual factors, such as the salience of corruption, impunity, and inefficacy of governmental institutions (Baquero, 2001), as well as individual

differences and the availability of information perceived as trustworthy and relevant

(Ardévol-Abreu et al., 2017). However, even in the most limiting of political contexts, the

belief that one is capable of changing society can develop, as evidenced throughout history,

from the abolitionist movement to the massive worker's rights protests during the industrial

revolution and, more recently, the Arab Spring. The information-efficacy-participation cycle

can be understood not as a series of causes and effects and more as virtuous cycle leading to

contexts of heightened political participation (Zúñiga et al., 2017).

Behavioral Contagion

In considering the day-to-day political behaviors of citizens as a major variable in how people

interact with their political context, it is also important that we reflect on how individuals and

groups motivate one another to participate politically. This interaction is often labelled as

behavioral contagion and can be defined as the influence individuals and groups exert over

one another through encouraging, convincing, or exemplifying behaviors (Carneiro, 2015).

The broadening access to social media, and the internet as whole, is understood as

potentializing these interactions, allowing for constant, near instant, interaction between

political actors around the world.

These interactions can be further defined by delimiting specific ways in which individuals

and groups prompt others to action (Bimber, 2016). Of particular interest to our research are

the social prompts, which refer to experiences made public, calls to action and similar

interpersonal exchanges in a social network. These processes not only underlie the formation

of larger movements, but also help to understand how politicized identities are formed in an

ever more connected society (Rheingold, 2007). These interactions establish feedback loops,

where political actions and discourse is retroactively motivated, potentializing group actions.

On a negative note, these feedback loops can also sustain echo chambers (Törnberg, 2018),

reinforcing the spread of false information, conspiracy theories and such through bandwagon effects.

Informational Habits

The increasing volume of the informational flow in contemporary society has heightened the need for citizens to develop effective strategies to process and evaluate the veracity of information. However, the growing use of misinformation, or fake news, in political discourse works against these efforts, creating bubbles of alternate realities within society (Herakova et al., 2017; Metzger et al., 2015). Nonetheless, the capacity to identify relevant and trustworthy information is essential to maintaining democracy, as citizens need to be reliably informed about their country to be able to meaningfully participate in politics. The concept of Informational Habits aims to identify what strategies respondents use to access and verify information in both traditional and new medias (Herakova et al., 2017; Kim & Yang, 2016).

Informational Habits also bring a focus to day-to-day interactions with information, instead of the technical skills often in focus in Information Literacy literature (Herakova et al., 2017). In this way, our focus falls on how one interacts with information and not on veracity of the beliefs they hold. Multiple authors have indicated that a critical filter of information correlates with participating politically (Herakova et al., 2017; Kim & Yang, 2016; Metzger et al., 2015), suggesting that the ability to find relevant information is impactful in motivating political action.

Political Ideology

Political ideology has often been measured as a unidimensional variable ranging from left to right or liberal to conservative (Azevedo et al. 2019; Feldman & Johnston 2014). These

unidimensional models of political ideology are likely to ignore the heterogeneity of meaning attributed to policies by citizens of any given nation, failing to scrutinize political beliefs that fall outside these two limited groups (conservative and liberal; Azevedo et al. 2019; Feldman and Johnston 2014; Feldman et al. 2018). Furthermore, citizens do not seem to visualize politics through these labels, but rather through the attitudes and beliefs they form regarding specific sociopolitical issues (Feldman and Johnston 2014).

By dealing with specific issues, it becomes simpler to draw comparisons between countries and periods, since the items themselves are easier to interpret than the meaning behind political labels (e.g., it is easier to interpret an increase in, say, support for minority rights and government subsided welfare than a "rise in liberalism"). Though the salience of these issues may change across time and geographical space (Caughey & Warshaw 2015; Caprara & Vecchione 2018; Shafer & Spady 2013), they nonetheless hold significance for people's general political beliefs, attitudes, and behaviors (Azevedo et al. 2019; Crawford et al. 2017; Duckit and Fisher 2003; Feldman et al. 2018).

Hypotheses

This study tests three main hypotheses. The first relates to the division of Political Participation between day-to-day behavior (Latent) and the interaction between the participant and political institutions (Manifest). The second delves into the multidimensional model of Political Ideology, which divides ideological attitudes between Cultural (relating to broader social issues) and Economic (relating to economic and institutional policy). Lastly, we hypothesize that Political Efficacy will act as a partial mediator in the relationship between Cultural and Economic Ideology, Behavioral Contagion, Informational Habits and Political Participation, both Latent and Manifest.

H1: A two-factor structure will be maintained for Political Participation, Latent and Manifest.

H2: A two-factor structure will be maintained for Political Ideology, Cultural and Economic.

H3: Political Efficacy will partially mediate the relationship between antecedent variables and both Manifest and Latent Political Participation.

Method

Participants

The overall sample was composed of 564 participants, however, only 417 effectively completed the questionnaires. Furthermore, 23 outliers were identified utilizing Mahalanobis distance, leading to an effective sample of 385. The sample was evenly split regarding sex (53% Female), with 15% stating income below R$2,811.00, 66% between R$2,811.01 and R$14,055.00, and 15% above R$14,055.01 (4% did not answer). Individuals with higher education were overrepresented, accounting for 80% of the sample, and most were young (77% below 41 years old). Skewedness towards highly educated, middle class participants was expected due to unequal internet access in Brazil, which still tends to exclude most of lower income regions. Moreover, we perceived a bias towards liberalism, most likely due to some form of self-selection bias.

Procedures

All measures were adapted from existing questionnaires and theoretical models, with additional items pertaining to the specific context of the Brazilian political scenario. Five measures were included in the final questionnaire, relating to Political Participation (Carneiro, 2015; Ekman & Amnå, 2012), Behavioral Contagion (Carneiro, 2015), Political Efficacy (Caprara & Vecchione, 2009), Informational Habits (Herakova et al., 2017; Kim & Yang, 2016) and two-factor Political Ideology (Feldman & Johnston, 2014). All were evaluated by peers and tested in a pilot study for comprehension and theoretical congruency.

A SurveyMonkey link was distributed in multiple communities and groups on Facebook and Reddit, ranging from far-right conservatives to self-identified socialists. All participants were asked for consent regarding both answering the questionnaires and the use of responses for future publications. All participants were 18 or older. No identifying information was collected.

Analyses

Assumptions for Exploratory Factor Analyses (EFA) included the Keise-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) factoriability test, considering a minimum threshold of .70 (Pasquali, 2012), and Bartlett's Sphericity test. Horn's (1965) Parallel Analysis was used for identifying the number of retained factors. Factor loadings of .40 were considered as the minimum threshold for the maintenance of items. For mediation, assumptions tested included multicollinearity, homoscedasticity of residuals, independence of residuals, normal distribution of standardized residuals and linearity between antecedent and consequent variables (Fávero & Fávero, 2016; Field, Miles & Field, 2012). Mediation was run with the "mediate" in the psych package in R (Revelle, 2022), which functionally operates on the basis of linear regressions and partial correlation with adapted output.

Results

The sample was split randomly into two groups for the EFAs. Sample 1 consisted of 202 participants, while Sample 2 consisted of 183. Two separate EFAs were run with each sample, utilizing oblimin, when multiple factors were present. This was done to establish further evidence of validity and consistency of factor structures. Tests for factorability were satisfactory for all variables (Tables 1 and 2). The psych (Revelle, 2018) package was utilized for all EFAs.

Political Participation

In accordance with previous literature (Carneiro, 2015; Ekman & Amnå, 2012), parallel analysis maintained a two-factor structure for Political Participation. Considering a .40 threshold for factor loadings, 10 of the 15 original items were kept, 6 for Latent Political Participation (LPP), which refers to day-to-day attitudes and actions of political nature (such as sharing political information and expression political opinion in daily interactions), and 5 for Manifest Political Participation (MPP), referring to physical manifestations of political participation (such as protests and voting), as shown in Table 1.

Table 1

EFA for Political Participation (Samples 1 and 2)

Items	Sample 1 (η = 202)		Sample 2 (η = 183)	
	Latent Political Participation	Manifest Political Participation	Latent Political Participation	Manifest Political Participation
PP.02		.49		.39
PP.04		.81		.68
PP.06		.75		.73
PP.07	.54		.61	
PP.08	.77		.71	
PP.09		.64		.65
PP.10	.76		.83	
PP.11	.49	.40	.61	.50
PP.12	.97		.85	
PP.13	.45		.31	
Cronbach's Alpha	.85	.76	.86	.75
Eigenvalue	2.97	2.17	--	--
Variance Explained (%)	30	22	--	--

Cronbach's alpha was satisfactory for both factors on both Sample 1 (LPP: α = .85; MPP: α = .76) and Sample 2 (LPP: α = .86; MPP: α = .75). Eigenvalues (LPP: 2.97; MPP: 2.17)

supported the maintenance of the two-factor structure. These factors explained a total of 52% of the variance within the sample.

Factor structure remained stable on both samples, however, due to high loadings on both factors, PP.11 was removed from further analyses. PP.02, regarding the effects of political opinions on lifestyle choices, and PP.13, regarding questioning different opinions in daily interactions, fell slightly below the threshold on Sample 2, but were maintained due to theoretical importance. Nonetheless, the relevance of these items in the Brazilian context should be scrutinized in further studies.

Political Efficacy

Horn's parallel analysis identified only on factor in this sample, corresponding to PE, which refers to the belief that an individual's political actions have some level of efficacy on the overall political context. Considering a .40 threshold for factor loadings, all eight original items were maintained in both samples, as shown in Table 2.

Table 2

EFA for Internal Political Efficacy (Samples 1 and 2)

Items	Political Efficacy ($\eta = 202$)	Political Efficacy ($\eta = 183$)
PE.01	.63	.61
PE.02	.50	.50
PE.03	.72	.70
PE.04	.49	.64
PE.05	.64	.59
PE.06	.72	.75
PE.07	.60	.67
PE.08	.66	.71
Cronbach's Alpha	.83	.85
Eigenvalue	3.11	--
Variance	39	--

Explained (%)

Cronbach's alpha was satisfactory for both Sample 1 (α = 0,83) and Sample 2 (α = .85). The

one-factor structure explained 39% of variance within the sample. Factor loadings were

stable across both samples, except for PE.04, regarding the expression of political opinion

when among peers who hold different views, which was considerably higher in Sample 2.

Behavioral Contagion

Consistent with previous literature, only one factor was retained in Horn's Parallel Analysis

for Behavioral Contagion (Carneiro, 2015; Bimber, 2016). This factor refers to the perceived

influence of one's peers over the individual's political participation and understanding of

political issues. Considering the .40 threshold for factor loadings, only item BC.01, regarding

the sharing of political posts in social media, was excluded. Results for the remaining four

items are shown in Table 3.

Table 3

EFA for Behavioral Contagion (Samples 1 and 2)

Items	Behavioral Contagion ($\eta = 202$)	Behavioral Contagion ($\eta = 183$)
BC.02	.42	.42
BC.03	.81	.83
BC.04	.79	.85
BC.05	.51	.50
Cronbach's Alpha	.72	.74
Eigenvalue	1.72	--
Variance Explained (%)	43	--

The Eigenvalue (1.72) sustained the one-factor structure, which explained 43% of the

variance within the sample. Cronbach's alpha was satisfactory in both Sample 1 (α = .72) and

Sample 2 (α = .74). Factor loadings were also stable throughout both samples, corroborating the reliability of the measure.

Informational Habits

Though Informational Habits are often divided into multiple factors, regarding how people access, understand, evaluate, and produce informational content (Herakova et al., 2017; Kim & Yang, 2016), only one factor was retained in Horn's Parallel Analysis. This discrepancy can be attributed to the specificities of our sample but may also indicate that the underlying construct accounts for accessing, processing, and producing information without the need for a more complex factor structure.

Considering factor loading threshold of .40, only two items were excluded, IH.08 and IH.09, both regarding information obtained through traditional formats (TV, Radio, news articles, etc.). Loadings for the seven remaining items are shown in Table 4.

Table 4

EFA for Informational Habits (Samples 1 and 2)

Items	Informational Habits ($\eta = 202$)	Informational Habits ($\eta = 183$)
IH.01	.48	.64
IH.02	.78	.78
IH.03	.79	.68
IH.04	.44	.51
IH.05	.51	.60
IH.06	.52	.59
IH.07	.50	.32
Cronbach's Alpha	.78	.79
Eigenvalue	2.45	--
Variance Explained (%)	35	--

Factor loadings were less stable, indicating lower consistency in the relevance of items for each sample. IH.07, regarding use of reverse image searches for identifying the origins of visual information, was particularly unstable. Nonetheless, we opted to maintain the item due to the growing relevance of this type of informational format in recent years, especially regarding the dissemination of fake news during election periods. Furthermore, retaining IH.07 had a positive effect on internal reliability for both Sample 1 (α = .78) and Sample 2 (α = .79). The Eigenvalue (2.45) sustained the one-factor model, which accounted for 35% of the variance within the sample.

