THINKING PAST THE LATIN AMERICAN HYBRID
Rationalism in Exile – A Brazilian Contribution to the Theory of International Relations
MARIANA ALVES DA CUNHA KALIL

THINKING PAST THE LATIN AMERICAN HYBRID
Rationalism in Exile – A Brazilian Contribution to the Theory of International Relations

Trabalho de Conclusão apresentado à Universidade de Brasília como exigência parcial para obtenção do título de Doutora em Relações Internacionais
Orientador: Prof. Dr. José Flávio Sombra Saraiva

BRASÍLIA
2017
MARIANA ALVES DA CUNHA KALIL

THINKING PAST THE LATIN AMERICAN HYBRID
Rationalism in Exile – A Brazilian Contribution to the Theory of International Relations

Relatório final, apresentado à Universidade de Brasília como parte das exigências para a obtenção do título de Doutora em Relações Internacionais [Final Report Presented to the University of Brasilia for the Obtention of the Author’s PhD title]

Brasília, 21 de Novembro de 2017 [Brasilia, November 21st 2017]

Supervisor: Prof. José Flávio Sombra Saraiva, PhD

Membros da Banca [Committee Members]

Membro [Committee Member]: Prof. Emeritus Amado Luiz Cervo, PhD

Membro [Committee Member]: Prof. Rafael Villa, PhD

Membro [Committee Member]: Prof. Danielly Becard, PhD

Membro [Committee Member] – Substituta [Sub]: Prof. Eiiti Sato, PhD
For Marcos Lins da Cunha (in memoriam)
Acknowledgements

I always read books' acknowledgements. I find them most helpful when they tell you the story behind the work, since you end up learning yourself how to become a better scholar. Kissinger's 'On China' is among the best ones I've read. I could not then refrain from writing my acknowledgements in the form I'd wish to read. How have I become the person who wrote this Dissertation?

My major challenge has always been to stick to a routine. When I seem to get the hang of things, there goes my attention span. I have to be extremely stimulated to actually sit down and read or write for long periods of time -I do not mean hours, but days, weeks, months, years! Sir Arthur Conan Doyle puts it quite appropriately, "my mind rebels at stagnation". A lengthy work is clearly far from my perfect suit. However, throughout the process of writing this PhD, I could rely on quite seasoned friends who were rather successful in similar endeavors.

Ernest Hemingway, in his "A Moveable Feast", taught me how to keep myself defied, always finishing my workday while I still had juice. With the deepest of all understandings regarding the restless nature of my mind, he knew the hardest part, besides taming my pursuit, would be living life, going through the rest of the day until it was time to work again. He had the horses and the cafés, I had to find what made me happy without destroying my finances or my health. Mason Currey came to the rescue. With his book 'Daily Rituals: How Artists Work', I could take a peek into how Hobbes, Kafka, Sartre, another odd 160 scientists, writers, painters, musicians, and her, Simone de Beauvoir, lived their lives. It could only have been a woman, and this woman. Simone taught me how to live my life until the other dawn, when I'd start working at 5:30am, after 30 minutes of me time -exactly when I wrote these acknowledgements, for instance. My partner would wake up around 7am, when I'd have a proper breakfast with him, while taking a short break eating and watching the news on CNN -and quickly realizing they must stop jeopardizing the US democracy; there is holding a President accountable, then there is, yes, a witch hunt. He'd do the dishes, get his notebook and I'd put on short podcasts on his ongoing research. He'd take notes, while I kept on working on my Dissertation. He'd then retreat to his study. I do not have a study, I work from our living room.

By 2pm, I would have a light lunch, usually a sandwich with salad and juice or chocolate milk. I'd then run errands, do house chores, see doctors, read or watch something for pleasure, tweet, until around 7pm, when we'd sit down, have dinner and talk about the work we had done that day. Sometimes, we'd read it to each other. I cannot thank him enough for providing me with the otherness necessary for one to have a holistic perspective and to brush up her own work.

This is a lot like Simone's and Sartre's daily rituals, except they did not live together - not only did we want to live together, but also rent anywhere in Rio is way too expensive for a senior scholar to choose to live on his own in a fine neighborhood; you can pretty much infer a PhD candidate would have to live with her parents. Our versions of Feminism and Existentialism had to adapt to our times and budget. Simone used to read and discuss Sartre's work during their daily early dinner/late lunch, the other way around was not as frequent at all. Decades have passed, and being le deuxième sexe is still a challenge. The very fact that Simone herself helped Sartre with his work on a daily basis rendered me a lot more comfortable balancing my
relationship with my feminist expectations regarding my role in his life, as well as the importance of guilt-free "me time" women in history rarely got -ldleness is key to creativity, right? Well, yes, I bake him mini-cakes whenever I'm overwhelmed with intellectual work and find mentally healthy to use my hands, or simply when he's craving one, just as he does all my dishes -frankly, a lot because I often forget to do them-, he does the grocery shopping -though I make the list-, he keeps the house in order -I'm not as tidy as you'd expect from a lady: it's a true partnership -obviously, there are asymmetries, and they rest wherever it feels comfortable for the both of us, what changes from time to time. Simone allowed me to be ok in being on the so-called losing side of the asymmetry. My life, my rules.

After dinner, we'd then take a shower and watch our favorite series. There were many throughout these years, but I can definitely tell you falling asleep to Kerry Washington, Viola Davis, Nicole Kidman, Reese Witherspoon, Tracee Ellis Ross, all strong women, quirky, flawless in their absolutely erratic existence, was but essential to populate my dreams with might. Lorelai's and Rory's Gilmore roles in my academic life could hardly be overplayed. They have been by my side from my undergrad years of commute from Niterói to PUC-Rio until recently when Netflix showed us how normal it nowadays is to be in your early 30s and still not on the traditional track your parents might have been, even though "everything she tackles, she conquers", even though you might have an outstanding CV and impeccable work ethics. F. Scott Fitzgerald could not be more ahistorical, in the way only literature can be, and, yes, I am aware "I shall go on shining as a brilliantly meaningless figure in a meaningless world." It's not like The Gilmore Girls hadn't warned me: in omnia paratus.

My aunt Tata has taught me everything I know about the English language since I was a little girl who swore she would marry Prince William, I couldn't possibly imagine my career without her or the Spice Girls, for that matter. Ginger, Scary, Posh, Baby and Sporty forced me to understand English, no subtitles, when I searched for firsthand Spice Girls stuff online, back when you had to log out as fast as you could to unclog your phone. Tata, the certainty of marrying Prince William as early as when I was 9, and the spiced up life of #girlpower and of racial diversity are the very foundations of my foreign language skills. But far more than that, I have always been so thirsty for abstract reflections that Geri Halliwell's 'image is just your imagination, reality is rarely revealed' actually introduced me to post-positivism -Baumann, to me more exact.

As you can see, my partner and my imaginary friends were my rocks. However, as aunt Tata has been fundamental for this Dissertation, so have been my mother and my father, who could not have helped more. Although in completely different fields, they are both scholars, and I am grateful for that. They understood my limitations, supported my reclusion, and never questioned my choice to write a theoretical PhD. My mom would send us food, which saved us time and money. In spite of her hectic schedule, she would deliver us food herself daily. My father would solve anything we'd need him to, would lend me his credit card to buy our thousands of bookcases, and, of course, the books themselves. My grandma, Therezinha, was so understanding. She never complained that her only granddaughter would rarely call her or show up even though we live only four blocks away from each other. On the contrary, whenever she could, she'd send us 'antidepressants' - she thusly called a care-package with the largest amount of Kopenhagen chocolates you will ever get.

My 28-years-old friendship with Nathalia Mussi, in turn, provided me with far more than sorority, everyday, anytime. Her and her husband Alvaro's life choice to embrace the world, to go after the best Education they could (they are UFRJ Engineers and MIT alumni) and then to face life in the most competitive market of the world still inspires
me every day. She reminds me of why, even though I do not descend from a diplomat or from anyone who could support, especially financially, the life of a world-class scholar in International Relations, I still chose to engage in international professional associations, such as the ISA and LASA. She reminds me of why I picked a fight, and won, with a former President of my country. She reminds me where we came from. We were raised together in a Catholic Church (Santuário das Almas) in Niterói, Rio de Janeiro, populated by representatives of the Theology of Liberation, especially Padre Chico, whose pickles with latifundiários in the South of Pará were but a message: you cannot let them have their way, and you can only offer what you carry inside you. This means, for both of us, our work needs to have a meaning, it needs to deliver something constructive to society -hence my choice to work under the umbrella of Global IR and to have active roles in administrative positions at the ISA. We are both perennially aware of the social impacts of each and every step we, and everybody else takes. The dilemmas we share are usually around the very same hovering topic: we were raised in a bubble that celebrates and holds ethics to the highest account; thus, in real life, we are constantly faced with a lot of pain when anti-ethical people cross our paths. It took us time to adjust to the idea, and I can tell you it still surprises us -though I don't think it is a bad thing we haven't yet normalized misbehavior (I gotta give it to her here, as she currently works in multinational finances in Manhattan)-, but we are learning to cope and to stand up for ourselves, to speak up, and most importantly not to let those people make us question who we are or what we are capable of achieving, afterall ‘you can only offer what you carry inside’. During most of my PhD, she has been my entire social life, she has been the only person I'd deviate from my daily rituals to accommodate, to admire, to applaud, to help, to keep company, to hang out, to simply listen to (or read, since a lot of our relationship has been through WhatsApp lately). She is worth every second spent with her online or offline. I hope everyone can count on someone like her in their lives. It makes things less painful, not to mention fun and - sorry, F. Scott - meaningful.

My brother, Marcos Kalil Filho, deserved to have a book written about his life even though he's not even 30 yet. My brother is the brightest person I have ever met, and I'll probably ever meet. His intelligence is, however, not confined to his professional or intellectual achievements. My brother embodies my ideal of a person. He is an outstanding partner, a civil rights lawyer, a political activist on the streets, a Lecturer at UFRJ, a graduated journalist, MSc in Linguistics and PhD Candidate in the same field, as well as an undergrad student in Language and Literature. Yet, he never fails to reply a WhatsApp nor to return a call. In the age of texting, he actually proactively calls people. He's generous to his roommates, he takes care of his apartment, he cooks, he does grocery shopping, he eats healthy, he likes puppies - to me, this is bizarre, I could never commit to another living being that would not outgrow his or her dependence on me. He is overwhelmed, of course, but anyone else in the same situation would probably endure serious mental health distress. He is still the soberest person I know, and has the best sense of humor, not to mention a striking common sense that's but odd in light of his profile. He's a nationalist who does not only want to study our country, but who actually travels to the deepest Sertões, to the less jet-setting regions of Pantanal, bonding with locals, partying with people, cultivating happiness throughout a life that has imposed him unnecessary burdens. His reflections upon his own work, the methodology he applied in his MSc Thesis, and his mere existence were structural to my Dissertation and are constitutive to my ontology. Epistemologically, he is my paradigm.
My Advisor, Professor José Flávio Sombra Saraiva, has always been supportive of my "non-orthodox" choices, as that of writing the Dissertation in English - there were not even norms regarding this in the entire University by the time I started my work. He usually describes me as a bold person, and I thank him for giving me space and trust to create my own demons, of course, but my very own achievements as well. Amado Cervo's openness to talk about his work can neither be forgotten. Professor Pio Penna Filho has also encouraged me to keep up the good work throughout these four years, while Professor Alcides Costa Vaz' trust on my potential to actually make a contribution has provided me with the responsibility one has to bear if she aims to deliver good work. IRel has been an appropriate choice. I was constantly presented with opportunities to take PhDs abroad, especially in the US, but I never regret having chosen to stay. At IRel, I know I'm part of something bigger than myself that has meaning to Brazil's society, namely in terms of international thinking. I'm humbled to have been part of the Institute for the six years of its life. I hope my career can contribute to make it even more worth of respect.

Being an active member of the ISA has given me the opportunity to mingle with outstanding scholars who have directly shaped my work. Professor Jacqueline Braveboy-Wagner, my mentor, my mother in Academia, never fails to tell you what you need to hear. Tough love, but, hey, love! Affection in Academia! How rare is that? Without her, I'd never have asked the thousands of questions that led to this research. I can actually trace this Dissertation back to her very public, blunt inquiries about my paper presentation in a conference in 2012. She spurred in me all I've written in these pages. Amitav Acharya, the great thinker and former president of the ISA, surprises me every time he answers to one of my emails. He's, as you'll see, one of my main theoretical sources, and, since he knows Global IR is (and will probably always be) a work-in-progress, he never fails to give you hints that, perhaps coincidentally, have always responded to my gut, have constantly brought me back to the basics of what I think Brazil's international thought has been all about. His generosity can never be measured, I hope to be like him when I am a senior scholar. Peter M. Kristensen and Pinar Bilgin have also read preliminary results of my research. Peter has been very encouraging in regard to my content-analysis, and Pinar could not have been more reassuring of my thoughts over the literature review. ISA has been central for this study, they have taught me how to be a professional scholar even on the earliest stage of my career, while providing me with a safety net in moments when my own country could not. Catia Confortini and Annick T.R. Wibben have been who I wannabe when I grow up. Their sorority, their leadership by example, the circle of niceness they've set in motion have all kept me going even through the most challenging moments. The Women's Caucus is unparalleled, they have actual impact in how IR scholars behave, I cannot thank them enough for actually educating myself as well.

The Russians, oh! The Russians! The Russians who I hereby thank through Pavel Kasyanov were the almost literal bedrocks of this Dissertation. I don't think anyone in the Global South can do research without the Russians. To me, this is living proof that a few will always profit from the spoils of geopolitical rivalries, and that science is entrenched in politics.

All in all, I could not have done it without love. His love has soothed my soul, enticed my body as much as my brain. Sharing life with him is unquestionably the greatest honor of my life.

October 15th, Niterói, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil
'Here's to the fools who dream, crazy as they may seem. Here's to the hearts that break. Here's to the mess we make (Audition - The Fools Who Dream, Justin Hurwitz).'
ABSTRACT: This Dissertation thought past the Latin American Hybrid to investigate a Brazilian contribution to International Relations Theory (IRT). Through a qualitative methodology that applied a content-analysis to inquire bibliometric data from RBPI and CINT, while triangulating these findings with those provided by the TRIP Survey 2014 and Kristensen’s (2015) interviews with Brazilian scholars where he searched for a Brazilian contribution to IRT, this research debated a new sociology of science on its reflexive and interactionist approaches. Ideas of social capital (scientific and temporal), and of the interaction between the macro-political and the micro-social spheres have pervaded the entire enterprise. Finally, a Brazilian contribution to IRT, inspired by the second generation of the Global IR/Non-Western theory debate, discussed the philosophy of science underlying the triangulation’s findings providing the final result of this research which is that there indeed is a Brazilian contribution to IRT, and it is not a hybrid, but what we have hereby dubbed rationalism in exile.

Keywords: Brazil; Data; Rationalism; Sociology; Theory

RESUMO: Esta tese vai além do Híbrido Latino-Americano ao investigar uma contribuição brasileira para a Teoria das Relações Internacionais. Por meio de metodologia qualitativa aplicada à análise de conteúdo que explora dados bibliométricos da RBPI e da CINT, enquanto triangula estes resultados com aqueles oferecidos pelo TRIP Survey e por entrevistas concedidas a Kristensen (2015) por acadêmicos brasileiros, ambas também em busca de uma contribuição brasileira, esta pesquisa debate uma nova sociologia da ciência em suas abordagens reflexivas e interacionistas. Ideias como a de capital social (científico e temporal) e da interação entre as esferas macropolíticas e microssociais perpassam toda a pesquisa. Finalmente, uma contribuição brasileira para a Teoria das Relações Internacionais, inspirada na segunda geração do debate da Global IR ou da Teoria Não-Ocidental, discute a filosofia da ciência que embasa os resultados consolidados da triangulação, oferecendo o resultado final desta pesquisa, o de que há uma contribuição brasileira para a Teoria das Relações Internacionais que não é híbrida, mas que é, nesta pesquisa, denominada racionalismo de exílio.

Palavras-chave: Brasil; Dados; Racionalismo; Sociologia; Teoria

RESUMO EXPANDIDO: ALÉM DO HÍBRIDO LATINO-AMERICANO- RACIONALISMO DE EXÍLIO – UM CONTRIBUIÇÃO BRASILEIRA PARA A TEORIA DAS RELAÇÕES INTERNACIONAIS


A metodologia qualitativa empreendida a partir de sua noção de teoria embasada (grounded theory) levou ao exame dessas três fontes a respeito de como as RI no
Brasil organizam-se intelectual e socialmente. Assim, foram derivados alguns resultados intermediários, como tendências de:

(i) Maiores uso e citação de autores que publicam em inglês a respeito do Brasil;

(ii) Aumento do uso e da citação de autores brasileiros nas publicações brasileiras e internacionais entre 2003 e 2013, período que concentrou maior investimento estatal na institucionalização da disciplina das Relações Internacionais no Brasil;

(iii) Predominância das relações macropolíticas e microsociais em relação às macrossociais e microsociais. Em relação ao impacto do macropolítico no microsocial, a narrativa macropolítica brasileira é variável presente sobretudo no aspecto organizacional da disciplina das RI no Brasil, o que tem impacto sobre, por exemplo, a identificação do debate acadêmico com a política acadêmica. A respeito do aspecto intelectual, a narrativa macropolítica teria impacto, sobretudo, na formação de dois paradigmas filosóficos para as ciências humanas brasileiras, o nacional desenvolvimentismo e o pensamento autoritário nacionalista brasileiro;

(iv) Identificação, a partir de análise de conteúdo, de predomínios temáticos nas RI do Brasil, confirmados pela triangulação, como foco em temas a respeito do Brasil e de sua inserção internacional, da política exterior brasileira, e de temas de segurança em geral. Aqueles que seriam localizadores de normas, sem que as adaptassem às realidades de seu objeto de estudo, costumam afiliar-se a teorias construtivistas e de securitização. Os que tendem a produzir normas subsidiárias hesitam em engajar em debate teórico com o mainstream, resignando-se a denunciar teorias como instrumentos de hegemonia, oferecendo, por sua vez, paradigmas e conceitos locais, nacionais e regionais;

(v) Superação do Híbrido Latino-Americano. O Híbrido Latino-Americano descreve o engajamento teórico da academia brasileira e da academia latino-americana das RI como um híbrido do realismo clássico, com a interdependência complexa e a teoria da dependência;

(vi) Supera-se a influência da teoria da dependência, ao constatarem-se a ausência de citação às obras da Teoria da Dependência, a ausência de publicações na RBPI e na CINT de autores dessa corrente, a confusão feita entre teorias da dependência (que a literatura restringe a Cardoso & Faletto (1970)), a teoria do desenvolvimentismo de Celso Furtado, e o nacional desenvolvimentismo - síntese do pensamento e da ação de Furtado (em contribuições intelectuais para além da CEPAL, em sua atuação na SUDENE e no Ministério do Planejamento), com o pensamento e a ação do autor mais citado entre os autores mais usados na RBPI e na CINT, Hélio Jaguaribe (fundador do IBESP, predecessor do ISEB que, em 1956, fora abarcado pelo Ministério da Cultura e da Educação (MEC) sob a liderança de Darcy Ribeiro), e com o pensamento e a ação de Darcy Ribeiro, cuja epitome é o projeto da Universidade de Brasília;

(vii) Identificação das referências à influência de Cardoso, teórico da dependência, em reflexões teóricas brasileiras e latino-americanas como produto do capital social do acadêmico que, em 1986, teria deixado, por fim, a vida e as reflexões acadêmicas para dedicar-se primordialmente à política partidária no Brasil;
(viii) Identificação das referências à influência da teoria da dependência de Cardoso como produto de um comportamento comum na ciência moderna que gera lendas urbanas acadêmicas a partir de um processo de citação superficial que se apoia, sobretudo, em capital temporal e, em menor medida, em capital científico. Nas RI, as principais fontes dessa lenda urbana seriam as publicações de Holsti (1985), de Tickner (2003a; 2003b; 2008) e de Gilpin (1981; 1987).

(ix) Reconhecimento de quatro autores como os mais relevantes estatisticamente para as Relações Internacionais do Brasil como um todo: Amado Luiz Cervo, Hélio Jaguaribe, José Flávio Sombra Saraiva e Maria Regina Soares de Lima;

(x) Reconhecimento, a partir de tratamento estatístico, de Hélio Jaguaribe e de Maria Regina Soares de Lima como autores-referência para a obra de Cervo e Saraiva;

(xi) Reconhecimento, após tratamento estatístico, de Cervo e de Saraiva como os principais autores da primeira geração das Relações Internacionais do Brasil. Embora, de acordo com a data de obtenção de seu doutorado, Saraiva devesse tender a pertencer à uma segunda geração, a incidência de seu uso e de sua citação – capital científico -, bem como a ocupação de espaços institucionais fulcrais para a organização da disciplina – como a diretoria do IBRI – levam-no à primeira geração como protégé de Amado Cervo.

(xii) Identificação, por análise de conteúdo, de codificação e de categorizações que estabelecem a tônica de uma contribuição brasileira para a TRI, a partir de observações do comportamento brasileiro em suas relações exteriores, com base em conceitos e paradigmas que enfocam ideias de autonomia e de desenvolvimento, a partir de observação histórica;

(xiii) Reconhecimento dessas categorias como decorrentes da influência do nacional desenvolvimentismo na produção de conhecimento dos autores estatisticamente mais relevantes para as RI do Brasil;

A partir da reunião destes resultados preliminares, examinou-se a filosofia da ciência que perpassa a contribuição de Cervo e de Saraiva, cujas principais fontes bibliográficas seriam Maria Regina Soares de Lima e Hélio Jaguaribe, além de, em segundo plano, José Honório Rodrigues e Celso Lafer. Maria Regina Soares de Lima utiliza-se de pouquíssimas referências brasileiras, com ênfase para uma maior diversidade de obras do autor Gerson Moura, fundador do IRI PUC-Rio, e de uma publicação de Tullo Vigevani, o autor mais usado na CINT (2002-2017).

Na medida em que é protégé de Cervo, a obra de Saraiva foi utilizada em sua análise da disciplina no Brasil, deixando-se uma análise da literatura publicada pelo autor na RBPI e na CINT como possível caminho a ser tomado no sentido de replicar e testar a tese. Já no stock-taking de Saraiva, encontram-se sinais das ontologias e da metodologia que é identificada na obra de Cervo.

Nota-se que, na obra de Cervo, há perspectiva racionalista sobre o Estado, cujo cálculo racional não se daria com base em lógica contratualista, mas nacional desenvolvimentista. A ontologia deste Estado também difere da contratualista e se aproxima à nacional desenvolvimentista, quando o autor identifica paradigmas que demonstram como a alternância de poder entre as classes sociais brasileiras gera diferentes entendimentos sobre o interesse nacional, embora a autonomia, e não a sobrevivência, seja o objetivo perene do Estado. O binômio fundacional das Relações Internacionais sob uma perspective brasileira não seria, portanto, decorrente da
Teoria do Big Bang de Westfália. O dualismo dependência-autonomia fundamentaria o Estado que, por meio de cálculo racional, buscaria desenvolvimento, avaliado não somente por noções econômicas, mas sobretudo sociais. Este cálculo racional, bem como a ontologia do Estado, embasados na noção de responsabilidade social de classes ilustradas trazida pelo nacional desenvolvimentismo, levaria a comportamento, na política internacional, que visa ao encontro de um mínimo denominador comum que possa forjar consensos que não sejam nocivos ao desenvolvimento das nações.
Said compreende que o pensamento produzido pelo exilado tende a ser exceptionalista, tende a marcar diferenças, peculiaridades, caracterizando-as como triunfantes, melhores, incompreendidas, lógica da qual decorreriam as percepções da literatura de que o Brasil seria o bastião da diplomacia pela paz em decorrência de uma suposta harmonia multicultural doméstica. Desse modo, como aspira a segunda geração das Relações Internacionais Globais/Teoria Não Ocidental, esta tese traduziu, pela via da filosofia da ciência, a produção intelectual de RI do Brasil – aquelas dos autores mais relevantes estatisticamente – para os termos do debate teórico Ocidental.
SUMMARY

Introduction ...........................................................................................................................................15
2. Hidden No More – Global IR and the Search for National Variants: A
   Methodological Conversation ...............................................................................................................112
3. Hidden No More – Global IR and the Search for National Variants: A
   Sociological Conversation ..................................................................................................................163
4. Hidden No More – Global IR and the Search for National Variants:
   Rationalism in Exile .............................................................................................................................215
   Conclusion: A Contrapuntal Reading ..................................................................................................284
   References .........................................................................................................................................298
   Artigo-Síntese ....................................................................................................................................307
Introduction

The purpose of this study is to systematize a Brazilian contribution to the Theory of International Relations (IR) thinking past the Latin American Hybrid (LAH) (Tickner 2003). By engaging in a debate with the LAH, this research intends to enter the discussions on Global International Relations. Affiliating to Global IR's second generation, it is intended to join the endeavor of bridging the gap between knowledge produced in the South and in the West / North by bringing locally, nationally and regionally-produced knowledge into mainstream IR Theory (IRT) (Acharya 2016).

Is there anything different or new, for example, about the way Brazilian IR literature tackles the foundational concept of sovereignty through its debate of the concept of autonomy? Or, for instance, is the anarchical conception of the international system of states rendered obsolete through Brazilian IR literature regarding the frozen distribution of power in the structure that socializes States, multinational companies and individuals through political and economic barriers to welfare and social justice?

By addressing such and other questions, this Dissertation seeks to transcend the misperception that there is a division of labor\(^1\) in IR theoretical thinking in which the South's major role would be to provide area expertise and to verify theoretical constructions offered by scholars based in Universities in the Western world, while aware that there might not be any actually unique approach to any of the core issues of the discipline -and yet whether simply diversifying, as well as amplifying its range of subjects and objects of study would in itself provide enough of a contribution, hence the following research question: how does IR thinking produced in Brazil contribute to the debate on the Theory of International Relations?

This Dissertation reaches out to a qualitative methodology that triangulates some of the findings conducted through the TRIP 2014 (Maliniak et al 2014), with Kristensen’s

---

\(^1\) Another reading is that IR is a “two-tiered discipline” segregated into an upper core tier of all-round theorists who publish in general journals and a lower tier of specialists who are accepted only in their respective subfields (Wæver 1998:718). These two tiers to a large extent correspond to a core–periphery reading of the bibliometric IR network; the core is made up by pure and general IR journals, while specialization enters at the periphery. While the idea of tiers seems to imply super/subordination, I use the core–periphery dichotomy not to imply an exploitative relationship between dominant core and dominated periphery but to characterize a type of organization “where the core has greater density of connections within itself than with the periphery [and] where peripheral elements are only loosely connected to one another” (Fowler, Grofman, and Masuoka 2007:736) (Kristensen, 2012, p.42-43).
(2015) findings following a micro-sociological approach of Brazilian IR through interviews, and finally with of a content-analysis of bibliometric data that sheds light on the publishing patterns of Brazilian IR’s top-ranked academic journals, Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional (RBPI) and Contexto Internacional (CINT). On the one hand, this research presents an empirically-oriented approach as it verifies the hypothesis that a Brazilian contribution to the Theory of International Relations would stem from said triangulation thinking past the Latin American Hybrid, which leads to two other hypotheses (Wemheuer-Vogelaar et al., 2016: 19).

On the other hand, this research is conceptual-normative on its attempts to bring Brazilian IR into the central conceptual and normative debates of Western IRT (Idem). Under the effort of the second generation of Global IR, this study shows its normative-conceptual facet as it goes beyond finding out whether there is an authentic Brazilian IR thinking since it denounces shortcomings of traditional IRT to verify which traces single out the country’s philosophy of IR literature from that produced in the West, thusly leading to the falsification of the following two hypotheses. Firstly, up until the 1980s, IR sub-fields of diplomatic history and international political economy would be central to a Brazilian contribution to the Theory of International Relations. Secondly, thenceforth the 1990s, reflections upon the country's foreign policy based on thoughts previously produced at ISEB, as well as on a post-positivist approach to international politics are central to a Brazilian contribution to the Theory of International Relations. This Introduction presents the basis for a sociological framework of the field of IR in Brazil. Since this research is based upon Global IR, as aspiration to bridge divides within the discipline, the methodology applied in this Dissertation entailed an alert that is also contained in this Introduction in regard to what Brazil’s scientific community might be failing to address and could result in yet another situation of underdevelopment: the data revolution.

*The bases for a sociology of Brazilian IR – the intellectual and social organization of the national-developmentalism paradigm*

Since Newton’s laws, the pattern of good, proper science is frequently subjugated to a hyper-specialized philosophy of science, that of Positivism, which is essentialized to the extent that it is frequently synonym to science itself. This perspective has been
sustained by several intellectual mechanisms strictly within the borders of each field of research. As expected, the narrative offered by a history of science that supersedes Sir Isaac Newton’s findings reveals a series of authoritative validations that can be associated with the normalization of Positivism as homonymous to science.

(...) my admiration at the surprising inventions of this great man, carries me to conceive of him as a person, who not only must raise the glory of the country which gave him birth, but that he has even done the honour to human nature, by having extended the greatest and most noble of our faculties, reason, to subjects which, till he attempted them, appeared to be wholly beyond the reach of our limited capacities (Pemberton Apud Burtt 2014: 31).

Clear as day, Pemberton’s discourse is one of a person of his own time. This extract is from 1728, a historical period when England was building up its upcoming global hegemony whose material capabilities were significantly connected to technological developments that allowed for the First Industrial Revolution. Hence, English superiority is but affirmed when a well-educated, white man accessed undeniable truth through the exercise of a reason that had been trained in top-English educational institutions such as The King’s School, and the Trinity College, Cambridge University. His nationality was hence not overlooked when his scientific contributions were compiled – Pemberton’s compliments are contained in a third edition of the *Principia*. Interestingly enough, even though Newton’s findings are deemed referential for the divorce between science and philosophy, philosophers and even poets -even these whose labor had been removed from the pedestal of reason since Plato’s *Republic* - also praised Newton’s reason.

Noticeable for his translation of ‘Homer’, and the second most cited writer – only after Shakespeare – in ‘The Oxford Dictionary of Quotations’, Alexander Pope, the English poet, hence praised: ‘[N]ature and Nature’s laws lay hid in night; / God said, “Let Newton be”, and all was light’ (Pope Apid Burtt 2014: 31). Locke, the contractualist of Wendt’s second culture of anarchy would express admiration over Sir Isaac’s sharp reason, his ability to focus on elements that were indeed substantial for the perception of truth: the ‘incomparable Mr. Newton, an under-laborer, employed in clearing the ground and removing some of the rubbish that lies in the way to knowledge’ (Locke Apud Burtt 2014: 31). One of the fathers of rationalism could not hide his awe at the
father of positivism.

It is not that surprising thus that even the most up-to-date research on Non-Western IRT / Global IR apply Bourdieu’s reflexivism on the sociology of science, committing itself to the possibility of an expanded internalism or a mitigated externalism, a new sociology of science end up narrowed down to such terms:

Under normal circumstances, however, changes at the macro-political environment will be only indirectly influential insofar as they affect the institutional and material bases of intellectual life (Kristensen 2015: 62).

Kristensen’s idea that IR in countries like Brazil, India, and China can indeed be submitted to the equivalent of standard conditions of temperature and pressure (SCTP) reveals an efficient methodology that delivers a relevant contribution to the state of the art of the field; yet, it leaves by the wayside explanations that might themselves provide an efficient framework for the extraction of Non-Western contributions from their local, national, and regional contexts. Kristensen acknowledges this shortcoming, and lays grounds for this research:

Moreover, this dissertation has presented a sociology of science of academic debates on international relations in rising powers. In some cases, these debates are connected to broader political debates, as the peaceful rise or international insertion narratives illustrate, but they have been analyzed here from a sociology of science perspective. (…)

This does not preclude connections between academic debates and broader political and national narratives, however, is [sic] further research is obviously needed to explore this aspect (Idem: 612).

Kristensen’s choice was by design. He delimited his research aware of what his advisor writes as one of the elemental steps to contextualize theoretical efforts from elsewhere: societal and political traces of a country. It is also clear that Kristensen decides to ignore even certain aspects of Brazil’s IR internal intellectual and social structures, another one of his advisor’s steps, as he interviews researchers interrogating them about their vision in regard to the intellectual production of other national colleagues and institutions, but does not factor in what he includes among the transcriptions of those interviews: in Brazil, the academic debate is intrinsically connected to academic politics to the extent that it might not even exist so to avoid rifts in academic politics. Kristensen (2015a: 521) transcribes the following:
In my interviews with Brazilian scholars, theoretical divides easily turned into institutional rivalries, which some scholars wished to avoid altogether. This PUC-Rio scholar declined to answer who are the most influential scholars and the major debate ("I prefer not to say anything"): (Idem)

Kristensen: ‘What is the debate, the big debate, is there any big debate that people are talking about? (Ibid)

IRI PUC-Rio’s scholar:

Theoretical debate? No. Again, I am very much, I am not saying that it doesn't exist this kind of debate but I am very much concerned not to kind of importing debates from, from wherever. Because I think when you start to pay too much attention on theoretical debates, although it’s, of course that's useful, but the possibility of losing contact with, eh, research in general, I think, well, I wouldn't say that actually, I am not being clear and I am not being. The main point is that I don't like very much this idea of what are the main debate nowadays because it’s very easier, very easy you get involved, instead to get involved in a theoretical debate, we start to get involved in an institutional and a political, academic political debate. And I don't like that. I think the debate get kind of contaminated by, eh, academic, política acadêmica, how would you say that? (Op cit: 521-522)

Kristensen: ‘Academic politics.’ (Op cit: 522)

IRI PUC-Rio’s scholar: Yes, academic politics, so that's when you ask me what’s the debate, I prefer not to say anything because it's so so easy to get in this academic politics. (Op cit)

Kristensen: ‘Because it's not an academic discussion, but academic politics?’(Op cit)

IRI PUC-Rio’s scholar:

Sometimes it is, sometimes it is academic discussion but very much intermingled with institutional and power dispute and which kind of power, access to resources, many kind of, you know, subject that got involved in this, in this debate. So I would much more, I would be much more comfortable to say that I have no idea what kind of debate is going on. (Op cit)

When the author’s acknowledgement includes the recognition of the importance of broader political and national narratives, the macro-political sphere, Kristensen narrows down these narratives to those provided by IR authors about the broader political and national narratives, the macro-political environment that he assumes has little impact over institutional and material bases of their intellectual life.
The individual case studies will look at theoretical innovation in IR in China, India and Brazil. The selection of these three cases is motivated by the problematique that these countries are widely seen as ‘rising’ or ‘emerging’ powers in the IR literature but their scholarship has played a marginal role in the mainstream IR discourse, both in general and in the specific literature on rising powers (see Rising Powers in International Relations Theory and How Can Emerging Powers Speak). The case selection is designed to study the assumption that rising power leads to theorizing; that countries experiencing growing economic and political impact on world politics will increasingly try to formulate their own grand ideas about world order. I present three overall arguments for why China, India and Brazil make reasonable cases of rising powers today. First, an argument based on their influence in the literature: given the hype surrounding the BRICs in the literature, it is hardly controversial to argue that China, India and Brazil have been seen as archetypical emerging powers/markets for the recent decade. Second, an objectivist argument: in terms of growing material power and political influence these are large and growing countries that have been trying to make the transition from regional to global great powers and project themselves on the global arena. Third, a constructivist argument: ‘rising power’ is not only objective and measurable as it pertains also to expected future power (Ibid: 29-30).

There are two interconnected problems with this premise. Firstly, the macro-political environment those scholars talk about, frequently complaining, is at the very core of the disciplinary divide that has motivated the projects of Non-Western IRTs / Global IR. Gilley (2015) insists upon the relevance of the Third World concept, one whose social, political, and economic contexts, domestically and internationally, would have shifted these country’s actions in international politics from attitudes of protest to a creative behavior, pointing out that ‘the main challenge for the West is to create a coherent pluralism in [sic] international order that embraces this creative Third World’ (Idem: 1405). Just like Kristensen, Gilley is talking about the international policies of Non-Western nations, but this profile shift, as Kristensen (2015:513) himself acknowledges, at least partially contextualizes the agency claimed by scholars:

Kristensen: ‘Yeah, it’s different. But it’s, I was just asking why you thought it was a problem because you said ‘ah, it’s good to, you know, develop a theory from Brazil’s perspective’. But do you think Brazil needs a theory?’ (Idem)

A Brazilian scholar from ‘the first generation’:

No, it’s not, but you can think in terms of why let, why you are going to leave all the discussion for emerging powers to be done in the North if we are the emerging powers? Why not, why don’t we think about ourselves? No? [laughing] (Ibid)

A senior scholar based in UERJ claims that:

My academic formation is history, philosophy e sociology. The three. It’s not orthodox [laughing]. But, and I studied very much Brazilian foreign policy. This is my principal theme of the reflection. The academic studies in Brazil is completely dominated by American theories. Between the persons that think
about Brazilian foreign policy, between diplomatics, we have a normative
theory that I resume how, as a theory of the democratization of international
relations. We have a traditional vision about this that started by 1960 and was
restated or revived about 1974-75. And president Lula resumed, he played
this line of the politics. But the academic studies is completely dominated by
American theories. (Kristensen 2015a: 513)

As we will explore in this Introduction and more thoroughly throughout this
Dissertation, there might be a Brazilian ‘theory’ of IR, but what seems to be more
precise in terms of the philosophy of science is that, in Brazil’s IR, there is at least one
paradigm from whom theories, methodologies, and ontologies derive. The difference
of this paradigm would result from its post-positivist status, nor from its Westphalian
denial, but from another type of rationalism, and the meaning of rationalism in IR will
be explored when we discuss Turton’s (2016) contribution.

There are several scholars in the TRIP Survey 2014’s findings, in Kristensen’s
interviews, and in the content-analysis hereby delivered that talk about different
subjects yet circling back to the same logics. These logics are most likely a paradigm,
and we will contextualize it macro-politically and micro-politically, so that especially on
chapters 3 and 4 we can investigate its content.

Tickner (2003b) hints toward what this and other contributions from Non-Western
Theory / Global IR:

One of the international relations (IR) discipline’s most notable silences refers
to the Third World. Silence is reflected in the fact that the field’s primary
narratives, which revolve around concepts such as anarchy, sovereignity,
power, and the state, are of limited relevance when applied to the Third World

Even though Tickner’s assumptions are the object of further inquiry in this Dissertation,
especially on chapter 2, since it is not necessarily the case that those concepts are of
limited relevance when applied to Non-Western scenes, her argument revolves
around an interesting premise that international relations would have rendered Non-
Western countries’ International Relations irrelevant as producers of theory in the
bigger picture of the theory-talk institutionalized at the core of the discipline:

Despite increasing efforts to create a ‘homegrown’ theoretical discourse in
China, India and Brazil, few articles in mainstream journals present novel
theoretical frameworks and particularly not framed as non-Western/Southern
theory or even as a ‘Chinese school’ or ‘Brazilian concepts’. Secondly,
scholars from emerging powers tend to speak as ‘native informants’ about their
own country, not about general aspects of ‘the international’. Thirdly, some
scholars even speak as ‘quasi-officials’, that is, they speak for their country (Kristensen 2015: 212).

Secondly, at least in Brazil’s reality, unlike what Kristensen (2015a: 62) supposes, macro-political elements are closely connected to the micro-social features of the discipline, as they do play a considerable role in the structural and contextual bases, both institutional and material, of the country’s intellectual life, its standing structure as an institutionalized field of research and teaching. This Introduction explores the contextual overlap among macro-political narratives and micro-social structures while presenting the institutional and material framework in which Brazil’s IR develops.

Since this Dissertation offers a qualitative analysis of the content produced at RBPI and at CINT, it is but essential those two publications were created is hereby explored. At this point, we acknowledge there is space for different narratives in regard to what is offered here, hence the assumption that every attempt to discuss a sociology or a philosophy of science ends up offering historiographies of that same science. The bases for a sociology of Brazilian IR, hence, conforms a historiography of the field of International Relations in Brazil.

In Kristensen’s PhD Dissertation, he interviews scholars from Brazil’s IR programs at PUC-Rio, USP, and UnB. One of these scholars mocks a colleague from another program who, he says, he heard telling people to quit reading Hobbes, and instead reading Brazilian thinkers –a very common attribute of Latinos, in general, is exaggeration, what at times ironically ends up matching real life (as in fantastic realism), but not necessarily at all. This same scholar asks Kristensen if ‘that guy’ does even know what Theory is. At this point, neither myself nor Kristensen are very much certain if the interviewee is talking about theory, in terms of the philosophy of science, or of the theory of international relations. I am not even sure the scholar knows exactly what he implied. I shall explain.

During my PhD at UnB, I took a class on the History of Brazilian Foreign Policy taught by Professor Pio Penna Filho. His pedagogy – that I for once deem 100% appropriate given the students’ level – was particularly Socratic, hence qualified discussion was not unusual. There was one student in particular who seemed very edgy about all literature, but especially that by Amado Cervo, since, the student supposed, they would make a mess of the philosophy of science: they would be inaccurate in every possible way, epistemologically, paradigmatically, ontologically, axiologically – that is, if the authors even knew what science is.
Part of that class’ grading process included our ability to peer review a few of our colleagues’ work, and I was appointed to peer review this student’s. His article, which was later published and is included among the references of this Dissertation, was correct. I do not mean I agree with his perspective, but it was publishable, it made its point, it discussed its literature, it showed a contribution. Since we had to bring our critiques to class and have a live discussion with the author, I weighed in through what goes something like this: ‘ok, you criticize Cervo’s hesitance to engage with the philosophy of science; however, are you sure when he means he is not doing theory he is actually addressing theory as an epistemological matter, or is he stating he is not engaging in the IRT debate?’ Daze could be grasped in the air. Cervo himself had read the paper, and partially agreed with it, but was he really talking about the philosophy of science?

Unless Cervo denies the Platonist heritage of reasoning, and its French revolutionary climax, like such authors as Walker (1992), as well as Rodrigues (2010), I would assume he addresses a whole different debate, one that is currently under the umbrella of Global IR, or of Non-Western Theories of IR.

Although Cervo in his texts is overtly skeptical about universalism and objectivity, two of the utmost pillars of positivist epistemologies, I firmly believe he is actually aiming at International Relations Theory and how the positivist character of Realism, Liberalism, and even Constructivism has rendered these currents incapable of explaining their primary historiographic inspiration, great power politics, let alone the reality of the Non-West or of the Global South. I do not believe Cervo is against theory, and he himself has written that there might be a theory intertwining his concepts or his paradigm (it is this supposed confusion that the student mostly targets), or that if you are capable of comparing his concepts with others from the Global South you may even have an IRT that, just as those thus far, intends to explain a certain reality, and not others. Only at this point of my Dissertation, and I promise I made an extreme effort to actually restrict it to this very paragraph, I will dare to offer my very own perception, what my gut tells me.

Kristensen (2015) assumes that authors like Cervo are results of the Coxian Critical Theory of IR, or of Neo-Marxian, Gramscian paradigms applied to IRT. When he conducts the interviews, he registers his surprise when he finds out that what authors like Cervo in Brazil would be offering is a way bolder -perhaps out of resistance, supposedly a common trait among social and organizational features of Brazil’s social
sciences, maybe in light of his own formal education or even of his personality -, a far more honest contribution, be it theoretical or not. They would not hesitate to unveil their own bias: if the US came up with IRT to advise its State; why would you enforce one hyper-specific philosophy of science, that of universalism, objectivity, replicability, into social scientists in other countries? Why could they not also develop theories, concepts, paradigms to help developing their own States’ project domestically and internationally?

This can be both Critical / Neo-Marxian / Gramscian, and as Machiavellian as it gets – what is not incoherent, since all these theories, paradigms, authors tend to offer rather normative contributions. This is one of the major nods in this Dissertation where we had to discuss the philosophy of science, and reach out to up-to-date reflections particularly about how this field is imprecisely approached in Western IRT to transcend teleological discussions about epistemological affiliations, the imprecision all social sciences, all over the world, tend to carry out on the concepts discussed by the philosophy of science (Wight 2002; Turton 2016), as well as, finally, testing whether there might be a Brazilian contribution to IRT through the debates of Global IR / Non-Western Theory.

These short anecdotes were brought into this entering narrative to introduce two of the most burning issues of this research: the philosophy of science in IR; and the sociology of science in IR. For us to finally make it into whether there is a Brazilian contribution to IRT, we will have to constantly tackle these two demanding subjects. While we will approach the former through perennial discussions that will eventually lead to a lexical choice, the latter will be offered a more grounded treatment, providing us with a framework. Since we intend to examine the field of IR in Brazil, it became imperative we delimited what we considered relevant to our approach; thus, the social and the organizational aspects of IR as an intellectual field in the country were particularly nailed down in this Dissertation, and their basic structure is also presented in this Introduction.

The use of the sociology of science mirrors also how Global IR / Non-Western Theory literature has been developing. The most relevant authors for this debate, meaning those who can be considered gatekeepers, tops-of-mind, concept-holders, all approach this relatively new debate in our field through the lenses of the sociology of science. The philosophy of science, however, is frequently taken for granted, or entirely bypassed namely in certain authors’ coding efforts within their content-
analyses. Yet, there are just as important exceptions, such as Hoffmann (1977), and Turtose (2016), and yet these authors differ in their approaches to the issue. Hoffmann offers an overview of how the American Social Science would confuse, for instance, ideas of theory and paradigm, however providing the most confident application of a positivist rationality to the study of international relations, the closest one who studies this object would ever get to actually delivering science. Turtose, in turn, disagrees that IR is an American Social Science, if by this we mean what Hoffmann did, a rigid, ‘scientific’ way of performing research. On the contrary, this type of science would be very much restricted to certain publications and research centers, while the largest chunk, even among the top ranked publications and institutions in the US, would actually prefer qualitative methodologies that are not comprised in the definitions of American Social Science brought by Hoffmann, Smith, and others.

One of the many hurdles faced during this research was to persistently integrate theory and method, providing firm grounds for the analysis of the object: a Brazilian contribution to Global IR.

*Micro-social features of Brazil’s IR, Qualitative Methodology, and the Data Revolution*

Press (2014) offers a narrative in which the first documented use of the term ‘big data’ happened at NASA in an article that explores a pickle they were facing in regard to visualizing data, for instance in graphics: ‘We call this the problem of big data. When data sets do not fit in main memory (in core), or when they do not fit even on local disk, the common solution is to acquire more resources.’ This is rather usual nowadays, at least for the millennial generation to which I belong. Our storage space in all of our clouds are never enough, we are always uploading more data depositing considerable faith in those providers – we store photos from our childhood that we digitalized to versions of our PhD, heaven forbid our clouds are hacked or there is some kind of virtual cataclysm – and trust me, this all goes through the mind of millennials who are writing their PhDs, I even read a book about ‘future crimes’ written by a former NSA officer who now consults on illegalities in the virtual world.

Press (2014) enlighten us

In 2008, a number of prominent American computer scientists popularized the term, predicting that “big-data computing” will “transform the activities of
companies, scientific researchers, medical practitioners, and our nation’s defense and intelligence operations." The term “big-data computing,” however, is never defined in the paper. But this is 2014 and maybe the first place to look for definitions should be Wikipedia. Indeed, it looks like the OED followed its lead. Wikipedia defines big data (and it did it before the OED) as (#2) “an all-encompassing term for any collection of data sets so large and complex that it becomes difficult to process using on-hand data management tools or traditional data processing applications.”

But this is 2014 and maybe the first place to look for definitions should be Wikipedia. Indeed, it looks like the OED followed its lead. Wikipedia defines big data (and it did it before the OED) as (#2) “an all-encompassing term for any collection of data sets so large and complex that it becomes difficult to process using on-hand data management tools or traditional data processing applications.”

What frequently matters to these researchers, and to social sciences in general, are the patterns or the absence of regularity the combination of big data reveals. There already are several academic contributions on how to address big data from the perspective of social sciences (Foster et al 2016). In fact, there is an academic field devoted to big data: data science. This is rather interesting, as it poses an apparently humongous challenge for social scientists who have always scorned quantitative methodologies – myself included.

Turns out that even if you want to engage in qualitative analyses of big data, what is offered in the last two chapters of this Dissertation, you are going to have to learn how to navigate relatively user-friendly software, such as Microsoft Office’s Excel, but also others that for a person who has never been really good at math and statistics, neither especially keen on learning logics present a painful learning curve. Software for data analysis such as R or Stata, however, are central exactly for the researcher who does not want to make mistakes resulting from his or her flawed knowledge of quantitative methodology and statistics. Then there is Atlas.ti, the software for qualitative analysis: this one is considerably more user friendly, as long as you are acquainted with methodologies in qualitative analysis, and, in the case of this research, particularly with those in content-analysis. Excel, Stata, and Atlas.ti were all involved in this Dissertation, in the treatment of the data raised through Scielo’s database, and through the far from pleasant work of tabulating every issue of RBPI and of CINT that are mysteriously out of Scielo. This was frustrating for both samples. Press (2014) tells us that the three main features of big data, the 3Vs, are volume, variety, and velocity. Volume and variety are already compromised, and in academia velocity is rather
relative compared to data regarding the behavior of consumers’ market in other fields, such as music.

The study of big data, if we can actually call the bibliometric data from these two journals big data, requires the observation of a considerably big (!) amount of data that will allow you to draw conclusions, observe tendencies, and even provide editorships with strategies to thrive in the world of impact factor. Thus, not being able to assess the behavior or readers (consumers) regarding those forty years of RBPI or those 16 years of CINT significantly narrows down our capacity to deliver definitive (or close to) findings. Of course, we can always analyze citation patterns, and this should give us a taste of what is relevant out of those previous years, but a lot will remain hidden if those editorships do not upload said previous years into Scielo. After uploading those previous issues, we will still have to wait around five years until we can factor in the relevance of those articles into samples of the Top 100 most read articles, for instance, since speed (velocity) is not Academia’s strength. Of course, there will always be outliers, usually those who carry what Bourdieu calls scientific power and/or temporal capital.

Scientific capital is a set of properties which are the product of acts of knowledge and recognition performed by agents engaged in the scientific field and therefore endowed with the specific categories of perception that enable them to make the pertinent distinctions, in accordance with the principle of pertinence that is constitutive of the nomos of the field (Bourdieu 2004: 55).

Basically, those who have scientific capital are those who are recognized by their peers for having authoritative knowledge that stems from his or her capacity to generate knowledge, to make ‘a distinctive contribution’ to the ‘progress of research’ within a certain discipline (Idem: 55-56). Bourdieu explains that scientific capital varies according to the originality of the scholar’s contribution, while the notion of visibility, key to the method applied in a central part of this research (the content-analysis of RBPI’s and CINT’s Top 100 most viewed articles), ‘evokes the differential value of this capital’, the temporal capital (Ibid).

The structure of power relation that constitutes the field is defined by the structure of the distribution of the two kinds of capital (temporal and scientific) that are effective in the field. Because the autonomy is never total and because the strategies of the agents engaged in the field are inseparably scientific and social, the field is the site of two kinds of scientific capital: a capital of strictly scientific authority, and a capital of power over the scientific world which can be accumulated through channels that are not purely scientific (in particular,
through the institutions it contains) and which is the bureaucratic principle of
temporal powers, deans and vice-chancellors or scientific administrators
(these temporal powers tend to be more national, linked to national institutions,
particularly those that govern the reproduction of the corps of scientists – such
as Academies, committees, research councils, etc. – whereas scientific capital
is more international) (Op Cit: 57).

This is particularly striking for this research, since those who have occupied
themselves with learning about national variants of the Theory of International
Relations, an enterprise that has been dubbed Non-Western Theory or Global IR,
usually draw to bibliometric data to find how a certain country’s IR thinks, and two of
the samples that will be triangulated with this Dissertation’s content-analysis are the
results of a survey – TRIP 2014 – and of interviews conducted with Brazil’s IR scholars
(Malinik et al 2014 ; Kristensen 2015). These samples tend to factor in the scientific
capital, and even though Kristensen (2015) draws to Bourdieu’s discussion of
symbolic power to transcend the internalist versus the externalist debate over the
sociology of knowledge, he ends up focusing on a broader version of Merton’s
internalism, which was possible because the author contemplated Bourdieu’s scientific
capital. Nonetheless, in spite of the gigantic contribution of his findings and interviews,
Kristensen does not include Bourdieu’s idea of temporal capital in Brazil’s sample,
besides downplaying what would be considered externalist in Mannheim’s terms,
macro-social factors that wield impact on how science is structured.

Chapter 3 will dig into this discussion more appropriately, but to lay down the basis of
this research it is relevant to realize that the first shortcoming is both complicated and
not. When we observe the sample of the Top 100 most viewed articles at RBPI and
CINT, and we arrange them in terms of leading authorship, we might realize that top
outliers are exactly the ones who incorporate an important dosage of temporal power.
However, a cross-sample analysis, besides an analysis of citation patterns, and of the
content of those authors’ most viewed articles suggest that most, not necessarily all,
have significant scientific capital as well.

The second shortcoming in Kristensen’s (2015) contribution is how much he bypasses
the interference of macro-political issues in the science of IR in Brazil, China and India,
above all places. To begin with, Bourdieu himself underlines that social sciences differ
from natural sciences especially in light of the behavior of their objects of study: in the
case of IR, as Merle’s sociology of IR shows, international relations (without capital
letters) have a life of their own, it is not wise, or even feasible to rule them out. *Ad absurdum*, if we ruled them out, there might still have researchers seriously discussing the great power the Ottoman Empire exerts in Eurasia.

However, even more concerning in the case of Brazil (and of India, but especially of China) is downplaying the relevance of macro-political changes to the scholars' research. Macro-political changes, argues Kristensen (2015), rarely affect the material reality of researchers. For the Swedish young, brilliant author, there would be normal conditions under which a scholar works. This could not be more inadequate to deal with IR in Brazil, and the content of RBPI from 1968 until 1979, the years when the military coup was especially repressive toward intellectuals, more than suffice to make this point. Nonetheless, there is yet another macro-social factor that directly impacts science in Brazil, and IR included: different governments have strikingly different priorities regarding investments in Higher Education in general, and in research in particular. Not only are their priorities different, but we also have to deal with a series of waxing-and-waning economic backdrops that have deeply affected the State's capacity to invest: and Brazil is a country where research institutions are concentrated in public universities.

In this unstable context, the discussion around big data is of special relevance for this Dissertation in light of what has been diagnosed as an international division of intellectual labor in IR:

> Regarding IR, I will begin with the American-partly-turned-global discipline and then briefly compare the other three national situations [Germany, France, and Britain]. Within most subfields of IR, task uncertainty is relatively low: one knows which methods, approaches, and even questions count as appropriate. (…)

In such a varied discipline, the crucial question is whether a hierarchy exists among fields. (Whitley points to a variation at equally low task uncertainty between chemistry and physics where only the latter has a hierarchy of fields, a privileging of theory, and thereby an integrative ordering of subfields.) Crucially, IR has a hierarchy of journals. The United States is a big job market with high circulation, and although a hierarchy exists among universities, the way up is through publications, so the leading journals are the most important bottleneck. (Waever 1998: 717).

IR is much less segregated [than Economics] due to the nature of the lead journals and the relationship between theory and “applied” articles. Theory articles do not as such rank higher than empirical, applied ones. On the contrary, there is a fatigue with new theories or metatheories and a premium (not least, for IO) on good tests that assist development of existing theories. However, the journals are mainly defined, structured, and to a certain extent controlled by theorists. You only become a star by doing theory. The highest citation index scores all belong to theorists. Thus, the battle among
theories/theorists defines the structure of the field, but it stimulates competition among
the subfields to make it into the leading journals.
The result is a two-tiered discipline (idem: 718).

Macro-political narratives: Brazil, Global IR and the Division of Intellectual Labor

Kristensen (2015) engages with the dividing discipline debate by mentioning Wæver
(1998), his PhD advisor, in this exact reflection (although he does not directly cite this
text), and by underlining ‘a core-periphery reading of bibliometric IR network’
(Kristensen 2015: 139). Basically, the North/West would theorize, and the South/Non-
West would apply these theories, providing the North with specific knowledge about
their own realities, while socializing IR researchers in theories produced in relation to
a different reality. As Acharya (2014) insists that Global IR must ‘explore reasons for
the underdevelopment of IR theories outside of the West, which include cultural
political, and institutional factors, when viewed against the “hegemonic” status of
established IR theories (Acharya 2014: 3)’, in the introduction we offer basic
discussions that will gain length and complexity throughout the four chapter of this
Dissertation.

A Brazilian colleague has once told me that in order to be accepted in high-impact
international journals or even to the ISA annual conventions he adopted what he cal-
led the Carmen Miranda Strategy: he would play the exotic role, one that he, as a white
male from a traditional family in Brazil, was not used to being requested to play. He
figured the West was only interested in what Non-Westerns had to say about exotic
realities that put Western theories in check, yet rarely rendering them moot. Otherwise,
we would be useless.

What is extremely curious is that this scholar’s theoretical work is based upon the
thoughts of a marginalized French philosopher, hence providing that the Global South
or Global IR are not necessarily located in nations elsewhere. Even more revealing is
that this scholar also mentioned to me in the same conversation that in Tristes
Tropiques Levi-Strauss translates what he thought of Brazilian elites: ‘[T]he tropics are
not so much exotic as out of date (Levi-Strauss 1961: 91)’. This backwardness ‘in the

---

2 Where the comparison in between cities remote from one another both historically and geographically,
certain rhythmic differences are added to the varying speeds of the cycle in question. The center of Rio
hint of a way of life’ or this attempt to adapt to whatever value exported by the Western society of reference, no matter how long that value took to be actually transferred to Brazil or even how fitting it is, might help explaining why IR in the country, a discipline populated by diplomats, sons and daughters of diplomats, middle-class worlded citizens, the intellectual elite would struggle to accept what Hélio Jaguaribe summoned: their social responsibility to develop transformative thinking aimed at their own society (Hollanda 2012).

Jaguaribe’s urge to awaken the social responsibility of an intellectual mass of citizens was institutionalized at the University of Brasilia’s (UnB) pedagogical project. Darcy Ribeiro, the idealizer and founder of UnB, diagnosed Brazil’s Higher Ed major bottleneck in the scattered structure of the few universities that actually existed. He advised that ‘in present conditions, only a brand-new university, entirely unified, could be structured in more flexible bases creating opportunities for a prompt revamp of Brazil’s Higher Ed System (Ribeiro 1961: 161-230)’. Darcy Ribeiro points out the backwardness of Brazil’s model of Higher Education by comparing it to Germany’s, Britain’s, the US, and Russia’s contemporary successful experiments in integrating their Higher Ed with modern science and technology, what Brazilians would despise based on outdated values of wisdom, refinement, erudite scholarliness: ‘[I]t is very likely that we are the only country that still wishes to graduate scientists and technology experts following the traditional model of teaching and cultivating erudition (Idem).’

Complementary to Jaguaribe’s idea of an intellectual activity submitted to the goal of national development, in accordance with the diagnosis shared by the Brazil-US Joint Commission for Economic Development, Darcy Ribeiro mentions that in the early 1960s it was high time the production of value in Brazil would transcend a primitive primary sector, one that back then demanded slim to none formal education:

is very 1900-10 in character, but elsewhere you will find yourself in quiet streets and among long avenues bordered with palm-trees, mangoes, and clipped Brazilian rosewood-trees, where old-fashioned villas stand in gardens of their own. I was reminded (as I was, later in the residential areas of Calcutta) of Nice or Biarritz in the time of Napoleon III. The tropics are not so much exotic as out of date. It’s not the vegetation which confirms that you are ‘really there’, but certain trifling architectural details and the hint of way of life which would suggest that you had gone backwards in time rather than forwards across a great part of the earth’s surface (Levi Strauss 1961: 91)
The world is entering the technological era, and now science and technical knowledge are also essential ingredients to the production of value, and dominating them is key to national autonomy. (…)

Reforming Higher Ed is thus imperative to adjust it to the imperative of graduating citizens capable of developing technology, and we cannot dismiss this urgency. The opportunity to launch, in practice, this reform has been given with the inauguration of Brasília, a city particularly constructed to embrace this project, a city that cannot go without a cultural and scientific center (Ibid).

Darcy Ribeiro outlines UnB’s primary goals:

To offer more opportunity for the formal education of Brazil’s youth; to diversify the model of scientific and technological education by institutionalizing new technical-professional guidelines that the increment of production, the expansion of services and the broadening intellectual enterprises are demanding; to contribute for Brasilia’s effective role in integrating the nation by providing the Higher Ed hub of open access to the youth all over the country and to part of Latin America’s youth, and by establishing a center for high end scientific research; to make sure Brasilia has the intellectual stature that it should carry as the capital of the country, allowing it to renew the national enterprises that as capital it would project and implement; to guarantee the new capital would be able to interact with other main cultural hubs, fostering the full development of sciences, language and arts in the whole country; to offer the three branches of government with advice in all matters of knowledge that only a university can provide; to offer the population in Brasília with a cultural perspective that liberates them from the risks of turning into a mediocre provincial town located in the most modern urban architecture of the world (Op.cit).

Ribeiro’s rationale was not a lone star. On the contrary, it had been tuning its content and capillarity in governmental institutions at least since the early 1950s. Jaguaribe’s Grupo de Itatiaia⁳, a group of intellectuals who institutionalized the Brazilian Institute for the Study of Economics, Sociology and Politics (IBESP), and who launched a publication dubbed Cadernos de Nossos Tempos are deemed a foundational experience for ISEB (Superior Institute for Brazilian Studies) and its impact over Brazil’s public policies at least until the 1980s.

Schwartzman (1981) pinpoints IBESP’s experience and the Cadernos as the roots of ‘the ideology of nationalism, one that would gain momentum in the upcoming years, and would offer a milestone for the foundation of ISEB (Schwartzman 1981).’ In light of the affiliation of this research to an effort to study IR in Brazil through the lenses of the sociology of knowledge, we should list the names of those who were part of the Grupo de Itatiaia, since they will appear as references in citations throughout our

---

³ From 1953 until 1956, IBESP gathered a group of intellectuals from São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro, such as Hélio Jaguaribe, Guerreiro Ramos, Cândido Mendes, and Nelson Werneck Sodré. Jaguaribe was the Institute’s Secretary General.
samples or as leading authors within our samples for the content- analysis of the two best ranked IR journals in Brazil’s academia.

Among others, we can outline the following members of the Group: Alberto Guerreiro Ramos, Cândido Mendes de Almeida, Carlos Luís Andrade, Cleantho de Paiva Leite, Ewaldo Correia Lima, Fábio Breves, Heitor Lima Rocha, Hélio Jaguaribe, Hermes Lima, Ignácio Rangel, Israel Klabin, João Paulo de Almeida Magalhães, José Ribeiro de Lira, Jorge Abelardo Ramos, Juvenal Osório Gomes, Moacir Félix de Oliveira, Oscar Lorenzo Fernandes, and Roland Corbisier. So we have a better grasp of the macro-political relevance of these intellectuals for Brazil’s institutions and the impact of their ideas in the Project that was defeated by a military coup in 1964 yet maintaining its influence across the military rationale and the country’s sole network of IR scholars, we may take the example of Hermes Lima, Cândido Mendes, and Cleantho de Paiva Leite.

Hermes Lima was Brazil’s Prime Minister (Sept 1962 – Jan 1963), Minister of Labor (Jul 1962 – Aug 1962); the President’s (João Goulart’s) Chief of Staff (Sept 1961 – Jul 1962), and Minister of Foreign Affairs (Sept 1962 – Jan 1963). Lima is the leading author of an article published at RBPI’s first volume in March 1958: ‘The Economic Conference of the OAS’. Also relevant are Cândido Mendes, whose university later sheltered IUPERJ, a Higher Education experiment in Political Science and IR sponsored by the Ford Foundation, and Cleantho de Paiva Leite, the director of Brazil’s Institute for International Relations (IBRI), the organization that still sponsors the best ranked IR journal in Brazil: Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional (RBPI). Paiva Leite is the leading author in four articles published through the latter: ‘The Inter-American Development Bank’ (1959); ‘The International Association for Development’ (1960); ‘Brazil-Japan: a special relationship’ (1974); ‘Brazil and the Caribbean’ (1978).

Through these examples, it might be natural to realize the group was not entirely unanimous on several issues, however they shared allegiance to a nationalism that relied on the role of the intellectual to foster a consensus among Brazil’s social classes on a minimum common denominator that was the urge to provide certain reforms so the country could overcome underdevelopment.
Authors positioned in opposite sides of a twenty-first century interpretation of right versus left wing in Brazil’s political and partisan spectrum, Schwartzman (1981) and Buarque de Hollanda (2012) see eye-to-eye on the nuanced positions of those intellectuals, even though they shared ‘a collective project dedicated to the analysis and the reform of the conditions of life in the country (Hollanda 2012: 610)’:

A concern in regard to Brazil’s underdevelopment, the search for a non-aligned international position and for a third aspiration, a nationalism related to the country’s natural resources, the professionalization of the public administration, more participation of the popular niches of society in the political life, these were, in a few words, the values that brought them together (Schwartzman 1981).

Hélio Jaguaribe’s ISEB was embraced by the structure of the Ministry of Education and Culture (MEC) in 1955, when Edgard do Rêgo Santos headed the Ministry under the transition of Getúlio Vargas’ last administration. In 1957, after being part of the President-elect Juscelino Kubitschek’s (JK) team to develop the administration’s National Guidelines for Education, Darcy Ribeiro became the director of MEC’s branch for social studies, a division of the Brazilian Center for Research on Education (CBPE), and in 1959 he was appointed to plan and implement UnB, which opened its doors in 1962 having Darcy as its president. The bulk of what was later called national-developmentalism, based on ISEB’s ideas implemented in the Higher Ed project idealized by Darcy, had thus been consciously part of Brazil’s social and political governmental goals since at least the 1950s.

Adding up to this social and political project, Celso Furtado’s scientific and temporal capitals in the field of Economics completed the puzzle that would underpin national-developmentalism. Furtado presided over the Working Group ECLA-BNDE that developed reports which served as the basis for JK’s General Policy Guidelines (Plano de Metas). In 1953, Celso Furtado briefly presided over BNDE, spending some time advancing his intellectual work in the United Kingdom, returning to Brazil in 1959 to implement the Superintendence for the Development of the Northeast (SUDENE), a product of his reflections within the book he wrote while in Europe: ‘The Economic Formation of Brazil’, also published (only in Portuguese) in 1959. In 1962, he assumed

---

4 Jaguaribe was the Secretary General of the Institute.
the position of Minister of Planification in the João Goulart administration, having
developed and attempted to implement the Tri-annual Plan for Social and Economic
Development. In 1963, he returned to the presidency of SUDENE, and in 1964,
following the military coup, he was included in the black list of people who lost their
political rights (Ato no 1, Suspende Direitos Políticos, acervoditadura.rs.gov.br).

We will witness throughout this Dissertation many authors who engage in stocktaking
practices of the constitution of the field of IR in Brazil, and its impacts in the field as
whole highlighting the importance of dependency theory not only as Brazil’s allegedly
only export theory of IR, but also as the backbone of the country’s own debate.
Developmentalism is surprisingly neglected, given its relevance in that same literature
as the engine behind Brazil’s public policies, including its foreign policy, at least since
the 1930s, when authors believe the Vargas administration implemented it or started
implementing it *avant la lettre*.

Overall, we can say that developmentalism opposes dependence and autonomy. This
is our cue to distinguish dependency from dependence. In Portuguese, they constitute
the same word, and one needs considerable contextualization to grasp possible
diversity within their meaning. Notwithstanding, in English, the two are different words
and carry different meanings. According to the Cambridge English Dictionary,
dependence is ‘the situation in which you need something or someone all the time,
especially in order to continue existing or operating.’ Dependency is defined as ‘a
country that is supported and governed by another country.’ In spite of the Dictionary’s
simplistic categorization of the latter, it does capture dependency’s need for a broader
contextualization that boarders a theorization, while dependence is delivered as a
generic noun that entails slim to none contextualization to reveal its meaning.
Dependency is strictly political. The Cambridge English Dictionary does not include
the term developmentalism. Chapter 2 will engage in a closer effort to tackle
dependency’s popularity in the Western world vis-à-vis a considerable neglect of
developmentalism.

Martínez-San Miguel et al (2016) emphasize the ‘questions of cultural and critical
translation’, taking into account
multiple moments of misunderstanding and misreading in which critical terms, or what we call keywords, circulate as disciplinary cognates, yet become particularly untranslatable as a result of their different origins in Caribbean and Latin American Studies (…) (Idem: 1).

For now, we need to understand how developmentalism enters the equation that makes up the national-developmentalist paradigm that guided macro-political variables and micro-social elements that shaped institutional, material and ideational bases for science in Brazil, IR included.

From the 1930s or, at least, the 1950s, Latin American countries adopted a successful national development strategy, namely, national developmentalism. (...) Peripheral countries, on the other hand, like Brazil and other Latin American countries that had lived through the colonial experience, remained ideologically dependent on the center after achieving their formal independence (Bresser-Pereira 2009: 1-5).

The statesman who first devised national developmentalism in Latin America was Getúlio Vargas, who governed Brazil in 1930–45 and 1950–4. On the other hand, the notable Latin American economists, sociologists, political scientists and philosophers who formulated this strategy in the 1950s came together in the Economic Commission for Latin America and Caribbean (ECLAC) in Santiago, Chile, and in Instituto Superior de Estudos Brasileiros (ISEB) in Rio de Janeiro. They developed a theory of underdevelopment and a nationalist view of economic development based on the critique of imperialism or of “the center–periphery relation” – a euphemism proper to public intellectuals associated with an organization of the United Nations. Latin American economists, among them Raúl Prebisch, Celso Furtado, Osvaldo Sunkel and Ignacio Rangel, drew on the classical political economy of Adam Smith and Karl Marx, the macroeconomics of John Maynard Keynes and Michael Kalecki, and the new ideas of the development economics school (of which they were part) to form the Latin American structuralist school (Idem: 6-7).

Bresser-Pereira (2009) discusses what he calls old/national and new developmentalism, and briefly spoon-feeds us the core difference between developmentalism and dependency. Bresser also shares with us how ISEB’s nationalism was intellectually compatible with developmentalism. So far, in this research, the old/national developmentalism is of our interest.

Both late-developing central countries and former colonies needed to formulate national development strategies, but the task was easier for the former. For peripheral countries, there was the additional hurdle of facing their own “dependency”, that is, the subordination of local elites to central countries’ elites [here we can realize how Bresser introduces the difference between developmentalism and dependency]. The structuralist social scientists who participated in national developmentalism in Latin America did not ignore this phenomenon, but assumed that economic development was characterized by a division between the progressive or nationalist elite associated with industrialization, and the conservative elite associated with the primary exports model that prevailed before 1930 (Ibid: 1-5).

The central elements of structuralism were the critique of the law of comparative advantage in international trade, the dualist character of
underdeveloped economies with unlimited supplies of labor, and the role of the state in producing forced savings and directly investing in key industries. National developmentalism was not an economic theory but a national development strategy based on the assumption that markets are effective in resource allocation in so far as they are combined with economic planning and the constitution of state-owned enterprises. It was a strategy sponsored in one way or another by industrialists, the public bureaucracies and urban workers. It faced intellectual opposition from neoclassical or monetarist economists and political opposition from the liberal middle classes and the old oligarchy whose interests were based on the export of primary goods (Op Cit: 6-7).

Cardoso (1977) himself, one of the fathers of dependency, and others state that dependency, unlike developmentalism, was not simply a political project, but had scientific concerns that explain its visibility, as well as its scientific validation in the Western world. Again, this will be better discussed in chapter 2, but since we are presenting how national developmentalism came together as a social sciences paradigm that epitomizes the overlap among macro-political and micro-social elements of science in Brazil, we shall investigate how developmentalism validates itself as knowledge, as Furtado (1982) introduces how Prebisch devised developmentalism as a theory under the guise of the social sciences:

The study of development, by leading to a gradual rapprochement of the theory of accumulation with the theory of social stratification and the theory of power, finds its place at a strategic point where the various social science disciplines converge. Early ideas on economic development, defined as an increase in the flow of goods and services that was more rapid than population growth, have been gradually replaced by others, which are linked to a complex of social changes that acquire meaning with reference to an implicit or explicit system of values. Measuring a flow of goods and services is an operation that has specific meaning only when such goods and services are related to the satisfaction of objectively defined human needs, that is to say which can be identified independently of existing social inequalities. Ambiguity will, however, always exist in any attempt to reduce to a common denominator expenditures by the different groups of a non-egalitarian society, or in any attempt to compare increases or reductions in inequalities.

Prebisch's starting-point was a criticism of the system of the international division of labor and the theory of international trade based on the concept of comparative advantages, the validity of which was still uncontested in the academic world. One of the corollaries of this theory was that international trade not only provided an 'engine of growth'—it enabled all participating countries to make more rational use of their own resources—but was also a factor in reducing inequalities in living standards as between countries, since it eliminated some of the negative effects brought about by the lack of complementarity of the available factors. Yet the empirical data on the long-term behavior of prices in international markets by no means confirmed these forecasts. Such evidence as existed was the other way around, i.e. it pointed towards the concentration of income in the hands of countries having the highest level of income. Prebisch brought the problem out of the abstract context of theorems of comparative advantages (an exercise in logic in which
the conclusions are implicit in the premises) into the context of social structures, within which costs are worked out and surpluses appropriated. The difficulty of bringing down money wages in industrial economies was pointed out by Keynes, who ascribed it to the vigor of trade-unionism. But the situation was different in countries that exported primary products, a theme that was shortly to be linked to the theory of the structural surplus of labor. Thus there is a structural tendency in the capitalist system towards concentrating income for the benefit of countries that have a more advanced form of social organization on. Disparities in the rate of accumulation, because in part of the system of the international division of labor and its impact on social structures, have produced a structural heterogeneity in the capitalist system that cannot be ignored in any study of international relations. Thus underdevelopment came to be regarded not as a stage on the road to development, but as a permanent structural feature (Furtado 1982: 78-80).

It is not hard to realize that Furtado and Prebisch had political, as well as theoretical concerns when they constructed developmentalism. Furtado actually acknowledges and debates Western authoritative knowledge such as Keynes’ perspectives, in a clear effort to bring developmentalism into the Western debate. Hence, while Lima (2015) borrows Jessé de Souza’s Theory of Emotional Action ‘to explore this Brazilian epistemology and still be able to overcome the theoretical and methodological insufficiencies of the literature that seeks to understand the way security has been thought in Brazil [in Brazil’s IR] (Idem: 9)’, this Dissertation would rather retrace the macro-political and the micro-social aspects that surround the institutionalization of IR in Brazil.

Instead of assuming a certain set of ideas underpin the way Brazilians create knowledge in all sciences, and also in IR – in the authors’ case Gilberto Freyre’s Casa Grande & Senzala, published in 1933, and Sérgio Buarque de Holanda’s Raízes do Brasil, published in 1936, are this set of ideas -, this research intends to provide a macro-political and a micro-social background against which Brazil’s IR produced, and still produce, theoretical content that might represent a contribution to IRT. Indeed, Lima (2015) states that she sees eye to eye with Jessé de Souza when he dubs ‘Theory of Emotional Action’ the only ‘one body of thought that is cohesive enough to be called ‘theory’ in Brazil (Ibid: 8). I do not seek to discuss the problems of both Jessé’s and Lima’s understanding of Freyre’s and Buarque de Holanda’s books, let alone their shortcomings when they preach a belief that together ‘[T]hey established a specific epistemology of social thought in Brazil by producing the first positive perceptions of Brazilian identity.’ (Op cit: 9). However, I can easily say that Lima (Op cit) does confuse theory and paradigm, as she continues:

This paradigm [the specific epistemology of social thought in Brazil] found both reason and popularity in the 1930s in Brazil due to its ontological claims about
Brazilian identity. As a theory [or a paradigm?], the TEA describes as essentialized Brazilian identity as the most basic structuring concept around which processes take shape, actors interact and history unravels. As such, these assumptions about Brazilian identity have been the only basis to inform social theorizing in Brazil for the better part of the last eight decades (Op cit: 10).

Lima goes on to agree with Jessé de Souza’s assumption that this theory/paradigm is consensual among people who affiliate to right and left wing ways of thinking society, politics, and the economy. She believes that the military and the security thoughts produced in Brazil are also embedded in this theory, and this is how she reads and interprets the texts that conform what she proposes as Brazil’s contribution to the study of international security.