Two-Factor Political Ideology

Parallel analysis sustained a two-factor structure, in accordance with the proposed model (Feldman & Johnston, 2014). One factor grouped attitudes regarding economic and administrative issues, such as welfare (Economic Ideology - EId), while the other grouped attitudes towards cultural and moral issues, such as minority rights (Cultural Ideology - CId). Considering the .40 threshold for factor loadings, all sixteen items were retained, as shown in Cronbach's alpha indicated sufficient internal reliability on both Sample 1 (EId: α = .89: CId: α = .78) and Sample 2 (EId: α = .88: CId: α = .75).

Furthermore, Eigenvalues sustained the two-factor structure (EId: 4.72: CId: 2.47), which explained a total of 44% of the variance within the sample. Factor loadings were also stable on both EFAs, though with more deviations than present in most of the other variables, as shown in Table 5. This is somewhat expected, as the relative relevance of specific political issues can change rather significantly from group to group (Feldman et al. 2018).

Table 5

EFA for Two-Factor Political Ideology (Samples 1 and 2)

Items	Sample 1 ($\eta = 202$)		Sample 2 ($\eta = 183$)	
	Economic Ideology	Cultural Ideology	Economic Ideology	Cultural Ideology
Id.01		.87		.69
Id.02	.57		.63	
Id.03		.57		.67
Id.04		.45		.46
Id.05	.63		.62	
Id.06		.48		.53
Id.07		.45		.45
Id.08		.72		.44
Id.09	.52		.63	
Id.10	.67		.59	
Id.11	.77		.78	
Id.12	.85		.80	
Id.13	.70		.79	
Id.14	.63		.52	
Id.15	.60		.50	
Id.16	.61		.49	
Cronbach's Alpha	.89	.78	.88	.75
Eigenvalue	4.72	2.47	--	--
Variance Explained (%)	29	15	--	--

Two items unexpectedly loaded into Economic Ideology, Id.02 and Id.05, relating to political correctness and death penalty, respectively. However, it should be noted that these were issues that were highly polarizing when the questionnaire was Applied, and this discrepancy may only indicate that they were conflated with overarching political narratives focused on economic and administrative issues.

Mediation Effects

Tests for partial mediation were processed through the mediate function (Tingley, Yamamoto, Hirose, Keele & Imai, 2017) in R. To account for non-normality, all regressions were done with bootstrapping (1000 iterations). Partial mediation of PE between LPP and antecedent variables was significant for all models, as shown in Table 6.

Table 6

Regression analyses for Mediation of PE between LPP and each antecedent variable (η = 385)

Model	b	se	t	Sig.	R²	VIF
LPP ~ IH					0,23	
IH	0,54	0,05	10,62	$p < 0,001$		
PE ~ IH					0,17	
IH	0,49	0,06	8,84	$p < 0,001$		
Model 1: LPP ~ IH & PE					0,30	1,20
IH	0,40	0,05	7,58	$p < 0,001$		
PE	0,28	0,04	6,21	$p < 0,001$		
LPP ~ CID					0,03	
CID	0,23	0,07	3,43	$p < 0,001$		
PE ~ CID					0,01	
CID	0,15	0,07	2,07	$p < 0,05$		
Model 2: LPP ~ CID & PE					0,21	1,01
CID	0,17	0,06	2,79	$p < 0,01$		
PE	0,40	0,04	9,30	$p < 0,001$		
LPP ~ EID					0,09	
EID	0,21	0,03	6,17	$p < 0,001$		
PE ~ EID					0,06	
EID	0,17	0,04	4,75	$p < 0,001$		
Model 3: LPP ~ EID & PE					0,23	1,06
EID	0,15	0,03	4,53	$p < 0,001$		
PE	0,37	0,04	8,46	$p < 0,001$		
LPP ~ BC					0,16	
BC	0,38	0,05	8,51	$p < 0,001$		
PE ~ BC					0,07	
BC	0,26	0,05	5,31	$p < 0,001$		
Model 4: LPP ~ BC & PE					0,28	1,07

BC	0,29	0,04	6,77	$p < 0,001$		
PE	0,34	0,04	7,98	$p < 0,001$		

Model 1 identified a strong total effect (b = .54, 95%CI [.45, .63], p < .05) between IH and LPP. The insertion of PE as a mediating variable accounted for 25% of that effect (95%CI [.17, .36], p < .05. Model 2 also identified partial mediation of PE 26% (95%CI [.01, .57], p < .05) between CId and LPP (b = .23, 95%CI [.10, .35], p < .05). Similarly, in Model 3, PE accounted for 31% (95%CI [.17, .49], p < .05) of the total effect between EId and LPP (b = .21, 95%CI [.14, .28], p < .05), and, in Model 4, 24% (95%CI [.14, .37], p < .05) of the total effect between BC and LPP (b = .38, 95%CI [.30, .48], p < .05). Though partial mediation hypotheses were supported by results, indirect effects of political ideology factors over LPP were small, indicating a low effect of political ideology over day-to-day and digital political behaviors (such as sharing political posts and discussing politics with acquaintances). Table 7 demonstrates similar results for mediation of PE between antecedent variables and MPP.

Table 7

Regression analyses for Mediation of PE between MPP and each antecedent variable (η = 385)

Model	b	se	t	Sig.	R²	VIF
MPP ~ IH					0,09	
IH	0,35	0,06	5,98	$p < 0,001$		
PE ~ IH					0,17	
IH	0,49	0,06	8,85	$p < 0,001$		
Model 5: MPP ~ IH & PE					0,15	1,20
IH	0,21	0,06	3,43	$p < 0,001$		
PE	0,28	0,05	5,36	$p < 0,001$		
MPP ~ CID					0,08	
CID	0,40	0,07	5,80	$p < 0,001$		
PE ~ CID					0,01	
CID	0,15	0,07	2,07	$p < 0,05$		
Model 6: MPP ~ CID & PE					0,18	1,01

CID	0,35	0,06	5,38	$p < 0,001$		
PE	0,33	0,05	6,99	$p < 0,001$		
MPP ~ EID					0,17	
EID	0,31	0,03	9,00	$p < 0,001$		
PE ~ EID					0,06	
EID	0,17	0,04	4,75	$p < 0,001$		
Model 7: MPP ~ EID & PE					0,24	1,06
EID	0,26	0,03	7,74	$p < 0,001$		
PE	0,27	0,05	5,82	$p < 0,001$		
MPP ~ BC					0,12	
BC	0,35	0,05	7,16	$p < 0,001$		
PE ~ BC					0,07	
BC	0,26	0,05	5,31	$p < 0,001$		
Model 8: MPP ~ BC & PE					0,19	1,07
BC	0,27	0,05	5,67	$p < 0,001$		
PE	0,28	0,05	5,87	$p < 0,001$		

In Model 5, a partial mediation effect of 39% (95%CI [.22, .63], p < .05) of PE between IH and MPP (b = .35, 95%CI [.24, .45], p < .05) was found. The weakest effect was identified in Model 6, in which PE accounted for only 9% (95%CI [.01, .18], p < .05) of the effect between CId and MPP (b = .38, 95%CI [.27, .49], p < .05). Similarly, PE mediated only 15% (95%CI [.08, .23], p < .05) of the effect between EId and MPP (b = .31, 95%CI [.25, .38], p < .05), indicating that both political ideology factors had a significant, but small effect over MPP. On the other hand, in Model 8 PE accounted for 21% (95%CI [.12, .34], p < .05) of the effect between BC and MPP (b = .35, 95%CI [.25, .45], p < .05). These results indicate that IH and BC were stronger predictors for MPP than were ideological attitudes, in other words, how one deals with information and the political activity of acquaintances and friends was more important for driving behaviors related to more traditional means of political participation (such as protests and voting).

Discussion

In recent years, a host of communication and social participation tools have ingrained themselves into the day-to-day lives of much of the populace. These tools have played a significant role in restructuring social and political interaction in contemporary societies, allowing for near constant flow of information and amplifying the reach of a multitude of social and political discourses (Turkle, 2008). The digital spaces in which these interactions take form have become fertile ground for an accelerated form of building and sharing of information and social movements, commonly referred to as cyberculture (Castells, 2013; Mazzotti & Campos, 2014). In this scenario, the spread of unchecked information leads to the constant resignification of both the information itself and broader political relations (Mazzotti & Campos, 2014). Considering this hybrid context of digital and physical interaction, we aimed to bring light to how the differences in personal belief in political efficacy might impact the relationship between political ideology, informational habits and behavioral contagion, and political participation, both latent and manifest.

We indicated that the construction and processing of an individual's information network is both relevant to political participation and to reinforcing political efficacy, the belief that one's action has impact in the political context. Results corroborated these assumptions, providing further evidence that how one builds their social networks and processes information received through those networks may be a particularly significant aspect of contemporary political behavior as hybrid spaces become more commonplace (Carneiro, 2015; Herakova et al., 2017; Kim & Yang, 2016; Metzger et al., 2015). It also indicates, however, that the forming of echo-chambers or social bubbles may become more problematic as digital media use expands (Törnberg, 2018), as it provides fertile grounds for fringe

movements to take root, leading to a reinforcement loop which could sustain propagation of disinformation and radicalized discourse in political groups.

Exploratory Factor Analyses sustained H1, indicating that a two-factor model for Political Participation was the more adequate solution, providing evidence to support the findings of Carneiro (2015) and Ekman & Amnå (2012). Though both relate to the same overall concept, these results indicate that day-to-day political interactions and formal, institutional forms of participation are nonetheless distinct. Considering the rapid advancement of internet access, this may be of particular interest to future political research, as it evidences that constant political interaction in digital social spaces constitutes a continuous sample of political behavior unfettered to more formal means of participation usually associated with election periods (Ekman & Amnå, 2012; Bimber, 2016; Feezell, 2016).

Similarly, the maintenance of a two-factor structure for Political Ideology constitutes preliminary evidence for the application of a multidimensional model in the Brazilian context, supporting H2. Results echoed expected factor structure shown in previous research (Feldman and Johnston 2014; Feldman et al. 2018), which pointed to a Cultural factor relating to broader social issues and an Economic factor more closely associated with institutional and economic policy. With a multidimensional structure sustained in the Brazilian sample, we argue that, though further testing is needed, especially in the sense of amplifying the diversity of ideological groups among respondents, considering the multidimensional model in further research is of importance to understand contemporary political phenomena, which has largely associated traditional "left" and "right" labels to symbols and stereotypes that can be largely unrelated to actual political policy or attitudes towards social issues not directly related to campaign discourse (Azevedo et al. 2019; Feldman and Johnston 2014; Feldman et al. 2018).

Cultural Ideology had a more direct influence in more traditional means of political participation, for all other relations Political Efficacy strongly influences the impact of predictor variables on political action. In other words, the belief that one's actions has significant impact on the political context strongly correlates to participating politically (MPP: r = .35; LPP: r = .44), and partially mediates most of the relationships analyzed, providing evidence for H3. In this sense, we conclude that to drive democracy forward, it is not enough to simply offer the means of democratic behavior, but also, to instill citizens with the belief that democratic political action bears practical consequence in changing theirs, or their peers, sociopolitical scenario.

Measuring Political Ideology: Validity Evidence for a Two-Factor Model

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Medindo Ideologia Política: Evidências de validade para um modelo de dois fatores

Abstract

In the context of far-right shifts in multiple democratic nations, multidimensional measures of political ideology have steadily gained traction in political science and psychology. However, these models have seldom been studied in the crisis-ridden context of young democracies. In this study, we assess the reliability and internal and external validities of a two-factor (Economic and Cultural) political ideology measure based on attitudes towards specific political issues. Throughout the analyses, we find consistent evidence across studies that support measure reliability and validity, as well as significant correlations between both ideological factors, personal values, unidimensional political ideology, and voting intentions. Results sustained the relative independence of each factor, indicating that political ideology for each factor is not necessarily harmonious throughout multiple sociopolitical issues. Furthermore, we provide tentative evidence that both factors differentially correlate with right- and left-wing voters, suggesting possible variations in factor relevance in different political groups. We conclude that the measure showed satisfactory evidence of reliability and validity, and that it further demonstrates the advantages of a multidimensional model in understanding the complexities of political ideology.

Keywords: Economic ideology, Cultural ideology, Political attitudes, Personal values, Voting intention

The pendulum shift from progressive governments to conservative populism in the USA has sparked a new wave of debate about politics throughout the world. This phenomenon is not exclusive to the USA, finding support in both established and budding democracies throughout the world. Brazil is no exception. The rise of our own "Tropical Trump" in the person of Jair Bolsonaro has created a foothold for the resurgence of many highly conservative ideals in Brazilian society, regarding both economic policy and minority rights. To understand these shifts, political ideology often takes center stage. However, multiple authors (Azevedo et al., 2019; Feldman et al., 2018; Feldman & Johnston, 2014) argue that the traditional way of measuring political ideology, which asks participants to place themselves on a continuum between conservative and liberal labels, is insufficient to understand it.

This criticism is often based on the idea that these labels do a poor job of identifying the underlying beliefs of the people who subscribe to them. There are many reasons for this perceived inadequacy. These include the meaning of the labels themselves, which may vary from individual to individual (Ellis & Stimson, 2012). The stigma that some of these labels may carry in certain political contexts leads to individuals who consider themselves liberal or conservative regardless of their attitudes towards actual policy content (Ellis & Stimson, 2012; Feldman & Johnston, 2014), and the limitations imposed by these measures in terms of political group heterogeneity, excluding groups which might be conservative or liberal in only certain aspects of their political beliefs (either cultural or economic; Azevedo et al., 2019; Feldman et al., 2018).

Research has been conducted with ideological measures that consider more dimensions in ideological placement, gravitating towards issue-based questionnaires that measure attitudes towards specific sociopolitical issues and policies (Azevedo et al., 2019; Crawford et al.,

2017; Feldman et al., 2018; Pan & Xu, 2018). These initiatives have generally shown that multidimensional models tend to better explain political attitudes in various issues, ranging from polarization (Feldman et al., 2018) to support for institutionalized inequality (Azevedo et al., 2019; Bakker, 2016).

Though some of this research has focused on non-democratic regions (Pan & Xu, 2018), most of it still focuses on well-established democracies in North America and Europe (Azevedo et al., 2019; Crawford et al., 2017; Feldman et al., 2018), leading to the underrepresentation of younger democracies, and the economic and political crises they have faced in the recent past. Limiting political ideology to conservative- liberal labels in younger democracies, such as Brazil, in which well over 30 registered political parties are active, might be outright detrimental to our understanding of politics.

In a preliminary attempt to deal with these issues, we first aim to gather evidence of reliability and validity of an issue-based multidimensional (Economic and Cultural) political ideology measure of our authorship, built with the peculiarities of the Brazilian context in mind. Factor structure and items in this scale are based on previous work by Feldman and Johnston (2014). Once satisfactory evidence of measure adequacy is found, we aim to evaluate how the two-factor model of political ideology relates to classical one-factor political ideology and personal values. Moreover, we aim to show that ideological preferences in both factors correlate logically with preference for specific presidential candidates in the Brazilian elections of 2018.

Measuring Political Ideology

Political ideology can be broadly defined as a system of symbols and signs representing groups of beliefs and attitudes relating to the interaction between individuals and groups and their sociopolitical context (Pereira & Camino, 2003). Political Ideology has often been

measured as a unidimensional variable ranging from left to right or liberal to conservative (Azevedo et al., 2019; Feldman & Johnston, 2014). These unidimensional models of political ideology are likely to ignore the great het- erogeneity of meaning attributed to policies by citizens of any given nation, failing to scrutinize political attitudes that fall outside these two limited groups (conservative and liberal; Azevedo et al., 2019; Feldman & Johnston, 2014; Feldman et al., 2018). Furthermore, citizens do not seem to visualize politics through these labels, but rather through the attitudes and beliefs they form regarding specific sociopolitical issues (Feldman & Johnston, 2014).

Further research has also implied that the unidimensional political ideology structure often leads to considerable in-group variation, as the meaning of political identifications themselves varies significantly from individual to individual (Ellis & Stimson, 2012). Though some might subscribe to party ideals and the policies spawned by them, many individuals may consider themselves conservative or liberal mainly due to the symbology attached to these labels (Ellis & Stimson, 2012; Feldman & Johnston, 2014). To deal with these limitations, previous research (Johnston & Ollerenshaw, 2020) has proposed that ideology be measured considering political attitudes regarding two distinct factors, one relating to cultural and another to economic issues. The first of these factors, Cultural ideology, concerns issues of national boundaries and traditional morality, while the second, Economic ideology, refers to issues related to the financial and administrative aspects of the government.

It should be noted that in the Brazilian context, political positioning is usually thought of as placement in a continuum from left to right. As such, political parties mostly follow suit, positioning themselves as left, center-left, center, center-right, and right. This simplification of political ideology commonly functions as a sort of shorthand, which allows for the public to identify politicians and political parties broadly aligned with their own worldview (Guan,

2020). Ideology in Brazil's political context, however, tends to be rather diffuse, with parties often fragmented, hosting politicians with differing or even conflicting agendas (Alves & Hunter, 2017). In this sense, the left-to-right labels serve more as symbolic anchors to specific social groups than a set of well-defined positions on cultural and economic issues (Pereira & Camino, 2003). In turn, measuring ideology through these shorthand labels makes it difficult to extrapolate the meaning of political placement regarding specific political issues or goals.

By dealing with specific issues, it becomes simpler to draw comparisons between countries and periods, since the items themselves are easier to interpret than the meaning behind political labels (e.g., it is easier to interpret an increase in, say, support for minority rights and government-subsided welfare than a "rise in liberalism"). Though the salience of these issues may change across time and geographical space (Caprara & Vecchione, 2018; Caughey & Warshaw, 2015; Shafer & Spady, 2013), they nonetheless hold significance for people's general political beliefs and attitudes (Azevedo et al., 2019; Crawford et al., 2017; Duckitt & Fisher, 2003; Feldman et al., 2018).

Feldman and Johnston's (2014) research provides evidence that supports a two- factor model, evaluating each through attitudes regarding multiple issues, such as religiosity, egalitarianism, and authoritarianism. This two-factor model has been utilized with success in assessing multiple political issues, including partisan and electoral polarization in developed countries (Feldman et al., 2018), prejudice (Crawford et al., 2017), and support for established economic and gender systems (Azevedo et al., 2019; Bakker, 2016). Multidimensional political ideology questionnaires have also seen less frequent use in non-democratic regions such as China (Pan & Xu, 2018); however, little research has been done utilizing these more complex ideological models in young and unstable democracies.

Personal Values

Schwartz's core human values (1992; Schwartz et al., 2010) suggest that distinct motivational types, beliefs relating to social ideals, may relate to conservatism. The ten motivational types are Stimulation, which refers to the need for excitement and novelty in life; Self-Direction, to independent thought and action; Hedonism, to pleasure and sensuous gratification; Achievement, to personal success according to social standards; Power, to social status and dominance over others; Conformity, to avoid violating social expectations and norms; Tradition, to accepting the customs proposed by traditional culture or religion; Security, to the need for safety and stability; Universalism, to tolerance and protection of the welfare of others; and Benevolence, to protecting the welfare of the in-group (e.g., family, friends, and colleagues). These motivational types can be grouped in two overarching dimensions by the relation between the general beliefs which each group of values represent (Czarnek & Kossowska, 2019). Self-Enhancement includes power and achievement, focusing on pursuit of self-interest, opposed by Self-Transcendence, which includes universalism and benevolence, emphasizing concern for the welfare of others. While Conservation includes interpersonal conformity, tradition, and security, centered on the need to avoid harming others or contradicting established rules, in opposition, Openness represents self-direction, stimulation, and hedonism, focusing on beliefs regarding individual growth and freedom. In Study 3, we focus on these two dimensions and their correlation to the political attitudes that constitute Economic and Cultural ideologies.

Overview of Studies 1 and 2

In choosing the issue-based approach, we must first identify central sociopolitical issues that are relevant in the day-to-day conversations of civilians (those that people often talk about, that are relevant to their beliefs, or are constantly on media channels). Considering how these

issues relate to conservative and liberal policies is also necessary. To facilitate future comparisons between cultures, we defined liberal and conservative attitudes according to international literature (Azevedo et al., 2019; Bakker, 2016; Caprara & Vecchione, 2018; Feldman & Johnston, 2014). In this context, attitudes labeled liberal are supportive of individual rights and economic policy (restricting free market to maximize equity), and those labeled conservative are supportive of traditional morality over individual rights and an economic policy that prioritizes free market practices (even to the detriment of social and economic equity). Evidence for the adequacy factor structure and model fit must be shown to sufficiently support the reliability and validity of the measure. Lastly, the individual results for each of the two ideological factors will be compared to correlated variables to test its external validity.

Considering these objectives, study 1 aims to introduce the measure and identify the factor structure through exploratory factor analysis (EFA), while study 2 aims to test the model fit through a confirmatory factor analysis (CFA). Each study was con- ducted on a different sample, and all analyses were run on the open-source statistical software R (R Core Team, 2014).

Study 1

This study focuses on identifying the underlying factor structure of the two-dimensional, issue-based political ideology measure and verifying internal consistency. Parallel analysis was conducted through polychoric correlation to evaluate the adequacy of the two-factor structure, since this method is more robust to the common skewness of ordinal variables such as those present in Likert-type measures (Garrido et al., 2013). EFA was the chosen method to determine item loadings on each factor and Cronbach's alpha to determine internal consistency.

Method

Before the main sample for this study was gathered, a pilot study was conducted through Google Forms and applied online to a sample of 50 participants in multiple Brazilian states. Item scores were meant to evaluate how liberal a participant's opinion was with respect to a specific issue-based statement (e.g., "Women should have the right to choose abortion") in a six-point Likert-type scale (1 completely disagree; 6 completely agree), where 6 represented the most liberal attitude towards the issue. The two-factor (Cultural and Economic) political ideology scale was based on previous discussion and research by Feldman and Johnston (2014).

Fifteen items, out of a total of sixteen proposed items, which were evaluated as easy to comprehend and relevant by a group of six members of the PhD program of the University of Brasilia working with social and political research, were maintained for these preliminary analyses. Items were placed, regarding content, by these judges in either Economic or Cultural factors, after being exposed to the definitions of each category. In this phase, Economic ideology was defined as position on issues regarding government administration, market intervention, and legislation, while Cultural ideology was defined as position on issues related to minority rights, social equity, and the impact of religious creed and scientific research in political decisions.

Some items were inverted to avoid a questionnaire overtly biased statements, which might have been overly off-putting for some participants. Minor problems regarding the understanding of the items were identified: These resulted in changes in wording to ease interpretation. These items were built considering previous research on multidimensional political ideology (Feldman & Johnston, 2014), as well as the specific issues that rose to salience in the Brazilian social and political context during the rise of the conservative and

antileft movements throughout the populace in 2016. Approval of an ethics committee was waived due to the non- invasive nature of the application procedure. Nonetheless, participants' anonymity was maintained, and all respondents were informed of their right to opt out of the research at any point.

Participants

The developed items were included in an online survey, which was completed by 188 participants (age: M = 29.65, SD = 9.62; 43.55% female; high school and under: 26.34%, higher education: 73.66%).

Procedures

The questionnaire was applied through SurveyMonkey and was distributed through the Facebook social network (being posted in various politically inclined groups and pages of diverse political orientations). After consent was confirmed, participants completed the scale in random order. All items were measured on six-point Likert-type scale (1 completely disagree; 6 completely agree), where 6 represented the most liberal attitude towards the issue. Eight items referred to Economic ideology and seven to Cultural ideology, which refer to how one views economic/administrative (e.g., government-funded education) and moral/social (e.g., minority rights) issues, respectively. Some items were inverted to avoid a questionnaire full of liberal or conservative statements.

Results

Mean (M) and standard deviation (SD) indicate a relatively large deviation from normality. Factorability was ensured using the Kaiser–Meyer–Olkin index (KMO = 0.91) and Bartlett's sphericity test ($X2 = 1517.45$, df = 120, $p < 0.001$), the latter of which indicates sufficiently large correlations between items and supports factorability (Damásio, 2012). To account for

non-normality, a robust maximum likelihood (fm = ml, n.iter = 100; Revelle, 2018), EFA was

run. Results for this analysis are shown in Table 8.

Table 8

Exploratory factor analysis and descriptive statistics per item (N = 188)

Items	λ	
	Economic	Cultural
1. Personal merit is enough to be successful in Brazil.*	.57	.21
2. Political correctness has made the world dull.*	-.03	.91
3. Quality health and education should be guaranteed by the government.	.62	.20
4. The private sector is a more honest administrator than the government.*	.68	.07
5. The less the government interferes in society the better the country would be.*	.85	.03
6. Social equity is more important than economic freedom.	.05	.71
7. Criminals should be punished with death.*	.93	-.17
8. The government should regulate the private sector to promote public interest.	.30	.54
9. Women should have the right to choose abortion.	.77	.11
10. Legalizing and regulating illicit drugs would bring about positive results.	.53	.17
11. The movements for minority rights are legitimate.	.75	-.04
12. Only heterosexual couples should be able to adopt.*	.00	.56
13. Science should not play god with research such as stem cells.*	-.31	.30
14. Tax is theft, regardless of what the money is used for.*	.54	-.03
15. Church/state separation in legal and political matters is essential.	.03	.49
Eigenvalue	5.22	2.61
Variance explained	.33	.16
Cronbach's alpha	.90	.81
KMO	.91	

*These items are inverted.

The robust EFA was processed using the R (R Core Team, 2014) package psych (Revelle,

2018) to explore factor structure within the construct. Preliminary parallel analysis utilizing

polychoric correlation was also tested through the psych package and confirmed the two-

factor structure. Oblimin rotation was used for the EFA, since factors were expected to

correlate significantly (Field et al., 2012). Correlation between factors (r = 0.46, p < 0.01)

was within expected values presented by previous research (0.40 to 0.69; Azevedo et al.,

2019). Reliability of each scale, measured through the internal consistency index of

Cronbach's alpha (alpha; R Core Team, 2014), was satisfactory. For Economic ideology, the

value achieved was $\alpha = 0.90$, and $\alpha = 0.81$ for Cultural ideology.

Considering both the sample size and the proposal of a more succinct measure, the cutoff for factor loadings was set at 0.50 (Field et al., 2012), leading to the removal of item 13. Item 14 was removed due to high correlation with items relating to government regulation. Item 15 was maintained though slightly below the threshold due to the importance of the item theme to the Brazilian political scenario. Loadings for all other factors ranged well above this threshold: from 0.54 to 0.86. The Economic ideology factor had an eigenvalue of 5.22 and explained 33% of the variance, while the Cultural ideology factor had an eigenvalue of 2.61 and explained 16% of the variance. Combined, they explained 49% of the variance within the data.