Tweaking Kristensen’s (2015a) relatively narrow use of the new sociology of science, this research avoids presuming there is ‘an essentialized Brazilian identity as the most basic structuring concept around which processes take shape, actors interact and history unravels’ assumptions that would ‘have been the only basis to inform social theorizing in Brazil for the better part of the eight decades (Lima 2015: 8-9).’ This is a methodological position of mine, but also once again a critique regarding the secularization of micro-social elements from macro-political factors in analyses of how any science, but particularly social sciences, IR included, yield intellectual contributions in Brazil, since Lima like Kristensen praises that

By analyzing the core of these ideas on identity independently from political and professional affiliation, Souza was able to trace the roots of contemporary social theorizing and to understand it as a set of ideas that have permeated both left and right wings as well as civilian and military thought (Idem: 9).

In this Introduction alone, the reader will be able to grasp at least two paradigms that emerge from a narrative of the macro-political and the micro-social features that are co-constitutive of Brazil’s IR material and ideational context, as well as of its institutionalization. In the next few paragraphs, we will further cement the institutional and paradigmatic compatibilities that adjudicated national developmentalism as a scientific and a political paradigm for social sciences. Afterwards, we will introduce another macro-political and micro-social reality that has simultaneously impacted the institutionalization of IR and its material and ideational sources in Brazil.

In 1962, Darcy went back to the government, assuming the position of MEC under João Goulart’s administration, when Furtado was the Minister of Planification, and ISEB was institutionally sheltered by the Ministry of Education. It is easy to realize how
Jaguaribe and Darcy Ribeiro were not only contemporary but also part of the same State project. In fact, after Ribeiro’s decease, Fernando Henrique Cardoso himself boasted his 40-years friendship with Darcy, a liaison he attributes to his brother-in-law’s having co-worked with Darcy Ribeiro at *Museu do Índio* in Rio de Janeiro:

He used to stay over at my father’s place in Arpoador, *Posto 7*, to enjoy the beach, occasions in which we talked, had heated discussions. Back then, he was married to Berta [Gleizer Ribeiro], I remember his house in the less well-off neighborhoods of Rio de Janeiro, a pleasant, modest home.

Afterwards, life antagonized us, we had a schism over the University of Brasilia. He wanted to move all the University of São Paulo’s (USP) sociologists to UnB, and I did not want to move, and he broke up with the paulistas. (…)

Here, it demands an interruption in the reproduction of the former President’s memoirs, so we clarify his implicit assumption that his choice not to collaborate with Darcy Ribeiro’s project at UnB was central or even connected to Ribeiro’s schism with USP’s sociologists. In 1961, Cardoso had just defended a not-so-celebrated PhD about capitalism and slavery, moving to France to continue his studies, returning to Brazil only in 1963, when he became a lecturer at USP.

Since Darcy Ribeiro (and Anísio Teixeira) saw at UnB an opportunity to modernize Brazil’s Higher Education, it is not unlikely that they invited USP’s sociologists to integrate the university’s faculty. Nonetheless, Florestan Fernandes, one of the most prestigious sociologists in Brazil now and then, the leading sociologist at USP, who was Cardoso’s supervisor during the latter’s PhD, had already ‘broken up’ with Darcy Ribeiro. Their schism even had media coverage, as they diverged regarding the content of JK’s administration National Guidelines for Education back in 1959. Additionally, Nogueira (2010 outlines basic distinctions between the content of the work of those two public intellectuals:

For Darcy Ribeiro (1969, 1978, 1995), the prevalence of social exclusion in Brazil’s society happens because there is not engagement in a project that represents the authenticity of the people, what carries a language of affection especially through the notion of solidarity. Hence nationalism is key to Ribeiro’s political project as a way to overcome exclusion and to project into Brazilian politics the singularity of the spirit of the people.

In Florestan Fernandes (1978, 1979a, 1979b), social exclusion happens when decision-making and politics are restricted to a minority, creating an illusion of democracy and citizenship. Only through the access of the people to politics and to decision-making, through their insertion in the political landscape, would Brazil overcome underdevelopment (Nogueira 2010:91).
In an interview, Darcy Ribeiro provides more substance for us to grasp their schism in 1959. In the 1940s, they had both studied Sociology at USP. Ribeiro relates the seminars offered by such scholars as Levi Strauss with the unprecedented scientific skills himself and Florestan Fernandes had developed. He says that, back then, Florestan was eager to prove that functionalism could be exercised through the investigation of primary sources, and, says Darcy:

He wanted to master the documents, the literature, he even wrote an exceptional book about the social organization of the Tupinambás. He focused on the reconstitution of what the Tupinambás were and wrote a brilliant piece. Myself, on the contrary, focused on reality to study the originary populations. 

(…)

What Florestan wrote based on paper, I wanted to write based on an actual tribe (Benzi and Fajardo 1997: 164).

Darcy Ribeiro swiftly cites what appears to be a superficial collaboration with a young Cardoso, then a PhD candidate, in the late 1950s, when the latter was research assistant to Florestan Fernandes – UNESCO had funded a project to study the dynamics behind the presence of the black population in São Paulo, a project that, alleges Darcy, was very useful to bring down any possibility of ratifying Gilberto Freyre’s thesis of Brazil’s racial democracy (Benzi and Fajardo 1997: 187). It might be the case that, in March 24 1961, when Darcy Ribeiro got the green light to implement the project of UnB, as Cardoso was wrapping up his PhD at USP, the former invited the young sociologist to go to Brasília - Darcy did it with others, such as Ruy Mauro Marini, who accepted the invitation. Nonetheless, it is unlikely that Darcy Ribeiro ‘broke up’ with all of USP’s sociologists because Cardoso, all of them or some part of them did not want to move to Brasília; if they actually definitively split up in that occasion, the schism was considerable more complex in light of the pre-existing very public rift Ribeiro and the chief-sociologist at USP had shared in 1959.

The deconstruction of Cardoso’s narrative is of relevance to this Dissertation in light of the distance between what scholars who research Brazil’s contribution to IRT claim to be the merit of Cardoso’s version of dependency theory and what any grounded analysis actually provides. A significant measure of temporal capital surrounds the intellectual work of Cardoso and precedes the publication and the consumption of his version of dependency theory, what could be assumed as the consolidation of his scientific capital.
In the 1950s, even before he had a PhD, he was assistant editor for a Marxist journal sponsored by the Communist Party to which he was never affiliated. In 1954, he became the youngest ever alumnus to be elected to represent the alumni of the Sociology department at USP’s University Committee. Also before receiving the PhD degree, Florestan Fernandes, to whom he was assistant researcher thence 1955, Cardoso lectured at USP’s Economics department, besides being assistant lecturer teaching a class on Sociology at USP’s Philosophy department.

Right after finishing his PhD, Florestan integrated Cardoso in the direction of the Center for Industrial and Labor Sociology, founded by Fernandes himself and Alain Touraine in 1962. In 1964, it is of utter relevance to underscore that Cardoso left Brazil on self-exile, and, unlike the majority of other colleagues, he was neither arrested nor tortured, having arranged for international mobility before the regime’s audience that would result in Florestan Fernandes' arrest – the State political law suit against Cardoso later absolved him (Borsari and Pomar 2004:29). Having left Brazil in self-exile, Cardoso was part of ECLA, and assistant director of the Latin American Institute for Social and Economic Planification’s (ILPES) social division, this was a period when he taught in Chile, Argentina, Mexico, and France, returning to Brazil to occupy the position of full professor at USP’s political science department, from where he was compulsorily retired after the December 13th 1968 institutional act number five, the IA that institutionalized repression and censorship.

His temporal capital is also evident, and so is its bias when in 1969 Ford Foundation invested in Cardoso’s enterprise to found a Brazilian Center for Planning and Analysis (Cebrap) in São Paulo. Let us be reminded that Ford Foundation (Chaves 2015; MEC-USAID Accords 1968) was one of the US Foreign Policy tools to bargain with South American governments, and since the USA was the primary geopolitical and ideological guarantee of the military coup in Brazil, it is to be noted that Cardoso was not deemed a pariah at least in relative terms.

Florestan Fernandes, who had also been fired from USP, sought institutional asylum at São Paulo’s Pontifical Catholic University (PUCSP), and did not take part in Cebrap. Funded by the Ford Foundation, in the immediate following years Cardoso was awarded honoris causa in more than 20 universities across the USA and Europe, including Cambridge, and Oxford. In 1971, he became a member of Flacso’s and
Clacso’s governing councils (Verbete, CARDOSO, Fernando Henrique, fgv.br/cpdoc). Cardoso only developed dependency theory after having accumulated temporal capital. His co-authored book with Faletto is published in 1969, the year Cebrap was inaugurated. This amount of temporal capital might help explaining why scholars tend to assume studying Cardoso suffices to fully grasp Latin America’s scientific capital produced during the Cold War.

The narrative that tends to prevail among social scientists, including in the field of IR, in Brazil and elsewhere is frequently the one provided by Cardoso, leading to a series of scientific malpractices that have been claimed to shape academic urban legends. This matter will be tackled in a few pages ahead. For now, we have realized that the Nation-State project envisioned by Darcy Ribeiro, institutionalized at UnB – home to Brazil’s first experience in teaching and researching IR -, and the nationalism of those who are the basis for ISEB’s activity in the public arena, the Grupo de Itatiaia, are consistent with one another. Moreover, we have realized they were consciously combined in Brazil’s governmental and academic structures to form what is known as national-developmentalism.

What is supposed to be crystal clear to our reader until now is that in Brazil the macro-political features of science exert direct impact over the intellectual and social organization of all social sciences, IR included. Not only the classic externalist variable, the behavior of the object of study itself, but also contextual political, economic, and social phenomena wield significant impact in the content of what is produced in Academia. Hence, the micro-social elements of science, basically the components of Bourdieu’s scientific and temporal capitals, should not be isolated from macro-political matters, otherwise the analysis will necessarily miss several explanatory variables.

Furthermore, it is possible to assume Brazilian decision-makers and intellectuals were well aware of the shortcomings of the country’s Higher Education, and that even those who were labeled communists under the military dictatorship had nationalist concerns regarding the modernization of the Higher Ed system and the professionalization of the public administration that were not at all different from what the military regime had in mind. So far, thus, we have realized that the project of Nation-State envisioned by Darcy Ribeiro, institutionalized at UnB – home to Brazil’s first experience in teaching
and researching IR -, and the nationalism of those who are the basis for ISEB’s activity in the public arena, the Grupo de Itatiaia – whose members, some of them, were frequent authors at RBPI during its first years, and in the 1980s, after the 1979 amnesty legislation.

Also, these nationalist projects sought to ride out a structure of social injustice that they thought constrained the country’s opportunity to embark in the productive and scientific revolutions going on around the world. Transforming the social, political and economic conditions that stalled both social justice and the country’s actual independence from different forms of colonialism were at the core of Darcy Ribeiro’s and ISEB’s thinking. Their notion of breaking free and of autonomy found in Furtado’s scientific and temporal capital the hook to shape what can be recognized as a paradigm: national-developmentalism. In fact, one of Brazil’s IR most read authors does classify national-developmentalism as one of Brazil’s paradigmatic contributions to how to think international relations – he (Amado Cervo) avoids assuming to be fostering a Brazilian IRT.

The bases for a robust sociology of Brazilian IR – the history of the institutional and material organization of science in Brazil through the Catholic spiritual project

As previously introduced, this research bridges gaps among macro-political and micro-social elements that constitute political narratives, as well as institutional and material bases for the development of the field of IR in Brazil. Exploring the history of UnB led us to what can be considered a paradigm whose intersectionality involves economists, sociologists, and historians, law experts, to name the core of the intellectual affiliation of those central scholars to the formation of national developmentalism. It is interesting to notice that the sociology of IR in Brazil is attuned to the institutional development of IR in the West, even though universities were only beginning to be consolidated.

Formal knowledge produced through systematic enquiry [ISEB; CEPAL; IBRI], and disseminated largely through publication in scientific and technological journals [Cadernos do Nosso Tempo; RBPI], is increasingly being seen as an economic resource that can be, and should be, organized and controlled by states and firms. (…) Consequently, their organization and development have become significant objects of state policies and management (2000: ix).

Whitley’s analysis and framework does include ‘critical factors in national research systems that continue to generate significant variations in the organization of
knowledge (Idem: x)’, however, the author’s ‘analytical framework for comparing scientific fields as particular kinds of organizations, reputational work organizations, and providing reasons for their similarities and differences (Ibid)’ is based upon the national realities in the USA, in Germany, and in Japan. As we will present in the following paragraphs, the diversified institutionalization of intellectual groupings was not a ‘genuinely novel development (Op Cit). ‘[n]ew institutionalism as a distinct specialism in organization studies’ of science already took place in Brazil at least since the 1800s, when we would find, for instance, the Brazilian Institute for the Study of History and of Geography (IHGB), to mention what, alongside with the Brazilian Literary Society (Academia Brasileira de Letras - ABL), was perhaps the one that lasted longer, there was already a variety of institutions that gathered intellectuals from different fields. In 1924, IHGB was nominated for a Nobel Peace Prize by a member of the International Court Arbitration at The Hague (Nomination Database, nobelprize.org)\(^5\).

Whitley, nonetheless, draws our attention to the fact that ‘the attempt to establish the new institutionalism as a distinct specialism in organization studies are probably more a result of the dominant form of intellectual competition in the post-war US social sciences (Op Cit)’. Hence, even though there were relatively few Higher Ed experiments in the form of Universities in Brazil, we can also find in the post-WWII, a proliferation of new institutions that gathered intellectuals with different specializations and that were either encompassed, sponsored, regulated or created by the State.

These institutions will be explored throughout this Dissertation as the loci where Brazilian reflections upon international relations flourished and gave way to the institutionalization of the field in the country, and to a Brazilian contribution to IRT. The post-war boom of intellectual organizations was indeed accompanied by state policies and management, and the foundation of Capes, as well as of CNPq are hereby introduced in their macro-political and micro-social overlapping features.

In the 1950s, the [social, political, and economic] dynamics asks for the consolidation [of the country’s economic growth and national identity] in two different yet complementary dimensions: the first regards the mechanisms of the process of organization of a society articulated and visible in the consolidation of the Brazilian State, identifying (…) contextual interests and political forces; while the second dimension situates the social and political

---

\(^5\) The motivation for the Institute’s nomination is not included in the database.
Hence, the material conditions of Brazil’s economic development were substantial for the foundation of a commission that would coordinate post-grad studies in a way that mobilizes intellectual capital toward the country’s economic development and consolidation of a national identity. The constitution or the stabilization of the Nation State is at the core of the macro-political narrative and of the micro-social motivations for the institutionalization of intellectual work in Brazil. The paradigm of national-developmentalism certainly points to a similar importance offered to the concept by those who have founded RBPI and IRel.

At the core of the institutionalization of science in Brazil, the project of consolidating a Nation State through the management of intellectual contributions to the country’s development is entrenched in the foundation of Capes and of CNPq, and so is Brazil’s reactions to the dynamics international relations, particularly to US Foreign Policy.

Capes was created in December 1951. Among its main goals was to ‘secure the supply of specialized personnel in quantity and quality sufficient enough to attend to the public and private enterprises aiming at the country’s development’ (História e Missão, capes.gov.br). It literally states that another main goal was to ‘restart the project of creating a developed and independent nation’ (Idem), offering the intellectual capital for the ‘industrialization and the complexity of the public administration’ (Ibid). While the process of industrialization and the increasing complex aspects of the public administration were indeed a bottleneck for the country’s development, international relations played an important role in the foundation of Capes and later on a strategic one in the creation of CNPq.

Capes would thenceforth focus its efforts in providing an institutional framework for the assessment and evaluation of post-grad programs in the country, besides providing material incentives through grants and fellowships for the country’s intellectual development. The Abbink Mission (1948-1959) and the Brazil-USA Joint Commission for Economic Development (1950-1952) were both influential to the institutionalization of development promotion policies by the State. While the former is in the origins of BNDES, the latter helps explaining the State’s efforts in fostering the micro-social structures for scientific developments in Brazil.
The demise of the high society, rural and feudal, from the monarchical era — when undoubtedly notable statesman and public servants were produced — and the emergence of new groups of political and economic power were not matched by a swift modernization of the relationship among education, technology and government. Education remained aimed at assuring social status, instead of emphasizing technical training (...). Governmental practices remained highly personal and paternalistic, and all social groups revealed themselves anxious for governmental support and protection.

The fact that only now is contemplated a horizon of scarcity following the depletion of the soil, alongside with the indifference regarding technological increments in the agricultural production explain the permanence of agricultural methods unbelievable primitive and harmful to the soil.

(...) Not rarely, Brazilians bypass technical and economic considerations in favor of a personal or partisan political interest (Report of the Brazil-USA Joint Commission, centrocelsofurtado.org.br: 300-301).

The bulk of the Joint Commission’s work took place in 1951, since it was founded in December 1950, and in April 1952 talks regarding its closure established December 1952 as the deadlines not in light of work to be done, but for political reasons – Vargas believed the Commission was symbolic of the US willingness to engender efforts to promote development in Brazil, and in Latin America, as a source of hemispheric security, a move the President made after the relative neglect of the region in light of the Marshall Plan (Cervo and Bueno 2002: 273-283; Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, The United Nations, The Western Hemisphere, Volume II, history.state.gov: 1184-1190). The Commission’s diagnoses were contemporary to the foundation of Capes and CNPq, and a lot of the language used in the report is emulated at Capes’ and CNPq’s official statements on their history and mission. Hence, macro-political features and micro-social elements for institutional and material conditions for making science are in sync in Brazil, what lends them significant instability. There nearly is normal conditions or standard conditions in Brazilian science, and in the field of IR it is no different.

While Andrade and Santos (2013: 144) interpret the creation of Brazil’s National Council for Research (CNPq), also in 1951, as an attempt to to keep up with the Western (USA, Canada and Western Europe) investments in research for science and technology ‘so that the economic development was accelerated, and the political-military capabilities amplified (Idem)’, Cervo and Bueno (2002) mention that the foundation of CNPq represented an alternative to the US boycott of Brazil’s development of nuclear technology:
CNPq, presided over by Admiral Alvaro Alberto secretly negotiated the purchase of three ultra-centrifuges for the fissure of uranium 235 (U-235) from German private companies for 80 thousand US dollars in Jan 1954 (Cervo and Bueno 2002: 283).

They however underline that Brazil would never actually receive the products, since the Western occupation of Germany did not allow their industries to produce this type of technology, and even after the occupation, in 1955,

‘the purchase was not delivered for reasons not entirely clear, but that could be related to CNPq’s imprecise definition in regard to the speed of the engine, as well as to the incompatibility of the uranium ordered (Idem)’

Andrade and Santos (2013: 144), nonetheless, also argue that, during Admiral Alvaro Alberto’s tenure, there was a sole focus on the development of nuclear capabilities, what entailed a preferential treatment to the field of Physics, and ended up fostering significant resentment among the representatives of other fields within the Council’s Deliberative Committee.

To illustrate the impact of the volatility of the macro-social context to the development of science, in 1955, less than a year after the creation of CNPq, it lost its protagonist role over its main activity, the development of nuclear technology, having also lost the larger percentage of its budget (Cervo and Bueno 2002: 287). Then, other sciences could even get an equal distribution of the budget, but the result would be even less favorable than the previous reality.

The foundation of UnB represented a watershed in Brazil’s post-WWII system of Higher Education. It was a product of a debate that transcended discussions about public policies toward Education. It was deeply embedded in a paradigm, the national-developmental, that intended to take Brazil out of the condition of underdevelopment through several strategies, and one of them was the investment in a system of Higher Education that value sciences with more direct impact on technological development as long as those scientists were aware of their social responsibility in regard to overcoming the capitalist-communist duality in favor of a nationalist project that would provide all classes, races and genders with a minimum common denominator, the development of the country.

Social scientists in general were hence key in this project, and no matter their ideological path, what mattered was their conscience over their social responsibility.
Their individual rights would be inviolable inasmuch as their collective action added up to a process of autonomy from semi-colonialist mentalities who were to blame for Brazil’s economic shortcomings. The capitalist structure that would hinder the country’s development was not considered enough of an explanation for the level and characteristics of the country’s underdevelopment, the national-developmentalist paradigm had the State as the agent most capable of providing change domestically and internationally, but its protagonist role would depend on the nationalism of the classes that conformed its social, political, and economic reality.

This paradigm and its rationale over the nature of Higher Education in Brazil was, as expected, a product of a debate whose inaugural literature was published in the 1920s, 1930s, and 1940s. It was in this context that the Brazilian Institute of International Relations (IBRI) was founded in 1954, embedding the Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional (RBPI) since 1958. A more detailed micro-social account of the creation of the institution and of the academic journal will be discussed later in this Dissertation. At this point, it is important to understand the macro-political and micro-social dynamics underlying the foundation of IBRI. Almeida (2004) presents that IBRI was the product of Itamaraty’s goal to gather public intellectuals, politicians, and diplomats seeking to democratize the Ministry’s decision-making process, constituted as a cultural enterprise to promote incentives to the study of important matters for the Brazilian state.

The broader macro-political context, however, allows us to infer that IBRI represented an attempt by Itamaraty to concentrate debates about international relations in times when Brazil’s War College (ESG) had been founded in 1949, ISEB, in 1955, and when IBAD, IPES, and ADEP would also be constituted, all of them gathering people who had political clout and were, within those institutions, discussing diplomacy, foreign policy, the international system, matters of the international reality that were already within Itamaraty’s agenda, and others that would come to be significantly in light of those exact debates.

The contextualization of Brazil’s foreign policy within the context of the Cold War and of the development associated to transnational financial flows counted with the support of two currents: the thought that guided ESG’s behavior throughout the military dictatorship, largely based on the geopolitical rationale by Golbery do Couto e Silva, as they presupposed alliance with the US, the defense of the Cristian Western Civilization and the Portuguese-
Cervo and Bueno depict a polarized scenario that might not have been that conspirational, even though there was a military-civilian conspiration that counted with Operation Brother Sam to perform a coup d’État in 1964. However, the ideological division they describe is rather revealing, and might help explaining why Itamaraty chose to create IBRI and RBPI in an effort to keep its virtual monopoly over international relations issues in Brazil. Illustrative of how Itamaraty tried to centralize the debate within its initiative it RBPI’s first issue. In this issue, they had an article from Raul Fernandes, Minister of External Relations to a right wing-prone foreign policy, and by Hermes Lima, who would be Minister of External Relations during the left wing-prone Independent Foreign Policy. Moreover, if, on the one hand, in their second issue still in 1958, they published an article by Bezerra de Menezes, a Brazilian Africanist whose work is said to have inspire the African turn of the Independent Foreign Policy, on the other hand, in 1961’s first issue, they published an article by Alceu Amoroso Lima, one of the father of the intellectual current that, within the macro-political and micro-social narratives that surround the institutionalization of IR in Brazil, was the exact counter-point to national developmentalism, not only politically, but also, and most importantly, philosophically.

The intellectual counter-point to the national developmentalist paradigm, and to the intellectual current that dominated RBPI’s publications until 1964 in light of Itamaraty’s own guidelines, ‘the authoritarian nationalist rationale’ had been institutionally developing since the 1920s (Fausto 2001). Within this strand, there would be three intellectuals whose ideas matter the most to our research at this point: Jackson de Figueiredo, Alceu de Amoroso Lima, and Francisco Campos. The authoritarian nationalist rationale had a catholic strand, represented by Amoroso Lima and Jackson de Figueiredo.

Overall, they held a spiritual interpretation of history hence their diagnosis of Brazil’s shortcomings. They sought to reinforce family values, they condemned the civil acceptance of the divorce, and pressured for the civil recognition of religious
marriages, and, most of all, in order to achieve social consensus over these issues, learning religion in schools should be compulsory. During his first tenure in Vargas’ administration, when Campos was Minister of Education and Health (1932-1934), in spite of other beliefs, he projected the educational reform, and endorsed the Catholic project. The success of this project, epitomized with the inauguration of the Pontifical Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro⁶ (PUC-Rio) in 1941, can be traced back not only to Campos’ role, but also to the Electoral Catholic League, founded in 1932, ‘that yielded considerable influence in the elections for the Constitutional Assembly of 1933-34, and, later on, in the elections that re-democratized the country [in 1945-46] (Fausto 2001: 66).’

The League’s main goals were to bring awareness to the Catholic population of the country’s political problems, mobilizing them to pressure parties and candidates to commit their vote to the dogmas of the Catholic Church in fundamental matters such as religion, family, and education (Idem: 67).

The League managed to create an organic support for its positions within the authoritarian government of Vargas who had already realized the leverage of flirting with Catholicism, when right after he took power in 1930 he threw ‘a symbolic spectacle for the inauguration of the statue of Christ, the Redeemer in Corcovado, and by early on introducing the facultative study of religion in public schools (Ibid: 66).’

PUC-Rio was the first private higher education institution in the country, created by the Catholic Church. It was founded in 1940 by Cardinal D. Sebastião Leme and Father Leonel Franca S. J.

Beyond providing education, PUC-Rio undertook the task of assisting the community, based on Christian ethical values, solidarity and human respect. It represents a space for achievement, overcoming challenges and development of its students [sic].

The university operates under the supervision of the Society of Jesus [the Jesuitas] and under the supreme authority of the Cardinal Archbishop of Rio de Janeiro as its Grand Chancellor.

PUC-Rio is a non-profit philanthropic institution.

It is thus a Catholic university based in Christian humanistic principles.

---

⁶ The title of a Pontifical institution was only conceded in 1946 by the Vatican.
It welcomes students, staff members, teachers, researchers and administrators of all religions, nationalities, ethnic groups and social classes.

The referential starting-point of PUC-Rio is the complete development of the human being in two main perspectives: the philosophical and the theological. Besides that, it is a doctoral research institution that focuses primarily in the development of academic and scientific knowledge.

PUC-Rio is, above all, a community of people, teachers, students and staff members united by a common interest in seeking the truth and acting in accordance with the needs of the society and with the ever-changing world around us (History And Mission, puc-rio.br).

This description has been reproduced from PUC-Rio’s website 2016 update, accessed again Nov 2017. Schwartzman (1982), Boris Fausto (2001), and CPDOC (PUC, cpdoc.fgv.br) helps us further trace the macro-political and the micro-social aspects of its foundation that nests one of Brazil’s IR’s most prominent Departments, IRI, and its academic publication, CINT, the second best-rated IR publication in Brazil.

To begin the appreciation of this other macro-political and micro-social reality that is also representative of how IR was constituted institutionally, materially, and ideationally in Brazil, we will briefly go back to how the new sociology of science approaches the role of struggles to the development of a field.

Kristensen sums up this new sociology of science in three trends: ‘a general rejection of the divide between the science-internal and science-external spheres; a contextualist and localist point of departure; and struggles for position and attention in the intellectual field as a driver of innovation (Idem: 26).’ All of these have been directly and indirectly tackled throughout this introduction, including the latter. Nonetheless, since these struggles are central to Kristensen’s narrative of Brazil’s IR through his interviews, and following the different macro-political and micro-social spheres upon which IR was born at IRI PUC-Rio, home to one this research’s most important samples, CINT, the upcoming paragraphs will emphasize, wherever possible and
appropriate, tensions between the project that led to IRel, UnB, and RBPI, and the one that led to IRI, PUC-Rio, and CINT.

There is a historical, underlying tension between the two micro-social experiments that is of a political nature. In this case, by political we also mean economic. This might mark the emergence of the political economic divide we find among IR authors in Brazil, especially among those who deal with matters of Brazilian Foreign Policy or Brazilian diplomacy. The introduction of developmentalism, and allegedly of dependency theory as theoretical contributions of Brazil’s IR could be justified through these primary struggles. Kristensen (2015a) neglects these, and so does Lima (2015). The former presents findings that are comparable, in light of his methodological delimitation, while the latter tends to offer a narrative that can hardly be comparable or replicated. The author herself recognizes her choices as a product of her personal experiences, hence a narrative that could as well be an essay, what explains why her findings are not encompassed in this Dissertation’s triangulation.

The macro-political context in which PUC-Rio was created is one of an authoritarian regime during its most authoritarian period. This would not necessarily reflect the University’s intellectual aspirations and guidelines, except that the authoritarian nationalist rationale that sustained Vargas’ regime, and still inspire the middle class and the high society in Brazil (Hollanda 2012) were attuned with the Catholic project.

Brazil’s authoritarian nationalism rivaled Liberalism on its social, political and economic facets, and blamed it for the incursion of Marxism in the country’s society. The Catholic thought had a spiritual explanation for what those Catholic intellectuals identified as the moral degradation of society, hence the economic and political crisis. The 1891 Constitution, inspired by Comte’s positivist ideas, had handled political power in Brazil to a class of citizens that was by law prohibited from taking into consideration their unequivocal Catholic identity, and who were also a product of the society’s distance from its Catholic’s roots, since not only the Church-Monarchy schism in the 1870s, but also since Marquis of Pombal’s reforms in the 18th century that had kicked out the Company of Jesus, then central to the country’s educational system, from the then-Portuguese colony (Schwartzman 1981; Fausto 2001).
At a glance, this might sound ludicrous, but there are several discourses from Jackson Figueiredo, Alceu Amoroso Lima, Father Leonel Franca, and D. Sebastião Leme, the core personnel that institutionalized the Catholic project, that tell this story. The process of institutionalization of this project also confirms this narrative. Center D. Vital, founded in 1922 to provide a safe space for Catholic intellectuals, was named in honor of the Archbishop that had picked the fight with the Monarchy, and the Company of Jesus, the Jesuítas, were precisely the group summoned to implement the Catholic Academic Institute (1932) project into a group of Colleges (1941) and a University (1946), the Pontifical Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro, that is still run by the Company.

Against the Western way of believing in science, and devout to the education of an elite whose philosophical and theological excellence would provide the skills necessary to run the nation toward the end of a series of political and economic crisis, Schwartzman (1981) brings us the words of Alceu Amoroso Lima to explain the Catholic intellectuals:

[H]eld the North-American civilization responsible for the spread of a secular, individualistic and protestant mentality that would have contributed for the fading spirituality in general and of Catholicism in particular. Consequently, the search for a particularly national profile inevitably implied the rejection of the scientific dogmas imported from the USA since they would not be compatible with the Brazilian Catholic soul. A spiritual revolution is offered as the only means to recover the true national identity under threat by the Yankees and the Soviets (Lima, 1931, p. VII) (Schwartzman 1981).

Thence, while the Western world submitted science to secularization not only from the Church, but also from Philosophy, the project that founded PUC-Rio implemented the exact opposite justified by what they thought was Brazil’s true national identity, Catholicism. Center D. Vital institutionalized the intellectuals’ trust in the compatibilities between religion and science. It offered three mandatory classes, sociology, philosophy, and theology, besides three optional, introduction to law, introduction to mathematics, and introduction to biology. Schwartzman (1981) teaches us that ‘the research conducted in the center followed the universally accepted methodologies, but grounded its knowledge in a Christian paradigm of science.’

In the Center and in the Institute, they emphasized the perfect compatibility between science and faith as two sides of the same truth, and also between the Catholic social action and social sciences, suggesting the field of Sociology as means to materialize this cooperation. In sum, science would be the
In 1941, the Catholic Colleges were created. They were the first private University in the country, what represented a hurdle for the approval of the project within the government’s ranks that believed the State should monopolize Higher Education. In the beginning, there were two Colleges, and eight undergrad programs. The College of Law and the College of Philosophy sheltered undergrad studies in Law, Philosophy, Classical Language, Neo-Latin Language, Neo-Germanic Language, Geography and History, Social Sciences, and Pedagogy.

In the current structure of the University, the Center for Social Sciences (CSS) is an umbrella unity under which there are nine departments: Administration, Social Sciences, Communication, Law, Economics, Geography and the Environment, History, the Institute of International Relations (IRI), and Social Service. The only department whose title includes the term Institute is IRI.

In the 1968 Higher Ed Reform, with the institution of departments and the extinction of chairs, the School of Sociology and Politics led to the creation of the Department of Sociology and Politics, and the Department of Economics both that alongside with the other departments constituted the Center for Social Sciences. In the 1970s, encompassing IAG, the Department of Administration was created, and its Master’s Degree was inaugurated within the Department of Economics in 1972. In 1979, based on a research center attached to the Department of Law, the Institute of International Relations was created, initially focused only on activities of research, and, in the 1980s, on its own post-grad course, a Master’s Degree, besides, in 2003, the inauguration of undergrad studies (CCS - Missão e Objetivos, puc-rio.br).

Unlike UnB, PUC-Rio’s IR studies emphasized research instead of teaching since its foundation. Indeed, IRI presents one of its main goals the aim to approximate the research conducted in the post-grad programs with the teaching experience in the undergrad studies. Having experience IRI’s undergrad studies initial years, I can attest to their struggle with this challenge.

They were reluctant to dumb down the structure of the undergrad courses, and IRI’s first classes studied syllabi that were very similar to what was taught and researched in their Master’s Degree and in their PhD. Also, following PUC-Rio’s Catholic tradition of developing a superior capacity to think based upon a critical take on Philosophy, Sociology and Theology, IRI, as Kristensen’s interviews will confirm, is proud of its emphasis on theoretical research. For most part of IRI’s existence, research
conducted with an eye on policy-making could not be deemed science, in a perspective that recalls that of the authoritarian Catholic thinkers, and again Kristensen’s interviews will highlight this.

Overall, although it is harder to name a paradigm out of this macro-political and micro-social formation, it is possible to underscore that science produced at PUC-Rio tends to be concerned with the elevation of reason, what, at IRI, turned into an emphasis on IRT, legitimated by the University’s foundational goals. If a Catholic identity to Brazil’s nationalism was at the core of the primary project, IRI can be interpreted as the turning point or as an outlier of this tradition. The majority of its faculty has been educated in Anglo-Saxon universities, and even though they bring back a critical perspective in respect to the philosophy of science, Brazil’s social, economic, and political problems do not pervade their research agenda, at least within the institute’s post-grad program, and even though the analysis of CINT’s publications may bring more nuances into this identity.

Even though a product of an authoritarian nationalist rationale, PUC-Rio was not alienated from the post-1964 repression. The fact that the IR department was only founded in 1979, the year when the regime relaxed its political spurges, is rather revealing. Those who have founded IRI and CINT had significantly less temporal capital than those involved in the creation of IR studies at UnB and at IBRI’s RBPI. Their temporal capital was forged within the discipline when it had already begun its process of institutionalization.

IReI’s and IRI’s projects are different, and, as the sociology of science highlights as a regularity in all sciences, struggle is also true in the case of these projects. Kristensen will provide a better recognition of these struggles for position and attention, but, since IReI’s project carries a direct relationship with the political and the scientific paradigm of national developmentalism, it is not hard to foresee some of their scholars’ critiques toward IRI’s faculty which, in turn, tend to boast their scientific capital, which they legitimate by hiring international faculty that carries significant scientific capital within Western IR, while pointing out that any other attempt to produce knowledge could not be considered IR, but an extension of Brazil’s foreign policy.
The fact that the first undergrad course of IR was embedded in UnB in the 1970s, and so was the first post-grad course in the University’s History department cannot be overlooked. Firstly, this is relevant so we can actually know to whom those engaged in thinking IR were speaking within their own country’s scientific politics, but also, and especially, public debate. In 1964, the year of the military coup, all UnB professors were summarily fired, and some of them tortured, including Ruy Mauro Marini, a story that would have direct impact over how Brazilian IR and its theoretical capacities are grasped in the West. Yet, after the amnesty legislation in 1979, RBPI’s publications provide that Darcy Ribeiro’s and Jaguaribe’s ideas had not been cauterized, and also that IRI’s founders would have as much space in the publication as IRel’s most prominent scholars.

On the contrary, given their nationalist facet –in this case, including those of IRI’s founders, such as Gerson Moura-, some of them had been part of the military regime’s state project, especially the ideas of developmentalism that underpin Darcy Ribeiro and Jaguaribe’s accounts. In fact, in the first years of UnB Darcy Ribeiro had been Minister of Education and Culture alongside Celso Furtado’s tenure as Minister of Finance, and Furtado, together with Prebisch, are precisely those who idealized developmentalism within the structures of ECLA (Economic Commission for Latin America (or Cepal, in Portuguese and Spanish)), but not only. Also, the fact that Jaguaribe’s ISEB had been introduced into the Ministry of Education and Culture provide an intervenient variable that connects his ideas with those of Darcy and of Furtado. To assume that produced by a young sociologist’s schism with his advisor who carried both scientific and temporal capital in Brazil’s social sciences (Florestan Fernandes), outside of research centers in Rio de Janeiro and in Brasília, and with the financial support of one of the foundations that was sponsoring the military coup, dependency theory is actually a product of Brazil’s efforts to theorize international relations is to dismiss both micro-social and macro-political aspects of the formation of the discipline in the country.

In fact, none of the authors of dependency theory appear in the samples provided by the most viewed articles in the two best ranked IR academic journals in Brazil, and neither have them ever been published in any of those journals. At RBPI, no author affiliated to dependency theory has ever been published, unlike, for instance, Celso
Furtado. This academic urban legend will be tackled throughout this Dissertation, what also contributes to think past the Latin American Hybrid, a composition of IR theories Tickner (2003b) attributes to Latin America’s IR production, where she juxtaposes dependency theory and the reflection upon autonomy – micro-sociologically, a product of ISEB, as well as macro-politically connected to developmentalism rather than to dependency. Through this rationale it will also be highlighted Global IR’s tendency to stress the merits of Non-Western ideas that have traveled North, mitigating the importance of Non-Western ideas that have traveled South, that have had impact over social sciences all over the world, except for Western scholarship, such as developmentalism.

The big data matter enters this debate as in the twenty-first century the ‘data revolution’ is bound to create yet another cleavage in the production of science. Besides from the debate on the importance of open access publications and the hindrances to it, there already are accounts on ‘[T]he big data rich and the big data poor: the new digital divide (…) (Metzler 2016).’ Referring to Boyd’s and Crawford’s (2011) understanding of this divide as a socio-technical problem, Metzler presents the findings of her survey conducted through odd-9 thousand social scientists

[to learn more about researchers who are engaged in research using big data and the challenges they face, as well as the barriers to entry for those looking to do this kind of research in the future. 32 per cent of respondents who are currently engaged in big data research reported that getting access to commercial or proprietary data was a “big problem” for them (…) (Metzler 2016).

This is very significant given that Metzler’s sample was limited to Western researchers. In the case of this Dissertation, the lack of access to such database as the Web of Science created an almost insurmountable problem that was tackled through an informal channel, and led to a reconfiguration of the entire object of study, which, on the one hand, rendered the findings more representative of Brazil’s scholarship, and, on the other hand, rendered them more prone to exceptionalism, less comparable to other samples collected in other countries. Hence, this Dissertation intends to bring Brazilian IR not only into the theoretical debate ushered by Global IR, but also to the center of the twenty-first century major challenge so far: dealing with big data in an era in which it has been proclaimed that ‘[D]ata is the new oil (Idem)’. In the twenty-first century, the struggle for IR in Brazil is hence tri-fold: assuring its presence in the
big data world, guaranteeing access to big data, and creating the capacity to engage with it.

To better assure Brazil’s IR is not left behind, scholars from all generations will most likely have to engage in the challenging field of data analysis, what once again proves the pertinence of macro-political variables to a sociological analysis of Brazil’s IR: the scholars will have to pressure the government to maintain the flux of funding so all sciences in the country can produce up-to-date knowledge. Toilet paper and campus security found themselves a sophisticated partner – that is if the Russians do not hack into all the big data we actually need.

Throughout this Introduction, we could already figure out which disciplines embedded most of the studies that was later covered through the institutionalization of the field of IR. At ISEB, historians, historians of diplomatic history and sociologists were those whose scientific capital was paramount for the debates offered at RBPI in its first years up until the military coup, in 1964. At ECLA, the scientific and the temporal capital of Celso Furtado, both an economist and a sociologist, helped forging, the paradigm of national-developmentalism, one that guided the intellectual work of several of Brazil’s intellectuals, including some who published in IR journals and who became IR professors, and that UnB erected as a project for the country’s Higher Education. In Chapter 3 and 4, we will figure out whether this paradigm can also be considered a paradigm of Brazilian IR. Chapters 1 and 2 will offer how a Brazilian contribution to IRT can be brought into the mainstream debate. Chapter 1 will present the epistemological, methodological, and ontological discussions that allowed us to engage in this effort, while Chapter 2 will present how this has been done especially in the case of Brazilian IR, and why it is still relevant to provide a more robust and grounded enquiry of this enterprise.

1. Global IR: Hidden Figures

The Prime Minister, and enthusiastic sightseer, was inseparable from his Baedeker guidebook. An ardent classicist, he read and wrote with ease and pleasure in classical Greek and Latin. Winston Churchill, no scholar of ancient languages or literature, was as jealous as a child. "Those Greeks and Romans," he protested, "they are so overrated. They only said everything first. I've said just as good things myself. But they go in before me (Fromkin 2009)."
British Prime Minister Herbert Asquith is not a top-of-mind figure in world history. Winston Churchill, in turn, couldn't be more noticeable (or notorious, depending on your partisan affiliations, especially if you were British in the immediate post-war parliamentary elections). There are literally hundreds, most likely thousands of books, plays, movies, TV series, all portraying Churchill's life and wisdom, some directly focused on him, others showing him for the sake of adding a little spice to the storytelling. However, as Fromkin (2009, p. 24) brings up, Churchill has never exactly matched the archetype of a statesman, especially back in the first half of the twentieth-century; he was not a classicist, nor a traditional intellectual, neither particularly smooth on his daily give-and-take.

It is well known that he despised his years at school, considering them but unproductive. He did not excel in any academic subject, had no interest in learning Latin -perhaps, they say, out of not having any special inclination-, and restricted his language studies to English (Fromkin, 2009, p. 20-22). Moreover, Churchill showed no interest in seeing a speech therapist although the projection of his tongue could hurtfully get in the way of eloquence (Idem).

The fact that Churchill, not said Prime Minister, is regarded in history, politics and common belief as a statesman, a concept-entrepreneur of the highest appraisal is rather revealing of the development of the field that studies international politics, namely that of its theoretical attempts, and so is Churchill's discomfort in regard to Asquith's scholarly, erudite capacities.

How has Non-Western Theory / Global IR been identified and defined? Or even, has it been at all? Is this debate the best fit to address the matter of whether there is a contribution to IR Theory (IRT) made in Brazil?

To disengage with this narrative is to inevitably produce a historiography of international relations. Since it is a perspective regarding the stocktaking of the discipline, by answering to those questions through the philosophy and the sociology of knowledge, one is inevitably constructing a historiography of IR that certainly differs from the traditional great debate organization.

One of the father figures of the Global IR enterprise, Hoffmann (1977) explores some reasons why IR as a subject had developed to become an American Social Science. In the author's observations, he underlines the American society's methodological and institutional virtù, as well as its circumstantial political fortune. Hoffmann presents
these as the post-1945 equivalents to the old regime's patterns of valid knowledge, painting the US, by the virtue of work and the fortune of power, as some kind of petri dish where social sciences could flourish and establish the new and only way of thinking.

It did not matter that IR had several roots other than the American Political Science, including in the margins of the US Ivy League, or even that it was indeed developing in many places other than the US: "[I]f our discipline has any founding father, it is Morgenthau (Hoffmann 1977: 44)". Thusly, any research done outside of the US patterns, or published outside of US Political Science - IR academic journals could not be recognized as science, and were not recognized as science. It literally could not. It does not matter if one has published top-notch work in any other journal, in a different language or style, they will not be recognized as having "said everything first", nor "as good things" themselves. By owning the authority to grant validity to knowledge, it appears as if "they go before" everyone else, and it would literally be a matter of capacity.

(…) in explaining why the discipline has fared so badly, by comparison, in the rest of the world (I leave aside countries like the Soviet Union and China, in which it would be hard to speak of free social science scholarship!). Insofar as it deals primarily with the contemporary world, it seems to require the convergence of a scholarly community capable of looking, so to speak, at global phenomena (…) and a political establishment concerned with world affairs; each then strengthens the other (Idem: 48).

The US, and as furthermore precisely explored in this Dissertation, the Western hegemony over the discipline of IR would then have silenced what does not go ‘beyond the study of the nation's foreign policy, or of the interstate politics of an area’, unless, of course, the scholar studies US foreign policy, as this would be the same as studying the international system, while studying the latter would inevitably entail studying the former (Ibid: 47-48). The utterly exclusory grasp of scientific IR Hoffmann portrays in his realization of the field as an American Social Science hints to some kind of justification, especially when we consider the author's commentaries, for instance, ruling out the possibility of actual science in countries he deems undemocratic.

Hence, the birth of IR’s self-reflection regarding the geopolitical components of its sociology as a science is also embedded in a type of intellectual eugenic behavior7.

7 Furthermore, the sociology of science has long grappled with the question of inequality and stratification in science, but the IR literature on US dominance has not really engaged with this literature either (Kristensen 2013: 6).
Even though Hoffmann and others probably believed they were delivering neutral, and even critical, analyses unveiling the criteria to what could be science in IR and that could hence be achievable by any society, the sociology of science itself teaches us in stratification is, more frequently than not, the norm in modern science. In the twenty-first century, Global IR emerges to read IR against the light, looking through the dark ink covering the forbidden knowledge to catch at least some of the hidden figures that have long been silenced in their contribution to the field.

Later in the 1980s, Alker and Biersteker (1984) sought to explore the state of the art of International Studies in a less restrictive manner, underscoring the naïveté in actually buying the universality of any knowledge, especially one whose object of study is based on experiences that, to say the least, differ in the socio-political contexts of their development (Idem: 122):

A future global archeologist would not be misled by the apparent unity of book titles or mathematical symbols discoverable in the writings of 20th-century international relations scholars. He or she would know that the linguistically unified hieroglyphics found in the different temples of ancient Egypt represented earthly conflicts among immortal gods, and therefore would suspect the same primitive phenomenon of top deities with different names, symbols and powers to reappear in different temples of another archaic civilization several millenia later.’ This scholar would be suspicious of the diffusion of mathematical symbols and specialized terminologies. An archeologist would want to know further what were the real differences in world understanding associated with the different approaches or traditions of scholarship. He or she would want to know also if there were any common or convergent themes underlying the contending perspectives and their scholarly accomplishments (Ibid: 121-122).

On the one hand, although Hoffmann recognizes US IR as power-based, and hence particularly concerned with matters relevant to the US in the post-1945 world, he argues that the "sea change" that transferred European knowledge to the US would have saved American IR from parochialism (Hoffmann 1977: 45-47). On the other hand, Alker and Biersteker (1984) offer an analysis of IR syllabi in the US to conclude just the opposite:

most 'leading' American instructors of courses on theories of international relations were exceedingly parochial. This was true even during the enlightened era of the early 1980s. Not only were the bulk of the readings on their syllabuses written by other American scholars, but those readings were also derived almost exclusively from a single one of the three major research approaches identified in Figure 1 behavioral science (Idem: 128).

The authors lament a 'systematic neglect' of 'Marxist writers on imperialism -the nation-state, dependency or the capitalist world system (Ibid)', what will be addressed
in Holsti’s (1985) work, contemporary to their reflections. Biersteker (1999) weighs in the debate by arguing that, in the 1970s, international political economy had ‘broadened considerably’ ‘the American discipline of international relations’ (Idem: 4). The author, nonetheless, recognizes the ambiguous outcomes of this diversification:

Whereas much of this broadening is genuinely welcome as part of a maturing process for the discipline, it is also indicative of a fragmentation that makes intellectual accumulation more difficult. In her International Studies Association presidential address in 1998, Margaret Hermann described her frustration with the "rather 'anarchic' field in which we find ourselves and with the lack of dialogue among subfields and specializations." Accordingly, she has proposed "several approaches to bridging, rather than deepening, the gaps that separate us (Ibid).

The first step toward a more unified and diversified field of IR, or toward a more Global IR, would be to recognize that parochialism is manifold. Biersteker argues it can be geographical, linguistic, methodological, and political, and that, even though it is paramount to ‘understand how the American context is reflected in the content of major theoretical developments with allegedly global theoretical applications’, scholars based elsewhere would not necessarily be less parochial (Biersteker 1999: 5):

Linguistic parochialism has created equally vexing problems for the creation of a global discipline. Much of the most theoretically sophisticated literature on situations of Latin American dependency was simply out of reach for most Americans unable to read Spanish. Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Enzo Faletto’s pioneering work on dependency, Dependencia y desarrollo en America Latina, originally written between 1965 and 1967, did not exist for most North Americans until the English language edition was published in 1979 (Idem: 5-6).

The author understands that in, an ideal world, scholars would be able to read in more languages, or there would be more efficiency in translating IR research into several languages. However, he criticizes what he calls radical positions that would not only oppose accepting the English language as the one that could render IR more Global, but also would hesitate to acknowledge ‘[T]here is often a close affinity between epistemology and political orientation’, and that ‘the intellectual tools used by the scholar of international relations are invariably a part of the social and political contexts of their investigation’ (Ibid: 6).

Thus, hindrances to Global IR would not rest only upon the structure of the American Social Science. In his attempt to overcome parochialism, Biersteker approaches methodological aspects of IR as an American Social Science, promoting ‘a basis for a more genuine global orientation to international studies (Biersteker 1999: 8)’ by drawing on the insights of more than one discipline, besides through
a global scholarly community capable of accommodating multiple perspectives. Indeed, we need to confront the fact that difference of interpretation, of understanding, and of purpose lies at the heart of international studies. We must face the uncomfortable proposition that there is often more than one "truth" about any given international issue. We must therefore give primacy to approaches that can accommodate incompatible or incommensurable differences, rather than try to choose a single "winner" out of competing claims. (...) we must assume the responsibility to listen carefully, to use our linguistic, emotional, and cognitive imagination to grasp what is being expressed and said in "alien" traditions (Idem: 8-9).

Namely at the dusk of the Cold War, the philosophy of the science of IR that has devised efforts to forge the field of International Relations (IR) has become a matter of major controversy from several philosophical, sociological and historical prisms. IR’s explanatory potential, what is scientifically valid and how much can it actually explain / help understanding have increasingly grown apart. Wight (2002) presents an interesting account of ‘the mess we make’, and together with Turton’s (2016) interpretation of the American Dominance, they offer an interesting perspective on how Global IR may transcend the duality between scientifically valid knowledge versus knowledge that could actually explain or help understanding the field’s objects of study.

Kristensen recognizes that

There are multiple, competing criteria for evaluating knowledge claims and they even differ among disciplines or sub-disciplines within the same socio-historical context (Lamont 2009). Therefore, validation does not depend on adherence to universally agreed-upon methodological procedures but on the dominant standards for validating knowledge claims in the particular academic audience to which the research speaks. This is a move from static criteria of validity to validation as ultimately a processual and communal activity (Kristensen 2015a: 286).

However, instead of sticking to the sociological elements of knowledge validation to characterize it in the field of IR, the author goes own to affirm that

In my case, qualitative research that speaks to an IR/political science audience, the typical canon of validation consists of criteria such as rigor, objectivity, replicability, validity and reliability. Qualitatively derived findings are traditionally considered weaker on most of these counts than quantitative, positivist methodologies (Kvale 1989; Miles and Huberman 1994:2) (Kristensen 2015a: 286).

He then discusses the reasons behind his methodological choice to undertake interviews of scholars in Brazil, China, and India as representative of those nation’s IR fields. The framework, although entirely drawn from the sociology of science, is highly dependent upon his intent to prove the ‘[R]eliability in qualitative research’, underlining
the importance of ‘[A]dhering to explicit rigorous and standardized procedures (...) to generate knowledge claims that can be regenerated by any researcher following the same procedures (Yanow and Schwartz-Sea 2013: 113). (Ibid: 287)’

Later providing that there are four principles that make for a strong program in the sociology of science, all of which are derived from epistemological criteria, Kristensen ends up verifying the points Wight (2002) and Turton (2016) make. In the first chapter of his Dissertation, Kristensen (2015) discusses the stocktaking syndrome among IR scholars. His intention there was apparently to provide epistemological justification for his attempt to find scientific IR elsewhere (in Brazil, China, and India). This can be comfortably assumed since while he travels through ‘[T]he “End of the Great Debates” between grand theories and the “Rise of Ecleticism”, “mid-level theory”, “causal mechanisms” and “normal science”’, he actually affirms that ‘[T]he great debates were socially integrative mechanisms that brought scholars together around discipline-wide conversations with relatively clear positions’ (Kristensen 2015: 76).

Since his object of study is the possibility of theoretical contributions outside the West that would have been hidden / silenced / marginalized in the historiography of IR, one would expect him to go beyond the identification of two sides in the debate regarding the effects of the fragmentation of the discipline. Nonetheless, instead of recognizing that there already was IRT elsewhere and that the several stock-takings for one reason or another ignored it, he pacifies his aim through an anxiety pill for the ‘white men’ panic in light of said fragmentation:

When today’s stock-takers identify fragmentation as a novelty, they tend to neglect that the narrative about the fragmentation of IR has prominent historical record and that academic disciplines look more chaotic to stocktakers in their own time than they do to posterity. Those who long for the neatly integrated great debates era forget that IR looked much less integrated at the time of great debates and those who cannot wait to move beyond the trench war era overstate the impact these debates ever had (Idem: 78).

There is no single moment in this chapter when Kristensen acknowledges that what he was about to travel the world to organize, to bring into the debate, was already there, organized, and perhaps even ready to be brought into the debate. This might result from his own background. If I am accusing him of appeasing white, male gatekeepers of the discipline, such as his own supervisor, who am I to judge since my own supervisor’s work is central to my Dissertation’s main question – whether there is a Brazilian contribution to IR? However, his silence on this is rather noisy, especially in light of Acharya and Buzan’s (2010) reflections:
There is, of course, a possibility that non-Western IR theories do exist, but that they are hidden from the Western discourse by language barriers or other entry difficulties and therefore do not circulate in the global debates. If the reasons for being hidden are largely cultural and/or linguistic, that may well result in local theories being hidden not just from the Western debate, but also from other non-Western debates. (...) If non-Western theory does exist, but is marginalized, then the purpose of this book is to reveal that existence, and the problem is not to create such theory but to get it into wider circulation (Acharya and Buzan 2010: 18-19).

Furthermore, having decided to appease the elders Kristensen ended up circling back to the characteristics of stocktaking itself, as described by Wight (2002:30): ‘[W]hen a discipline begins to reflect on its own practices there are various resources on which it can draw and a range of foci upon which the gaze can be turned.’ For the author, however, ‘[T]he philosophy of social science is inseparable from the history of social science, and many of the debates that have shaped international relations (IR) have been concerned with issues integral to the philosophy of science (Idem).’ In IR, this has led to a few characteristics that Wight and Turton identify as misrepresentations of the philosophy of science.8

IR’s intent to validate its knowledge as scientific has led to quite a few pickles:

Wight (Idem: 35) and Turton (2016: 77) illustrate the misapplication of the term positivism when it is equated with an epistemology, with a methodological approach, with science, or with behavioralism.

Turton (2016) uses the same string of thought as Wight, yet focusing on what the recognition of an American Dominance of IR would indeed entail. She mentions that

---

8 ‘If social inquiry is to emulate the natural sciences it needs to examine its methods, procedures and underlying rationale. It needs a yardstick against which claims to be science can be measured. Where better to look than the philosophy of science? (...) Since knowledge claims in social science are almost always couched in terms of some philosophical justificatory framework, the various disciplines have felt the need to examine the status of them (Reynolds 1973: 14). Not least because claiming that one’s research is science is exactly to claim legitimacy not accorded to other forms of knowledge (Ashley and Walker 1990; Smith 1987) (Wight 2002: 34).’
US supremacy is usually explained through the hegemony of rationalism and positivism. First of all, she highlights that in IR rationalism and positivism are frequently associated, or even intertwined, and Wight (2002) helps us understand why. Morgenthau, frequently named the father of the discipline, is thusly recognized because scholars align ‘him with a science of IR (Hollis and Smith 1990: 21), with some even going as far as to label him a positivist (George 1994; Hollis and Smith 1990: 28; see Bain, 2000 for an alternative view, Garnett 1984; Nicholson, 1996a) (Idem: 38).’ However, Turton makes it easy for us to realize where the confusion lies: ‘[T]o see if positivism dominates the discipline of IR one would have to look at whether (1) empiricism dominates and (2) whether the associated methodologies do (Idem: 75).’

Turton reminds us that rationalism, in the way it is equated to positivism in IR, ‘refers to “formal and informal applications of rational choice theory, to any work drawing on the tradition of microeconomic theory from Alfred Marshall to recent developments in evolutionary game theory” (Fearon and Wendt 2003: 54) (Turton 2016: 73).’ Where Turton enlightens us about how rationalism is actually used in IR literature is precisely where Wight shows us why people mistake Morgenthau’s work as positivist:

In conceding that politics is governed by objective laws of human nature Morgenthau is actually saying that there is no need for a science of IR, because IR is governed by laws that are explained by biology, not social science (Griffiths 1992: 39). (…) More important is the fact that Morgenthau does not ground his arguments about human nature in any scientific content, but in metaphysical ones (Griffiths 1992: 38, 43; Honig 1996: 305) (Wight 2002: 38).

When Wight tells us why people mistake Morgenthau for a positivist is very illustrative of why the latter is also frequently labeled under a rationalist epistemology, even though what makes him part of the rationalist –and not of the positivist – tradition is the methodological employment of ‘philosophical assumptions regarding the rationality of actors in the international system’, a trait that would automatically disqualify him as a positivist.

Morgenthau would hence be methodologically affiliated to rationalism, since he grounds his ‘arguments about human nature’ in metaphysical content that grants rationality to the actors of the international system, but not at all methodologically affiliated to positivism, since he did not falsify his assumptions based on empiricist analyses.
These conceptualizations of rationalism and positivism, as well as their most common use in the field of IR are associated with those terms’ methodological corollaries. Yet, scholars in IR tend to use both terms as epistemologies, while juxtaposing epistemology with ‘general worldviews, theories or paradigms (Wight 2006: 227)’.

Turton is once again generous in her explanation: ‘[E]pistemology or the theory of knowledge is driven by three main questions: ‘What is knowledge? What can we know? And ‘How do we know what we know (Greco 2006:1)?’ (Turton 2016: 75).’

All this discussion is of a particular importance to Global IR, since

We will also look out for what might be called ‘pre-theory’, which is to say elements of thinking that do not necessarily add up to theory in their own right, but which provide possible starting points for doing so. IR theory is mainly the province of academics, but we will not exclude the thinking of practitioners if it meets, or leans towards, our criteria. IR is a big subject without fixed borders. It has many frontiers where it blends into history, economics, sociology, domestic politics, psychology, law and military strategy. In keeping with this character, we will take a broadminded view not just of what theory is, but what it theorizes about (Acharya and Buzan 2010: 6).

Besides, even though philosophically-shaming Western IR for its brutal imprecision might sound bitter or unproductive, it is of the utmost relevance so the myth that Western minds are pre-disposed to construct better, pure theory (this is presented especially in Hoffmann’s (1977) work, but not only) is deconstructed, and there is space for other contributions whose flaws may not fall under the same category of those commonly committed in Western IR, but that do not either stop them from adding up to the debate.

In the twenty-first century, Non-Western Theory / Global IR shows up to possibly overcome IR’s hurdles in developing knowledge that is capable of explaining and understanding its objects of study while tackling the matter of the discipline’s scientific status.

When Kristensen arrived in Brazil to conduct his interviews, he had in mind the search for Non-Western contributions to IRT. What he quickly realized was that his Brazilian interviewees (1) considered themselves Western, yet from the Global South; (2) and this entailed an intellectual culture that, unlike in China and in India, did not search for ancient knowledge dating back to a pre-colonization era. This does not mean that it is simply the three issues that Kristensen pinpoints in his interviews - inequality, development and autonomy – that are actually promising in terms of what Brazil’s IR may offer to IRT. Later, the development of a sociological framework for the analysis of Brazilian IR will better discuss these matters of intellectual identity.
For now, it is fundamental to understand how Global IR has been identified or defined, and why it seems appropriate to investigate whether there is a Brazilian contribution to IRT. Following Wight's (1966) and Hoffmann's (1977) reflections about the possibility of a more international discipline and the shortcomings of parochialism, by the early 1980s IRT had begun to embrace the imperative of a less American / Western field based not only on epistemological or methodological debates, but on local, national and regional variants, what started to translate into the quest toward a more global IR:

As illustrated by our previous remarks about disciplinary alternatives, it is the sharing, the interpenetration and the principled opposition of these often antagonistic approaches in the First, Second and remaining 'Worlds' that truly constitute the global interdiscipline of International Relations. (...) In the scholarly environments of contemporary Latin America, Africa and Western Europe, multiple variants of these approaches are not only the subject of wide debate, they more or less openly contend for hegemony. (...) Hence it appears paradoxically that multiple disciplines of international relations have been created, diffused and have indeed thrived in the 20th century (Alker and Biersteker 1984: 123).

Acharya (2014) underlines the features of Global IR as an approach to the study of international relations that aims to further the epistemological debate adding up ideas and experiences from subjectivities that have been marginalized both by the positivist and the post-positivist meta-theoretical insertions. The author thusly defines Global IR as an umbrella,

A commitment to pluralistic universalism (one that does not impose any particular idea or approach on others but respects diversity while seeking common ground), grounding in world history, theoretical pluralism, a close nexus with the study of regions, regionalisms and area studies, avoidance of cultural exceptionalism, and recognition of multiple forms of agency, including the agency of non-Western actors. A Global IR research agenda calls scholars to discover new patterns, theories, and methods from world histories; analyze changes in the distribution of power and ideas after 200 plus years of Western dominance; explore regional worlds in their full diversity and interconnectedness; engage with subjects and methods that require deep and substantive integration of disciplinary and area studies knowledge; examine how ideas and norms circulate between global and local levels; and investigate the mutual learning among civilizations, of which there is more historical evidence than there is for the ‘clash of civilizations’.

Acharya also understands that there has been a generation whose efforts to denounce Western-centrism in IRT or the imperative to ‘develop concepts and theories from the history and practice of the non-Western world or the Global South’, albeit essential, no longer suffices (Acharya 2016). A second, and contemporary, generation would face the challenge of bridging the gap, of ‘bringing the “Non-Western” or the Global
South ‘in’ (Idem). To offer approaches that do ‘travel beyond their nations and regions’ would rest as the task for such scholars who seek to contribute to the Global IR debate (Ibid). This Dissertation would be among the second generation.


A conceptual-normative literature on “IR beyond the West,” which seeks to uncover the hegemony of Western history and culture in IR theorizing and sensitize the discipline to the realities of people and institutions in the Global South/East (Nayak and Selbin 2011; Hobson 2012). Although some have argued for the establishment of national or regional schools of IR as a means of decentering mainstream “Western” IR (Song 2001; Makarychev and Morozov 2013), others have invested in the development of “post-Western” IR theories (Shani 2008; Vasilaki 2012) (Wemheuer-Vogelaar et al 2016: 19).

An empirically-oriented approach, in turn, would tend to offer descriptions, as well as to analyze practices in the field of IR outside the West. ‘Authors in this literature enrich their narrative reports with quantitative and qualitative data about’ publications patterns, ‘providing evidence for the low level of representation and impact of Non-Western scholars’, about how ‘graduate curricula and syllabi also illustrate a standard divide’, and about how citations, whose ‘analyses permit researchers to determine what counts as central knowledge in a discipline (Maliniak et al 2014), connections between scholars and scholarly communities (Kristensen 2012), and the diffusion of knowledge (Wemheuer-Vogelaar 2013)’ (Wemheuer-Vogelaar et al 2016: 19).

This research affiliates to a second generation of Global IR, examining a possible Brazilian conceptual-normative contribution to the Theory of International Relations, both in terms of a national school and of post-Western theories, based on categories and conceptualizations derived from an empirically-oriented content-analysis triangulated with the TRIP Survey 2014, and with Kristensen’s interviews. By addressing the questions of how IR thought produced in Brazil contributes to the debate on the Theory of International Relations, this Dissertation affiliates mainly to a methodology that relies on underlying premises of the new sociology of science.

In the case of Brazil’s IR, a sociological enterprise to world the country's knowledges ends up historicizing the narrative behind the construction of the patterns that have long determined the validation of science in International Relations. As an aspiration and by worlding knowledges, Global IR offers an opportunity to focus ‘on the importance of linkages, flows, and connections among localities in weaving together
(local) stories into something more comprehensive’ (Nappi 2013: 104). The historicization of previously mute knowledges in other field such as History has been thusly presented:

Persistent concerns in the subject matter of the history of science (the circulation of knowledge, the tension between the global and the local) can also inform a discussion of the practices of the field itself. History looks different as practiced in different localities, be they localities of institution, geography, or medium (Idem: 103).

Global IR avoids references to Global History, and offers a version of historicization on its intrinsic aspiration to worlded knowledges:

This book offers an alternative in worldism. It aims to transform, not simply problem-solve. Yet in reframing our understanding of world politics, worldism changes our practices in it. For example, worldism helps China revalue a rich, ancient archive of concepts, methods, goals, and worldviews not filtered through its experiences with the West and Westphalia. China cannot afford to reproduce what passes for IR in world politics (Ling 2014: 10-11).

Hence, when the sociology of science worlds IR knowledges, this research unintentionally engages in a larger debate concerning the history of the science of IR, and, although literature on Global IR rarely draws to the experience of historians in Global History,

[H]istorians have placed increasing emphasis on local case studies as a path toward a more polyvocal and encompassing narrative of science in global history. The logic of this seems to be that an agglomeration of these individual points should give us a more comprehensive history that respects local difference while weaving together individual stories into a common, global plot (Nappi 2013: 104).

The main differences between worldism and historicization are that the former includes the latter. Worldism, under the scope of Global IR, not as an unintended consequence, but as a premise, includes not only local histories and historiographies, but also local knowledges deriving from local philosophies, sociologies, among other traditions of assessing knowledge, such as religious and cultural experiences, depending on the scope of the worlded research. To better explain worldism, Ling (2014) offers a comparative analysis between what she dubs Westphalianism vis-à-vis worldism.

In terms of premises, a Westphalian world order needs universalization, standardization in spite of differences, while worldism understands that the world order needs communication/ negotiation across differences. In terms of justifications, for Westphalianism, States would inhabit a Hobbesian state of nature, while, for worldism,
subjectivities would pertain in a world-of-worlds, a *pluriverse*. The goal of the latter would be to connect multiple worlds to one another, as well as to the Westphalian world, while the goal of the former would be to establish a hierarchical dualism between the self and the other, the Westphalian world and the Other. Westphalianism’s means of action would be through power politics, while worldism would implement a worldist dialogic. Outcome-speaking, Westphalianism would seek a static truth enforced by hegemony, hierarchy, violence; worldism would look after flows endured by parity, fluidity, and ethics (Idem: 14-15).

In this study, worlding occurs mainly through the construction of a contrapuntal reading (Bilgin 2016) of the history of Brazil’s International Relations approached through the lenses of the ideas whose studies are deemed more relevant based on the statistical treatment of the two best rated publications triangulated with the TRIP Survey 2014, and with Kristensen’s interviews. Aiming at worlding Brazil’s IR contributions, it is intended to offer a contrapuntal reading of the discipline in the country and in the West, based on a qualitative methodology.

While acknowledging the expertise developed in the field of Global History, the choice to go after this scheme stems from the blueprint Global IR already offers, so debate can move on, and fire can stop being perennially rediscovered. In this study, since worlding is a consequence both of the sociology of science and of the qualitative methodology, on the one hand, this research design contributes to a more plural discipline of IR, assuming the latter, predominantly Western, would be parochial; on the other hand, it also generates stratification, inasmuch as it leaves by the wayside marginalized perspectives within Brazil’s IR scholarship. However,

> [W]hen engaging the debates over IR as a not-so-international and US-dominated discipline in terms of publication patterns, it should be kept in mind that the theoretical expectation from the sociology of science is that stratification, not equality, is the norm in science. Moreover, we would expect stratification at various levels not only among nation-states. Publications in general, and especially those in leading journals and the most cited ones, can be expected to cluster around certain regions, countries, cities, institutions, and even individuals (Kristensen 2013: 252).

It is then of the utmost relevance to contextualize the interpretations of the selected data, otherwise running the risk of not only further marginalizing the marginalized, but of looking into a reality with lenses only capable of grasping the most traditional features replicating in Non-Western scenarios the hidden-figures dynamic in an age when the outcasts are making sure they remain hidden no more.
Different historiographies of International Relations would then stem from a sociological reading of Non-Western scholarship, as in the case of Brazil. Another of the most daunting challenges remains, yet, within the philosophy of science. A game-changing contribution from Non-Western ideas would certainly stem from a paradigmatic turn. ‘Positivist’ paradigms in IR have endured ‘post-positivist’ attacks aiming at the former’s supposedly realistic ontologies and axioms. Instead of denying the truth, but claiming to be closer to it, notwithstanding, has both provided virtually infinite grounds for critique, as well as granted those ‘Positivist’ paradigms credibility, especially in a post-truth era when post-modernism is under scrutiny, particularly by Marxians, for allegedly providing theoretical grounds for the manipulation of data, for the political phenomenon of the alternative facts. Global IR would come to the rescue not necessarily nor exactly redeeming Positivism, but neither automatically joining post-positivist categories.

What is scientifically valid and how much can it actually explain or help understanding is less incompatible through the eyes of Global IR researchers since historiographical, sociological and philosophical diversity are worlded, brought into a previously debate seemingly private to Westerns. What is considered science might, then, be naturally broadened, while how much it can explain or entail understanding might also be inexorably expanded, if a contextualized content-analysis thusly leads. In spite of a few, but striking shortcomings, Holsti’s (1985) is still among the most referred works regarding this matter.

In his contribution, Holsti (Idem) presents a divided discipline, and engages in a narrative that debates paradigms and methodologies that have shaped International Theory ‘since the middle of the seventeenth century, when the states (sic) system of Europe was being organized’ (Ibid: vii). Although the author brings into the debate ‘non-orthodox’ approaches to IR, poignantly important to this Dissertation those he dubs ‘neo-Marxist challenges to the classical tradition’ -the dependency theory and the theory of world capitalist-system-, he does not unleash his analysis from the shackles of what he deems the correct form of addressing science, ‘positivism’, what yields a rigidity to his conclusions that, in the twenty-first century, can be despised (especially by post-structuralisms), dealt with caution or even seized as an opportunity for some who are currently studying Global IR / Non-Western Theory.

In the twenty-first century, encompassing, yet moving over the epistemological debates that have characterized the field thenceforth the 1980s, the so-called third
debate (Lapid 1989), Global IR represents an opportunity to transcend these doubts over what is valid IR knowledge, and who said what first. Holsti’s (1985) account of the period of existence of scientifically valid reflections over international politics, since the 1700s is thus one of the first assumption to crumble yet not necessarily hindering ‘synthesis’ or debate, as ‘[P]aradigm shifts, noted Thomas Kuhn, do not just affect systems of knowledge; they also involve social institutions’ (Ling 2014: 19). Holsti’s argumentation would then be relevant, but insufficient to advance the science of International Relations, even though he attempts to include a more diverse geo-cultural source of systems of knowledge deriving from non-traditional social institutions of the discipline.

Holsti’s shortcomings result from a few limitations and contradictions. Aiming at an actual international community of scholars with ‘a reasonably symmetrical pattern of ‘production’ and ‘consumption’ of theories, ideas, concepts, methods, and data between members of the community’ (Idem: 102), the author counter-intuitively presumes restrictive conceptions (i) of what can be considered scientific\(^9\), (ii) of the criteria toward what constitutes IR as a science and since when it is studied (which also carry consequences over who is considered an IR scholar and from where their rationale stems)\(^10\), (iii) and of what debates pose valid challenges ‘to the hegemony of the classical tradition’, not through meddling (Rosenau 1979), but

\[
\text{[f]}r\text{om new and entirely different conceptualizations of the priority problems within the field, and from fundamentally different ideas about the appropriate units of analysis, the important processes, and the kind of context in which actions and processes take place (Holsti 1985: 11).}
\]

Holsti’s methodological reference to what Rosenau (1979) describes as modelling and meddling unveils the former’s apprehension in preserving what had been constructed as the discipline of IR through paradigmatic debates. Indeed, Rosenau’s article to which Holsti refers thusly begins:

---

\(^9\) Thus, until recently there has been an intellectual hegemony in the sense that a single paradigm has served as the theoretical platform of our field. This hegemony is not necessarily to be lamented, provided that critical questions generated by the paradigm meet certain tests, including 'isomorphism', logical consistency, the capacity to generate research, and 'reasonable correspondence with the observed facts of international politics (Holst 1985: vii).”

\(^10\) While the criteria are not easily delineated, with some overlap between them and some conceptual fuzziness at the edges, they have provided the guidelines for more than three hundred years of inquiry in the field. They are: (1) the causes of war and the conditions of peace/security/order; an essential subsidiary problem is the nature of power; (2) the essential actors and/or units of analysis; (3) images of the world/system/society of states (Idem, p. 8).”
When paradigms crumble, they crumble very quickly. The slightest inroad into their coherence opens gaping holes and the collapse of each of their premises raises further doubts about their adequacy. Before long everything seems questionable, and what once seemed so orderly soon looms as sheer chaos (Rosenau 1979: 130).

Holsti’s relatively conservative disposition to broaden the theoretical basis upon which IR is constructed - maintaining references to ‘appropriate units of analysis, the important processes’, for example- uncovers his concerns over a ‘paradigm deterioration’, or the previously mentioned fragmentation, ‘underway in the study of world affairs’ (Idem). Rosenau underlines that ‘meddling through can prevent the collapse of a paradigm that has started to go’ (Ibid: 132), and that ‘[M]uch more is to be gained by presuming that all the available epistemologies and methodologies have something to offer if more appropriate paradigms can be developed’ (Op cit). However, by meddling and attaching to continuities would pose ‘the risk of missing out on the prevailing dynamics of our field’, because

history also records breakpoints, watersheds and transformations, with the result that the presumption of historical continuity can be just as prejudiced and self-deceptive as the assumption that profound changes are occurring (Rosenau 1979: 133-134).

Hence, Rosenau recognizes that ‘the rapidity with which a paradigm crumbles’ does not automatically lead one to ‘discern the outlines and basic premises of those that might evolve in its place’ (Idem, p.134), underscoring the need to ‘piece together’ ‘a structured and parsimonious’ replacing paradigm (Ibid), although there might exist previously marginalized paradigms whose ‘basic premises’ are consistent with ‘the reasons for the collapse of the old’ (Op cit). Then, the new, if ‘well-developed’, gains competitiveness, skipping the horror! of ‘sheer chaos’ (Op Cit). Nonetheless, the author’s attachment to what he calls Positivism, understood via his grasp over what constitutes a paradigm, as well as his self-proclaimed limitations deriving from his geo-cultural bias (based on the US) elucidate his need to start from scratch and undertake a search for the essential components of a future paradigm that accounts for an overall global structure which imposes coherence on diverse issues without presuming the orderliness of a society (Rosenau 1979: 135).

This enterprise is presented as a modelling effort that takes place through an effort of aggregation. ‘(...) [a]ggregation is conceived to be a whole (macro unit) composed of parts (micro units) whose actions are sufficiently similar to be summable into the whole
(...)’ (Idem, p.136). Instead, however (or should it be thusly?), of entertaining ideas that stem from epistemological and methodological diversity, Rosenau actually states that ‘neither epistemological nor methodological problems are the source of our difficulties in the field today’ (Ibid: 132).

Quantitative and qualitative methodologies would suffice to analyze any phenomena in world politics, ‘but the dynamics of change that are rendering the world ever more complex’ would constitute the major challenge. Non-State actors, transnational threats to security, a myriad of new ways of experimenting international relations would defy the Theory of International Relations whether ‘one is inclined to rest enquiry on scientific practices, on Marxian dialectics, on historical-interpretative approaches or on methods of analytic philosophy’, since none would be capable of contending with the declining capacity of governments, the rise of new issues, the advent of new actors and the many interactive effects that derive from mounting interdependence in an increasingly fragmented world (Rosenau 1979: 132).

The ‘aggregative process’, or the systematization of the modelling effort, ‘refers to the interactions whereby such transformations [in micro and macro units] occur’ (Idem, p.136). By treating ‘all collectivities as susceptible either to aggregative processes that transform them into larger wholes or to disaggregative processes that transform them from wholes into parts’ would be ‘key to making a full break with the differentiated state paradigm and constructing new ones to replace it’ (Ibid).

When Holsti goes after Rosenau’s meddling versus modelling to restrict his paradigmatic samples, for instance, to paradigm #2, which encompasses dependency theory and world-system theory -what he assumes to be an exercise of modelling- is actually one of meddling when he confines his aggregates to ‘appropriate units of analysis, the important processes, and the kind of context in which actions and processes take place’. Priority problems might differ, but these do not necessarily entail an effort of modelling, especially since, following Rosenau, epistemological and methodological strategies are not disputed.

Holsti’s rigid account does not interpret as a challenge to the classical paradigm, for example, Keohane's and Nye's interdependence. They would not have disputed at least two of the three pillars that constitute the classical paradigm, and, consequently, would simply meddle, ‘acknowledging the importance of some non-state actors, disaggregating the field in terms of issue areas, or focusing on crises rather than wars’ (Idem, p. 11). Keohane (1988) actually sees eye-to-eye with Holsti on this matter (Ibid).
The institutionalist coins the rationalist vis-à-vis reflectivist approach to debates over the Theory of IR, placing his and Nye's contribution alongside with the realists' and neorealists', while reflectivists would all be ‘interpretive’ scholars, since they all emphasize the importance of historical and textual interpretation and the limitations of scientific models in studying world politics’ as they ‘emphasize the importance of human reflection for the nature of institutions and ultimately for the character of world politics’ (Idem: 382).

Of the utmost importance to this research, dependency theory and world-system theory, thus, would be two of the only paradigms (he considers them both only one paradigmatic perspective) that could validly debate the rationalists, what Holsti (1985) defends when he seeks to explore the possibility of synthesis among them\textsuperscript{11}. But while recognizing the merit of such efforts as ‘dependency theories’ that ‘have demonstrated that certain classes of state face sets of problems that neither the historical European states experienced, nor that present-day industrial nations either confront or fully comprehend’ (Ibid, p.146), Holsti holds accountable local, national and regional authors who ‘do not seek to reach international audiences, and thereby deprive those elsewhere who might be interested in new ideas, new approaches, methodological innovations (Op cit)’.

These ‘scholars themselves do not regularly seek to have their ideas enter the network of scholarly communication’ – aka the most prominent journals internationally, membership and active participation in international professional associations, etc - as Inoguchi (1982) realizes in the case of Japan. Now blaming Western scholars for having ‘little interest’ over certain issues that are, then, more accessed by ‘area specialists and those in comparative politics’, Holsti slightly overlooks the foreign language barrier, but strikingly forfeits any further analysis over the composition of editorial boards, the patterns of peer reviewing, the institutional give-and-take among academic publications and certain research centers, differences in epistemological, methodological and ontological cultures, amongst several other structural constraints that have sociologically amplified cleavages in the discipline of IR since it formally exists, no matter when one choses to mark the calendar.

\textsuperscript{11} Keohane (Ibidem, p. 382), in turn, disagrees with Holsti’s understanding of the consequence of a neo-marxist affiliation to the epistemological aspects of dependency theory and of world-system theory.
Under the umbrella of what is nowadays conceived as Global IR's first generation, Holsti's blame-game precedes, for instance, on the one hand, Acharya's assumption that scholars outside the West are 'willing and able (i.e., have the capabilities and resources necessary) to reshape IR (Acharya 2014, 2016)' (Wemheuer-Vogelaar et al 2016: 18). On the other hand, it heralds Tickner (2013) assumptions that IR's academic structure is one of a global discipline under the hegemony of the United States, yet comprising different regional and national niches with differing levels of influence, interdependence and interaction in relation to the center of the field (Idem). In the scope of if or which ideas travel from the periphery of knowledge production to the core, and in contrast with the affirmation of the dependency theory's relevance to traditional IRT, Holsti alternatively assumes there is, or there should be, a universal concern over 'the problems of a states system, the growth and decline of governing norms, the implications of interdependence, processes of integration, decision-making, and many other subjects that have formed the core of the field since the times of Hobbes, Grotius, and Rousseau' (Ibid: 127), 'no matter what their [the researchers'] national roots' (Op cit). If this is the case, once again, the choice to accommodate rationalism with dependency theory is troublesome.

Since the beginning of his book, the author correctly assumes dependency theorists were not concerned with the outlined core subjects of the field of IR, nor dealt with the same philosophical backdrop. It is less questionable they were contrasted with paradigms of International Political Economy, but debating them against Realism or Neo-realism seems to be a self-fulfilling prophecy that assures the classical paradigm still prevails upon any other in terms of analytical reach in the field of IR.

Yet another shortcoming of Holsti's methodology is his assumption that, by the 1980s, no other theoretical intent stemming from the Global South has traveled as far as did the theory of dependency, which reinforces Global IR’s general tendency to downplay South-South theoretical exchanges, as would be the case of the theory of developmentalism. Holsti (1985: 145) argues

Dependency theory, despite its Marxist roots, is essentially an intellectual creation of the Third World, probably the first systematic set of statements about international relations dynamics to emerge from an area outside Europe and North America.
Probably most likely being the operative word, the author does not provide references or evidence that he has looked out for other sources of systematic sets of statements about international relations from the Non-Western World.

In terms of Latin America itself and of theoretical endeavors similar to that of *dependência*, Holsti neglects, for instance, said theory of developmentalism, one that has deep roots in the Global South and does travel, although it has been substantially more celebrated - and applied - outside the United States and Western Europe, an assumption that is grounded on content-analyses explored in later chapters. For now, it might suffice to realize that a simple search for the terms ‘dependency theory’ and ‘developmentalism’ in the Web of Science’s IR journals without any temporal cut returns interesting results. Although IR stocktaking usually cites dependency theory’s alleged contribution to IRT, on April 6th 2017, said search resulted in 358 results for developmentalism, and 245 results for dependency theory. The former is particularly restricted to publications from or about the Global South, and the latter is particularly restricted to publications from or about the Western world.

Holsti’s methodological rigidity seems, then, unintendedly selective, a result of blind spots, language barriers, etc. Although Holsti (Idem, pp. 85-86) ‘omitted [from his analysis of textbooks] chapters that did not deal with central topics in the field’ - under his own categorization of central topics -, the author conveniently eases his methodological restrictiveness to better grasp the reality of a certain national approach to IR.

By broadening the kinds of textbooks observed in Indian scholarship

![image]

Holsti argues that these items are credible sources for his research goals because ‘[T]hey rely extensively on the theoretical literature in the field, particularly that dealing with imperialism, as well as that favorite of Indian scholars, the theory and practice of non-alignment’ (Ibid: 91-92).

Consequently, it appears that even though rationalists or the classical paradigm do not theorize about certain issues, these could be deemed theoretical to the field of IR

---

12 Since I do not have access to the Web of Science from any Brazilian University to which I am affiliated, I counted with the generosity of a Russian member of the Web of Science office in Moscow, after I asked for help from the epistemic community on my twitter account.
as long as they hold on to a 'valid' paradigm that models the classical (Rosenau 1979). In this sense, although not explored by Holsti, Non-alignment, for instance, could be considered theoretical, since it could relate to another valid paradigm, that of dependency theory and world-system theory, to follow the author's logic, and would make efforts into summing up similar behaviors of wholes or parts, yet not necessarily through quantitative or qualitative methodology.

Holsti (Idem: 91-92) does not expand into the specificities of how a theory of non-alignment intertwines with said paradigm, which is problematic from his own point of view. Yet, this supposed flaw provides second-generation research in Global IR with a window of opportunity to examine how certain local, national, regional, Global Southern and/or marginalized debates can be included into a traditional appraisal without hurting its scientific, positivist credibility.

Besides, Holsti (Ibid: 103) also provides that, even though IR as an institutionalized discipline might have been born in the US and the UK, ‘in cognate fields such as international law, diplomatic history and international economics, such national paramountcy does not exist’, and since he reaches out to a national contribution to international economics -dependency theory- to forge a paradigm capable of debating with the rationalists, it seems reasonable even to his reasoning that other cognate fields might provide that as well, especially since ‘the questions that command diplomatic as well as scholarly attention are not the same world over’ (Idem: 127).

This unintended consequent openness toward Non-Western thinking can be construed as a result of the author's careful differentiation over production and consumption of the Theory of International Relations. When he says there is an asymmetry that may render IR American he emphasizes he is considering the consumption, not the production of thought (Ibid: 103). Although Holsti's restrictive criteria may curb the inclusion of knowledge produced outside of the Anglo-Saxon world into the science of IR, the theories of dependency and of world-system appear as sorts of tokens of hope of inclusion and diversity even in the face of a necessarily positivist science (oxymoron?) that models other than meddles with the causes of war and peace, security, order, and the nature of power, with the essential actors or units
of analysis, besides with the images of the world, of the system, of the society of states
(Holsti 1985: 8).

1.1 A Western Theory of International Relations

If, to entertain the idea of a Global IR based on a Non-Western IRT, or of a Post-Western Theory, or of what has been dubbed Global IR is to subscribe to the premise that there is a Western IRT, it is but essential to discuss the meanings of Western IR.

Ling (2014) equates Western IR to Westphalian IR. As such

Neither philosophically nor institutionally does Westphalia World recognize its relations with or contributions from Others, despite ample evidence to the contrary. Indeed, Westphalia World claims a pristine, intellectual lineage. It dates from the ancient Greeks (usually Thucydides) to medieval Machiavelli to mid-Enlightenment Grotius, Hobbes, Locke, and Kant to nineteenth-century Pax Britannica to post-World War II Pax Americana to twentieth-century Cold War power politics to a twenty-first-century liberal world order. (Interestingly, the Treaty of Westphalia itself rarely receives mention.) Wiped out are any references to the occupations, massacres, expropriations, and enslavements that made this rendition of history possible. Erased, also, are subaltern resistances and reformulations, such as the self-emancipation of Haiti’s slaves and declaration of their own, constitutionally articulated Emancipation Proclamation (Idem: 16-17).

There would be many forms of otherness shadowed under the light of a Western/Westphalian discipline to the extent that some find the existence of geoepistemologies (Wæver and Tickner 2009; Wemheuer-Vogelaar 2016). Moreover,

In their survey of the top 23 IR departments in the US and Europe, Jonas Hagmann and Thomas Biersteker find a predominant pattern in syllabi in terms of methodology (rationalist/formal), language (English), geographical location of authors (US), and their gender (male).43 Some European institutions, like those in France and Italy, may include local histories and perspectives but no teaching exists of non-Western approaches to the world, world politics, or IR (Ling 2014: 17).

The formation of this “imperial common sense” is traced through Global IR’s first generation publications, and Hoffmann (1977) could be deemed one of its founding

---

13 A model of international community of scholars would include at least two related characteristics: (1) professional communication between researchers residing in different and separate political jurisdictions; and (2) a reasonably symmetrical pattern of ‘production’ and ‘consumption’ of theories, ideas, concepts, methods, and data between members of the community (Holsti 1986, p.102).
fathers. Indeed, since Hoffmann’s (1977) pioneering publication, the theory of IR has been perceived as yet another arena where, in the post-war period, US hegemony has reigned. Kristensen thusly weighs in:

[S]ome degree of US dominance is probably to be expected given the sheer size of IR, and social science more generally, in the United States: the United States accounts for 33% of the world’s research funding (55 countries surveyed), employs 24% of the world’s researchers in terms of full-time equivalent (53 countries surveyed), produces around 26% of the world’s PhDs in social sciences (48 countries surveyed), and 30-40% of all social science research articles (UNESCO 2010:368–385). To grasp the “Americanness” of IR, it is pertinent to ask a comparative question: Is IR a more “American social science” than, say, economics, sociology, anthropology, or political science? And is it more or less US-dominated than it used to be (Kristensen 2013: 247)?

Based on the analysis of authorships and co-authorships in the most prominent IR journals according to the TRIP Survey 2012, all of which are included in the Web of Science and based in Western institutions, Kristensen (Idem) presents that, since the 1960s, IR has become less exclusory, and that it is not currently as exclusive as some other social sciences, when national affiliations are at stake. However, '[W]hile the dominance of US-based authors is in decline, US influence is still felt through doctoral training, the migration of US scholars, and co-authorships' (Idem: 265). Yet, 'a less 'American' discipline is not necessarily a truly international discipline that better represents nations, peoples, and cultures around the world' (Ibid: 259).

Even though scholars affiliated to institutions in the US, England, Germany, Canada and Australia have decreased their share of publications since the 1970s, they still account for 60% of the author's sample in 2010 -by 1970, the share was 84%, coming down to 75% in 1980, to 77% in 1990, and to 72% in 2000 (Kristensen 2013: 259)-, ‘[T]he growing communities in Brazil, India, and China ('BIC') play a marginal role in mainstream journals’ (Idem). This is revealing especially when contrasted with publications from Israel or from countries politically aligned with the US in world politics, such as Japan, South Korea and Taiwan. These, without Israel, add to 10% of current publications, while '[T]he 'BIC' group accounts for 3.2% in recent years, up from less than 1% before the mid-1990s.' China, although far from aligned with the US, is currently perceived as the country's most challenging opponent, which would help understanding why the country's scholars' publications were 'the main driver [of the increase in the BICs share] with an increase from 0.3 to 0.4% in the 1980s and 1990s to around 2.5% of total publications in recent years' (Idem).
Even according to Kristensen’s own research, and unlike what he proposes in his Dissertation (Kristensen 2015), the macro-political sphere of language and politics come up hence paramount for validation in the science of IR, at least through the field’s main journals. Scholars based in English-speaking countries or in those politically aligned with the US in world politics entered the second decade of the twenty-first century accounting for 70% of all publications. While the Rest of the World and the BIC will not add up to more than 5%, Continental Europe accounts for 25% of all publications. It is thus no revelation that

[In the last decade of self-reflection, researchers have shifted focus from American dominance over Europe to Euro-American dominance over the “non-Western” world (Aydinli and Mathews 2000; Tickner 2003; Tickner and Wæver 2009; Acharya and Buzan 2010; Millennium 2011(3); International Political Sociology 2009 (3)) (Kristensen 2013: 249).

The ideas on IRT exchanged, produced and exported by these (English-speaking, US-aligned) States would be currently recognized as Western, not restrictively American. Cold War cleavages would have also left its scars in a dividing discipline whose rifts between the North and the South -the First and the Third World, respectively- have rendered the latter home to the epitome of Otherness, a dynamic entrenched in the development of IRT. Enlightenment has also played its role in such state of the art (Walker 1993). If, to IR, namely contractualists are the ones to blame for the alleged static borders between a hierarchical and peaceful inside vis-à-vis a war-prone anarchical international arena, the positivist imperative of universalism is no innocent before the manner IRT affiliated to the West accredits what is/is not scientific (Rodrigues 2010; Rodrigues 2014).

Ling (2014) describes some consequences and characteristics of the prevalence of a Western Theory of International Relations assuming that it is related to the preponderance of the logics of the Westphalian World. In this reality, ‘[S]ince identical fears and motivations drive every State, neither history nor culture matters (Ling 2014: 11)’. Nonetheless, she highlights that ‘[W]estphalians still abide by a classic line from Thucydides' History of the Peloponnesian War (fifth century BC): 'The strong do what they can, the weak suffer what they must'.' (Idem). The author criticizes the claimed objectivity, universality and autonomy of Westphalian researchers who actually advance hierarchy and otherness, in what Krasner calls out hypocritical:

[a] Eurocentric discourse defines Westphalia World and its foremost agent, the State. The discourse institutionalizes a dichotomy whereby the first term - Self, White, West - always supersedes and sets the bar for the second -Other, non-
White. Rest- rendering the latter either constantly trying to catch up or lagging hopelessly behind (Ling, 2014, p.12).

Acharya and Buzan (2007) also assume that the Western theoretical domination would result from its hegemonic status, but in the Gramscian sense, meaning:

Here, one would need to take into account the intellectual impact of Western imperialism and the success of the powerful in imprinting their own understandings onto the minds and practices of the non-Western world. As noted above, the process of decolonization left in its wake a world remodeled, sometimes badly, on the lines of the European state and its ‘anarchical society’ form of international relations. (...) If Western IRT is hegemonic because it is right, then there is little scope for non-Western contributions. But if it is dominant because it rode on the back of Western power, then there is both room and reason to develop a non-Western voice. (Acharya and Buzan 2007: 294-295).

One might ask why to affiliate to Global IR when post-structuralists and post-colonialists, to name a few, have just as well been dwelling with these perspectives. Indeed, simply acknowledging the discipline of IR stems from the Eurocentric Big-Bang Theory of World Politics that is embedded in the power the West conveyed throughout Modern History might represent more of the same. And so would the recognition that this Big Bang Theory propagates two myths, one that the West created itself ex nihilo, another that, after creating itself out of the blue, the West would have exported a standardized civilization to the rest of the world (Idem).

The fact that throughout most of the twentieth-century in the discipline of IR the scientific criteria smuggled cultural, political, philosophical, historical and sociological biases into the idea of valid science is no surprise to those familiar with post-positivist debates in IRT. Notwithstanding, those who affiliate to a Global IR aspiration to internationalize the study of international relations recognize the importance of bringing the hidden figures, the other, the non-white, the rest into an existing science, of bridging the gap between what is geopolitically dubbed West versus the Rest, looking into local, national and regional approaches that engage in a dialogue with the established knowledge, not necessarily through paradigms of the philosophy of science that disagree with Positivism or with Rationalism, but that might fulfill these with different epistemologies, methodologies, and ontologies.

If Acharya and Buzan (2007) see the theoretical prevalence of the West as a fragile result of the distribution of power in the empirical world, Ling (2014, p.12) proposes that the Westphalian/Western colonization of IR’s hearts and minds has not entirely precluded the existence of many world views: two-way, yet unequal, ‘[a]bsorptions and
adaptations of language, deed, and thought’ would have all shaped the relationship between the West and the Rest, and ‘these have taken place in actuality. They remain invisible in formality only’. The author argues that the ‘unexpected resistance and disruption from the subjugated, hyper-feminized Other’ is formally invisible because it has been relegated to a private arena unlike the Westphalian world, presented true, normal, the rule. Phenomena such as the currently labeled white-guilt, as well as ‘[T]he shame of such subaltern relations’ would have hidden an intimacy between the Self and the Other’ (Idem: 13), and yet it would be high time to unveil the products of these relations.

Freeing Western and Non-Western minds of doubts and dangers in regards to local, national and regional hidden figures epitomizes the horizon Global IR currently envisions, since many of the researches under this umbrella have been focusing on how emerging States in the international system have not been comfortable in being persistently treated as the object, never the subject, of theorizations, hence would scholars based in those country’s research institutions get out of their comfort zones and engage in what can be called Worldism, attempts to bridge Non-Western -or Non-Westphalian, Post-Western, Post-Westphalian, local, national and regional knowledges to established Theories of International Relations. The national and the regional components of this enterprise have to date been specially challenging, as well as considered a tantalizing path to better world the discipline of IR, what will be more closely explored ahead in the presentation of a Non-Western Theory of IR.

These national and regional attempts expose, amongst others, hurdles related to language. When Holsti (1985) maps the nationalities of the authors cited in IR textbooks in Korea, Great Britain, the United States, Canada-Australia, India and Japan, he does not neglect the language barrier that has contributed to turn IR into ‘an American Social Science’ (Hoffmann 1977), which would also result from the institutionalization of IR programs, with a few exceptions such as the Argentinians (Deciancio 2016), being chronologically first instated in the United Kingdom and in the United States (Holsti 1985: 103) -although there seems to be scant accounts of how the field of IR formally developed outside of the US or of Western Europe perhaps with different concerns or under different institutionalizations.

In this sense, Churchill’s prominent stature in the study of international politics is two-fold illustrative of this trend in a narrative that massively constructs the discipline of International Relations restricting it to a Western historiography, sociology, and
philosophy of science. As pointed out, the Statesman did not bother to learn any language other than English and, during the conferences that shaped the post-War world, the French were in no shape to politically bargain for their language to remain the diplomatic paradigm. As of the role of the then-nationalist China, it is well accounted for she only joined the clique that forged the UNSC P5 following Roosevelt's and Churchill's strategic invitation in Cairo, 1943. The isolation of Stalin behind an "Iron Curtain", Churchill's (author of the latter expression) unyielding personality and lack of foreign language skills combined with the fact that America had won the war, even though FDR was fluent in French and German, helped creating a post-1945 liberal order that was politically Anglophone.

That such IR theorists as Morgenthau had sought refuge against the Nazi regime in US universities neglecting, including for funding reasons, intellectual production in their mother tongue also helps understanding why consumption of the Theory of International Relations is usually through the English language. As Mearsheimer (2016) highlights, this is not necessarily bad. Communicating through one language may even help fostering what Holsti (1985: 102) claims to be imperative for a truly international discipline: exchange, an effective communications system. Nonetheless, it does provide Anglophone scholars with relevant comparative advantage. Many of the scholars outside of the United States and Western Europe (sometimes even within this region) were raised, educated in a world where French was the international and intellectual language, providing a generational gap over which contributions from outside the US and the UK actually end up having an impact in the scientific development of IR.

Besides, Churchill's aforementioned discomfort with Asquith's ancient language skills gives rise to reflections over the views of prominent scholars in IR local, national and regional Academia whose work does not resonate outside of their language-speaking spaces, hence fostering a feeling that Anglophone IR scholarship is ‘so overrated’. Since ‘they’ create the rules of the game (of what is considered IR) based on their own vices and virtues, optics are that traditional IR, just like the Greeks and the Romans, ‘only said everything first’, although Non-Western IR intellectuals produce ‘just as good things’ themselves.

Language hindrances to an actual Global IR, however, would not be restricted to foreign-language skills. Pieczara (2010) draws attention to the mechanisms of competition and learning as tools for verifying the dialogue between Western and Non-
Western theoretical approaches to Asian international relations. Her premise is that a genuine dialogue exists only when it leads to regional theorizing or theorization about a sub-system (Choi, 2008 Apud Pieczara, 2010), concluding that ‘(J)just as the European example indicates, national/regional schools would migrate to *sui generis* boxes only to further obstruct disciplinary conversations (Pieczara, 2010)’. The author’s skepticism stems from the centrality she offers to language. If regional theories would adapt to an established linguistics of IRT, the true innovations when it comes, for instance, to sources and objects of study would be lost. If not, they would be stigmatized, resound peculiar, with restricted application and, eventually, forgetfulness. In her line of thought, Non-Western Theories would perhaps be possible, yet not exactly recognized as theories, in case they account for the idiosyncratic in a peculiar manner, disregarding the state-of-the-art of the discipline or its own scientific status. Theoretical resilience would be more probable in cases when a region or a nation counts on indigenous intellectual baggage that has none or little influence from the West.

1.2 A Non-Western Theory of International Relations

Pieczara’s (2010) skepticism is only shared to a certain extent. There are attempts to systematize how IR produced in institutions embedded in emerging powers speaks, as well as whether it has been successful in penetrating the Western debate through, for instance, academic publications (Kristensen 2015a: 638). Based on his sample of 20 Western journals, which he assumes to be biased, Kristensen concludes that IR scholars in Brazil, China, and India rarely ‘theory speak’, ‘few articles in mainstream journals present novel theoretical frameworks and particularly not framed as non-Western/Southern theory or even as a ‘Chinese school’ or ‘Brazilian concepts’’ (Kristensen 2015a: 212). Also, these scholars would ‘tend to speak as ‘native informants’ about their own country, not about general aspects of ‘the international’, and ‘some’ would ‘even speak as ‘quasi-officials’, that is, they speak for their country.’ (Idem).

Kristensen brings up that, in the case of Brazil, some scholars ‘have promoted the development of “Brazilian concepts”, mainly the so-called “Brasília School” of “international insertion”, to counter US theories (Cervo 2008; Bernal-Meza 2009;
Saraiva 2009c’), an attempt that would, nonetheless, ‘have gone largely unnoticed in mainstream IR discourse’ (Ibid: 213).

While Kristensen (Op Cit: 215) seeks to discover what type of ‘scholarship produced outside the core of the discipline’ is ‘published in mainstream Anglophone journals’.

His bias leads him to state that

My reading of Chinese, Indian and Brazilian scholarship published in mainstream Anglophone journals tells us more about the hegemonic structures of mainstream IR than it does about IR in China, India and Brazil per se. (Op cit)

This should come as no surprise in light of his sample, and this is exactly how Kristensen justifies conducting interviews with scholars from those three countries. Kristensen’s notion of theory talk is, nonetheless, a bit problematic. He intends to be ‘as inclusive as possible’ including

all articles that frame their contribution as one of making a move in existing or emerging theoretical debates and literature (this framing will often appear in introductions and conclusions) or articles that set up and apply analytical framework as opposed to, say, simply start describing recent foreign policy events in their country. I also include critiques or tests of theory and even articles that make a methodological contribution (Op cit: 225).

Based on Acharya’s (2014) discussion on how ideas spread and on whose norms matter, I do not apply such generous criteria to my RBPI and CINT samples. Acharya presents he understands

norms in two ways: first, by proposing a framework for investigating norm diffusion that stresses the agency role of norm-takers through a dynamic congruence-building process called localization (…) In some respects, localization is similar to behavior that scholars have described as adaptation. But adaptation is a generic term that can subsume all kinds of behaviors and outcomes. Localization has more specific features. (…) In localization, the initiative to see change normally belongs to the local agent. Moreover, while adaptation may involve an “endless elaboration of new local–foreign cultural ‘wholes’,” in localization, the “local beliefs … were always responsible for the initial form the new ‘wholes’ took.” (Acharya 2014: 240, 250).

Moreover, he establishes the trajectory of localization and the conditions for its progress. There would be four steps toward localization:

i) Pre-localization (what includes resistance and contestation):

Local actors may offer resistance to new external norms because of doubts about the norms’ utility and applicability and fears that the norms might undermine existing beliefs and practices. The contestation may lead to localization if some local actors begin to view the external norms as having a potential to contribute to the legitimacy and efficacy of extant institutions without undermining them significantly.
Condition 1: Some aspects of the existing normative order remain strong and legitimate, although other aspects may be already discredited from within or found inadequate to meet with new and unforeseen challenges (Idem: 251).

ii) Local initiative (what includes entrepreneurship and framing):
Local actors borrow and frame external norms in ways that establishes their value to the local audience.
Condition 2: There must be willing and credible local actors (insider proponents). These actors should not be seen as "stooges" of outside forces. Prospects for localization are helped if their local society has developed a reputation for being unique (Ibid).

iii) Adaptation (what includes grafting and pruning):
External norms may be reconstructed to fit with local beliefs and practices even as local beliefs and practices may be adjusted in accordance with the external norm. To find this common ground, local actors may redefine the external norm, linking it with specific extant local norms and practices and prune the external norm, selecting those elements which fit the preexisting normative structure and rejecting those that do not.
Condition 3: There must be some scope for grafting between the external norm and some aspects of an existing norm hierarchy. Borrowing supplements, rather than supplanting an existing norm hierarchy (Op cit).

iv) Amplification and ‘universalization’:
New instruments and practices are developed from the syncretic normative framework in which local influences remain highly visible.
Condition 4: Borrowing and modification should offer scope for some elements of an existing norm hierarchy to receive wider external recognition through its association with the foreign norm (Op cit).

Hence, I will strict my final content-analysis sample to articles ‘that frame their contribution as one of making a move in existing or emerging theoretical debates and literature’ (Kristensen 2015a: 225). However these ‘existing or emerging theoretical debates and literature’ will not be restricted to a Western conception, not to run the risk of replicating ‘shallow’ attempts to label Latin American IR knowledge production. The trajectories and the conditions Acharya (2004) establishes will be followed to filter research that deals with Western IRT. Yet, so that it is possible to filter local, national, and regional contributions that do not establish a direct dialogue with existing theories, this Dissertation will step on Kristensen’s (2015a: 228) shoulders as he presents a third variety of theory talk, one that would be more usual among Brazilian articles:

Theory is engaged but the contribution is framed as empirical/methodological rather than theoretical as such: the articles contribute with new data, variables, models, tests or statistical tools that may enrich or challenge existing (Western) theories. The few articles that speak to mainstream IR this way follow an almost identical structure that first introduces the problem, reviews existing theory, derives hypotheses from it, builds a statistical model, runs the regression, presents results, discusses them and concludes. These articles speak more to a comparative politics/political science than an IR literature. This type of theory-speak is particularly found among Brazilian articles (Idem).
Thus, it is possible to infer that Brazilian scholars who published in those journals throughout that period of time tended to apply models of Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) singling out what does not work to grasp the dynamics they are inquiring. Kristensen does not share the institutional affiliation of those authors, only the city where their institutional affiliations were based. This is a significant flaw, since the Political Science departments in Brazil, and their post-grad programs, as well as their academic journals are not the communications system Brazilian IR scholars established as their epistemic community. I will take into consideration this third interpretation of ‘theory-speak’ when I treat my final sample, but I do not expect them to be structured in the way Kristensen found in his sample.

Assuming that, treated in the way Kristensen (Ibid) presents, FPA in Brazil would encompass methodological choices under the guise of quantitative analysis, formal modeling, experimental methodology, and a particular share of those who claim to primarily employ methods of Policy Analysis\textsuperscript{14}, according to the TRIP Survey 2014 (N=207):

Figure 1: Brazil’s Faculty Main Methodological Choice

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{BrazilFacultyMainMethodologicalChoice.png}
\caption{Brazil's Faculty Main Methodological Choice}
\end{figure}

Hence, when we triangulate Kristensen’s (2015a) research with the TRIP 2014’s findings, as well as with the micro-social structures of Brazilian IR, we find the author’s criteria to establish what type of theory is actually produced and exported from Brazil are far from sufficient to provide a more representative account. Not only does this present Dissertation factor in the relationship between macro-political and micro-social

\textsuperscript{14} Only six (2.89\%) scholars who claim to apply Policy Analysis as their primary methodology are affiliated to the issue of IR.
aspects of the field of IR in Brazil wishing to find out whether there is a Brazilian contribution to IR theory, but also does it tweak the literature’s and the survey’s narrative over the discipline in the country.

Furthermore, the Kristensen (2015a: 228) assumes that ‘social structures and material incentives in the IR disciplines’ in Brazil ‘do not necessarily favor participation in the mainstream ‘Western’ discipline compared to, say, national or regional journals or perhaps non-journal formats like monographs’ (Idem). ‘The publication market in all three countries [Brazil, China, and India]’, he says, ‘indeed has a distinctly national orientation’ (Ibid). In the case of China, he informs, national journals are more significant for career advances than international journals, but in the Brazilian case this would be different.

According to Capes’ 2017 Report on the Poli Sci and IR Area (2013-2017) since 2006 Brazil internationalized its publications profile in the Area. They illustrate this by pointing out that, in 2003, Brazil had less documents indexed at SCImago than Argentina, Chile, and Mexico. Currently, Brazil occupies the 23rd position at SCImago’s Journal & Country Rank by documents. Mexico ranks 33rd, Argentina, 36th, Chile, 43rd. Also, according to the Report, and having investigated Qualis Capes’ Sucupira system based on the 2013-2016 Journal Evaluation, there are more Poli Sci and IR international journals indexed in the highest strata (A1; A2; B1; 351 journals total) than journals based in IR Brazilian institutions (5 total).

Table 1: SCImago vis-à-vis Qualis Capes 2015 - Number of IR Publications based in Brazilian Institutions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indexation</th>
<th>Number of Indexed Journals</th>
<th>Number of IR publications based in Brazilian institutions</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A1</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A2</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0,80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B1</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1,70%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total:</td>
<td>351</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1,15%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

All other journals are either based in Brazilian Political Science programs, or in international institutions (2017 Report on the Poli Sci and IR Area (2013-2017): 9-10).
On Chapter 2 and 3, we will go deeper into these statistics and their implications to our content-analysis. For now, it is important to realize that, unlike China’s, Brazil’s system of rewards does positively sanction the internationalization of the scholars’ publications. In fact and in theory, a Brazilian IR scholar would be at least quantitatively stimulated to publish in international journals.

Based on his journal sample, and on publications from 1990 until 2014, Kristensen (2015a: 223) finds three major centers of Brazilian IR: São Paulo (10); Rio de Janeiro (7); and Brasília (6). Moreover, in terms of co-authorships, São Paulo scholars would be linked to three other cities in the world, Brasília, to two, and Rio de Janeiro to none.

Co-authorship not only indicates integration into global IR however. The fact that almost half of the Chinese articles (18) are co-authored with scholars from abroad suggests that it is more difficult for scholarship authored only by Chinese scholars to get published in these journals. Language capacities may play a role compared to India and Brazil where the proportion of co-authored work is much lower.

In terms of citation patterns, Chinese, Brazilian and Indian articles in mainstream journals tend to cite those same mainstream journals [a trend that would not differ from the general tendency within those publications] (Idem: 224).

One the one hand, and most likely as a result of not separating Poli Sci and IR epistemic communities, which is indeed a challenge for someone who is not inside the system for Capes metrics join both groups, Kristensen recognizes São Paulo’s scholars as the most internationalized in relation to those in Brasília, and in Rio de Janeiro.

On the other hand, the observation of IR’s micro-social construction, as presented in the introduction, provides that IRI PUC-Rio and its publication, CINT, as well as IRel UnB, and its quasi-official publication, RBPI, are the main sources for a grounded observation of Brazilian IR. They are respectively located in Rio de Janeiro, and in Brasília.

Also, a quick look into the Top 100 most viewed articles at RBPI (1997-2017), and at CINT (2002-2017) provide that within the statistically relevant authors among both samples, the journals are significantly tied when it comes to the prevalence of Brazilian leading authors.

Figure 2: Most Used Authors by National Affiliation - RBPI
In terms of co-authorships, and also restricted to the statistically relevant sample of authorship, CINT presents four co-authorships, three of them among Brazilians, and one of them between a Brazilian scholar based in São Paulo’s USP, and a Polish scholar. In the case of RBPI’s statistically significant authorships, there are two co-authorships, and they are both among Brazilian scholars.

These dynamics paint a picture of a rather provincialized IR, given that Brazilians are also the scholars who have published the least, in absolute values, in comparison with the Indians and the Chinese in Kristensen’s sample of top 20 international publications and their authorships from 1990 until 2014. It is also interesting to contrast said provincial trend with Brazilian scholars (N=191) answers to the TRIP Survey 2014 when asked about the competitiveness of a scholar who has taken his or her PhD at
a US university vis-à-vis one who complete his or her PhD in Brazil. 49.74% of the scholars said those who complete their PhD abroad are generally advantaged to compete in the Academic job market in Brazil, while 38.22% said they do not think so, and 12.04% responded they did not know.

This varies considerable when the economic ideology of the respondents is factored in. Liberals and Conservatives generally consider yes, people who complete their PhDs in the US will have advantages in the academic job market in Brazil. Nonetheless, those who consider themselves in the ‘middle of the road’ ideologically radically differ. Among these, 65.45% say yes; and 21.82% say no, scholar graduated in the US for their PhDs will not have any advantages in Brazil’s Academic job market.

When it comes to social ideologies, and the same denominations, yes prevails in all of the social ideological affiliations, with the exception of the Liberals, who tend to say yes and no in a similar proportion. Socially conservatives and those socially in the ‘middle of the road’, in turn, group around yes.

Hence, the scholars’ engagement in macro-political narratives, both in terms of economic and social ideologies, tend to have a significant impact on their behavior while composing the boards that will decide the profile of scholar who will be introduced into the system. Nonetheless, when we analyze the national affiliation of the most viewed authors at CINT and RBPI, we may infer that, once within Brazil’s IR Higher Ed System, these scholars tend to let go of (most of) their international networking or not to value co-authorship with scholars based abroad as much as they value the education a Brazilian scholar receives in a US PhD. As a result, to investigate the existence of a Non-Western IR, or of Global IR, several features must be considered, including the geo-cultural formal education of IR scholars, a micro-social element of the sociology of IR, but also such macro-political issues as economic and social ideological affiliations.

Examining the existence of Non-Western Theory, Acharya & Buzan (2007) reach out to Wight’s question back in the 1960s of why there would be no international theory. Based on the English School prominent, the authors question if there would not be a Non-Western theory, since the trigger to theoretical insight would be the exceptionally of the extreme – such as revolution or civil war in the case of political theory. Facing a more stable landscape, the West would thus be able to develop theories over the international (the place of the exceptional of the extreme), while the rest would remain drowning in social, political and economic mud, seeking only to survive. Disengaging
from perspectives that discard micro-social movements in light of macro-political elements, what may be true to certain cases, but not generally, Acharya & Buzan (2007) bluntly disagree with this argument, furthering that

Our explanations for the apparent absence of a non-Western IRT focus not on the total lack of good life in the non-West, but on ideational and perceptual forces, which fuel, in varying mixtures, both Gramscian hegemonies, and ethnocentrism and the politics of exclusion (Acharya, 2000). Some of these explanations are located within the West, some within the non-West, and some in the interaction between the two (Acharya & Buzan, 2007: 288).

Once again, the sociology of science is to be emphasized, alongside with the importance of historiography to IRT (or of whose history is told). Together with local, national and regional narratives, they would transcend macro-political and micro-social shackles, yet considering the implications of Marxism-inspired Coxian Critical Theory approach on IRT - that ‘Theory is always for someone and for some purpose (Cox 1981: 207).’

Clearly adopting an affiliation to a traditional thought underpinning IRT, such as Gramsci’s contribution to Critical Theory, or providing less theoretical debate with established IRTs, like Realism and Liberalism, authors who investigate Non-Western Theory, for example Tickner (2003), take note also of the importance of metaphysical reflections upon traditional epistemologies. Understanding these intents in the scope of expanding for instance ontologies building theoretical capacity to cope with non-State actors or to provide theoretical insights that do not reaffirm the conflictual dynamics of the great powers’ grasp of anarchy.

Tickner (2003) and others would intend to draw efforts into figuring out what has already been produced outside of an Anglo-Saxon tradition, willing to disclose the extent to which there is a Non-Western IRT, focusing on disclosing national variations sometimes even concluding there is no Non-Western Theory. Acharya (2011), in his turn, sheds light on ‘how to redress this problem [of apparent positivist or Western-affiliated Non-Western thinking] and move forward’ (Acharya 2011: 620). Willing to approach how to change this theoretical reality, the author thusly affirms:

Questions about what to study, how to study and even where to study IR are involved. Resolving all these controversies and finding common ground may not be possible, or even desirable. But having a dialogue over them seems timely and essential to the original cause that everyone agrees on: that the current parochialism and ethnocentrism of ‘International Relations’ as a field of study, especially its dominant theoretical approaches, are unacceptable and perhaps untenable. (...) how we develop IR into a more genuinely universal discipline depends very much on what we think is missing from it now. My main argument is that while one cannot and should not seek to displace existing (or
future) theories of IR that may substantially originate from Western ideas and experiences, it is possible, through dialogue and discovery, to build ‘alternative theories about the functioning of international relations that have their origin in the South’. Moreover, one should acknowledge and encourage dialogue within as well as between cultures and locations, East, West, North, South, to make the project of discovery worthwhile and productive (Idem).

Projecting an attitude that distances himself from an ideological rejection of the built IRT knowledge, Acharya (2011) then points toward a direction where inquiry over the existing Southern or non-Western thought in IRT ought to be globally approached in order to provide a more fruitful debate for the evolution of the discipline. By addressing if existing (and changing) IR theories already contemplate Non-Western realities, if indigenous inputs are simply conceptual and theoretical efforts that end up mimicking Western theories and if national or regional schools are the best means to approach the existence of a Non-Western IRT, the author glimpses on possible research agendas. The genealogy of international systems, the matter of the agency of the South, the human dimension of IR, the role of Area Studies, the study of regions and regionalism, and, as he deems more relevant, the epistemology of IR knowledge, all figure among possible researches that add to diversity and dialogue in IRT (Acharya 2011: 626).

Certain Brazilian authors, such as Cervo (2009) and Sombra Saraiva (2009), would have been following both their directions for long, while they believe they can forge a type political science of international relations, especially via systematic conceptualizations. However, they do not intend to stretch their epistemological findings toward universalization. On the contrary, they defend their methods, as well as their conceptualizations can only be applied to the Brazilian case, and perhaps to the Argentinian. This local theory-behavior refers to the institutional collaboration between IR scholars from the University of Brasilia and their counterparts in the University of Rosario, as well as in the University of Buenos Aires, a partnership that can be traced at RBPI’s most viewed authors, who, among their statistically relevant samples, include two Argentinians, besides, within the second most viewed author’s citations, Argentinians are frequent sources of reflections in their publications. Cervo and Sombra Saraiva underscore the extreme relevance of historiography to compose a solid, grounded IR knowledge produced in Latin America. Tickner (2003a) rehearsed going through a Latin American historiography. However, Brazilian and
Argentinian authors themselves have since the 1990s begun to overtly research together under the effort to find common ground on their ways of telling their history (Rapoport and Cervo 2002). Although, as it will be realized, Acharya (2011) makes interesting points regarding Latin America’s idiosyncratic contribution to creating norms in the field of IR, Tickner (Idem) fails to present the narrative behind her historiography.

Skeptics regarding the existence of Non-Western IRT usually point out to the fragility of the concept of the West. In this matter, it becomes clear that the search for a Non-Western Theory builds upon the premise that IRT is or has been a Western theory. Following the accusations first systematized in Hoffmann (1977) and having observed Bibliometric data, Kristensen (2015) opens the black box of geographic affiliations in IR to find out that “there are peripheries within the US core and cores within the non-US periphery” (Kristensen, 2015: 247). He underlines that the diversity seen in IR publications and thinking the 1960s thenceforth is still rather concentrated: “The production of knowledge in top IR journals is not dominated by “America” but is clustered in elite networks centered around certain nodes in North America, Western Europe, and Israel (Kristensen, 2015: 248).” IR would then be more than an American social science, but less than an international social science: it would be a Western social science.

Moreover, Wæver (1998: 701-702) selects a sample of publications to compare the meta-theoretical orientations of national variations within Europe and the American way of producing IR. He selects two leading journals from each side of the North Atlantic, and provides the following codification to analyze their content:

(i) formalized rational choice, game theory, modeling; quantitative studies;
(ii) non-formalized rationalism, soft rational choice, such as most neorealism/neoliberalism, and a few independent currents;
(iii) non-post-modern constructivism;
(iv) the radicals: post-structuralists, Marxists, or feminists;
(v) Other: purely historical or policy articles (with no theory); articles discussing authors; articles that draw on theories of other fields.

(Idem: 701)

Almost each author who deals with Global IR through an empirically-oriented approach (Wemheuer-Vogelaar et al 2016: 19) follows the same path of qualitative analysis of journals and content evaluation. Tickner (2003) thusly justifies this approach by stating that the
Qualitative content-analysis is concerned with the formulation of hypotheses or the discovery of new relationships derived from the analysis of texts (George, 1959:8–9). As a result, qualitative analysis allows for greater margin in the interpretation of non-quantitative data (Idem: p.335).

Citing Wæver (1998), the author grants that ‘Journals provide one of the most accurate pictures of the state of a given discipline in terms of its theoretical tendencies, major concerns, and primary debates’ (Idem: 697). Tickner then explains how she selected the specialized journals over which she conducted a qualitative content analysis. In Brazil, she picked Contexto Internacional, and the criteria underpinning this choice were “(1) uninterrupted publication for ten years or more, (2) regional and international circulation, and (3) linkage with a teaching program (Tickner, 2003: p.339).” Again, as did Wæver (1998), she also underlines the criteria she used to identify thinkers to one or another theoretical tradition. She, in her turn, reads theory as it follows:

(i) classical state-centric tradition (classical realism, neorealism, neoliberal institutionalism);
(ii) classical non-state-centric tradition (interdependence, liberalism, integration theory);
(iii) the general classic tradition (includes all of those works that exhibit the principal concerns and assumptions of the classical tradition, but fail to express a clear preference about the central actors of the international system (state or non-state). The great majority of IR textbooks that address the so-called ‘major debates’ of the discipline, and are widely used in IR theory courses, work between the state-centric and nonstate-centric variants of the classical tradition;
(iv) Marxist/neo-Marxist tradition (imperialism, dependency theory, world-system, critical theory);
(v) Post-modern tradition (postmodernism, poststructuralism, gender, postcolonialism);
(vi) Constructivist tradition;
(vii) Latin American Hybrid (draws upon distinct concepts derived from dependency theory, Morgenthauian realism and interdependence);
(viii) Foreign Policy Analysis;
(ix) Other.

(Tickner 2003a: 335)

The use of qualitative analysis can be rather efficient to reveal meaning. To engage in content-analysis by coding data, seeking themes, concepts or narratives can be groundbreaking, especially for a discipline that does not usually reflect upon its own sociology. Nonetheless, while Wæver's (1998) open coding pinpoints the level of internationalization IRT actually carries might apply to European cases, namely to Western European traditions, Tickner's (2003a;2003b) labels might fall short of actually ‘hearing the voices’ of Latin American IR, since

Methodological language and labels are presented and located within a particular time, space, and cultural context. Additionally, different uses of language and labels are often historical and ideological, building from and
referring to traditions, intertextual connections, and values and beliefs of the users. Methodological labels are stances and indications of linguistic material connections. Labels matter, since they serve as epistemological markers, ontological reference points, and personal preferences (Koro-Ljungberg 2015: 11).

Is Latin America located in the same ‘particular time, space, and cultural context’ of those labels Tickner uses to code the region’s participation in the narrative of IRT? If it does, are those ‘language and labels’, when applied to Latin America, used in the same historical and ideological backgrounds, in the same traditions, intertextual connections, values and beliefs intrinsic to those categories? The possibility that they do not carry the same referential, at least in some of these categories, are troublesome for the author’s epistemological and ontological findings whose pinnacle is the Latin American Hybrid (LAH), which will be explored in detail in Chapter 2.

Legitimation is central to any scholar who seeks to advance his or her career climbing as fast and painless as possible the metrics of rank throughout the world. Qualitative research, particularly content-analysis, has been a frequent path adopted by scholars who deal with Non-Western, non-mainstream, marginalized, less appealing themes, concepts and narratives to IRT. IR’s communication system seems to have legitimized their option to the extent that Wemheuer-Vogelaar et al (2016: 19) thusly describes the empirically-oriented approach to Global IR.

Koro-Ljungberg (2015) warns about the weaknesses such attempts exactly by highlighting, on one hand, possible “shallow conceptual links' to 'socially accepted' qualitative research practices used mainly to gain reviewers' trust and create a sense of expertise’ (Idem, p.20), what, on another hand, tends to result in the validation of one’s findings and studies. In the case of a possible Brazilian contribution to Global IR under its second generation, it is paramount to acknowledge that 'labels are necessary yet inaccurate' (Ibid: 22). Their inaccuracy may result from time, space, cultural context, history, ideology, traditions, intertextual connections, values and beliefs. Nonetheless, ‘[T]hey are necessary for engaging in various forms of dialogue, producing text, and showing intertextual connections between discourses and within texts (...)’ (Koro-Ljungnerg 2016: 22). Thus, the aim to find a Non-Western contribution to IR through qualitative analysis faces a rather objective challenge of credibility.

If the author does not bring up traditionally validated knowledge in the form of tradition Western IR, even though it might not apply, he or she runs the risk of not getting published, not being read, hence not contributing to the debate. On the course of a
qualitative investigation under the guise of Global IR, one of the key moments is precisely that when the researcher engages with data analysis through a process of open coding.

‘You are now at a point where you can see how to move from raw data to meaningful concepts or themes. I call this the three Cs of analysis: from coding to categorizing to concepts’ (Gibbs, 2012, p.251). Gibbs provides six steps that would address the three Cs: (i) Initial Coding; (ii) Revisiting Initial Coding; (iii) Developing an initial list of categories; (iv) Modifying initial list based on additional reading; (v) Revisiting your Categories and Sub-Categories; (vi) Moving from Categories to Concepts (Idem: 251-255).

Gathered the data, then, the most sensitive aspect to Global IR would thus far be the mindset that leads to open coding and its revisitation, hence the importance of a consistent and prior literature review about the particular variation the researcher seeks to address, so the observer’s eyes are trained to smell clues, to trust his or her own gut when it comes to different or equal but not quite the same traditions, not only those of the mainstream. If, like Wæver (1998), Herz (2002) and Tickner (2003), the researcher clings to a mainstream interpretation of the texts, he or she will run a high risk of hardly being capable of putting his or her finger on a Non-Western contribution to IR. Before gathering the data, which is usually when the researcher's brain starts coding it, it is also of paramount importance to learn about what sets of references pervade his or her own thoughts.

Hoffmann (1977) and Wæver (1998) provide indications over what to consider while designing a framework that would establish the structure upon which IR thinking in Brazil has developed, what thusly allows a more accurately coding process, categorization and conceptualization. When Hoffmann (1997) assesses the reasons why IR flourished as a discipline in the United States especially in the post-1945 world, he, willingly or not, engages in a debate that crosses those under the guise of the new sociology of science. The author highlights three elements that would have been essential for IR to become an American social science: (i) the US intellectual predisposition; (ii) the US political circumstances; (iii) the US institutional opportunities. Hoffmann sees as an advantage for the proliferation of all social sciences in the US post-war scenario the presence of a national ideology shared by Americans from the Right and the Left Wings, and most importantly by the political elites, in which there would be a
profound conviction (...) that all problems can be resolved, that the way to resolve them is to apply the scientific method - assumed to be value free, and to combine empirical investigation, hypothesis formation, and testing - and that the resort to science will yield practical applications that will bring process (Hoffmann 1977: 45).

This national creed in science would have also been peculiar on its faith that social sciences could achieve the same universality and precision of natural sciences through methodological efforts that would unveil a ‘master key’, ‘an operational paradigm’, that could thusly explain and solve every problem. Political Science in the US, which Hoffmann deems the mother of the field of IR, would be optimistic over the possibility of disclosing its own master key, since, like Economics - the most exact science among social sciences - , since it would deal with matters of scarcity, competition, power, unlike other areas ‘which deal with more diffuse phenomena and which are less obsessed by the solution of pressing problems by means of enlightened central action’ (Ibid: 46).

Moreover, unlike other Western traditions that in the post-war period engaged in existentialist critics or in philosophical exercises concerned with denouncing instead of creating, and even though American political scientists recognized that knowledge was power, they did not hesitate to seek knowledge for power. Besides, the immigration of European scholars running away from the Second World War provided the US social sciences, and especially the country’s Political Science, with injections of talents of different sorts’, and ‘these were scholars whose philosophical training and personal experience moved them to ask far bigger questions than those much of American social science had asked so far, questions about ends, not just about means (Hoffmann 1977: 46).

The virtù of American social scientists addicted to methodology met the fortune of being complemented by European scholars who then played the role of conceptualizers, in addition to bringing

with them a sense of history, an awareness of the diversity of social experiences, that could only stir comparative research and make something more universal of the frequently parochial American social science (Idem: 47).

Not by coincidence, within the field of International Studies, Area Studies is far more developed in the US than in any other country in the world, including European nations with their Erasmus. These scholars had supposedly arrived in the US seeking ‘to find out the meaning and the causes of the catastrophe that had uprooted them, and
perhaps the keys to a better world’ (Ibid). The role the US played in the post-1945 world further spurred their and the American scholars’ interest in investigating the reality of power abroad, not domestically, adding up to the US Political Science tradition the investigation of US Foreign Policy, what meant studying the international system, as well as the study of the international system, what ‘could not fail to bring one back to the role of the US’ (Hoffmann 1977: 47).

On the side of the political scientist, there was the desire to research what sounded relevant during the Cold War, as well as to contribute to the community, to society’s well-being, not only as scientists, but as expert citizens, pundits, that could provide high-level knowledge to better shape public policies. On the side of the politician, or of the practitioner, or of the political elites, two aspects contributed to the serendipity of their encounter with political and social scientists: their conscience over the shortcomings of the US positions in the past (isolationism and the First World War; neutrality, appeasement, and the Second World War, amongst others), and the fact that they shared said national ideology, they believed in science, and namely in the science carried out in the US, respecting truth, freedom of investigation, of discussion, of publications, all values that DC defended in its foreign affairs, and to which US citizens had literally made the ultimate sacrifice to guarantee. Hence, politically, the US had the alleged perfect combination of scholarship and politicians for the development of the science of IR.

Institutionally, the US would have offered ‘the most direct and visible tie between the scholarly world and the world of power’ what has been translated into foundations, or, more recently, into think tanks, offering funding for scholars who carry a combination of intellectual courage to contest ‘the frontiers of knowledge’ and their ‘civic desire to be of service’, a ‘sociological peculiarity’ (Ibid: 50). Moreover, argues Hoffmann, in the US, universities have been the sources of most discoveries, in spite of, independent
of, public fundings. The structure of higher education in the US would have lent universities two ‘immense virtues’: flexibility, since they do not follow general regulations provided by States in ‘quasi-feudal traditions’ that render universities financially dependent of the country’s political and economic whims; besides, IR itself would have profited from a well-established and large-range departmental structure provided by Political Science, having been born unleashed from diplomatic training programs (Hoffmann 1977: 50).

Wæver (1998) also describes macro-political and micro-social elements the researcher would bear in mind while coding data regarding Non-Western IR. The author argues that by understanding (i) societal and political traces of a country; (ii) the standing structure of this country’s social science in general; (iii) and the internal intellectual and social structures of that country’s IR as a discipline in particular, the researcher intends to grasp the data and code it in what he or she understands to be a less ‘shallow’ manner, less inclined to meet ‘socially accepted’ rules of research. The next steps -to develop an initial list of categories and to modify this initial list in light of additional reading- imply that the researcher will inevitably face problems of legitimacy and representativeness.

It is not necessarily a problem that the author seeks validation (and complying with measures that advance his or her career). Nonetheless, sticking to pre-conditioned categories in spite of coding efforts to reach a less ‘shallow’ understanding is equally counterproductive to bluntly neglecting or denying the existence and the influence of traditional perspectives in local, national and regional variations of IR thinking. The most demanding task seems then to be to balance the old and the new, the traditional and the particular, especially when it is time to move from categories to concepts, then finally revealing whether there is a special meaning in the researcher's sample that may lead to a singular contribution to science.

Global IR literature has dealt with an underlying cul-de-sac to this issue, which is what to look for when coding national variants of IR, the similar or the different? Tackling this legitimation dilemma, Acharya (2011) and Bilgin (2008) provide two perspectives. Acharya relies on the peculiarities behind Non-Western thinking and the need to transcend epistemological shackles in an attempt that Wemheuer-Vogelaar et al (2016: 19) would name normative-conceptual Global IR. Bilgin (2008), in turn, also through a normative-conceptual approach, draws attention to the opposite
of the peculiar as a better manner of grasping Non-Western thinking and its contribution to IRT.

Braveboy-Wagner (2003) adds to this debate over what should we focus, the same, or the not quite, however still very much inspired in the macro-social sphere, or by the object of study itself:

> Although in some ways third world nations still seem to cling to older perspectives on the role of the state and state power, as well as inequality and dependency, they have also had to modify their approaches to incorporate new realities (Idem: 1).

Acharya’s (2011) insights shed light on the relevance of the national and the regional contributions to IRT, if only there are less restrictive criteria regarding what contents can actually be considered IR and how to retrieve IR knowledge. Of ‘[P]art of the answer lies in broadening our conception of what the philosophy of science behind IR actually means (Acharya 2011: 633)’. In discussing the latter, the author underscores that the importance of the constitutive features of science ought to be nuanced in the analysis of Non-Western Theory contributions. For instance, non-orthodox sources of knowledge might foster new understandings regarding ‘the contexts, motivations and outcomes of the behavior of actors embedded within these beliefs and approaches’ (Acharya 2011: 636). That is to say, the systematic feature, the success in tackling criticism and particularly the intention to produce worlded knowledge cannot get in the way of the recognition of different patterns that might help better understanding, explaining or even predicting international relations. Acharya’s (2011) warnings over an excessive and prejudicial adhesion to hard science go hand-in-hand Hoffmann’s (1977) concerns with the development of IR thinking:

> The field has both suffered and benefited from a triple fragmentation – benefited, insofar as much ingenious research has been brought to each fragment, yet suffered because the pieces of the puzzle do not fit. First, there has been (and still is) the so-called level of analysis problem. (...) Second, there has also been fragmentation at each level of analysis. One could say, not so flippantly, that each student of international systems has hugged his own version of what that abstract scheme “is”. (...) Third, there has been functional fragmentation as well. If there is, or can be, no satisfactory general theory, if the overarching concepts are excessively loose-fitting clothes, why not try greater rigor on a smaller scale (Hoffmann, 1977: p. 52-54)?

Hoffmann (1977) grapples with the fact that IRT could benefit from ingenious research, but these, at the time, did not fit the established scientific status. When he nails down the most common shortcomings of those ‘ingenious’ contributions, he finds that the toolbox IRT offers has not sufficed to understand let alone explain and predict a
reasonable amount of international phenomena. Also, he contends with the possibility of universal theories aiming to explain extracts of reality or behavior, summing up these attempts as following:

On the one hand, there is the debate between those traditionalists, who precisely because of the resistance the field itself opposes to rigorous theoretical formulations, extol the virtues of an approach that would remain as close to historical scholarship and to the concerns of political philosophy as possible (this is the position taken by Hedley Bull), and all those who, whatever their own brand of theorizing, believe that there can be a political science of international relations – if not in the form of a single theory, at least in that of systematic conceptualizations, classifications, hypotheses, etc. – a science which can be guided in its questions by the interrogation of past philosophers, yet finds reliance on philosophical discourse and diplomatic intuition both insufficient and somewhat alien to the enterprise of empirical analysis (Hoffmann, 1977: p. 52-54).

Qualitative research, namely content analysis, of Non-Western IR may overcome these hurdles, and both Wæver (1998) as well as Tickner (2003) engage with such an attempt. Notwithstanding, in the case of Global IR, coding data gains special relevance since it may assess said "ingenious" contributions through lenses designed to fail to provide dialogue between the Western and the Non-Western, mute, insensitive to the data they are gathering. The findings of these studies would be potentially moot for

When labels and their uses are not situated in discursive, epistemological, and theoretical context, proposed meanings, uses of labels or things that labels do cannot easily be dismantled or questioned on epistemological and theoretical grounds by other discourses or language users. In this case, researchers may establish an illusion of a generalizable label that can be used uncritically across contexts. By doing this, researchers grant a sort of conceptual immunity to the labels -a view from nowhere- as if a label associated with nothing is possible (Koro-Ljungberg 2015: 20).

Possibly, then, the downsides of Hoffmann’s (1977) triple fragmentation are of a significant larger magnitude. Even though addressing a more traditional region, game-changing contributions might have slipped Wæver’s (1998) hands precisely in light of the labels the author adopted in his coding endeavor, what also applies to Tickner (2003) and leads to the general aim of this contribution, which is to think past the Latin American Hybrid (LAH) in the case of Brazilian IR. Reaching out to the post-positivist reflections of Bhabha, Bilgin (2008) does not jug with these matters of universality based on the range of the possible, or even likely, peculiarities of Non-Western ideas. Instead, she invites the hypothesis that Non-Western thoughts might be almost the same, but not quite of the Western. She draws to Ling’s (Apud Bilgin 2008) adaptation of Bhabha’s concept of mimicry to IR.
Advocating for a middle course between subsidiarity and localization (Acharya 2011). Pinar urges researchers to go after Non-Western approaches bearing in mind they might be rather similar to the ideas of the West.

This might simply be, but may result from a Non-Western attempt to play by the hegemon’s rules, to have its studies legitimized, what may yield benefits not only in terms of acceptance, and the resulting profits, but also since it allows one to survive, to exist, in the face of the colonizer’s authoritative claim over the right and the right to rule. In addition, says Bilgin (2008), IR has already developed around the world with most of its traditional literature based on Western thinking. Therefore, it would be but natural that some of its analytical categories do have explanatory potential and have too been successfully localized around the world, to use Acharya’s (2011) jargon, rejecting the birth or rebirth of allegedly more authentic ways of thinking. Bilgin (2008) argues for a sociology of IR that does not get stuck into particularities that do not translate into actual theoretical novelty.

Avoiding grappling with empirically-oriented research, Bilgin (2008) seems less concerned with ‘the potential overgeneralization of labels, and the lack of contextual grounding or understanding of historical discourses shaping different language uses (see also Gurtler & Huber, 2006)’ (Koro-Ljungberg 2015: 20). She seems to accept that top-bottom ideas have been assimilated and normalized, and so have their ideologies and values. Yet, from the most assimilated theoretical culture of IRT in the Non-Western world to the more indigenous of all peripheral thoughts, there would be differences, as well as similarities; and to whichever degree the latter prevails the former would still provide theoretical contributions. She is, then, less worried about the consequences of ‘decontextualization’ to ‘conceptual immunity’ than about unveiling what is left after hegemony.

In the case of Latin America, Holsti’s (1985) decontextualization of Neo-Marxism leads to an overgeneralization and to a conceptual immunity that arise in the form of a self-fulfilling prophecy, and neither dependeey theory nor world-system theory would successfully present a new paradigm for IRT. If, on the one hand, the author’s idea that what is ‘too much’ different from the classical paradigm can never validly challenge it not even flirt with the possibility of epistemological synthesis entails that Holst grants dependência and world-system the status of paradigms that argue in the same terms with the classical; on the other hand, reflectivism, in Keohane’s (1988) perspective, encompasses
approaches, such as strongly materialist historical-sociological approaches indebted to Marxism, or political theoretical arguments emphasizing classical political philosophy or international law, which would also be interpretative as they would ‘emphasize the importance of human reflection for the nature of institutions and ultimately for the character of world politics (Idem: 382).

Holsti’s classical paradigm rigidly discards synthesis provided by inter-paradigmatic debates whose counter-paradigm is affiliated to what Keohane describes as reflectivism. This conundrum hints to the imperative of challenging the overgeneralization of labels through shallow conceptual links to socially accepted ways of approaching IR, hence further examining both dependency theory and world-system theory, and of grappling with the question of Neo-Marxism in IRT.

Such blurred assumptions regarding dependency theory and world-system theories as mere corollaries of Neo-Marxism in IR, and the only ones that matter, or their overgeneralization, might stem from Holsti’s hesitance in looking into the ‘divided tendencies within these two formulations’, because his ‘task is not to evaluate the theories as contributions to knowledge, but to examine how they relate to teaching and research in international politics and theory’ (Holsti 1985: 63). Besides, Keohane (1988) does not either engage with the details of how ‘materialist historical-sociological approaches indebted to Marxism’ can be compatible under the same label of reflectivism with post-positivist strands that, for instance, explicitly question dialects and structuralism, core values for Marxian perspectives.

Although Lapid (1989) allegedly solves this equation in regard to the Marxist traditions by addressing the ‘third debate’ acknowledging the structuralism of Marxian ideas, yet their tide-changing treatment of IR ontologies, the slippery conceptual grounds of what Holsti (1985: 86) dubs paradigm #2 remains dissatisfactory.

The relevance of paradigm #2 or of dependency theory and of world-system theory to IRT is, in terms of content, loosely presented. It seems intended to be left implied they have had some or similar levels of impact on IR debates, and although it is stated that the works of seven authors underpin Holsti’s references to both schools, there is no account of how ‘[T]hey are basically concerned with the problem of underdevelopment’ (Holsti 1985: 63), nor of how this ‘new neo-Marxist paradigm’ explores its so-called underpinning problematic: ‘the causes of inequality/exploitation and the conditions for equality, and in some versions, for political and economic autonomy’ (Idem, p. 65-66), or even of how literature in the field of IR actually debates these ideas. It is assumed that ‘[A] number of Latin American economists, sociologists,
and historians’, not concerned with the study of international politics, but rather in response to the theories of economic development of the 1950s and the 1960s, decided to theorize their political opposition to problem-solving models that had historically only created more problems to their region.

Oddly, since Holsti seems to consider dependency theory and world-system theory a paradigm capable of challenging the classical, the author also affirms the impossibility of synthesis from such debate, since ‘[T]o change questions and then to conclude that models designed to answer other questions are outmoded is neither substantively nor theoretically sound (Sullivan 1982: 212, Apud Ibid: 129)’. If it is unclear why Holsti picked dependency theory and world-system theory as one paradigm, it is then even less understandable why he goes through the trouble of assessing the debate between these two -as one paradigm- and the classical paradigm, since he knows, from the beginning, they are concerned with different realities even though they follow the three-fold epistemological criteria he establishes for legitimizing knowledge as part of the field of International Relations in general, and of the Theory of IR in particular.

Celebrating paradigm #2’s capacity to outreach to the mainstream of the IRT, Holsti on a different note points out that institutional mechanisms for communications are increasingly developing, in contrast with IR's deepening parochialism, possibly seeking to validate his study through "'socially accepted' qualitative research practices" (...) "to demonstrate and reproduce acceptable knowledge that can lead to acknowledgement, further acceptance, and belonging’ (Koro-Ljungberb 2015: 20).

The author (Holsti 1985: 147-148) then minimizes the relevance of structural constraints to an actual internationalization of IRT blaming researchers for refraining from proactively engaging in a true global community. Empirically-oriented through bibliometric data, the author examines the national affiliations of references within textbooks used in IR in the US, the UK, South Korea, India, France, Canada and Australia (‘[T]he Anglophone Peripheries’ (Idem: 94)), and Japan.

Holsti (Ibid: 126-128) concludes that throughout the twentieth-century, there has been a trend toward greater parochialism in the field of IR with two peculiarities: an increasing focus on US-based references, and an increasing emphasis on local, national or regional-appropriate references, as the author argues ‘[M]ost books are written for national, not international audiences. And, as suggested, the policy problems -the questions that command diplomatic as well as scholarly attention- are not the same world over’ (Op cit: 127).
Home to most of the seven authors he cites as sources to dependency theory and to world-system theory, Brazil does not appear in Holsti’s sample, and yet his normalization of theoretical labels restrains his capacity to grasp reality, which the author himself figures out when he eases the criteria in regardsto IR literature in India. It is curious, to say the least, that the intellectual source of those theories is not included among the author’s samples. This research seeks also to fill this gap by, in the case of Brazilian IR, seeking to findings from TRIP 2014, from Kristensen’s interviews, and from the content-analysis of RBPI’s and CINT’s Top 100 most viewed articles, what may produce more representative findings, and theoretical contributions that may have been produced via less orthodox discussions around development or identity for instance.

Furthermore, if ‘[L]abels matter’ and ‘are stances and indications of linguistic material connections’, when it comes to Brazilian IR, Wæver’s (1998) preliminary selection based on what were the leading journals in terms of impact factor cannot be applied, since such is not a consolidated measure among Brazilian publications. Tickner’s (2003) preliminary choice, in turn, has deep implications regarding the results of her research. The fact that RBPI is not linked to any post-grad program does not excuse the fact that for twenty three years it has been edited by, and only by, scholars affiliated to IRel’s post-grad program. Moreover, the Brazilian institution who grants the qualification of publications, CAPES, under the Qualis system, deems RBPI more qualified (A1) than CINT (A2). Therefore, Tickner’s (Idem) work ends up carrying an important bias concerning the Brazilian contribution to the theoretical debate of IR.

In regard to the division Wæver (1998) and Tickner (2003) establish over the theory of IR, there are a few concerns about their ‘(un)critical use’ in a qualitative research of the Brazilian case. Wæver’s (Idem) inclusion of post-structuralists and Marxists within the same label disregards a very dear distinction for scholars at IRI and IRel:

There is disagreement [among IR scholars at IRel UnB and at IRI PUC-Rio] on the usefulness of IR theory and these diverging approaches to IR theory import/indigenization in Brazil are embedded in institutional divides. (…) The Brasília School rejects American IR theory in favor of Brazilian foreign policy concepts. The PUC school is critical of both Eurocentrism and the Brazilianization strategy, but advocates engagement with critical ‘theories’. (Kristensen 2015a: 505)

Also, when Wæver downplays the relevance of theories from other fields, he fails to capture the very diversity Non-Western Theory usually seeks. Tickner (Idem), in her turn, also minimizes the impact of ‘Other’ theories, while simplifying the Latin American
Hybrid which becomes restricted to three previously accepted labels derived from analyses of random authors who wrote from the 1950s until the 1970s whose impact in explicitly IR literature, for instance, on Foreign Policy, is not examined.

When dealing with, for example, the concept of autonomy in Brazilian literature, the author restricts herself to Jaguaribe’s work. While his contribution has been influential, Gerson Moura’s, to name one, who is actually one of the founders of IRI, has also dealt with the concept of autonomy. Jaguaribe, as presented in the Introduction, has significant scientific capital across all social sciences in Brazil, but his temporal capital is very much connected to a macro-political sphere. Gerson Moura has scientific and temporal power in the micro-social arena of IR in Brazil. Even though Jaguaribe’s scientific capital in IR is significant, according to RBPI’s pre-1997 sample, where he is the third most published author, Gerson Moura’s impact was not only institutional, through the construction of IRI PUC-Rio, but also fails to be properly measured, since the bulk of his scientific capital is contained in manuscripts, in books, not in indexed articles, unless one examines IR syllabi and the most cited books across IR’s journal publications.

Besides, Tickner (2003) states that in 1995 Escudé’s peripheral realism ‘constitutes the only exhaustive conceptual endeavor in recent Latin American International Relations’, failing to comprise for instance Cervo’s (1994) or Soares de Lima’s (2013) substantive efforts. Later in 2009, Tickner and Wæver joined forces to edit volumes regarding the capacity to theorize beyond the West. Then they acknowledge the need to pinpoint concrete mechanisms that shape IR in different geo-cultural sites, coming up with debates over geo-epistemologies, and the underlining the need to reach for theories from the sociology and the history of science, post-colonialism, etc. (Wæver and Tickner 2009: 1)

The discipline seems to be heading – slowly and reluctantly – toward increased sociological reflexivity, but one major aspect is still missing: detailed and comprehensive accounts of the core–periphery structure so deeply entrenched within it (Wæver and Tickner 2009: 3). When the authors underscore the missing rationale in IRT is exactly the core- periphery structure the system itself produces, they add to
the voices in the Global South\textsuperscript{15} who, explicitly or not, affiliate to certain lines of thought.

Tickner (2013), for instance, alleges Latin American ideas would forge a Latin American Hybrid under a strong core-periphery assessment. Instead of sovereignty and non-intervention, for example, Latin Americans would approach autonomy as the central principle on which their States rely to exist. If Tickner (Idem) goes with the Latin American flow, denying any direct debate between their ideas and the rationalists’ or the reflectivists’ in IRT, this research intends to understand exactly those connections after Wæver and Tickner’s (2009) following provocations:

On the other hand, the study of various “third world” contexts has led to claims that key IR concepts, including the state, self-help, power, and security, do not “fit” third world realities and may not be as relevant as others for thinking about the specific problems of such parts of the world. Connecting the two should bring to light how IR knowledge is shaped by the privileging of the core over the periphery and the formation of key concepts based solely on core perspectives (Tickner & Wæver, 2009: p.1)

Establishing a missing dialogue, this contribution expects to extract from triangulations of an interview, a survey, and a content-analysis possible contributions to IR. If the agent-structure debate, or its transcendence, appears to be the link between rationalism and reflectivism in IRT, taken for granted or deeply deconstructed and neglected, anarchy is definitely at the core of IRT (Keohane 1989; Buzan and Little 2010; Rodrigues 2010). This research hopes to analyze for instance how Brazilian literature dialogues with anarchy, be it via the notion of sovereignty or autonomy, guns or butter. In case this literature provides theoretical contributions that differ from the Western, or that gather them in a different manner, perhaps as Tickner (2003) signalizes, but not necessarily, this research will have confirmed its hypothesis. If it does not, as previously asserted, it will have at least discarded a few paths, contributing to the scientific evolution of IR via the Non-Western Theory discussions.

Chapter 1 presented the general IR literature that has given way to this research. Chapter 2 cuts to the chase, and, through a methodological conversation, starts exploring a Brazilian variation, or a Brazilian contribution to Non-Western Theory/Global IR. It paves the way for a qualitative analysis of this variation through the triangulation of Kristensen’s (2015a) interviews, Brazil’s faculty answers to TRIP

\textsuperscript{15} For a better discussion about the term Global South vis-à-vis Third World, see Braveboy-Wagner (2009:3).
Survey 2014, and a content-analysis led by this Dissertation of RBPI’s and CINT’s bibliometric data since their respective foundation.


Woody Allen usually says that ‘[C]onfidence is what you have before you understand the problem (Geary 2007: 9).’ This could easily be the epigraph to basically all chapters of this Dissertation. However, I choose to initiate this second chapter, in light of the following situation.

I started my Higher Education in IR at IRI PUC-Rio. I was part of the first four classes of their undergrad program, and back then they were a bit reluctant to create a pedagogical project that would differ from their traditional post-grad programs. Thus, my undergrad studies were primarily research-oriented, and focused on IRT. Scholars such as Nicholas Onuf and Rob Walker were habitués at IRI, and so was our familiarity with all post-positivist strands. Personally, I had an urge to research matters related to Brazil, specially to Brazilian Foreign Policy. Plus, I knew the University of Brasília had the most traditional program in IR –even though their PhD is younger than IRI’s, their expertise in IR as an independent discipline dated back to the 1970s, and Itamaraty itself relied on their professors, as well as on their intellectual production to socialize Brazilian diplomats.

When I arrived at IRel UnB to take my MPhil, I realized they tended to the opposite of IRI PUC-Rio: they did not care that much about theoretical IR, what matters is that you have a strong object of study from which you can derive patterns and reflections inspired by the work they themselves had been doing at least since the 1980s, but that they trace back to historians of diplomatic history, including, some of them argue, E. H. Carr (Saraiva 2006: 134-137). Also, they teach a class on the Historiography of International Relations, besides that on IRT, and another one on Methodology: the tripod of the post-grad curriculum. At least for those scholars who work under the area of concentration on the History of International Relations –the reason I had moved from Rio de Janeiro to the savannah of Brasília – cared little about methodology, although they did value method, internal logic in interpreting primary sources, while
making sense and providing a sense of continuity or of rupture to State policies toward the international arena. Methodology, however, was not neither IRI’s strongest suit. IRI’s affiliation to post-positivist philosophies of science leads them to neglect methodology as a result of critiques and rejection of the positivist dogmas of universalism, causation, etc.

Having finished my MPhil, I decided to attend my first International Studies Association (ISA) conference. It was only then that I started to understand the extent of problem. I already had a feeling that what I was doing on my research, especially on that about Brazilian Foreign Policy/Diplomacy, was some kind of text interpretation based on previous interpretations other scholars had done, including when I applied Anglo-Saxon theoretical frameworks tweaking them to fit my object. After presenting my paper ‘Development in Brazilian Foreign Policy’, I received several questions from the audience about the actual extent of Brazil’s benevolence, and, finally, the chair of the Global South Caucus (GSC), the group that was hosting the conference at Sciences Po, got the mic, and told me the Caucus was not a place for people to promote Global South exceptionalism, nor foreign policy expectionalism, and time was over;I could not use the floor to answer to her.

Several colleagues, most of them US colleagues, came down to the stage to express solidarity, and that my research was actually extremely enlightening. Indeed, my presentation and my paper were cited in at least other two roundtables/panels – that I have witnessed – on very positive notes. Nonetheless, I heard what the chair, Prof. Jacqueline Braveboy-Wagner, had said, it had resonated in me. I did sound like I was defending Brazil’s foreign policy, and, as noted in Chapter 1, Kristensen (2015a) would argue that I played the role of a quasi-official scholar. I then approached Jacquie, who is now some kind of mentor in my career, and told her I had listened to the content of her remarks, and thanked her for naming what I had not yet been capable of expressing about my own research: exceptionalism.

The Gramscian or Marxian non-positivism of Critical Theory was, and still is, to me, just as normative as rationalist possibilities, although I do not see any problem in doing rationalist research, as long as you are honest with your reader, and establish the limitations of your research –at least those limitations you and your peer reviewers get to realize before publishing it. I believe in no best science, but in a more honest science, which I largely owe to having read a lot of Cynthia Weber’s contributions (2005; 2009). And then Amitav Acharya was elected ISA President (2014).
In his inauguration address, which later became one of the most cited references in Global IR literature, he encouraged people to do, I thought, exactly what my professors had been doing at IRel UnB for decades: to unveil local, national, and regional traditions. Nonetheless, I had never seen any of Acharya’s or Tickner’s nor Wæver’s work about what was then circulating as Non-Western Theory in any of my professors’ syllabi neither at IRI PUC-Rio nor at IRel UnB (this reality has already changed, as far as I know, since I have had access to IRel’s MPhil’s IRT syllabus, and it does include, for instance, L.H.M. Ling’s book on worlding IR). Yes, this can be a matter of not having realized back then that this content was there, but I had really good grades, and I read a lot, perhaps around 95% of all that was assigned in all classes since my undergrad days. Plus, I still have most of the hand-outs and the syllabi applied in my undergrad and post-grad classes, and, really, it was not there.