Discussion

Results of the EFA supported the two-factor structure and justified the maintenance the majority (13 out of 15) of proposed items. Correlation between Cultural and Economic factors fell within the expected range (cf. Azevedo et al., 2019), indicating their relative independence. Item 7 loaded on the Economic factor, suggesting that attitudes towards death penalty had been conflated with more administrative questions (rather than with the social issues initially anticipated). The next logical step would be to test the proposed measure through a CFA using a different sample, as suggested in the literature (Worthington & Whittaker, 2006).

Overall, items that factored in Economic ideology related to government intervention on market dynamics, taxing, and broad issues regarding abortion and drug use. Meanwhile, Cultural ideology mainly included items related to social equity, individual rights, and church/state separation. Though all ideology can be thought of as social, item placement indicates that, in the Brazilian context, Economic ideology can be more specifically understood as the position on issues regarding government administration and matters

regarding laws that limit individual freedoms, while Cultural ideology more can be defined as position on issues that impact minority rights, governmental investment in public services, and the impact of religious institutions in politics.

Study 2

Following up on study 1, this study aims to test the two-factor model's fit in a larger sample. Since the distribution was non-normal, we opted for a robust CFA with the Satorra-Bentler chi-square statistic (Satorra & Bentler, 1994). Composite Reliability was used to analyze the measure reliability, and Cronbach's alpha was used to evaluate internal consistency of the resulting reduced measure.

Method

The 13-item (5 Cultural, 8 Economic) scale resulting from study 1 was applied to a larger sample composed of online participants belonging to both the general populace and a traditionally conservative institution (the Military Police). The inclusion of a conservative-aligned group aimed to heighten the variability of the sample, given that, in study 1, online respondents leaned heavily towards liberal positions. The skewness towards liberal responses on general samples is thought to be the result of self-selection bias, as academia is often conflated with the left in the Brazilian political context. As evidence, the liberal bias was maintained in the general online application, even though the questionnaire was applied to 10 conservatively aligned and only 8 liberally aligned groups and pages on Facebook. Data gathered from this study were then submitted to a robust CFA, aiming to evaluate model fit. As a follow-up to the EFA reported in study 1, this study furthers the first proposed objective of gathering evidence for reliability and validity of the construct.

Participants

A total of 230 participants (age: M = 34.19, SD = 24.40; 56.58% female; high school and under: 20.44%, higher education: 79.56%) were surveyed both through politically oriented pages and groups on Facebook and a specialization course for members of the Military Police (a traditionally conservative group).

Procedures

The questionnaire for the online application was built through SurveyMonkey and distributed in the same fashion as study 1. The 13 items were answered in a six-point Likert-type scale (1 completely disagree; 6 completely agree), where 6 represented the most liberal attitude towards the issue. Eight items comprised the economic segment and five constituted the social measure.

Results

The package lavaan (Rosseel, 2012) was used for conducting the CFA to validate the two-dimensional structure of the scale. Robust maximum likelihood estimation and the Satorra-Bentler chi-square statistic (SB X2; Satorra & Bentler, 1994) were used to account for non-normality in the data. Indices checked to assess quality of the model fit (cutoff thresholds in parentheses; Schweizer, 2010) were the model chi- square, the robust comparative fit index (CFI; > 0.95), the robust tucker-Lewis index (TLI; > 0.95), the robust root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA; < 0.06), and the standardized root mean square of residuals (SRMR; < 0.08).

The CFA results indicate that the two-factor model with all 13 remaining items was a satisfactory fit to the data, SB X2 = 106.14; df = 64; p < 0.05; CFI = 0.92; TLI = 0.91;

RMSEA = 0.05 [90%CI: 0.04, 0.07]; SRMR = 0.06. Loadings for each item can be seen in Table 9.

Table 9

Confirmatory factor analysis standardized loadings and squared multiple correlations for study 2 (N = 230)

Items	λ		R^2
	Economic	Cultural	
1. Personal merit is enough to be successful in Brazil.*	.65		.42
2. Political correctness has made the world dull.*	.75		.56
3. Quality health and education should be guaranteed by the government.	.62		.39
4. The private sector is a more honest administrator than the government.*	.80		.63
5. The less the government interferes in society, the better the country would be.*	.75		.55
6. Social equity is more important than economic freedom.	.86		.74
7. Criminals should be punished with death.*	.61		.37
8. The government should regulate the private sector to promote public interest.	.63		.40
9. Women should have the right to choose abortion.		.82	.68
10. Legalizing and regulating illicit drugs would bring about positive results.		.61	.37
11. The movements for minority rights are legitimate.		.89	.78
12. Only heterosexual couples should be able to adopt.*		.60	.36
13. Church/state separation in legal and political matters is essential		.37	.14

*These items were inverted.

Scale reliability was reassessed through the composite reliability measure (0.92) using the lavaan package (Rosseel, 2012). Lastly, the strong correlation between factors (r = 0.62; p < 0.01) is indicative of the sustainability of the two-factor model and falls within expected parameters (0.40 to 0.69; Azevedo et al., 2019).

Discussion

Study 2 reassessed the measure's reliability and factorial structure through a robust CFA. Results indicated a good fit of the modified scale to the data; they also con- firmed the sustainability of the two-factor model: a strong but not near-perfect correlation between factors was shown.

The scale maintained its reliability and items remained relevant for each factor. Evaluating the measure's relation to practical political behavior and a related variable (personal values, one-factor political ideology) seemed prudent as the next step. These relations were explored in study 3.

Study 3

Previous research on political ideology has implied that the unidimensional model tends to lead to significant in-group variation, both because the meaning of political identifications (e.g., what it means to conservative) vary (Ellis & Stimson, 2012) and because people often do not fit neatly into the broad liberal or conservative labels (Feldman & Johnston, 2014). These apparently paradoxical attitudes (e.g., supporting minority rights and conservative economic policy) can be better explained in the multidimensional model, since ideological groups consider differing positions in economic and cultural factors, leading to multiple distinct groups.

Similarly, Schwartz's core human values (1992; Schwartz et al., 2010) suggest that distinct motivational types may relate to economic and cultural conservatism. The ten motivational types are Stimulation, which refers to the need for excitement and novelty in life; Self-Direction, to independent thought and action; Hedonism, to pleasure and sensuous gratification; Achievement, to personal success according to social standards; Power, to social status and dominance over others; Conformity, to avoid violating social expectations and norms; Tradition, to accepting the customs proposed by traditional culture or religion; Security, to the need for safety and stability; Universalism, to tolerance and protection of the welfare of others; and Benevolence, to protecting the welfare of the in-group (e.g., family, friends, and colleagues). With these relations in mind, study 3 aims to test whether the two-factor model will have any significant correlation with voting intention, as well as if this

correlation will prove more extreme on more polarized candidates. It also aims to evaluate if each factor correlates to personal values in the Brazilian context, as theoretically predicted by the similarities between specific motivational types and political attitudes, as well as the relationship between each factor and a unidimensional ideological measure. In this sense, this study gathers evidence for external validity. Lastly, it aims to test the stability of the issues throughout time, identifying similarities and differences with previous studies.

Method

The 13-item scale resulting from studies 1 and 2 was applied to two samples with the objective of identifying correlations between each ideological factor and three related variables. Correlations among each of the variables (Cultural and Economic Ideologies, voting intention, personal values, and one-factor ideology) were analyzed with the rcorr function of the Hmisc package (Harrel, 2019).

Participants

The sample for voting intention and personal values was composed of 173 participants (age: M = 32.88, SD = 12.70; 49.71% female; high school and under: 25.55%). While a smaller sample of 93 was used for comparing two-factor and one-factor political ideology measures (age 18–30: 42%; 31–45: 23%; 46–60: 18%; 61 + : 11%; 59.14% female).

Procedures

The questionnaire was built through SurveyMonkey and was distributed mostly in the same fashion as study 1, but through 22 Facebook pages and groups of diverse political orientations (with over 13 million subscribers in total at the time). Ten liberal-leaning and twelve conservative leaning groups and pages were targeted in this study. The focus was given to non-liberal pages to gather more heterogeneous data. After consent was confirmed,

participants completed the scale in random order. All items were measured on a six-point Likert-type scale (1 completely disagree; 6 completely agree), where 6 represented the most liberal attitude towards the issue. Eight items referred to Economic ideology and five to Cultural ideology. The PVQ-21 (Davidov, 2010) measure was used for measuring personal values. This instrument is comprised of 21 items answered along a 5-point scale. One-factor political ideology was measured through a 1–10 scale ranging from left/liberal (1) to right/conservative (10). Voting intention was measured on a 1–100 slider scale for each of the thirteen presidential candidates during the two months prior to the 2018 elections.

Hypotheses

Given the overlap of each of these constructs regarding broad political attitudes and beliefs, we hypothesize that liberally leaning attitudes towards issues presented in the Economic ideology will partially correlate with voting intention towards left- leaning candidates in the 2018 elections, preference for motivational types related to transcendence and openness, and left placement on the unidimensional ideology measure. While conservative leaning attitudes regarding Economic ideology will correlate in the opposite directions.

Similarly, we also hypothesize that liberally leaning attitudes towards issues presented in the Cultural ideology measure will partially correlate with voting intention towards left-leaning candidates in the 2018 elections, preference for motivational types related to transcendence and openness, and left placement on the unidimensional ideology measure. While conservative leaning attitudes regarding Cultural ideology will correlate in the opposite directions.

Results

Results indicated that Economic and Cultural factors, in general, had significant correlations with the participants' intent to vote. They also correlated in the expected direction: negative for more conservative candidates and positive for more liberal ones. These correlations tended to be stronger for candidates on the extremes, being highest for Jair Bolsonaro (Economic: r = - 0.68; Cultural: r = - 0.72) and João Amoedo (Economic: r = - 0.61; Cultural: r = - 0.26) on the conservative side, and Ciro Gomes (Economic: r = 0.55; Cultural: r = 0.46), Fernando Haddad (Economic: r = 0.65; Cultural: r = 0.50), and Guilherme Boulos (Economic: r = 0.63; Cultural: r = 0.44) on the liberal side. Candidates were placed as either liberal or conservative by evaluating published policy proposals and guidelines for their potential mandates that aligned with issues present in the multidimensional ideology scale, focusing on issues present in the multidimensional political ideology measure.

Table 10

Factor correlation with voting intention by candidate, personal value by axis, and one-factor political ideology

	Year	N		r	
				Economic	Cultural
Voting intention per candidate (conservative to liberal)	2018	173	Jair Bolsonaro	-.68*	-.72*
			Daciolo	-.23*	-.28*
			Eymael	-.21*	-.30*
			João Amoedo	-.61*	-.26*
			Geraldo Alckmin	-.35*	-.13
			Alvaro Dias	-.37*	-.36*
			Henrique Meirelles	-.34*	-.17*
			João Goulart Filho	.03	-.04
			Marina Silva	.12	.22*
			Ciro Gomes	.55*	.46*
			Vera Lúcia	.21*	.09
			Fernando Haddad	.65*	.50*
			Guilherme Boulos	.63*	.44*
Personal values by axis	2018	173	Transcendence-enhancement	.42*	.31*
			Openness-conservation	.18*	.34*
One-factor political ideology	2020	93	Left to right	-.40*	-.43*

*$p < 0.05$.

The analysis shown in Table 10 indicates both transcendence-enhancement and openness-conservation axes correlated with the specified factors. Economic ideology demonstrated stronger correlation to the Self-Transcendence and Self-Enhancement axis ($r = 0.42$; $p < 0.05$) than in relation to the openness and conservation axis ($r = 0.18$; $p < 0.05$). Cultural ideology has similar correlations to both the Self-Transcendence and Self-Enhancement ($r = 0.31$; $p < 0.05$) and the openness and conservation ($r = 0.34$; $p < 0.05$) axes.

Correlations between ideological factors and unidimensional political ideology were significant both for Economic ($r = - 0.40$; $p < 0.05$) and Cultural ($r = - 0.43$; $p < 0.05$) Ideologies and occurred in the expected direction. However, results clearly indicate that they are not identical constructs, reinforcing the assumption that a two- factor model accounts for ideological attitudes that are not covered through left-to- right self-placement.

Discussion

By comparing the two-factor model to related concepts, study 3 brought evidence of the measure's external validity, with the inclusion of new items that reflected issues salient in the current Brazilian political scenario. The resulting 13-item scale evidenced good internal reliability for both Economic (0.89) and Cultural ideologies (0.85), and maintained the proposed two-factor structure, though with higher correlation between factors ($r = 0.71$; $p < 0.05$). The heightened correlation between factors may have been related to the highly polarized tone of the 2018 elections, during which the voting intention questionnaire was applied, as evidenced by the lower correlation ($r = 0.45$; $p < 0.05$) in the sample used for comparing multidimensional and unidimensional political ideology, which was collected 2 years later (2020).

Ideological groups declared intent to vote in the expected directions. Those with more liberal attitudes voted liberally, while those with more conservative attitudes voted conservatively.

Correlations among Economic and Cultural factors and voting intention showed overall significant results, though stronger for candidates on the extremes. Cultural ideology showed especially significant correlation to voting intention regarding more conservative candidates, indicating that, contrary to conservative discourse at the time, economic issues were not mainly responsible for voting in far-right candidates. On the other hand, economic issues showed stronger correlation to voting for liberal candidates, suggesting that issues of government regulation and social equity remained mainly responsible for liberal-leaning votes.