Recently, I could confirm that it is very likely that I am right. By the time Brazil’s faculty replied to the TRIP Survey 2014\textsuperscript{16} there was slim to none reference to said debate in the syllabi or in the references my professors taught—or even in their own research I usually read thoroughly. And as discussed in the first chapter, to propose a Non-Western Theory, or Global IR, is to assume IR is Western and parochial. Although they did not have access to said literature, I supposed scholars in Brazil shared this idea, especially since at IRI and at IRel, they seem particularly keen on denouncing rationalism and geopolitics, respectively, as biases of the Theory of IR. Nonetheless, apparently, this was not the reality, and by contrasting the findings of the TRIP Survey 2014 with those of Kristensen’s (2015a) interviews with 32 Brazilian IR scholars (Maliniak et al 2014; Kristensen 2015a: 506-507) we find interesting ground from where to departure to finalize the content-analysis of our RBPI and of our CINT samples in Chapter 4.

When Brazil’s Faculty (N=91) was asked to which extent they agreed or disagreed that IR is a discipline dominated by the West, 89.01% strongly disagreed or disagreed with the assumption; 4.4% neither agreed nor disagreed; and only 6.6% agreed or strongly agreed. The latter are concentrated among scholars who identify their primary paradigmatic affiliation with Realism (8.33% Agree), Other (4.76% Agree; 14.29% Strongly Agree), and with ‘I do not use paradigmatic analysis’ (4.76%).

\textsuperscript{16} ‘Released on September 30th, 2015 as part of the All TRIP Survey Data from February 2014 - October 2016, version 1.0.0 (Maliniak et al 2014).’
When the question shifts to enquire to which extent they (N=101) agreed or disagreed that IR is a discipline dominated by American science, 80.2% strongly disagreed or disagreed, 1.89% neither agreed nor disagreed, and 17.82% agreed or strongly agreed. In this case, the latter is less concentrated. Among scholars who identify their research paradigmatic affiliation to Constructivism, Liberalism, Marxism, Realism, ‘I do not use paradigmatic analysis’, and Other, faculty 32.77% of Liberals agree or strongly agree IR is an American dominated discipline, in the case of Realists, 32.77%, among Constructivists, 14.28%, and throughout those who ‘do not use (...) or who apply Marxist paradigms, 9.52% and 9.09%, respectively, agree or strongly agree with the idea.

This reluctance to assume IR is Western or American dominated is surprising when we factor in the results of the Survey when it asks Brazil’s Faculty (N=170) to freely list ‘four scholars whose work has had the greatest influence on the field of IR in the past 20 years.’ These were the results (the survey provides only the Top 10):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>List four scholars whose work has had the greatest influence on the field of IR in the past 20 years. Please provide both first and last names. (N=170)</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alexander Wendt</td>
<td>35.29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joseph S. Nye Jr.</td>
<td>32.35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robert O. Keohane</td>
<td>30.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barry Buzan</td>
<td>27.06%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenneth Waltz</td>
<td>21.18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John J. Mearsheimer</td>
<td>17.06%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robert W. Cox</td>
<td>12.35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicholas Onuf</td>
<td>7.06%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Samuel Huntington</td>
<td>7.06%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fred Halliday</td>
<td>6.47%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Maliniak et al (2014)

Literally all of these scholars are based in Universities in the US or in Western Europe. This might be a case of hidden figures, very similar to racism in Brazil: it is there, but we strongly believe we are a ‘racial democracy’ – it is so overt, it is covert. At this point,
it is safe to assume when Brazilian scholars replied to the Survey they most likely had not been in touch with literature on Non-Western Theory or on Global IR, otherwise it is also safe to suppose they would have naturally connected the dots.

Literature about how Latin America sees the world highlights, for instance, how scholars from polarized ideologies (‘the left’ and ‘the right’) have argued that the realist-idealist dichotomy in IR theory was in itself prejudicial to Latin America and an element of hegemonic control (…) (Tulchin 2016 :2). This signals to a perception that non-rationalist theories are not imperialist.

It is also possible that the scholars surveyed were concentrated among IRI PUC-Rio’s faculty (and IRI USP’s), where

\[
\text{When it comes to position-taking with/against ‘theory’, (...) [scholars] advocate engagement with Euro-American IR theory – with one sub-strand advocating engagement with critical and post-positivist theory (PUC-Rio)(…)}
\]

(Kristensen 2015a: 507)

In Brazil, in light of IRI PUC-Rio’s tradition, post-positivist theories, ‘particularly critical theories, postmodernism and post-positivist strands’, ‘are the most integrated in the global discipline’ (Idem: 508). Reproducing some of Kristensen’s interviews, it is easier to grasp IRI PUC-Rio’s appreciation for theory, as well as a sense among them that they are the only ones in Brazil who actually teach and research IR properly:

IRI PUC-Rio scholar:

Yeah, I wouldn’t say that there is one discipline of IR in Brazil because people learn different things from different regions. And here we can go up to the latest book in IR theory, and there they are gonna quit learning at the neo-neo debate at the graduate program, not talking about undergraduate. In southern Brazil, a friend of mine who was a professor of IR theory he would go up to the neo-neo and then he would quit and give the Social Theory of International Relations for students, ‘OK, now you read that, that’s bullshit, but that’s constructivism.’ See how it works?

(…)
Yeah, it’s bad, I feel sorry for them. It’s bad, it happens and you’ve gotta deal with this kind of people. If you have a good training in IR theory you know that there are many and much more things involved, talking about normative agenda and talking about post-positivism, talking about how our choices matter. (Ibid: 533)

Kristensen goes on showing us how IRI PUC-Rio scholars consider themselves the only scholars in Brazil who actually engage in theory:

The PUC school is also defined vis-à-vis internal Others. One scholar mentioned a PUC colleague who “says things that are really out of place. But we are a department that is really open in terms of theoretical orientations, we are open, we accept him”. There is room for “out of place” scholars because PUC is open “in terms of the range of issues, research topics that are being studied nowadays, it’s really huge and the theoretical perspectives, you know,
Kristensen argues that ‘[T]his creates a theoretical paradox: Euro-American theories are employed to criticize Eurocentrism, a critique that sometimes undermines itself’ (Op cit). After transcribing the excerpt I am about to cite, Kristensen registers he felt ‘uncomfortable’ in being in a position where he had ‘the burden of proof’, where he had to play the role of a scholar advocating for a perspective scorned by the interviewee (Op cit).

IRI PUC-Rio’s interviewee:

Yeah, yeah, well, you know Rob Walker and Nicholas Onuf are members of the staff and we are very much influenced by their views. I am not embarrassed at all of being influenced by their views. Stefano Guzzini and Anna Leander have visited us also.[...] And Jens Bartelson also, has also influenced us. So it’s true but I don't know, do you wanna call them Western scholars, they are Western scholars in terms of sociology of knowledge, let’s say. But, you know, I was having actually this conversation yesterday, it’s, this is my point of view, this is only my point of view, my perspective is that I wanna know what people can say about relations of domination and alternatives to these relations of domination. I don't care if they come from the West or the East or the moon. So this idea that the geographical insertion is what matters, I don't buy it. (Op Cit)

A different interviewee seems less uncomfortable to assume that IRT is Eurocentric, and even that critiques to Eurocentrism usually come from Western-affiliated scholars, with a few exceptions:

Yeah, at PUC we are all aware of that, that’s why we read Foucault and other poststructuralists. We know that. And that’s why we had, ehm, oh, Inayatullah, the guy was here and taught a course here in international political economy from this different perspective. The Westphalian deferral, the notion that they had, we study that in the graduate courses. It’s not really common in other places. So we have this feeling that we know, we know that IR theory, here at PUC, we know that IR theory is Eurocentric. (Op Cit: 535)

The author also underlines that at IRI PUC Rio scholars ‘reject nationalizing IR along the lines of the Brasília school’. IRI PUC-Rio’ interviewee about IRel UnB’s perspective:

You know, once I saw that guy telling that ‘Hey, why do we need to read Thomas Hobbes, we’ve gotta think about that in a Brazilian way, not reading those foreign guys’. He was quoting Thomas Hobbes and Jacques Rousseau, come on, he is crazy, that’s stupidity. That guy is stupid, sorry to tell you that, you can record that, I am not afraid of that. (Op cit: 535-536)

The interview goes on, and I hereby transcribe it from Kristensen’s Dissertation.
Kristensen: ‘OK, yeah, yeah. But he was, yeah, it’s true he thought that there was a Brazilian way of doing’

Interviewee: ‘Yeah, they do that to promote themselves. Did you talk to him about anything interesting?’

Kristensen: ‘Well, he didn’t, he was, he didn’t seem so much in favor of theory but rather like that there is a Braz’

Interviewee: ‘Does he have any idea what theory is? [laughing]’

Kristensen: ‘I don’t know, I mean, yeah, I guess, but he was more into like peace studies, peace research.’

Interviewee: ‘That’s where you get money from the government and from the military.’

In Brazil, Kristensen highlights, the academic debate, and the scholars’ perspectives over the relevance of ‘theory’ are entrenched in ‘generational and institutional divides’. At IRel UnB, in turn, ‘post-colonialists, postmodernists, constructivists and critical theorists of PUC’ are viewed as ‘the most “mainstream” and “Northern” scholars in Brazil’, a critique to which Kristensen subscribes (Op Cit: 533). According to the author’s interviews with IRel UnB’s scholars, and with others based in São Paulo’s universities, Kristensen concludes that ‘among the first generation of [Brazilian] IR scholars’ they would advocate ‘a move beyond theory towards [sic] nationalized foreign policy concepts (Brasília school)’ (Op cit). They would define the sub-field of the History of Brazilian Foreign Policy in opposition to the sub-field of IRT.

Kristensen (Op cit: 509) reaches out to the TRIP Survey 2014 to find out about ‘the most influential’ Brazilian IR scholars in the past 20 years. There was not a list from where they could pick. Here, a concept from consumer behavior theory might be enlightening. According to the Marketing Dictionary17,

**Top of mind awareness** (or **TOMA**) is defined as the first brand that comes to mind when a customer is asked an unprompted question about a category. The percentage of customers for whom a given brand is top of mind can be measured. In a survey of nearly 200 senior marketing managers, 50% responded that they found the "top of mind" metric very useful. Top of mind or TOMA is the percentage of respondents who, without prompting, name a specific brand or product first when asked about a general product category.

---

17 The dictionary’s academic source is [Farris, Bendel, Pfeifer and Reibstein](2010).
In the sociology of science, the results to a top-of-mind awareness survey can be interpreted in different ways (LSE Impact Blog, Impact of Social Sciences > The Handbook > Chapter 3 > Key measures of academic influence, blogs.lse.ac.uk; Taylor and Kamalski 2012). Thus we will analyze Kristensen’s and the TRIP Survey 2014 findings contrasting them with the results of RBPI’s and CINT’s content-analysis, while inquiring their results based on the key measures of academic influence, their virtues and limitations.

Kristensen (Op Cit) presents the following table he collected from TRIP Survey 2014 top-of-mind scholars among Brazil’s faculty (N=209):

Table 3: TRIP Survey 2014 - Most Influential Scholars in Brazil’s Part of the World in the Past 20 Years

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>#</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Votes</th>
<th>Affiliation</th>
<th>Alma Mater</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Maria Regina Soares de Lima</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>IESP (UERJ)</td>
<td>Vanderbilt University, PhD Political Science USP, PhD Political Science</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Rafael Villa</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>USP</td>
<td>USP, PhD Political Science</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Tullo Vigevani</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>UNESP</td>
<td>USP, PhD Social History</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Amado Cervo</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>UnB</td>
<td>University of Strasbourg, PhD History</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Eduardo Viola Leticia</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>UnB</td>
<td>USP, PhD Political Science</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Letícia Pinheiro</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>PUC-Rio</td>
<td>LSE, PhD International Relations Oxford, PhD International Relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Matias José Flávio Sombra Saraiva</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>UnB</td>
<td>University of Birmingham, PhD History</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Raúl Bernal-Meza</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>UNICEN/Argentina UTDT/Argentina</td>
<td>Sorbonne and PUC-Argentina, PhD Sociology Johns Hopkins, PhD International Relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Monica Herz</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>PUC-Rio</td>
<td>LSE, PhD International Relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Héctor Saint-Pierre</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>UNESP</td>
<td>UNICAMP, PhD Philosophy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>José Luís Fiori</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>UFRJ</td>
<td>USP, PhD Political Science</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Octavio Amorim Neto</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>FGV</td>
<td>UCSD, PhD in Political Science</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Paulo Vizentini</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>UFRGS</td>
<td>USP, PhD Economic History</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Andrés Serbin</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>CEGRE/Argentina UTDT/Argentina</td>
<td>Universidad la Plata, Lic. Social UAFntRhGroSp,oPlohgDy Strategic Studies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Mónica Hirst</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>UTDT/Argentina</td>
<td>UFRGS, PhD Strategic Studies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Marco Cepik</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>UFRGS</td>
<td>IESP (UERJ), PhD Political Science</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
This sample contemplates 54% (248) of the votes, and it only includes the scholars who were appointed more than three times. When we contrast this list with those provided by the content-analysis of RBPI (1997-2017) and CINT (2002-2017), we find the following differences and similarities.

Applying the box plot method to this sample, we find that Maria Regina Soares de Lima and Rafael Villa are outliers, and hence would not be that representative of the patterns and regularities found throughout the rest of the sample. However, at this point, we will not factor them out. The following figure offers a holistic view on the overlap between the TRIP Survey 2014 previous figure, and data extracted from CINT and from RBPI:

Table 4: Most Influential Scholars in Brazil’s Part of the World in the Past 20 Years vis-à-vis their number of publications at RBPI and CINT:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>#</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>RBPI Top 100</th>
<th>RBPI Pre-1997</th>
<th>RBPI Post 1996</th>
<th>CINT Top 100</th>
<th>CINT Pre-2002</th>
<th>CINT Post-2001</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Antônio</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Carlos Lessa</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Cristina</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Pecequilo</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Alcides Costa</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Arlène</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>Eugénio Diniz</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Mario</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Rapoport</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: TRIP Survey (2014) > List the four scholars who have had the greatest influence on the field of IR in your part of the world in the past 20 years (Maliniak et al 2014)

Although it is not available on the survey’s website, Kristensen informs us that scholars who received three votes were appointed by 62% (N=130) of all faculty surveyed.

For both samples, I grouped items based on who would be the most viewed author, hence providing a sense of those scholars’ scientific and temporal capital, and the impact of both leverage into the sample.
One of Global IR’s remarkable contributions to the field of IR is, through its empirically-oriented approach namely by its second-generation scholars, a sociological analysis of the field, and here lies one of its greatest challenges as well. The sociology of
science has quite a few currents, and figuring out which applies best to IR in general, and to Global IR in particular, if it is even possible/desirable to pick a uniform sociology of science to treat each inquiry of Non-Western Theories, is daunting. In the case of this Dissertation, as explored, Kristensen’s interpretation of the new sociology of science – especially its transcendence of the internalism versus externalism debate – is rendered more complex via the inclusion of the macro-political sphere into the study of Brazil’s IR. However, there is at least one more matter in which this research deviates from Kristensen’s:

Apart from the content of journal publications, bibliometric studies of IR increasingly use citation data to assess the state of the discipline. Until recently, citation analysis was used mostly in the literature about the ranking of IR and Political Science journals (Norris and Crewe 1993; Garand and Giles 2003; Giles and Garand 2007) or by the occasional librarian or bibliometrician who conducted “citation analysis for collection development” (L. Zhang 2007). Apart from concerns with rankings and library collections, ‘IR cites’ have recently been employed by more sociological studies that aim to increase reflexivity about IR’s production knowledge by providing insights into its organization and communication patterns, its subfields and relation to other (sub)disciplines, its divisiveness, ‘great debates’ and theoretical imports from other disciplines (including the so-called ‘turns’ to culture, linguistics, visuals, aesthetics, sociology and so on) as well as biases and deficiencies in its citation practice. Some studies employ statistical tools to study what explains citation practice in a selected set of journals, that is, do citations go to the best articles or is citation practice affected by factors not directly related to article quality such as author characteristics, journal outlet, institutional base and so on. The primary focus here has been whether there is a gender bias in citation practices (and studies do find that women are systematically cited less than men) (Young 1995; Mathews and Andersen 2001; Maliniak, Powers, and Walter 2013; Mitchell, Lange, and Brus 2013; Østby, Strand, Nordås, and Gleditsch 2013). Another literature focuses not so much on the biases in citation practice but on the resulting citation networks. Citation network analyses have produced mappings of the citation networks in IR and more specialized literatures like security studies, conflict studies and feminist IR (Soreanu and Hudson 2008; Russett and Arnold 2010; Sillanpää and Koivula 2010) (Kristensen 2015a: 65).

The author recognizes the shortcomings of studying citations as the measure of academic impact in general, but not only does he not specify the problems of this criteria for the particular cases of Brazil, China, and India, but also does he opt to engage in such use.

I choose in this part of the dissertation to study mainstream IR primarily through published research in journals in order to speak to the majority of the existing literature and hopefully contribute to a more reflexive use of bibliometric data in the sociology of IR. One reason is that although bibliometrics is the most prevalent approach in the sociology of IR, there has been little systematic engagement with the specialized literature in bibliometrics, its methodologies and theories. (Idem: 69)
Although bibliometrics has been the methodology of choice, few bibliometric studies of IR contain any theoretical reflections on citation as academic practice. To fill this gap, the paper introduces three theories of citation practice—a normative/Mertonian, constructivist/Latourian and symbolic/Bourdieuian. (Ibid: 70)

The paper illustrates the three theories using empirical data from of the Web of Science: 561,769 citations in 19,811 documents published in 89 IR journals over the recent four years (2010-2013). It looks primarily at aggregated citations: the most cited authors and works in IR. Its main contribution is to present the three theoretically informed readings of this bibliometric data inspired by Merton, Bourdieu and Latour. The paper thus functions as the theoretical and methodological nodal point of part one even though the following papers have their own methodological frameworks and can be read separately.

Third, the paper Dividing Discipline then uses citation data from the Web of Science to construct an IR network as a way to reflect on prevalent divides in the mainstream discipline. The focus in this mapping is on citations as the links that make IR hang together or fall apart. (Op cit: 71)

Although the author does not problematize the use of citations for each of the Non-Western cases in hand, when he actually grapples with the geographic divides within the discipline, he leaves citations by the wayside of his research, not explaining his reasons, but focusing on the geographical patterns of production in IR, yet still visiting a Western-based sample of journals.

The existing literature on American/Western dominance focuses on national, regional, and sometimes even civilizational units, some of which are dominant while others are dominated. The paper problematizes this cartography and extends the analysis beyond self-enclosed national units to focus on relational spaces: the interconnected sites of IR production. It makes a methodological argument for disaggregating nations and instead mapping social networks centered on elite institutions, and co-authorships among them, as a way to analyze the geography of IR. The paper thus constructs a map where there are ‘peripheries in the core’ and ‘cores in the periphery’. (Op cit: 72)

It is rather elevating to ‘step on Kristensen’s shoulders’. His work has laid the foundations for an important debate, and this Dissertation would not exist without his. Yet, the use of citations as a ‘proxy for scientific quality’ is increasingly troublesome, and at times inappropriate, or even useless:

In recent years, however, interest has grown in applications at the author, institute and country level. These developments can be summarized in this chart. The Journal Impact Factor (JIF) was born at a time when there was one delivery route for scholarly articles – paper publications – and computational power was expensive. The migration from paper to electronic delivery (particularly online) has enabled better understanding and analysis of citation count-based impact measurements and created a new supply of user-activity measurements: page views and downloads. Over the past few years, the growing importance of social networking — combined with a rising number of platforms making their
activity data publicly available — has resulted in new ways of measuring scholarly communication activities: one encapsulated by the term altmetrics (Taylor and Kamalski 2012).

Altmetrics also has its complications. The scholarly consumption versus lay consumption issue applies especially for scholars who seek the status of public intellectuals. For instance, scholars who have a stronger presence on social media tend to have a higher viewership. Accounting for viewership through ‘specialized scholar tools’, like research gate or academia.edu, are a possibility that has yet to be consensually established. This is definitely the case of Paulo Roberto de Almeida’s leading viewership at RBPI, who is hence an outlier that will not be included in our content-analysis of Brazil’s IR.

At the statistically relevant strata of RBPI’s Top 64 most viewed authors (1997-2017), he is the only author who has a full and active presence on social media. He is active on Facebook, on Twitter, he has an active blog, a professional page, an active academia.edu account, and a Wikipedia page hosted in Germany, where he served as a Brazilian diplomat. Moreover, he is a diplomat, which can have an impact on his viewership especially in the cases Itamaraty recommends his articles for its personnel or include them in the bibliography of its acceptance exams. Maurício Santoro also represents an outlier alongside with Almeida, since he is an IR scholar with a booming presence on Brazil’s biggest television network, an active presence on social media where he posts up-to-date, live analyses over several, and almost any, burning issues in Brazil’s political agenda, including international events.

This is no problem per se, but since both authors do not appear relevant top-of-minders in spite of their popularity, they are both excluded from the contents that represent Brazilian scientific IR. Throughout the rest of the statistically relevant sample, Kai Kenkel has an active presence on Facebook, even though the content of his publications is not usually or necessarily IR-oriented.

In Altmetrics, viewership is treated as usage, and is not even among the most challenging impact criteria in the brave new world of data (Priem et al 2010). In viewership, it is included downloads and views, what is exactly what Scielo offers in
their Top 100 articles per journal.\textsuperscript{20} For a more precise result, Altmetrics propose measuring impact by a balanced measure among usage, peer-review (expert opinion), citations, and alt-metrics (storage, links, bookmarks, conversations) (Idem).

Usage is becoming increasingly more attuned than citation for the measure of impact in Academia – even though a more balanced review includes both, and is always desirable: ‘[I]t is a sobering fact that 90\% of papers that have been published in academic journals are never cited. Indeed, as many as 50\% of papers are never read by anyone other than their authors, referees and journal editors.’ (Meho 2007). Remler (2014) interviews the author of this assertion who then explains that the figure is accurate for humanities, but not for other fields:

This could mark the beginning of the end for the 40-year monopoly of citation analysis held by the US-based firm Thomson Scientific, formerly known as the Institute for Scientific Information (ISI). (Meho 2007: 2).

In regard to Kristensen’s (2015a) source, the Web of Science, Meho makes the following points:

Young researchers might find it hard to comprehend, but until 1988 these indexes existed only in print form, although searching them online has been possible since the mid 1970s using third-party information-retrieval systems such as Dialog. In 1988 the ISI supplemented its indexes with CD-ROM editions, and in 1997 the databases finally migrated online with the launch of Web of Science. The move to an online interface, which can analyse [sic] thousands of records in a few seconds, has given the ISI’s databases an even greater stranglehold in the field of citation analysis. But at the same time the Web has produced new publication venues and competitors that challenge the wisdom of continuing to use Web of Science exclusively. Another problem with Web of Science is that it ignores the fact that scientists increasingly publish or “post” their papers online via open-access journals, personal homepages, e-print servers or in institutional repositories so that others can freely access the material. At the same time, researchers have started to search and download research materials via services such as arXiv.org, Google Scholar or publishers’ websites, like Elsevier’s ScienceDirect. Many of the millions of documents accessible via these services, which are published instantly to give the wider scientific community time to use and ultimately cite them, are not indexed by Web of Science. Moreover, an increasing number of Web-based services are enabling explicit citation searching (see box 2). (Idem: 4)

In Box 2, Maho explains that Scopus, launched in 2004 by Elsevier, ‘covers more refereed journals and conference proceedings than Web of Science (15 000 titles compared with 8 700)’, but it ‘provides citation searching only from 1996 onwards,

\textsuperscript{20} Scielo includes access through html, pdf, epdf, abstract, and total. In this Dissertation, we use only the total value.
whereas Web of Science goes as far back as 1900.’ (Ibid: 5) This impacts in RBPI’s impact factor, since Capes requires from its Qualis-A-strata journals to be registered at Scopus, and not at the Web of Science. Given that RBPI also registered at the Web of Science, even though maintaining a time series restriction, and that Kristensen draws his results from the former, a comparative analysis of RBPI’s citations with those embedded at the Web of Science would have to provide a control variable to the problem of the time series, which is hereby presented when I analyze RBPI’s and CINT’s viewership through Scielo’s data, but which Kristensen does not mention.

In the case of RBPI, this time-series restriction is likely to have significant results on the journal’s impact factor, in light, for instance, of the presence of heavy-weight scientific and temporal capitals among the pre-1997 sample, and in spite of the language barrier – which could have been relatively compensated by citations from Spanish-speaking scholars. Five Brazilian Nobel Peace Prize nominees are included as authors in this sample: Josué de Castro (nominated in 1953, 1963, 1964, and 1965), Marshall Rondon (nominated in 1957), Raul Fernandes (nominated in 1953), and Oswaldo Aranha (nominated in 1948) (Nomination Database, nobelprize.org). Moreover, Alceu Amoroso Lima, nominated in 1965 for the Nobel Prize in Literature, is also an author in the pre-1997 RBPI sample (Idem). Other non-Brazilian Nobel Prize nominees are also in the sample, such as Nehru (nominated in 1953,1954, 1955, 1960, and in 1961), and Amartya Sen, who actually won the 1998 Nobel Prize in Economics ‘for his contributions to welfare economics’ in his ‘[R]esearch on fundamental problems in welfare economics. Studies of social choice, welfare measurement, and poverty. (Amartya Sen – Facts, nobelprize.org)

Moreover, in the case of the present Dissertation, measuring impact through viewership makes significantly more sense than via citation, in light of the samples’ peculiarities that go beyond language barriers to include the absence of CINT from SCImago which is definitely a game-changer.

At RBPI’s Top 100 most viewed articles (1997-2017) on September 2017, there were 64 leading authors. I only accounted for original publications (90), discounting for instance book reviews and others (10). At RBPI’s Top 100 most viewed articles,
viewership tends to be concentrated among the 44 articles published from 1997 until 2003 (1 020 696) – between 2004 and 2017; 46 articles account for 680 629 views. Articles published in the seven first years of the sample are 1,5 times more viewed than those published throughout the 13 most recent years. The study of academic impact easily explains this trend, as articles that have been published less recently tend to endure more exposure and to gather more access than those published earlier, what tends to be more intense the closer the analysis is of the time series investigated – for a more exact grasp of an author’s impact, the h-index is usually considered a more balanced measure, which, however, is based upon citations, a measure that is not systematically provided by Scielo through the treatment it offers to viewership.21

At CINT’s Top 100 most viewed articles (2002-2017) on September 2017, there were 89 leading authors. I only accounted for original publications (94), discounting for instance book reviews and others (6). At CINT’s Top 100 most viewed articles, viewership also tends to be concentrated among the less recently published articles. Articles (47) published from 2002 until 2008 are 0,6 times more viewed (361 141 vis-à-vis 229 379 views) than articles (49) published from 2009 until 2016. The study of academic impact

It is evident that, overall, CINT has received less views than RBPI, which is confirmed when we control the samples by isolating the same times series from RBPI. From 2002 until 2017, CINT’s most downloaded and viewed articles make up for 590 520 views, while RBPI’s add up to 929 073. One of the possible explanations for these phenomena could be internationalization. Indeed, not only is RBPI registered at SCImago and the Web of Science, but also are its publications (1997-2017) more diverse in terms of language than CINT’s, hence accessing a broader audience:

Table 5: Languages Used at RBPI’s Articles (1997-2017)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>#</th>
<th>Languages</th>
<th>RBPI</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Portuguese</td>
<td>58.70%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

21 RBPI is included at SCImago, and thus its citations could be fairly tracked. Nonetheless, this would leave us with a very limited sample since the journal’s impact factor is relatively low. Also, there is the ‘problem’ of language. For most of its existence, RBPI has been published in Portuguese, and citations at SCImago are concentrated in articles published in English.
Table 6: Languages Used at CINT’s Articles (2002-2017)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>#</th>
<th>Languages</th>
<th>CINT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Portuguese</td>
<td>71,40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>English</td>
<td>28,60%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Scielo > CINT > Site Usage Reports > Publishing Analytics > By Document.

It is interesting to notice that, even though RBPI publishes in more languages than CINT, it still publishes more articles in English than CINT. This happens in spite of the country-affiliation of the journals’ authors, since CINT publishes more English-speakers than RBPI:

Table 7: Authors’ National Affiliations at RBPI (1997-2002)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>#</th>
<th>Countries</th>
<th>RBPI</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>91,60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>USA</td>
<td>2,75%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>1,60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>1,40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>0,09%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>China</td>
<td>0,08%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>0,07%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>0,07%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Scielo > RBPI > Site Usage Reports > Publishing Analytics > By Document.

Table 8: Authors’ National Affiliations at CINT (2002-2017)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>#</th>
<th>Countries</th>
<th>CINT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>70,85%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>USA</td>
<td>6,60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>5,00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>3,00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>3,00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>3,00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>2,20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>1,10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>1,10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>0,07%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>0,07%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Sources: Scielo > CINT > Site Usage Reports > Publishing Analytics > By Document.

CINT publishes a more diverse authorship nationally, including more authors based in the USA, and in other countries who host top-of-mind scholars across Brazil’s IR faculty. As far as internationalization goes, it is hence possible to conclude that readers of Brazilian IR seek to read Brazilian authors, and that the more these publish in English the better.

Unlike Pieczara’s (2010) assumption that by publishing in IR lexicon, and especially in English authors would inevitably become parts of the mainstream theoretical debate, Villa and Pimenta (2017) assert that

More significantly, we can see that, as regards formal modeling, there is little penetration of these American methods into the IR community of Latin American internationalists, with as little as 5% at best reporting its use (as in Chile). There are communities that report usage near 0%, such as Mexico, Colombia, and Brazil. This finding somehow belies the perception of members from epistemic communities in Latin America, according to which quantitative [sic] would be the methodological mainstream in teaching and research institutions on Political Science and International Relations in Latin America (Villa and Pimenta 2017: 264).

In the following pages, a content-analysis of Brazil’s IR through CINT and RBPI, as well as through Kristensen’s interviews, and through TRIP’s data will debate to what extent this and other expectations hold when we isolate and present a more grounded perception of Brazil’s IR.

At RBPI’s Top 100 most viewed articles 75 percentile, the average year of publication is 2002, with a standard deviation of four years. This means that most publications in this sample are concentrated in the years from 1998 until 2006. There are six articles that are not within this time series. Vera Thorstensen, part of the Brazilian delegation at the WTO, has the second most viewed article in this sample which was published in 1997, the year when she published the other article that is contained in the complete sample, the only two she has ever published at RBPI. Argemiro Procópio is the author of the other most viewed article that is outside of said time frame, and so is Amado
Luiz Cervo, both whose articles were also published in 1997. They are both retired Professors from IRel UnB. The other three articles that are outside of the time frame are authored by Amado Luiz Cervo, Darly Henrique da Silva, a member of CNPq, and by three co-authors based in Portugal, and in Vietnam. The latter is the most recent of this sample, 2013, and its international range might help explaining its inclusion in this sample in spite of the authors’ maturity and the article’s year of publication.

At CINT’s Top 100 most viewed articles’ 75 percentile, the average year of publication is 2008, with a standard deviation of three years. This means that most publications in this sample are concentrated in the years from 2005 until 2011. There are five articles that are not within this time series. The articles that were published before 2005 and within this highest percentile are from a Brazilian diplomat (Tanno), and two scholars based in Universities in Continental Europe (Nour, and Buzan). 2012 is the most recent year in this highest percentile. There are two articles published in this year, and whose viewership vary significantly below the standard deviation of viewership: Gómez’ (8630), and Rodrigues’ (8578). Viewership and citation tend to be lower in the case of publications authored by younger researchers. The maturity of a researcher is usually measured by the year when he or she attained his or her PhD. The fact that Gómez got his PhD in 1979, and Rodrigues, in 2008, provide that the former has accumulated scientific and/or temporal capitals rather quickly.

Overlapping RBPI’s and CINT’s publications (all of them) with the TRIP Survey 2014 top-of-mind scholars for Brazil’s faculty, we find a few inconsistences. Overall, RBPI concentrates the publications of the authors who conform the top-of-mind among Brazil’s faculty according to the TRIP Survey 2014.

Figure 4: Top-of-Mind Authors in Brazil’s Part of the World in the Past 20 Years vis-à-vis their Publications at RBPI and CINT
When we add to the top-of-mind authors in Brazil’s IR according to TRIP Survey 2014 the total number of publications they have in the two best rated journals in Brazil, we end up on a 75 percentile with four authors whose publications are concentrated at RBPI.

Table 9: The Most Published Authors at RBPI and CINT among the Top-of-mind Authors in Brazil’s Part of the World in the Past 20 Years

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>#</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>RBPI Top 100</th>
<th>RBPI Pre-1997</th>
<th>RBPI Post 1996</th>
<th>CINT Top 100</th>
<th>CINT Pre-2002</th>
<th>CINT Post-2001</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>José Flávio Sombra Saraiva</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Antônio Carlos Lessa</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Amado Cervo</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Raúl Bernal-Meza</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


We will factor out Raúl Bernal-Meza, in light of his national affiliation to an Argentinian university, and later Eduardo Viola, following the characteristics of his publications, which will be explored in a few paragraphs. Tullo Vigevani is then factored into this
sample, and so is Maria Regina Soares de Lima. The former is factored in since he follows Bernal-Meza and Viola in the overlapped sample, ranks as a positive outlier among TRIP’s top-of-mind scholars, besides being the most viewed author at CINT’s sample, and pertaining to RBPI’s pre-1997 sample, as well as to the middle percentile of RBPI’s most viewed authors.

The latter is factored in for being the top-of-mind scholar among Brazil’s faculty, and for her efficiency in attaining this status. Here, efficiency refers to the fact that she managed to attain recognition even though (i) she has no publications among the most-viewed ones at CINT (2002-2017), since both her articles in the journal date back to 2000 and 1990; (ii) she has and only two publications at RBPI, one of them among the highest percentile of the most viewed articles, what places her as the 15th most used author from RBPI, even though the other article dates to 2017, the ongoing year, meaning it is still too recent to figure among the most viewed publications; (iii) she has no active presence on social media and relatively less temporal capital than other scholars who, for instance, have been editors of one of those two journals, and have occupied leading positions in the field’s national institutions such as Brazil’s International Studies Association (ABRI), founded in 2005, or IBRI.

José Flávio Sombra Saraiva’s article is not among the CINT’s 100 most viewed articles, but is included in the statistically relevant sample derived from the Top 100 most viewed authors at RBPI (Saraiva 2014). Besides, while Amado Cervo is the only author who figures within the highest percentile of RBPI’s Top 100 most viewed authors, of TRIP Survey 2014’s top-of-mind authors, and of this sample’s most published authors, Sombra Saraiva is the second top-of-mind author in the middle percentile of this sample extracted from the TRIP Survey 2014 results, although he outranks the first scholar of said percentile (Matias Spektor) in the number of publications both at RBPI and at CINT.

RBPI’s Top 100 most viewed articles concentrate 50% of Amado Cervo’s publications, and 40% of Bernal-Meza’s, while 21% of Cervo’s were published before the journal was uploaded into the Scielo system, and 29% of Cervo’s, besides 60% of Bernal-Meza’s were published in the time frame where RBPI was already at Scielo, but these
eight articles are not among the publication’s most viewed items. Unlike Lessa’s leading authorships and co-authorships, which are not statistically relevant neither to RBPI’s nor to CINT’s most viewed articles, Sombra Saraiva’s leading authorship is statistically relevant for RBPI’s sample (Saraiva 2008).

In fact, Antonio Carlos Lessa is the first author within the lowest percentile (Q1:25%) among the top-of-mind authors according to the TRIP Survey 2014. Also, his published contribution is only among the Top 100 most viewed articles within CINT’s sample, where he holds one article which, nonetheless, is not comprised into the statistically relevant sample (Lessa et al 2010). Moreover, 94% of all his articles at CINT and RBPI are published in the latter, a journal where he is either editor or has been part of the leadership of the institute where it is embedded, although none of his leading authorships at RBPI figure out within the most viewed items.

Conversely, when we pinpoint the 25 percentile of a list contrasting the top-of-mind authors in Brazil’s IR according to the TRIP Survey 2014 and the total number of their publications across the two best rated journals in Brazil, we end up with eight authors whose publications are concentrated at CINT.

Table 10: The Less Published Authors at RBPI and CINT among the Top-of-Mind Authors in Brazil’s Part of the World in the Past 20 Years

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>#</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>RBPI</th>
<th>RBPI Pre-1997</th>
<th>RBPI Post 1996</th>
<th>CINT</th>
<th>CINT Pre-2002</th>
<th>CINT Post-2001</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Héctor Saint-Pierre</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Mónica Hirst</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Marco Cepik</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Andrés Serbin</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Arlene Tickner</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>José Luis Fiori</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Octavio Amorim Neto</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Aníbal Quijano</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>...</td>
<td>Total:</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
It is easy to notice at least one discrepancy. Even though Brazilian IR faculty might hold José Luís Fiori, Octavio Amorim Neto, and Aníbal Quijano in their top-of-mind, these scholars have never published in any of the most representative journals in Brazil’s IR, which might lead to further research, for instance, on the impact of manuscripts in the country’s field. Rafael Villa’s work, since part of a second generation of Brazil’s IR, and not necessarily engaged with the project Kristensen calls International Insertion, will now factored out.

Kristensen (2015:510-511) makes a few interesting points in regard to the TRIP list and to the content of those top-of-mind authors’ work:

The majority of these scholars, especially those at the very top of the list, are known as experts on Brazilian foreign policy. This is particularly so for top ‘first generation’ scholars like Lima, Vigevani and Cervo, but applies to the majority of scholars above. By judging from their doctoral dissertation titles and/or current work registered in the Curriculo Lattes database, most are oriented towards Brazilian domestic, foreign policy or bilateral relations (Lima, Vigevani, Cervo, Fiori, Vizentini, Hirst). This also applies to later generations of scholars (Pinheiro, Spektor, Saraiva, Lessa, Pecequilo). Relatively few top scholars are connected to specific theories or theoretical arguments. There are some ‘second generation’ scholars who are known for work applying IR theory and/or for writing dissertations on IR theory in the late 1990s and early 2000s (Diniz, Saint-Pierre, Villa, Herz). Some interviewees also mention textbook authors João Nogueira (PUC-Rio) and Antônio Jorge Ramalho (UnB) as theory scholars—these are not included in the list above, however. If connected to any particular theory, interviewees associate most second-generation scholars with varieties of constructivism, critical theory, post-positivism, post-structuralism, sociological and cultural approaches, non-traditional security studies and so on (e.g. Herz, Nogueira, Ramalho and Villa). Some of their recent publications confirm this orientation—at least for those who publish (Herz 2010, 2011; Huysmans and Nogueira 2012; Villa 2014; Villa and Weiffen 2014). There is a close connection between ‘IR theory’ and varieties of ‘constructivism’ (cf. the PUC school below). One exception from this pattern works on realist theory, strategy and Clausewitz (Diniz 2006, 2010; Diniz and Baccarini 2014; Diniz and Proença 2014) while others are known as liberals (e.g. Viola who is mostly known for his work on Brazilian climate policy, however). Most theory oriented scholars also work on Brazil and Latin America, however, thus confirming the argument made by several observers of Brazilian IR: Practical, applied and foreign policy-relevant knowledge is highly valued (Fonseca 1987; Tickner 2008, 2009; Tickner and Herz 2012) (Idem).
Kristensen’s observations are generally unproblematic down until the last sentence of this direct citation. This matter will be addressed on chapters 3 and 4, where a more thorough content analysis of Brazil’s IR will be undertaken. For now, we will continue to explore how literature has attempted to read Brazilian IR.

Villa and Pimenta (2017) provide interesting insights that allow us to further triangulate our three sources that analyze Brazil’s IR. They provide us with data regarding the size of Brazil’s IR scholarship according to the TRIP Survey criteria:

The largest communities of international relations are those of Brazil and Mexico (both account for 73% of the total). In total the approximate size of the five communities is 835 researchers. The five communities investigated in Latin America totaled 445 respondents’ researchers (Villa and Pimenta 2017: 263).

They go on to present what they call ‘[M]ethodological, epistemological and paradigmatic challenges from Latin American scholarly communities’ (Idem 264). Villa and Pimenta comprise the TRIP Survey 2014’s results without, however, debating the criteria the survey applies to establish a roster of methodologies, epistemologies, and paradigms, from where the surveyed can respond. They begin their enquiry by testing the following assertion against TRIP’s data on Latin American countries:

In recent decades, there has been some debate between different scientific communities of Latin American social scientists over whether the strong influence of American quantitative methods would lead to different research designs among new generations of researchers (Barasoul & Silva, 2016; Herz, 2010; Tickner, 2002, 2009). (Idem: 264)

The survey asks Brazil’s faculty (N=200) how they would characterize their work in epistemological terms - there is no explanation as to what the survey, or the authors, consider to be positivist, non-positivist, nor post-positivist:

Figure 5: ‘Epistemological’ Affiliation of Brazil’s Faculty
Instead of observing epistemological answers, Villa and Pimenta, however, go straight to the methodology questions of the survey, where the faculty was requested to provide which is the method they primarily employ (N=207) in their research. As presented in Chapter 1, the following figure sums up Brazilian scholars’ answers:

Figure 6: Main Methodological Affiliation of Brazil’s Faculty

Source: Maliniak et al (2014)

At this point, it is interesting to contrast this with Kristensen’s (2015a: 567) understanding that “‘International Insertion’ is a serious contender in the project of developing Brazilian concepts.’ (Idem):

The concept of ‘Inserção Internacional’ is emphasized by some interviewees as a particularly Brazilian, or emerging power, perspective on IR. It relies on an imaginary where Brazil at the outset is constituted by its outsider status.
Insertion then implies breaking from dependence, becoming autonomous and eventually redeeming its rightful role (for a critical view, see Arend 2011). Insertion, as a scholar from PUC-Rio argues, signifies that “we want to be heard. We want to have a voice.” The systematization of Brazilian concepts about “International Insertion” has been mostly associated with the “Brasilia School” (Arend 2010:1) and is seen by its leading scholar as a distinctly Brazilian contribution to IR (Cervo 2009:49): “Building concepts applied to the international insertion of Brazil corresponds to a methodical mental exercise, done with the purpose of producing knowledge and generating comprehension to international life, in addition to reflecting praxis and suggesting paths of action.” (Cervo 2009:65; see also Saraiva 2009a; Bernal-Meza 2009; Cervo and Lessa 2014; Saraiva 2014). (Ibid)

In light of what has been presented in the Introduction, it is interesting to observe that the ‘Inserção Internacional’ project has been born at UnB, where the paradigm of national developmentalism was epitomized institutionally and intellectually thence 1961. Kristensen (Op cit: 567-568) transcribes part of his interview with a ‘senior Brasília school scholar’:

International insertion, international insertion means three things. First, diplomacy, negotiation. Second, policy, the role of policy is put inside the negotiation, interest, values and padrões de conduta, conduct. Policy gives things for diplomacy negotiations. And the international relations include all the actors of the society that are not governmental. The enterprise, business, the classes, the groups, the segments, dynamic segments of the society. Insertion is a concept that I created. (…)

Yes, exactly.[…] I invented the concept because I was working with the thing, with the phenomenon, and I didn’t find a word to express this phenomenon, the insertion. Insertion is not international relations only, international relations of Brazil. It is lot which is the role of diplomacy in negotiation, which is the role of the state, which is the role of the politician, including the academy. The things that study international relations. Insertion, I think, is convenient in this sense. Insertion includes international relations, international politics and diplomacy. (Op cit)

Kristensen assumes that scholars from the first generation of Brazilian IR would be more connected to the project of International Insertion, and within the list of 20 top-of-mind scholars TRIP offers, and Kristensen discusses, and we contrasted with the content-analysis of RBPI and CINT, we can find the authors that would most affiliate to this project voluntarily or not. From said list complemented by RBPI’s and CINT’s publications, it is safe to assume that Amado Luiz Cervo, José Flávio Sombra Saraiva, Tullo Vigevani, and Maria Regina Soares de Lima do engage in efforts similar to those described by Kristensen and associated with the national developmentalist paradigm for social sciences.

All their publications at CINT and RBPI are hereby compiled:
Table 11: The Four Statistically More Relevant Authors for the Brazilian IR’s Communications System: Articles at RBPI and CINT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>#</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Author</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Co-author</th>
<th>Academic Journal</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>1983</td>
<td>Amado Luiz Cervo</td>
<td>Intervention and Neutralism: Brazilian doctrines for the Plata region in the middle 1800s</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>RBPI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>1985</td>
<td>Amado Luiz Cervo</td>
<td>Brazilian Foreign Policy toward Territorial Borders in the 19th Century</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>RBPI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>Amado Luiz Cervo</td>
<td>Socializing development: Brazil's history of technical cooperation</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>RBPI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>Amado Luiz Cervo</td>
<td>Foreign Policy and Brazil's International Relations: a paradigmatic approach</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>RBPI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>Amado Luiz Cervo</td>
<td>Concepts in International Relations Policy for Foreign Trade And Development: the Brazilian experience</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>RBPI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>Amado Luiz Cervo</td>
<td>Brazil's International Relations: an account of the Cardoso Era</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>RBPI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>Amado Luiz Cervo</td>
<td>The fall: the international insertion of Brazil (2011-2014)</td>
<td>Antonio Carlos Lessa</td>
<td>RBPI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>Amado Luiz Cervo</td>
<td>Brazil's rise on the international scene: Brazil and the World</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>RBPI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>Amado Luiz Cervo</td>
<td>Under the neoliberal mark: Latin America's international relations</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>RBPI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>Amado Luiz Cervo</td>
<td>Conceptual Axes of Brazil's Foreign Policy</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>RBPI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>Amado Luiz Cervo</td>
<td>Angola and Brazil in the South Atlantic routes</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>RBPI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>Amado Luiz Cervo</td>
<td>Editorial: foreign policy from Cardoso to Lula</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>RBPI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>2014</td>
<td>Amado Luiz Cervo</td>
<td>An Assessment of the Lula era</td>
<td>Antonio Carlos Lessa</td>
<td>RBPI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>José Flávio Sombra Saraiva (Co-author)</td>
<td>Financial para-diplomacy in Brazil's Old Republic (1890-1930)</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>RBPI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>José Flávio Sombra Saraiva</td>
<td>The new Africa and Brazil in the Lula Era: the rebirth of Brazilian Atlantic Policy</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>RBPI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>José Flávio Sombra Saraiva</td>
<td>500 years of Brazil-Portugal relations</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>RBPI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>José Flávio Sombra Saraiva</td>
<td>Constructing international news in Brazil's press</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>RBPI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>José Flávio Sombra Saraiva</td>
<td>South America's international projection</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>RBPI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>José Flávio Sombra Saraiva</td>
<td>René Girault: in memoriam</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>RBPI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>José Flávio Sombra Saraiva</td>
<td>Europe and Globalization: trends, problems, opinions</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>RBPI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No.</td>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Author</td>
<td>Title</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>José Flávio Sombra Saraiva</td>
<td>IBRI and the preparation for the Quebec Summit</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>José Flávio Sombra Saraiva</td>
<td>Political Regimes and Foreign Policy: new approximations</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>José Flávio Sombra Saraiva</td>
<td>International Law in a changing world</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>José Flávio Sombra Saraiva</td>
<td>Israel-Palestine: building peace from a global perspective</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>José Flávio Sombra Saraiva</td>
<td>Lula Foreign Policy: the African challenge</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>José Flávio Sombra Saraiva</td>
<td>Foreign Policy and the First Republic: the golden years (1902-1918)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>José Flávio Sombra Saraiva</td>
<td>The search for a new paradigm: foreign policy, foreign trade, and federalism in Brazil</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>José Flávio Sombra Saraiva</td>
<td>Africa in the 21st century international order: superficial changes or attempts toward an autonomous decision-making process</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>José Flávio Sombra Saraiva</td>
<td>Revisiting the English School From national-developmentalism to the internationalization of Brazil's sub-national</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>José Flávio Sombra Saraiva</td>
<td>Autonomy in Brazil's International Insertion: its own historical way</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>2014</td>
<td>José Flávio Sombra Saraiva</td>
<td>A Brazilian Long-term overview on Latin American Integration</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>Tulio Vigevani</td>
<td>Bureaucracy in Regional Integration (and in MERCOSUR): its impact on decision-making</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>Tulio Vigevani</td>
<td>Trotsky: his analysis of the Second World War</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>Tulio Vigevani</td>
<td>Lula da Silva's Foreign Policy: The Autonomy Through Diversification</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>Tulio Vigevani</td>
<td>Brazilian Thought and Regional Integration</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>2014</td>
<td>Tulio Vigevani (Co-author)</td>
<td>An overview of domestic aspects in US climate policy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>Tulio Vigevani (Co-author)</td>
<td>The role of regional integration for Brazil: universalism, autonomy, and elites' perception</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Authors</td>
<td>Title</td>
<td>Journal</td>
<td>Source</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>Maria Regina Soares de Lima (Co-author)</td>
<td>Politicising financial foreign policy: an analysis of Brazilian Foreign Policy Formulation for the Financial Sector</td>
<td>Rubens Duarte (Author)</td>
<td>RBPI</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Maria Regina Soares de Lima</td>
<td>Brazilian foreign politics and the challenge of South-South cooperation</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>RBPI</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>Maria Regina Soares de Lima</td>
<td>The International Political Economy of Brazilian Foreign Policy: an analytical framework</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>CINT</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>Maria Regina Soares de Lima</td>
<td>Democratic Institutions and Foreign Policy</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>CINT</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


In Chapter 1, we have established that Kristensen’s understanding of ‘theory-talk’ were not exactly how we would proceed to analyze the journals’ samples. Through Acharya’s (2011;2014) norm localization steps, and norm subsidiarity conceptualization, we are capable of figuring out more precisely in which type of theory-talk these four Brazilian first generation scholars engage, if any.

Unlike what Kristensen assumes, that in Latin America’s, and in Brazil’s IR, policy-relevant knowledge offers higher returns, hence theorizations or conceptualizations would generally stem from foreign policy analyses, when we contextualize Cervo’s, Sombra Saraiva’s, Vigevani’s and Lima’s contributions, we find a scenario in which their institutional and material conditions to research were directly related to macro-political narratives. Part of a first generation macro-politically influenced by ISEB’s ideas, Darcy Ribeiro’s Higher Ed project, and Furtado’s developmentalism, it is thus no surprise that they theorize international relations thinking of Brazil, as social scientists aware of their social responsibility to foster a national interest that would allow the country to overcome underdevelopment. Since economic policies have historically had enormous impact on material and institutional infrastructures for scholars in Brazil, overcoming underdevelopment meant also possibly overcoming the instability they endure in the micro-social context.
In light of a perennial imminent scarcity, there is always incentive to accumulate temporal capital, even if, and frequently, at the cost of scientific capital, what also helps understanding why senior scholars relate academic debate to academic politics in Brazil: by all means, they avoid confrontations that might lead to resentment and pay backs in times of need. Moreover, when Hoffmann (1977) investigates the birth of IR in the US, he assumes that IR had become an American Social Science for several reasons, one of them being that, in the USA, to study IR meant to study the behavior of the USA abroad, diversifying domestic investigations under the field of Political Science thus far.

By studying US Foreign Policy, believes Hoffmann, researchers would inevitably be studying the international system, since the USA played a significant role in shaping it. Updating his sociological externalism to a new sociology of science means to understand that the international system is definitely part of the macro-political narrative that wields theoretical thinking. Yet, it does not matter how much the scholar affiliates to a realist, a liberal, a constructivist or a post-positivist paradigm, they all assume there are international relations—with different types of agent-structure interaction or inside-outside beliefs.

When we investigate those 43 publications authored and co-authored by those four members of the first generation of IR, the first open coding effort leads us to the following regularities:

i) 58% of the titles (25) contain the terms Brazil or Brazilian;
ii) 37% of the titles (16) contain the term Policy;
iii) 30% of the titles (13) contain the expression Foreign Policy;
iv) 7% of the titles (three) contain the expression Brazilian Foreign Policy;
v) 21% of the titles (nine) contain the expressions Brazil’s history; Brazil’s International Relations; Brazil’s rise; Brazil’s Foreign Policy; Brazil’s Old Republic; Brazil’s press; Brazil’s sub-national; Brazil’s International Insertion
vi) 5% of the titles (two) contain the expressions International Insertion in the context of ‘Brazil’s International Insertion’, and ‘the international insertion of Brazil’;
vii) 7% of the titles (three) contain the term autonomy;
viii) 7% of the titles (three) contain the term development or developmentalism;
ix) None of the titles contain the terms dependence or dependency;
x) Only one title contains references to the USA, and the article is about US domestic policies on climate change;
xi) 5% of the titles (two) contains the expressions Latin America or Latin American;
-xii) 9% of the titles (four) contains the expressions region or regional, in the context of Brazil’s regional integration in South (two) and Latin (two) America;
xiii) 9% of the titles (four) contains the term integration, one of them associated to South American integration, and the other four, to Latin American Integration;
xiv) 7% of the titles (three) contain the words Africa (two) or African (one)
xv) 5% of the titles (two) contains the word cooperation, one related to technical cooperation, and the other to South-South cooperation;
xvi) In terms of time series,
xvii) In terms of IRT and the philosophy of science, two titles (5%) contain the terms concepts or conceptual, another two titles (5%), paradigm or paradigmatic, one title (2%) makes direct reference to International Political Economy; three titles (7%) make reference to two different schools of thought in IRT: to the Marxist, via a Trotskian narrative of the Second World War; to the French, via an assessment of René Girault’s contributions; and to the English School, through revisiting its theoretical debates.

At a glance, these regularities would simply verify the hypothesis that Brazilian IR is policy-oriented. Most of the articles would focus on matters related to Brazil, to Brazil’s policies, and to the treatment of the country’s relationship with the international. What Kristensen presents as the most promising theoretical effort in Brazil’s academia would represent only 5% of the whole sample, the same relevance given to Latin America, and to cooperation. Autonomy, development and developmentalism would rank a little higher than International Insertion, accounting for 7% of the titles, but still significantly lower than supposedly policy-oriented concerns.

However, when we consider theoretical and philosophical issues, we find a coinciding
relevance given to matters of concepts and conceptualization and of paradigms that are not included in articles discussing IR’s existing paradigms. This leads us to refinement in our open coding process. This refinement is based on Acharya’s concepts of norm localization, and norm subsidiarity brought into the broader aspiration of Global IR’s second generation, i.e. to bring Non-Western thought into the mainstream debate.

Acharya (2011: 95) distinguishes what moves norm localizers from the drive of those who engage in a process of norm subsidiarity. Macro-politically, Brazil’s IR scholarship has a perennial awareness in regard to their autonomy: it is not necessarily only from Western ideas that end up invalidating their knowledge production, but also from peers with temporal capital over resources that are always to be scarce or bluntly scarce. Autonomy is also sought from the State itself, not necessarily (and not usually) financially, since research in IR in Brazil is largely financed by the State, but historically from a State that has politically persecuted intellectuals. In the twenty-first century, early career researchers are also faced with a flow of cash from international foundations famous for recruiting the educated youth in the Global South frequently leading to their participation in processes of regime change that fall into a juridical grey area.

Micro-socially, the field of IR was born in Brazil in the heart of the Higher Ed project, UnB, that epitomized the national developmentalist concern over the country’s autonomy, and the social scientist’s social responsibility over forging a national interest capable of overcoming class struggles to promote development based on a common denominator whose end game is social justice. The rationality of Brazil’s IR, hence, was born within a context in which the word autonomy carries a complex, nationalist meaning as the means to achieve the State’s main goal, social justice through development.

The intrinsic relationship between the macro-political and the micro-social in Brazil’s IR’s first generation of scholars is easily illustrated through RBPI’s affiliation to IBRI, forged by Itamaraty to foster research in IR with an eye on the Brazilian State’s interests. RBPI still plays a protagonist role in the country’s epistemic community, not having deviated from IBRI’s guidelines. It still publishes knowledge that favors inquiries over an agenda that is not disconnected from the macro-political narratives
of the Brazilian society. The statistically relevant sample of RBPI’s Top 100 most viewed articles (1997-2017) illustrates this perfectly:

Table 12: The Most Used Authors at RBPI (1997-2017)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Views</th>
<th>Year of Publication</th>
<th>Author</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>159005</td>
<td>2001; 2004; 2007</td>
<td>Paulo Roberto de Almeida</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>122316</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>Paulo Roberto de Almeida</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24860</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>Paulo Roberto de Almeida</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11829</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>Paulo Roberto de Almeida</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>158148</td>
<td>2003; 2008; 1997; 2002; 2014; 2010; 2000</td>
<td>Amado Luiz Cervo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3975</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>Amado Luiz Cervo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25747</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>Amado Luiz Cervo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25696</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>Amado Luiz Cervo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25284</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>Amado Luiz Cervo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17371</td>
<td>2014</td>
<td>Amado Luiz Cervo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15419</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>Amado Luiz Cervo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12656</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>Amado Luiz Cervo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>95658</td>
<td>1998; 1998</td>
<td>Vera Thorstensen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60147</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>Vera Thorstensen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35511</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>Vera Thorstensen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>94883</td>
<td>2002; 2002; 1997</td>
<td>Viktor Sukup</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>44398</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>Viktor Sukup</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36762</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>Viktor Sukup</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13723</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>Viktor Sukup</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>58655</td>
<td>1997; 2001</td>
<td>Argemiro Procópio Filho</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35874</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>Argemiro Procópio Filho</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22781</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>Argemiro Procópio</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>58298</td>
<td>1998; 2008; 2002; 2009</td>
<td>Raúl Bernal-Meza</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20593</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>Raúl Bernal-Meza</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16353</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>Raúl Bernal-Meza</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11330</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>Raúl Bernal-Meza</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10022</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>Raúl Bernal-Meza</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>49586</td>
<td>2000; 2003</td>
<td>Eiiti Sato</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29919</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>Eiiti Sato</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19667</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>Eiiti Sato</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42997</td>
<td>1999; 1998</td>
<td>Wolfgang Döpcke</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25114</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>Wolfgang Döpcke</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17883</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>Wolfgang Döpcke</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38714</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>Valérie de Campos Mello</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34264</td>
<td>2004; 2010; 2007</td>
<td>Miriam Gomes Saraiva</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13336</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>Miriam Gomes Saraiva</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Author</td>
<td>Title</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paulo Roberto de Almeida</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paulo Roberto de Almeida</td>
<td>International Economy in the 20th century: an attempt of a synthesis</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paulo Roberto de Almeida</td>
<td>A committed foreign policy: the diplomacy of Lula’s administration</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

145
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Author/Editor</th>
<th>Title</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Paulo Roberto de Almeida</td>
<td>Brazil's international economic relations, from 1950s to 1980s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amado Luiz Cervo</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amado Luiz Cervo</td>
<td>Foreign Policy and Brazil's International Relations: a paradigmatic approach</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amado Luiz Cervo</td>
<td>Concepts in International Relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amado Luiz Cervo</td>
<td>Policy for Foreign Trade And Development: the Brazilian experience</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amado Luiz Cervo</td>
<td>Brazil's International Relations: an account of the Cardoso Era</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amado Luiz Cervo</td>
<td>The fall: the international insertion of Brazil (2011-2014)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amado Luiz Cervo</td>
<td>Brazil's rise on the international scene: Brazil and the World</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amado Luiz Cervo</td>
<td>Under the neoliberal mark: Latin America's international relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vera Thorstensen</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vera Thorstensen</td>
<td>The WTO - World Trade Organization and the negotiations on trade, the environment, and social standards of living</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vera Thorstensen</td>
<td>The WTO - World Trade Organization and the negotiations on competition and investments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Viktor Sukup</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Viktor Sukup</td>
<td>China in light of Globalization: challenges and opportunities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Viktor Sukup</td>
<td>The post-9/11 USA: implications for the world order and for Brazil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Viktor Sukup</td>
<td>Eastern Asia and the Southeast Asia: models for Latin America?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argemiro Procópio Filho</td>
<td>Brazil in the context of the international drug-trafficking</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argemiro Procópio Filho</td>
<td>Terrorism and international relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Raúl Bernal-Meza</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Raúl Bernal-Meza</td>
<td>Relations Among Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and the USA: foreign policy and MERCOSUR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Raúl Bernal-Meza</td>
<td>Argentina and Brazil in the International Politics: regionalism and Mercosur (strategy, cooperation and factors of tension)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Raúl Bernal-Meza</td>
<td>Brazil's Foreign Policy: 1990-2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Raúl Bernal-Meza</td>
<td>Fascism in the 20th century: a comparative history</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eiiti Sato</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eiiti Sato</td>
<td>The post-Cold War international agenda: new issues and new perspectives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eiiti Sato</td>
<td>Conflict and cooperation in international relations: International organizations in the 21st century</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wolfgang Döpcke</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wolfgang Döpcke</td>
<td>The long life of the straight lines: five myths about borders in Sub-Saharan Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Valérie de Campos Mello</td>
<td>Globalization, regionalism, and the international order</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miriam Gomes Saraiva</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miriam Gomes Saraiva</td>
<td>The European Union as an international agent and the MERCOSUR contries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Author</td>
<td>Title</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miriam Gomes Saraiva</td>
<td>Brazilian foreign policy towards South America during the Lula administration: caught between South America and Mercosur</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miriam Gomes Saraiva</td>
<td>South-South cooperation strategies in Brazilian Foreign Policy from 1993 to 2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ana Flávia Barros-Platau</td>
<td>International Relations and Environmental Issues: theoretical perspectives, institutional responses, and the new dimensions at stake</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Darly Henrique da Silva</td>
<td>Montreal and Kyoto Protocols: similarities and fundamental differences</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luiz Alberto Moniz Bandeira</td>
<td>Neoliberal policies and crisis in South America</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luiz Alberto Moniz Bandeira</td>
<td>The Chaco War</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maria Regina Soares de Lima</td>
<td>Brazilian foreign politics and the challenge of South – South cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paulo Romeu Braga</td>
<td>The US economic interests and Brazil's domestic security between 1946 and 1964: analyzing the line between a coercive diplomacy and covert operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phuc Thi Tran</td>
<td>Vietnam’s strategic hedging vis-à-vis China: the roles of the European Union and Russia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gustavo de Lemos Campos Carvalho</td>
<td>Brazil's 200 miles territorial waters: strategy and sovereignty, 1970-1982</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Francisco Fernando Montelivita</td>
<td>The Barão do Rio Branco's policy toward the Region of the Plata River</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alexander Zhebit</td>
<td>Russia and the world order: Eastern, Western, or an autonomous pole in a multipolar world?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mario Rapoport</td>
<td>The USA in the face of Brazil and Argentina: the military coups of the 1960s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joana Castro Pereira</td>
<td>Environmental issues and international relations, a new global (dis)order - the role of International Relations in promoting a concerted international system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paulo A. Pereira Pinto</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paulo A. Pereira Pinto</td>
<td>China and Southeast Asia: differences and similarities in perceptions regarding current affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paulo A. Pereira Pinto</td>
<td>The rise of China and India – the cultural impact</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alessandro Warley Candeas</td>
<td>Brazil-Argentina relations: an analysis of advances and retreats</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cristina Soreanu Pecequilo</td>
<td>Brazil's foreign policy in the 21st century: the combining axis of horizontal and vertical multilateral cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maurício Santoro</td>
<td>Cuba after the Cold War: economic change, new diplomatic agenda and the limited dialogue with the United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mónica Salomón</td>
<td>Foreign Policy Analysis and Brazilian Foreign Policy: evolution, challenges and possibilities of an academic field</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alan Barbiero</td>
<td>MERCOSUR and The New International Economic Order</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Virgílio Caixeta Arraes</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Virgílio Caixeta Arraes</td>
<td>The Gulf War: the crisis of a new world order</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Virgílio Caixeta Arraes</td>
<td>Brazil and the UN: Struggle for a Role in the Security Council (From the Nineties to the Present Day)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gilmar Masiero</td>
<td>Ethanol and biofuels as alternatives energetic sources: Latin-American e Asian perspectives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pio Penna Filho</td>
<td>Selective security in the post-Cold War: analyzing the UN security policies and instruments toward peripheral countries: the African case</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kai Michael Kenkel</td>
<td>Five generations of peace operations: from the &quot;thin blue line&quot; to &quot;painting a country blue&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adalberto Santana</td>
<td>Globalization And Drug Trafficking</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Author</td>
<td>Keywords</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Henrique Altemani de Oliveira</td>
<td>Brasil-China: 30 years of strategic partnership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J.A. Lindgren</td>
<td>Durban Conference on Racism and the common responsibilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Celso Amorim</td>
<td>Brazilian foreign policy under President Lula (2003-2010): an overview</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>José Flávio Sombra Saraiva</td>
<td>Africa in the 21st century's international order: superficial changes or essays of autonomy in the decision-making process?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Celso Amorim</td>
<td>Brazilian foreign policy under President Lula (2003-2010): an overview</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luiz Felipe Lampreia</td>
<td>The FHC administration's foreign policy: continuity and renewal</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Author</th>
<th>Keywords</th>
<th>Affiliation (National)</th>
<th>Affiliation (Institutional)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Paulo Roberto de Almeida</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paulo Roberto de Almeida</td>
<td>Brazilian diplomacy; Fernando Henrique Cardoso government; Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva government; Globalization; Regionalism; Trade negotiations.</td>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>Itamaraty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paulo Roberto de Almeida</td>
<td>Brazilian economy, world integration, trade, financing and direct investments.</td>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>Itamaraty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amado Luiz Cervo</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amado Luiz Cervo</td>
<td>Brazilian Foreign Policy; Development; Dependence.</td>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>UnB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amado Luiz Cervo</td>
<td>Brazilian concepts on International Relations.</td>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>UnB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amado Luiz Cervo</td>
<td>Brazil: external trade, development, protectionism, multilateralism.</td>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>UnB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amado Luiz Cervo</td>
<td>Brazil; Foreign Policy; International Relations.</td>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>UnB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amado Luiz Cervo</td>
<td>Dilma Rousseff Administration; Brazil's international insertion; Brazilian Foreign Policy</td>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>UnB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amado Luiz Cervo</td>
<td>Brazilian foreign policy; new global order; emerging countries.</td>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>UnB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amado Luiz Cervo</td>
<td>Latin America, international relations, neoliberalism.</td>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>UnB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vera Thorstensen</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vera Thorstensen</td>
<td>WTO. Investments. Competition. Multilateral negotiations.</td>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>WTO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Viktor Sukup</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Viktor Sukup</td>
<td>China; Hong Kong; Chinese Foreign Policy; Globalization.</td>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>UBA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Viktor Sukup</td>
<td>Internacional Politics; North-American Foreign Policy; Terrorism; International Order; Brazilian Foreign Policy.</td>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>UBA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argemiro Procópio Filho</td>
<td>Brazil. Narcotics traffic. Antidrugs policy.</td>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>UnB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argemiro Procópio Filho</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Research Areas</td>
<td>Institutions</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argemiro Procópio</td>
<td>Terrorism. International Order. International</td>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Relations.</td>
<td>UnB</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Raúl Bernal-Meza</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Raúl Bernal-Meza</td>
<td>Argentina. Brazil. Chile. United States. Regional</td>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>agenda. Foreign policy.</td>
<td>UBA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mercosul. Regional Integration</td>
<td>UBA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Raúl Bernal-Meza</td>
<td>Brazilian Foreign Policy. Mercosur. FTAA.</td>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Regional Integration. Multilateralism.</td>
<td>UBA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Raúl Bernal-Meza</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>UBA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eliiti Sato</td>
<td>Cold War. Globalization. Collective action.</td>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Economic development.</td>
<td>UnB</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eliiti Sato</td>
<td>International Organizations; UN; Gatt; FTAA.</td>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>UnB</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wolfgang Döpcke</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wolfgang Döpcke</td>
<td>Africa. Frontiers.</td>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>South Africa. South-African sub-continent. Regional</td>
<td>UnB</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>policy.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>UERJ (IESP)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miriam Gomes Saraiva</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miriam Gomes Saraiva</td>
<td>Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP); European</td>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>foreign policy; Interregional dialogues; Mercosur</td>
<td>UERJ</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>and European Union; Europe and Latin America.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miriam Gomes Saraiva</td>
<td>Brazilian foreign policy. South America. Unasur.</td>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mercosur.</td>
<td>UERJ</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miriam Gomes Saraiva</td>
<td>South-South cooperation, Brazilian foreign policy,</td>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>South America, regionalism and multilateralism.</td>
<td>UERJ</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ana Flávia Barros-Platiau</td>
<td>International organizations; international regimes;</td>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>governance; environment.</td>
<td>UnB</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Darly Henriques da Silva</td>
<td>Kyoto and Montreal Protocols.</td>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>CNPq/MCT</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luiz Alberto Moniz Bandeira</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luiz Alberto Moniz Bandeira</td>
<td>South America; Neo-liberal politics; Washington</td>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Consensus; Crisis.</td>
<td>UnB</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luiz Alberto Moniz Bandeira</td>
<td>Chaco War. Paraguay. Bolivia.</td>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>UnB</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maria Regina Soares de Lima</td>
<td>Brazil, India, South Africa, Cooperation,</td>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Multilateralism.</td>
<td>PUC-Rio</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paulo Romeu Braga</td>
<td>Foreign Policy; Brazil; United States; Brazilian</td>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>internal security; North-American economic</td>
<td>ABIN</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>interests.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phuc Thi Tran</td>
<td>China; European Union; Russia; South China Sea;</td>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Southeast Asia; Vietnam</td>
<td>University of</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Minho</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gustavo de Lemos Campos</td>
<td>Brazil. Off-shore border.</td>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carvalho</td>
<td></td>
<td>UnB</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Francisco Fernando Monteoliva</td>
<td>Rio Branco. Brazilian foreign policy. South Cone.</td>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doratioto</td>
<td>Power balance.</td>
<td>UnB</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alexander Zhebit</td>
<td>Russia; Foreign Policy; Occidentalism; Orientalism;</td>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Multi-polar World; September 11th, 2001.</td>
<td>Bennett</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Affiliation</td>
<td>Country</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mario Rapoport</td>
<td>Brazil, Argentina, United States, Military coups.</td>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joana Castro Pereira</td>
<td>environment; geopolitics; globalization; International Relations; natural resources; security</td>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paulo A. Pereira Pinto</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>Brazil, Itamaraty</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paulo A. Pereira Pinto</td>
<td>China: tradition, proximity, security, human rights. Southeast Asia.</td>
<td>Brazil, Itamaraty</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paulo A. Pereira Pinto</td>
<td>China. India. Cultural Rise.</td>
<td>Brazil, Itamaraty</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alessandro Warley Candeas</td>
<td>Brazil, Argentina, Bilateral Relations.</td>
<td>Brazil, Itamaraty</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cristina Soreanu Pecequilo</td>
<td>Brazilian Foreign Policy, Strategic Partnerships, Horizontal Cooperation, Vertical Cooperation.</td>
<td>Brazil, UnESP</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauricio Santoro</td>
<td>Cuba; foreign trade; foreign policy.</td>
<td>Brazil, FGV</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mónica Salomón</td>
<td>Foreign Policy Analysis; Brazilian Foreign Policy; decision-making process.</td>
<td>Brazil, PUC-Rio</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Virgilio Caixeta Arraes</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>Brazil, UnB</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Virgilio Caixeta Arraes</td>
<td>Gulf War; United States; Soviet Union; New World Order.</td>
<td>Brazil, UnB</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Virgilio Caixeta Arraes</td>
<td>Brazilian foreign policy; United Nations; international security</td>
<td>Brazil, UnB</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gilmar Masiero</td>
<td>Biofuels, Asia, Latin America</td>
<td>Brazil, UnB</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pio Penna Filho</td>
<td>Peacekeeping operations; UN; African Continent.</td>
<td>Brazil, UFMT</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kai Michael Kenkel</td>
<td>construção da paz; manutenção da paz; operações de paz; Nações Unidas.</td>
<td>Brazil, PUC-Rio</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adalberto Santana</td>
<td>Drug traffic. Globalization. Drugs. Latin America</td>
<td>Mexico, UNAM</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Henrique Altemani de Oliveira</td>
<td>Brazilian foreign policy; Brazil-Asia relations; Brazil-China relations.</td>
<td>Brazil, PUCSP</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J.A. Lindgren Alves</td>
<td>Durban Conference; Racism; Racial Discrimination</td>
<td>Brazil, Itamaraty</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Celso Amorim</td>
<td>Brazilian Foreign Policy; Lula's administration.</td>
<td>Brazil, Itamaraty</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>José Flavio Sombra Saraiva</td>
<td>Africa, African regional politics, Mozambique.</td>
<td>Brazil, UnB</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Celso Amorim</td>
<td>Brazil Foreign Policy Diplomacy LulaDaSilva</td>
<td>Brazil, Itamaraty</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luiz Felipe Lampreia</td>
<td>Brazil Foreign Policy Diplomacy FernandoHenriqueCardoso</td>
<td>Brazil, Itamaraty</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Scielo > RBPI > Site Usage Reports > Publishing Analytics > By Document.

From these 38 most viewed authors, and 61 most viewed articles, 70% contemplate international relations’ themes that include matters directly related to Brazil.\(^{22}\) In fact, this trend is even more visible when we observe the national affiliation of those 38 scholars:

---

\(^{22}\) I accounted for all of the titles that contained the terms Brazil and Brazilian, as well as MERCOSUR, and South America when they were not included in another country’s international relations, such as China’s or the US.
Brazilian scholars do concentrate most of the publications. Noting the percentage of authors whose primary occupation is being a Brazilian diplomat at Itamaraty, it is also evident that RBPI still follows IBRI’s historical concern regarding Brazil’s political agenda, if one assumes diplomats who have earned PhDs, but still work primarily as diplomats publish what is in the agenda of the macro-political narrative surrounding the interests of the Brazilian State:

Source: Scielo > RBPI > Site Usage Reports > Publishing Analytics > By Document;

Figure 7: National Affiliations of the Most Used Authors at RBPI (1997-2017)

Figure 8: Institutional Affiliation of the Most Used Authors at RBPI (1997-2017)
We hereby provide the same samples for CINT.