The relationship between ideological factors and both personal value axes was also within expectations, with positive correlations between Self-Transcendence and liberal attitudes in both Economic ($r = 0.42$; $p < 0.05$) and Cultural ($r = 0.18$; $p < 0.05$) issues. Similarly, openness to change shows strong positive correlations to liberal attitudes in both Economic ($r = 0.31$; $p < 0.05$) and Cultural ($r = 0.34$; $p < 0.05$) issues. Cultural ideology demonstrated stronger correlation to the Open- ness to Change axis, indicating that these values tend to better relate to cultural issues such as gender equality, drugs, abortion, and minority rights, rather than broader economic issues.

General Discussion

Results throughout the 3 studies showed consistent support for the two-dimensional structure in all samples. Significant correlations between political ideology and voting intention were found across most candidates (study 3), indicating that the measure may have real-world applicability, at least in Brazil. It should be noted that due to small sample size and convenience sampling, these correlations should not be generalized, serving more as an indicator of the external validity of the measure.

Correlations were also found between ideological factors and personal values, though values were lower than expected regarding the relation between Economic ideology and the openness-conservation spectrum. Correlations between Cultural and Economic factors steadily rose from sample to sample up to the elections but remained consistent with previous studies (0.40 to 0.69; Azevedo et al., 2019). Correlation dropped back well into expected values on the sample gathered two years after the elections, indicating the highly polarized scenarios may temporarily conflate Economic and Cultural issues, as suggested in previous research (Feldman et al., 2018). These results, nonetheless, support the proposed model, as both factors remained independent throughout (Azevedo et al., 2019; Bakker, 2016; Feldman & Johnston, 2014).

A stronger correlation was found between Economic and Cultural factors and voting intention regarding candidates who sat on the extreme ends of the conservative-liberal spectrum: Jair Bolsonaro and João Amoedo (conservatives) and Fernando Haddad and Guilherme Boulos (liberals). This tendency suggests that political ideology might weigh more heavily on voting intention towards more polarized candidates.

Economic ideology seems to have played a stronger part in directing voting intention (with overall higher correlations than Cultural ideology), possibly a consequence of the Brazilian economic crisis. However, the Cultural factor achieved the strongest individual correlation ($r = -0.72$) with voting intention for Jair Bolsonaro, Brazil's most conservative candidate in the 2018 elections (sometimes referred to as the Brazilian Trump). This result may well indicate that social issues were more relevant than economic ones for electing the far-right candidate. In Bolsonaro's case, this primacy of Cultural ideology makes sense, as it conforms with much of the dis- course that was present in his political campaign, including controversial statements such as: "I'd rather have my son die in an accident than show up with some

bloke," "human rights only serve to defend criminals," "[Brazilian] universities only have leftist psychos" (the list goes on; Hunter & Power, 2019).

Bolsonaro won the presidential election against Fernando Haddad by a small margin in the second turn. In this conflict, Bolsonaro represented a new Brazil to many of his voters, distant from the failures (economic and political crises) that surfaced over the worker's party (PT) 4 consecutive governments. Haddad, on the other hand, acted as a proxy of PT's major representative, Lula, who was the most popular candidate, but was also in prison due to several corruption scandals (Hunter & Power, 2019).

In general, online samples were simultaneously liberally biased and shied away from more extreme opinions (favoring center-left candidate Ciro Gomes), misrepresenting the overall voting intention of the public (possibly due to some form of self- selection bias). Future studies should attempt to circumvent this limitation through more effective targeting. Focusing sample-gathering efforts in conservative social media groups and pages helped achieve a comparatively more balanced sample in study 3, but hardly enough for generalization.

We focused on providing evidence for the reliability, as well as internal and external validity of the two-factor ideological measure. Further testing of concurrent or predictive validity regarding theoretically related variables, such as internal efficacy, political engagement, and fake news consumption, might all provide valuable insight. Though previous studies (Azevedo et al., 2019; Crawford et al., 2017; Duckitt & Fisher 2003; Feldman et al., 2018) relate political ideology to a multitude of other political phenomena, testing the validity of this measure in other countries (noting that the measure was only tested in Portuguese) as well as in larger, more heterogeneous Brazilian samples, is still necessary.

Limitations considered these studies provide strong evidence for the multidimensional structure of political ideology, for the measure's reliability, and for its validity. As such, we succeeded in our purpose to further the understanding of contemporary politics in young democracies and provide a framework for future measurements of multidimensional political ideology in the region.

Opting out of Democracy: Antecedents of Democratic Erosion in Brazil

Abandonando a Democracia: Antecedentes da erosão democrática no Brasil

Abstract

In the context of far-right shifts in multiple democratic nations, understanding how support for illiberal policies and governments grows has steadily gained prominence in political and social psychology. However, these processes have seldomly been studied in the crisis-ridden context of young democracies. Two main objectives guide the three studies proposed in this thesis. First, we assess the reliability and validity of measures relating to Personal Values, Economic and Cultural Ideology, Fear of Crime, Economic Insecurity and Democratic Support in the Brazilian context. Second, we propose and test a model suggesting that the relationship between Personal Values and Democratic Support is mediated by political attitudes (Political Ideology) and by more contextual factors, relating to perceived vulnerability to crime (Fear of Crime) and economic instability (Economic Insecurity). To test this model, we utilized Structural Equation Modeling in a Brazilian samples (N = 251), aiming to evaluate the magnitude in which each of these precedent variables influenced a general support for democratic forms of government. We found that the Self-Transcendence and Conservation aspects of Personal Values, as well as Political Ideology, both Cultural and Economic, and Economic Insecurity were significant predictors to Democratic Support, evidencing that more authoritarian attitudes related to both more pessimistic and more conservative worldviews.

Keywords: Ideology, personal values, political trust, security, democratic support.

The pendulum shift from progressive to populist authoritarian representatives in many developed countries has sparked a new wave of debates about democracy (Claassen, 2019; Inglehart & Norris, 2017; Stolle et al., 2019). This phenomenon is, of course, not exclusive to more established governments, finding support in budding democracies throughout the world. Brazil is no exception. The rise of our own "Tropical Trump" in the person of Jair Bolsonaro has created a foothold for the resurgence of many antidemocratic ideals in Brazilian society, regarding both economic policy and social issues.

Similar politicians have gained support in many other democracies, suggesting a more general crisis of the legitimacy of democratic institutions and principles (Claassen, 2019; Inglehart & Norris, 2017). Recent research argues that *Democratic Support* behaves reactively, in other words, where democracy is prevalent, support wanes, where it is scarce, support rises (Claassen, 2019; Soroka & Wlezien, 2010). However, we propose a deeper look into other underlying variables as potential leads to further explain the erosion of *Democratic Support*.

The concept of ideology, or partisanship, often takes a prominent role in trying to understand political phenomena. However, multiple authors (Azevedo et al., 2019; Feldman & Johnston, 2014; Feldman et al., 2018) argue that the traditional way of measuring *Ideology*, which asks participants to place themselves on a continuum between conservative and liberal labels, is insufficient to understand it. This criticism includes the variation of the meaning of ideological labels between individuals (Ellis & Stimson, 2012), the weight of the stigma that some of these labels may carry in certain political contexts in self identifying with them, regardless of policy preference (Ellis & Stimson, 2012; Feldman & Johnston, 2014), and the limitations imposed by these measures in terms of political group heterogeneity (Azevedo et al., 2019; Feldman et al., 2018). In its place, they propose a multidimensional, issue-based

measure of *Ideology*, which separates social/moral and economic political attitudes, which has led to an overall more detailed understanding of *Ideology* (Azevedo et al., 2019; Crawford et al., 2017; Feldman et al., 2018; Pan & Xu, 2018).

Motivational types have shown correlation to general (left-right or liberal-conservative) ideological placement (Schwartz et al., 2010), as well as to democratic demonstrations, with stronger effects for more democratic contexts (Vecchione et al., 2014). This may indicate a significant role for *Personal Values* in explaining growing support for conservative populism and, consequently, for understanding the underlying worldviews that motivate a tolerance for the erosion of democratic rights and principles. These are defined in Schwartz's *Personal Values* theory (1992) as broad personal goals measured in terms of their relative importance to the individual. These are the base standards by which one judges others and society.

Aside from the broader ideological attitudes and personal motivations, other more contextual variables have been analyzed in terms of their impact on partisanship. Among those, we consider three to be more representative of contemporary Brazil's salient issues.

First, as a country with high crime rates (30.5 murders per 100.000; World Bank, 2017), and recurrent alarmist political discourse, addressing the social/criminological insecurities seems essential. *Fear of Crime* has gained prominence both as a major political issue and an important variable in political research, and aptly deals with this generalized anxiety of being victimized (Barni et al., 2015). Moreover, increased *Fear of Crime* has shown to diminish social cohesion and solidarity, increasing racist and xenophobic behavior (Amerio & Roccato, 2005), consequently increasing extremist ideological tendencies, including those related to authoritarianism (Jackson, 2004).

Second, the idea of *Economic Insecurity* has received increased attention in both the public (Bossert & D'Ambrosio, 2013) and in political research (Burgoon & Dekker, 2010; Wroe,

2015). Recent crises and austerity policies have made the issue relevant to understanding the political role of this type of insecurity in Brazil as well. On an individual level, *Economic Insecurity* refers to past, present, and future economic perspectives relative to personal expectations (Wroe, 2015). When negative, these assessments may increase distrust in the effectiveness of political institutions, impacting on *Political Trust* (Wroe, 2015), as well as on support for social-welfare (Burgoon & Dekker, 2010) and, on more extreme cases, even leading to support for populist authoritarian policies as solution to an ineffective government (Inglehart & Norris, 2017).

Third, research in consolidated democracies (Hooghe, 2011; Van der Meer, 2017) as well as in the younger democracies present in Latin America, including Brazil (Moisés & Carneiro, 2008; Santos & Rocha, 2011), has shown decreasing trust in government institutions. Diminished trust is not necessarily cause for alarm, as a healthy skepticism can be necessary for democracy to function (Van der Meer, 2017). However, with the recent rise of populist authoritarian representatives, we question whether Brazil's consistently low (Latinobarometro, 2018), and worsening, trust in democratic institutions is not in part responsible for the radicalized shift in politics.

Personal Values

In Schwartz's *Personal Values* theory (1992), broad personal goals are defined and measured in terms of their relative importance to the individual. These are the base standards by which one judges others and society. Previous research has suggested that political attitudes, regarding both *Cultural* and *Economic Ideology*, are produced by distinct motivational profiles (groups of goals prioritized by the individual), with values such as tradition, security, conformity and self-direction relating to the *social* aspect, and achievement, power,

universalism and benevolence to the *Economic* aspect of ideology (Feldman & Johnston, 2014).

Ten motivational types are originally identified, each defined by their general goals. Stimulation, which refers to the need for excitement and novelty in life; Self-Direction, to independent thought and action; Hedonism, to pleasure and sensuous gratification; Achievement, to personal success according to social standards; Power, to social status and dominance over others; Conformity, to avoid violating social expectations and norms; Tradition, to accepting the customs proposed by traditional culture or religion; Security, to the need for safety and stability; Universalism, to tolerance and protection of the welfare of others; and Benevolence, to protecting the welfare of the in-group (e.g., family, friends, colleagues).

More recently (Davidov et al., 2014), some of these have been further divided, leading to a total of 19 motivational types and better cross-cultural invariance. Self-direction into thought, relating to the freedom to cultivate one's own ideas and abilities, and action, relating to the freedom to determine one's own actions; Power into dominance, control over people, and resources, control of material and social resources; Security into personal, safety in the environment, and societal, societal safety and stability; Conformity into rules, compliance with rules, laws and formal obligations, and interpersonal, avoidance of upsetting or harming other people; Benevolence into dependability, being reliable and trustworthy, and caring, devotion to the welfare of the in-group; Universalism into concern, commitment to equality, justice and protection for all, nature, preservation of the natural environment, and tolerance, acceptance and understanding of those who are different from oneself; Lastly, a new motivational type was added in the form of humility, relating to the recognition of one's own insignificance in the larger context.

Previous research (Schwartz et al., 2010) suggests that distinct motivational types correlate to economic and social conservatism. Considering the two-factor model of *Ideology*, *Conformity*, *Tradition*, *Security* and *Universalism* well represent the *Cultural* dimension, while *Achievement*, *Power* and *Benevolence* better relate to *Economic Ideology*. Though it should be noted that, as broad beliefs, values are likely to be more ample in scope than ideological preferences and political issues in such a way that, in many cases (such as *Benevolence* and *Security*), each may encompass both economic and social issues. In a similar vein, *Personal Values* have shown effects on democratic civic demonstrations, with stronger effects in democratic countries and weaker effects in illiberal ones (Vecchione et al., 2014).