Table 13: The Top 56 Most Used Authors at CINT (2002-2017)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Views</th>
<th>Years of Publication</th>
<th>Leading Author</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>36792</td>
<td>2007;2010</td>
<td>Vigevani, Tullo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32556</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>Vigevani, Tullo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4236</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>Vigevani, Tullo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26011</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Silva, Marco Antonio Meneses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21946</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>Moreira, Helena Margarido</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19238</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>Mielniczuk, Fabiano</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16470</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>Tanno, Grace</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16316</td>
<td>2003;2003</td>
<td>Nour, Soraya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11580</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>Nour, Soraya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4736</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>Nour, Soraya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15727</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>Oliveira, Ivan Tiago Machado</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12716</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Ayerbe, Luis Fernando</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12236</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>Duque, Marina Guedes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11877</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>Aragón, Luis E</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11635</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>Bertazzo, Juliana</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11455</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>Pinto, Simone Martins Rodrigues</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10793</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>Souchaud, Sylvain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9951</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>Cepik, Marco</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9868</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>Rocha, Antonio Jorge Ramalho</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9757</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>Baracuhy, Braz</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9556</td>
<td>2008;2010</td>
<td>de Camargo, Sônia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5586</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>de Camargo, Sônia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3970</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>de Camargo, Sônia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8747</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>Gómez, José María</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8742</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>Rodrigues, Thiago</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8714</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>Reis, Rossana Reis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8478</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>Buzan, Barry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8076</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>Ávila, Fabrício Schiavo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8067</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>Bracey, Djuan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7649</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>Queiroz, Fábio Albergaria de</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7494</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>Garcia, Ana Saggioro</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6766</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>Badmus, Isiaka Alaní</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6456</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>Saint-Pierre, Héctor Luis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6411</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Carvalho, Gustavo Seignemartindet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6251</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>Cruz Jr., Ademar Seabra da</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leading Author</td>
<td>Titles</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vigevani, Tullo</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vigevani, Tullo</td>
<td>Lula da Silva’s foreign policy: the autonomy through diversification strategy</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vigevani, Tullo</td>
<td>Brazilian thought and regional integration</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Silva, Marco Antonio Meneses</td>
<td>Critical theory in international relations</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moreira, Helena Margarido</td>
<td>The Kyoto Protocol and the possibilities for the insertion of Brazil at the Clean Development Mechanism through projects in clean energy</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mielniczuk, Fabiano</td>
<td>Identity as a source of conflict: Ukraine and Russia in the post-USSR</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanno, Grace</td>
<td>The Copenhagen school’s contribution to the area of international security studies</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nour, Soraya</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nour, Soraya</td>
<td>The cosmopolitans: Kant and kantian themes in international relations</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nour, Soraya</td>
<td>The historian and the theoretician. Hobbes’ historiography in the theory of international relations</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oliveira, Ivan Tiago Machado</td>
<td>The international economic-commercial order: an analysis of the evolution of the multilateral trading system and of the involvement of the brazilian economic diplomacy in the global scenario</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ayerbe, Luis Fernando</td>
<td>The United States in the present international relations</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Author(s)</td>
<td>Title</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Duque, Marina Guedes</td>
<td>The synthesis made by the Copenhagen School in international security studies</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aragón, Luis E</td>
<td>Introduction to the study of international migration in the Amazon</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bertazzo, Juliana</td>
<td>NATO's action in the post-Cold War era: implications for international security and for the United Nations</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pinto, Simone Martins</td>
<td>Transitional justice in South Africa: restoring the past, rebuilding the future</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Souchaud, Sylvain</td>
<td>A visão do Paraguai no Brasil</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cepik, Marco</td>
<td>Organized crime, the state and international security</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rocha, Antonio Jorge Ramalho</td>
<td>Influences of the American political system on US foreign and defense policies</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>de Camargo, Sônia</td>
<td>The League of Nations crisis of 1926: neoclassical realism, multilateralism, and the nature of Brazilian foreign policy</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>de Camargo, Sônia</td>
<td>The European Union: a community under construction</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rodrigues, Thiago</td>
<td>Drug-trafficking and militarization in the Americas: the addiction to war</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reis, Rossana Reis</td>
<td>Brazilian policy for international migrations</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buzan, Barry</td>
<td>The implications of September 11 for the study of international relations</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ávila, Fabrício Schiavo</td>
<td>Strategic weapons and power in international system: the rise of direct energy weapons and their potential impact over the war and multipolar distribution of capabilities</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bracey, Djuan</td>
<td>Brazil and UN peacekeeping: the cases of East-Timor and Haiti</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Queiroz, Fábio Albergaria de</td>
<td>Environment and international trade: Sustainable relationship or irreconcilable opposites? Environmental and pro-commerce arguments of the debate</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Garcia, Ana Saggioro</td>
<td>Hegemony and imperialism: characterizations of the capitalist world order after the Second World War</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Badmus, Isiaka Alani</td>
<td>&quot;Our Darfur, their Darfur&quot;: Sudan's politics of deviance and the rising &quot;ethnic-cleansing&quot; in an African emerging anarchy</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saint-Pierre, Héctor Luis</td>
<td>&quot;Defense&quot; or &quot;security&quot;? Reflections on concepts and ideologies</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carvalho, Gustavo Seignemartins de</td>
<td>The autonomy and relevance of regimes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cruz Jr., Ademar Seabra da</td>
<td>A new bipolarism: methodological notes for the definition of the international system</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fonseca, Carlos da</td>
<td>With God on our side: religion and American exceptionalism</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Title</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Garcia, Eugênio Vargas</td>
<td>The United States and Britain in Brazil: transition of power in the interwar period</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Faria, Carlos Aurélio</td>
<td>Itamaraty and Brazilian foreign policy: from isolation to the search for coordination amongst governmental actors and cooperation with societal actors</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monshipouri, Mahmoud</td>
<td>The muslim world in a global age: protecting women's rights</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leita, Iara Costa</td>
<td>Arguments for a dissociation of Thomas Hobbes' political philosophy from the realist tradition</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fuccille, Alexandre</td>
<td>South American regional security complex: a new perspective</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Souza, Igor Abdalla Medina</td>
<td>Don Quixote meets Sancho Panza again - international relations and international law before, during and after the Cold War</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Machado, Aletheia de Almeida</td>
<td>The local and the global in the international environmental politics structure: the social construction of the Bhopal major chemical accident and the ILO Convention</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cepaluni, Gabriel</td>
<td>International regimes and the medical patent dispute: strategies for developing countries</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trento, Maikel</td>
<td>The issue of war in the English School of International Relations</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lopes, Renata Rossetto</td>
<td>Bilateral trade agreements as Chile's strategy for regional and international insertion</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arbix, Daniel Ferabolli,</td>
<td>Brazil litigation in the WTO: trade mix, politics and institutions</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Silvia</td>
<td>International relations of the Arab World (1954-2004): the challenges for the achievement of pan-arab utopia</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miyazaki, Silvio Suarez,</td>
<td>New asian economic regionalism</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marcial A. Garcia</td>
<td>Terrorism and international politics: an approach to South America</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laje, Victor Coutinho</td>
<td>&quot;Global civil society&quot;: non-state agents and space of interaction in political society</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guimarães, Feliciano de Sá</td>
<td>The cosmopolitan-communitarian debate and the International Relations theory: the Rawls's law of people as a middle ground theory</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pautasso, Diego</td>
<td>China's energy security and USA reactions</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suppo, Hugo</td>
<td>Reflections on the place of sport in international relations</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Leading Author</th>
<th>Keywords</th>
<th>National Affiliation</th>
<th>Institutional Affiliation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Vigevani, Tulio</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vigevani, Tulio</td>
<td>Lula da Silva - ForeignPolicy - Autonomy - Constructivism - PoliticalChanges</td>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>UNESP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vigevani, Tulio</td>
<td>RegionalIntegration - BrazilianForeignPolicy - BrazilianThought</td>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>UNESP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Silva, Marco Antonio Meneses</td>
<td>InternationalRelationsTheory - CriticalTheory - FrankfurtSchool - Gramsci</td>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>Ceub</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

155
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Research Interests</th>
<th>Institution</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Moreira, Helena Margarido</td>
<td>Global Warming - Sustainable Development - Kyoto Protocol - Clean Energy</td>
<td>Brazil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mielniczuk, Fabiano</td>
<td>International Security - Constructivism - Ukraine - Russia</td>
<td>Brazil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanno, Grace</td>
<td>Copenhagen School - Security - International Security Studies - Theory Of International Relations</td>
<td>Brazil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nour, Soraya</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nour, Soraya</td>
<td></td>
<td>German Center Marc Bloch</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nour, Soraya</td>
<td></td>
<td>German Center Marc Bloch</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oliveira, Ivan Tiago Machado</td>
<td>GATT - WTO - Multilateralism - International Trade - Economic Diplomacy</td>
<td>Brazil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ayerbe, Luis Fernando</td>
<td>GATT - WTO - Multilateralism - International Trade - Economic Diplomacy</td>
<td>Brazil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Duque, Marina Guedes</td>
<td>Bush Doctrine - Unilateralism - Multilateralism - Hegemony</td>
<td>Brazil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aragón, Luis E</td>
<td>International Relations Theory - Rationalism - Constructivism - International Security Studies</td>
<td>Brazil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bertazzo, Juliana Pinto</td>
<td>NATO - International Security - International Intervention - UN Security Council</td>
<td>Brazil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pinto, Simone Martins</td>
<td>South Africa - Transitional Justice - Apartheid - Truth Commission - Democracy</td>
<td>Brazil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Souchaud, Sylvain Cepik</td>
<td>Brazil - Paraguay - International Migrations - International Relations</td>
<td>France</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rocha, Antonio Jorge Ramalho</td>
<td>United States - American Foreign Policy - Interdependence - International Law - International Regimes</td>
<td>Brazil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baracuhy, Braz de Camargo</td>
<td>International Relations Theory - Neoclassical Realism - Brazilian Foreign Policy - Crisis Of The League Of Nations</td>
<td>Brazil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gómez, José María Rodrigues</td>
<td>BRICS - Energy Matrix - Energy Cooperation - New World Energy Order</td>
<td>Brazil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rodríguez, Thiago de Camargo</td>
<td>Drug Trafficking - War On Drugs - Latin America - United States</td>
<td>Brazil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>de Camargo, Sônia de Camargo</td>
<td>European Union - Institutionalization - Enlargement - Identity - Diversity - Democracy</td>
<td>Brazil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mercosur - Regional Integration - Free Circulation Of Workers - The Right Of Domicile - Fundamental Labor Rights</td>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National University of Rio de Janeiro (UFRJ)</td>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fluminense National University (UFF)</td>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Research Interests</td>
<td>Location</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reis, Rossana</td>
<td>Migration Policy - International Migrations - Foreign Policy</td>
<td>Brazil São Paulo (USP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buzan, Barry</td>
<td>International Relations - Theory - September 11 - Neorealism - Globalism - Regionalism - Constructivism</td>
<td>UK LSE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ávila, Fabrício</td>
<td>Nuclear Weapons - Polarity - War - Directed Energy Weapons - Russia - China</td>
<td>Brazil University of Rio Grande do Sul (UFRGS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bracey, Djuan</td>
<td>Peacekeeping - Haiti - MINUSTAH - East Timor</td>
<td>United States Georgetown University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Queiroz, Fábio</td>
<td>Environment - Free Trade - Environmental Law - Sustainable Development</td>
<td>Brazil University Center of the Federal District (UDF)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>García, Ana Saggioro</td>
<td>Imperialism - Hegemony - Marxism - Realism - Institutionalism</td>
<td>Brazil PUC-Rio</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Badmus, Isiaka Ali</td>
<td>Republic of Sudan - Darfur - Politics of Deviance - Ethnic Cleansing - Civil War</td>
<td>Nigeria Obafemi Awolowo University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carvalho, Gustavo Seignemartinho</td>
<td>Regime - Regimes Definition - Regimes Effectivity - Regimes Autonomy - Regimes Relevance - Regimes Elements</td>
<td>Brazil PUC-Rio</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cruz Jr., Ademar Seabra da</td>
<td>International System - Bipolarism - United States - Global Civil Society</td>
<td>Brazil Itamaraty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Garcia, Eugênio Vargas</td>
<td>Brazil - United States - Brazil - Britain - Transition of Power - Interwar Period</td>
<td>Brazil Itamaraty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Faria, Carlos Aurélio Pimenta de</td>
<td>Islamic Feminism - Patriarchy - Cultural Politics - Textual Reinterpretation</td>
<td>United States Quinnipiac University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monshipouri, Mahmood</td>
<td>International Anarchy - State of War - Theory of International Relations - Thomas Hobbes</td>
<td>Brazil State University of Rio de Janeiro (UERJ) - IESP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leita, Iara Costa</td>
<td>Intersection Cooperation</td>
<td>Brazil PUC-Minas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fuccille, Alexandre</td>
<td>European Union - Institutionalization - Enlargement - Identity - Diversity - Democracy</td>
<td>Brazil PUC-Rio</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Souza, Igor Abdalla Medina</td>
<td>International Relations - International Environmental Policies - Constructivism - Bhopal Convention 174 - Local Global Relations</td>
<td>Brazil PUC-Rio</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Machado, Aletheia de Almeida</td>
<td>South America - Regional Security Complex - Brazilian Foreign Policy - Constructivism</td>
<td>Brazil UNESP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cepaluni, Gabriel</td>
<td>International Regimes - Patents - Foreign Affairs - GATT - WTO</td>
<td>Brazil UNIVALI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Author</td>
<td>Affiliations</td>
<td>Country</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trento, Maikel</td>
<td>InternationalRelations - InternationalLaw - Liberalism - Realism - Constructivism - CriticalTheory</td>
<td>Brazil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lopes, Renata Rossetto</td>
<td>War - EnglishSchool - InternationalSociety</td>
<td>Brazil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arbias, Daniel</td>
<td>China - BilateralTradeAgreements - RegionalTradeAgreements - FreeTradeAgreements</td>
<td>France</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ferabolli, Silvia</td>
<td>ForeignTradePolicy - WTO - DisputeSettlement - GovernmentalInstitutions - Camex</td>
<td>Brazil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miyazaki, Silvio</td>
<td>ArabWorld - PanArabism - ArabStateSystem - PoliticalIntegration - StructuralRealism</td>
<td>Brazil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suarez, Marcial A. Garcia</td>
<td>Regionalism - Asia - Trade - TradeAgreements</td>
<td>Brazil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Milaní, Carlos</td>
<td>TheoryOfInternationalRelations - Terrorism - SouthAmerica</td>
<td>Brazil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lage, Víctor Coutinho</td>
<td>BrazilianForeignPolicy - ForeignPolicyAnalysis - ActorsAndAgendas - PublicPolicy</td>
<td>Brazil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guimarães, Feliciano de Sá</td>
<td>GlobalCivilSociety - Constructivism - Foucault - PoliticalSociety</td>
<td>Brazil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pautasso, Diego</td>
<td>Cosmopolitism - Communitarism - InternationalDistributiveJustice - JohnRawls</td>
<td>Brazil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suppo, Hugo</td>
<td>China - EnergySecurity - USA - ReorganizationOfForces</td>
<td>Brazil</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Scielo > CINT > Site Usage Reports > Publishing Analytics > By Document.

Figure 9: National Affiliations of Top 89 Most Used Authors at CINT (2002-2017)

Source: Scielo > CINT > Site Usage Reports > Publishing Analytics > By Document.

Figure 10: Institutional Affiliations of the Most Used Authors at CINT (2002-2017)
Unlike the overall sample, among the statistically most relevant authors of both samples we find CINT has a more international range than RBPI, both in terms of quantity and diversity (national and institutional affiliations). Also, IRel's authors tend to be more relevant for this sample of RBPI than IRI’s scholars are to CINT’s. They tend to offer each other the same relative space. At CINT, scholar-diplomats tend to be less prominent among the most relevant sample than at RBPI, what may help explaining the difference in the absolute number of viewership between both journals. Hence, it is possible to deduce that readers of Brazil’s IR do not only seek to read what Brazilian scholars have to say about Brazil's IR in English, but also what scholar-diplomats have to say about international relations in general.

At CINT the highest percentile among the statistically most relevant authors for the Top 89 Most Used Authors (2002-2017) tends to discuss matters related to Brazil, in general, to security, particularly – and not necessarily to Brazil’s security -, and to IRT, especially to constructivism and theories of securitization. The macro-political sphere would have less impact over this sample’s content, even though the macro-social, meaning the object of study itself, international politics, intends to influence not only the issues discussed – i.e. instead of interstate war, drug-trafficking -, but also the approach authors emphasize – i.e. there are no references to the rationalist mainstream, but to theoretical viewpoints that carry in their core critiques from the outside, perspectives from theories considered peripheral to mainstream Western IR,
even though, in Brazil, they tend to be conceived Western, yet less conservative, or less orthodox.

On the other hand, it is possible to assume that in 70% of the articles occurrences at RBPI’s statistically relevant authors within the Top 100 most viewed articles (1997-2017) macro-political narratives are pervasive. Certainly, Paulo Roberto de Almeida’s and Amado Luiz Cervo’s radically different approaches to the Lula administration in their articles are an indication that social and economic ideologies, as tested in the TRIP Survey 2017, do have an impact on the construction of ideas in Brazil’s IR. In the case of Almeida, who is not among the top-of-mind scholars of Brazil’s IR according to the TRIP Survey, his most viewed articles tend to explore stock-takings of Brazil’s economic relations, offering a more conservative input in terms of economic and social ideologies.

Cervo not only is in the highest percentile of the top-of-mind Brazilian scholars, but also in the highest percentile of those top-of-mind scholars who have published the most in Brazil’s most relevant academic journals, as well as in the highest percentile of the most viewed Brazilian IR journal, the only one indexed at SCImago. In his case, for both samples, he does provide an outward-look, rejecting the domination of Western theories, proposing subsidiary, national ways of thinking IR that could be amplified at least to the Latin American scenario, he assumes, unlike what he denounces as parochial ideas enforced by IR’s social organization whose scientific validation is still dependent upon Western validation. Sombra Saraiva’s work also falls within this category, unlike Tullo Vigevani and Maria Regina Soares de Lima whose publications tend to present norm localizations. Saraiva’s and Cervo’s contributions will be more closely analyzed in chapter 4. Lima’s and Vigevani’s will be now explored.

Lima’s (2000) publication at CINT analyses the relationship between democratic politics and foreign policy. It criticizes the two main arguments concerning the difficulties to reconcile democracy and foreign policy in view of the specificity of foreign policy and the institutional flaws of democracies. It also examines the causal weight of domestic policy in the constitution of foreign policy, notably the implications of political and economic liberalization. The consequences of recent economic and political changes for Brazilian foreign policy are analyzed at the end. (Idem: 303).

Lima debates the works of Morgenthau, Kennan, Waltz, Grieco, Allison, Putnam,
Milner, and Krasner, only then, ‘at the end’, and based also on Polanyi’s ideas, Lima divides Brazil’s foreign policy into three larger eras when foreign policy was for the collective good or a distributive foreign policy, factoring in different types of political regimes: the moment of State building; the period of protected industrialization; and the phase of competitive integration (Ibid: 290-295).

In 1990, Lima’s article providing a framework for the analysis of the political economy of Brazilian Foreign Policy established the recipe the author reproduced in her 2000 article. Also at CINT, Lima (1990: 27) debates Western contributions, and then analyses the Brazilian case in light of them:

Based on the collective action-approach to international relations, the article develops a scheme for analyzing the foreign policies of semi-peripheral nations, characterized by their greater integration within the global economy – a product of the intensification of their industrialization process – and by their high degree of structural heterogeneity. Owing to the unfolding interest in various international arenas and to the imbalanced configuration of their power resources, these nations tend to display distinct and non-uniform foreign behavior patterns and strategies, which result from the particular incentive structure in certain issue areas, which result from the power resources specific to these areas, and from domestic constraints. Five modalities of behavior are postulated: unilateral action, “free-rider” behavior, hegemonic strategy, leadership action, and defensive or reactive behavior. To illustrate the empirical pertinence of the proposed scheme, Brazilian foreign policy is examined in the areas of foreign trade and nuclear energy and in the Bacia do Prata (Argentina, Uruguay, and Paraguay). (Idem)

Again, the author’s references are Western theorizations, and the main contribution of the article is a localization of formal models, even when Third World matters are the focus of her article, such as Krasner’s input on the motivations behind the Third World foreign policies in international regimes. Brazilianists, such as Wayne Selcher, are cited before Brazilian authors such as Celso Lafer and Gerson Moura, when Lima presents the guidelines of Brazilian foreign policy, indicating the author’s concern regarding the validation of the knowledge she was basing her work upon (Ibid: 25). The framework she offers is entirely based on Western references, even that on world-system theory, where she does not even acknowledge the contribution of such Brazilian authors as Theotônio dos Santos, restricting her citations to Wallerstein. Lima also makes use of game theory, a tradition that, as presented, is very much associated to American IR (Turton 2016).

AT CINT, Tullo Vigevani’s article on bureaucracy in the context of regional integration
Discusses the Brazilian decision-making process in Mercosul, besides analyzing its coordination centers. We [Vigevani and the co-author] would define centers as the bureaucracy of public administration that stipulates strategies, makes decisions, and implants these decisions. This is a comparative analysis of the “transition period” (the integration process – 1991/1994) and the present situation. The purpose of this analysis is to demonstrate how the decision-making process evolved in the Brazilian bureaucracy which deals with economic integration. (Vigevani and Mariano 1997: 305)

Vigevani and Mariano (1997) apply Allison’s, as well as Haas and Schmitter’s formal model to analyze the decision-making process, besides using Western European references to shed light on the integration process undertaken in the Southern Cone. In Vigevani and Cepaluni (2007: 335), the authors thusly present their article:

The objective of this article is to analyze the changes brought about by the foreign policy of Lula da Silva’s first government (2003-2006). To discuss the topic, we will make use of Hermann’s (1990) article on foreign policy change and the motivation behind it, integrating it with constructivist insights useful to examine the roles of the ideas in the formulation of the Brazilian foreign policy after 2003. To compliment our analysis, we will make use of three notions: autonomy through distance, autonomy through participation, and autonomy through diversification. These notions explain the main changes occurring in Brazilian foreign policy from 1980 through to the mid-2000s. We will conclude by demonstrating how the autonomy through diversification best applies to the aforementioned period, acknowledging that the first two levels of Hermann’s theory, adjustment change and program change, did in fact happen. We suggest that the third level, problem/goal changes, can come into effect with the consolidation and amplification of the first two levels (Idem).

In this case, the authors go through all three steps toward localization, including adaptation. They ‘borrow and frame external norms’ in ways that validate their analysis to the national audience, and adjusts them, linking them to specific national ideas and practices, pruning the Western ideas, cherry-picking the elements that fit the overall framework that results from this process. In Lima’s two publications, however, she does not get to this point, simply borrowing and framing Western ideas in a way that validates her proposal.

Therefore, unlike what Villa and Pimenta (2017) observe based on the TRIP Survey 2014’s answers regarding the importance of formal modeling to Brazil’s IR, this quantitative methodology is of high relevance to Brazil’s IR, and provide a distinction among the four first-generation scholars who, according to Kristensen, would be engaged in the International Insertion project. This means that there might be two methodological trends within this project, or that the project is in fact restrictively
inspired by the contributions of scholars based at the University of Brasília, actually conforming a Brasília school of IR.

Chapter 1 provided the theoretical backdrop against which methodological conversations on how to better ground an investigation of a Brazilian variation of IRT. Chapter 2 grappled with the methodological debate while kick-starting a triangulation that has already provided primary findings. In Chapter 3, we move forward with the triangulation needling it through a debate of Brazilian and foreign literature that debates a Brazilian variation. The academic urban legends that pervade this literature is contrasted with said triangulation further grounding this qualitative analysis.


My current Instagram account is @yeahbutnotreally. I came up with this after five years attending ISA annual conventions, particularly their panels, many times as discussant, and their roundtables on Global South countries. It is extremely usual to see gringos making a perfect argument about your own country, or your own region. The arguments are philosophically and methodologically correct inside their own logic, but more frequently than not far from accurate. By reading foreign contributions about Brazilian IR, and Brazilian contributions as well, I frequently come across misperceptions that result from a shy tradition of investigating the sociology of IR in general, and the sociology of IR in Global South countries, in particular.

In Brazil, one of the only references on this issue is Marcel Merle's, a 1976 French contribution translated into Portuguese by UnB's publisher in 1981. It is of particular relevance to underscore three aspects of the translation. First, the macro-political and the micro-social spheres in the country at that point. Second, the editorial board, and the technical reviewer. Third, the content of the book itself. Macro-politically, the year of 1981 witnessed the beginning of the infamous lost decade in Latin American countries, concerning their macroeconomic crisis. At that
point, a Second Cold War was at its dawn, Argentina was about to go to war against
the British, Latin American countries were getting closer together to tackle the debt
predicament, and non-conventional threats such as the war on drugs was at the crux
of a soaring interventionism from the USA in the region, not to mention the Iranian
crisis, the Afghanistan war, or the dim domestic situation within the USSR that was no
longer a taboo, as perestroika and glasnost would later confirm. In Brazil, we were
undergoing a process of slow transition to democracy: the slow, gradual, and safe
political opening, designed by Golbery do Couto e Silva, and implemented under
General Geisel’s administration (Resende 2014).

The Amnesty Law (1979) had suppressed the AI-5, pardoning civilians for alleged
political crimes committed during those years, as well as the military for any of their
actions in the name of the coup (Idem: 37). The most conservative wing of the military,
especially those within the hierarchy of the Army, conceived Golbery as a traitor to the
principles of the regime which they called - and some still do - a revolution. Hierarchy
tended to discourage these guys from extending President General Geisel the same
treatment. The year of 1981 is of significant importance, because in many ways it
marks the loss of legitimacy from the regime, now under the Presidency of General
Figueiredo.

In April 30, a plot to plant bombs and explode them during the celebrations of May 1st
in a Rio de Janeiro’s center of conventions, Riocentro, went as wrong as it could
(Lagoa 1986). The conservative wing of the Army sent out a Sergeant and a Captain
to plant the bombs, except that they exploded while both officers were still in the car
at the parking lot of the event -only the Sergeant passed away (Idem). The Captain
later confessed to the failed attempt (Ibid).

In the context of then Vice-President's George H. W. Bush to Brazil, Brazil's Minister
of External Relations, Saraiva Guerreiro, and the US Secretary of State, Alexander
Haig, met in DC, exchanging information aiming at dissolving namely the
disagreement regarding the production of nuclear energy in Brazil (George Bush
Presidential Library > Inventory for FOIA Request 2013-1222-S,
bush41library.tamu.edu):

Haig said that in his view the multiplicity of American norms on nuclear energy
constituted “an aberration” a “fixation” that does not correspond to President
Reagan’s thinking nor to that of the American people. Such “insanities”, which
were a product of the policy followed by the previous American government,
were harming the very economic performance of the country, since because
of the number of instances dealing with the various aspects of nuclear
questions, eleven years are now required between the conception and the effective operation of a nuclear plant in the United States. According to Haig, such norms, therefore, should be changed. My interlocutor remarked that the examination of the question of the recharging of Angra I belongs to this context. (Secret-Exclusive Information for the President of the Republic, Sep 30, 1981, Brazil-USA, Interview with US Secretary of State Alexander Haig No 319 by Ramiro Saraiva Guerreiro, digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org)

Cervo and Bueno (2002: 440-443) paint a picture of a special relationship between Brazil and the US at that time, one that would be verified by President Reagan's administration willingness to lend Brazil money, unlike his posture before Mexico (Secret-Exclusive Information for the President of the Republic, Sep 30, 1981, Brazil-USA, Interview with US Secretary of State Alexander Haig No 319 by Ramiro Saraiva Guerreiro, digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org). Saraiva Guerreiro's memorandum about the meeting with Haig certainly supports this perspective especially on their seemingly bilateral disposition to tackle political and economic mishaps without affecting the whole of the relationship (Idem). Guerreiro presented some concerns, namely about US policies on the Law of the Sea, on the North-South divide in Cancún's multilateral negotiations on the financial crisis, and Haig seemed to recognize Brazil as an important player on the African stage, as the US Secretary of State made sure to inform Guerreiro about the provisions the US was taking over Namibia, asking for Brazil's about the Angolan situation (Ibid):

12. Haig confided that he would tell Gromyko this coming Monday that the United States are willing to resolve the Southern African questions with or without Soviet participation. In a previous meeting, Gromyko had already said that the USSR does not have "an interest" in the region and Haig called on him to act accordingly ("put your money where your mouth is"). (Op Cit)

13. Haig said that Namibian independence and the Cuban withdrawal are no longer a "chicken and egg question" but rather a "chicken omelette". He stated he has been receiving positive signs from the AUO and even from Cuba. (Op Cit)

14. I repeated to Haig what I had already expressed to Enders in Brasilia: we do not speak for Angola, but it seems to us that the solution for the question lies in the negotiation of mutual guarantees by stages, combined with an eventual withdrawal ("phasing out") of the Cuban troops. I added that I did not see any reason preventing the Angolan government to reach a compromise in this direction, while, of course, Angola would keep an internal socio-economic organization of a Marxist kind. Haig made two comments to this: he said it was necessary to "preserve" his Angolan interlocutors in order to avoid happening to them "the same that happened to Agostinho Netto"; and that the United States wanted to keep the superpowers away from Southern Africa. I mentioned to him again the possibility of negotiation of mutual guarantees and of the Brazilian interest in a truly independent and non-aligned Angola, in reply to his observation that we should not "repeat" the idea that the Cuban troops should only leave Angola after Namibia becomes independent. (In fact, the Brazilian government never put the question in those terms. Haig probably received from Enders an inaccurate report of the conversation I had with the
latter in Brasilia. On that occasion, I observed to Enders that it was not likely that the Cuban troops would leave Angola before the independence of Namibia, in view of the very genesis and motivation of the Cuban presence: to protect Angola from South African incursions, something that would only become unnecessary with an independent Namibia. That was the background of my suggestion to Enders about the negotiation of reciprocal guarantees distributed along stages, as a form of breaking the impasse. (Op Cit)

The point of a USA-Brazil approximation in the early eighties might be strengthened by Jaguaribe's co-authorship with Kissinger at RBPI's 1982 issue, volume 25, numbers 95-100: 'The Brazil-USA Relations: the Conference of Brasília (Nov. 1981)'. Kissinger had visited Brasília, an infamous occasion when at UnB for the aforementioned event students egged him in a protest against who they believed to be one of the responsible for the Vietnam carnage (18 de Novembro de 1981, Memorial da Democracia, Alunos jogam ovos em Kissinger na UnB, memorialdademocracia.com.br). Students also protested against Kissinger being paid 15 thousand US$ to speak at the University, a matter supported by parties from all ideological currents (PMDB, PDT, and PT) (Idem).

June 1981 is the date the first political party re-emerged in Brazil, PMDB, initially gathering politicians from MDB and Arena, the consented parties during the military regime (Glossário > Partido Político, tse.jus.br).

It is relatively clear that, while Brazilian domestic politics were at a slow, gradual, safe pace toward a political opening, Brazilian diplomatic language was far from conservative. In fact, Brazil's diplomacy during the military regime, even during the most repressive years, are frequently portrayed as a continuation of what the Independent Foreign Policy had inaugurated, even though the latter was part of the picture that conferred legitimacy to the coup in 1964. The same national-developmentalist associated with unionism in between authoritarian regimes (1945-1964) was then the very backbone of the State's foreign policy. There are endless examples, such as the series of political and economic disagreements with the USA bilaterally and multilaterally: the coffee trade, the law of the sea, the norms on trade, human rights, nuclear capability, among several others were matters through which Brazil would establish its understanding of the urge of the country's autonomy.

A common misinterpretation of autonomy stems from a confusion between what the national-developmentalist paradigm had envisioned and what theories of foreign policy analysis explore as autonomy in the decision-making process. Unlike the latter, for the national-developmentalist conceived by the institutional triad of ISEB-MEC-Ministry of Planification, later adopted in several other spheres, such as foreign policy,
grasped autonomy as an end, not necessarily as a mean. This is one of the core reasons why developmentalism and dependency theory are no equivalent. Dependency theory contemplates development as an end that could be achieved through association with other countries’ elites, what did not guarantee autonomy whatsoever. While dependency read the world through the lenses of the development-underdevelopment duality, especially Jaguaribe's and Furtado's developmentalism designed an autonomy-dependence dualism that would influence public policies during leftist administrations, as much as during radically right-wing, authoritarian administrations, in spite of the influence of the authoritarian nationalist rationale especially over domestic social policies and repression.

Micro-socially, the macro-political sphere was intrinsically connected to the first institutionalization of the field of IR at UnB, since the University itself was an epitome of the national-developmentalist paradigm. The editorial board of UnB's publisher that in 1981 translated Merle’s sociology of IR into Portuguese, as well as its technical reviewer are illustrations of this proximity. Afonso Arinos de Melo Franco, one of the Independent Foreign Policy strongest Ministers of External Relations during immediate pre-coup period, Hélio Jaguaribe, the master-mind of the autonomy rationale, José Honório Rodrigues, whose work still influences Brazil's macro-political, as well as scientific lexicon regarding the polarization of the 1945-1964 years (the internationalists versus the nationalists, or the entreguistas versus the sindicalistas - those who had sold their souls to the hegemons, and the unionists) were among the board. The technical reviewer was Amado Cervo.

Hence, not only had UnB's undergrad studies in IR been inaugurated with the key participation of scholar-diplomats as professors, but the publication that is still central to the university's International Relations faculty, RBPI, was part of a hybrid institute, public and private, but that had been welcomed by the organizational and social structures of Itamaraty and the military. Among the 11 most published authors at the journal from 1958 until 1996, 55% are diplomats. Within the other 45%, one is of unknown affiliation up to this version of this Dissertation, one is a Brazilianist, and the other three are at the core of the national-developmentalism that was perceived as radical and leftist, which is not all far-fetched in the reading of Moniz Bandeira, and the other two were directly involved in both the theorization, as well as the implementation of the paradigm.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Author</th>
<th>#</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Primary Occupation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>dealmeida</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>Diplomat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>portodeoliveira</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>Diplomat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>diascarneiro</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>Diplomat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ferreirareis</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>Scholar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>frankdacosta</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>Diplomat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>jaguaribe</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>Scholar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>bathsergio</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>Diplomat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>herrerafelipe</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>hiltonstanley</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>Brazilianist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>monizbandeira</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>Scholar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>souzaesilva</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>Diplomat</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


We have seen Jaguaribe’s participation in the national-developmentalist theorization and institutionalization, and, even though he was not part of any governmental position during the military regime, Arthur Cezar Ferreira Reis, author of various contributions about the development of the Amazon Forest region, was appointed governor of Amazonas, the Northern state of Brazil home to most of the country’s share of the forest. He is the author of one of the books that has shaped the most the Brazilian common sense about, he argued, the international greed over the Amazon forest, and the urgency to occupy and develop the region.

In 1966, the military regime coined the Plan for the Economic Valorization of the Amazon, and, under developmentalist arguments, offer tax exemptions, as well as financial incentive to attract private investments to the region, targeting industries that
were not among those productive processes that prevailed upon the region’s social structure. By occupying the region, and integrating the people into the labor, as well as the consumers’ market, the autonomy of the region would walk side-by-side with Brazil’s. Development was a mean to achieve autonomy, and development was not a matter restricted to economic indexes, but also, and necessarily, to social measures. During the military regime, the rhetoric of social justice was ‘cauterized’ from the national-developmentalalist paradigm, and domestic policies based on national-developmentalism were mitigated in their social justice goals through the application of an authoritarian nationalist rationale that, as provided in the Introduction of this Dissertation, had a trickle-down approach to social prosperity.

From 1964, the year of the coup, until 1979, when the political opening institutionally relaxed censorship, 12% of RBPI's issues were special issues in which the foreign policy documents and speeches were reproduced in the journal by thematic criteria. Other 11% were authored by generals and one admiral, and the other 77% were authored by diplomats or civil servants. Only by 1980 scholars returned to the publication’s pages. There are two residual exceptions. Cleantho de Paiva Leite, IBRI’s president, and Celso Lafer, who would be Fernando Henrique Cardoso’s Minister of External Relations in the President’s second term. Lafer published two articles: ‘[A]n interpretation of Brazil’s system of international relations’ (1967), and ‘[T]he evolution of Brazilian Foreign Policy’ (1975). De Paiva Leite published one article: ‘[B]razil-Japan: a special relationship’ (1974).

This deeply questions some stock-takings Brazilians ourselves have suggested for the development of the field in the country. Pinheiro (2008) juggles with what she calls academic and structural variables to explain how Brazil’s IR unraveled. Her chronology (1970s-1980s; 1990s onwards) starts by underlining that ‘[F]rom the 1970s onwards, however, two simultaneous processes pushed a group of Brazilian academics towards [sic] IR studies’ (Idem: 4):

The world became more economically and politically multilateral, despite the maintenance of the military-strategic bipolarity. This process increased the scope for a more active international behavior for peripheral countries, et pour cause, enlarged the possibility of a new international agenda for developing countries. As a result, the prospects of Brazil acquiring a new international role led a group of academics to turn their interests to International Relations and Foreign Policy (IDEM:68) and to look at the domestic constraints and the possibilities of Brazil having an international role, besides the systemic constraints or opportunities. Therefore, in its beginnings, this new area of studies was characterized by two important aspects. Firstly, as a consequence of the larger latitude for autonomous performance in the international system as mentioned above, at
that time the interest of the academic community went alongside policymakers’ priorities. It is said that the Foreign Policy Analysis agenda walked pari passu with Brazil’s foreign policy agenda; academics basically being concerned with explaining the policies formulated and implemented by the government in power. (Ibid)

According to Pinheiro (Op cit), up until the 1980s, Brazilian diplomats exerted a ‘strong influence’ in the country’s IR scholarship, what she considers a result of these diplomats’ academic formation within the Ministry itself.

Indeed, the institutional characteristics of the Itamaraty (as the Brazilian Foreign Ministry is usually called), responsible as it is for giving diplomats a high-level education and professional training, did not only give the institution relative decision-making autonomy, particularly during the military regime (CHEIBUB, 1985), but also a strong voice in foreign policy analysis (SHIGUENOLI, 1999:86) (Op cit).

To begin with, Pinheiro does not point out to which bibliographic sample she is referring. It is not clear whether she is referring to Brazilian IR scholarship published through journals, national or international, manuscripts, syllabi, or another source. This poses a poignant challenge for any grounded discussion of her contribution. Also, the author refers to Cheibub’s (1985) contribution to assume that the military regime has offered diplomats intellectual autonomy. This is definitely a misunderstanding, suffice it to remember several diplomats who were summarily fired for ideological reasons during the regime – some of them as famous as Vinicius de Moraes, poet and composer, or the not-that-famous father of Sergio Vieira de Mello. Through a content-analysis of what diplomats published at RBPI, and of what RBPI published in general, it becomes visible how this alleged autonomy was actually bounded, restricted by the regime.

Pinheiro’s misperception stems from the military regime’s allegiance to the principles set by the Independent Foreign Policy, a policy that had been labeled leftist and part of the reasons a right-wing, conservative coup was set in motion. The macro-political and micro-social stock-taking of Brazil’s IR associated with the triangulation this Dissertation offers hints to a different reality.

Although the regime has certainly stocked to the foreign policy tenets of the national developmentalist paradigm for social sciences, a claim supported by RBPI’s 1965 publication of Raul Prebisch’s ‘The meaning of UNCTAD – a Report addressed to the UNSG by the Conference’s Secretary General [Prebisch himself]’, diplomats who published at RBPI had autonomy as long as they remained within the lines of the regime’s policy-orientations. It is no coincidence that from 1964 until 1979 a significant
number of military staff published at the journal, a percentage that had never happened, and never repeated itself not even closely.

Besides the content of the articles that were actually published in this pre-Amnesty period, the number of articles published per issue in this era versus those published previously and afterwards, as well as the journal’s engagement in publishing official discourses, especially by Brazilian representatives in international political events, confirm this relative lack of autonomy. During these 15 years, Brazil’s IR’s sample at RBPI does allow one to infer it mirrored the country’s diplomatic endeavors, even chronologically.

The topics that were at Itamaraty’s agenda or the government’s in general (especially the Presidency and the National Security Council) biased the journal’s content. For instance, in 1970, the Brazilian government voiced internationally the decision to expand the country’s territorial sea to 200 miles (Carvalho 1999). In 1969, this was RBPI’s Sept-Dec issue:

Table 15: Articles and Issue Published at RBPI (1969)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Volume</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Month(s)</th>
<th>Author / Special Issue</th>
<th>Title (Article)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>47-48</td>
<td>Sept-Dec</td>
<td>Special Issue: Laws of the Oceans</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>47-48</td>
<td>Sept-Dec</td>
<td>Pardo, Arvid</td>
<td>Under the Sea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>47-48</td>
<td>Sept-Dec</td>
<td>Castro, Raimundo</td>
<td>Fundamental features of the Brazilian Doctrine on the continental platform</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>47-48</td>
<td>Sept-Dec</td>
<td>Nonnato L.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>47-48</td>
<td>Sept-Dec</td>
<td>Chapman, W. M.</td>
<td>To whom does the ocean belong?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The same happens throughout the entire 15-years sample. For example, preceding the 1972 United Nations Conference on the Human Environment in which Brazil performed a defensive role in regard to its policies toward the Amazon, the articles ‘[The Armed Forces and the Amazon’s Integration’ (1971, vol. 14, n.53-54), ‘The demographic problem’ (1971, vol. 14, n.55-56), and ‘[T]he Amazon: the problem of the urbanization of virgin territories’ (1971, vol. 14, n.55-56) were published at RBPI, respectively authored by a General (Rodrigo Otávio Jordão Ramos), a young diplomat (Antônio de Aguiar Patriota, Minister of Foreign Affairs under the Dilma Rousseff Administration), and Miguel Ozório de Almeida who ranked within the country’s delegation to said Conference in Stockholm. During those 15 years, it did seem ‘as if scholars were more interested in underlining the best decisions to be made, than in
working on the best theoretical approach to explain them (1989:278)’ (Pinheiro 2008: 4). However, this was definitely not the case for many reasons, including that scholars were barely published, once a content-analysis of RBPI is presented.

The only scholars who did get to publish at RBPI during those 15 years did not necessarily publish according to the country’s foreign policy agenda. Although Cleantho de Paiva Leite did play by the book and engaged in a quasi-official speech through his article on the Brazilian-Japanese relations, since President Geisel was the first Brazilian President to visit Japan, in 1976, Celso Lafer, alphabetized in the American Graded School of São Paulo, then a Professor at the University of São Paulo’s (USP) Law School, did get to discuss general reflections about the world through the lenses of a Brazilian scholar who did not abandon his national place/locus of speech (Kristensen 2015a; Aragusuku 2010: 97; FGV > CPDOC > Verbete > Celso Lafer, fgv.br/cpdoc). Lafer’s articles are respectively a reflection upon the international system through the concerns of a Global Southern individual, and a stock-taking of the country’s Foreign Policy, where he entertained systematizations that are not policy-oriented, problem-solving, or based on Foreign Policy Analysis theories, but that developed rationales closer to considerations under the philosophy of science.

Moreover, neither from 1958 until 1963, nor from 1964 until 1979, or from 1980 until present days has RBPI ever provided a sample in which ‘the Foreign Policy Analysis agenda walked pari passu with Brazil’s foreign policy agenda’ simply because the largest bulk of Brazilian scholars who engage in analyses of the country’s foreign policy do not abide by the theories or the methodologies established by Foreign Policy Analysis’ theories and methodologies. Even when the sample of the most relevant authors for Brazil’s first generation of IR thinkers engaged with the notion of International Insertion is on the spotlight, we find the application of FPA through a modality of norm localization, meaning there is adaptation of theories and methodologies to the country’s case.

Also, in the cases where there is a chronological connection between those four authors’ publications and the country’s international relations, the agenda is not simply juxtaposed from Itamaraty to scholarship. The 43 articles those authors published at CINT and RBPI might flirt with the macro-political sphere, but they do do (i) by establishing a dialogue with matters that have fired domestic debate among the country’s general public opinion or within the country’s academia; (ii) by discussing how these issues affect a broader periodization or systematization over the country’s
international relations, over international relations as a whole, or, especially through the works of Cervo and Sombra Saraiva, over Brazil’s IR intellectual traditions that will be examined in their philosophical facet in chapter four.

Between 1958-1964, and 1980-1996, scholar-diplomats were still the most published authors at RBPI, concentrated most of RBPI's articles, but not only did the military lose their primacy, and the issues published significantly less documents in proportion to articles, but also did RBPI started publishing scholars from what Kristensen (2015a) recognizes as the first generation of Brazilian scholars, whose research is placed under the notion of 'International Insertion'. This is the case of Amado Cervo, Sombra Saraiva, and Tullo Vigevani, paramount to our content-analysis of a Brazilian variant of IRT. The fact that this is true does not ratify Pinheiro’s (2008) argument that there is a continuum in Brazil’s IR form the 1970s until 1989.

There are, as we have observed, significant nuances to this period. Furthermore, a large presence of diplomats at the journal’s sample from 1980 until 1996 does not mean their contributions have been fundamental for the field of IR, or for how the field of IR in Brazil is organized. Pinheiro suggests there is a high impact of the diplomats’ publications in the country’s syllabi, but she does not offer any evidence. Also, when the TRIP Survey 2014 questions IR faculty in Brazil about the top-of-mind authors constitutive to the local IR discipline, there is no scholar-diplomat among the 20 most cited scholars, even though RBPI’s (1997-2017) and CINT’s (2002-2017) samples of the Top 100 most viewed articles do include diplomats. At RBPI’s most viewed articles, 15% of the authors are diplomats. At CINT’s case, the percentage goes down to 6%.

This chapter will look closely into the sociological reasons for these still relatively high numbers, and next chapter will discuss the impact of their content through a philosophical discussion.

These macro-political and micro-social elements presented the context in which Merle’s sociology of science was published in Brazil through UnB’s publisher. In Brazil, the first impulse to better grasp the social machinery of the field was hence based on a French tradition that, unlike the sociology of knowledge in Anglo-Saxon lands, did not engage with the Mertonian-Mannheimian debate, nor with Kuhn’s conceptions of science. Merle provides a narrative that he understands sociological for its understanding that all social phenomena are socially constructed, and so he would name names behind the different conceptions of international relations, including the participation of historians as a perspective, as much as that of the philosophers that
through contractualism had built the Anglo-Saxon tradition undisputed at least up until the emergence of the functionalists and the behaviorists. This certainly had impact over the way Brazilian IR developed, especially through the work of the book’s technical reviewer, Amado Cervo.

This chapter intends to move further with the triangulation among the TRIP Survey 2014’s and Kristensen’s (2015)s findings with those of the bibliometric data retrieved through a content-analysis of both RBPI and CINT. To advance in this enterprise, I will take a dive into the state-of-the-art of the sociology of science to provide the organizational and the social grounds upon which IR in Brazil unravels, while triangulating said sources and providing more grounded data so that chapter 4 can strictly focus on the content of Brazilian IR.

3.1 An Intellectual and Social Organization of Brazil's IR

Wæver (1998) turns to the sociology of knowledge to unravel different European variations of IRT and provide the discipline with a more pluralistic facet. For that, Wæver nails down three levels of criteria upon which to verify peculiar features behind his object (the European variations).

The first level, or the first layer, would be the societal and political traces of a country. These could be verified by taking into consideration cultural and intellectual styles; ideologies or traditions of political thought; form of State; state-society relations; foreign policy. The second level, or layer, would be the standing structure of social science in general in said country, measured through general conditions; diffusion of social science; disciplinary patterning; disciplines and subfields. The third level/layer would be the internal intellectual, as well as social structures of IR as a discipline, including its theories and forms of debate, outlined through the social and intellectual structure of the discipline; and theoretical traditions.

Although the author does not defend these measures could universally apply to any other analysis over any other national variation, his systematization is useful to translate the macro-political and the micro-social into the science of IR. Kristensen (2015) discusses his advisor’s sociological background systematization by shedding light on what he calls an old sociology of science in which there would be 'an
unproblematic distinction between the internal substance of ideas and the external, social factor that condition it (Kristensen 2015: 39-40).

Macro-social factors, such as politics, economy and culture, as well as how these elements can explain a scholar's conceptualizations, beliefs, and arguments, would be part of a first wave of the sociology of science, having implications over how IR developed as a field in the twentieth-century.

Kristensen (2015c) contrasts this externalism in Mannheim's studies with the impact of Merton's internalism in the traditional narrative that has constituted IR. Mertonians subject science to a functionalist analysis. Science serves a social function: it provides certified knowledge. This function is fulfilled through a number of institutionalized norms that structure work in the scientific community. These norms are famously codified as CUDOS: Communalism (scientific results are the common property of the entire scientific community, science is a worldwide pursuit, secrecy inhibits progress), Universalism (truth claims should be evaluated by pre-established impersonal criteria and everyone can contribute regardless of gender, race, class, nationality, age, religion and other particularistic factors), Disinterestedness (scholars should have no personal, emotional, financial attachment to their work, except the motivation to arrive at the truth) and Organized Skepticism (scholars should remain skeptical and cautious about their findings and continue to challenge conventional truths) (Merton 1942:270–278, 1957:646). These norms are key to the success and authority of science (Kristensen 2015: 47).

The Mertonian interpretation entails that '[G]ender, social, national, cultural origins, favoritism, personal gain, cronyism, status, reputation and other factors that do not serve the function of science should not interfere in the allocation of rewards' in any science, and their influence in the formation of IR can be grasped through the institutionalization of the field in university departments, through the discipline's constant quest for autonomy in regards to other fields and to non-scientific actors through 'the influence of the institutionalized mechanisms for peer recognition (e.g. journals) and institutionalized fora (e.g. associations and conferences) on the formation of professional disciplinary identities' (Idem: 49-50).

The notion that there is one CUDOS system for each discipline is, nonetheless, misleading, and perhaps a corollary of the Mertonians' faith in communalism. Provided that in the twenty-first century Internet access is less exclusive, there might have been a more favorable environment for the achievement of communalism, if it were not for, for example, for few open access journals and databases.

As the epigraph to chapter two, a Churchill's quotation, suggests, however, the CUDOS system might have created a reality in which thoughts produced under its guise are not necessarily better; they are simply conveyed through a network whose
capillarity suggests these ideas are one-of-a-kind, authoritative, while they might have simply been 'said first' in those media, the gatekeepers of scientific validity, thus gaining popularity even though 'just as good' rationale is previously produced in other CUDOS systems.

The idea that there are concomitant CUDOS systems that do not necessarily communicate is easily figured when one looks into international versus national databases, and the sometimes radically different results stemming from them. In Brazil, CAPES and CNPq have created the country's very own CUDOS system. The government's agencies have founded the country's sticks and carrots, positive and negative inducements, in a structure that does not necessarily favor the internationalization of the scholars' publications, hence at least also partially explaining or helping to understand the relatively small share Brazilian scholars present in Kristensen's (2015) samples of theoretical journals or of the best-ranked journals in the Web of Science database.

Measuring success in Academia consequently depends upon which social reality one is talking about. Studying the relevance of social capital for career success among scholars, Seibert et al (2001: 219) underline that 'the key explanatory variables for the effect of social capital on career mobility are greater access to information, resources, and sponsorship.' Resources and sponsorship are certainly one of the most burning issues when it comes to the internationalization of Non-Western scholars.

In the case of Brazil, there are limitations in applying for funding to attend national and international conferences that vary according to the rank of the post-grad program, to the scholars' own career stage, to the scholars' relationship with the leadership of their own department and of the funding institutions, not to mention the macroeconomic context of the country besides the different administrations' belief in the importance of research. The best-funded scholars or programs, however, rely on relatively few sources, in light of the virtual monopoly of CAPES and CNPq -although better-off entities of Brazil's federation, such as the state of São Paulo, have their own agencies that foment research. The concentration of research funding in the public sector creates a scenario in which there are considerably less options for the scholar and that is extremely dependent on the government's priorities and economic stability, what, in the Non-Western world, means these funds are everything but dependable, there are no normal circumstances.
The fellowship system in the US and in the UK offers considerably more opportunities. Support for field research, for Dissertation writing, for conference attendance, etc, are common positive enticements offered in said countries, but private funding institutions for Brazilian researchers in IR are close to non-existent, and currently the ones that prospect particularly promising young scholars are usually in the service of foundations whose reputation in fostering regime change around the world warns against the association of those who seek to engage in scientific research, namely in light of the post-2010 political instability in South America.

Access to international funds is not always easy neither. Even when institutions abroad offer financial support for international scholars, certain countries tax these incentives, which are rarely robust to begin with, or even deny their citizens access to foreign currency, as is currently the case of some African countries such as Nigeria. This is not currently the case of Brazil, but to transfer currency to the country’s researchers through official means implicates they will get less 6.38% of the total amount, what, depending on the sum and on the scholar’s personal financial availability, is at times onerous, at others determinant. In Brazil, the import of publications such as books, journals and magazines are exempt of collection, and so are national scholarships and grants, but international funding is not.

Seen that Merton’s internalism carries relevant explanatory potential in regard to the dividing discipline IR currently consists, the impact of external factors in the development of science is see-through, and has deep consequences to the production-consumption division of labor among Western and Non-Western IR scholars. As Hoffmann (1997) points out, some of the comparative advantages of the field of IR in the USA are that the country’s social sciences have a tradition of openness to academic advisors, including immigrant scholars, offering them access to information, sometimes even within the country’s government, as well as providing researchers with ‘resource-rich’ and ‘research-based’ universities.

In general, thus, the social capital of a scholar based in the USA, or in a Western country, largely exceeds that of a scholar based in a Non-Western, or in a Global Southern institution. If language barriers have already been approached, inasmuch as communication in IR is consistently dependent of knowing how to communicate in ‘scientific’ English, access to information further widens the gap between Global Southerns and researchers based in the West. Language is of course again of the
utmost relevance, since fluently reading in English is key, but the democratization of information access is of unparalleled importance.

The second generation of Global IR intends to bring silent debates into those who have underpinned the development of the discipline. Nonetheless, without access to Academic journals and databases, how can a researcher keep him or herself up-to-date with the debate? More importantly, how can he or she engage in qualitative or quantitative methodologies based on bibliometric data, a strong pillar of said second generation's empirically-oriented current, without open access to information?

In the case of Brazil, the government's commitment to investments in Education, especially in Higher Education, waxes and wanes not only in respect to the administrations' emphasis on the issue, but, most alarmingly, to the level of macroeconomic stability deduced from Armínio Fraga's tripod, endorsed by the IMF, that has not been abandoned since its implementation in 1999. Free currency fluctuation, fixed targets for government's expenditure and for inflation rates dictate how much is spent on Education and when. The Higher Education community has little leverage to influence decision-making, and strikes are not uncommon yet rarely leading to structural change in societal values or disposition to provide steady and increasing budgets to research.

According to PINTEC (2014), in Brazil, the private sector invested less than 1% of its liquid profits in research and development (R&D), also known as innovation (Portal Brazil, 2013). Companies in the business of electricity and gas show the highest commitment to such endeavor, and yet 44.1% of the companies in the sector invested less than 1% in R&D. The tertiary sector, services, accounts for the highest amount of companies that reinvest their profits in innovation. Nonetheless, the overall figures show that most of the country's investments in R&D are directed to the purchase of capital goods. Between 2012 and 2014, 29.9% of all companies who invested in R&D gave preference to the acquisition of machinery and equipment. In contrast, only 1% of these innovative companies invested in projects involving universities and research centers.

By 2014, in the case of Brazil, only 1% of all companies who value innovation invested less than 1% of their profits in partnerships with scholars. Provided that out of this 1% of companies, 82.2% are from the electricity and gas industry, 36.0% are from the tertiary, and 24.2%, from the secondary sector, it is dauntingly low the probability that research in theoretical aspects of the field of International Relations has been funded.
Think tanks are another appropriate measure of private investments in research. Brazil has around 86 think tanks, ranking 12th among the 25 countries with more think tanks in the world (McGann 2017: 31; Secchi and Ito 2016: 340). The United States (1835), China (425) and the United Kingdom (288) are the top 3 countries with most of these institutions, further supporting Kristensen's (2015a) claim over a 'natural' prevalence of the USA in social sciences.

McGann (2017: 38) considers think tanks institutions that help bridging the gap between knowledge and policy, defining them in terms of research, analysis and public engagement on a wide rage of policy issues with the aim of advancing debate, facilitating cooperation between relevant actors, maintaining public support and funding, and improving the overall quality of life' in a country. The author also presents the areas of research of his sample: transparency and good governance; defense and national security; domestic economic policy; education policy; energy and resource policy; environment; foreign policy and international affairs; domestic health; global health; international development; international economic policy; science and technology; social policy (Idem: 39–41).

The author rates USA- and non-USA-based think tanks. The top three (Brookings Institution, Chatham House and Carnegie Endowment for International Peace) are based in the US and the UK. While the 12 countries with more think tanks involve such countries as China, India, Argentina and Brazil, the 12 best-rated list encompasses 11 US-based and UK-based think tanks, and one based in Belgium. Brazil's Fundação Getúlio Vargas (FGV) ranks 13th, being followed by other ten based in English-speaking countries or in nations politically aligned with the USA in world politics, such as Japan, what, once again, adds up to Kristensen's (2015a) analysis of publication patterns. The following best-ranked down until the 50th include two Russian, four Chinese, several based in English-speaking countries, such as Australia, Canada and the UK, or in Western Europe, such as France, Germany and the Netherlands.

Brazil's governmental institute for research in applied economics, IPEA, launched a report that relies on McGann's (2017) study as a credible source. Although the latter does provide a comprehensive list of think tanks around the world, the criteria regarding their quality is less unbiased. It is interesting to notice the presence of not only FGV, but also of ECLA, CEBRI (Centro Brasileiro de Relações Internacionais), Instituto Fernando Henrique Cardoso (iFHC), IPEA itself, CEBRAP (Centro Brasileiro de Análise e Planejamento), Centro de Estudos da Violência (NEV), BRICS Policy
Center, and Instituto Millenium among the 50 best think tanks in Central and South America (Idem: 57-58). With the exception of CEPAL, based in Chile, all other Brazilian think tanks rated among the 50 best in the region tend to pertain to the political economic spectrum of liberalism.

Instituto Lula, which has recently been the pinnacle of 'research, analysis and public engagement on a wide range of policy issues with the aim of advancing debate, facilitating cooperation between relevant actors, maintaining public support and funding, and improving the overall quality of life' in Brazil and abroad is not mentioned in several of the selected research areas (for partnerships of the Instituto Lula with the United Nations' FAO, and with the African Union, see Conheça as atividades e leia a Iniciativa África do Instituto Lula, institutolula.org).

Said study's apparently insufficient categorization has influenced IPEA's research regarding the relationship between think tanks and universities in Brazil. Secchi and Ito (2016: 341) select the think-tank sample based on McGann's report. They exclude Fundação Getúlio Vargas (FGV) because it is also a University. Hence, the rapport of Cebri, iFHC and IPEA with Brazilian universities are analyzed based on bibliography, theses and dissertations and on governmental statistic reports about the sector of knowledge production (Idem: 342). They conclude that the pattern of relationship is generally cooperative, not competitive.

This would stem from, among others, the different types of sponsorship. Universities, as previously mentioned, rely on their own budget or on national and regional governmental agencies, while think tanks have access to peak organizations (such as federations of industrials, unions, amongst others), international organizations or even foreign governments’ agencies, etc (Ibid: 344). There would be a pattern of common enterprises between think tanks and universities. Think tanks' research projects may count with the participation of scholars, who may also take part in the think tanks' short duration courses. There are joint publications whose collaboration was initiated by one or the other side, both who also promote conferences that mingle scholars and specialists.

Given the overall scenario of Brazil's investments in research, we will now engage in a more focused presentation of IR's intellectual and social organization in the country, focusing on the post-grad level. The 2017 Report on the Poli-Sci & IR Area (2013-2016) found that there has been an increase in the number of programs, students enrolled, faculty, and Master’s and PhD graduations, an increment of 75% in the
number of defended PhD Dissertations per Permanent Professor, of 73% in the median value of academic publications among Professors in publications on the A1-A2-B1 strata, and of 36% in the median value of academic publications among post-grad students on journals indexed by Qualis Capes.

The number of Poli Sci & IR indexed publications is significantly lower than what is expected at Capes for all areas, 50% lower. In the superior strata (A1-A2-B1), international journals prevail. Kristensen (2015) contrasts the attention Brazil, China, and India receive as objects of study among IR journals in the Web of Science with the space for their voices to be heard, for their own work to be published. The Chinese concentrate the increase toward the three countries role as objects and subjects.

Based on Kristensen’s data, Brazil and Brazilians (951) concentrate less articles than China and the Chinese (6 914), and India and the Indians (1 940). However, Brazilians tend to be the authors of 15,7% of their sample, while the Chinese author 7,4%, and the Indians 7,06%. Even though India and the Indians receive double the space Brazil and Brazilians do, when all three samples are combined (9 805), the Chinese author 5,22% of the articles, Brazilians, 1,52%, and Indians, 1,4%. Moreover,

In all the 100 510 articles published in IR journals in Web of Sciences from 1990 to 2014 (October 20), China accounts only for 0,91% of all articles (915), India for 0,29% (292 articles), and Brazil for 0,27% of all articles (271 articles). (…)

When publishing in Web of Science journals, scholars based in Brazil tend to publish in RBPI and Latin American Politics and Society, Marine Policy, Space Policy, and Journal of Inter-American Studies and World Affairs (Idem: 216-217).

From these five journals, three are ranked in the highest stratum at Qualis Capes, while two are not even indexed:

Table 16: Most Prominent IR Journals at Web of Science vis-à-vis their classification at Qualis Capes 2015

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Journal (WoS)</th>
<th>Strata (Qualis Capes)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Latin American Politics and Society</td>
<td>A1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RBPI</td>
<td>A1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marine Policy</td>
<td>A1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
There are 103 Qualis A1 Journals; 126 Qualis A2; and 122 Qualis B1. Capes’ report states that most of these publications have an international outreach. They divide the category international into two lists: international, and Latin America. Among those at the A1 stratum, 62% are International, and 18% are Latin American. Among those at the A2 stratum, 21% are International, 11% are Latin American. Kristensen (Ibid: 217) justifies his choice of the 20 most influential journals in IR based on the results of the TRIP Survey 2012 (Maliniak et al 2012). He recognizes ‘an Anglo-American and mainstream bias’ to the sample, but stands by his choice presenting it as a good indicator of ‘what enters the Anglo-American IR mainstream’ (Op Cit: 217-218).

Table 17: Number of Brazil-base Authors’ Publications at the Most Prominent IR Journals at Web of Science (1990-2014) vis-à-vis the publications’ classification at Qualis Capes 2015

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Journal</th>
<th>Brazil</th>
<th>Strata (Qualis Capes 2013-2016)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Millennium Journal of International Studies</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>A1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Affairs</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>A1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Affairs</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Journal of Peace Research</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global Governance</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>A1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Review of International Political Economy</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Review of International Studies</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Kristensen further explores this data acknowledging that[1]

Brazilian articles are concentrated in International Affairs and Global Governance. Four of the publications in International Affairs as well as the two in Millennium are book reviews, the three research articles are about Brazilian economy, foreign policy and Free Trade in the Americas. The articles in Global Governance are all substantive research articles about Brazilian multilateral diplomacy, the BRICS, the World Bank in Brazil as well as human rights (Op Cit: 221).

The sample accounts for articles published between 1990-2014 (Oct), and Kristensen’s observation of how these publications spread throughout the years lead to the conclusion that from 2003 until 2013 there is a relatively sustained engagement of Brazilian researchers in those journals – there is a lapse between 2007 and 2009,
when there are no publications. This does coincide with macro-political elements that had direct impact over institutional and material bases for Brazil’s IR, and, most importantly, reinforce the idea that, in Brazil, the national debate and the macro-political sphere is entrenched in the micro-social context in which the country’s ideas develop.

In 2003, in the first year of its first tenure, the Lula administration presented the National Plan for the Development of Education: Reasons, Principles, and Programs. The plan thusly interprets the constitutional provisions on Education:

Public Education, and, generally, the national policy for Education entail organizations and institutionalizations that allow for processes of individualization and of socializations aiming at autonomy. (…) Furthermore, the main goal of the national policy for education must be to balance the fundamental goes of the Republic, established by the 1988 Constitution: to construct a free, just, and solidary society; to guarantee national development; to eradicate poverty and marginalization, to reduce social and regional inequalities, and to promote the well-being of all, without any prejudice over origin, race, sex, ethnicity, age, or any other form of discrimination. There is no form of constructing a free, just and solidary society without a republican education, based on the construction of autonomy, and on principles of inclusion, and on the respect of diversity. It is only possible to guarantee national development if Education is treated as the structuring axis of the State’s actions so it can boost its effects (National Plan for the Development of Education: Reasons, Principles, and Programs: 5-6).

The Plan had four pillars - basic education, higher education, professionalization; and literacy – and includes ‘more than 40 programs’ (Idem: 15). On the subject of Higher Education, the Plan establishes principles the would complement each other:

opening more slots for students, given it is unacceptable that only 11% of all young people from 18 and 24 years old have access to Higher Education; ii) to guarantee quality, since it is not enough to open more slots, this must be done with quality in mind; iii) the promotion of social inclusion through Education, mitigating Brazil’s historical waste of talents, considering we [sic] have a verified significant contingent of young competent and talented people that have been systematically excluded through a bias of economic nature; iv) territorial ordination, allowing access to Higher Education of quality in less populated regions of the country; v) social and economic development, turning Higher Education into the master-key for the integration and the construction of the Nation, as a resource for highly qualified human capital, and for scientific and technological capitals (Ibid: 26).

The implementation of these principles happened through: i) the National Program for Student Assistance that would have consolidated REUNI. This is the Program for the Support to Plans of the Re-Structure and Expansion of National Universities; ii) the democratization of the access to Higher Education through the Program University for All (PROUNI), and the Fund for Financing Students in Higher Education (FIES). The Plan points out that from 1998 until 2004 private institutions in the Higher Ed system
enjoyed tax exemption that was supposed to be the product of social outreach, but since the provision had not been regulated 'more than one million scholarships were wrongfully not granted' (Op Cit: 29). The main focus of the National Plan in terms of Higher Education was clearly the undergrad level. Yet, it remains clear the vertical rise of Master’s and PhD programs, which is actually more sustained than the numbers of slots opened for undergrad students in public and private universities.

Kristensen (2015) emphasizes 2003 as the year that marks the rise of Brazil, China, and India, or the rise of the rest. Vigevani et al (2016) sum up Brazil's government’s investments in the institutionalization of the field of IR. Although one of the initiatives dates back to 2001, it was only institutionalized in 2003. Moreover, in 2003, the Lula administration inaugurates a decade of significantly increased investments in social policies, Higher Education and research contemplated, exactly the decade in which Kristensen identifies a sustained trend of Brazilian publications in his sample of journals.

Table 18: Governmental Opportunities for the Institutionalization of IR in Brazil (2001-2013)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Edital</th>
<th>Year of Publication</th>
<th>Providers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>San Tiago Dantas</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>CAPES; Itamaraty; CNPq</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Renato Archer</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>CAPES; Itamaraty; CNPq</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pro-Defense</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Capes; Ministry of Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pro-Defense</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>Capes; Ministry of Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pro-Defense</td>
<td>2013</td>
<td>Capes; Ministry of Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pro-Strategy</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>Capes; Ministry of Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPCP - MERCOSUR</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>Capes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPCP - MERCOSUR</td>
<td>2013</td>
<td>Capes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
From the Edital San Tiago Dantas, the homonymous post-grad program was created in 2003 (Master's Degree; and PhD, in 2011). From the Renato Archer, IRI PUC-Rio, IRel Unb, and San Tiago Dantas were the three beneficiaries. From the Pro-Strategy, San Tiago Dantas, IRel UnB, the post-grad program on International and Strategic Studies at UFRGS, UFSCar, UFS, and UniPampa were the beneficiaries, and also were a few international institutions, such as Quilmes University in Argentina (Idem: 17). From the Pro-Defense Editais, UFF’s Program on Strategic Studies in Defense and Security was created with its Master’s Degree, and IRI PUC-Rio, and San Tiago Dantas were also recipients.

This macro-political sphere in Brazil is directly associated to the election of a leftist party who shifted the focus of public policy from supply to demand - although suppliers received generous benefits which were actually the reasons why Workers’ Party (PT) members were first prosecuted at the Supreme Court in the Mensalão scandal, they were no longer the only ones to benefit from state policies. The national political debate over social policies implemented throughout PT’s administrations is hence at the crux of the institutional and the material bases upon which Brazilian IR flourished. National-developmentalism returns to the spotlight of the macro-political narrative, as Brazilian and foreign scholars investigate, for instance, a neo-developmental paradigm (Bresser-Pereira 2009; Bresser-Pereira 2010; Kroger 2012; Boito and Berringer 2014).

The content-analysis of RBPI and of CINT reinforce the idea that in Brazil’s IR the macro-political sphere is intrinsically related not only to institutional and material structures, but also to the ideas conveyed at least in part of the country’s way of thinking IR. Given the debate is strongly embedded in political perspectives over economic policies, IPE is central to the structure of the country’s post-grad programs. The TRIP Survey 2014 actually provides interesting findings regarding the social and the economic ideologies of the scholars, their primary issues and methodologies of research.

Kristensen’s data regarding the time series when Brazilians most published at the most prominent academic journals in the Anglo-Saxon world coincides with a macro-
political context in Brazil when the country enjoyed a protagonist foreign policy, and when Lula’s administration interpreted the mandate of the popular vote as one of change, i.e. to implement policies that would re-structure the nation, this time bottom-up. This, as seen in the National Plan’s citation, included investments in Higher Education, affecting the micro-social incentives within the field of IR. So, from 2003 until 2013, not only did the world supposedly wanted to learn from/about us, but we had means to produce knowledge, and the more Brazilian scholars produced about Brazil in English, the more they were published and used.

At Capes, Brazil’s gatekeeper in Assessment & Evaluation of Science in the Post-Grad Level, Political Science and IR are one area under the great area of Humanities. Arts, in turn, is part of the great area of Linguistics and Language (Linguistics, Language, and Arts), while Applied Social Sciences constitute another great area[21]. Marenco dos Santos (2015) explains the role of Capes in Brazil’s Higher Education System, mainly in post-grad studies:

> In Brazil, only Master’s and doctoral degrees conferred by CAPES-approved programs and subsequently ratified by the National Board of Education are valid. Therefore, all programs must undergo CAPES’ accreditation process so they may operate legally and grant graduate degrees (Idem: 35)[22].

Unless specific legislation bypasses the need of the accreditation of Capes to a certain degree from a certain system, any diploma, from any university abroad, is not automatically recognized in any Higher Ed institution in Brazil - it must undergo a process of ratification through an official Brazilian post-grad program.

We opted to include ‘Marenco’ in the reference of the author’s last name (Santos), in light of his role in assessing and evaluating post-grad programmes in Poli Sci and IR in Brazil. André Luiz Marenco dos Santos, better known as ‘Marenco’, has been Head of the Poli Sci and IR Area at Capes since 2011 (-2017). In 2009-2010, he was also a member of Capes Assessment and Evaluation Committee. The information he offers tends to be as accurate as it gets when it comes to how the system works given his familiarity. He’s also particularly critical of certain trends and realities, but in this research we will stick to his explanation of the system. Marenco goes on enlightening us:

> The core of the Brazilian post-grad education system’s evaluation can be isolated in the combination between (i) scientific production –as proxy of academic quality and vocation for research– (ii) education of Masters and, above all, Doctors, and (iii) internationalization achieved by each program (Santos 2015: 36).
Marenco thusly contextualizes the state of the art of Poli Sci and IR publications in Brazil:

Parallel to the expansion of Brazilian political science [and international relations], we find a significant consolidation in academic consistency rates in the last two triennials [2007-2009; 2010-2012], which proves that growth and quality are not mutually exclusive. The position of the Political Science and International Relations areas in the citation ranking by SCImago Journal & Country Ranking rose from 38th in 2004 to 16th in the world in 2012. Until 2004, they ranked behind Argentina, Chile and Mexico in terms of publications indexed in Latin America. Since 2008, Brazil has secured a leadership position in Latin American PS & IR, considering SCImago data on documents and citations (Santos 2015: 38).

Currently (1996-2016), in SCImago's ranking for all areas, Brazil ranks 15th (out of 239 countries or territories) in terms of number of documents. When it comes to cited articles, the country falls to the 18th position (Santos 2014: 30).

In both rankings, all countries that occupy higher positions than Brazil are
(a) English-speakers: USA, UK, Canada, India, Australia);
(b) Western European nations - a concept referring to the Cold War divisions: Germany, France, Italy, Spain, Netherlands, Switzerland, Sweden, Belgium, Denmark;
(c) post-WWII preferential areas of influence of the West: Japan and South Korea;
(d) or nations that have veto power in the United Nations Security Council: Russia and China.

There certainly are several ways of grouping these countries, and Brazil would probably be less of an exception if the criterion had been having been a colony, or the stage of industrialization. Nonetheless, this logic follows that of the Global IR debate provided in such publications as Kristensen's (2015a), when he not only transcends the national feature of the divide, but also entails linguistic and geopolitical considerations over how IR is socially arranged in the twenty-first century.

In the Poli Sci-IR ranking based on the number of documents, Brazil falls down to the 23th position, falling yet again to the 29th when citations are the ranking criteria. Marenco dos Santos (2014; 2015) thoroughly explores the causes of this phenomena.

For this Dissertation, it is relevant to figure out which countries rank higher than Brazil. Once again, in both rankings, all countries that occupy higher positions than Brazil are
(a) English-speakers: USA, UK, Canada, India, Ireland, South Africa, Singapore, Israel, New Zealand, Australia);
(b) Western European nations - a concept referring to the Cold War divisions: Germany, France, Italy, Spain, Netherlands, Norway, Switzerland, Sweden, Belgium, Denmark, Austria[23];

(c) post-WWII preferential areas of influence of the West: Japan, South Korea, Hong Kong, Singapore and Israel[24];

(d) or nations that have veto power in the United Nations Security Council: Russia and China.[25]

When we switch the criteria to journals instead of countries, we are surprised to find out that only one of the two journals ranked in the highest strata of Brazil's publications system (Qualis Capes) is actually in SCImago's catalogue: Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional (RBPI). The other, Contexto Internacional (CINT), is not registered.

This is one of the reasons the present Dissertation justifies even after Tickner's (2003) assessment of Latin American IR through bibliometric data of the discipline's most relevant academic journals in each country of her sample. Tickner's (2003) criteria was the journal's affiliation to a post-grad program. Indeed, while CINT is affiliated to IRI's post-grad program, and RBPI is under the guise of a think tank (IBRI), the sociology of the latter, as well as its high evaluation at Qualis Capes (highest than that of the former) provide it is indeed representative of the state of the art of the field of IR in Brazil.

Tickner is not the only one to cast doubts on RBPI's affiliation to Brazilian IR scholarship, as presented in the previous chapter. The content-analysis of RBPI and CINT justify for two reasons. First, the relevance of academic journals to measure the state-of-the-art of a discipline. Second, Qualis Capes. Qualis Capes is Brazil's Ministry of Education tool to rate academic publications.

A token to the first generation of Global IR, Wæver (1998) inaugurates an era in which the bibliometric data acquired from journals are the main source to research on Non-Western contributions to IRT. Wæver argues that

To look for patterns in IR, one could examine three types of sources: textbooks (used by Holsti in The Dividing Discipline), curricula (such as by Hayward Alker and Thomas Biersteker and in a small survey of national distribution by Alfredo Robles), and, finally, journals Wæver (1998: 696-697).

The author then affirms that '[J]ournals are the most direct measure of the discipline itself (Idem).', thusly name-dropping proof, besides explaining his preference without discussion or reference:
The sociology of science from Merton to Whitley has pointed to journals as the crucial institution of modern sciences. Textbooks are important because they introduce newcomers, but though they might affect the discipline, they are not the discipline itself. For practitioners, the field exists mostly in the journals (ibid).

In 1998, it might have been a matter of common sense to agree with Wæver. In 2003, when Internet access was not as widespread as in 2017, neither were virtual databases, things had not changed that much, and Tickner (2003: 339) also assumes that ‘[J]ournals provide one of the most accurate pictures of the state of a given discipline in terms of its theoretical tendencies, major concerns, and primary debates (Wæver, 1998:697).’ In 2015, Kristensen still goes after Wæver: ‘[T]he methodological reasoning is that research published in journals provides a good indicator of disciplinarity because journals sanction what counts as IR (Kristensen 2015a: 67).’ He goes on to validate his assumption: ‘[W]eaver (citing Merton and Whitley) is often cited for the argument that “Journals are the most direct measure of the discipline itself” (Wæver, 1998:697).’ And even though the youngest among the three authors does cite Goldmann (1995: 247) to mention the role of gate-keepers journals play within the communicative structure of modern science, he does not problematize what each sample means to each network of scholars, as we will present in a few paragraphs.

The three authors subscribe to Merton’s (1942) conceptualization of the ethos of science as a whole, the normative structure of science. Merton (1942) argues that ‘[T]he ethos of science is that affectively toned complex of values and norms which is held to be binding on the man of science’ (Merton 1942: 269). Such values and norms materialize through ‘prescriptions, proscriptions, preferences, and permissions’, institutional imperatives Merton dubs ‘mores’. They would pervade science not necessarily just as enforced metrics, but as moral imperatives that populate the scholars ‘super-ego’ via sanctions, mentorship, among other sticks and carrots. Merton’s grasp of the importance of journals to modern science derives from his conceptualization of how science is organized.

Merton recognizes four sets of institutional imperatives - four norms (technical and nontechnical) that would, yet not-exhaustively, translate the way science works: universalism; communism - later revisited and named commonality; disinterestedness; and organized skepticism (Idem: 273-278). The impact of these norms on IR and to this specific research will be tackled in a few paragraphs ahead.
Kristensen (2015a) broadens the horizon of the sociology of science cited in Wæver (1998) and Tickner (2003) by presenting ‘[A]n interactionist methodology for the Sociology of IR’ to justify his methodological decision to analyze ‘whether and how there has been a drive towards innovation of local theories in three [Brazil, China, and India] rising powers’, by underlining ‘the development of ideas, particularly academic ideas such as local or indigenous theories to resist and complement Western theories (Kristensen 2015a: 262).’ He then goes beyond journals, to enquiry what exists ‘here and now, actively pursuing academic careers and theoretical innovations (Idem: 263).’ Kristensen also observes the ‘[R]eflexivity in the Sociology of Science’ mentioning Bourdieu’s tradition regarding the role of the researcher and dynamics among scholars, such as that of competition, ‘the role of animosity in science’ (Sirinelli 2003: 250).

His adoption of ‘the new sociology of science’, quoting Camic and Gross (2004), is what sustains his search for national contributions to IRT. He acknowledges that this new sociology of science rejects the internal/external divide, adopts contextualism instead of structuralism, values localisms, and keeps an eye on the struggles for attention in the scientific field. Through rejection of the external/internal divide Kristensen, even though the new sociology of science advocates the opposite, downplays the relevance of macro-sociological events to the research led by scholars who ‘are located in a much more immediate social context than, say, the rise of China (…)’. What matters is the social landscape of the scientist, a micro-sociological approach. The macro-social would be the role the scholars’ object of study occupies in the broader narrative of the discipline. By subscribing to contextualism, Kristensen also modulates the relevance of geopolitical phenomena in the determination of the production of knowledge: a scholar’s social context is not restricted to macro-social or external influences. Hence, to gain meaning, texts and theories would have to be contextualized in a particular socio-intellectual context: ‘[A]dvancing a theory is a performative speech act: their authors are doing something in a particular context when putting them forward (Kristensen 2015a: 55).’ And the author believes this particular context is filled with animosity, rivalries, that, in science, makes the world go around, yields debate, opens the doors to progress.