Cultural and Economic Ideology

Political ideology has often been measured as a unidimensional variable ranging from left to right or liberal to conservative (Azevedo et al., 2019; Feldman & Johnston, 2014). These unidimensional models of *Ideology* are likely to ignore the great heterogeneity of meaning attributed to policies by citizens of any given nation, failing to scrutinize political beliefs that fall outside these two limited groups (conservative and liberal; Azevedo et al., 2019; Feldman & Johnston, 2014; Feldman et al., 2018). Furthermore, citizens do not seem to visualize political issues through these labels, but through the attitudes and beliefs they form regarding each specific issue (Feldman & Johnston, 2014). In this sense, left-right ideology seems to relate more closely with group identity rather than political positioning.

Further research has also implied that the unidimensional *Ideology* structure often leads to considerable in-group variation, as the meaning of political identifications themselves varies significantly from individual to individual (Ellis & Stimson, 2012). Though some might subscribe to party ideals and the policies spawned by them, many individuals may consider

themselves conservative or liberal mainly due to the symbology attached to these labels (Ellis & Stimson, 2012; Feldman & Johnston, 2014). To overcome these issues, *Ideology* measurement and theory must move away from abstract labels and consider the more practical ways in which *Ideology* makes itself relevant in day-to-day life.

By dealing with specific issues, it becomes simpler to draw comparisons between countries and periods, since the items themselves are easier to interpret than the meaning behind political labels (e.g., it is easier to interpret an increase in, say, support for minority rights and government subsided welfare than a "rise in liberalism"). Though the salience of these issues may change across time and geographical space (Caughey & Warshaw, 2015; Caprara & Vecchione, 2018; Shafer & Spady, 2014), they nonetheless hold significance for people's general political beliefs and attitudes (Azevedo et al., 2019; Crawford et al., 2017; Duckit & Fisher, 2003; Feldman et al., 2018).

Feldman and Johnston's (2014) research provides evidence that supports a two-factor model, evaluating each through attitudes regarding multiple issues, such as religiosity, egalitarianism and authoritarianism. This two-factor model has been utilized with success in assessing multiple political issues, including partisan and electoral polarization in developed countries (Feldman et al., 2018), prejudice (Crawford et al., 2017) and support for established economic and gender systems (Azevedo et al., 2019; Bakker, 2016). Multidimensional *Ideology* questionnaires have also seen less frequent use in non-democratic regions such as China (Pan & Xu, 2018), however, little research has been done utilizing these more complex ideological models in young and unstable democracies.

Fear of Crime

Since the early stages of fear of criminological research, there has been little evidence relating *Fear of Crime* to victimization, be it personal or vicarious, or with actual crime rates

(Garofalo & Laub, 1978; Barni et al., 2015). Rather, beliefs about declining social trust, intergroup conflicts and moral decline seem to be the more relevant factors related to these growing anxieties about declining social stability and order (Hummelsheim et al., 2010). In more specific terms, it is often defined as a generalized insecurity about personal safety and the safety of friends and family (Barni et al., 2015).

Heightened *Fear of Crime* can lead to practical social issues such as the diminishing of cohesion and solidarity among the populace, as well as growing racist and xenophobic behavior sustained by an "ideology of safety", all of which are contradictory to democratic discourse (Amerio & Roccato, 2005). Consequently, *Fear of Crime* quickly became one of the major social issues in contemporary society (Barni et al., 2015). Moreover, with populist governments taking hold in many parts of the world, growing *Fear of Crime* has garnered increased attention in political research, especially in how it influences extreme ideological tendencies, such as authoritarianism (Jackson, 2004).

Measuring *Fear of Crime* is often done through a single item: "How safe do you – or would you – feel walking alone in your neighborhood after dark?" (Barni et al., 2015). The *Fear of Crime Scale* (Gorman-Smith et al., 2000) presents a more robust measure, accounting for three more situations: Walking alone during the day, being attacked or robbed in their home, walking in a group during the night. In our evaluation, these extra items better represent fears in societies with higher crime rates, such as Brazil (Pimentel et al., 2012), than the one item measure commonly employed.

Economic Insecurity

The idea of *Economic Insecurity* has received increased attention in both the public (Bossert & D'Ambrosio, 2013) and in political research (Burgoon & Dekker, 2010; Wroe, 2015). Though attempts to define the concept are diverse, Bossert & D'Ambrosio (2013) aptly

summarize it as: "anxiety produced by the possible exposure to adverse economic events and by the anticipation of the difficulty to recover from them". Through this definition, *Economic Insecurity* becomes less about objective economic indicators and more about the psychological experience of being insecure about one's financial wellbeing, both in the present and in the future.

In this individual-based notion of *Economic Insecurity*, perceived increase in insecurity is centered on the individual's reference point (Wroe, 2015). As such, eventual losses in security are assessed relative to past, present and future economic perspectives in relation to personal expectations. When negative, these assessments may increase distrust in the effectiveness of political institutions (Wroe, 2015), as well as in support for social-welfare (Burgoon & Dekker, 2010) and, on more extreme cases, even leading to support for populist authoritarian policies as solution to an ineffective government (Inglehart & Norris, 2017).

Individual-level *Economic Insecurity* has been measured in multiple formats, generally in a fairly direct fashion over a few items related to job security and fear of falling into poverty (Burgoon & Dekker, 2010), as well as perceived economic difficulty in the present and expected economic difficulty in the future (Wroe, 2015). For our objectives, these are both an improvement on derived insecurity from more objective economic indicator (Dynan et al., 2012) and enough for identifying general attitudes towards individual economic perspectives.

Democratic Support

In the optic of traditional *Democratic Support* research, support for democracy would only grow with time due to socialization through education and the experience of its benefits in adulthood (Rose et al., 1998). However, scholars around the world have shown findings that indicate a crisis of legitimacy in established liberal democracies, with diminishing support for their institutions and principles (Claassen, 2019; Inglehart & Norris, 2017). To account for

these inconsistencies, the thermostatic model (Soroka & Wlezien, 2010) of *Democratic Support* proposes that public opinion is reactionary, rather than consistent. In other words, where democracy is prevalent, support wanes, where it is scarce, support rises (Claassen, 2019).

Aside from these pendulum shifts in public opinion, increased economic or existential (e.g., through rising perceived crime rates) insecurity may also influence increased support for illiberal policies centered around in-group benefits, such as xenophobia a rejection of outgroups (Inglehart & Norris, 2017). As *Democratic Support* wanes, so does the perceived importance of democratic attributes by the populace (e.g., checks and balances, civil rights and so on; Stolle et al., 2019). This incremental erosion of the importance of democratic attributes often occurs through democratic means, and as such may not feel immediately threatening or even visible. It is then legitimized by the democratic election of "strong" leaders, often with populist authoritarian discourse, strongly aligned to the in-group and closed off to outgroups (Inglehart & Norris, 2017; Stolle et al., 2019).

Additionally, partisanship may lead to further decrease in *Democratic Support* in multiple ways (Stolle et al., 2019). Citizens and politicians with strong partisanship may consider democracy as a tool to further advance their interests, stretching the rules to achieve their in-group objectives. They may also be willing to accept erosion in democratic principles if it hurts the other party, for example, conservatives supporting limited voting rights if they feel it would limit the success of liberal candidates or limiting checks on executive power if their candidate is elected. Lastly, these aspects may hide an underlying ideological divide, leading to willingness to sacrifice democratic rights in favor of advancing their agenda on, for example, gender policies, abortion, welfare, and taxation.

In this context, rather than simply asking whether one supports democracy or democratic institutions individually, measures of *Democratic Support* should propose items that offer more specific authoritarian alternatives. Assertions such as "there are too many checks and balances in our political system" and "when congress is obstructing a president's agenda, a president should shut down Congress and govern on his/her own" (as proposed by Stolle et al., 2019) might be more effective in striking a chord with partisans and more authoritarian electorates. For these reasons, we opted for the adoption of this framework in measuring *Democratic Support* in the Brazilian context, where similar discourse arguing for increased presidential power and limitations to "leftist" agendas are on the rise since the election of the populist right-wing candidate Jair Bolsonaro.

Hypotheses

Our proposed model posits that Support for Democracy is a resulting variable of a multitude of other Cultural and Economic factors that more directly affect a citizen's day-to-day life. For the sake of this study, we elected five possible antecedent variables: Personal Values, Cultural Ideology, Economic Ideology, Fear of Crime and Economic Security. We expect that each of these variables exerts significant effect over an individual's support for democratic forms of government in specified directions.

> H1.1: Higher Openness and Self-Transcendence will positively correlate with Democratic Support.

> H1.2: Higher Conservation and Self-Enhancement will negatively correlate with Democratic Support.

> H2: More liberal Cultural and Economic Ideologies will positively correlate with Democratic Support.

H3: Higher Fear of Crime will negatively correlate with Democratic Support.

H4: Higher Economic Security will positively correlate with Democratic Support.

In this sense we assume that, as a general thread, more conservative, self-focused, attitudes will lead to less support for the more wide-reaching policies which define an inclusive, diverse contemporary democracy. Similarly, we also consider that heightened fear of being victimized by crime and of being negatively impacted by economic crises will also undermine democratic support, even if only by creating general dissatisfaction with the results attained by current political institutions.

Method

Participants

The online survey was completed by 251 participants, spread throughout Brazil, with demographic variables, including age, religion and ethnicity for participants shown in Table 11.

Table 11

Total count of each Demographic Variables

Variable	Count	%
Age		
18-25	32	11.9
26-30	35	13.0
31-35	45	16.7
36-40	25	9.3
41-45	12	4.5
46-50	22	8.2
51-55	28	10.4
56-60	26	9.7
61-65	25	9.3
66-70	10	3.7
71-75	8	3.0
76-80	1	0.4
Religion		
Buddhism	1	0.4
Catholicism	93	34.6
Protestantism	28	10.4

Adventism	2	0.7
Anglicanism	1	0.4
Jehovah's Witness	1	0.4
Spiritism	29	10.8
Neopaganism	5	1.9
African-Brazilian	14	5.2
Amerindian	1	0.4
Non-Religious	53	19.7
Atheism	23	8.6
Agnosticism	18	6.7
Ethnicity		
White	156	58.0
Brown	82	30.5
Black	19	7.1
Asian	5	1.9
Other	7	2.6
Gender		
Female	160	59.5
Male	106	39.4
Other	3	1.1

The sample was predominantly between 18 and 40 (50.9%), white (58%) and Christian (46.5%). However, we were able to successfully reach out to ethnic and religious minorities, which account for about half of our sample, resulting in a relatively small divergence from recent demographic surveys conducted by the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE, 2019).

Procedures

Five scales were adapted for application in this study, each based on previous research on Personal Values (Davidov et al., 2014), multidimensional Ideology (Feldman et al., 2018), Fear of Crime (Barni et al., 2015), Economic Security (Wroe, 2015) and Democratic Support (Stolle et al., 2019). Items were also added for one-factor Ideology, as well as for demographic variables. Questionnaires were translated into Portuguese and edited to more closely relate to the issues present in contemporary Brazilian politics.

Questionnaires were applied online, distributed mainly through Facebook, with a smaller volume of participants being reached through other social media including Instagram, Twitter

and WhatsApp. In all mediums, groups and pages with political, journalistic, and academic leanings were targeted, with concentrated effort on reaching more conservative users. All in all, over 60 individual groups received the links for the survey over a 6-month period, resulting in 370 respondents.

Incomplete responses (99) and outliers (20) were then removed, with analyses being run on the remaining 251. Each scale was evaluated regarding its factorability through Keiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) factorability test, considering a minimum threshold of .70 (Pasquali, 2012), Bartlett's Sphericity test and composite reliability (McDonald, 1999), with a minimum threshold of .70. Correlation between each variable, including one-factor ideology, support for the current government and demographic variables was also tested. A Confirmatory Factor Analysis was run to test the overall fit, leading to the exclusion of Fear of Crime, Self-Enhancement and Openness from the model to better adjust fit. Lastly, Structural Equation Modeling (SEM) was utilized to test the fit of the overall model. All analyses were run using R (version R-4.1.2).

Results

Factorability was tested for each measure using the Kaiser–Meyer–Olkin index (KMO) and Bartlett's sphericity test. As shown in Table 12, both tests support factorability (Damásio, 2012), with KMO above .70 and significant results for sphericity on every factor. Meanwhile composite reliability indicated sufficient internal consistency of each questionnaire ($\omega > .70$).

Table 12

Assumptions for each factor

Factor	Composite Reliability	KMO	Bartlett's Sphericity		
			χ^2	*p*	*df*
Personal Values	.79	.71	1154.29	< .05	210

Cultural Ideology	.87	.85	475.17	< .05	15
Economic Ideology	.84	.78	463.54	< .05	21
Fear of Crime	.93	.74	678.86	< .05	15
Economic Security	.92	.89	821.57	< .05	10
Democratic Support	.77	.73	296.79	< .05	28

Each factor correlated with at least 4 other factors, establishing the interrelation of these concepts, but evidencing that not all predictive variables selected are significantly related to support for democratic forms of government. Notably, Fear of Crime ($r = -.06$) and both the Openness ($r = -.01$) and Self-Enhancement ($r = .00$) axes of Personal Values had particularly low correlation with Democratic Support, as shown in Table 13.

Table 13

Correlation matrix for all factors

	Cultural Ideology	Economic Ideology	Fear of Crime	Economic Security	Democratic Support	Openness	Conservation	Self-Transcendence	Self-Enhancement
Economic Ideology	.66*								
Fear of Crime	.03	-.07							
Economic Security	-.03	-.14*	.27*						
Democratic Support	.39*	.47*	-.06	-.12					
Openness	.19*	-.01	.13*	.07	-.01				
Conservation	.37*	-.37*	.18*	.23*	-.10	-.01			
Self-Transcendence	.16*	.12	.07	.12	.22*	.27*	.14*		
Self-Enhancement	.12	.06	.17*	.20*	.00	.41*	.33*	.14*	
Ideology	.54*	.60*	.05	.09	.30*	.09	-.33*	.11	.02

* $p < .05$

The strong, but not absolute correlation between Economic (Feldman et al., 2018) and Social ($r = .60$) ideology and one-dimensional ideology corroborates that they relate to same social construct but remain distinct measures. This result corroborates Feldman (et. al, 2018) argument that the more detailed ideology measure captures enough of the nuance in ideology to sufficiently differentiate from one-factor models. Correlation between Economic and Cultural Ideology ($r = .66$) was expectedly high, as Brazil's polarized political scenario is conductive to conflation of these two factors in political discourse (Feldman et al., 2018).

The motivational types measured by Personal Values had overall significant correlation with Cultural Ideology, except for Self-Enhancement ($r = .12$), while Economic Ideology only correlated significantly with Conservation ($r = -.37$). The latter indicates that beliefs related to a heightened need for security and stability are conducive to support for more conservative economic policies, while the former that beliefs related to Openness ($r = .19$) and Self-Transcendence ($r = .16$) relate to support for liberal social policy. The direction of the relationship between Cultural Ideology and Conservation ($r = .37$) was unexpected, but may signal that more inclusive social policy was, for the participants, analogous to a greater sense of overall stability.

The negative correlation between Economic Security and Economic Ideology ($r = -.14$) supports the notion that ideological attitudes have some influence over one's sense of how good or bad the economic context is in a particular country. Furthermore, it reinforces that more conservative economic ideology tends to relate to lower optimism towards future economic growth or success.

The relationship between Economic Security and Self-Enhancement ($r = .20$) and Conservation ($r = .23$) is unexpected, as both motivational types tend to be more closely aligned with conservative ideological standpoints. These correlations also serve to evidence concurrent validity of the Economic Security questionnaire which, though based on previous measurements (Wroe, 2015), was specifically built for this study to reflect current economic worries that were heightened due to Brazil's current (2022) economic crisis.

Given these results and thorough testing of the overall model, One-Factor Ideology, Cultural and Economic Ideology, Economic Security and the Self-Transcendence and Conservation axes were included in the final SEM model. The correlation between each of these antecedent variable and Democratic Support are further detailed in Table 14, which indicates significant results for all, though Self-Transcendence ($r = .03$) was comparatively less impactful.

Table 14

Correlations and variances for each antecedent variable in relation to Democratic Support

| Factors	r			Variances		
	Estimate	Error	Z	Estimate	Error	Z
Ideology	.13*	.02	6.59	6.17*	.65	9.55
Cultural Ideology	.28*	.04	6.97	16.20*	2.01	8.05
Economic Ideology	.35*	.05	7.15	11.37*	2.27	5.01
Economic Security	-.24*	.12	-2.08	742.59*	66.54	11.16
Self-Transcendence	.03*	.01	2.36	6.74*	.61	11.14
Conservation	-.13*	.03	-.522	20.10*	1.88	10.72

* $p < .05$

Similarly, One-Factor Ideology ($r = .13$), measuring ideological placement from "right" to "left", had comparatively low correlation with Democratic Support, while the more detailed Social ($r = .28$) and Economic ($r = .35$) Ideology measurements, based on support themes closely related to policy, had stronger correlations. These indicate that ideological measures are likely the strongest predictors for overall support for democratic forms of government, with more liberal placement relating to higher Democratic Support.

In the final model, the Conservation ($r = -.13$) axis related to Democratic Support in the expected direction, indicanting that predominance of beliefs relating to Security, Conformity and Tradition had a negative impact support for Democracy. Similarly, Economic Security ($r = -.24$) negatively correlated with Democratic Support, suggesting that discontentment with the economic scenario of a country and pessimism towards one's financial future led to lesser support for democratic forms of government. However, this negative relation might be less about rejection towards democracy, in specific, and more about an overall discontentment with the economic success of current governmental institutions.

Lastly, the model itself achieved a satisfactory fit ($\chi^2 = 33.36$, $df = 13$, $p < .05$; CFI = .95; TLI = .92; RMSEA = .08, $p > .05$; SRMR = .06). This result is shown on Table 15 and corroborates the predictive effect of the selected antecedent variables on Democratic Support.

Table 15

Fit measures for the model

Model	χ^2	*df*	CFI	TLI	RMSEA	SRMR
Democratic Support =~ .	33.36*	13	.95	.92	.08**	.06

* *p* < .05

** *p* > .05

Image 01

SEM Model

The model included covariance between Self-Transcendence and Conservation, which are adjacent Personal Values axes in Scwartz's theory (1992), and thus are expect to correlate. In fact, the addition of this covariance was beneficial to the model fit, specifically in pushing the RMSEA into non-significant values, in effect reducing the effect size of model misfit. No significant correlation was found between Democratic Support and demographic variables.

Discussion

In the convoluted political scenario resulting from the rise of far-right movements (Claassen, 2019; Inglehart & Norris, 2017; Stolle et al., 2019), spearheaded in Brazil by the president elect Jair Bolsonaro, we considered essential to better understand the underlying beliefs and

attitudes which motivate the abandonment of democratic ideals by a sizeable portion of the populace. To this end, we propose a model for analyzing Democratic Support through the lens of Personal Values, political ideology, Fear of Crime and Economic Security.

Although three factors, namely Fear of Crime, Openness and Self-Enhancement, were found to have negative impact on the overall model, results generally corroborated the hypotheses. H1.1 was partially sustained, as Self-Transcendence ($r = .03$) did positively correlate with Democratic Support, albeit said correlation was comparatively low. Similarly, H1.2 was partially sustained as Conservation ($r = -.13$) negatively correlated with Democratic Support, indicating that a predominant need for Security, Conformity and Tradition were somewhat nonconductive to support for democratic forms of government, in line with previous research (Feldman & Johnston, 2014).

Meanwhile, H2 was thoroughly evidenced, with more liberal ideological attitudes correlating with Democratic Support for Cultural Ideology ($r = .28$), Economic Ideology ($r = .35$) and One-Factor Ideology ($r = .13$). All of which corroborate for the Brazilian context evidence found in research abroad (Inglehart & Norris, 2017; Stolle et al., 2019), that general discontentment with Democracy tends to be higher within conservative groups, regardless of which ideological measurement is used. Moreover, the higher correlation between Cultural and Economic Ideologies and Democratic Support, compared to one-factor ideology, sustains the notion that these more detailed and policy-oriented ideology questionnaires more clearly evaluate the relationship between ideological attitudes and governmental preferences (Azevedo et al., 2019; Crawford et al., 2017; Feldman et al., 2018; Pan & Xu, 2018). As such, they seem to be particularly useful as ideological measurements when evaluating institutional crises such as the one being currently experienced in Brazil (Pinheiro-Machado & Scalco, 2020).

We rejected H3 as no significant relation was found between Fear of Crime and Democratic Support. However, it should be noted for future research that Fear of Crime did show strong correlation with Economic Ideology, Openness, Conservation and Self-Enhancement, and has been related to political issues in previous research (Amerio & Roccato, 2005) suggesting that it may have place in the study of Personal Values and ideological attitudes in a broader sense than is the specific scope of this study. Moreover, Fear of Crime might show relevance in a similar model with a wider sample including more participants from more dangerous parts of the country.

Economic Security ($r = -.24$), on the other hand, strongly correlated to Democratic Support in the final model, suggesting that financial insecurity has a significant impact in the discontentment with the result of democratic institutions. This discontentment may be more related to an overall rejection of governmental institutions due to poor economic success (Wroe, 2015), leading to the manifestation of a generalized distrust in the effectiveness of democracy because of political dissatisfaction (Inglehart & Norris, 2017) rather than a deep-rooted preference for non-democratic forms of government.

Considering stated result, we believe that the main goals of this study were achieved, though replication in larger sample sizes might be necessary to better evaluate the significance of Personal Beliefs and the consistency of Economic Security as antecedent variables. It should be noted that the sample was somewhat liberally biased, likely due to a form of self-selection bias and the Brazilian far-right's general dislike for academia. Reaching these more extreme opinions is also important for future studies that endeavor to understand the far-right shift in Brazil or elsewhere in the world.

Through this study, we hope to contribute to clarifying the variables involved in the acceptance of far-right policies and even dictatorial forms of government. Though populist

political personalities such as Bolsonaro and Trump are in evidence, such widespread

acceptance of their discourse, leading to their elections, is likely to result from more

ingrained beliefs and attitudes regarding society and the effectiveness of democracy in

satisfying the financial and motivational needs of a sizeable part of the populace (Claassen,

2019; Inglehart & Norris, 2017). In this sense, as we delve further into the motives of rising

authoritarian discourse, it is perhaps prudent to consider that these groups may feel that rising

against democracy is the only way to attack a government they perceive as hostile to them,

rather than an end in itself.

General Discussion

In "Believing in Change: Impact of Political Efficacy over Political Participation" we delved into the specifics of how political behaviors took place in digital and physical spaces, focusing on the effects of Political Efficacy and Informational Habits on political participation. These hybrid spaces have become a fertile ground for a rapid, unchecked flux of information (Mazzotti & Campos, 2014), which define much of the political relations in contemporary society, especially with the widened use of Fake News and other forms of mass manipulation (Azevedo et al. 2019; Feldman and Johnston 2014; Feldman et al. 2018). We found that the effect of Political Ideology, Informational Habits and Behavioral Contagion on Political Participation was partially mediated by Political Efficacy, indicating that one's belief in the impact of their political action was a significant part of moving from political attitudes to political behaviors, corroborating previous findings (Zúñiga et al., 2017).

Furthermore, we identified significant correlation between day-to-day (latent; Ekman & Amnå, 2012) political participation and more traditional forms (manifest) of participation, indicating that promoting one may lead to a rise the other. In this sense, though not interchangeable, both forms of political activity are likely to be important to further democratic dialogue, especially as mass media technology becomes ever more present (Ekman & Amnå, 2012; Bimber, 2016; Feezell, 2016). This first study also served as the basis for establishing the validity and reliability of the two-factor political ideology measurement in the Brazilian context, which we consider to be one of the most significant contributions of this thesis, alongside its relation to support for democratic forms of government, in deepening our understanding of the rise of the populist far-right in Brazil.

To further evidence the validity of the two-factor ideological model, in "Measuring Political Ideology: Validity Evidence for a Two-Factor Model" we ran exploratory and confirmatory

factor analysis focusing on the reliability and validity of Cultural and Economic Ideology measurements. Their relation to Personal Values and Voting Intention was tested to understand how these issue-based questionnaires correlated with participant's beliefs and practically impacted their voting preferences. Though correlated within expected parameters (.40 to 0.69; Azevedo et al., 2019), Cultural and Economic Ideology remained partially independent of each other, indicating the importance of considering the complexities of ideology beyond left to right-wing measurements (Azevedo et al., 2019; Bakker, 2016; Feldman & Johnston, 2014).

The relationship between both ideologies and Voting Intention was of particular interest, exemplifying how the importance of these issues varied across the political spectrum. The effects of both Cultural and Economic Ideology were more pronounced when relating to intention to vote on politicians more clearly aligned with the right or the left, with little impact on intent to vote on candidates at the center of the spectrum. This is congruent with previous research, as more centrally aligned candidates tend to veer away from the more polarizing sociopolitical issues which characterize more radicalized movements and more evidently outline the ideological attitudes measured in the two-factor model (Feldman et al., 2018). Specifically, Economic ideology seems to have played a stronger part in directing voting intention, with overall higher correlations, while Cultural Ideology achieved the strongest individual correlation ($r = -0.72$) with voting intention for Jair Bolsonaro, Brazil's most conservative candidate in the 2018 elections.

In Bolsonaro's case, this primacy of Cultural Ideology makes sense, conforming with much of his political propaganda, based around controversial statements such as: "I'd rather have my son die in an accident than show up with some bloke," "human rights only serve to defend criminals," "[Brazilian] universities only have leftist psychos" (Hunter & Power, 2019). Bolsonaro won the presidential election against Fernando Haddad by a small margin

in the second turn. In this conflict, Bolsonaro represented a new Brazil to many of his voters, distant from the failures (economic and political crises) that surfaced over the worker's party (PT) 4 consecutive governments. Furthermore, Bolsonaro voiced the general discontent with democratic institutions which was said to have allowed the economic decline to take place. This general indignancy with democracy may have motivated far-right supporters in Brazil and elsewhere, serving as a basis for an "anti-establishment" movement which flirted with authoritarianism in a misguided attempt to right the failings of democracy (Inglehart & Norris, 2017). Haddad (PT), on the other hand, acted as a proxy of Lula, who was the most popular candidate, but was imprisoned at the time due to several corruption scandals (Hunter & Power, 2019).

Four years later, the convoluted political scenario caused by both the worsening economic crisis and the rise in support for the far-right in Brazil has not abated. In this unstable political context, Bolsonaro loyalist, though diminishing in number, grow ever bolder, calling for military intervention and alleging that his eventual loss in the 2022 elections will be the result of electoral fraud. Thus, we considered that it became especially important to understand how variables relating to personal beliefs, political attitudes and the economic crisis impacted the maintenance of a general support for democratic forms of government, leading to "Opting out of Democracy: Antecedents of Democratic Erosion in Brazil".