Indeed, Hoffmann (1977) recognizes in Morgenthau’s Politics Among Nations the foundation of IR based on the following reasoning:
Be that as it may, Morgenthau's work played a doubly useful role – one that it may be hard to appreciate fully if one looks at the scene either from the outside (as does Aron), or thirty years later, as does the new generation of American scholars. On the one hand, his very determination to lay down the law made Morgenthau search for the laws, or regularities, (…); by tying his sweeping analysis to two masts, the concept of power and the notion of national interest, he was boldly positing the existence of a field of scientific endeavor, separate from history or law. On the other hand, the very breadth of his brushstrokes, the ambiguities hidden by his peremptory pronouncements about power, the subjective uncertainties denied by his assertion of an objective national interest, and even more the sleights of hand entailed by his pretense that the best analytic scheme necessarily yields the only sound normative advice – all of this incited readers to react and, by reacting, criticizing, correcting, reguting, to build on Morgenthau's foundations (Hoffmann 1977: 44-45).

Kristensen then advocates for the socio-intellectual contextualization of Non-Western / Global Southern intellectual enterprises, an interactionist approach that makes an effort to grasp the moves and countermoves of national ideas that ‘may be put forward as a response to other indigenous theories in the immediate and local scene or perhaps in opposition to ‘Western’ theories, ‘Northern IR’, or the ‘American Social Science’ (Kristensen 2015: 55).’ The author realizes also that those scholars might be making their move ‘against opponents that are not only distant in space, but also in time (Idem).’

When Kristensen advocates for an analysis of Global IR based on nationalism, he sustains that

[T]he main argument of a micro-sociology of science is that the site of all action is the local. (…) Therefore, theories are shaped more directly by their most immediate setting, the academic scene, or the laboratory, than by the broader socio-political or geopolitical setting. (…) It is important to understand the local practice of theorizing, as Camic and Gross argue, “Without discounting the relevance of the macro-social, the context ordinarily considered most fundamental for analyzing the development of ideas is no longer taken to be the general economic, political, and cultural milieu, but the particular local institutional settings in which intellectuals find themselves when formulating new ideas (Camic and Gross 2004: 246-247).” (Idem: 57-57)

It is hard to cope with the possibility that Kristensen has indeed entirely abandoned macro-social features of the Global South researchers’ ideas, in favor of mapping ‘the existing rivalries among persons, groups and institutions in that local space’, because even when facing similar national conditions different networks of scholars respond differently, and ‘we may even see faculty politics within certain schools of thought (Abbott 1999) (Ibid: 57).’

However, he certainly downplays those macro-sociological elements, as he adopts the framework of this new sociology of science. By analyzing the struggles for position
and attention in IR, he consolidates this claim that ‘sociological explanations of theorizing should move beyond macro-political events towards the micro-social dynamics among scholars (Op cit: 58).’ The primary social conditions of science, as previously introduced, would be competition, and Kristensen reaches out to Bourdieu to thusly explain:

The ‘pure’ universe of even the ‘purest’ science is a social field like any other, with its distribution of power and its monopolies, its struggles and strategies, interests and profits, but it is a field in which all these invariants take on specific forms (Bourdieu 1975: 19 Apud Kristensen 2015: 58).

Hence, a reflexive sociology of science is to abandon the myth of disinterested knowledge, and, Kristensen assumes, to account for the interest of scholars especially ‘in relation to each other, not in relation to the broader social universe (Idem: 59).’ However, as previously explored, deeming the macro-social the only, and disposable, external condition of science is to miss the point of the new sociology of science, which precisely accounts for macro-political spheres to encompass the macro-social, and to transcend the internalist versus externalist divide.

Kristensen tackles possible shortcomings of his emphasis on micro-social features of local contributions to IRT at the expense of macro-social elements by saying that ‘Under normal circumstances, however, changes at the macro-political environment will be only indirectly influential [over the output of the scholars’ research agenda] insofar as they affect the institutional and material bases of intellectual life (Kristensen 2015: 62).’ He concludes this inspired by Collins’ (1998: 324) integration of micro, meso and macro sociological levels that include how ‘the sociopolitical structures shape the organizations supporting intellectual life, which allow intellectuals to face inward at intellectual controversies’.

Also citing Collins (2002: 48-49), Kristensen assumes there might be an original externalist bias in the case of the sociology of IR in rising powers that has sparked his own interest in examining Brazil’s, China’s, and India’s cases, since

the geopolitical and economic rise or fall of states shifts the location of resources, expanding material bases for some intellectual networks at the expense of others. Networks realign; new philosophical positions appear (Collins 2002: 48-49) Apud Kristensen (2015: 62).

It is reasonable to assume that by directly citing the author’s contribution on the relevance of journals for science, Tickner and Kristensen also subscribe to the other author Wæver mentions. Whitley (2000)[26] makes an effort to systematize ‘the
changing nature of knowledge production at the end of the twentieth century (Idem: xi). Whitley offers a political economic perspective on the organization of science. By drawing attention to the growing interest in regulating, managing, organizing and developing scientific and journal publications, he pinpoints journals as the main sources of ‘systematic enquiry’ that ‘are being increasingly considered key sources of the innovations that provide the basis of new industries (Ibid).’ The public and the private sectors would be competitors in the enterprise to enforce policies over these systems of knowledge. The most interesting point in Whitley’s investigation is nonetheless not explored by neither one of those three authors.

In the 2000 edition, Whitley (2000: ix) traces the nature of the changes that have pervaded the organization of science, ‘and their varied extent in different countries, together with their consequences for the modern sciences as particular kinds of intellectual novelty producing systems’. Since the 1970s, the most relevant change, he argues, would have been ‘in the political-economic environment[27] and more specific developments in the structure of formal knowledge production systems and state policies dealing with them (Idem: xiii)’. Although the author’s samples are the USA, Japan, and Continental Europe, in the case of Brazil, this could not be more accurate. The 1968 Higher Ed reform took place 14 days before the military regime’s most repressive institutional act, AI-5, institutionalizing, for instance, practices of torture. Schwartzman (2015)[28] recognizes a few motives for the reform: the surge in applications for the Higher Ed system – a trend that would be reinforced in the upcoming decade of speedy economic growth, as well as with the interest of new demographic groups such as women and the elderly; the need for higher qualified labor in light of the growing rates and the modernization of the economy; and the protagonist role of student unions in demonstrations against the ongoing military regime (Idem: 338).

Schwartzman briefly cites the role of UFMG in the idealization of the reform, alluding to what he calls “a frustrating experience” at the University of Brasília. At UnB, noticeable (in our point of view, yet notorious in Schwartzman’s) leftist intellectuals and experts in public policy, Anísio Teixeira and Darcy Ribeiro designed and implemented UnB’s project. Lira (2016) explains that the project had a developmentalist background, being the first university in the country to be founded based on a pedagogical project that did not have to accommodate the interests of previous structures (colleges, chairs, etc). At UnB, the department had already tackled
the chair as the unity harboring activities in teaching and research, focusing entirely on Higher Education, explicitly aiming at the country’s autonomous and independent economic, scientific and cultural development (Idem: 1-2).

Be that as it may, the 1968 legislation stemmed from a series of 12 deals signed between Brazil’s Ministry of Education (MEC) and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) (Schwartzman 2005: 339; Snider 2013). The first deals were signed around three months after Operation Brother Sam that aided Brazil’s military’s coup in 1964. When Snider (2013) narrates the debate around the 1968 reform, he recognizes the MEC-USAID accords as ‘the most polarizing issue’ among students who, in both sides of the political spectrum, called it out ideological, as well as institutional affronts. Unlike the bilateral accords, the need for a reform was however consistently consensual.

While against-the-regime protesters on the streets demanded active participation in drafting a national legislation based on national ideas, besides more mundane requests such as ‘inexpensive student restaurants, clean bathrooms, and functioning drinking fountains (Snider 2013: 104)’, even some students who actually supported the regime, tells Snider (2013: 105-106), wrote to Brazil’s Minister of External Relations asking him for support for research trips to European Universities, so that a BRAZILIAN UNIVERSITY REFORM (sic) could be properly drafted. In the Parliament, however, there was slim to none desire to disguise the ideological background of the reform based on the collaboration with the US agency, and deputies urged the approval as ‘immediate means for combating revolutionary wars’ (Idem: 106).

In 1967, the Costa e Silva military administration made an effort to address such a pickle. An all national clique, the Meira Mattos Commission gathered and elaborated a report nailing down the supposed shortcomings of the Higher Educational sector[29]. The recommendations were the reduction of the Council for Federal Education, the nomination of college directors, as well as of university deans by the President of the Republic himself with no binding regard to the triple list assigned by the collegiate organs, and the limitation of university autonomy (Verbete Relatório Meira Mattos, fgv.br/cpdoc).

The legislation passed in Congress in November 28 1968, following a working group that started working in July 10th under the authority of the Minister of Education largely gathering input from the Meira Mattos Report, and from the works of the MEC-USAID collaborations. There was an important paradox in the reform. As Whitley points out
there was relevant political and economic pressures for the regulation of the Higher Education sector through state policies dealing especially with structural matters. In theory, the reform absolutely condoned this trend. However, there was a gap between what was designed and implemented, especially in terms of the results regarding the sponsorship of research for development. Whitley observes that in the 1970s the private and the public sectors had an interest in boosting research, what entailed the proliferation of educational institutions beyond the university system. In Brazil, the reform opened the doors to the privatization of Higher Ed in the country (Martins 2009). This is no apparent problem. Nonetheless, in light of a pressing demand for higher education that could not be met by public Higher Education, especially in terms of budget, but also in light of basic infrastructure (buildings, number of professors, etc), the government relaxed the accountability of the new legislation regarding universities from the private sector. These, in turn, became an educational industry focused on teaching, contradicting the global trend of the time, and the core goal of the 1968 reform, which was already present in the developmentalist project of the University of Brasílìa. Thus, in general, until present years, private universities in Brazil are not committed to investments in research (Martins 2009: 16-17)[30].

In the case of public universities, the legislation decentralized authority in the campi transforming chairs and college congregations into departments and research institutes. Besides, it increased the scholars’ salaries by creating the position of D.E. (Exclusive Dedication), a professor who would exclusively commit to teaching and research activities, being prohibited of officially accumulating any other job position. Again, this had an unexpected consequence: there was not an adequate amount of highly qualified scholars, so many of those who got job positions as D.E. in the public sector, meaning that it is extremely unlikely they will quit or get fired, were not ready to oversee research projects that actually boosted the Brazilian developmentalist project (Martins 2009: Schwartzman 2015; Lira 2016).

Indeed, the Final Report of The United States Team on Brazilian Higher Education to The Midwest University Consortium for International Activities itself recognized that ‘all aspects of Brazilian higher education developed from and are tied directly to uniquely Brazilian social and historical circumstances (usaid.gov, 1968: 27).’ In the further paragraph, the document highlights the reason why ‘specific solutions’ like ‘administrative structure, basic studies, the academic department’, among others had
been ‘ineffective’ or would yield ‘little contribution to the reform and transformation of the system (usaid.gov, 1968: 27): ‘[C]ollaboration with the Ministry of Education was admittedly difficult (…). It unfortunately has a highly political orientation, and changes at the level of the Minister and Director of Higher Education (…), and the absence of a professional staff in the Ministry, make long range planning difficult (usaid.gov, 1968: 28).’

The report marks also the hurdle represented by the authoritarian process to design and implement a successful legislation for the country and based on the bilateral cooperation’s expectations: ‘(…) the absence of any substantial Brazilian input’, meaning the authoritarian process of designing the legislation, had rendered the reform moot to the extent that USAID recommended the US government bypassed Brazilian governmental institutions and ‘extended association of US and Brazilian educators in joint endeavors to cope with problems’, collaborated with specific governmental agencies that had direct ‘responsibilities for educational planning as well with individual universities who seek US assistance (usaid.gov, 1968: 27-28).’ This strategy will be particularly important for the sociology of the science of International Relations in Brazil, and will be approached a few pages ahead.

The political and economic structure of the capitalist world make the 1980s the turning point of the current international distribution of science-making. During the 1980s, the increasing domination of research-intensive industries influenced ‘the expansion and the differentiation of formal knowledge production organizations (Ibid: xv)’. Countries that led this further step in the industrial revolution underwent a deeper distinction among universities, public and private research institutes, corporate laboratories, among other organizations that had different, yet complementary roles in the political and technological endeavors of their nations’ public and private sectors. The background of Brazil’s Higher Education, one that concentrated research programs in public universities, coupled with the deep financial crisis of the State distanced the country from the core of countries with research-intensive Higher Education systems. Herz (2002), for instance, sees the 1980s as the demise of the relevance of dependency theory for international studies, and highlights that the realist strand of IPE dominated the study of IR in Brazil. Although this diagnosis needs further verification, this perspective might result from the perception that the birth of dependency theory was in the 1970s fathered by scholars who were financed by the US government as said Final Report suggested.
The top-of-mind institutional crib of Dependency Theory in Brazil and outside of Latin America is Cebrap (Brazilian Center for Planning and Analysis). Cebrap was founded in São Paulo in 1969 funded by Fernando Henrique Cardoso’s provisions together with the Ford Foundation. It is in 1970 when Cardoso and Faletto publish the book on dependency theory that both Herz (2002)[31] and Tickner (2003) praise. At Cebrap’s publications, Cardoso continues to develop his perspectives on the theory, stirring debate with another Brazilian author noticeable especially in Latin American countries for his dependency theory, Ruy Mauro Marini.

Unlike FHC, who, although disagreed with the military regime, was funded by its geopolitical ally, the USA, exactly in the most intensive years of repression, Ruy Mauro Marini had received his MSc in the then controversial University of Brasília, and had been personally invited by Darcy Ribeiro to integrate their faculty. It was at UnB that Marini and Theotônio dos Santos[32] met and established a parallel center for the debate of dependency theory. However, came the regime, Marini had to distance himself from Brazil, and was not at all a recipient of Brother Sam’s investments. Yet, between 1972 and 1979 FHC and Marini were at the center of the theoretical debate that had a symbolism that would last until current years in Brazilian political landscape. Through FLACSO (a foundation FHC presided over for a while) and Cebrap, Cardoso and his up-until-present-days pal José Serra publish a series of critiques of Marini’s 1972 ‘The Dialect of Dependency’ (Dialética da Dependência) (Wagner and Silva 2013: 186). This debate is rarely approached by those IR scholars who seek to expose the relevance of dependency theory to IRT. It is as if dependency theory had been born a star, without any debate, what would be rather unusual in Academia. Sociologically, it is not hard to explain this selectivity.

It is not hard to figure out why Cardoso’s version of dependency theory is the top-of-mind in Brazil, and in the world –especially outside of Latin America. Cardoso, ironically called the Prince of the Sociologists, has never been a political outcast. In times when the military regime censorship aimed especially at the content of Humanities in Higher Education, this meant Cardoso was actually able to, more than crown his perspective, but to actually establish a public intellectual blueprint, what Marini did not have the chance to leave. Marini’s and Cardoso’s lives in the post-1964 are very illustrative. While, in 1974, FHC accepted the invitation of opposition party, MDB, to co-lecture with José Artur Giannotti (also a member of Cebrab) a series of conferences that established the connection between the Center and the only official
opposition party promoted by the military regime, Ruy Mauro Marini was running away from Pinochet’s Chile, returning to his previous exile in Mexico, where he had fled after being arrested and tortured in Rio de Janeiro following March 31st 1964 (Verbete, CARDOSO, Fernando Henrique, fgv.br/cpdoc; Vianna 2014).

Moreover, Marini’s publications are mostly in Portuguese and Spanish, while FHC’s work is available in English at least since 1975, when he lectured at Princeton (1975-1976). In 1977, he became a member of the Latin American Program (Wilson Center, D.C.), returning to Princeton until 1978, the year he was awarded with an honoris causa doctorate of law by the State University of New Jersey (Verbete, CARDOSO, Fernando Henrique, fgv.br/cpdoc). Furthermore, the fact that even after the re-democratization, when, in 2001, a second edition of FGV’s DHBB compiled additional 2127 entries, neither Marini, nor Theotônio dos Santos have been included certainly further represents the public sector’s and the private sector’s remaining interest to outcast concurring versions of Cardoso’s dependency theory.

It is relevant to underline that FGV is a hybrid institution different from IBRI. Created by a Presidential decree in 1944, and, initially, largely funded by the federal government, as well as by sub-national governmental entities, its goals to qualify professionals with scientific management skills to work in the public, and in sensitive industries of the private sector, besides producing macro-economic indexes about the national economy soon drew the attention of private donors. The 2001 project started in 1995, meaning it was entirely undertaken during FHC’s presidential tenures, and was funded by institutions from the federal government (Finep; and CNPq), as well as from the State of Rio de Janeiro foundation for research support (FAPERJ). The main financial source for the second edition was, however, the Pronac (mostly known as ‘Lei Rouanet’), a program to foster investments from the private sector into cultural and educational enterprises. The following figures show who were the investors in the project and the impact of their funding:

Table 19: Financial Sources for the Publication of FGV-CPDOC’s Verbetes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>#</th>
<th>Number Of The Project</th>
<th>Title Of The Project</th>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Segment</th>
<th>Solicited (R$)</th>
<th>Approved (R$)</th>
<th>Proposed (R$)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>972888</td>
<td>DHBB 1930-1995</td>
<td>Humanities</td>
<td>Editorship (Book)</td>
<td>436</td>
<td>714.72</td>
<td>408</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>714.72</td>
<td>079,16</td>
<td>358 079,15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>961331</td>
<td>DHBB 1930-1995</td>
<td>Humanities</td>
<td>Editorship (Book)</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>735.61</td>
<td>135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>735.61</td>
<td>735,61</td>
<td>135 000,00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>994617</td>
<td>DHBB 1930-1995</td>
<td>Humanities</td>
<td>Editorship (Book)</td>
<td>604</td>
<td>864.82</td>
<td>815</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>864.82</td>
<td>399,27</td>
<td>604 864,00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>..</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1 177</td>
<td>1 359</td>
<td>1 097</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.</td>
<td>Total (R$):</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>315,15</td>
<td>214,04</td>
<td>943,15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 20: Financial Sources for the Publication of FGV-CPDOC’s Verbetes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>#</th>
<th>CNPJ</th>
<th>Investor</th>
<th>Amount (R$)</th>
<th>% Per Investor</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>33.657.248/0001-89</td>
<td>Banco Nacional do Desenvolvimento (BNDES)</td>
<td>100 000,00</td>
<td>9.10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.</td>
<td>14.308.514/0001-13</td>
<td>BBM Participações S/A</td>
<td>258 079,15</td>
<td>23.50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>15.114.366/0002-40</td>
<td>BBM Participações S/A</td>
<td>135 000,00</td>
<td>12.30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>33.657.248/0001-89</td>
<td>Banco Nacional do Desenvolvimento (BNDES)</td>
<td>150 000,00</td>
<td>13.67%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.</td>
<td>33.000.167/0001-01</td>
<td>Petróleo Brasileiro S.A. - Petrobrás</td>
<td>394 864,00</td>
<td>35.96%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.</td>
<td>Total (R$): ...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>1 097 943</td>
<td>100.00%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Salicnet > Proponentes > E Seus Projetos Culturais > Fundação Getúlio Vargas

The Bank BBM is the only private donor to the project – the value of its donations is 0.16% behind those of Petrobras’, one of the ten largest oil companies in the world. Pronac encourages companies to donate to cultural and educational projects in exchange for tax exemptions. In 1998, BBM was the 98th largest donor in FHC’s campaign for reelection – there was a total of 2 315. The other largest donors, BNDES and Petrobras, were to a certain extent controlled by the President, since the legislation determines he nominates the boards.

As the reader might have realized, FHC dropped his primary dedication to academia to focus on politics. There is no consensus as to when this actually happened, but I make a point for a transition from 1978 until 1986, when he consolidated the transition. In 1978, he still had his political rights suspended by the 1968’s Institutional Act n.5 (AI5). Nevertheless, the consented opposition party, MDB, thenceforth 1975 had supported a tour in which Cardoso gave lectures throughout Brazil on his dependency theory (FGV CPDOC > Verbete > Cardoso, Fernando Henrique, fgv.com.br/cpdoc).

In 1975, he registered at MDB, and launched his bid for Senator. By the end of the campaign, the Supreme Court had revoked Cardoso’s name from AI5, and he was successful in exercising his tenure (Idem).

What you will not find at CPOC’s Verbetes is the moment I consider tide-changing in his scholar-politician career. To me, at that moment, he opted to abandon academia
and seek the power he believed he was deserving as an ideal-type statesman: an intellectual with public-office experience. Before democracy was reinstated through the 1988 Constitution, Cardodo ran for mayor of São Paulo in 1985. It was hard to imagine his opponent could win, at least probably for the mainstream political circles, because ‘the other guy’ was Jânio Quadros, the former President who had resigned and triggered the political crisis that led to the coup. Jânio had gained a reputation of being a basket case, and his tenure was infamous for banning bikinis, cockfight, among other restrictive policies that were of small impact for the political and economic turmoil the country faced. Cardoso was so certain he would win that the day before the results were announced, he went to the City Hall and let himself be photographed occupying the mayor’s seat in office. The next day, when Jânio Quadros won the election, he let himself be photographed disinfecting the chair (see photos and story at Acervo Estadão, and at Acervo O Globo).

Cardoso still believes he is an intellectual, and in Portuguese being an intellectual translates to being erudite. Yet, he has not occupied any teaching or research position since the 1970s, and although he does publish books these are not scientific in the sense that they are not products of research, but of the knowledge and memories he claims he has accumulated throughout the years.

Cardoso’s great grandfather was the first governor of the state of Goiás, in Brazil’s Midwest, and from his grandfather’s generation forward most of his family’s men had a military career. His grandfather, his father, his uncles, and his cousins all held high-rank positions in the Army, the most conservative and interventionist of all three forces. His father was chief of staff of Vargas’ Ministry of War in the 1930s under General Góis Monteiro’s tenure, and during the military regime he had close relatives among the Army personnel (FGV CPDOC > Verbete > Leônidas Fernandes Cardoso, fgv.br/cpdoc).

It is interesting to address here Bourdieu’s notions of social capital in science. Kristensen subscribes to Bourdieu’s imperative of the scientific capital, one that stems from

investment and peer recognition versus holders of economic, social, political and cultural capital (inherited or acquired), intellectual capital related to popular/media fame and media appearances, institutional/university capital related to formal academic position of membership in academies, boards and committees (Bourdieu 1988: 227-242; 1991: 3-7; 2004: 34).
Bourdieu assumed that scientific and temporal capitals were usually inter-related, and Cardoso’s dependency theory has many merits. However, as we will explore in the next chapter, the use IR literature, Brazilian and foreign, has been making of dependency theory has mostly relied on two fragile elements: Cardoso’s hold ‘of economic, social and cultural capital’, inherited and acquired, ‘intellectual capital related to popular/media fame and media appearances’ (Idem); and on superficial citations that take his contribution for granted basing it on another scholar’s use of his contribution, usually one who holds scientific and temporal capital within the discipline, what leads to what the sociology of knowledge calls an academic urban legend. Next chapter, this will be thoroughly explored.

Given that dependency theory had its relevance, but that, as perceived through national developmentalism, it is possible to notice other theoretical contributions were certainly being produced in Brazilian social sciences in general, and in Brazil’s IR in particular. Cardoso relies on a strict conception of science that (i) he does not thoroughly follow in his dependency theory; (ii) does not exclude developmentalism’s scientific validation. All this will be better discussed a few pages ahead. For now, it is relevant for us to examine the topic of scientific validation through sociological lenses, exploring the social and the intellectual organization of Brazilian IR. Kristensen (2015a), Tickner (2008), and even Brazilian authors contained in the following citation consider Brazil’s IR what Kristensen’s theory-speak lexicon dubs quasi-official scholarship. There is one key similarity in both authors’ work, they both cite Cox’ 1981 contribution about the distinction between problem-solving theory and critical theory to accuse Brazil’s and Latin American IR of being policy-oriented, without however going back to Cox’ text. Here, when Tickner mentions ‘critical IR scholarship’ she inserts a footnote carrying a bibliographic reference to Cox (1981):

> During the past decade, the claim that dominant international relations (IR) theories’ incapacity to understand fundamental issues of global import warrants tapping into alternative sources of knowledge has become commonplace. Among the key targets of the field’s efforts to visibilize non-conventional subjects and to expand its boundaries, the Third World has figured prominently, mainly because both IR’s central narratives and the academic practices that it cultivates have reinforced peripheral countries’ and scholars’ irrelevance to the study of international politics. Critical IR scholarship increasingly argues that when the third world replaces the great powers as authors of theory, new types of problems, research agendas, and ways of knowing come into view. And yet, IR studies in the non-core have often been described in terms of their adherence to core, mainly US models, and the lack of interest in theory building (Holsti 1985; Acharya and Buzan 2007; Tickner and Wæver 2008). (Tickner 2008: 735)
As in the case of other areas of the social sciences, IR studies in the region were also constituted through their involvement in the political domain; they continue to operate primarily through diverse forms of articulation with the policy world. What this means is that the “ivory tower” autonomy that separates Western scholars from the “real world” is absent in the Latin American context. In fact, those regional scholars who do attempt to distance themselves from events on the ground are normally scorned for being “too academic.” The primacy of practical knowledge susceptible to being translated into policy formulae, and the scarcity of theoretically inclined scholarship in IR are largely derived from this condition. (Tickner 2008: 745)

Finally, the field’s subservience to state cues, coupled with the deep historical roots of the state in the collective imaginary, may explain why nearly all Latin American analyses of international issues assign primordial status to this actor. Although the state and concepts such as sovereignty have become highly problematic within the field of IR and in global practice itself, Latin American scholarship, buttressed by regional states and societies, continues to cherish them. (Idem)

By not going back to Cox’ (1981) text, Tickner (2008), and Kristensen (2015a) applied a commonsensical interpretation of Cox that was deadly in their case. Tickner and Kristensen, the latter also misled by Brazilian scholars’ own stock-taking about the country’s discipline, blur the distinction between problem-solving theory, policy-oriented research, and Brazilian foreign policy analyses that are not necessarily the application of Foreign Policy Analysis theories and methodologies.

It is relatively simple to disentangle this nod. To begin with, Cox did not believe in a strict distinction between the state and civil society, hence, quoting him and then treating the scholar as a quasi-official researcher, to apply Kristensen’s (2015a) lexicon on theory-speak, misses the point he makes in the first paragraph of this text:

One old intellectual convention which contributed to the definition of international relations is the distinction between state and civil society. This distinction made practical sense in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries when it corresponded to two more or less distinct spheres of human activity or practice: to an emergent society of individuals based on contract and market relations which replaced a status-based society, on the one hand, and a state with functions limited to maintaining internal peace, external defense, and the requisite conditions for markets, on the other. Traditional international relations theory maintains the distinctness of the two spheres, with foreign policy appearing as the pure expression of state interests. Today, however, state and civil society are so interpenetrated that the concepts have become almost purely analytical (referring to difficult-to-define aspects of a complex reality) and are only very vaguely and imprecisely indicative of distinct spheres of activity (Cox 1981: 86)

Brazilian IR scholars could not be subservient to the State, precisely because the secularization that was believed to allow scholars to objectively analyze any phenomena does not exist, at least if you are basing your argumentation of Cox’.
State and the researcher would be parts of the same ethos, thus this Dissertation’s reflexive, interactive approach to the sociology of science. The macro-political and the micro-social are in constant exchange. Also, to sustain the separation between the scholar and the State, or to even flirt with the notion of an ivory tower as an ideal type of scholarship exercised in the West is to overlook US scholars’ perennial transit through governmental agencies, think tanks, and university positions, not to mention the UK’s REF, their pattern and periodical measurement of research excellency, under which the impact of the research upon public policies is highly praised and sanctioned as good science.

In fact, Hoffmann (1977) underlines three institutional elements that would have been paramount for the development of IR in the US, even though only the first two are relevant to our analysis right now:

One is the most direct and visible tie between the scholarly world and the world of power: the “in-and-outer” system of government, which puts academics and researchers not merely in the corridors but also in the kitchens of power. (…) A second institutional factor of great importance is the role of what I have elsewhere called the relays between the kitchens of power and the academic salons. (Hoffmann 1977: 49-50)

Cox’ critique targeted exactly this intimacy in the US case, where these same scholars publish their ‘civic duties’ as if they were universal, objective, products of pure science. Hence, using Cox to critique Latin American scholars for being clear about to whom and based on whom they are thinking is to miss the author’s very motive:

Beginning with its problematic, theory can serve two distinct purposes. One is a simple, direct response: to be a guide to help solve the problems posed within the terms of the particular perspective which was the point of departure. The other is more reflective upon the process of theorizing itself: to become clearly aware of the perspective which gives rise to theorizing, and its relation to other perspectives (to achieve a perspective on perspectives); and to open up the possibility of choosing a different valid perspective from which the problematic becomes one of creating an alternative world. Each of these purposes gives rise to a different kind of theory. (…) (Cox 1981: 88)

The first purpose gives rise to problem-solving theory. It takes the world as it finds it, with the prevailing social and power relationships and the institutions into which they are organized, as the given framework for action. The general aim of problem solving is to make these relationships and institutions work smoothly by dealing effectively with particular sources of trouble. Since the general pattern of institutions and relationships is not called into question, particular problems can be considered in relation to the specialized areas of activity in which they arise. Problem-solving theories are thus fragmented among a multiplicity of spheres or aspects of action, each of which assumes a certain stability in the other spheres (which enables them in practice to be ignored) when confronting a problem arising within its own. The strength of the
The problem-solving approach lies in its ability to fix limits or parameters to a problem area and to reduce the statement of a particular problem to a limited number of variables which are amenable to relatively close and precise examination. The *ceteris paribus* assumption, upon which such theorizing is based, makes it possible to arrive at statements of laws or regularities which appear to have general validity but which imply, of course, the institutional and relational parameters assumed in the problem-solving approach. (Idem)

The second purpose leads to critical theory. It is critical in the sense that it stands apart from the prevailing order of the world and asks how that order came about. Critical theory, unlike problem-solving theory, does not take institutions and social power relations for granted but calls them into question by concerning itself with their origins and how and whether they might be in the process of changing. It is directed toward an appraisal of the very framework for action, or problematic, which problem-solving theory accepts as its parameters. Critical theory is directed to the social and political complex as a whole rather than to the separate parts. As a matter of practice, critical theory, like problem-solving theory, takes as its starting point some aspect or particular sphere of human activity. But whereas the problem-solving approach leads to further analytical subdivision and limitation of the issue to be dealt with, the critical approach leads toward the construction of a larger picture of the whole of which the initially contemplated part is just one component, and seeks to understand the processes of change in which both parts and whole are involved. (Ibid)

Aside from the cue to transcend the inside-outside duality, Cox thusly defines problem-solving theories which are also relatively different from policy-oriented research. Policy-oriented research usually applies problem-solving theories to deliver their policy-orientation. Policy-oriented research would comprise research into the existence, causes, and potential solutions of problems and then, if a solution is implemented, into its impact. Nonetheless, when we present a content-analysis of RBPI’s and CINT’s articles by the four most relevant authors to the first generation of Brazilian IR scholars who engaged with what Kristensen (2015a) considered the most promising Brazilian contribution to IRT, Maria Regina Soares de Lima, Tullo Vigevani, Sombra Saraiva, and Amado Cervo, we do realize that they are dealing with Brazilian Foreign Policy, or with Brazilian diplomacy. Yet, they are all clearly questioning not only the theoretical status quo, but also the political and the economic realities underpinning the social organization of IRT. It is neither policy-oriented, nor problem-solving. Kristensen brings another variable into this confusion, which is the fact that Brazilian scholars tend to seek Brazilian foreign policy trends and decisions:

The most traditional attempt to identify a disciplinary core in Brazilian IR points to its close relation to Brazilian foreign policy. Interest in foreign policy was the main impetus for developing IR in the 1970s and several studies simply identify Brazilian IR with the study of Brazilian foreign policy (Fonseca 1987:273; Pinheiro 2008:4–5; Hirst in Faria 2012:100). One reason for making this equivalence is that “intellectual reflection has kept up with the priorities established in foreign policy: the ‘anguish’ of the researcher remains close to
the anguish of the policy-makers. As a result, an analysis of scholarly production is always greatly revealing with regard to the state’s activities.” (Fonseca 1987:273). The “Brazilian Way” of doing IR, Fonseca further argues, is prescriptive and policy-focused: ‘The ‘Brazilian way’ to reflect on international relations is essentially characterized by a search for an understanding of the major Brazilian foreign policy trends and decisions” (Fonseca 1987:274). IR serves primarily to explain the foreign policy “formulated and implemented by the government in power” (Pinheiro 2008:4). Theory, by contrast, is seen as a useless luxury of little value for solving practical real world [sic] problems (Tickner 2008:744). The theoretical and epistemological debates that characterized IR in Europe and the U.S. made little impact in Brazil where most researchers conducted historical and prescriptive studies of Brazilian diplomacy and foreign policy (Herz 2002:8, 16). Apart from dependency theory—which does not really fit into the vision of IR as Brazilian foreign policy either—most studies were historical studies of Brazilian foreign policy and the country’s “international insertion” (Herz 2002:16, 29). Several scholars still subscribe to the view of IR as Brazilian foreign policy analysis, but there is some divergence on whether it remains the dominant view within Brazilian IR. One study finds that Brazilian foreign policy is the “most chosen topic of study” and that the foreign policy agenda continues to have “a strong role in the definition of choices for objects of study” (Pinheiro 2008:13–14). (Kristensen 2015a: 496)

Based on the “theory is for someone” maxim, Brazilian scholars explicitly aimed to come up with the best advice for Brazil and to lessen political, economic and intellectual dependence on the US (Ferreira-Pereira and Resende 2010: 3–7). (Kristensen 2015a: 547)

To begin with, there is a problem with Pinheiro’s assessment of the most chosen topic of study. There are two sources that challenge her assumption: the TRIP Survey, and the organization of the country’s post-grad programs.

The 2017 Poli Sci and IR Assessment and Evaluation Document (Area Document) lays down four different sub-areas and each one’s amount of post-grad programs: Political Science (16); International Relations (11); Strategic and Defense Studies (5); and Public Policies (9). While none of the latter has institutional affiliations to the sub-area of International Relations, the sub-area of Strategic and Defense Studies is intrinsically connected to IR. The presentation of their areas of concentration and lines of research certainly illustrate the interdisciplinary content between Strategic and Defense Studies and contents traditionally approached in the field of IR. The content of the Strategic and Defense Studies programs is hereby explored. To begin with, we provide a thorough account of the post-grad programs in Brazil, then offering word clouds that present a better visualization of these programs’ focus.

Table 21: Strategic and Defense Studies Post-Grad Programs in Brazil (2017)
Table 22: Strategic and Defense Studies Post-Grad Programs in Brazil (2017) – Areas of Concentration and Lines of Research

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>#</th>
<th>Areas of Concentration</th>
<th>Lines of Research</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Theory and Analysis of International Relations and International Security</td>
<td>South American Thinking in Security and Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>National Defense and Political Power</td>
<td>National Defense and The Defense Sector In Democratic Periods</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Security, Integration, and Development</td>
<td>International Politics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>International Security</td>
<td>International Political Economy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>National Defense</td>
<td>War and Peace Studies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Logistics of the Defense Sector</td>
<td>Relations Among States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Aero-spatial Power</td>
<td>Strategic Thought and Aero-spatial Power</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Contemporary Political and Strategic Thought</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: The 2017 Poli Sci and IR Assessment and Evaluation Document (Area Document)

Table 23: International Relations Post-Grad Programs in Brazil (2017)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>#</th>
<th>University</th>
<th>Program</th>
<th>MSc (foundation)</th>
<th>PhD (foundation)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>UNB</td>
<td>IR</td>
<td>1984</td>
<td>2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>PUC-RIO</td>
<td>IR</td>
<td>1987</td>
<td>2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>San Tiago Dantas</td>
<td>IR</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>PUC/MG</td>
<td>IR: International Politics</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>UFRJ</td>
<td>IPE</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>USP</td>
<td>IR</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>UERJ</td>
<td>IR</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>2016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>CEBELA</td>
<td>IR Toward South America</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>UEPB</td>
<td>IR</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>UFSC</td>
<td>IR</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>UFRGS</td>
<td>IR</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: The 2017 Poli Sci and IR Assessment and Evaluation Document (Area Document)

Table 24: International Relations Post-Grad Programs in Brazil (2017) – Areas of Concentration and Lines of Research
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Program</th>
<th>Areas of Concentration</th>
<th>Lines of Research</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>International And Comparative Politics</td>
<td>IPE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Cooperation, Integration And International Institutions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Foreign Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>History of International Relations</td>
<td>History Of Contemporary IR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>History Of Brazilian Foreign Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>International Politics</td>
<td>IPE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Processes of Globalization And Regional Integration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Foreign Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Historical Politics</td>
<td>Regional Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Institutions, Processes, and Actors</td>
<td>IPE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>US Foreign Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Peace, Defense And International Security</td>
<td>Strategic Thought, Defense, and Foreign Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Peace Studies, Conflict Resolution, and Crisis Management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>International Conflicts And Violence in Contemporary Societies</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| 4       | International Politics: Institutions, Conflicts, and Inequalities | Institutions, Conflicts, And International Negotiations | Development And International Inequalities
|         |                                        | Decision-making Processes in International Politics And Foreign Policy               |
| 5       | IPE                                    | Inter-State System And Global Power                                                |
|         |                                        | Capitalist Development And Geopolitics                                             |
| 6       | IPE                                    | Trade Policy And International Negotiations                                         |
|         |                                        | Foreign Policy Analysis And Brazilian Foreign Policy                               |
|         |                                        | Institutions, and Comparative Political Processes in Latin America                  |
|         | Culture And Normative Questions in IR  | Cultural Matters And IR's Normative Agenda                                          |
|         |                                        | Order, Democracy, and Global Governance                                            |
| 7       | International Politics                 | Politics, Culture, And Institutions                                                |
|         |                                        | Foreign Policy                                                                      |
| 8       | CLOSED                                 | IPE                                                                                |
| 9       | International Politics                 | Cooperation, Integration, and International Institutions                            |
| 10      | IR                                     | Foreign Policy And Security                                                         |
|         |                                        | IPE                                                                                |
| 11      | CLOSED                                 | X                                                                                 |

Source: The 2017 Poli Sci and IR Assessment and Evaluation Document (Area Document)
When we observe both samples, we have a better sense over to what Brazilian IR’s post-grad courses commit themselves. As expected in the Strategic and Defense Studies sample, security and international security combined concentrate most of the sample, providing a direct link with IR, followed by power, and national defense. However, strategic studies, strategic thought, defense, defense sector, and aero-spatial (a qualifier of power, and of studies in both incidences) follow closely. When we factor into this analysis the words most cited throughout IR’s post-grad programs, we realize they have a general commitment to study international politics, followed closely by the study of international political economy, which is then followed by the study of institutions.

It is not far-fetched to infer that Brazilian IR post-grad programs (including Strategic
and Defense Studies) commit themselves primarily to the study of international security phenomena through approaches that deal preferentially with issues related to the country’s national defense, approaching power through the lenses of international political economy, and of its realization via institutions. CINT’s and RBPI’s keywords, as well as some of TRIP Survey 2014’s findings will now be contrasted with this inference to further ground Brazilian IR’s intellectual profile.

Hereby, we offer figures with the most used keywords at RBPI’s and CINT’s samples available at the Scielo system. At CINT, there are 294 different keywords. Only the words cited more than four times were considered for this sample (five is the median value):

Table 25: Most Repeated Keywords at CINT (2002-2017)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Keyword</th>
<th>Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>constructivism</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>brazilianforeignpolicy</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>internationalrelationstheory</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>multilateralism</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>internationalsecurity</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>unitedstates</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>brazil</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>china</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>democracy</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>regionalism</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>southamerica</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>wto</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Atlasti; Scielo > CINT > Site Usage Reports > Publishing Analytics > By Document.

At RBPI, there are 199 different keywords. Only the words cited more than six times were considered for this sample (seven is the median value):

Table 26: Most Repeated Keywords at RBPI (1997-2017)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Word</th>
<th>Count</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>brazil</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>brazilianforeignpolicy</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>regionalism</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>foreignpolicy</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>trade</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>globalization</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mercosur</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>china</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Unlike the case of CINT, RBPI’s most repeated keywords have an outlier, the term ‘brazil’. ‘Brazil’ tends to be an outlier because it unbalances the sample. It does so for its high frequency as a restrictive adjective in regard to several issues. These samples confirm and specify the findings of the content-analysis of the post-grad programs. They conform a reality in which Brazilian Foreign Policy is intrinsic to both publications, carrying relatively more weight to RBPI, what is consistent with its editorial guidelines since 1958. The presence of constructivism and of international relations theory at CINT’s sample is also consistent with IRI PUC-Rio’s post-grad program’s profile under the Catholic tradition in which philosophy and sociology are above the practice of science, they must guide the practice of science as much as theology.

Furthermore, ‘multilateralism’, ‘regionalism’, ‘globalization’, ‘South America’, ‘Mercosur’, ‘WTO’, and ‘trade’ confirm the post-grad samples in the sense that, also at RBPI and CINT, Brazil’s IR would favor the practice of power through institutions, and the interpretation of these realities would frequently take place through the lenses of international political economy, hence the frequent citation of ‘trade’, and the concomitant relevance to ‘South America’ and to ‘Mercosur’. Besides explaining the presence of specific countries among the journals’ top keywords [IR of a particular region], TRIP Survey 2014’s findings on Brazil’s faculty primary research issues reinforces our inference, and confirms the relevance of international security issues to Brazilian IR:

Table 27: Primary Research Issue Among Brazil’s Faculty (2014)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>#</th>
<th>Issue</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Global / International Security</td>
<td>21.74%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Brazilian Foreign Policy</td>
<td>14.49%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>IPE</td>
<td>9.66%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Other</td>
<td>9.66%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>IR of a particular country/region</td>
<td>7.25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>IRT</td>
<td>4.35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Development Studies</td>
<td>3.86%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Comparative Foreign Policy</td>
<td>3.38%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Global / International Environment</td>
<td>3.38%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>International Organization(s)</td>
<td>3.38%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>US Foreign Policy</td>
<td>3.38%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>History of International Relations</td>
<td>2.90%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Given that in the study of Brazil-related phenomena, be it on international security, on international institutions, among others, the most relevant authors at RBPI’s and at CINT’s sample, contrasted with the TRIP Survey’s list of top-of-mind local scholars among Brazil’s IR faculty, provide that they do not aim at solving problems, nor at advising the State, Brazilian IR does not study primarily Brazilian Foreign Policy, even though the issue is among the most relevant to the country’s publications and post-grad pedagogical projects, unlike what Kristensen assumes based upon Pinheiro. Also, by seeking to unravel foreign policy trends and decisions and to explain the foreign policy formulated and implemented by the administration in power, ‘the Brazilian way’ is not problem-solving, or policy-orienting. It is simply epitomizing the overlap between the macro-political arena and the micro-social sphere, especially since they more frequently than not engage in reflexive processes about the process of theorizing itself, achieving a perspective on perspectives, broadening the status quo’s worldview through a different valid perspective creating an alternative work: ‘[E]ach of these purposes gives rise to a different kind of theory’ (Cox 1981: 88).

As a result of the social capital gathered by the scholars who helped institutionally and intellectually forging IRel UnB’s IR, including its unofficial journal, RBPI, as well as of the chronological age of CINT, the first generation of Brazilian IR who engages in a specific different kind of theory under the effort of what Kristensen recognizes as the ‘International Insertion’ project, and whose work does broaden the status quo’s worldview through norm subsidiarity, namely the works of Amado Cervo and of Sombra Saraiva, are affiliated to the macro-political and micro-social paradigm of national-developmentalism, one that will be further inquired in the last chapter of this Dissertation, when we will focus on the philosophy of science behind the investigation of a Brazilian contribution to IRT. For now, we will wrap up our sociological conversation by exploring how Whitley (2000) interprets different types of theoretical
exercise.

The hyper-specific concept of science advocated by Western IRT casts out contributions that diverge from what Whitley presents as ‘theory-directed explanatory research’, and ‘instrumental research’. Thus, to be scientifically valid in Western IRT, one has to be under the guise of these two patterns of theory-making. In the 1980s, IRT had already scrutinized this perspective, namely through Robert Cox’s (1981) work, but Global IR has brought a breath of fresh air into this debate. Turton (2016), for instance, investigates the rhetoric that equals an American dominance over IR to a widespread enforcement of positivism or rationalism in the field’s most prominent international publications. We have seen explored her explanation over how classical American IR has adopted rationalism, instead of positivism. Here, we will observe how she treats US rationalism and its actual impact over the most prominent, international publications.

Rationalism would prevail upon (Western) IR ‘because there is a rationalist hegemony, which has manifested in the denial of historicist arguments and the embracing of quantitative methods’ (Turton 2016: 78):

Rational choice methods are defined as the methods of modeling social behavior based on the assumption of the rationality of actors. (…) Rational choice research refers to scholarship that uses game theory, quantitative (small and large N-studies) and modeling methods using deductive reasoning based on the assumption of the rationality and therefore utility maximizing behavior of actors (Mahoney 2000). (Idem: 79)

Turton states that the argument that rationalism prevails on IR Western literature is not sustainable after a grounded analysis of 12 international journals from 1999 until 2009. All journals are published in English. Methodologically, she found that 77% of all publications in those journals applied qualitative methodology; 23% applied quantitative methodology. She provides the following roster of methods:

(i) Quantitative: statistical analysis; quantitative analysis; formal modeling; rational choice; cross-sectional time series; econometrics; spatial modelling; process-tracing; case studies;

---

23 The journals are: International Organizations; International Studies; International Studies Quarterly; International Studies Perspectives; World Politics; European Journal of International Relations; Cooperation and Conflict; Journal of International Research and Development; International Relations; Review of International Relations; American Journal of International Affairs; International Relations of the Asia-Pacific.
Qualitative: longitudinal analysis; event history analysis; content-analysis; interpretivism; historical analysis; literature review; comparative analysis; archival analysis; discourse analysis; deconstruction; genealogy; semiotics; hermeneutics; linguistics; ethnography; participant observation; counterfactual analysis; historical materialism; interviews.

How each of these methodologies behave in the author’s sample, in this research’s sample, in TRIP’s and in Kristensen’s findings is a question for the next chapter. As visited previously, the TRIP Survey 2014 questioned Brazil’s faculty (N=200) about their primary epistemological affiliations. We will not get into the problems of the answers they offered at this moment, as next chapter will focus exactly on the philosophy of science of Brazil’s IR in particular, and of IR in general. But Brazilian scholars responded they affiliate most to Non-Positivism, Positivism, and Post-Positivism, even though the survey does not provide definitions to these alleged epistemologies.

Figure 13: ‘Epistemological’ Affiliations of Brazil’s Faculty (2014)

![Chart showing epistemological affiliations](source: Maliniak et al (2014))

The survey also provides the answer by issue. What is extraordinarily interesting for this Dissertation is that scholars who consider their primary issue of study to be Brazilian Foreign Policy did not conform to any ‘epistemology’ provided by the survey. Also, according to the survey, Brazilian scholars who primarily research IRT would not consider positivism across their ‘epistemological affiliations’.

Table 28: Brazil’s Faculty Main Issue of Research vis-à-vis the Faculty’s Epistemological Affiliations:
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>#</th>
<th>Issue</th>
<th>Positivism</th>
<th>Non-Positivism</th>
<th>Post-Positivism</th>
<th>% Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Global / International Security</td>
<td>37,78%</td>
<td>33,33%</td>
<td>28,89%</td>
<td>100,00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Brazilian Foreign Policy</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>IPE</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>100,00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Other</td>
<td>24,71%</td>
<td>43,53%</td>
<td>31,76%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>IR of a particular country/region</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>IRT</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>33,33%</td>
<td>66,67%</td>
<td>100,00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Development Studies</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Comparative Foreign Policy</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Global / International Environment</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>International Organization(s)</td>
<td>57,14%</td>
<td>14,29%</td>
<td>28,57%</td>
<td>100,00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>US Foreign Policy</td>
<td>37,93%</td>
<td>44,83%</td>
<td>17,24%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>History of International Relations</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>International Law</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>European Studies / European Integration</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Human Rights</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>100,00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Global / International History</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Global / International Ethics</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Human Security</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>Global / International Health</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Maliniak et al 2014.

It would be possible to assume that given Brazil’s IR’s particular approach to the country’s International Insertion, especially, as we have explored in the previous chapter, through Cervo’s and Sombra Saraiva’s work, its tendency to research relevant matters for the country’s macro-political sphere through ideas that deeply question the theoretical status quo, while distancing themselves from positivism, and applying non-positivist, as well as post-positivist perspectives on international political economy, and on the theory of international relations, it is very likely there is a Brazilian variant of IRT.

Whitley does not emphasize the geographic division of science-making specifically in IR, but he problematizes an overall trend of the segmented regulation of scientific knowledge that from a discipline-grounded science turned into an applications-based research.
They [Gibbons et al] characterize the former kind of science as dominated by university-based disciplines in which units of administrative authority are the same as intellectual ones and research priorities are determined by disciplinary élites. These scientific élites also dominate the allocation of research funds as well as the standards to judge research competence and significance. Research teams and peer group communities are quite stable in this model of science, with intellectual and social mobility largely occurring within disciplinary boundaries. Basic research here is mostly conducted in universities, funded by block grants from the state that delegates control over their allocation to practitioner élites. Applied research and development, in contrast, are carried out mostly in private firms and state research institutes. Thys, different research objectives are organizationally segmented in this stereotype (Whitley 2000: xvi).

This shift, argues Whitley, would not be universal neither in terms of national higher education systems, nor in terms of areas of research. Finally, to definitely wrap up our tour through Brazil’s IR intellectual and social organization, we will examine the framework where the field’s social capital exchange unravel. In one of the chapters of René Rémont’s edited 1988 volume, Sirinelli (2003) claims the content and the relative importance of science’s social structures would ‘naturally’ vary according to time and to specific groups, the latter he dubs networks. There would be ‘a common language’ among these networks that thusly fulfill the following two elementary structures of sociability among intellectuals:

Journals would provide structure to the intellectual field through antagonistic forces of adherence (…) and of exclusion (…). (…) The journal is, above all things, a locus of intellectual proliferation and of affectionate relationships, besides providing a cage, as well as a space for social exchanges (…) (Sirinelli 2003: 248).

Manifestos and petitions would be another structure of sociability (Sirinelli 2003: 248). Rather usual among Global South scholars in light of their persistent need to buzz public spheres to be provided basic infrastructure for science or following practices of censorship and torture focused especially on intellectuals within Humanities, Social and Political Sciences that entailed the imperative of collectively organizing to amplify leverage or to diffuse the consequent repression.

Juxtaposing Sirinelli’s understanding of the role of journals on the behavior of intellectuals and the development of science with Kristensen’s application of Bourdieu’s reflexivity regarding the (micro-social) nature of the scientific debate, we can assume that although other methods such as that of interviews and surveys might provide substantial indications of the state of the art of a discipline, journals would represent the most institutionalized loci, ones that offer researchers the opportunity to exercise structured rivalry.
Capes ranks periodicals in 8 strata (A1; A2; B1; B2; B3; B4; B5; C). 'In the area of Political Science [and IR], only publications in periodicals rated A1, A2 and B1 are considered for purposes of assigning scores to academic production (Santos 2015: 37).’ RBPI is ranked A1; CINT, A2: '[t]he requirements for an area to include a journal in such strata are the impact factor (for foreign periodicals) and inclusion in the Scopus (for A1 and A2) and [in] Scielo (for B1) [sic] 7 [data]bases (Idem).’ As Marenco points out, impact factor and indexation are core criteria for an academic journal rank, but so are 'internationalization and qualitative criteria (Santos 2014: 27).'

A 'qualitative criteria' that is common to all great areas for the Qualis Capes Assessment and Evaluation is Peer Recognition, which is

[e]xpressed by the impact factor, calculated by the number of citations (that is, the importance that academic peers attribute to a certain author's contribution), the rigour and selectivity in the peer review procedures adopted by each periodical for accepting articles, or even more subjective criteria such as the importance attributed to a journal in a certain disciplinary field (Santos 2014: 7).

Whitlety (2000) teaches us about the impact of the social capital developed through the intellectual and social organization of different fields in different countries. He explains that

the more researchers depend on their reputations among their intellectual peer group for access to jobs, promotions, resources, and other rewards, the more they will struggle to convince that peer group of the merits of their research strategies and achievements. Thus, considerable levels of delegation of control over key resources of research practitioners coupled with considerable collective organization and control of intellectual goals and standards by trans-organizational scientific elites generate high levels of intellectual competition. (Whitley 2000: xxii).

As well, then, as variations in the structure of scientific fields remaining significant, it is additionally necessary to consider how national research systems are organized in different ways such that patterns of scientific and technological development vary.

One of the crucial differences between states concerning the organization and control of formal knowledge production is the extent to which researchers are collectively able to control the standards governing research priorities and performance evaluation. (…)

A second important characteristic of national research systems concerns the organization and control of employment opportunities and promotions in academia and other organizations producing published research. (…) [Third] organizational rigidity and segmentation of goals and resources between different employment units. (…) [Fourth] the extent of standardization and homogeneity of resource allocation procedures, employment structures, and organizational relationships across scientific fields and industrial sectors. (Idem: xxiii)
In Brazil, assessment and evaluation boards at Capes are composed only by scholars. Hiring committees are also composed only by scholars, there is no participation of the university’s bureaucracy in the entire process, as they simply process the red tape prepared by the departments’ faculty and the by the committees. However, this scenario in Brazil entailed a competition that is not reflected in the country’s journals’ pages, since in light of a perennial latent resource scarcity, that from time to time emerge to confirm all fears, neither early career researchers, who depend upon those in power to access the academic labor market, nor senior scholars register any possible discomfort to a colleague who, once occupying positions of power may damage their lives structurally.

Having presented the theoretical discussions on Non-Western Theory/Global IR underpinning this Dissertation, we then moved forward to methodological considerations that shed light onto this chapter’s sociological investigation of Brazil’s IR. The final chapter of this research will explore the shortcomings of the attempts to make sense of the content of Brazil’s IR through the sociological idea of academic urban legends to pave the way for a conclusion that will finally explore the philosophical content of our findings to provide a contrapuntal reading of IRT through a historiography of a Brazilian contribution to it.


You may write me down in history
With your bitter, twisted lies,
You may trod me in the very dirt
But still, like dust, I’ll rise.

Does my sassiness upset you?
Why are you beset with gloom?
’Cause I walk like I’ve got oil wells
Pumping in my living room.

Just like moons and like suns,
With the certainty of tides,
Just like hopes springing high,
Still I’ll rise.

Did you want to see me broken?
Bowed head and lowered eyes?
Shoulders falling down like teardrops,
Weakened by my soulful cries?

Does my haughtiness offend you?
Don't you take it awful hard
'Cause I laugh like I've got gold mines
Diggin' in my own backyard.

You may shoot me with your words,
You may cut me with your eyes,
You may kill me with your hatefulness,
But still, like air, I'll rise.

Does my sexiness upset you?
Does it come as a surprise
That I dance like I've got diamonds
At the meeting of my thighs?

Out of the huts of history's shame
I rise
Up from a past that's rooted in pain
I rise
I'm a black ocean, leaping and wide,
Welling and swelling I bear in the tide.

Leaving behind nights of terror and fear
I rise
Into a daybreak that's wondrously clear
I rise
Bringing the gifts that my ancestors gave,
I am the dream and the hope of the slave.
I rise
I rise
I rise.

(Still I Rise, Maya Angelou 1978)

When Chowdry (2007) and Bilgin (2016) draw to Edward Said’s contrapuntal reading for a methodological inspiration to better approach Global IR, they bring up his essay ‘Reflections on Exile’. For Said, exile hinges an involuntary state of mind. However, since he constantly borrows from Freud, the involuntary counts at least with the slip. This is relevant for this chapter, because I now intend to provide philosophical reflections on the triangulation explored throughout this research, a conversation that, perhaps more than all others, actually tackles the content of our content-analysis, the content of a Brazilian contribution to IRT.

When I commit myself to this enterprise, a detached, sanitized science could easily accuse me of not having enough distance to properly analyze this content. If I argue that methodology has granted me the necessary space, I am perjuring methodology, since it relies on a perennial exchange between the macro-political, and the micro-social. Hence, even if I managed to step back from the micro-social, I would
‘involuntarily’ remain stuck into the macro-political, and more precisely, a macro-political.

In the beginning of this Dissertation, I was writing about how Hoffmann (1977) approaches the comparative advantages the USA united allowing IR to flourish in the country. And I ‘involuntarily’ wrote that US IR scholarship was lucky for the Nazi persecution of intellectuals. This is of an utter offense. I do not subscribe to a zero-sum perspective of life: every time someone loses, others gain. Those scholars’ exile was not the virtue that allowed the US IR to prevail upon all others. Turton (2016) argues that, philosophically, US IR does not even prevail. But sociologically it certainly does, and Hoffmann’s analysis of the superpower’s intellectual organizations is significantly more grounded than assumptions that those exiles’ philosophical worldviews were the perfect match for a mathematical political science, hence its capacity and willingness to theorize.

To agree with Hoffmann is to dismiss any type of theorization that does not combine empiricism with philosophical insights, any type of theory that is not positivist or rationalist. Indeed, this Dissertation allows for any type of theorizing. My ‘place of speech’ is what led me into a philosophical conversation, and here is where the exile, a macro-political, and Acharya’s (2014) concern over exceptionalisms in Global IR all meet.

When I attended that first ISA conference at Sciences Po, my contribution was essentially exceptionalist, and when Jacquie pointed that out as a flaw, I agreed with her. I also thought this was an enormous flaw that needed to be corrected so my knowledge could be deemed valid in IR’s epistemic community. Following that only two of the Qualis Capes A1 and A2 IR journals are based in Brazil, and most of them are based in Western institutions, I had desperately to fix this problem. This is the most conscious, pragmatic reason behind this Dissertation. I wanted to write about Brazil, about Brazilian Foreign Policy, about Brazilian literature in IR without having to validate my knowledge each and every time. I thought that after this Dissertation, and the several visitations that it will definitely entail, if only for chronological reasons, I could finally validate Brazil’s IR to Western scholarship, and then I could have more options to publish – and to advance asap my early researcher career.
Having arrived at this chapter, introducing it with a direct quote from Maya Angelou, and referring to Edward Said's contrapuntal reading is proof that I bought it all too quickly, certainly out of the grim fear of unemployment, and an equally daunting terror of not being recognized by my peers, - aren't I good enough, smart enough? -, an anguish scholars tend to share; according to the sociology of science, it would be a significant part of their drive. To access a philosophical conversation over the content of Brazil's IR, nonetheless, cannot mean to assume the role of Plato’s freed prisoner. I do not have all answers.

On the contrary, this Dissertation raises infinitely more questions than it answers – and this actually soothes my anguish way more than generates anxiety (especially in regard to those who have temporal power, and do not feel contemplated through the methodology I employed): I would have a research agenda, after all. Particularly this chapter raises considerably more questions than it tackles. It is indeed not meant to be consensual, but simply a well-grounded contrapuntal reading of IRT.

The reason I opened the chapter with Angelou’s ‘Still I Rise’ is that, even though the poem was first published in 1978, Maya’s rhetoric is immensely similar to that of an exile. Would there be any other population whose exile is this much taken for granted as the peoples of the African diaspora? Slavery alone would be a form of exile. Slavery in exile is a whole different, wrathful animal.

‘You may write me down in history/ With your bitter, twisted lies,/You may trod me in the very dirt/But still, like dust, I'll rise’ (Angelou 1978). See how Maya inaugurates her incursion by vindicating a sense of estrangement, separation, hostility, discord, and realize how Said (1984: 281-285) is of help to explain her literature:

To see a poet in exile-as opposed to reading the poetry of exile-is to see exile’s antinomies embodied and endured with a unique intensity. (...) These and so many other exiled poets and writers lend dignity to a condition legislated to deny dignity - to deny an identity to people. All nationalisms in their early stages develop from a condition of estrangement. (...) (Idem)

Now grasp how Angelou insists upon her otherness, to right away reclaim it:

(...)  
Does my sassiness upset you?  
Why are you beset with gloom?  
'Cause I walk like I've got oil wells  
Pumping in my living room.
(...) 
Does my sexiness upset you?
Does it come as a surprise
That I dance like I've got diamonds
At the meeting of my thighs? (Angelou 1978)

And she reclaims it to the extent of triumph, hence the very title of the poem, ‘Still I Rise’:

(...) 
Out of the huts of history's shame
I rise
Up from a past that's rooted in pain
I rise
I'm a black ocean, leaping and wide,
Welling and swelling I bear in the tide.

Leaving behind nights of terror and fear
I rise
Into a daybreak that's wondrously clear
I rise
Bringing the gifts that my ancestors gave,
I am the dream and the hope of the slave.
I rise
I rise
I rise. (Idem)

Said once again comes to our rescue:

Exiles feel, therefore, an urgent need to reconstitute their broken lives, usually choosing to see themselves as part of a triumphant ideology or a restored people. The crucial thing is that a state of exile free from this triumphant ideology - designed to reassemble an exile's broken history into a new whole - is virtually unbearable, and virtually impossible in today's world. (Said 1984: 287)

Acharya (2014; 2016) advises against exceptionalism in Global IR. Yet, when Bilgin (2016) borrows Said’s contrapuntal reading as a useful metaphor for Global IR’s methodology in the special issue Acharya himself organized at *International Studies Review*, he writes a thorough introduction discussing all contributions, including hers, and he recognizes their diverging perspectives over what to look for in Non-Western Theories (the difference or the similarity?), but he seems to misinterpret the very assumption underpinning Said’s contrapuntal reading that triumphalism is substantially unavoidable when exiled voices are heard:

The challenge to building Global IR concerns not only theory but also epistemology and methodology. Pinar Bilgin in this issue argues that the question of method has been neglected in the attempts to broaden the discipline and should not be relegated to the background in the development of Global IR. To meet this challenge Global IR scholars must look to non-Western traditions
and scholarship. Elsewhere, I have discussed some possibilities of doing this, drawing on the Hindu epic literature and Buddhist philosophy (Acharya 2011, 634–36). Instead of highlighting the differences between Western and non-Western approaches, Bilgin offers Edward Said’s notion of “contrapuntal readings” to suggest the possibility of developing an “overlapping and intertwined” relationship between the two. Said holds that the answer to the parochialism of Western universalism should not be other kind, non-Western parochialisms. The idea of a “contrapuntal” method, borrowed from music, implies two tunes that can be played independently as well as in harmony. In her view, the communicative processes involved in this approach would break down disciplinary and paradigmatic barriers and help the movement toward a Global IR. (Acharya 2016: 8–9)

His misinterpretation might stem from Bilgin’s (2016) interpretation:

What renders Said’s ideas a good starting point for doing Global IR is his notions of “contrapuntal awareness” and “contrapuntal reading.” Said’s approach to contrapuntal reading offers students of IR a method of studying world politics through focusing on “connectedness,” on intertwined experiences, past and present. Said also offers an ethos for approaching IR through raising our “contrapuntal awareness” of multiple ways of thinking through a problem and translating the findings of different perspectives. There is already a wealth of re-search in IR that focus on future possibilities and/or past instances of translation, including “analytical eclecticism” (Katzenstein and Okawara 2001; Sil and Katzenstein 2010), postcolonial studies (Chowdhry and Nair 2002; Ling 2002; Grovogui 2006), and historical sociology (Halperin 1997; Hobson 2004; Buzan and Lawson 2015). I draw on Said’s approach to pull together these studies without seeking to synthesize them, treating contrapuntal reading as a metaphor for Global IR, that is global and regional, one and many. (…)

Said defined “contrapuntal awareness” as belonging to multiple worlds not only in terms of cultural identity but also academic field, thereby defying disciplinary belonging and restraints. Such “eccentricity” allows the exile not only “the negative advantage of refuge,” wrote Said, but also “the positive benefit of challenging the system, describing it in language unavailable to those it has already subdued” (Said 1993, 334). Lamenting the passing of an era where intellectuals were expected to be fluent in several subject areas and languages, he maintained that “[t]he fantastic explosion of specialized and separatist knowledge is partly to blame” for present-day limits of our insight into “intertwined and overlapping histories” of humankind (Said 1993, 320). (Idem: 139)

Bilgin’s decision to overlook Said’s disclaimer might result from her focus on the œuvre ‘Culture and Imperialism’ at the expense of the author’s ‘Reflections on Exile’:

How, then, does one surmount the loneliness of exile without falling into the encompassing and thumping language of national pride, collective sentiments, group passions? What is there worth saving and holding on to between extremes of exile on the one hand, and the often bloody-minded affirmations of nationalism on the other? Do nationalism and exile have any intrinsic attributes? Are they simply two conflicting varieties of paranoia?

These are questions that cannot ever be fully answered because each assumes that exile and nationalism can be discussed neutrally, without reference to each other. They cannot. Because both terms include everything from the most collective of collective sentiments to the most private of private emotions, there is hardly language adequate for both. (Said 1984: 286)
It is crystal clear that Said does not believe in neutral, sanitized nationalist analyses. Two of the paradigms offered in this Dissertation’s introductory chapter, and swiftly explored up until now, are exactly those of national developmentalism, and of an authoritarian nationalism. A Brazilian contribution to IRT would hence be intrinsically biased by nationalism, and thus necessarily resonates exceptionalism. Avoiding this is certainly one of the perks of operating on a regional scale, even though in the case of Latin America it is not guaranteed that the region as a whole does not share a rhetoric of exceptionalism.

However, since the national scale is the one adopted in this research, and since I subscribe to Said’s notion of nationalism, as well as to his perspective on exile, following my sociological reflexivism and interactionalism, I do recognize that the final findings of this research might flirt with exceptionalism. And my place of speech is also to fault.

In Brazil’s current debates on social psychology, the concept of ‘place of speech’ is in its micro-social interactions as much a burning issue as it is among the organized civil society. Feminisms and the black movements frequently borrow this perspective to (i) unveil prejudice masked by a patriarchal society raised to believe it intrinsically is a racial democracy, (ii) to claim their agency, the protagonist role in the world of algorithms, where the post-truth-the rage of the monopoly of the place of speech—would be in a constant fight to erase the idea the truth stems significantly from places of speech.

A place of speech would hence comprise personal and collective experiences. Translating to our methodology in this research, one’s place of speech in science would result from one’s macro-political and micro-social positions, both always interacting, perennially reflecting. The place of speech behind this Dissertation consequently influenced the choice to derive philosophical findings from the methodological and the sociological treatment of the triangulation of the three different sources of data on a Brazilian IR. I could have gone through an anthropological, literary, or linguistic path, for instance, but in light of the intellectual organization of Western IR, and of my urge, under the second generation of Global IR, to bring Non-Western knowledges into the mainstream, philosophy has come as a no-brainer.
You must first set aside Joyce and Nabokov and think instead of the uncountable masses for whom UN agencies have been created. (…) But Joyce's success as an exile stresses the question lodged at its very heart: is exile so extreme and private that any instrumental use of it is ultimately trivialization? (…) Is the same exile that quite literally kills Yanko Goorall and has bred the expensive, often dehumanizing relationship between twentieth-century exile and nationalism? Or is it some more benign variety? Much of the contemporary interest in exile can be traced to the somewhat pallid notion that non-exiles can share in the benefits of exile as a redemptive motif. (…) And naturally "we" concentrate on that enlightening aspect of "their" presence among us, not on their misery or their demands. (Said 1984: 284-294)

Said’s remarks are illustrative of Brazil’s field of IR for a few reasons. Firstly, there is a sense, as provided by Tickner (2003), Pinheiro (2008), and, to some extent, Kristensen (2015a), that during the 1970s, when the most repressive years of the dictatorship were in place, the only real Brazilian or Latin American contribution to IRT was developed.

Outside of dependency theory, there would be Morgenthaluan realism, and interdependence - that is when Brazilians or Latin Americans even bother to theorize (Tickner 2003a; 2003b; 2008). It is ironically fitting that Pinheiro’s epigraph contains Belchior’s lyrics to Como nossos pais [Just like our parents], yet highlighting the following verses to the song [Pinheiro’s own translation]: ‘[T]oday I know/ That those who gave me the idea/ For a new consciousness And a new youth Are at home Protected by God …’ (Pinheiro 2008: 2).

There are several other excerpts from this song that are bluntly critical of hers, and Tickner’s, besides Kristensen’s belief in the undisputed uniquely valid qualification of dependency theory. They can be enlightening:

My greatest pain is to realize that, although we have done all we could/ everything is still the same, we live just like our parents/ Our idols are still the same, and appearances are not deceiving at all./ You say that nobody else has come after them./ You might even say that I am clueless, or that I am making things up./ But it is you who clings to the past, and refuses to see/ But it is you who clings to the past, and refuses to see/ the future always rises (Belchior 1976).

We have explored a few sources to the dependency theory-bias of stock-takings over a Brazilian or a Latin American IRT. We have underscored Global IR’s tendency to disregard South-South exchange and impact of ideas in favor of Southern ones that have allegedly impacted the West. We have also briefly investigated imprecisions and misinterpretations that have collaborated to forge a real ‘academic urban legend’. This chapter firstly debunks this myth, so we can move forward with our grounded
philosophical conversation on a Brazilian contribution to IRT.

Secondly, Said’s notion of exile can be accurate to treat Brazilian IR scholars in light of their macro-political, as well as of their micro-social positions. When Sirinelli (2003: 248) brings up manifestos and petitions as relevant structures of sociability among intellectuals, the author touches a sore spot in Brazilian scholarship. I have recently had a rather traumatizing experience in this sense. I have personally organized a petition to disinvite Fernando Henrique Cardoso to talk about democracy at the 2016 Latin American Studies Association’s Annual Conference, held in Manhattan, New York. Praised by several colleagues, fiercely criticized by others, the latter occupied a place of speech rather comfortable: they had the support of the traditional media, and of the conservative middle class. They have even started a counter-petition petition.

James Joyce chose to be in exile: to give force to his artistic vocation. In an uncannily effective way—as Richard Ellmann has shown in his biography—Joyce picked a quarrel with Ireland and kept it alive so as to sustain the strictest opposition to what was familiar. Ellmann says that “whenever his relations with his native land were in danger of improving, [Joyce] was to find a new incident to solidify his intransigence and to reaffirm the rightness of his voluntary absence.” Joyce’s friction concerns what in a letter he once described as the state of “being alone and friendless.” And although it is rare to pick banishment as a way of life, Joyce perfectly understood its trials. (Said 1984: 294)

None of our four statistically relevant authors from the first generation of IR who dealt with the International Insertion have signed neither of them, and yet IR has not remained distant from social or economic ideologies, like the TRIP Survey 2014 puts it, or from a political economic worldview, suffice it to recover the post-grad courses’ commitment to International Political Economy (IPE), or the country’s faculty’s affiliation to IPE be at as an issue of research or as a paradigm of research, namely through Marxist paradigms.

Moreover, since Cardoso has become a hub of positionality in Brazilian partisan, ideological politics, it is not hard to realize some of these authors’ political economic positions, or economic and social ideologies, and this is part of our philosophical discussion. At this point, we will present how an academic urban legend is constructed, demystifying the role of dependency theory to a Brazilian contribution to IRT, so we can then explore a philosophy of a Brazilian science of IR, so we can develop a historiography of Brazilian IRT, or a contrapuntal reading of the Theory of International Relations.
Rekdal (2014) sums up the notion of academic urban legends through the example of ‘a remarkable case in which a decimal point error appears to have misled millions into believing that spinach is a good nutritional source of iron’ (Idem: 638). The author underlines that in academic cultures where the quantity of publications is more relevant than the content of the publications, the publish-or-perish environment, has led scholars, peer reviewers and editors to miss certain points.

The quote caught my attention for two reasons. First, it falsified an idea that I had carried with me since I was a child, that spinach is an excellent source of iron. The most striking thing, however, was that a single decimal point, misplaced 80 years ago, had affected not just myself and my now deceased parents, but also a large number of others in what we place on our table. After reading Larsson’s article, I took a poll of colleagues at my institute, asking them why they think spinach is healthy. The conclusion was quite clear. The belief that spinach is a good source of iron, although falsified 30 years ago by Hamblin in a British Medical Journal article, is still widespread among my colleagues, all of whom have, at minimum, a master’s degree in health sciences. (…)

Truth be told, there is iron in spinach, but not significantly more than in other green vegetables, and few people can consume spinach in large quantities. A larger problem with the idea of spinach as a good source of iron, however, is that it also contains substances that strongly inhibit the intestinal absorption of iron (see e.g. Garrison, 2009: 400). Simply put, spinach should not at all be the first food choice of those suffering from iron deficiency. Larsson’s article made me aware of the remarkable fact that a large number of people in the Western world have been misled for a staggeringly long time. Since so many people still believe that spinach is a good source of iron, I have good reason to convey this newfound knowledge to others. The story of this decimal point error is, in addition, a brilliant illustration of how a small stroke may fell a great oak, and a reminder of the importance of accuracy and quality control in the production and distribution of scientific knowledge (Ibid: 639-640).

Rekdal explores the problem of direct and indirect citations in scholarly articles. Besides appropriating someone else’s work through paraphrasing, there would be four other legal alternatives when referring to someone else’s finding/argument:

(i) refer directly to the source where I found the information, and I am even courteous enough to provide exact page numbers for readers who would like to verify it, or who may be interested in exploring whether there is more to learn from Larsson. The problem in this case is that I omit a piece of information: the fact that Larsson’s statement is based on an entirely different source, namely Hamblin (1981). In other words, I am referring to an article that I very well know is a secondary source, and thus hide from my readers the
The fact that Larsson actually just passed on information published by Hamblin 14 years earlier. (Op Cit: 641)

(ii) A third and even more honest alternative would be to refer to my source in this way: The idea that spinach is a good source of iron is a myth that was born in the 1930s, due to a misplaced decimal point, causing the concentration to appear ten times higher than its real value (Hamblin, 1981, cited in Larsson, 1995: 448–449). This is a perfectly legitimate way of referring to sources in cases where it is difficult or impossible to obtain a primary source. (…) Another and perhaps more likely explanation is that we are dealing with an academic who has not understood the importance of the principle of striving to use primary sources in order to minimize the whisper game effect. This type of citation does not necessarily have to be explained by laziness or lack of knowledge, but rather by an almost touching degree of confidence and trust. This type of citation does not necessarily have to be explained by laziness or lack of knowledge, but rather by an almost touching degree of confidence and trust (Op cit: 641-42).

(iii) A fourth alternative, which unfortunately is far more common than we should wish, is to solve the problem the following way, without consulting Hamblin (1981): The idea that spinach is a good source of iron is a myth that was born in the 1930s, due to a misplaced decimal point, causing the concentration to appear ten times higher than its real value (Hamblin, 1981) (Op cit: 642). (…) An attractive aspect of this academic shortcut is that it is usually impossible to discover and to prove the sin committed. Academics such as Larsson presumably check their sources thoroughly, and double-check that their own text corresponds with the sources it refers to. If Larsson has understood Hamblin correctly, and Hamblin is worthy of his trust, then there would be no negative consequences from this highly dubious type of reference, neither for my readers, nor for the truth and reliability of what I am writing (Op cit).

(iv) The final alternative is to follow the short and narrow path back to Hamblin’s article to see what he wrote on the issue. It is, of course, wise to check the accuracy of what we base ourselves upon when we write and publish, and there is also the possibility that we might learn something even more valuable about the issue (Op cit: 643).
The premise behind this Dissertation is that interactive and reflexive sociologies explain the social and intellectual organization of science. As a result, to assume that my colleagues are liars is to assume that the IR field’s communications structure is more than flawed, but corrupt. I do not believe that. I believe scholars jiggle with scientific capitals as much as they interact with temporal capitals. Some individuals have gathered legitimacy, authority, hence referring to them usually suffices to convey a certain idea. Prominent scholars, especially those engaged in theorizations, not unfrequently turn into synonyms of an idea, and the more time goes by without anyone defying certain uses of their argument, the more authoritative these uses tend to get.

Going to the primary source and reflecting upon it is frequently the best antidote to the off-put whisper game effects.

Referring to sources that one has not consulted can be, however, a risky business. Academics, as other human beings, do from time to time misinterpret or make errors that are not discovered by peer reviewers or editors, even in respectable journals (…) When several authors independently of each other manage to misrepresent a single source in exactly the same erroneous way, the explanation is either a statistically unlikely coincidence, or a case where authors have plagiarized references. Systematically patterned distributions of errors and misinterpretations are in fact common enough to make it possible to study the prevalence of citation plagiarism and the unfortunate consequences of the practice (Op cit).

The p* word in this case should not be interpreted as an accusation of professional malpractice. In this case, it is not uncommon nor illegal, but an actual tradition in modern science. Like any other tradition, it does have consequences. In this Dissertation, we have explored a central academic urban legend to the investigation of a Brazilian contribution to Non-Western Theory/Global IR.

As Rekdal (Op cit) suggests, in the twenty-first century it is relatively easier to track the publications’ sources. In this case, the coincidental source to Kristensen (2003), as well as to Pinheiro (2008) is Tickner’s (2003a) idea of a Latin American Hybrid.24

24 Latin America’s dependent status vis-a`-vis the United States has also spurred wariness toward those ideas produced in the United States. Dependency theory, touted as the one authentically peripheral formula for confronting problems of development and global insertion, was largely a reaction against the U.S.-produced theory of development, modernization theory (Tickner 2003a: 326).

Dependency theory was celebrated as the first genuine peripheral approach to development and international insertion. In general terms, the diverse authors grouped together under the dependency label seek to explain economic under-development in the periphery as the product of the specific nature of global capitalism, as well as examining the ways in which external dependency has molded internal processes in ways that reinforce inequality and exclusion (Idem: 327).

In their classic book, Dependencia y desarrollo en América Latina (1969), Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Enzo Faletto base their analysis of underdevelopment in the region on a core assumption shared by all dependency authors: underdevelopment is a direct result of the expansion of the capitalist system,
Another one is Herz’ (2002). Herz (Idem) and Tickner (Idem), in turn, both refer to Cardoso and Faletto (1969; 1970), and to Santos (1968; 1978). In fact, the which links diverse economies to the global system according to their respective productive apparatuses (Cardoso and Faletto, 1969:23) (Ibid: 328).

(…) The central hypothesis of the authors is that the formation of social groups as well as the political evolution of the Latin American countries took different paths, depending upon whether the export-oriented growth stage of the late nineteenth century (or transition stage) was characterized by domestic control of the productive system or foreign-controlled enclave economies (Cardoso and Faletto, 1969:55) (Op cit).

Likewise, amongst those who now praise the current days due to the fact that they show more dialogue with the international theoretical debate, there are those who, on a post-colonialist basis, underline the need for an autochthonous view of IR (NOGUEIRA & MESSARI, 2005:8-9, RAMALHO, 2004). Besides the somewhat contradictory stance that simultaneously values the incorporation of international theoretical and methodological perspectives and claims for a national view of IR, they seem to render too little value to the indigenous studies from the past. In this sense, it is worth reminding ourselves of the importance of Dependency Theory, an important framework for understanding the insertion of Third World countries in the international system, their external relations and foreign policy, as well as the limits imposed by the rules of capitalism and imperialism for Third World sovereignty, a key IR concept (CARDOSO & FALETTO, 1970). Moreover, as Tickner adds, “Contrary to the literature on state weakness, which examines the state as a unit of analysis essentially insulated from the effects of global capitalism, dependency theorists illustrate[d] that processes of statebuilding are highly circumscribed by this system” (TICKNER, 2003: 318) (Pinheiro 2008:8)

This geographical imaginary is not only a product of Brazil’s geographical location in the ‘Western but Southern’ hemisphere, but also because the IPE focus draws attention to dependency-inspired questions of how Southern underdevelopment is related to Northern development. Another Brazilian characteristic is arguably the policy-oriented histories of Brazilian foreign policy (or the BRICS) that move chronologically through policy events (Lima and Hirst 2006; Fonseca 2011; Stuenkel 2013b) which are typical of the “Brazilian way” of doing IR (Fonseca 1987; Herz 2002; Santos 2005) (Kristensen 2015a: 232).

Apart from dependency theory—which does not really fit into the vision of IR as Brazilian foreign policy either—most studies were historical studies of Brazilian foreign policy and the country’s “international insertion” (Herz 2002:16, 29) (Idem: 496).

A key source for specifically Brazilian concepts comes from Latin American thought. One of the “roots” of the Brasília School is the Latin American School associated with the Economic Commission on Latin America (ECLA/CEPAL) and dependency theory. (Ibid: 526)

The critique of North American IR is not new in Brazil. Given Brazil and Latin America’s historical exposure to the political, economic, cultural and intellectual influence of the United States, there are “cyclical attempts to disentangle itself from US domination” (Tickner 2008:736). Dependency theory is widely recognized as the most famous example of such an attempt and one of the main contributions to IR theory from outside Euro-America (Even by some Chinese and Indian scholars interviewed). Dependency theory is seen as an “indigenous” approach to IR theory, the “first peripheral approach to development and international insertion.” (Tickner 2003b:327) and an “authentically local formula for interrogating core–periphery relations and their noxious effects upon development, and was flaunted by the United States and others as if it were a genuine Third World contribution.” (Tickner 2008:736).

An influential Brazilian scholar argues that dependency theorists “were committed to an attempt to searching for a native and original view of international relations, following a tradition of thought characterized by a Southern perspective.” (Pinheiro 2008:8). Several interviewees see dependency theory as “the only theory we developed in Latin America”, thus also implying a post-dependency silence (Ibid: 553).
dependency-theory myth is not restricted only to IRT or to stock-takings of the Brazil’s IR. Gilpin (1987: 82-92; 270-273) not only does not cite any other Latin American contribution to IPE, but also fails to distinguish dependency theory from world-system theory (Bresser-Peireira 2009; 2010).

The scientific and the temporal capitals Cardoso, especially, has accumulated throughout time, which we have thoroughly explored throughout this Dissertation, is definitely among the strongest root-causes of the academic urban legend dependency theory has become to Brazil’s and to Latin America’s IR. Aside from the former Brazil’s President’s social capital, Arlene Tickner’s social capital can be traced to the secondary cause of a general misconception. When we triangulate the TRIP Survey with Kristensen’s research, and with the content-analysis performed through this Dissertation, we have a better grasp of Tickner’s social capital in IR.

Although she is not among the four scholars whose work has had the greatest influence on the field of IR in the past 20 years (see page 113 of this Dissertation), she is among the 25 most cited scholars who have had the greatest influence on the field of IR in Brazil’s part of the world in the past 20 years (see page 117 of this Dissertation) (Maliniak et al 2014). We have already established that Tickner is Kristensen’s entrance into the dependency myth.

As for CINT and RBPI, Arlene was part of CINT’s consulting board from 2005 until 2015, and part of the journal’s editorial board since 2016, even though she has never published there (Pesquisa Avançada: Arlene Tickner > Texto: Tickner > Expedientes; Circulations of Information > Resultado da busca por: Tickner, contextointernacional.iri.puc-rio.br). At RBPI, she has co-authored an article in a special issue she co-organized with the author, Cristina Inoue, in 2016 (Featuring New RPIB’s Editorial Board Members > Instituto Brasileiro de Relações Internacionais, ibri-rbpi.org). At this journal, she was a reviewer in 2015, and in 2016 joined the editorial board (Idem).

Through TRIP Survey 2014’s results, as well as through our content-analysis of RBPI and of CINT, we have established that she shares temporal capital among Brazil’s IR scholars. Kristensen (2015a) hints to her social capital on the international micro-social structures of the field. We have established that the domain of the English language raises a scholar’s social capital in IR (see page 167 of this Dissertation). Given that Tickner is American, and is based in Colombia, she has an intrinsic comparative advantage in relation to other Latin American scholars, as well as to
Western scholars, since she _naturally_ becomes the legitimate translator of Latin American content into English. This does not preclude the author's merits at all, but helps explaining the validity behind her knowledge-production, and why the Latin American Hybrid has had a considerable impact on the consolidation of a trend in motion through Cardoso’s own social capital, as well as through the development of IPE.

The fact that she authors a chapter on autonomy in Latin American IR thinking in a Routledge handbook on Latin America edited by two Latin American scholars illustrates this (Domínguez and Covarrubias 2014: 74-84). So does her co-editorship with editor David L. Blaney of two Routledge books, one about thinking IR differently, another about reclaiming the international (Blaney and Tickner 2012; 2013). Also does her co-editorship alongside with editor Ole Wæver of a Routledge book on IR scholarship around the world (Wæver and Tickner 2009). It is interesting at this moment to search for her contributions in the form of manuscripts, since these are usually restricted to those who publishers trust as authoritative knowledge-producers, otherwise they do not sell.

We have explored the imprecisions behind Tickner's (2003a; 2003b) conceptions of an undistinguished current encompassing dependency theory and world-system theory, as well as the overlap between ECLA’s developmentalism and dependency theory (see pages 34-35, 28-42, and 176 in this Dissertation). Behind Tickner’s misperception of ISEB’s nationalism’s overlap with dependency theory, we can also find a few misperceptions:

> Beyond its economic formulations, ECLA argued in favor of the need for a strong, active state in the redirection of Latin America’s productive process. As was the case of modernization theory, tremendous faith was also placed in the role of the “modern” economic and political elite in spearheading development. This view was upheld by other institutions such as the Superior Institute for Brazilian Studies (ISEB), created in 1956 by the Brazilian state in order to foster front line academic analyses of the obstacles to development in that country. According to both agencies, a national capitalist “revolution,” led by the progressive bourgeoisie and modern bureaucratic class and based upon an alliance with the working class, would result in the consolidation of the kind of national state that was considered indispensable to development (Bresser-Pereira 2006:424–426). Clearly, the underlying assumption of this argument was that state building and the claiming of sovereignty were necessary preconditions for overturning the core–periphery relations that drove underdevelopment. (Tickner 2008: 737)
First of all, as we have presented in this Dissertation’s introduction, ISEB was not created by the Brazilian State. Neither was it created to ‘foster front line academic analyses of the obstacles to development’ in the country. ISEB was created by scholars and politicians who sought to move away from what they considered internationalism in the liberal and in the Marxist traditions they considered hijacked the country’s political spectrum. They were seeking autonomy, and development would be the mean to achieve this end. In developmentalism, development would also be the mean to overcome a social conundrum which would be the domestic source of Brazil’s underdevelopment, also hampering the country’s emergence in international politics.

Secondly, ISEB envisioned such ‘national capitalist “revolution”’, but to use the term ‘alliance’ is to bypass those thinkers’, especially Jaguaribe’s, notion of social responsibility. This social responsibility would fall upon the shoulders particularly of social scientists in general. Among the non-military and non-diplomats published at RBPI before 1997, there are 20 articles authored by authors who are not institutionally part of IR, nor have undertaken governmental positions during the civil-military regime. Only the authors with more than two articles were included in this list, and Jaguaribe is, not only, by far the most published author (35%), followed by IBRI’s director Cleantho de Paiva Leite (20%), Celso Lafer (15%), and Alceu Amoroso Lima (10%). When we check their impact over the publications of the four most relevant authors to our bibliometric analysis, as well as the impact of the latter samples’ cross-citations, we find the following general pattern:

Table 29: Most Cited Authors Among the Four Statistically Most Relevant Authors at CINT, RBPI, and at TRIP Survey 2014

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Author</th>
<th>Number of Citations</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Celso Lafer</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amado Cervo</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hélio Jaguaribe</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>José Flávio Sombra Saraiva</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maria Regina Soares de Lima</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vigevani</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Furtado</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cardoso</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The most cited authors, based on the box plot method, are those who have been cited at least 10 times across the sample. The median value is three, and the average value is seven, meaning that there is a concentration of citations among authors who have cited at least seven times. Based on the box plot method, any author whose number of citations is 14 or higher is an outlier.

Table 30: Most Cited Authors Among the Four Statistically Most Relevant Authors at CINT, RBPI, and at TRIP Survey 2014 (Outliers, and Lowest Percentile Subtracted)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Author</th>
<th>Number of Citations</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Amado Cervo</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hélio Jaguaribe</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>José Flávio Sombra Saraiva</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maria Regina Soares de Lima</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Hence, if we add to our bibliometric analysis of the most used authors of RBPI and of CINT, besides the top-of-mind scholars among Brazil’s IR’s faculty, as well as Kristensen’s perspective on the relevance of the International Insertion research agenda and its first-generation authors, corrected by the concept of generation in science through the year-of-PhD pattern, these would be the most cited authors within
our sample. This treatment checks and balances the one offered by the previous triangulation, refining our results.

There are two possible paths here. One is ignoring the fact that Vigevani does not figure among the most cited authors in light of his treatment among the top-of-mind authors, where he ranks higher than Cervo or Sombra Saraiva, which would be the most detached behavior. The other is factoring in the fact that Vigevani does not figure among the most cited authors in light of the more expansive treatment of the top-of-mind sample, even though in this case there was both statistical and bibliographic discussion underpinning the methodological choice. I will commit to the first path at this point, and then I will proceed based on the second and most methodologically sound.

For the sake of triangulating this bibliometric analysis with Kristensen’s (2017) division of Brazil’s IR into a three-states tradition (Brasília-based, São Paulo-based, Rio de Janeiro-based), we will take the first path to investigate the cross-citations patterns. Maria Regina Soares de Lima only cites one author present in this sample, Lafer, and he has been factored out by our statistical treatment. I did not include any self-citation. All citations of Jaguaribe and of Cervo are hereby included, and they are concentrated in Sombra Saraiva’s and in Cervo’s publications. Vigevani accounts for the same number of citations of Lima’s work as Cervo’s and Sombra Saraiva’s articles combined. This pattern would entail a Rio-São Paulo connection, while the fact that Vigevani does not cite Sombra Saraiva at all, and Sombra Saraiva’s plus Cervo’s citations provide more than double the citations of each other’s work than the number of citations of Cervo’s articles in Vigevani’s work. The fact alone that Vigevani does not cite Sombra Saraiva, while Cervo and Sombra Saraiva cite each other, alongside with the realization that Vigevani concentrates the citations to Lima’s work points signal the existence of what Kristensen calls the School of Brasilia.

Since Maria Regina and Jaguaribe are both cited in Cervo’s and in Saraiva’s work, we also find a connection between Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo. This approximation, however, is not through IRI PUC-Rio’s scholars, but through those who research what Kristensen (2015a) suggest as the most promising contribution of Brazilian IR to IRT, the ‘International Insertion’.

Table 31: Most Cited Authors in Vigevani’s Articles at RBPI (1958-2017) and CINT (1985-2017)
### Table 32: Most Cited Authors in Cervo’s Articles at RBPI (1958-2017) and CINT (1985-2017)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Author</th>
<th>Number of Citations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Amado Cervo</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maria Regina Soares de Lima</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hélio Jaguaribe</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


### Table 33: Most Cited Authors in Sombra Saraiva’s Articles at RBPI (1958-2017) and CINT (1985-2017)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Author</th>
<th>Number of Citations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>José Flávio Sombra Saraiva</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hélio Jaguaribe</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maria Regina Soares de Lima</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


### Table 34: Most Cited Authors in Sombra Saraiva’s Articles at RBPI (1958-2017) and CINT (1985-2017)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Author</th>
<th>Number of Citations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Amado Cervo</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hélio Jaguaribe</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maria Regina Soares de Lima</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Still factoring in Vigevani’s articles, we find that all citations of dependency theory authors (Cardoso and Marini) are contained in his investigation of a Brazilian though and its considerations of processes of regional integration. The article’s abstract is the following:

The aim of this article is to analyze the way some schools of thought represented by persons of renown look upon the issue of regional integration in Brazil. The focus is on the second half of the 20th century, seeking to understand the conceptions of the country’s regional and international projection that ground the possibilities for integration. To this end, the following themes are discussed: the role of the State; the vision for the country; nationalism; economic development and underdevelopment; international recognition; and neighbors’ perception. The idea of specificity in relation to neighboring countries is an element present in the work of intellectuals and policy-makers. It is also present in other countries, including in countries of this region. We endeavor to understand how this idea evolved in Brazil, culminating in the 1980s with the acceptance of the existence of a community of interests with the countries of the Southern Cone and of South America (Vigevani and Ramanzini 2010: 487).

Although Vigevani and Ramanzini (Idem) do not ground his reasons for including any of those schools of thought into the analysis, they do not restrict a possible Brazilian contribution to IRT to dependency theory, and neither do they overlap the latter with developmentalism.

To a certain extent, unlike the formulations at ECLA [the authors focus on Furtado’s], among the dependency authors, the ties between underdevelopment and the world capitalist development were close (Idem: 469).

Also, Vigevani and Ramanzini (Ibid) distinguish between the different strands of dependency theory—hence the citations of Marini.

Within the framework of dependency theory, there are several interpretations (CHILCOTE, 1974) (sic), what does not allow us to approach dependency theory as a homogeneous phenomenon, even though there is a common denominator in the sense of promoting dependency theory as the Latin-American paradigm for development (Op cit: 469-470).

They find two overall trends: ‘the Weberian, recognizable in the works of Cardoso and Faletto, (…), and the Marxist, connected to Marini’s reflections (Op cit: 470).’ The former ‘contemplates the possibility of a dependent development’, the latter ‘discusses the development of underdevelopment based on the idea of the super-exploitation of the workforce, deeply criticizing the idea of a dependent development’ (Op cit). This alone would entirely cast aside the possibility of a Latin American Hybrid, since the LAH does not make a distinction between developmentalism and dependency theory, nor among dependency theory trends, assuming only Cardoso’s and Faletto’s, but mostly Cardoso’s reflections actually mattered for Latin American scholars in IR.
The bibliometric analysis of CINT’s and RBPI’s published authors underline this idea, since, as presented, no dependency theory author has ever been published in neither, while Furtado and Prebisch have been published at RBPI. The Latin American hybrid approach draws upon distinct concepts derived from dependency theory, Morgenthauian realism, and interdependence. According to the Latin American hybrid approach, the international system is characterized by hierarchical relations of domination and interdependence. The state, viewed in relatively nonproblematic terms, is highlighted as the principal actor in the international sphere, followed by other types of economic actors such as multinational corporations. The Latin American hybrid approach sustains a nonhierarchical view of the international agenda, as well as a multifaceted notion of power (Tickner 2003a: 336).

The bibliometric analysis of CINT’s and RBPI’s published authors underline this idea, since, as presented, no dependency theory author has ever been published in neither, while Furtado and Prebisch have been published at RBPI. Moreover, in Tickner’s (2003a: 337) own grounded analysis of the role the LAH plays in Brazil’s IR, she mentions that she only finds occurrences of the LAH in the country’s syllabi (both at IRel UnB’s and at IRI PUC-Rio’s post-grad programs). Since she focuses only on the CINT sample among Brazil’s IR journals, and no dependency theory author has ever published, plus she does not update her bibliometric date in her latest research to encompass for instance Vigevani’s and Ramanzini’s (2010) publication, hence insisting upon the misperception (Blaney and Tickner 2012; Herz and Tickner 2012). It does seem like Tickner over-valued the social capital of Cardoso, namely his scientific capital, but she is not alone. We have seen that so did Pinheiro (2008), and she did so by citing Tickner as an academic validation of Cardoso’s scientific capital, while replicating and discussing Herz (2002).

Herz makes reference to Cardoso’s and Faletto's original work on dependency theory, as well as to Santos’ original work on the world-system theory, besides to Figueiredo’s book that discusses Brazil’s dependent development, none of which actually debating theoretical issues of IR, how famous dependency theory got to be in the field of IR nor the alleged scarcity of theoretical contributions to IR thenceforth, which the author does not approach throughout the article.

As Biersteker (1999: 5) underscores, unlike other potentially theoretical contributions to IR made outside the Anglo-Saxon world, dependency theory has been published in English, which might help explain why it has been grasped as perhaps the only theoretical contribution from Latin America—which is rather odd, provided that, especially in Area Studies, a sub-field quite developed in the US, there are scholars
who might be capable of alerting to a different reality, even though Brazilian scholars' own shortcoming in regard to theoretical production is to be discussed. Nonetheless, Herz (2002) assumption is particularly curious, since she is not only based in Brazil, but also takes part in one of the two most prominent IR post-grad programs in the country, and exactly in the one that places more relevance to establishing a theoretical debate with the international scholarship.

Dependency theory has indeed traveled to mainstream Academia in Sociology and Economics (Cardoso 1977) - although South-South exchange lead to different findings in terms of the range of dependency theory and its status as the only theoretical contribution made in Latin America or in Brazil. Herz (2002) and Tickner (2003) offer brief illustrations of how dependência entered the state-of-the-art of the field of IR. Herz (2002, p.16-17) through Lima's (1986) and Hirst's (1984) publications presents the interpretations of the international system as hierarchical, which would figure among dependência's major contributions, yet, unlike Holsti (1985), forfeiting citations on World-System theories.

As for the consumption of dependência in the North, Cardoso himself accounts for the relevance of English-produced literature regarding 'his' theory:

The risk of ceremonial celebration [of his own theory] becomes greater as studies of dependency arouse a certain movement of conversion among social scientists. Susanne Bodenheimer, grasping the critical power that these studies contained, gave wider currency to some of these formulations (since she wrote in English, which is the Latin of our times) and presented them as a new paradigm. From that point on (although it was not her fault), what had been an endeavor to be critical and to maintain the continuity of previous historical, economic, sociological, and political studies in Latin America was transformed into an article for consumption in various versions that include references to the original myth but in large measure constitute the expression of a quite distinct intellectual universe from that which gave it birth (Cardoso 1977: 8).

Besides the problem of sticking to Holsti’s (1985) overemphasis on dependency theory, Tickner (Idem) and Herz (2002) do not explore how dependency theory has actually modeled or meddled with the Theory of International Relations, nor do they investigate why other theoretical propositions, such as developmentalism or those organized at Jaguaribe's (a recurrent reference especially in Tickner's accounts) ISEB, are not grappled with in the endeavor to grasp a Latin American contribution to IR thinking. Cardoso (1977, p. 9-11) justifies the omission based on alleged methodological shortcomings, underscoring that although "[S]ome intellectuals in
these organizations [ECLA and CESO, Chile] played a certain role in the proposal of a set of themes and in the critique of Keynesianism and of structural-functionalism-a role to be discussed further on-", developmentalism did not make an impact on international debates because "they did not propose any new methodology (Idem, p.11)."

The restriction to what can be considered international impact onto what can be dubbed First World, the North, or the West is clearly stated:

Once the methodological contribution of the dependentistas has been limited and the possible influence of North American Marxism on proposing studies of dependency has been redefined, it is necessary to look at the contribution of Andre Gunder Frank to the themes of dependency. Some of his studies in Capitalism and Development in Latin America had great critical impact and were contemporary with the elaboration of what is called here the 'theory of dependency' (Ibidem).

Cardoso (1977) then tries to justify his restrictive acknowledgement of ‘[T]he consumption of dependency theory’ based on a rejection of developmentalism's scientific credentials. However, a quick research of such databases as JStor shows a reality in which developmentalism, in Prebisch's and Furtado's terms, is actually internationally debated and implemented.

A 2010 Working Paper provided by institutions in Norway tell a different tale:

Developmentalism – or the idea of the 'developmental state' – was one of the most spectacularly successful ideologies of the 20th century. The Cold War and the division of most ideas into a camp of either being politically to the 'right' or to the 'left' has obliterated the fact that Developmentalism was successfully performed along the whole political axis, from fascism via social democracy to communism. In their emphasis on economic growth built on industrial mass production – on the idea that only a certain type of national economic structure is conducive to increased wealth – Stalin, Hitler and the Scandinavian social democracies all represented Developmentalism. With the growth and eventual dominance of neo-classical economics and economic neoliberalism, Developmentalism gradually disappeared along the whole political axis, with the exception of Asia and to some extent Brazil (Reinert et al 2010: 1).

Moreover, while Streeter (1999) underlines the failure of the US attempt to implement what the author dubs a liberal developmentalism in Guatemala following the demise of Arbenz Guzmán through a coup sponsored by the US; more recently, Guillen (2003) and Mallorquí (2007) published in Western Academic journals, brush up accounts of Furtado's developmentalism, while others, also published in these types of publications, have pinpointed the theoretical and practical results of the implementation of developmentalism throughout the Global South. Rahnema (2008:
483) explores the hypothesis that ‘the contemporary rise of radical Islamism’ is a complex consequence ‘of failed modernization programs, failed developmentalism under the auspices of international capital and in collaboration with the local propertied classes, and corrupt, undemocratic governments throughout the Islamic world’. Pereira (2008), in turn, observes the case of Singapore as an outlier, since the country's developmentalism would have succeeded. Bunton (2008) raises doubts over the resilience of Iraq as a Nation-State following his argument that a strong form of developmental nationalism lay at the root of the consolidation of the nation-state in Iraq. The Islamic communal and cultural nationalisms which came with the failures of developmentalism and the slide towards progressively liberal economic policy were exacerbated successively by the privations of war with Iran, the sanctions regime and the ongoing civil war (Idem: 631).

Desai (2008) engages in a theoretical observation of differences, similarities and consequences of developmental nationalisms and of cultural nationalisms outlining Indonesia’s Sukarno, India’s Nehru, Egypt’s Nasser, amongst other leaders of the Non-alignment Movement as heads of State who would have implemented developmental nationalisms, however highlighting their peculiarities (Idem: 651). Gosh (2010) furthers the discussion observing the ambiguous heritage of Nehru’s version of developmentalism, suggesting a South-South debate in regard to the Latin American-born theory. Barker (2008) also examines the Indonesian case, yet offering ‘an overview of the transition from developmental to (multi)cultural nationalism in Indonesia in the mid-1960s (Idem: 521)’. Gudynas (2016) sets eyes on ‘disputes and alternatives’ in patterns that go ‘beyond varieties of development’, conceptualizing a neo-developmentalism ‘ranging from that of liberal capitalism to the South American neo-developmentalism run by progressivist governments to Chinese state capitalism (Idem: 722)’.

This brief literature review singles out at least two trends. International Academic publications based in the West have given space to non-Western theoretical endeavors other than only dependência, what helps to undermine accusations over an alleged lapse of methodological commitment in developmentalism. Furthermore, there is at least one major debate -that carries several other consequential discussions- based on the Non-Alignment Movement or its countries’ appropriation of developmentalism, the one between developmental nationalisms and cultural nationalisms. Still, it is relevant to take note of the fact that Third World Quarterly, an
International Relations journal until recently embedded in the International Studies Association, accounts for seven from the eleven sources presented—which is not an intentional bias, since said database is largely multidisciplinary.

Unlike what is assumed in Tickner's (2003) Latin American Hybrid, in Herz's (2002) and in Holsti's (1985) works, dependência is not necessarily the prevailing theoretical input from Latin America or from Brazil. While Cardoso (1977) humbly disguises his positive judgement in regard to the consumption of the dependency theory in the West, yet slightly boasting the idea accusing for instance Furtado and Prebisch of a lack of methodological innovation, a review of bibliometric data that deal with developmentalism, although published in Western Academic Journals in IR, rarely, if any time, deal with Western realities or stem from analyses about the United States or Western Europe. Bilgin (2008) warns against these enterprises through Edward Said’s reflections about theories that travel.

To prefer a local, detailed analysis of how one theory travels from one situation to another is also to betray some fundamental uncertainty about specifying or delimiting the field to which any one theory of idea might belong (Said 2000 Apud Bilgin 2008: 19).

Rather symptomatically, Tickner (2003) finds no trace of dependência in Brazil's IR syllabi or academic publications. It is hence paramount to verify references to developmentalism aiming at finding out whether such concepts as that of autonomy may debate with this theoretical approach, since dependência only appears in IR thinking when no content-analysis is done, or assumptions are in no way grounded. This adds up to Holsti's slip.

Since originally Cardoso's and dos Santos' intellectual work are not conceived within the field of IR, carrying methodological and epistemological concerns otherwise oriented, Herz's (2002) choice of criteria was not entirely successful, as she nails down International Relations Theory alongside with thinking regards to the International System as approaches that might prove her samples fit in one or another category or sub-field in IR. From the beginning, both authors are aware dependency theory deals with different questions and concerns, and thus cannot be deemed IRT, but still investigate it since it would allegedly respect Holsti's (1985) three criteria of what a debate with the classical paradigm must contain and Herz's (2002) educated guess over what happened in the field of IR in Brazil before 1981.

If Tickner (2003) and Herz (2002) insisted in assuming dependency theories as sources of theoretical reflections in the case of IR scholarship in Brazil, it would have
been more accurate to look into how -or if- the authors in the field of IR have referred to those ideas, only then seeking to examine Santos’ and Cardosos’ contributions. This inaccuracy is rather relevant, namely because Tickner’s (2003) work on the Latin American Hybrid is among those with the widest range regarding Latin American thinking, and she may have portrayed IR in the region as a land of nobody where economists and sociologists have the upper hand.

Even when she claims to verify the impact of dependency perspectives in IR Thinking, she presents the ECLA school, the Brazilian dependentistas, as well as Blaney’s (1996) understanding of autonomy in Latin American thought as a product of dependency theory’s construction of the international society through a logic of capitalism and a logic of sovereignty. The only author presented by Tickner (2003) whose reflections upon how dependency theory has influenced IR, Blaney, is then not affiliated to Latin American institutions, as if the void Herz (2002) points out in the 1980s did exist and has yet to be fulfilled by an IR national scholar. It is as if there is no scientific (or any other possible kind) IR debate in Brazil, which is also the case in Herz’s (2002).

Yet, Herz refers to Hélio Jaguaribe and Celso Lafer as authors who, during the 1970s, would emulate a diplomatic hint (Araújo Castro’s) over a Brazilian, Third World-prone conceptualization of détente as the frozen distribution of power:

The structure of the power distribution in the international system is examined through a Southern perspective under which an oligarchical nature of power relations is highlighted and the possible breaches in this system are explored (Lafer, 1972b; 1982a; 1982b; 1984; Jaguaribe, 1977; 1980) (Herz 2002: 17).

As can be inferred by her previous textual narrative, Herz (Idem, p.17-18) interprets this Southern perspective shaped as a result of the close ties between Brazilian diplomacy and Brazilian IR scholarship, as a consequence of the influence of dependency theory in the diplomatic and in the country’s IR scholarship in opposition both to the optimism of the liberals through the interdependence, as well as to a rising prevalence of the realist thinking by the end of the 1970s. Moreover, Tickner (2003) does not present both of ECLA’s (Cepal) founding fathers: Raúl Prebisch, Argentinian; Celso Furtado, Brazilian. She intends to differentiate ECLA’s thinking from the theories of dependency, but she does not even quote any of Furtado’s groundbreaking publications nor his role as a statesman, simply quoting Cardoso’s work on how uniquely theoretical is his own work.
As expected following Cardoso's (1977) remarks, the literature review on developmentalism, besides Holsti's (1985) and Herz's (2002) suggestions, International Political Economy as a sub-field of International Relations might encompass the terms of the debate raised by dependency theory, but, while Herz (Idem) undermines its possible impact, she understands Realism in IPE had significantly more impact on the study of IR in Brazil -although she does not illustrate such an assumption, nor defines a realist approach of IPE. Indeed, this sub-field does bring dependency theory into the debate, but it does so simplifying it under a Marxist umbrella and/or the sub-field of regional integration and/or the World-System Theory (Gilpin 1987; Gilpin 2000). International Political Economy, when studied through its major reference in IR, Robert Gilpin's textbook, does make reference to "the issue of dependency and economic development" and does make reference to dependency theory, especially through the work of Theotônio dos Santos, what is possibly to blame for Gilpin's (1989: 282) understanding that 'dependency theory is closely related to the concept of the Modern World System (MWS)'. According to dos Santos himself, though, Gilpin (Idem) would not be entirely wrong. Theotônio himself argues that the continuing work of dependency theory has entailed a dialogue with Wallerstein's World-System theory, what Gilpin (Ibidem: 67-72) presents introducing noticeable dependentistas such as Gunder Frank, while establishing a connection between this approach to that of Critical Theory:

Rather than being independent actors or variables, they [the nation-state of the nationalists and the market of the liberals] are the consequences of a peculiar juncture of ideas, institutions, and material capabilities (Cox, 1981) (Gilpin 1989: 68).

Going back to Tickner's (2003) understanding of the Latin American Hybrid (LAH) and to Herz's (2002) choice of interpretations of the International System as criteria to identify theoretical affiliations, the characterization of the international system ‘by hierarchical relations of domination (Tickner 2004: 336)’ certainly stems from her grasp of the participation of dependency theory in said Hybrid -since anarchy is the foundational premise of the rationalists. However, the ‘relatively non-problematic’ perspective over the State, even though might confirm the LAH's affiliation to rationalism or to the classical paradigm, goes frontally against the very core of both dependency and World-System theories, both openly Marxian. Developmentalism, however, might positively verify this account, since the State would play a role not unfamiliar at all to the rationalists' political theoretical roots in contractualism.
The following part of this research will finally explore the philosophy of science of what might be a Brazilian contribution to the Theory of International Relations. Combined, these four chapters shape up a historiography of IR in the sense of Said’s proposal of contrapuntal readings, what will be better explored in our Conclusion. We will begin the next part of this chapter by exploring Said’s notion as a new methodology of analysis in IR that allows for a more accurate resonance of local, national and regional ideas in the frameworks of the philosophy of science (Chowdry 2007; Bilgin 2016).

A Philosophical Conversation

We have approached some of the hurdles IRT faces when jiggling with the philosophy of science. This chapter intends to finalize the content-analysis promised throughout this research, after its exhaustive triangulation with the TRIP Survey 2014, and with Kristensen’s (2015) research. The first task here is to address the idea of a ‘paradigm’. We have been exploring national developmentalism in Brazil, but we have not yet actually investigated whether it is philosophically coherent enough to thusly name it a paradigm, neither if it is actually a paradigm for Brazil’s International Relations.

Kuhn (1977) is traditional the source we draw to when we intend to be strict toward our definitions of a paradigm –even though he himself has recognized his work entailed at least 12 different notions of the idea. In here, we are establishing a conversation especially with Wight’s (2002) and Turton’s (2016) contributions, as we have already explored in previous pages.

When talking about philosophy, it is fundamental to define. I hereby define paradigm as a universe. In this universe, there would be compatible epistemologies, ontologies, methodologies, and concepts. Any research agenda that stems from this paradigm, from this universe, is hence bound to the language this universe transpires through its epistemologies, ontologies, methodologies, and concepts, otherwise it is not accurate to call out a research agenda into that paradigm.

Unlike Kuhn, our major concern here is not paradigm-shift, but whether there is a paradigm in Brazilian IR.

Attempting to discover the source of that difference led me to recognize the role in scientific research of what I have since called “paradigms.” These I take to be universally recognized scientific achievements that for a time provide
model problems and solutions to a community of practitioners. Once that piece of my puzzle fell into place, a draft of this essay emerged rapidly (Kuhn 1977: viii).

The first test is hence recognition, validation before ‘a community of practitioners’ – in this case, this was tested via cross-citations among the four most relevant authors thus far. And, other than the statistic treatment, this is the main reason why we restrict our sample of the most relevant authors for Brazil’s IR’s first generation debating with the International Insertion to Maria Regina Soares de Lima, Amado Luiz Cervo, and José Flávio Sombra Saraiva.

Table 34: Articles’ Titles at RBPI (1958-2017) and CINT (1985-2017) – Three Most Statistically Relevant Authors after the Cross-Citation Inquiry

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>#</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Author</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Co-author</th>
<th>Academic Journal</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>1983</td>
<td>Amado Luiz Cervo</td>
<td>Intervention and Neutralism: Brazilian doctrines for the Plata region in the middle 1800s</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>RBPI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>1985</td>
<td>Amado Luiz Cervo</td>
<td>Brazilian Foreign Policy toward Territorial Borders in the 19th Century</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>RBPI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>Amado Luiz Cervo</td>
<td>Socializing development: Brazil's history of technical cooperation</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>RBPI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>Amado Luiz Cervo</td>
<td>Foreign Policy and Brazil's International Relations: a paradigmatic approach</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>RBPI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>Amado Luiz Cervo</td>
<td>Concepts in International Relations</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>RBPI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>Amado Luiz Cervo</td>
<td>Policy for Foreign Trade And Development: the Brazilian experience</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>RBPI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>Amado Luiz Cervo</td>
<td>Brazil's International Relations: an account of the Cardoso Era</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>RBPI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>2014</td>
<td>Amado Luiz Cervo</td>
<td>The fall: the international insertion of Brazil (2011-2014)</td>
<td>Antonio Carlos Lessa</td>
<td>RBPI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>Amado Luiz Cervo</td>
<td>Brazil's rise on the international scene: Brazil and the World</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>RBPI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Page</td>
<td>Author(s)</td>
<td>Title</td>
<td>Journal</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>Amado Luiz Cervo</td>
<td>Under the neoliberal mark: Latin America’s international relations</td>
<td>RBPI</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>Amado Luiz Cervo</td>
<td>Conceptual Axes of Brazil’s Foreign Policy</td>
<td>RBPI</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>Amado Luiz Cervo</td>
<td>Angola and Brazil in the South Atlantic routes</td>
<td>RBPI</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>Amado Luiz Cervo</td>
<td>Editorial: foreign policy from Cardoso to Lula</td>
<td>RBPI</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>Amado Luiz Cervo</td>
<td>An Assessment of the Lula era</td>
<td>Antonio Carlos Lessa, RBPI</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>José Flávio Sombra Saraiva</td>
<td>Financial para-diplomacy in Brazil’s Old Republic (1890-1930)</td>
<td>RBPI</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>José Flávio Sombra Saraiva</td>
<td>The new Africa and Brazil in the Lula Era: the rebirth of Brazilian Atlantic Policy</td>
<td>RBPI</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>José Flávio Sombra Saraiva</td>
<td>500 years of Brazil-Portugal relations</td>
<td>RBPI</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2018</td>
<td>José Flávio Sombra Saraiva</td>
<td>Constructing international news in Brazil’s press</td>
<td>RBPI</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2019</td>
<td>José Flávio Sombra Saraiva</td>
<td>South America’s international projection</td>
<td>RBPI</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>José Flávio Sombra Saraiva</td>
<td>René Girault: in memoriam</td>
<td>RBPI</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>José Flávio Sombra Saraiva</td>
<td>Europe and Globalization: trends, problems, opinions</td>
<td>RBPI</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2020</td>
<td>José Flávio Sombra Saraiva</td>
<td>IBRI and the preparation for the Quebec Summit</td>
<td>RBPI</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2020</td>
<td>José Flávio Sombra Saraiva</td>
<td>Political Regimes and Foreign Policy: new approximations</td>
<td>RBPI</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2022</td>
<td>José Flávio Sombra Saraiva</td>
<td>International Law in a changing world</td>
<td>RBPI</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Page</td>
<td>Author</td>
<td>Title</td>
<td>Journal</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>205</td>
<td>José Flávio Sombra Saraiva</td>
<td>Israel-Palestine: building peace from a global perspective</td>
<td>RBPI</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>206</td>
<td>José Flávio Sombra Saraiva</td>
<td>Lula Foreign Policy: the African challenge</td>
<td>RBPI</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>207</td>
<td>José Flávio Sombra Saraiva</td>
<td>Foreign Policy and the First Republic: the golden years (1902-1918)</td>
<td>RBPI</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>208</td>
<td>José Flávio Sombra Saraiva</td>
<td>The search for a new paradigm: foreign policy, foreign trade, and federalism in Brazil</td>
<td>RBPI</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>209</td>
<td>José Flávio Sombra Saraiva</td>
<td>Africa in the 21st century international order: superficial changes or attempts toward an autonomous decision-making process</td>
<td>RBPI</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>300</td>
<td>José Flávio Sombra Saraiva</td>
<td>Revisiting the English School</td>
<td>RBPI</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>301</td>
<td>José Flávio Sombra Saraiva</td>
<td>From national-developmentalism to the internationalization of Brazil's sub-national</td>
<td>RBPI</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>302</td>
<td>José Flávio Sombra Saraiva</td>
<td>Autonomy in Brazil's International Insertion: its own historical way</td>
<td>CINT</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>303</td>
<td>Maria Regina Soares de Lima (Co-author)</td>
<td>Politicising financial foreign policy: an analysis of Brazilian Foreign Policy Formulation for the Financial Sector</td>
<td>RBPI</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>304</td>
<td>Maria Regina Soares de Lima</td>
<td>Brazilian foreign politics and the challenge of South-South cooperation</td>
<td>RBPI</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>305</td>
<td>Maria Regina Soares de Lima</td>
<td>The International Political Economy of Brazilian Foreign Policy: an analytical framework</td>
<td>CINT</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>306</td>
<td>Maria Regina Soares de Lima</td>
<td>Democratic Institutions and Foreign Policy</td>
<td>CINT</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Yet, Kuhn’s discussion on the history of science might come in handy when we debate authors who do not believe Brazilian scholars have created, should create, or can create ‘theories’.

My distinction between the pre- and the post-paradigm periods in the development of a science is, for example, much too schematic. Each of the schools whose competition characterizes the earlier period is guided by something much like a paradigm; there are circumstances, though I think them rare, under which two paradigms can coexist peacefully in the later period. Mere possession of a paradigm is not quite a sufficient criterion for the developmental transition discussed in Section II (Kuhn 1977: ix).

In this essay, ‘normal science’ means research firmly based upon one or more past scientific achievements, achievements that some particular scientific community acknowledges for a time as supplying the foundation for its further practice.

Although there is reluctance in accepting investigations about a Brazilian paradigm to IRT, Kuhn’s definition hint another way.

Although “Brazilian thought” on IR has grown more dense (sic) as a result of immense growth in institutions and researchers in the 1990s (Vizentini 2005:24; Lessa 2006:14), scholars lament that there has not been a parallel growth of original theories. American theories are still “extremely popular” in Brazil (Lessa 2005a:10). Most scholars interviewed agree that there is more Brazilian ‘thought’ on IR but no ‘theory’ yet. In the words of a senior scholar: “I would say the requirement of a theory if you are going to be scientifically straight are not that easy. But if you use the word thought, I would say that there is a significant amount of thought on international relations in Brazil.” (Kristensen 2015: 547).

Seeking to debate whether there is a Brazilian contribution to IRT, the use of the word ‘thought’ is not, however, a possibility. Kuhn thusly defines paradigm:

They [the scientific community] were able to do so [base their research on past scientific achievement] because they shared two essential characteristics. Their achievement was sufficiently unprecedented to attract an enduring group of adherents away from competing modes of scientific activity. Simultaneously, it was sufficiently open-ended to leave all sorts of problems for the redefined group of practitioners to resolve. Achievements that share these two characteristics I shall henceforth refer to as ‘paradigms,’ a term that relates closely to ‘normal science.’ By choosing it, I mean to suggest that some accepted examples of actual scientific practice—examples which include law, theory, application, and instrumentation together—provide models from which spring particular coherent traditions of scientific research (Kuhn 1977: 10). (...) That commitment and the apparent consensus it produces are prerequisites for normal science, i.e., for the genesis and continuation of a particular research tradition (Kuhn 1977: 10).

We have found that Hélio Jaguaribe and Maria Regina Soares de Lima are the common denominator among Vigevani’s, Cervo’s, and Sombra Saraiva’s work at RBPI and CINT. Vigevani is not cited in neither Cervo’s nor in Saraiva’s work, and Saraiva is not cited in Vigevani’s sample. This allows us to further specialize our sample. Also, these dynamics confirm our previous finding in which we have provided
macro-political, as well as micro-social reasons behind Brazilian IR’s hesitance in debating among each other—suffice it to remember Kristensen’s interviewee’s concern over the overlap between academic politics and academic debate in the country. In terms of academic politics, there would be a trend to overlook certain scholars’ scientific capital, resulting in a disengagement from their literature in spite of their scientific capital. This might help explaining why Maria Regina Soares de Lima and Hélio Jaguaribe are said common denominator. Their scientific capital is undisputed, but so is Vigevani’s or Sombra Saraiva’s, as provided through our statistical treatment of the most used vis-à-vis the top-of-mind scholars in Brazilian IR. However, Hélio Jaguaribe is not part of Brazil’s IR’s academic structure, hence, debating his work tends to be less perceived as an exercise of academic politics. Maria Regina Soares de Lima, in turn, has placed herself in a Political Science program, mitigating the pressure over her political clout in IR’s institutional channels. Tullo Vigevani, in spite of the seniority of his scientific capital, remained active in IR’s post-grad studies, and so has Sombra Saraiva, especially given his younger age. Amado Luiz Cervo’s senior scientific capital and the fact that Sombra Saraiva assumed the political front of his activities at IRel UnB, and in IR’s institutional channels in general as well have cushioned the political pressure around the former. We have also realized that unlike in Kuhn, our major concern here is not paradigm-shift, but if there is a paradigm in Brazilian IR, or if how Brazilian scholars do science is based on Western paradigms.

My distinction between the pre- and the post-paradigm periods in the development of a science is, for example, much too schematic. Each of the schools whose competition characterizes the earlier period is guided by something much like a paradigm; there are circumstances, though I think them rare, under which two paradigms can coexist peacefully in the later period. Mere possession of a paradigm is not quite a sufficient criterion for the developmental transition discussed in Section II (Kuhn 1977: ix). Although “Brazilian thought” on IR has grown more dense as a result of immense growth in institutions and researchers in the 1990s (Vizentini 2005:24; Lessa 2006:14), scholars lament that there has not been a parallel growth of original theories. American theories are still “extremely popular” in Brazil (Lessa 2005a:10). Most scholars interviewed agree that there is more Brazilian ‘thought’ on IR but no ‘theory’ yet. In the words of a senior scholar: “I would say the requirement of a theory if you are going to be scientifically straight are not that easy. But if you use the word thought, I would say that there is a significant amount of thought on international relations in Brazil.” (Kristensen 2015: 547).

The fact that Maria Regina Soares de Lima does not cite José Flávio Sombra Saraiva or Amado Luiz Cervo—and very few Brazilian authors, besides herself (she refers to
Gerson Moura’s and Celso Lafer’s contributions, and once to Tullo Vigevani)-, although Cervo and Saraiva do cite her, entails that Maria Regina gains a status of reference, and not of authorship in our investigation. She would then join Hélio Jaguaribe, José Honório Rodrigues, and Celso Lafer as the statistically relevant references that conform the intellectual basis upon which a Brazilian contribution to IRT would stand. In this sample, all Brazil-based authors who are cited both in Cervo’s and Saraiva’s work have been factored in, in spite of their statistical relevance for the overall sample – hence the inclusion of Celso Lafer and José Honório Rodrigues.

Still, however, restricted to our statistically relevant authors and their patterns of cross-citation, we find that the intensity with which Maria Regina Soares de Lima is cited in the figure bellow could challenge the accuracy of maintaining Sombra Saraiva among the authors whose work has first translated a Brazilian IR contribution to IRT. Nonetheless, since I have factored out self-citations and Maria Regina Soares de Lima does not cite the Brazilian authors statistically relevant for our sample, citations to Cervo and Saraiva tend to be downplayed, as they cannot cite themselves (see the zeros in the following figure):

Table 35: Total Number of Cross-Citations After Inquiry over the Role of the Author’s Citations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Author</th>
<th>ALC</th>
<th>JFSS</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Amado Luiz Cervo</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hélio Jaguaribe</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>José Flávio Sombra Saraiva</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maria Regina Soares de Lima</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


As a result, we are forced to contextualize the sample. The standard deviation value is of 1,7 citations. The average value is 5,75 citations. Maria Regina’s citations would be the minimum value, below the standard deviation.
As expected, Cervo and Saraiva are the most relevant authors through this methodology. They are closer to the average value, considered the standard deviation. This confirms our finding that they indeed are the core authors of Brazil’s IR’s scholarship. Further statistical analysis sheds further light onto the role each of them play in Brazil’s IR.

There are no outliers in this sample. Given our median (6) and average (5.75) values in relation to our standard deviation (1.7), we can safely assume authors that rank over 4.05 citations are the most relevant in the overall sample. However, given the small difference between our median and our average values in relation to our standard deviation value (14%), we can also safely deduce that the most relevant author of our sample are cross-cited at least 6 times.

We are faced with a situation in which we know Cervo is the most relevant author for Brazil’s first generation of IR, and Hélio Jaguaribe is the most author among the references for Brazil’s first generation of IR. Sombra Saraiva’s citations are then comparable to Cervo’s, as Lima’s are to Jaguaribe’s. When we factor in seniority and institutional identity, we have a better grasp of how Lima and Saraiva are each positioned as a reference to Brazilian IR’s first generation, and part of Brazil’s IR respectively.
Table 36: Rank of the Top Four Most Cited Articles and Their Scholar Background

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Author</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Institution</th>
<th>Supervisor</th>
<th>Title</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hélio Jaguaribe</td>
<td>1946</td>
<td>(undergrad)</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amado Luiz Cervo</td>
<td>1970</td>
<td>University of Strasbourg</td>
<td>François Chatillon</td>
<td>In the service of God, and in the service of Your Majesty: the Spanish justification for the conquest of America</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maria Regina Soares de Lima</td>
<td>1986</td>
<td>Vanderbilt University</td>
<td>John Dorsey Jr.</td>
<td>The Political Economy of Brazilian Foreign Policy: Nuclear Energy, Trade, and Itaipu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>José Flávio Sombra Saraiva</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>University of Birmingham</td>
<td>Paulo Faria</td>
<td>Brazil’s Foreign Policy Towards (sic) Africa (1946-1985): Realpolitik and Discourse.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Currículo Lattes; Hélio Jaguaribe > Academia Brasileira de Letras (ABL).

Although Hélio Jaguaribe has no formal post-grad education, after the 1964-coup in Brazil, when he was exonerated from public office, went to exile, a period he taught in Harvard (1964-1966), Stanford (1966-1967), and in the MIT (1968-1969). Following the political opening, in 1979, he joined Cândido Mendes’ (former member of ISEB and IBESP) university in Rio de Janeiro, when they created the Institute for Political and Social Studies (then transformed into IUPERJ, which later moved away from Cândido Mendes’ University to re-create IESP, currently under the guise of Rio de Janeiro’s state University, UERJ). He was Full Professor in the Institute until 2003.

The fact that he taught in the most prominent universities in the Western world from 1964 until 1969 is going to be grasped here as a sign his knowledge was valid in a PhD level, which would hence imply he had finished his PhD before 1964. The average number of years a scholar in Brazil’s humanities take to complete his or her post-grad degrees is eight years. If he would have entered his MPhil in 1947, he would have finished all of it in 1955. Since in 1952 he created IBESP and directed its publication, one that had significant impact in Latin America’s scholarship, we can assume – also observing Cervo’s timing – he will assume he would have finished his PhD in 1952.

This allows us to compare his academic seniority, even though the Higher Ed system back then was differently organized.

Hence, Jaguaribe’s role as the most prominent bibliographic reference to Brazil’s IR is comparable to Maria Regina’s role. Once we observe the methodology h5 to measure number of citations, we understand that there is generally a certain distance
of time that allows the article to enter the sample of the most cite, but also that after this time the most recent the article the most likely it is to receive citations – given, for example, technological matters. This helps explain how Maria Regina and Jaguaribe can both be considered bibliographic reference to Brazil’s first generation of IR.

In the case of Sombra Saraiva and Cervo, the statistical analysis is as revealing as its contextualization. Sombra Saraiva’s citations are below the average value, while Cervo’s are above the average value and represent the median value itself. When we factor in seniority, we can deduce that both Cervo and Sombra Saraiva are indeed part of the first generation of Brazil’s IR, but that this first generation has a mentor: Amado Luiz Cervo.

Mentoring is a relationship. It is a relationship between the mentor and the protégé. Mentoring is defined as a one-to-one relationship in which an expert or a senior person voluntarily gives time to teach, support, and encourage another (Santamaria, 2003). (…) (Inzer and Crawford 2005: 31).

There is much refining of the definition in the recent literature on mentoring. According to Zachary (2002), mentoring passes on knowledge of subjects, facilitates personal development, encourages wise choices, and helps the protégé to make transitions. In other research (sic) it is stated that most of the literature primarily examines mentoring in relation to individual career development, with the mentor as a friend, career guide, information source, and intellectual guide. This review promotes mentoring with peers, where those in the mentoring relationship are colleagues. Both participants have something of value to contribute and to gain from the other. Participants in peer mentoring have been known to achieve a level of mutual expertise, equality, and empathy frequently absent from traditional mentoring relationships (Harnish & Wild, 1994) (Inzer and Crawford 2005: 31-32).

Another broader definition of mentoring is someone who helps a protégé learn something that he or she would have learned less well, more slowly, or not at all if left alone (Bell, 2000). This is different from the traditional definitions of mentoring where mentoring mentoring where mentoring is a relationship where a superior, subordinate or a peer can share knowledge, wisdom, and support.

In an organizational sense this researcher states, “All mentors are not supervisors or managers. But all effective supervisors and managers should be mentors. Mentoring must become that part of every leader’s role that has growth as its primary component” (Bell, 2000, p. 2) (Idem).

In this case, we find Zachary’s (2002 Apud Inzer and Crawford 2005: 31-32), as well as Harnish’s and Wild’s (1994 Apud Inzer and Crawford 2005: 31-32) suits best to describe the relationship between the authors, both colleagues at IRel UnB, and given their roles at IBRI and RBPI, where Sombra Saraiva was director of the Institute, while Cervo was RBPI’s Editor, hence providing a sense of how Sombra Saraiva’s is conceived in spite of the difference of years between his and Cervo’s PhD. The fact that they cross-cite rather frequently also shows a mentorship relationship among peers.
The almost spooky factor in this relationship is Saraiva’s (2009a) edited book in which he offers concepts, histories, and Theories of International Relations for the twenty-first century through regional and national approaches. In the book, Saraiva does not present any bibliometric analysis, nor content-analysis, but he is as right into the target as he gathers what he deems representative of national and regional approaches. In the case of what TRIP Survey 2014 found to be how Brazil’s faculty interprets the country’s epistemic community’s place in the world, including mainly Argentinians, we can definitely grasp Saraiva’s very sober grip of what he dubs Argentine-Brazilian School. However, given the academic urban legend we have debunked, he also mentions it without providing any evidence:

There is, in development, a tradition which becomes dense, as its own school, to some extent Argentine-Brazilian and, even, perhaps, Latin American, around the construction of proper concepts. One of its inspirations is the dependency theory, by having reached, in its time, the explanation of economic asymmetries between States (Saraiva 2009b: 29).

Yet, he goes on to group an extremely precise pull of thinkers in regard to traditional stock-taking after our triangulation in this Dissertation.

Argentine-Brazilian historiography of international relations has already produced almost one hundred books and countless theses and dissertations on the region’s great universities in the last 30 years. It is a safe field, with great capacity for concept production and understanding not only of the region’s international insertion, but also the wide field of international relations (Idem: 30).

Hélio Jaguaribe and Gerson Moura, already deceased; but also dynamic in current times, such as Mario Rapoport, Moniz Bandeira, Amado Cervo, José Paradiso, Raul Bernal-Meza, Sombra Saraiva, Figari, Carlos Escudé, among others, are authors that have been leading working groups with impact in the construction of concepts proper to the study of the medium and long run in the formation of the region’s and the regional with the world’s international relations. This Argentine-Brazilian School evidences its own theoretical angle, by having identified problems and developments particular to the region. (Ibid)

It is both unparalleled, and, at the same time, a verification of this triangulation, the fact that Saraiva singles out the very same authors that appear in at least one of our samples – with the exception of Paradiso, and Gerson Moura, even though the latter is the only Brazilian author Maria Regina Soares de Lima cites constantly and more than one of his publications, hence he does appear in our sample indirectly. In the case of Escudé, although he does not explicitly appear, he is constantly cited in stock-takings of Latin America’s IR (Herz 2002; Tickner 2003a; 2003b; 2008; Kristensen 2015).

The content of Sombra Saraiva’s publications at CINT and RBPI hint that he did share and reflect upon Cervo’s ideas, while maintaining a more diverse research agenda.
This can be illustrated in Saraiva’s (2009b) narrative regarding the role of concepts and of theories, very much similar to what we are going to explore in Cervo’s most recent publications:

One can observe, in the conceptual and theoretical production of this group of scholars, the overcoming of the theorecist (sic) explanation of objects in favor of the narrative-conceptual method, distancing it from the study of conflicts in favor of the study of international insertion themes of the region, the substitution of fatalism in the dependency theory for the identification of concrete opportunities for development as a value of universal tendency, a historiographical centrality of the possibilities and practices of cooperation in a more balanced and multipolar world, the search for identities that unify more than the singularities that pull apart Latin American States and societies (Idem: 30).

In a few pages, we will examine how it has been misinterpreted the notion of theory and methodology, what will provide that, as Saraiva himself affirms, there is the construction of ideas targeting and inspired by ‘the study of the medium and long run’ in Brazil. These ideas are indeed universal, not necessarily geographically. Also, we will examine how this ‘narrative-conceptual method’ is actually a qualitative methodology, the interpretivist, one that is the most used across IR’s most prominent journals in the world.

It is also incredible how Saraiva does repeat the academic urban legend, but does not succumb to it. He acknowledges the importance of dependency theory, but he argues it has been transcended, the future has indeed risen, toward what we will explore as an underlying paradigm to Humanities in Brazil, national developmentalism, suffice it to realize Saraiva has cited Jaguaribe. The philosophical consequences of this perspective will appear refining Saraiva’s reflections, by introducing it into a framework of the philosophy of science that presents ontologies and methodologies under what we hereby dub rationalism in exile.

Since Saraiva provides an important stock-taking of Brazilian IR, while Cervo restricts his publications to forging it, we will leave Saraiva’s primary publications to further analyses. Our final content-analysis is hence restricted to Cervo’s publications, even though we will initially factor in Saraiva’s, to better ground a Brazilian contribution, and to provide a grounded framework for a future test of the latter’s contributions to a Brazilian IRT.

Consequently, our first effort in coding derives from our crunching of the terms used in the authors’ titles:
Table 37: Most Repeated Words among Sombra Saraiva’s and Cervo’s Titles at RBPI (1958-2017) and CINT (1985-2017)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Word</th>
<th>Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BRA + foreign + policy</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>brazil's + brazil +</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>brazilian</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>international</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>lula</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>era</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>new</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>africa</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>america's</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>atlantic</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>autonomy +</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>autonomous</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cardoso</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>concepts + conceptual</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>development</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>history + historical</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>insertion</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>national</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>paradigm +</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>paradigmatic</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>republic</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>south</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>trade</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


It becomes even more clear that although Brazilian Foreign Policy (9.4%) is important to the authors’ research agenda, the terms surrounding the notion of Brazil (8.5%) are relatively as relevant as the former, given that all other terms have significantly less impact into the sample. The idea that there might be a paradigm based on research about Brazilian Foreign Policy is verified when we look into these most cited words among the authors’ titles, not only because the terms ‘paradigm’ and ‘paradigmatic’ can be found, but also since we do encounter terms that establish a dialogue with the national developmentalism, such as ‘national’, ‘development’, and ‘autonomy’. Clues regarding the systematization of this paradigm in this literature are found in the incidence of the terms ‘concepts’, ‘conceptual’, ‘history’, ‘historical’, ‘insertion’: ‘[A]s Andrew Hurrell argues, “as with autonomy, dependency-style ideas also formed an
important part of élite thinking on Brazil's international insertion” (Hurrell 2013:30) (Kristensen 2015: 568).

It is interesting to notice how Hurrell treats dependency theory. Since he did not choose to investigate it, yet acknowledging there is conversation on this theories’ contribution to IR, he does not affirm one type of dependency theory has influenced Brazil’s way of doing IR. Hurrell speaks Portuguese, has been to Brazil several times for different periods of time. He is aware dependency theory is not uncontroversial let alone consensual among the country’s scholars, namely throughout their research.

If ‘Peaceful Rise’ is the master narrative in the search for a Chinese School, ‘International Insertion’ is a serious contender in the project of developing Brazilian concepts. The concept of ‘Inserção Internacional’ is emphasized by some interviewees as a particularly Brazilian, or emerging power, perspective on IR. It relies on an imaginary where Brazil at the outset is constituted by its outsider status. Insertion then implies breaking from dependence, becoming autonomous and eventually redeeming its rightful role (for a critical view, see Arend 2011). Insertion, as a scholar from PUC-Rio argues, signifies that “we want to be heard. We want to have a voice.” The systematization of Brazilian concepts about “International Insertion” has been mostly associated with the “Brasília School” (Arend 2010:1) and is seen by its leading scholar as a distinctly Brazilian contribution to IR (Cervo 2009:49): “Building concepts applied to the international insertion of Brazil corresponds to a methodical mental exercise, done with the purpose of producing knowledge and generating comprehension to international life, in addition to reflecting praxis and suggesting paths of action.” (Cervo 2009:65; see also Saraiva 2009a; Bernal-Meza 2009; Cervo and Lessa 2014; Saraiva 2014) (Kristensen 2015: 567).

I am not philosophically familiar with China’s peaceful rise, and hence I could not comment on Kristensen’s comparison. However, his initial grasp of what he deems a concept, ‘Inserção Internacional’, and that Arend (2010) considers a systematization of concepts about Brazil’s international insertion is not far off from the tone to which the content-analysis drives us. However, when we examine the bibliographic sources of the authors, such as Hélio Jaguaribe and José Honório Rodrigues, besides the discussion in which they engage with matters of autonomy, and of development, we can draw a straight line from Amado Luiz Cervo’s and José Flávio Sombra Saraiva’s contributions to the operationalization national developmentalism into the field of IR in Brazil.

Instead of looking at national developmentalism as a strategy to Brazil’s international insertion, this Dissertation switches the debate into how the national developmentalism first idealized in the 1950s has impacted over the production of knowledge in Brazil’s IR. I do not intend to adopt the notion of a Brasília School, but rather of a Brazilian School, because my methodology did not entail a homogeneous
result among other authors’ publications triangulated with the survey or the interviews that could actually allow me to ground the existence of other state-based schools as far as goes the interaction between the macro-political and the micro-social spheres of intellectual and social organization of IR in Brazil. Therefore, we can affirm that national developmentalism has been brought into the country’s field of International Relations particularly by the contributions of Amado Luiz Cervo and José Sombra Saraiva, when, for example, they discuss literature conceived by Celso Lafer, José Honório Rodrigues, Hélio Jaguaribe, and Maria Regina Soares de Lima. Kristensen (2015) attempts to debate what this represents in terms of IRT-talk:

The Brasilia School on international insertion is a hybrid of structuralist and realist theory where a strong ‘logistical state’ serves as the tool for Brazil’s international insertion (Cervo 2003:22). The logistical state “does not go passively to market forces and the hegemonic power” but envisions the state as an active instrument to insert Brazil into the world, including “the design and management of world order” (Bernal-Meza 2010:208). The project of inserting Southern emerging powers simultaneously embodies a notion of the existing order as exclusive, rigid and frozen. As one observer of Brazilian IR argues, “the motif of ‘insertion’ in discussions of how IR has been approached by Brazilian theorists” involves looking at “the economic question of how the country can find its way in an international structure that is given and immutable.” (Moore 2008:31). The idea is that status quo powers have used multilateral institutions to ‘freeze power’ and secure an advantageous position (Fonseca 2011:386). The idea of a “freezing of global power” coined by Araújo Castro is influential in Brazilian foreign policy and IR (Fonseca 2011:387; Lima and Hirst 2006:28; Herz 2002:17; Miyamoto 1999:86). Brazil’s insertion functions as a force for change in this order. Several scholars argue that the distinctiveness of the Brazilian perspective on IR is its opposition to the status quo: “Brazilian view is that the world is dead because Brazilian never come to be part of, it is always United States, France, England, wawawawa.”. This also goes for status quo theories, this scholar continues, so Brazilian scholars should start “Not to think like status quo, status quo, blablabla, no status quo please [laughing].” As a self-declared Marxist-developmentalist puts it, “The question for Americans is the question of the power, how to conserve the power,” Brazil’s question is development and change (…) (Kristensen 2015: 568-569)

However, he does not define what he means by neither structuralism nor realism. By illustrating this hybrid through Cervo’s ‘logistical state’, yet quoting Bernal-Meza to explain it, I assume Kristensen sought to highlight the centrality of the State, hence the affiliation to realism. First of all, if we treat realism as a paradigm, we must be aware that there are two types of realism, one that assumes the State’s agency is paramount to world politics, hence central to the explanation of the phenomenon of war, and another that considers the States' behavior toward war as a product of systemic features. Hence, and secondly, when Kristensen mentions realism and, separately, structuralism, I assume he is dealing with the former. I assume also that
to render his hybrid compatible he interpreted Cervo’s logistical state as a type of structural realism ‘tropicalized’ through a dependency-theory oriented structuralism (‘[I]nsertion also draws its conceptual baggage from dependency thinking’) (Idem: 568).

Finally, there are relevant short-comings in this analysis. Aside from repeating the dependency theory urban legend, Kristensen fails to provide that a Brazilian IR would hold the State central to its analysis just like in realism. The logistical State is definitely a poor evidence of this phenomenon, since it treats the State as a mediator between civil society and international relations. The logistical State, that, according to Cervo, would have mitigated Brazil’s subservience to neoliberal policies, would represent

Logistical is the State is ahead of the country’s strategies to overcome underdevelopment, while supporting through legitimation the initiative of other economic and social actors to whom it delegates power and responsibilities.

(...)

Three factors collaborate for the consolidation of the logistical State [in Lula’s administration]: a) civil society is at an advanced level of organization with associations of class that articulate several industries, their owners, their workers, and their consumers, a condition that makes it easy for the State to exercise the national interest as the sum of the society’s interests; b) political and economic stability, which suggest us to extrapolate the logics of the domestic capacity to govern with the logics of global governance; c) the high level of social and economic actors in terms of the private sector organization vis-à-vis their international competitors.

Since all this depends from the domestic and from the international, the State throws its weight as a mediator of the national interests through its foreign policy and this is how it shapes its agency in global governance (Cervo and Bueno 2011: 529-530).

Realism’s rationalism assumes the State performs an ontology that is unique, separate from any other, and this is how the State is capable of making rational decisions, of maximizing gains, and minimizing loss. This is definitely not the case in Cervo’s understanding of the role of the logistical State. This example actually disqualifies any relationship between a Brazilian IR based on Cervo’s ‘concepts’ and realism. I believe that when Kristensen referred to realism in his version of a hybrid he meant to refer to rationalism, which we will explore a few paragraphs ahead.

Furthermore, when Kristensen mentions structuralism as central to the ‘international insertion hybrid’, he illustrates it through the idea that there is a ‘freezing of global power’. However, structuralisms assume that the structure is paramount for the agent’s behavior, and the agent could not change the structure simply by being included in its mechanisms. Structure would still prevail. If, as Kristensen hints, he meant structuralism in a Marxist-developmentalist-oriented argument, Brazil’s quest to change the structure results from structural imbalances that resemble Wallerstein’s
world-system theory. In this case, the notion of developmentalism is not consistent with the logics of structuralism, and neither with Marxism.

As previously presented, Furtado cannot be interpreted as a Marxist. In fact, when Cervo (2003) presents the developmentalist paradigm Brazilian Foreign Policy would have allegedly exercised in a certain period of time (1930-1989), he acknowledges the role of Celso Furtado in its intellectual organization (Idem: 8; 12). He also cites the names of Ruy Mauro Marini and of Theotônio dos Santos without however any further account of these two contributions.

The developmentalist current of this Latin American way of thinking unraveled based on the formulations of ECLAC, the group that in the 1950s shaped up a theory originally inspired in the political practice of Getúlio Vargas from 1930 until 1945. From Prebisch’s original concepts-center-periphery, industry, internal consumers’ market, high basic income, deterioration of the exchange terms—until Celso Furtado’s theory of developmentalism, that insists upon the technological inequality, the current has inspired dependency theory in the 1960s and 1970s, when authors focused their research on the domination-dependency relationship based on structuralism (Ibid: 13).

In the paragraph that succeeds the former, Cervo distances a ‘Latin American Theory’ from dependency’s structuralism:

I believe ‘Latin American Theory of International Relations, to use Bernal-Meza’s expression, encompasses the theory of developmentalism, liberalism, and a sense of belonging to the West, besides the culture of democracy. These would be the ideological components of the developmentalist paradigm [Brazilian Foreign Policy exercised from 1930 until 1989]. The political features of this paradigm would be the promotion of development, requiring autonomy to make decisions, without which nothing will ever be achieved through this paradigm (Op cit).

The assumption of the possibility of a State making autonomous decisions also challenges Kristensen’s idea that structuralism underpins Brazil’s contribution to IRT. Once again, what seems to emerge from this discussion is a notion of rationality that differs from the realist, and from the liberal, without, however, a paradigmatic rupture from rationalism.

Offering a definition of rationalism is easier in opposition to positivism, as discussed through the analysis of Morgenthau’s work (see pages 65-66). Positivism rejects hypotheses, casts off ‘propositions which were not immediately deduced from phenomena’ (Burtt 2014: 33). Empiricism prevails. Positivism distances itself from philosophical thinking in the sense that it presumes truth to flourish from objective observation, while philosophical analyses allegedly presuppose problems that refer to
an ‘ontological quest in terms of a relatively new background of language and a new undercurrent of ideas’ (Idem: 27).

These ideas would be external to the philosophical inquiry, that would accept them as basic premises. This is the case of the realist paradigm’s acceptance of a Hobbesian human nature, or of a Hobbesian international system—the same applies to the English School, and to Liberalism, although they are based in different political theorists. Rodrigues (2010) discusses the philosophical origins of IR’s liberal and realist paradigms. Based on Walker’s (1992) insights on the fragility of the inside-outside divide, Rodrigues proposes an agonistic turn to IRT. Through Foucault’s genealogy, the author accesses Proudhon’s notion of life as ceaseless struggles, what leads him to question not only contractualism, but the Platonist roots of Western reason, particularly taken for granted in IRT.

IRT’s rationalist paradigms would all stem from contractualist authors: Hobbes, Locke, and Kant, not even providing an actual polarized debate, since the trends following Hobbes, or those after Locke and Kant would stem from the same political and philosophical aim: to place the State as the savior and the place of politics where violence would fade away completely, while, alternatively, the lack of a State-unity in the international arena would logically lead to violence or the perpetual imminence of violence. The inside is portrayed as hierarchical, political, peaceful, under a social contract; the outside is consequently anarchical, not the place of politics, but of conflict and war.

Notwithstanding, he points out, the landscape within States could not be further from peaceful. On the contrary, recurring to Schmitt, Rodrigues (2010) describes a reality in which States establish rules that normalize their perennial resource to violence thus creating the illusion of safety. The idea that under the social contract violence is the exception would be paradoxical in relation to its corollary Weberian definition of the State-as the monopoly of the legitimate use of force. The exception would in fact be the rule of the sovereign as long as the social contract remains intact. Nonetheless, the history of Brazil’s social contract, as well as of other Latin American countries, all objects of study of Rodrigues’ focus on drug trafficking, could not be less representative of a stable social contract let alone of a legitimate monopoly of the use of force.

Rodrigues’ object of study in itself offers never-ending examples of actors whose use of force is not only legitimate, for a certain part of the population, but also a monopoly
in certain spaces, even though they inhabit a territory of a distinguished sovereign. Hence, violence, combat, conflict, dispute: agonism would be the persisting rule of conduct of life, a continuum inside and outside, a perspective that definitely derives from the transnational characteristic of drug trafficking.

The agonistic turn emerges from a tradition that is not only outside of contractualism, but also of the Platonic dogmatic of reason. Heraclitus and his pre-Socratic language of wisdom-poetry, as well as his currently-dubbed post-modern grasp of thinking underpin Rodrigues’ reach to Proudhon, Nietzsche and Foucault. Unlike following pre-Socratics, such as Parmenides, or Plato and Aristotle, later normalized in Western intellectual history especially through Scholastics, Heraclitus did not believe knowledge should rely on otherness, duality.

Heraclitus’ monism contrasts with the binarism that Foucault's genealogy seeks to deconstruct. Thusly, ontology, if even applicable, would result from a phenomenon's own dynamic whose stability would be none, just as ‘one cannot step into the same river twice’ (a famous Heraclitus’ verse), simply because one is not the same twice, neither is the river. One of Heraclitus' major contributions to IRT through the lenses of Rodrigues' agonistic turn would be his grasp of change. Instead of truth or synthesis, chronic modification would better describe reality in a way that there is no necessary co-constitution among agencies, rules or structures, but, as Proudhon later emphasizes, a perpetual struggle that, unlike in the contractualists or for Marxians, cannot and will not be solved.

Conflict is the enduring solution to conflict. Peace is not a possibility, as there would always be imbalances in existence, as well as in coexistence. Who and what is considered powerful would result from circumstantial arrays among several ‘ontologies’ whose essences are perennially shifting. An agonistic turn would then provide IRT with a more realistic grasp of reality both based on the South, as well as on the margins of the West.

If Hobbes' Leviathan may derive from his wishful thinking amidst the civil war in Britain, Rodrigues' agonistic turn may be a product of his experiences as a citizen, as well as of his object of study, of his macro-political and micro-social positions of speech. Yet, based on the author's reflections, the philosophical tradition of the West would fall short of providing analytical tools not only for Brazilian IR scholars, but also for those who do not seek to understand or to explain the realities provided by the three corollaries of contractualism.
Both Smith (2000) and Rodrigues (2010) understand that Realists undermined the likelihood of peace while normalizing war, detaching ethical considerations by applying dogmas of individual/State rationality or the maximization of goals and means. Liberals, in their turn, discarded war, focusing on peace as a possible institutional or a value-oriented commitment, in spite of other considerations. The two poles of rationalism, then, would not observe the social aspects of violence. The economy and the political variables were widely taken into account, but the social elements of violence were neglected both by Realists, who basically saw societies in cost-benefit ratios, or Liberals, who primarily deemed societies intrinsically peaceful, simply denying violent behavior.

These misperceptions, Rodrigues (2010) affirms, would stem from the political theory upon which IRT is constructed. The European Enlightenment behind IRT would have created a situation where the intra-State reality could not be closer to a chimera. Some, as the Kant-affiliated Liberals, would subscribe to the possibility of spilling over the effects of such institutions to the international arena. Others, more Hobbes-affiliated Realists, would still deem ideal the domestic, hierarchic landscape within States, yet discarding any likelihood of transcendence to the international arena.

Although Rodrigues (2010) concentrates on Realists and Liberals, his analysis overlaps with Dunne’s over the Middle Course of IRT (Saraiva 2006). The English School, more Locke-oriented, would neither disregard the contrast between a hierarchic domestic arena, and an anarchic international sphere, assuming the importance of certain domestic features, such as values, also to the international relations (Idem). Nonetheless, embedded in those political theoretical affiliations, Western IRT would provide short qualitative variations. In the international arena, anarchy would apparently be the insurmountable variable.

The theorist, or the scholar who primarily intends to be published in IR best-rated communication structures, would necessarily run into a glass ceiling. Especially during the twentieth-century, any intent of theorizing against or besides the premise of anarchism would fall short of validation in the science of IR. In Brazil, particularly in the literature studied in this research, scholars working on Brazilian Foreign Policy or on the History of Brazil’s international relations have rarely engaged into direct theoretical-only debates with Western IR. Nonetheless, the absence of a conscious dialogue with core debates does not necessarily signify there has not been any conversation.
As a philosophy of science that relies on ‘philosophical assumptions regarding the rationality of actors in the international system’, rationalism is at the core of a Brazilian IR’s approach to the national developmentalism (Wight 2002: 38). When Brazilian IR scholars address the social sciences’ paradigm of national developmentalism, they ground their arguments about the State in an ‘intellectual bloc’ that construes rationality in a way that is different from the contractualists (Cervo 2003: 12).

Instead of survival, autonomy (‘autonomous’; ‘autonomy’) would be the State’s ultimate goal. The State’s behavior in international politics, in turn, would emulate that of educated, enlightened classes in the domestic arena. Consequently, in the international arena, Brazil would carry a social responsibility to lead by example, to foster consensus over a minimum common denominator, hence the perception of exceptionalism:

As observers of Brazilian foreign policy have argued, there is consensus on “Brazil’s aspiration to play an influential international role” but not the means: integration into international rules, norms and institutions or autonomy and South-South relations (Giacalone 2012:339; see also Lima and Hirst 2006). Here we return to the political debate between the left/South-leaning and right/North-leaning (Kristensen 2015: 571). (...)