In this last study, we tested the fit of a model evaluating the effect of the antecedent variables Personal Values, Political Ideology, Fear of Crime and Economic Security on the resulting variable Democratic Support. Fear of Crime showed no significant relation to the resulting variable, leading to its exclusion in the final model, though we consider it should still be re-evaluated in further studies, especially in more dangerous parts of the country. Economic

Security, on the other hand, showed strong correlation to Democratic Support, perhaps in part due to the deepening economic crisis (Wroe, 2015).

In line with the two previous studies, we also sought to further evidence the consistency of the multidimensional ideology measurement, comparing it to the traditional left-to-right model. Through this comparison, we ascertained that, though correlated, Cultural and Economic Ideologies remained distinct from the one-dimensional measure, corroborating the findings of Feldman and Johnston (2014; Feldman et al, 2018). The two ideological factors were also strongly correlated with other variables, including Democratic Support, again sustaining that more complex, issue-based measure led to more significant relations (Azevedo et al., 2019; Crawford et al., 2017; Feldman et al., 2018; Pan & Xu, 2018) with other sociopolitical factors. As the entirety of the sample was national, it is hard to say if this understanding can be generalized in other cultures, however, it is a strong indicator that complexifying ideological measures may lead to a better understanding of the causes of such extreme political shifts.

A major part of this thesis revolved around evaluating conceptual tools with which political studies in Brazil may more robustly evaluate the impact of contextual and ideological factors on the political scenario. However, relatively low sample sizes and a liberal-leaning bias, likely caused by some form of self-selection bias, leading to a low volume of respondents who identified as Bolsonaro loyalists, may limit generalization regarding the effectiveness of these tools even in a national context. Nonetheless, we consider the repeated tests yielding evidence of validity and reliability of the measure offer a solid foundation for further research.

Furthermore, by correlating Cultural and Economic ideology to online and off-line political behaviors, as well as Personal Values, Political Efficacy, voting preference, Economic Security and Democratic Support, we offer consistent evidence of its usefulness in evaluating and understanding the effects of ideological attitudes in relation to personal, contextual, and

electoral attitudes. It is our hope that these tools may prove useful to understanding the aftermath of the 2022 elections, which have been marked by ever more extremist discourse from the far right, heightened used of disinformation and strong polarization even in day-to-day political interactions.

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ANEXO I – Questionnaires

TCLE

Antes de responder ao questionário que segue, é necessário que você leia o termo abaixo e assinale sua concordância. Obrigado pela participação!

Este estudo está sendo realizado com o intuito de analisar a influência de uma série de fatores na percepção dos brasileiros sobre a democracia. A sua participação neste processo consiste em responder a um conjunto de questões sobre suas crenças e opiniões sobre a sociedade, a economia e o governo. Pedimos que respondam com sinceridade, de modo que possam nos ajudar a melhor entender o cenário político do nosso país. Os dados demográficos solicitados ao final servem apenas para ajudar no agrupamento dos resultados segundo estado, renda, escolaridade e afins, não serão usados com qualquer objetivo de identificação dos participantes, sendo mantido o anonimato.

Esta pesquisa faz parte da tese de doutorado do pesquisador Pedro Cardoso Alves e é coordenada pela professora Juliana Porto (UnB). Para maiores informações contatar o pesquisador neste endereço: pedro.cardoso1989@gmail.com.

Ainda que este estudo não traga benefícios diretos aos participantes, a sua colaboração poderá contribuir para a construção do conhecimento científico sobre o assunto. Não são conhecidos os riscos envolvidos na participação desta pesquisa, contudo este tipo de pesquisa não costuma apresentar transtornos para os participantes para além do tempo investido. Caso se sinta desconfortável em qualquer momento da pesquisa, é assegurado o seu direito de desistir de sua participação no estudo sem qualquer prejuízo. Todos os participantes têm direito de acessar o trabalho final produzido a partir deste estudo, bastando sinalizar interesse mediante e-mail disponibilizado.

Por fim, a participação nesta pesquisa é totalmente voluntária, não havendo contrapartida material ou financeira por parte dos pesquisadores.

Participação Política

Com que frequência...

PP.01 Tento convencer outros em minhas redes sociais a atacar políticos ou empresas que vão contra o que acredito.

PP.02 Minhas convicções sociais e/ou políticas orientam escolhas do meu dia a dia (músicas, roupa, alimentação e etc).

PP.03 Assino petições produzidas por entidades como Avaaz e/ou Change.org com as quais concordo. (excluída)

PP.04 Participo de manifestações e/ou protestos políticos.

PP.05 Entro em contato com páginas de conteúdo político para sugerir matérias para publicar. (excluída)

PP.06 Participo de ocupações de espaços públicos e/ou privados como forma de protesto.

PP.07 Expresso minha opinião sobre políticos ou órgão públicos comentando em suas páginas em redes sociais.

PP.08 Comento me posicionando quando discordo de um post de natureza política nas minhas redes sociais.

PP.09 Me reúno com outros manifestantes para impedir ações governamentais ou empresariais, mesmo quando a lei os protege.

PP.10 Compartilho conteúdo político em minhas redes sociais.

PP.11 Divulgo manifestações e/ou protestos com os quais concordo nas minhas redes sociais.

PP.12 Divulgo minha opinião sobre os políticos nas minhas redes sociais.

PP.13 Questiono as opiniões políticas dos outros.

PP.14 Doo dinheiro ou mão de obra para caridades e/ou outras campanhas sociais. (excluída)

PP.15 Voto nas decisões do congresso que vão para plataformas online como a votenaweb e e-cidadania. (excluída)

Eficácia Política

Você se sente capaz de...

EPI.01 Pressionar os candidatos nos quais votei para que honrem suas promessas.

EPI.02 Ter papel significativo na melhoria do meu país através do meu voto.

EPI.03 Impactar o cenário político através de ações políticas na internet.

EPI.04 Expressar abertamente minha opinião política, mesmo entre aqueles que discordam.

EPI.05 Participar na escolha de lideranças nos movimentos sociais de quais participo.

EPI.06 Ajudar a mudar o país para o melhor através de manifestações políticas.

EPI.07 Mudar ou formar a opinião política das pessoas pela disseminação de informações e notícias.

EPI.08 Mudar ou formar a opinião das pessoas pelo debate de ideias políticas.

Hábitos Informacionais

Com que frequência...

HI.01 Busco informações em fontes que tem opiniões políticas diferentes das minhas.

HI.02 Checo informações políticas que recebo em minhas redes sociais para verificar se são verdade.

HI.03 Checo se as informações que recebo são verdadeiras mesmo quando concordo com elas.

HI.04 Converso sobre política com pessoas que discordam da minha opinião.

HI.05 Leio sobre questões políticas na internet.

HI.06 Busco informações sobre questões políticas em livros ou artigos acadêmicos.

HI.07 Faço pesquisa de imagens para descobrir a origem de fotos usadas em posts políticos.

HI.08 Busco informações sobre questões políticas no jornal/rádio/televisão. (excluída)

HI.09 Recebo notícias sobre questões políticas nas minhas redes sociais/grupos de whatsapp/etc. (excluída)

Contágio Comportamental

Com que frequência...

CC.01 Meus contatos compartilham conteúdo político em suas redes sociais. (excluída)

CC.02 As opiniões políticas dos meus amigos são bem fundamentadas.

CC.03 As pessoas próximas a mim me encorajam a participar da política.

CC.04 As pessoas próximas a mim me encorajam a aprender mais sobre as questões políticas.

CC.05 Quantos de seus amigos/parentes costumam participar de atividades políticas (aproximadamente)? (1-100)

Ideologia

Você acredita que...

ID.01 O aborto deveria ser legalizado.

ID.02 O mundo era menos chato antes do "politicamente correto". (invertida)

ID.03 A legalização e regulamentação do uso de drogas atualmente ilícitas trará resultados positivos.

ID.04 A luta das minorias (LGBT, étnicas, sociais e afins) pelos seus direitos é legítima.

ID.05 Criminosos deveriam ser punidos com a morte. (invertida)

ID.06 Somente casais heterossexuais devem poder adotar. (invertida)

ID.07 A ciência não deve "brincar de deus" com pesquisas de clonagem, células tronco e afins. (invertida)

ID.08 A separação entre a religião e as decisões legais e políticas é essencial.

ID.09 Mérito próprio é suficiente para ser bem sucedido no Brasil. (invertida)

ID.10 Serviços como saúde e educação universal de qualidade devem ser oferecidos pelo governo.

ID.11 O mercado é um administrador mais honesto que o governo. (invertida)

ID.12 Quanto menos o governo intervir na sociedade, melhor a situação do país. (invertida)

ID.13 A equidade social é mais importante que a liberdade econômica.

ID.14 O governo deve regular o mercado para promover o interesse público.

ID.15 É obrigação da nação trabalhar para a redução das desigualdades sociais.

ID.16 Imposto é roubo independente do que for feito com o dinheiro arrecadado. (invertida)

PVQ-21

Por favor, assinale quanto você concorda ou discorda com cada afirmativa.

1. Pensar em novas ideias e ser criativa é importante para ela (a pessoa). Ela gosta de fazer as coisas de maneira própria e original.

2. Ser rica é importante para ela. Ela quer ter muito dinheiro e possuir coisas caras.

3. Ela acredita que é importante que todas as pessoas do mundo sejam tratadas igualmente. Ela acredita que todos deveriam ter oportunidades iguais na vida.

4. É muito importante para ela demonstrar suas habilidades. Ela quer que as pessoas admirem o que ela faz.

5. É importante para ela viver em um ambiente seguro. Ela evita qualquer coisa que possa colocar sua segurança em perigo.

6. Ela gosta de surpresas e está sempre procurando coisas novas para fazer. Ela acha ser importante fazer muitas coisas diferentes na vida.

7. Ela acredita que as pessoas deveriam fazer o que lhes é ordenado. Ela acredita que as pessoas deveriam sempre seguir as regras, mesmo quando ninguém está observando.

8. É importante para ela ouvir as pessoas que são diferentes dela. Mesmo quando não concorda com elas, ainda quer entendê-las.

9. É importante para ela ser humilde e modesta. Ela tenta não chamar atenção para si.

10. Aproveitar os prazeres da vida é importante para ela. Ela gosta de se mimar.

11. É importante para ela tomar suas próprias decisões sobre o que faz. Ela gosta de ser livre e não depender dos outros.

12. É muito importante para ela ajudar as pessoas ao seu redor. Ela quer cuidar do bem-estar delas.

13. Ser muito bem-sucedida é importante para ela. Ela espera que as pessoas reconheçam suas realizações.

14. É importante para ela que o governo garanta sua segurança contra todas as ameaças. Ela deseja que o Estado seja forte para poder defender seus cidadãos.

15. Ela procura por aventuras e gosta de correr riscos. Ela quer ter uma vida excitante.

16. É importante para ela sempre se comportar de modo adequado. Ela quer evitar fazer qualquer coisa que as pessoas possam dizer que é errado.

17. É importante para ela ter o respeito dos outros. Ela deseja que as pessoas façam o que ela diz.

18. É importante para ela ser leal a seus amigos. Ela quer se dedicar às pessoas próximas a ela.

19. Ela acredita firmemente que as pessoas deveriam preservar a natureza. Cuidar do meio ambiente é importante para ela.

20. Tradição é importante para ela. Ela procura seguir os costumes transmitidos por sua religião ou pela sua família.

21. Ela procura todas as oportunidades para se divertir. É importante para ela fazer coisas que lhe tragam prazer.

Medo do Crime

Por favor, assinale quanto medo você sente de ser vítima de algum crime em cada uma das situações.

1. Ao andar sozinho/a na sua vizinhança durante a noite?

2. Ao andar sozinho/a na sua vizinhança durante o dia?

3. Ao andar em grupo na sua vizinhança durante a noite?

4. Ao andar em grupo na sua vizinhança durante o dia?

5. Quando está em casa sozinho/a?

6. Quando está em casa com outras pessoas?

Insegurança Econômica

Por favor, assinale quão preocupado/a você se sente com cada possibilidade descrita.

1. Perder seu emprego.

2. Não conseguir pagar suas contas.

3. Não conseguir se sustentar quando for idoso.

4. Não conseguir sustentar sua família.

5. Não conseguir pagar um medicamento ou consulta médica em caso de doença.

Apoio à Democracia

Por favor, assinale quanto você concorda ou discorda com cada uma das afirmações.

1. O Brasil seria melhor se fosse uma monarquia.

2. O Brasil seria melhor se fosse uma ditadura.

3. O Brasil seria melhor se fosse parlamentarista.

4. A democracia é a melhor forma de governo para o Brasil.

5. Os demais poderes (Congresso, STF etc.) deveriam ser fechados e o Presidente da República deveria decidir tudo sozinho.

6. É essencial que o Governo defenda as liberdades individuais de todos.

7. É essencial que o Governo defenda os direitos e deveres civis de todos.

8. O Brasil deve ser governado pelos representantes que o povo escolheu em eleições justas, mesmo que eu não tenha votado neles.

9. A democracia não funciona para o Brasil.