In my interviews with Brazilian scholars, the conceptualization of the insertion project was often built on an exceptionalist discourse. Several interviewees stressed the exceptional feat that a country the size of Brazil has not been involved in a war for 140 years (“Brazil is really a country, these conditions are very rare, a country of this size with a lot of neighbors that is in peace with all his ten neighbors for 140 years, you know”). It has been argued that its foreign policy is one of “pacifismo instrumental” and that “war as a continuation of politics by other means” was never an option for Brazil (Lafer in Cruz 2005:118–119). This exceptionalism is undergirded by the argument that Brazil has settled all territorial disputes, fostered a peaceful regional environment and is “geopolitically satisfied” (Lima and Hirst 2006:21–22). As one scholar put it, “Brazil is—to use traditional language—a territorially satisfied country. Brazil has no ambition to expand its territory. And it has never had this ambition. It had the ambition to sort out the disputes that existed.” The insertion project is thus built on the argument that Brazil can contribute to the world with its unique peacefulness: “So we have, as a country, we like to think of ourselves as a peaceful country. And I think this is very important for our international identity (Kristensen 2015: 571-572).

Several scholars view Brazil’s insertion into the great power club as exceptional: Brazil is inserting itself through diplomacy and disarmament, because it had no nuclear weapons, no arms race or territorial disputes (Fonseca 2011:383). To one scholar, Brazil’s renunciation of nuclear weapons is a unique way “to open up the mind, let’s do something different, we are not provoking war, we want to restore peace, we are not killing [because] people are perceiving that things cannot be done as United States or England or the old colonial powers for international resolution or international conflict resolution or for the world peace or for the world construction or for the world development, etcetera, etcetera (Kristensen 2015: 572).

Brazil’s uniqueness is construed in opposition to “old powers” that use
violence. The notion of an exceptionalist Brazilian approach to peace-building based on football, carnival and samba rather than military force is also found in the literature (Kenkel 2010:657). Emerging powers are different from the West in this respect, a Brasília School scholar argues: “the emerging countries, like BRICS, are trying to put an end of this international security policy of NATO and substitute by another way to see the world and to think what should be better for all the countries. There is no solution by violence. [...] I think the world will change very slowly, very slowly. And we are changing with this concept, pacifismo, pacifism, no interventionismo, no interventionismo, no violence, no violence in international politics.” Brazil’s exceptional peacefulness is related to its internal tolerance of difference, the same scholar continues. Brazil is posited as a place where differences coexist (…) (Kristensen 2015: 573).

These authors Kristensen cites, and Kristensen (2017) himself have been attempting to put their fingers into how Brazil’s IR has interpreted the country’s international insertion, but, at least thus far, they had not engaged directly in philosophical dialogue with IRT in spite of several attempts to provide explicit theoretical hybrids, or implicit ones that are visible through the authors’ lexicon. The war-and-peace lexicon would hardly suffice to explain Brazil’s IR take on International Relations, since not only the core concerns of the country’s political agenda, but also the core philosophical bloc cannot be conciliated with any of the contractualist rationalisms. Instead, Brazilian IR’s rationalism in exile would not be constructed upon a sovereignty-non-intervention duality, but upon a dependence-autonomy dualism (see pages 156-157). For the rationalism in exile, a State’s ultimate goal should be to guarantee its autonomy. Instead of bucking up its own monopoly of the use of force in relation to other States’ military capacity, rationalism in exile would entail an exercise of diplomacy through which all States could find a minimum common denominator that would allow all others to share prosperity in the form of development measured not only in economic, but also in social terms. The political inequality of the international structure would stem from social and economic misbehavior, and since States like Brazil would carry the social responsibility to ignite change its presence in all fora would be welcome as it is intended to bridge divides. Under this rationalist paradigm, to maximize gains means to succeed in forging consensus, in creating an environment where the inevitable clashes, controversies, struggles do not interfere with the States’ autonomy.

In this sense, and maybe only in this sense, national developmentalism is compatible with Rodrigues’ agonistic turn. Rodrigues’ work was brought into this discussion not only because it fits, and it is a Brazilian attempt to theorize, but following a grounded analysis of the author’s relevance in the field. In light of Rodrigues’ antiquity, measured
by the year he graduated from his PhD (2008), it is highly unlikely that he was filtered in the TRIP Survey top-of-mind scholars (that have exerted influence in the past 20 years in Brazil). However, as previously underlined (see page 127), Rodrigues is not only part of the statistically most relevant authors of Brazil’s IR based on their use at RBPI and at CINT, but he is also the youngest of the sample without any occupation other than Academia. Besides, he is one of the most cited authors among the current (Oct 2017) most cited articles at RBPI and CINT based on the h5 methodology provided by Scielo.

Tables 38 and 39: Most Cited Articles at CINT and at RBPI, respectively (h5 Methodology; Oct 2017)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cit</th>
<th>Year of Public</th>
<th>Leading Author</th>
<th>Co-Author</th>
<th>Title</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5 8</td>
<td>2013</td>
<td>Milani, C.R.L,</td>
<td>Pinheiro, L</td>
<td>Brazilian foreign policy: challenges to its characterization as a public policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 4</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>Pimenta de Faria, CA</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>Itamaraty and Brazilian foreign policy: from isolation to the search for coordination amongst governmental actors and cooperation with societal actors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 1</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>Rodrigues, T.</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>Drug-trafficking and militarization in the Americas: the addiction to war</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 4</td>
<td>2013</td>
<td>Fuccile, A.</td>
<td>Rezende, L.P.</td>
<td>South American regional security complex: a new perspective</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 9</td>
<td>2013</td>
<td>Legler, T.</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>Post-hegemonic regionalism and sovereignty in Latin America: optimists, skeptics, and an emerging research agenda</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cit</th>
<th>Year of Public</th>
<th>Leading Author</th>
<th>Co-Author</th>
<th>Title</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6 7</td>
<td>2014</td>
<td>Cervo, A.L.</td>
<td>Lessa, A.C.</td>
<td>The fall: the international insertion of Brazil (2011-2014)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 3</td>
<td>2013</td>
<td>Salomón, M.</td>
<td>Pinheiro, L</td>
<td>Foreign Policy Analysis and Brazilian Foreign Policy: evolution, challenges and possibilities of an academic field</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 4</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>Viola, E.</td>
<td>Franchini, M.; Ribeiro, T.</td>
<td>Climate governance in an international system under conservative hegemony: the role of major powers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 4</td>
<td>2014</td>
<td>Abdur, A.E.</td>
<td>Souza Neto, D. M.</td>
<td>Brazil and the cooperation in defense: building a regional identity in the South Atlantic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 6</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>Scheno ni, L.</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>Rise and hegemony: some observations on emerging powers from a South American perspective</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 0</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>Cesar, S. E.M.</td>
<td>Sato, Eiti</td>
<td>Doha Round, changes in the international trade regime, and the Brazilian commercial policy</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The first figure shows CINT’s most-cited articles, the second, RBPI’s. It is visible that, unlike throughout the most used sample, there are more co-authorships than articles with only one single author in this rank. Hence, we may deduct that the more authors a paper has, the largest the extent of the network it reaches, hence the higher number of citations. Also, in both samples, articles that discuss matters related to Brazil, especially if they were published in English, concentrate the citations, reinforcing our previous finding in which we realized that the more a Brazilian scholar publishes about Brazil in English, the more will it be accessed.

Rodrigues’ contribution is single-authored, has been published in Portuguese, and is not about Brazil. Plus, the average year of publication in this rank is 2013. The more recent the article, the more citations it gets. Besides, Rodrigues is the most cited article from 2012 that does not follow the pattern of having been published in English, in co-authorship, or about Brazil. Rodrigues’ exceptions highlight his current social capital in IR, as well as his potential to become part of Brazil’s top-of-mind scholars in the ongoing twenty years following 2011-2014, when the TRIP Survey was conducted (Maliniak et al 2014).

Table 40: Most Statistically Relevant Authors by Citation (h5 Methodology) – CINT and RBPI Combined (Oct 2017)
Itamaraty and Brazilian foreign policy: from isolation to the search for coordination amongst governmental actors and cooperation with societal actors

Climate governance in an international system under conservative hegemony: the role of major powers

Drug-trafficking and militarization in the Americas: the addiction to war

Brazil and the cooperation in defense: building a regional identity in the South Atlantic

Rise and hegemony: some observations on emerging powers from a South American perspective

South American regional security complex: a new perspective

Doha Round, changes in the international trade regime, and the Brazilian commercial policy

Five generations of peace operations: from the “thin blue line” to “painting a country blue”

Post-hegemonic regionalism and sovereignty in Latin America: optimists, skeptics, and an emerging research agenda

The G-77, BASIC, and global climate governance: a new era in multilateral environmental negotiations

The Brazilian position on forests and climate change from 1997 to 2012: from veto to proposition

Sources: Scielo > RBPI > Site Usage Reports > Publishing Analytics > By Document; Scielo > CINT > Site Usage Reports > Publishing Analytics > By Document.

Also, it is highly likely that Rodrigues was indirectly cited in Kristensen’s interviews at least once.

IRI PUC-Rio’s young scholar:

But trying to understanding this perspective, or this Brazilian perspective we are using an outside lens. We are not trying to create a Brazilian theoretical tool to understand this. We are definitely using Bourdieu and Foucault and Nye’s soft power, you know. People are not trying to create a Brazilian, definitely not. Sometimes I see people say ‘oh, we need to do this, a theory is always a tool to dominate someone and when we are using the outside tools we are getting somehow dominated’ (Kristensen 2015: 535-536)

Interviewer: ‘But who is saying that? (Idem)’

IRI PUC-Rio’s young scholar: ‘At UFF a lot of guys’(Ibid).

Interviewer: ‘But not here? (Op cit)’

IRI PUC-Rio’s young scholar:
In PUC definitely not, because these guys are, well, they are really in contact with the outside. I mean, Rob Walker is giving classes here, and Guzzini, Onuf and Anna Leander. So, yeah, I mean you can’t say that the outside is exploiting you when you are paying those guys to be here to. And I don’t know if sometimes people arguing this they sometimes they are just jealous, they want to be here working with Rob Walker and maybe Guzzini and all these really good theorists and say ‘oh, no, they are just dominating us and I don’t like them’ but really I wish I was there working with those guys (Op cit).

I cannot be 100% certain Rodrigues is among the UFF ‘guys’ the young scholar cites, but his work certainly criticizes Western IR, even though Rodrigues is frequently attending their events and his post-structuralist perspective is significantly more in tune with IRI PUC-Rio’s post-colonial tendency than with nationalistic currents. Either way, Rodrigues is the only scholar at UFF’s IR who researches IRT, even though INEST’s (Institute for Strategic Studies, Fluminense National University – UFF) research agenda in general is strongly pervaded by nationalist ideas, especially in light of their civil-military mandate.

Therefore, it is possible to deduct that Rodrigues’ agonistic turn tends to become part of a Brazilian contribution to IRT. Although some of it might be compatible with Brazil’s rationalism in exile, it is sharply, and intrinsically critical of any Platonist rationalism, and shall hence be factored out of this rationalism in exile, hinting, however, to a promising contribution made in Brazil.

National developmentalism and its philosophical framework, hereby dubbed rationalism in exile, can be tracked namely throughout Amado Luiz Cervo’s25 and José Flávio Sombra Saraiva’s26 work. So we can thoroughly grasp how a rationalism in exile

---

25 Amado Luiz Cervo studied History at the University of Strasbourg’s undergrad program (1964-1967), beginning his MPhil right away, in 1968, in the same university, also in the field of History-the same is true about his PhD, except he finished his MPhil in 1968, and his PhD, in 1970. According to his profile at CNPq’s database Currículo Lattes, the title of his MPhil Thesis is ‘Europe and the Incas, a contribution to the comparative history of techniques’ [L’Europe et les Incas: contribution à l’histoire comparée des techniques], supervised by Prof. George Livet on a French government fellowship. Also under a French government fellowship, François Chatillon advised Cervo’s PhD which had the title of ‘In the service of God, and in the service of Your Majesty: the Spanish justification for the conquest of America’ [Service de Dieu et Service de sa Majesté: la justification espagnole de la conquête de l’Amérique]. Still judging by the existence of a Wikipedia biographical page, it is possible to support that François Chatillon (1904-1994) had significant social capital. Cervo’s supervisor founded and directed the Revue du Moyen Âge Latin [the Journal of the Latin Middle Ages].

26 Antonio Carlos Lessa and José Flávio Sombra Saraiva’s are the only Brazilian IR scholars in the top-of-mind rank by TRIP Survey 2014 whose major was in International Relations, both of them at UnB. Sombra Saraiva’s obtained his MPhil in 1985 at El Colegio de México (COLMEX) whose title was ‘Angola-Brasil (1500-1980): un estudio de un caso en las relaciones y vinculaciones de Africa con América Latina’ [Angola-Brazil (1500-1980): a case study of the ties and relations of Africa and Latin America]. In 1991, he obtained his PhD from the University of Birmingham under the title of ‘Brazil’s Foreign Policy Towards (sic) Africa (1946-1985): Realpolitik and Discourse’. In Mexico, his supervisor
underlies a Brazilian contribution to IRT, I will now chronologically track this trend in these authors’ publications at RBPI and at CINT, contrasting them, when appropriate, with their own sources, and with their own work. But first let us better explore Said’s notion of exile.

Rationalism in Exile: a Brazilian Contribution to the Theory of International Relations

Acharya’s and Bilgin’s idea that Global IR/Non-Western Theory theoretical endeavors should be rid of exceptionalism is controversial, besides contradictory to Said’s conceptualization of exile, the core of the contrapuntal reading enterprise recovered by Bilgin (2016) and Chowdry (2007). I believe what Acharya and Bilgin sought to avoid was a paradigm-shift, in Kuhn’s (1977) terms, or the inclusion of one paradigm in the mainstream debate at the expense of all others-the authors do not necessarily mean local, national, and regional contributions to IRT should be rid of exceptionalism, given the latter is far from extrinsic from the former.

Having allowed myself gradually to assume the professional “voice of an American academic as a way of submerging my difficult and unassimilable past, I began to think and write contrapuntally, using the disparate halves of my experience, as an Arab and as an American, to work with and also against each other. This tendency began to take shape after 1967, and though it was difficult, it was also exciting. What prompted the initial change in my sense of self, and of the language I was using, was the realization that in accommodating to the exigencies of life in the U.S. melting-pot, I had willy-nilly to accept the principle of annulment (…) (Said 2000: 812-813)

Said offers a direct citation of Adorno to explain such a principle:

For this a special rubric has been invented. It is called “background” and appears on the questionnaire as an appendix, after sex, age and profession. To complete its violation, life is dragged along on the triumphal automobile of the united statisticians, and even the past is no longer safe from the present, whose remembrance of it consigns it a second time to oblivion (Adorno Apud Said 2000: 813).

The bi-national author explains how he ignited the flame of his background:

The net result in terms of my writing has been to attempt a greater transparency, to free myself from academic jargon, and not to hide behind

was Maria Federico Real de Azua, and, in the UK, his supervisor was Paulo Fernando Faria. Professor Paulo Fernando Farias is Honorary Professor at the University of Birmingham, and, in July 2017, was included among the 66 leading minds of the world by The British Academy. According to the University of Birmingham, Professor Farias works in the Department of African Studies and Anthropology, and his research investigates epigraphic sources for the medieval history of West Africa-he has developed innovative approaches to the inquiry of West African oral traditions and to the 17th century Timbuktu Chronicles. There is no online register of Maria Federico Real Azua, except for a PhD Dissertation quoting her supervision to Saraiva’s PhD without providing a source, besides Saraiva’s own Lattes.
euphemism and circumlocution where difficult issues have been concerned. I have given the name “worldliness” to this voice, by which I do not mean the jaded savoir-faire of the man about town, but rather a knowing and unafraid attitude toward exploring the world we live in (Said 2000: 817).

A contrapuntal reading would then world International Relations, to paraphrase both Said (Idem) and Ling (2014). Worlding IR would mean to better ground it, to better contextualize it, to turn the background music up.

In practical terms, ‘contrapuntal reading’ as I have called it means reading a text with an understanding of what is involved when an author shows, for instance, that a colonial sugar plantation is seen as important to the process of maintaining a particular style of life in England . . . the point is that contrapuntal reading must take account of both processes, that of imperialism and that of resistance to it, which can be done by extending our reading of the texts to include what was once forcibly excluded (Said 1993:51).

Operative words being ‘resistance’, ‘forcibly’, ‘excluded’. A contrapuntal reading would unquestionably provide a narrative of exile: ‘failing into the encompassing and thumping language of national pride, collective sentiments, group passions’ would be irresistible’ (Said 2000: 286). In the case of a Brazilian contribution to IRT, a contrapuntal reading tells the story of macro-political and micro-social realities that have contextualized the institutional birth of the field of International Relations in Brazil’s Higher Ed system.

National developmentalist was consciously conceived in resistance to two international ideologies, Liberalism, and Marxism, national developmentalism was designed in the 1950s, in a context of macro-political, as well as of micro-social exile from mainstream IR. Hence, social sciences’ national developmentalism has influenced Brazilian IR providing it with background.

Unsuspectingly, I followed Said’s steps, and I now stand on his shoulders acknowledging that I ‘allowed myself gradually to assume the professional “voice of an American academic as a way of submerging my difficult and unassimilable past’ (Said 2000: 812-813). My background did not offer methodological me tools to simultaneously produce research that offered a plausible discussion of a Brazilian contribution to Global IR/Non-Western Theory, but the engagement with Global IR’s/Non-Western Theory’s second generation relatively annulled my angst, detaching my doubts from my research through a qualitative methodology concocted with a new sociology of science.

It is important to realize that in the case of Jaguaribe, the statistically most relevant source for Brazil’s IR, exile is not simply a metaphor. Jaguaribe was indeed in exile,
as we mentioned previously. Besides, in the macro-political sphere, severely polarized in the country exactly when he was most active during the 1950s and the early 1960s, his national developmentalist ideas were increasingly led into a metaphorical exile the closer we got to the regime change in March 1964, when actual exile began. It is not hard to understand then how fitting it is to modify the noun that philosophically describes national developmentalism in IR through Said’s notion of exile, hence ‘rationalism in exile’.

Now, we will engage in a thorough investigation of how Cervo’s publications conform a paradigm of rationalism in exile. We have affirmed that rationalism in exile would not interact with a sovereignty-non-intervention duality. Instead, it would rely on a dependence-autonomy dualism. This lexicon is significantly related to the influence of national developmentalism, namely through the work of Jaguaribe.

The main idea underlying Cervo’s publications is that IRT does not suffice to investigate the case of Brazil. Also, IRT is a product of Western countries’ hegemonic intentions. His publications hereby analyzed date back to 1983, 1985, 1995, 2003, and 2008. The more recent the publication, the more Cervo denounces IRT. In the 1980s and in the 1990s, the author tended to acknowledge their insufficient capacity to deal with the country’s reality. In the 21st century, he directly approaches certain theories in particular, and IRT general.

Cervo (1983) sheds light on his article’s general goal, which would be to find ‘a Brazilian version of doctrines on the spot light back then [in the 1800s]’ (Idem: 104). Unlike the behavior of ‘the European powers’ who had institutionalized ‘the doctrine of intervention, in several summits succeeding the Vienna Congress’, Brazil would sustain a neutralist thought (Ibid). His second publication at RBPI dates back to 1985, and discusses the Brazilian Foreign Policy toward territorial borders in the 19th century. This is the first article in which he includes an abstract. This time, Cervo (1985) seeks to explain why ‘the issue of borders, per se, did not mobilize the political agenda of the statesmen who declared the country’s independence’ (1985: 49).
hand, the achievement of territorial integrity, José Bonifácio’s greatest triumph, that relied on monarchy, adopted for this exact purpose (Idem: 52).

See how, a lot similar to Angelou’s poem in the beginning of this chapter, there is a tendency to convey triumph. Cervo refrains from publishing at RBPI from 1985 until 1995, when he dedicates his time to produce, for instance, the first edition of a book (1992) that would be re-edited at least four times, until present days (2017). Cervo’s and Bueno’s (2002) ‘History of Brazil’s Foreign Policy’ is a robust research of primary sources. The authors then apply Cervo’s rationale to make sense of the data. In 1995, at RBPI, he publishes an article about multiculturalism and foreign policy. He claims that the relationship between these two has been frequently explored through the impact in the decision-making process of certain ethnical groups exiled in a country, and ‘[A]lthough Brazil is one of the most ethnically plural societies in the world, this hypothesis has not been particularly prolific in the study of our case (Cervo 1995: 133).’ His hypothesis is that the construction of a Brazilian identity based on ethnic and cultural pluralism, on a form of symbiosis, has entailed principles, values, and patterns of conduct that have been incorporated into the country’s foreign policy, establishing its historical background [see Conclusion for a debate about the notion of background] (Idem).

It is possible to notice how Cervo shifts from his then swift debate of international theories to frankly target IRT in the twenty-first century:

Every theory involves a viewpoint from within international relations, because it carries values, designs, and national interests. Hence, a foreign theory can be considered epistemologically inadequate to explain another country’s international relations, and, even more so, when it informs the other country’s decision-making process, it can be politically destructive. (…) In IR, knowledge is a capability, a useful instrument. For critical minds, it plays a preventive role before external threats as long as decision-makers draw their inspirations from introspective formulates that stem from national interest or national cultures (Cervo 2003: 5).

In Brazil, theories integrate the syllabi of IR studies on the undergrad and on the post-grad levels, hence playing an important role for the construction of the country’s way of thinking and intelligence. They also inform a decision-making process, like Celso Amorim, Brazil’s Minister of External Affairs and a former Professor of IRT at IREL UnB, argues: those who do not know theory is not granted with an intuition counselor to the decision (Cervo 2008: 9).

In 2008, not only does denounce IRT, but he also raises awareness for the imperative to produce national and regional rationales.

Intellectual distrust invades the field of IRT with an ethical mandate. The roots that sustain the theories connect them to particular interests of particular societies that are, in turn, these theories’ loci of observation. These roots also connect these theories to values these societies nurture, and to patterns of conduct they elevate as ideal. While they promote these particularities, they
As Kristensen interprets out of his interviews, exceptionalism plays no small part in Cervo’s literature neither.

In my interviews with Brazilian scholars, the conceptualization of the insertion project was often built on an exceptionalist discourse (Kristensen 2015: 571). Brazil’s uniqueness is construed in opposition to “old powers” that use violence (Idem: 573). The “convivência das diferenças culturais” and tolerance are construed as distinctly “Brazilian concepts” different from American and British theories (represented by “clash of civilizations”) (Ibid: 574).

As we have realized from Said’s notion of nationalism and exile, it is not hard to understand the roots of this exceptionalism. Moreover, when Cervo, and Kristensen’s interviewees highlight Brazil’s exceptionalism in relation to an idea about one ‘other’:

To see a poet in exile—as opposed to reading the poetry of exile—is to see exile’s antinomies embodied and endured with a unique intensity. (…) These and so many other exiled poets and writers lend dignity to a condition legislated to deny dignity-to deny an identity to people. All nationalisms in their early stages develop from a condition of estrangement. All nationalisms in their early stages develop from a condition of estrangement (Said 1984: 281-285).

Restless, turbulent, unceasingly various, energetic, unsettling, resistant, and absorptive, New York today is what Paris was a hundred years ago, the capital of our time. It may seem paradoxical and even willful to add that the city’s centrality is due to its eccentricity and the peculiar mix of its attributes, but I think that that is so. This is not always a positive or comforting thing, and for a resident who is connected to neither the corporate nor the real estate nor the media world, New York’s strange status as a city unlike all others is often a troubling aspect of daily life, since marginality, and the solitude of the outsider, can frequently overcome one’s sense of habitually being in it (Said 2000: 8).

The macro-political stigmatization of scholars who assume a national developmentalist approach has been frequent in Brazil’s political scenario. Marginalization, solitude, exile would then tend to characterize these scholars status quo throughout Brazil’s recent history. Moreover, the country’s marginalization in international politics, especially in comparison with Western countries, is yet another factor that provides Brazilian IR scholars with a sense of exile, especially among those who study Brazil’s international insertion. Hence the Carmen Miranda syndrome.

The micro-social exile of Brazil’s IR is also reinforced when we grapple with what type of knowledge is deemed valid – and this is significantly more accurate and exclusory when we are talking about the discipline and its communication structures throughout the twentieth century. At first, Brazilian IR’s exceptionalist approach would then result from the macro-political, as well as the micro-social exile of the country’s scholars who study the country itself.
As we could see in Cervo, there tends to be an extension of geopolitical considerations into IRT. Hence, producing national and regional knowledge would represent buckling up the country’s and the region’s capabilities. In here, we can already picture a rationalist perspective. As Turton reminds us, rationalism can be defined as ‘formal and informal applications of rational choice theory’ (Turton 2016:73). By suggesting that IRT is capability, and Brazil must invest in its own nationally and regionally, Cervo definitely hints a rational choice in which he intends to foster IR ideas based on Brazil to maximize the country’s goals. Cervo condemnns Western IRT for disguising the geopolitical agenda of their theories through alleged universal claims, while promoting knowledge, although more honest, not at all devoid of the same logic that would have motivated Western scholars to develop their own theories. It is evident then that Cervo does not engage in post-positivist paradigms, nor in a reflective approach.

Unlike Tickner and Kristensen assume, a Coxian drive would not underlie Cervo’s thought. He would acknowledge theory is produced for someone with a certain aim, but he would not break apart from the same enterprise, yet committing to a more honest perspective in which he fully discloses the range of this thought. This is again rather appropriate for a rationalism in exile. It is no coincidence that in New York exiles maintain, and even amplify their national identities, even by constituting rather hostile neighborhoods to frequent unless you are one of the ‘us’. Exiles tend to draw lines in the sand, which, especially in New York, tend to be as allegorical as metaphorical, an attempt to find comfort and safety in a reproduction of otherness where they are the subject.

It is interesting to find in Cervo’s lexicon the use of the idea of ‘roots’ that support theoretical enterprises, but that connect them ‘to values these societies nurture, and to patterns of conduct they elevate as ideal’, meanwhile discarding ‘other societies’ interests values, and patterns of conduct’. The rational choice underlying Cervo’s investigations of Brazilian ‘paradigms’ and ‘concepts’ would then significantly rely on his perception of the country’s IR as one in exile.

Some Brazilian scholars have promoted the development of “Brazilian concepts”, mainly the so-called “Brasília School” of “international insertion”, to counter US theories (Cervo 2008; Bernal-Meza 2009; Saraiva 2009c). As this paper demonstrates, however, these theoretical and conceptual debates have gone largely unnoticed in mainstream IR discourse (Kristensen 2015: 213).

Rationalism is distinct from positivism, since it relies on “philosophical assumptions regarding the rationality of actors in the international system” (Wight 2002: 38). In his
publications, Cervo is constantly searching for the rationality of the Brazilian State, hence Kristensen’s and Tickner’s (2008) misperception that Brazilian IR aims at advising Itamaraty and other decision-makers. Cervo does so by looking for patterns and regularities in the country’s behavior in its international insertion.

‘The prevalence of the neutralist thought’ in Brazil’s foreign policy would have undergone three phases: (i) 1849-1850, ‘marked by an unwavering defense of neutrality’; (ii) 1851-1856, ‘manifest through facts, and even through a treaty with Uruguay establishing the principle of non-intervention in each other’s domestic issues, a singular case in all of Brazil’s diplomatic history’; (iii) 1857-1860, ‘when the contradictions of this political thought are polarized to the point of synthesis, a compromise in between common sense and harmony’ (Cervo 1983: 104). Neutrality, argues Cervo, would be a legacy of the Monroe doctrine, as well as an adaptation of its regional range to the Plata Bay area (Idem).

Back in the beginning of the 1980s until the 1990s, Cervo was less engaged with the Theory of International Relations, as well as less self-conscious with the use of the notion of theorization:

Friendship, compromise, cooperation, trade without politics, politics without trade, a passive posture in light of domestic turmoil, dictatorships, expansionist intentions or acts, neutrality, non-interference or direct/indirect involvement of the Armed Forces, ousting unfavorable administrations, ‘civilizational’ expeditions? This range of ideas and, consequently, of possible actions is rather complex. Hence the need to theorize about the chaos. An analysis of the literature and of the facts will sustain the positive prospects of such an enterprise (Ibid).

The author then engages in a classificatory effort of each of said three phases. The underlying rationale of the classification would be

a dialectic outcome in two levels: the structural, and the chronological. In terms of the latter, the successive prevalence of a neutrality thought, followed by the emergence of an interventionist thought, then by a period of ‘limited neutralism’, to use the expression the Viscount of Rio Branco coined. On the structural level, a perennial struggle among its essential contradictions have caused affirmation, rejection, and synthesis (Op cit).

Cervo (1985) also commits himself to a theorization, one that he dubs a processual theorization that, in turn, likewise the 1983 article entails the recognition of different phases—in this case, four (Idem: 49-50). In 1995, at RBPI, he publishes an article about multiculturalism and foreign policy. He claims that the relationship between these two has been frequently explored through the impact in the decision-making process of certain ethnical groups exiled in a country, and ‘[A]lthough Brazil is one of the most
ethnically plural societies in the world, this hypothesis has not been particularly prolific in the study of our case (Cervo 1995: 133).’ His hypothesis is that

the construction of a Brazilian identity based on ethnic and cultural pluralism, on a form of symbiosis, has entailed principles, values, and patterns of conduct that have been incorporated into the country’s foreign policy, establishing its historical background [see Conclusion for a debate about the notion of background] (Idem).

He considers ‘four categories of data’ relevant for the inquiry of the subject: ‘the ethnic and cultural plurality that has historically constituted the Brazilian population’; ‘the analysis of the connections between ethnic groups and Brazil’s foreign policy’; ‘the intellectuals, and the State’, through ‘the construction of a plural cultural identity through social theories from the late 19th century until the 1960s’; and ‘the development of the country’s diplomatic thought based on the traditional approach to the country’s pluralist cultural identity’ (Ibid).

In this publication, Cervo raises his awareness in regard to a grounded scholarly debate, which coincides with the moment when Brazil had welcomed back from their PhDs scholars who would affiliate to the institutionalization of IR, and hence are still among the first generation of Brazilian IR scholars. Aside from primary sources, Cervo makes reference to Sombra Saraiva’s publications, to his own, to one of Moniz Bandeira, which is among our sample of the most used authors, and another of Renato Ortiz., all of them published in the 1990s, except his own book about Brazil’s Foreign Policy-Parliament relations (1981).

In a few paragraphs we will come back to some of the issues that emerge through these direct citations, such as the protagonist role of the notion of national identity. At this point, it is still curious to keep on exploring his shift toward hesitance in explicitly forging theories based on Brazil’s reality. In 2003, we can already observe this shift:

These considerations prove the imperative of a country’s development of its own theories based on theoretical constructions that are epistemologically adequate and sociologically useful. Latin America has its own. There are two versions of the Latin American thought applied to international relations: the one that thinkers focused on the regional reality of international relations produce, and the one that has been elaborated inside the cabinets of policymakers and that have been historically exercised (Cervo 2003: 5-6).

(…) The paradigmatic analysis that we advance in our recent inquiries over Brazil’s and Latin America’s international relations has been a method through which instrumental concepts have been created based upon empirical observations that yield a set of concepts which leads to a theory (Idem).

Realize that whereas in the 1980s and 1990s Cervo did not problematize the notion of designing theories, in the twenty-first century, he changes the lexicon reaching out to the notion of paradigm and of concept to translate his enterprise. Kristensen has
already caught our attention to how Brazilian scholars based in UnB prefer to think of their engagement as a ‘thought’ not as a theory ‘yet’ (Kristensen 2015: 547). In Kristensen’s interview, a senior scholar explains that he would not dub theory Brazil’s ideas, but ‘thought’ out of scientific rigidity (Idem). However, to be scientifically rigid, there is no scientific rigidity to the idea of ‘thought’. Horta (2017) explains this hesitance:

The normativity Cervo criticizes in the theories of long range – a critique that drives the entire enterprise of the author – is not absent from his own work. He simply exchanged the nationality of the normativity (Idem: 169).

Normativity is indeed inevitable in any form of rationalism. However, I believe the most relevant issue here is that of long-range theories. I believe that, whenever Cervo discards the creation of theories, he is actually discarding the geographical universality advocated by rationalist Western IRT.

It has been argued that a dividing line has emerged in Brazilian IR between a “conformist” approach to American IR, using theories like liberalism or realism without questioning them, and a “replacement” approach criticizing these theories and advocating the development of local, national, regional or “Southern” rooted concepts and narratives (Jatobá 2013:41). Conformists stress the pervasive influence of Euro-American thought in Brazil. (…)The conformist view of this scholar is simultaneously related to the universality of theory: “It’s difficult you know because, well the influence, Western influence is so much that what can you do? You can bring in contributions from social science in general to international relations, but you, my view actually is that any of these fields should be universal, you know. Why not? It’s not possible to have theories apply to one type of society[…]it’s universal. Theory construction is something that transcends, how you say, transcends national barriers.”

Since Cervo believes national identity is the pillar of any IR theory, and that national identities imply societal values, interests, and patterns of conduct, all, he assumes, flourishing on a national scale, geographical universalism would be a fallacy. Otherwise, when it comes to the ahistorical conception of universalism, Cervo tends to agree with Kuhn’s notion of normal science and of paradigm-shift:

The set of concepts, interconnected among each other and with the field of IR was presented in the book International Insertion. This set is similar to a theory, as it works to explain and to confer value. It differs from theory since it restricts its range to the international relations of only one country (Cervo 2008: 13)

We add to the study of IR the Brazilian contribution, essential in light of its cognitive merits, and legitimate for its ethical aims. We are not concerned with the elaboration of yet another theory, but we do not reject the idea that a set of concepts can be compared to a theory because it exercises identical roles (Idem: 14).

Finally, the paradigmatic analysis generates two types of results. From a paradigmatic analysis, on the one hand, one expects a cognitive effect, since the paradigm organizes the subject, that is, in turn, always complex, diffuse, disorganized, when we are observing human behavior-the paradigm offers the subject an organic intelligibility (Cervo 2003: 7).
The production of a paradigmatic concept presupposes a long duration, because the paradigm tends to yield more visible results in the long run, and should not be inconsistently applied to circumstantial analyses, unless in hindsight, since these short-term circumstances might then generate cognitive and operational relationships with the paradigm (Idem).

Thus, in the scope of the philosophy of science, it is possible to refer to Cervo’s intellectual efforts as intended short-range and in mid-range theorizations in terms of geographical range. Universality, however, is no stranger to Cervo’s work when we view it through Kuhn’s perspective about normal science and paradigm-shift. Indeed, we find universality in Cervo’s understanding of the State’s ontology, deemed an actor that inevitably makes rational choices. The sources of motivation for the State’s choices, as well as the goals the State seeks by maximizing its gains are the elements of Cervo’s rationalism are what allows us to perform a contrapuntal reading. In them, there is the similarity between Brazilian IR’s theoretical efforts and those from the West, the philosophical affiliation to rationalism. But also in them we find the differences that dub it rationalism in exile. The roots of these differences result from Cervo’s affiliation to national developmentalism, namely through references to Hélio Jaguaribe.

In Cervo, the State is not a black box. The State, in its international insertion, is a product of its relationship with the civil society. Cervo (1983) believes the Parliament and the Council of State, to the extent that he believes one of the determining variables for the country’s adoption of neutrality was Congressman Limpo de Abreu’s advocacy, one that aimed at avoiding Brazil’s interventionism in the Plata Bay region: ‘Limpo is, hence, the actual theorist of [Brazil’s] neutrality (…)’ (Cervo 1983: 106).

Cervo’s explicit treatment of the question of national interest had not yet appeared, but the sources to his research, and the role he assigns to journalists, intellectuals, congressmen, besides those who traditionally represent a State’s interest abroad indicate an approach to rationalism that differs from the realist or the liberal. Cervo offers substantial importance for the civil society in his perspective about the State’s international behavior: ‘[O]ther circumstances contributed for a late awareness among Brazil’s public opinion regarding the urging question of the country’s territorial borders (Cervo 1985: 52)’.

In Cervo’s article about the role of culture, more specifically of multiculturalism, in Brazil’s foreign policy is also revealing. Cervo believes that to come up with a better rationale of how multiculturalism affects foreign policy, namely in the case of Brazil, it
is essential to observe, once again, the interaction between the ethnical groups and the State, when he insists in the relevance of the public opinion to Brazil’s behavior in the international arena, also taking into account the relationship between intellectuals and the State, not to mention Itamaraty itself.

By exploring what he calls paradigms and concepts, Cervo (2003; 2008) establishes those who would constitute the State’s national interest, which would hence shift according to those agents’ interpretation:

the intellectuals who think of the nation, of its destiny, of its place in the world;
the intellectuals who think of Brazil’s foreign policy, and those who are diplomats; the academic circles and the centers of scientific inquiry that methodically analyze the connections between the domestic and the international (Cervo 2008; 14).

These would perennially determine the State’s national interest. The content of the national interest, however, would not be perennial. It would depend not only on the level of consensus it gathers, but also upon each class prevails in a certain period of time. This is how Cervo (2003) explains the changes in Brazilian Foreign Policy from what he calls the liberal-conservative paradigm, to the developmentalist paradigm, to the normal/neoliberal paradigm, to the logistical-State paradigm.

This perspective is inherently based on national developmentalism. National developmentalism viewed the social sphere as the essential determinant for the State’s behavior. The social sphere would be influenced by the political, as well as the economic. These would create the conditions for a social class and its interests to rise or to plummet. These conditions would be the level of development, measured not only through economic indexes, but also through social transformations.

Yet, no matter which social class prevails, the State’s ontological goal would be to maintain its autonomy through development. In times when certain social classes would tend to behave in a more subservient manner in relation to other societies’ national interests, they would still seek to develop, as well as to allow for the country’s autonomy, if only in certain economic sectors they deem relevant. Their understanding of development might include the introduction of international competitiveness, but this would be regulated by the State on a case-specific basis.

When we examine the rationalism in exile through its ontological interpretation of the State, we are automatically dragged into a national developmentalist approach to social sciences. Trying to interpret Brazil’s exceptionalism through other viewpoints would lead one to an analysis that is clearly an attempt to bring Brazil's behavior into
the logics of IRT, but that fails to do so by not grasping its similarities and its differences in regard to the Western IRT. When Kristensen tries to read Brazil’s notion of international insertion through these eyes, he ends up with a rather coherent analysis for a foreign analyst who wishes to understand the country. However, when Kristensen places Brazilian IR’s exceptionalist perspectives on the scholar’s identity with the West, but through the lenses of the South, he falls short of a few matters. Firstly, it buys into a wide-spread notion among Brazilians that we are indeed Westerns. This falls into how the country has historically approached racism. There are several ways to name skin color, all of them avoiding the black and white divide, in a desperate and racist attempt to avoid being black. Being Western means being white, suffice it to include in Kristensen’s interviews questions about Bolívia’s or Haiti’s status. If Latin America is Western, they should also be Western.

Brazil’s uniqueness lies in “mestizaging” differences, another professor contends. This Brazilian exceptionalism—located in its special inclination for miscegenation and multiethnic/racial coexistence—can be traced back to Gilberto Freyre’s ideas on Lusotropicalism (for an elaboration of Brazilian exceptionalism, see Lafer 2000:209) (Kristensen 2015: 574).

As this scholar later argues, “this is the Brasilia school, this is the Brazilian perspective.” A colleague at the University of Brasilia supplements with one of the classic examples of Brazilian tolerance: the peaceful coexistence of Jews and Muslims in São Paulo: “I mean there is no reason to be against anyone. That’s why in terms of being a place where, it’s not because Brazil is better than anyone, it’s sort of a historical accident for some, in this situation, what we can say we are very lucky. I mean we are not involved, we don’t have any difference. Can you imagine, in São Paulo there is a street and this street is shared by Arabic and Jewish and it is very common they become friends with each other, they are merchants, they trade, they most of them are textile merchants and sometimes they go have lunch together and they are Jewish and Arabics” (Idem).

It is understandable, and absolutely reasonable, that Kristensen distinguishes Brazil’s IR from theoretical efforts in India and in China, where pre-colonial cultures influence the way scholars are engaging in the IRT Non-Western Theory/Global IR debate. We are again faced with Lima’s (2015) misconception that Gilberto Freyre’s racial democracy has pervaded Brazil’s social sciences alongside with Buarque de Hollanda’s concept of patrimonialism.

Translated into IR terms, Brazil’s contribution is not a pure indigenous civilization like China or India but its civilizational mixing: “Brazil is not China, you cannot go all the way back, I think only China and the Middle East can go that back and Greece and Rome[...]But based more on the experience of having been a colony and so on post-colonialism and being a peripheric actor and principles of sovereignty, non-interference that Brazil really prizes because of its characteristic as being a melting pot and a you know place of tolerance and no racism.” As a senior scholar argued in an interview, Brazil’s contribution is that it is “A new mutant made up of Indians, people who came
from Africa as slaves, people who came from all parts of the world but under the regency of Portuguese culture and democracy. You know, I think that the fact that this is a result of amalgam is part. I think, of the attraction that Brazil, of the soft power of Brazil.” Brazilian exceptionalism is alive and well—but so are its critics (Kristensen 2015: 574-575).

In Brazilian IR, as one can observe through Cervo, there is no consensus over a harmonic society. Social classes would be in a constant struggle to define the country’s national interests. During the nineteenth century up until 1930, Cervo provides that

Brazilian liberal-conservative people monopolized the interpretation of national interest, evoking a simplistic concept of society that would be fundamentally composed of two classes: the land owners and the power owners, the rest would not matter, no matter who they were: slaves, former slaves, workers, immigrants (Cervo 2003: 10).

From 1930 until 1989, a new social scenario entailed a different interpretation of the national interest:

critics of dependence and underdevelopment, as well as the demands of a rising urban middle class, of workers who demanded income and employment, an emerging national bourgeoisie claiming business opportunities, the military seeking modernization, intellectuals and politicians (Idem: 11-12).

In 1990, a social class who Cervo criticizes as subservient to neoliberalism would have once again re-interpreted national interest, a phase that lasted until early 2000s, when the social class empowered enough to establish its interpretation of the national interest was diverse and mature, which Cervo understands, as we have explored, as a stage of an advanced organization of the civil society.

Exceptionality is intrinsic to a rationalism in exile, but, since exile is never static, it entails insecurity, flow, change, to derive a Brazilian contribution to IRT from a collective misperception that is indeed frequently repeated at Itamaraty’s discourses, and even in our own scholarship is to narrow down our conception of theory to storytelling, without examining the underlying philosophical reflections.

Cervo rarely discusses the international system itself. Thus, we can compare this rationalism in exile to realism’s stage in Morgenthau’s contribution. While Morgenthau’s contribution is known as classical realism, and it derives its perspectives about the international system from the States’ behavior, we can definitely, yet with caution, extrapolate Cervo’s understanding of the State’s ontology into a perspective about the international system. Here is where the alleged benevolence of Brazilian Foreign Policy is unveiled.
Under a rationalism in exile, a State’s ultimate goal would be to guarantee its autonomy: instead of bucking up its own monopoly of the use of force in relation to other States’ military capacity, an exercise of diplomacy through which all States could find a minimum common denominator that would allow all others to share prosperity in the form of development measured not only in economic, but also in social terms. Inequality in the international structure would result from political and economic misbehavior that cause social imbalances, including war. States like Brazil, would carry a social responsibility to ignite change, its presence would be welcome as it is intended to bridge divides. The level of commitment to such responsibility would vary according to which social niche is interpreting the national interest at a given time. Under this paradigm of rationalism in exile, to maximize gains means to succeed in forging consensus, in creating an environment where the inevitable clashes, controversies, struggles do not interfere with the States’ autonomy. Methodologically, rationalism in exile would be primarily interpretivist. This is actually a powerful interface with Western IR. Turton (2016:81) shows that the methodological orientation of 12 of the most prominent international journals in Western IR is 77% qualitative, and 23% quantitative.

Each article from the 12 journals being investigated from 1999 to 2009 was analyzed in order to determine the methodology used. If the authors made overtly clear, the article’s methodology through self-identification, then this was noted accordingly. The self-categorization of academics gave rise to the different categories used. In other words, all the different methodologies captured emerged from the authors themselves. If the authors did not make his or her methodology explicit, each article was read carefully using critical discourse analysis in order to uncover the methodology used, which was then noted. (…) Regarding the use of mixed methods if an article employed two distinct methodologies such as statistical analysis and interviews, for example, the ‘dominant’ method was noted. In other words, the method that produced the primary insights was accounted for (Idem: 80).

The 12 journals were International Organizations, International Studies, International Studies Review, International Studies Perspective, World Politics, European Journal of International Relations, Conflict and Cooperation, Journal of International Relations and Development, International Relations, Review of International Studies, American Journal of International Affairs, and International Relations of the Asia-Pacific. Interpretivism, the most used methodology, represents 42% of all articles, meaning that for the most part authors published in these journals use interpretive judgements and inductive reasoning [investigation of a hypothesis] in order to provide explanations and understandings of phenomena (Blakie 2004: 509-511). The method refers to the understanding and interpreting of
texts, documents, events, in a subjective manner, which relates to the subjective nature of the artifacts being interpreted (Ibid: 83).

Cervo’s affiliation to an interpretivist approach can be tracked throughout all of his publications in question. Cervo (1983) investigates the following categories of primary sources that are more appropriate to our endeavor: political speeches (in Parliament), technical reports (from the State Council), and the diplomatic act (from the Cabinet). In these places, a more complex elaboration of the national political thought was developed or resonated (Idem: 103).

Based on these he provides an understanding of ‘Brazilian doctrines on the spotlight’ during the nineteenth century, explaining the country’s behavior through references to Pandiá Calógeras’ historiography and to the primary sources he outlined (Ibid: 103, 117).

In his second publication at RBPI, Cervo sought to explain why Brazilian territorial borders did not mobilize the country’s political agenda after Brazil’s independence in 1822 (Cervo 1985: 49). Cervo thusly describes his methodology:

It is evident that, in each phase of the process [of the negotiation of territorial borders’ treaties], a certain type of document is produced. Combined with parliamentary documents, and with news from the press, these are the primary sources for this research. (…) (Idem: 50)

This article does not intend to retrace the history of the territorial borders. Instead, it focuses on one of historiography’s shortcomings, a political interpretation of the issue. What were the political patterns and regularities that hovered over the list of facts described through traditional analyses (Ibid)?

On his next publication, Cervo (1995) draws to an inductive reasoning, by establishing the insufficiency of the traditional approach to tackle the relationship between multiculturalism and foreign policy to deal with the Brazilian reality. He then investigates another hypothesis:

the constitution of Brazil’s national identity was based on a ethnically and culturally plural bulwark through a symbiosis that generated principles, values, and patterns of conduct that have been incorporated into the country’s foreign policy, creating its historical background (Idem: 133).

In his article about the behavior of Brazil’s social classes and its impact over the interpretation of the national interest, Cervo (2003) indicates that he interprets data from the country’s history of international relations to underline patterns and regularities related to the country’s history of international relations itself:

History is the locus of observation, the laboratory of the experiences which we investigate. Since our method entails the observation of the phenomenon, We collect historical experiences, from the year of the country’s formal independence until present days, on three different levels: the diplomatic, the political, and the international (Idem: 7).
His hypothesis is that there are two versions of a Latin American thought applied to international relations, that of the intellectuals, and that of the decision-makers, and both would have been applied throughout history (Ibid: 6).

Cervo’s discussion over concepts in International Relations, in turn, inquiry the hypothesis that, in Brazil, the country’s, as well as South America’s experiences constitute the sources for conceptualizations that explain and qualify phenomena, but that, unlike theories, have a short-range or a mid-range ambition, hence providing a more accurate and honest contribution to the field (Cervo 2008: 8-9; 13; 21).

Based on Whitley’s (2000) approach to theory-making, it is finally possible to acknowledge that a Brazilian contribution to IRT based on a rationalism in exile is based on a theory-directed explanatory research, since it focuses on understanding why phenomena behave the way they do. To avoid using the word ‘explaining’ to tackle one’s own efforts to understand phenomena is to mistake the enterprise of explanation for positivist methodologies that aim at finding universal, geographic and temporal, causal relations. Through an interpretivist methodology, it is possible to engage in successful theory-making, and Cervo’s seminal rationale translated into rationalism in exile, since replicable, is definitely a promising Brazilian contribution to IRT.

Having wrapped up our content analysis, we will now briefly conclude this Dissertation by contextualizing rationalism in exile, the major finding of this research, in the author’s macro-political, as well as in her micro-social context, so it is possible for the reader to come out of this reading with a sociological context of the work.

**Conclusion: A Contrapuntal Reading**

Before summoning scholars under the second generation of Global IR/Non-Western Theory to engage in a contrapuntal reading, Bilgin (2008) invites us to think past Western IR. She does so, as we have explored, by emphasizing the need to look into the familiar, not only into the different, to observe the ‘almost the same but not quite – to use Bhabha’s turn of phrase (Idem: 6).’ Several contributions have attempted to verbalize this same but not quiet tradition developed in Latin America’s IR.
This Dissertation thought past the Latin American Hybrid (LAH) to investigate a Brazilian contribution to International Relations Theory (IRT). Through a qualitative methodology that applied a content-analysis to inquire bibliometric data from RBPI and CINT, while triangulating these findings with those provided by the TRIP Survey 2014 and Kristensen’s (2015) interviews with Brazilian scholars where he searched for a Brazilian contribution to IRT, this research debated a new sociology of science on its reflexive and interactionist approaches. Ideas of social capital (scientific and temporal), and of the interaction between the macro-political and the micro-social spheres have pervaded the entire enterprise. Finally, a Brazilian contribution to IRT, inspired by the second generation of the Global IR/Non-Western theory debate, discussed the philosophy of science underlying the triangulation’s findings providing the final result of this research which is that there indeed is a Brazilian contribution to IRT, and it is not a hybrid, but what we have hereby dubbed rationalism in exile.

This Dissertation committed itself to falsifying the following two hypotheses:

(i) up until the 1980s, IR sub-fields of diplomatic history and international political economy would be central to a Brazilian contribution to the Theory of International Relations.
(ii) thenceforth the 1990s, reflections upon the country's foreign policy based on thoughts previously produced at ISEB, as well as on a post-positivist approach to international politics are central to a Brazilian contribution to the Theory of International Relations.

Firstly, we found that Brazilian IR does not necessarily compartmentalize sub-fields in a rigid manner. The key underlying issue is Brazil, more frequently the country’s foreign policy and security, which is sustained from a content-analysis of RBPI and CINT, as well as of the content to which the countries post-grad programs commit, besides on the data provided by the TRIP Survey 2014.

We have also realized that the idea that until the 1980s IR relied on diplomatic history and on IPE to produce knowledge is a result of a misperception about the content explored in the work of those who grapple with diplomatic history, as well as of an academic urban legend. When authors affirm IPE influenced Brazil’s IR up until the 1980s, they are not referring to national developmentalism, but to dependency theory. We have thorough evidence that this is not the case, and that dependency theory has actually never even entered IR’s most representative communications structure: its
major journals. We have seen how the social capital of certain authors have influenced this misperception.

Furthermore, by analyzing Cervo’s so-called access to diplomatic history, we have found that he does not debate diplomatic history. He actually tends to cite only one author of this current, Pandiá Calógeras. What Cervo, the statistically most relevant author to IR in Brazil, does is to investigate Brazil’s behavior in the country’s international insertion searching for patterns and regularities. By doing so, he ends up establishing a debate mainly with Hélio Jaguaribe, the author who represents one pillar of the constitutive tripod of the idea of national developmentalism, what we can refer to as a paradigm for all Humanities in Brazil.

If we wish to place national developmentalism as an IPE current, then, yes, a Brazilian contribution to IRT is rooted in IPE, which would be coherent with the content analysis of the country’s post-grad programs, as well as with the content of the publications of the most used author at RBPI, Paulo Roberto de Almeida. Nonetheless, placing national developmentalism under IPE is missing the point where even when political economy is at stake, particularly through Furtado’s work, the social variable is the one that is central. Plus, national developmentalism is not pure developmentalism.

The ‘national’ part is not intended only to convey said developmentalism as a Brazilian contribution. In this case, national, as an adjective, really modifies the noun, developmentalism. The ‘national’ highlights in Furtado’s developmentalism what Darcy Ribeiro and Hélio Jaguaribe were producing, a project of nation-building that placed the social sphere above the political and the economic. Social determinants would be necessary variables for any event, for any change. Politics and economics would determine the social configuration. Combined, always in some arrangement within the paradigm of national developmentalism, the three variables would suffice to explain any type of change, or any behavior of the Brazilian State.

National developmentalism is hence a paradigm for Brazil’s humanities – especially social sciences, political science, and IR. It has established the shoulders upon which these fields’ local, national, and regional contributions based in Brazil would stand. We have seen how it is verified in the case of IR, namely through inquiries over RBPI’s and CINT’s authorships, as well as citations. We have also investigated how it influenced Cervo’s – and consequently Saraiva’s - engagement with the theory of international relations.
Hence, and aiming at falsifying the second hypothesis, since 1958, we find a deep influence of national developmentalism at RBPI. Even during the civil-military regime’s years of peaking repression (1964-1979), references to national development prevailed upon the Brazilian State behavior in international relations, even though scholars had no space to theorize on the pages of RBPI. After the 1979 amnesty, scholars quickly returned to the publication’s pages, and so did reflections upon patterns and regularities of Brazil’s insertion. These reflections offer prolific sources into how Brazilian IR can be brought into the debates of mainstream IRT. This enterprise has been particularly easy, since, unlike what the second hypothesis supposed, post-positivism did not prevail. Neither did positivism. We discussed the differences between positivism and rationalism. This allowed us to figure out a Brazilian contribution to IRT based on conversations about the philosophy of science. The most statistically relevant authors to the country’s IR are Amado Luiz Cervo and José Flávio Sombra Saraiva, whose most statistically relevant sources are the works of Hélio Jaguaribe and of Maria Regina Soares de Lima. This is one of the reasons it would make little sense to talk about different schools within Brazil. Cervo and Saraiva would not be a Brasília School, but a Brazilian School. This Brazilian School, against all odds of academic politics and resource scarcity, does debate Rio de Janeiro’s scholars (Jaguaribe and Lima) – except that these are not based at IRI PUC-Rio, but at the former IUPERJ, the current IESP, one that is actually an institutional product of two intellectuals involved with IBESP and ISEB, Jaguaribe himself, and Cândido Mendes.

Macro-politically and micro-socially, national developmentalism is in the roots of a Brazilian contribution to IRT. A philosophical conversation allowed us to extract from Cervo’s and his colleague Saraiva’s work how a Brazilian paradigm to IRT is organized.

We have realized when scholars united realism, and the liberalism in hybrids to explain Latin America’s IR, even though they are not philosophically compatible between each other, let alone with the third strand scholars included in the hybrid - structuralism or dependency theory -, they were attempting to make sense of the region’s thought through a contractualist lexicon that is not quite the same especially in Brazil. The affiliation to the national developmentalist paradigm to Brazil’s humanities entailed a different conception of IR’s constitutive ontologies.
The formation of Brazilian concepts applied to international relations adds, in sum, in the Brazilian school, four components in its production: the author’s reflection, a social construction – of thinkers, diplomats and academics –, a historical aspect that aggregates consistency, and, no less important, a positive value that they transmit to the reader and the decision-maker (Saraiva 2009b: 32).

In this Dissertation we have grounded Saraiva’s hints toward a Brazilian contribution to IRT. We have provided that interpretivist methodologies do include subjectivities (‘the author’s reflections’), as well as data extracted from history (‘a historical aspect that aggregates consistency’). We have realized how rationalism in exile stems from a broader paradigm for Brazil’s humanities, national developmentalism, that was indeed forged by ‘thinkers, diplomats, and academics’, and we have established that under the efforts of Global IR exceptionalism might be inevitable, but can definitely be mitigated through an honest presentation of the theorization’s range (‘a positive value that they transmit to the reader and the decision-maker’). Besides, we have seen how rationalism is what connects Brazil’s IR to the Western tradition, and that normativity is one of its corollaries, what, alongside with the national developmentalist investment in the scholar’s social responsibility, leads to normativity, ‘a positive value that they transmit’.

Ontologically, rationalism in exile conceives the State’s main goal, instead of survival, autonomy. Instead of understanding material and ideational capabilities in a realist or liberal sense, Brazilian IR envisages capability as development. These, not a security dilemma, would be the means through which autonomy could be guaranteed. Development, measured not only in economic terms, but especially through social variables, would be key for a State to guarantee its autonomy.

One can easily understand why this has prevailed, and not sovereignty. For Latin Americans, sovereignty has never been a reality. In colonial times, this is rather obvious, but even after the countries’ independence sovereignty has always been a hypocrisy. Latin Americans have constantly been the targets of international interventions. To theorize about it means to theorize about what has never existed. Autonomy, on the other hand, has been the constant horizon toward which Latin American countries have navigated.

Moreover, it made little sense to think of capabilities as, for instance, military triumph, suffice it to acknowledge that in 1812 the United States had already defeated the all-powerful British navy, and in 1824 had already established a doctrine under which the
Americas would be a matter for DC to decide. However, the less developed the country, the more dependent it is upon not only the USA, but of all of the Western nations, and this would create a cycle that delegitimized the State’s capacity to negotiate and forge consensus toward the solution of international crises, controversies, struggles, war, that would end up compromising the nation’s development, and, consequently, its autonomy, rendering it dependent.

For Brazilian IR, States do make a rational calculation, and this rational calculation would be based on the autonomy-dependence duality, and not on the Westphalian sovereignty-non-intervention dualism. Brazil’s Big Bang Theory would not refer to the West’s Big Bang Theory (1648), but to the country’s own history, one that is common to several other Latin American nations, but also to other Non-Western Nations. Whether these are designing contributions to IRT inspired on pre-colonial heritage or on post-independence legacy is highly contingent, depending upon the relationship those societies have nurtured with their past, with what this past represents for their national identity.

By observing that Brazilian scholars did portray the State as a rational actor, it is natural that scholars, mainly those who do not read fluently in Portuguese, associated the country’s production of knowledge with realism and with liberalism, both rationalists. Nonetheless, if, on the one hand, rationalism is what makes Brazilian IR similar to Western IR, this rationalism construed in the country’s IR carries different perspectives that result from the country’s and the scholars’ position of exile, in Said’s terms. This rationalism in exile would consequently resonate nationalism, particularly since it does not wish to disguise its findings in a geographical universalism.

By seeking to understand why phenomena work the way they do, a rationalist in exile produces theory-directed explanatory research, through an interpretivist methodology that actually prevails throughout IR’s most prominent international journals.

I believe that this finding does contemplate this Dissertation’s aims, as it represents the result of a thorough triangulation that has been debated through a new sociology of science culminating in a philosophical conversation about the triangulation’s findings. It fulfills the aim of the second generation of Global IR/Non-Western IR by combining empirically-oriented methodology with conceptual-normative reflections, providing a contrapuntal reading that highlights both the difference and the similarity. This contrapuntal reading is exactly what entails us to assume chapter four has provided a new historiography of IR, in general, and of Brazilian IR in particular.
To wrap up this Dissertation, I intend to provide the reader with a contextualization of this research, what is only fair provided that I made substantial use of a reflexivist sociology of science.

*Full Disclosure: Contextualizing ‘my’ Rationalism in Exile*

I mentioned before, introducing chapter 4, that I had single-handedly organized a petition against a lecture Fernando Henrique Cardoso was to give in the context of LASA’s 2016 Annual Conference in New York. I did not mention that he was scheduled to talk about democracy in Latin America, alongside with Chile’s former President Ricardo Lagos. In the context of the petition, I negotiated with LASA’s program chair, Amy Chazkel (CUNY), a shift in the program. Instead of being scheduled to talk about ‘Fifty Years of Latin American Democracy: The Challenges of Politics, Scholarship, and History’, they changed the title to ‘Fifty years of Latin American Public Life: The Challenges of Politics, Scholarship, and History’.

In my view, it is absolutely obvious that he could talk about whatever he wanted, I simply could not stand by and watch an association of scholars who were among the most targeted population by the civil-military regime offer legitimacy for a politician who was not only supporting a grey-area impeachment process, but who is honor president of the party who had lost the free elections, and who had sponsored, as well as impetrated the impeachment request. Cardoso was also constantly in the first page of all major traditional media outlets speaking against the legitimacy of a government that had received the popular mandate to carry on with policies that were the exact opposite of everything Cardoso’s party and its allies in office intended to enforce, and actually ended up enforcing. I had to speak up. *Revista Época*, one of Brazil’s major weekly publications, part of the Globo Group, called out my petition ‘Tropical McCarthyism’, without naming me personally, the author of the op-ed thusly painted me:

> By observing Cardoso’s not-modest-at-all biography LASA sought to invite him for a debate with his friend Ricardo Lagos. The invitation was enough for a group of Brazilian scholars, apparently led by a PhD candidate in International Relations at the University of Brasilia, to launch an embarrassing campaign appealing to the association’s board to “des-invite” our former President. (…) (Macarthismo tropical, epoca.globo.com)
(...) The grotesque situation obligated Professor Simon Schwartzman to draw a counter-petition aimed at LASA’s president requesting him to sustain the invitation to Cardoso (Idem).

I have explored this episode in two book chapters, and I have spoken about it whenever requested. I will not get into many details, it suffices to underline that I did not find it appropriate for an Association based in Pittsburgh, USA, to sustain an invitation for him to speak about democracy when he was actually flirting with a rather grey area of our democratic institutions. When LASA changed the title, I called it mission accomplished. However, it was not easy at all to have my name crushed in the most traditional media in the country. I was portrayed as a public enemy (FH cancela palestra em Nova York após protestos de intelectuais, oglobo.globo.com; Repúdio a ‘golpe’ faz FHC cancelar debate, politica.estadao.com.br; Sob ameaça de protesto, FHC cancela participação em evento em NY, folha.uol.com.br).

While, among historians, social scientists, several political scientists and law experts, including former ministers of justice, and prominent human rights lawyers, among others, I am still respected for risking my career to speak up for our sovereignty, especially since we were experiencing a fragile context, in Brazil’s field of International Relations I received scarce support from colleagues who held temporal capital. Among the top-of-mind scholars the TRIP Survey listed, only one, Professor Letícia Pinheiro, who had been my Professor at IRI PUC-Rio in 2008, signed the petition.

It is true that they did not sign the counter-petition neither. It is also true that I received support from several early career scholars who signed the petition or even opted not to sign it, some did not even agree with it, but offered me support, and so did American colleagues at the International Studies Association (ISA). Obviously, in the third year of my PhD (2016), those who did not sign it, and who hold significant temporal capital, were the ones to whom I paid more attention.

Insecurity does not begin to describe it. Fear certainly does, and when President Dilma Rousseff was impeached I developed a serious condition the very next day, had to go to surgery, and still have not recovered 100%, doctors cannot predict whether I will recover. If I became afraid of my peers, who are enlightened enough to deal with diverging political positions, I was infinitely more terrified of what was going on in my personal life.

I was in exile. In Brazilian Academia, I was the PhD candidate who was too activist for someone who had not yet been tenured. In Brazil’s society in general, and in my social
circle in particular, I was the PhD candidate who had picked a battle with the
gatekeeper of common sense, and, worse, won the battle followed by a
condescending letter from the former President to the press explaining his absence
from the conference in an absolutely patronizing treatment of my initiative, while using
the fact that he had lost his job at USP after AI5 as a legitimization of his alleged
democratic ontology. I stood no chance. Only one personal friend actually stayed with
me throughout the entire process. My white, middle class social environment exiled
me.
Meanwhile, the new government adopted a constitutional amendment capping
investments in Education for the upcoming 20 years in a symbolic day, December 13th,
anniversary of the AI5. The other shoe had dropped. I was now also hampered from
attending international conferences. How could I make science in the twenty-first
century if I did not have access to data bases, like the Web of Science, which the new
government stopped paying the same month it assumed the Presidency, or to
international dialogue?
My research wished to take Brazilian IR scholarship away from exile, and yet I was
myself experiencing several forms of exile in my own home. I am a firm believer all we
do is to a certain extent self-biographical. I could never deny the macro-political
context of my Dissertation, neither its impact to my investment in engaging in a
sociologically interactionist and reflexive framework. To abstract IR’s micro-social
sphere from the macro-political sounded clearly misleading. This is how I ended up
phrasing Brazilian IR’s rationalism as one in exile, instead of a peripheral one.
I had planned to include Bilgin’s (2016), and Chowdry’s (2007) notion of contrapuntal
reading in my last chapter, exploring the narrative in my conclusion, since the latter
had to expose my findings. Said’s reflections upon exile, the very philosophical source
of the contrapuntal reading, had slipped my mind. When I wrote chapter five, I realized
Brazilian IR was in exile for several reasons.
To my surprise, when I was composing this conclusion, I decided to read Edward
Said’s ‘Criticism and Exile’, and I found yet another reason I had thought of rationalism
in exile to epitomize Brazilian IR’s national developmentalism. I had already written
this on my ‘Acknowledgements’, but Said actually writes that ‘New York today is what
Paris was a hundred years ago’:

Written over a period of roughly thirty-five years, these essays constitute some
of the intellectual results of teaching and studying in one academic institution,
Columbia University in New York. I arrived there fresh from graduate school in

294
the fall of 1963 and, as of this writing, I am still there as a professor in the Department of English and Comparative Literature. Aside from this abbreviated testimonial to my deep satisfaction for such a long time in the place—the American university generally being for its academic staff and many of its students the last remaining utopia—it is the fact of New York that plays an important role in the kind of criticism and interpretation which I have done, and of which this book is a kind of record. Restless, turbulent, unceasingly various, energetic, unsettling, resistant, and absorptive, New York today is what Paris was a hundred years ago, the capital of our time. It may seem paradoxical and even willful to add that the city’s centrality is due to its eccentricity and the peculiar mix of its attributes, but I think that that is so. This is not always a positive or comforting thing, and for a resident who is connected to neither the corporate nor the real estate nor the media world, New York’s strange status as a city unlike all others is often a troubling aspect of daily life, since marginality, and the solitude of the outsider, can frequently overcome one’s sense of habitually being in it (Said 2000: 8).

The friend who had stayed with me throughout all those turbulent times is exactly the one who works in Manhattan’s finances, aka Wall St. Every year, before attending ISA’s annual conventions, always held in the USA or in Canada27, I spend at least a month in Manhattan, usually longer. I found it to be extremely inspiring to be in New York City for part of my year, when I attended several workshops, seminars, symposiums, and lectures at Columbia University. I also managed to get a hold of several classes’ syllabi, and bought all books I could afford-and carry back to Brazil. What I felt in New York City was precisely what Said describes: marginality, solitude, the clear-cut perception that I was an outsider and, here I devise from Said, exactly for this reason as insider as you get to be.

From these immigrant communities came a great deal of the city’s identity as a center of radical political and artistic life as embodied in the socialist and anarchist movements, the Harlem renaissance (so well documented recently by Ann Douglas in Terrible Honesty), and various pioneers and innovators in painting, photography, music, drama, dance, and sculpture. That set of urban expatriate narratives has over time acquired an almost canonical status, as have the various museums, schools, universities, concert halls, opera houses, theaters, galleries, and dance companies that have earned New York its considerable status as a sort of permanent theatrical showplace—with, over time, less and less real contact with its earlier immigrant roots (Said 2000: 9)

This conclusion gets spookier by the minute, since I have actually been listening to Lou Reed’s ‘Walk on the Wild Side’ from the moment I decided to finally deliver it28.

---

27 In Baltimore (2017), we managed to change the ISA’s charter in the chapter that required all annual conferences to be held in the USA or in Canada, although there are a few criteria that make it almost impossible to hold it anywhere else apart from Western Europe.

28 “We were just anarchists,” John Cale said of the Velvets. “But we were anarchists with heart. We really felt that we were doing this with a certain altruistic, non-malevolent spirit.” And despite all their fatalism, the fear and loathing that runs through their music, you can feel that heart in their recordings, that sense that Reed and the band were trying to connect, to share something important, for them and for us. Lou Reed wasn’t trying to be popular. He wasn’t trying to be liked. He was trying to tell the truth (Boeder 2015). (…)
Being in New York City allows you to see yourself in other people. You get to picture their otherness in relation to so many subjects—who, in turn, are also, more frequently than not, others.

Nevertheless, and despite the all-pervading power and scope of these large historical movements, there has been great resistance to them, whether in the strident choruses of “let’s go back to the great books of OUR culture,” or in the appalling racism that gives tiresome evidence of itself in attacks on non-European cultures, traditions, and peoples as somehow unworthy of serious attention or consideration (Said 2000: 12-13).

New York, the melting pot whose ingredients never meddle, is currently the best place on earth to materialize in words (almost) any thought you entertain. After experimenting life in Manhattan, you can definitely fend for yourself verbally widely more successfully than ever, and this increases exponentially.

In one of my stays in Manhattan, I had the chance to escort Brazil’s former Minister of External Relations, then our Ambassador for the United Nations, in a few events at Columbia University, and in Washington DC’s Brookings Institute. I had also the chance to exchange with him perspectives about what he thought was different in Brazil’s way of doing IR (and international politics). He could not actually put his finger on it, I ended up aiding him, for instance, in an interview for BBC Brasil when the reporter asked what Brazil would add to the Security Council if it does not hold material capabilities (the BBC journalist, João Fellet, phrased the latter a bit differently, but I cannot recall it perfectly).

After his request, I replied for the Ambassador underscoring Brazil’s role as a norm entrepreneur through a singular capacity to yield consensus still respecting the multilaterally agreed rules. The current chief of staff of the Ministry was among the Ambassador’s delegation, and he quickly approached me to discuss Brazil’s IR, and still keeps up with my publications and social media interactions. I have found these opportunities fruitful not to explore inside information and write about it for the media, but to observe to which extent Brazil’s IR literature is actually a simple continuation of the Ministry’s deeds and words.

As I have discussed throughout this Dissertation, it is definitely not, especially after 1997, when Capes started its assessment and evaluation of the country’s academic publications-Qualis Capes. But even before, except for the censorship period from

(…) Lou Reed was a platoon leader in ROTC at Syracuse University. He was eventually expelled from the program for holding an unloaded gun to his superior’s head (Idem).
1964 until 1979, the national developmentalist paradigm was explored in a scholarly way particularly through Brazil’s most traditional IR academic journal, RBPI. Being an exile in my own home, and choosing to spend part of my years in another type of exile have tuned me to Said’s contrapuntal reading, what Bilgin (2016) and Chowdry (2007) deem a promising methodology for Global IR/Non-Western Theory.

I have also already debated the idea of contrapuntal reading as a methodology, and, instead, I believe it is, in Global IR/Non-Western Theory, both an aspiration and an unavoidable result of a different exercise of stock-taking which enriches the Western narrative of the Theory of International Relations. In this sense, every attempt to provide contrapuntal readings would inevitably assume a marginal role that Said compares to exile. Global IR exists in response to a mainstream trend that has rendered other currents moot. Non-Western Theory is clearly an opposition, a contrast, a recognition of its own peripheral role.

I spent most part of my Dissertation with the seemingly most complete tool box for which a researcher could ask. The triangulation of three different sources of whether there is a Brazilian contribution to IR gave me infinite opportunities to explore how national developmentalism had actually become Brazil’s IR most relevant paradigm, in light of its authors’ statistical relevance in terms of use, citation, and social capital. It was hence possible to figure out that, while the mainstream developed realism, and liberalism in inter-paradigmatic debates that also discussed with empiricists, Brazilian IR conformed a paradigm that is as rationalist as Liberalism or Realism, but whose rationalism is based on national developmentalism, not on any contractualism. As a result, to study the philosophy of science of Brazil’s IR is to explore how this rationalism in exile systematizes its ontologies, ones that define the limitations to methodology, as well as to research agendas stemming from it.

A Wrap Up

This Dissertation was intended to provide a starting point. It does not wish to answer all questions. On the contrary, it wishes to start a conversation through which Brazilian scholars could engage in the mainstream debate of IRT without losing their intellectual identity.

The first and urgent contribution entailed by this Dissertation is to broaden its sample, including, first of all, the work of José Flávio Sombra Saraiva, and then of other
authors, and perhaps finding other Brazilian contributions to IRT – and hopefully further refining this rationalism in exile.

The second urgent corollary of this research is to introduce emerging approaches that, through a bibliometric analysis, always tend to be left out. This is the case of Rodrigues’ agonistic turn, as the author has even become part of the ISA’s annual conventions’ core theorists, taking part in round tables with other consecrated theorists, such as Ole Wæver, Amitav Acharya, Lilly Ling, Pinar Bilgin, Arlene Tickner, among others.

The reader will also definitely find several points he or she disagrees, and this is one of the main reasons I tried to provide methodological explanations for each decision I made, so the reader could easily criticize it, stand on its shoulders, and produce an even better contribution. Additionally, I am aware I could have included other bibliographic references, such as Schwartz’ ‘Ideias fora do lugar’ ['Misplaced Ideas'], which would have helped me explaining why Western rationalism does not apply to Brazil’s rationalism in exile. However, my attempt to stick to Brazilian IR’s literature as much as I could, an enterprise to which I committed myself when I affiliated to Global IR, tied my hands. It does not mean I will not do it later, neither that the reader should not.

I carry no intentions to exhaust this debate. The more discussions the reader might raise, the better, since it is then more likely other scholars feel persuaded to debate them, to bring Brazilian IR into IR’s mainstream. Academic debate is the essence of scholarship, and I am a firm believer ‘in the green light, the orgastic future that year by year recedes before us. It eluded us then, but that’s no matter – tomorrow we will run faster, stretch out our arms farther. . . And one fine morning –

So we beat on, boats against the current, borne back ceaselessly into the past (Fitzgerald 1925: 17).’

References


Angelou, Maya (1978) *Still I Rise*. Available at: https://www.poets.org/poetsorg/poem/still-i-rise


Ato No 1, Suspende Direitos Políticos. Available at: http://www.acervoditadura.rs.gov.br/legislacao_10.htm


CCS – Missão e Objetivos. Available at: http://www.puc-rio.br/sobrepuc/admin/ccs/missao.html


Conheça as atividades e leia a Iniciativa África do Instituto Lula, institutolula.org Available at: http://www.institutolula.org/conheca-as-atividades-e-leia-o-relatorio-da-iniciativa-africa-do-instituto-lula


Deciancio, Melisa. (2016) História da construção del campo de las Relaciones Internacionales en la Argentina. Dissertation submitted to the PhD Program in Social Sciences at FLACSO-Argentina when the author obtained her PhD supervised by Diana Tussie.


Featuring New RPIB’s Editorial Board Members > Instituto Brasileiro de Relações Internacionais, ibri-rbpi.org Available at: http://www.ibri-rbpi.org/?p=15572

FGV > CPDOC > Verbete > Celso Lafer, fgv.br/cpdoc Available at: http://www.fgv.br/cpdoc/acervo/dicionarios/verbete-biografico/lafer-celso


Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, The United Nations, The Western Hemisphere, Volume II. Available at: https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1951v02/pg_1191


George Bush Presidential Library > Inventory for FOIA Request 2013-1222-S, Available at: https://bush41library.tamu.edu/files/foia/2013-1222-S%20%5bGregg%20Foreign%20Travel%20Files%5d.pdf


Glossário > Partido Político, tse.jus.br Available at: http://www.tse.jus.br/eleitor/glossario/termos/partido-politico

Hélio Jaguaribe > Academia Brasileira de Letras. Available at: http://www.academia.org.br/academicos/helio-jaguaribe/biografia


História e Missão, capes.gov.br Available at: http://www.capes.gov.br/historia-e-missao


Kristensen, Peter Marcus. (2013) Revisiting the “American Social Science”- mapping the geography of International Relations. *International Studies Perspectives* 10.1111/insp.12061

Kristensen, Peter Markus. (2015) Rising Powers in the International Relations Discipline: social inquiries into a dividing discipline and the quest for Non-Western Theory. Dissertation submitted to the Department of Political Science of the University of Copenhagen when the author obtained his PhD supervised by OleWæver


Lagoa, Ana. (1986) O destino do SNI. *Lua Nova* 3(1).


LSE Impact Blog, Impact of Social Sciences > The Handbook > Chapter 3 > Key measures of academic influence, blogs.lse.ac.uk. Available at: http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/impactofsocialsciences/the-handbook/chapter-3-key-measures-of-academic-influence/#assesing


Nomination Database, nobelprize.org.

Available at: https://www.nobelprize.org/nomination/archive/show.php?id=8370


Pesquisa Avança da: Arlene Tickner > Texto: Tickner > Expedientes; Circulations of Information > Resultado da busca por: Tickner, contextointernacional.iri.puc-rio.br Available at: http://contextointernacional.iri.puc-rio.br/cgi/cgilua.exe/sys/start.htm?tpl=home

PINTEC (2014) Available at: http://www.pintec.ibge.gov.br/downloads/PUBLICACAO/PUBLICA%C3%87%C3%80%20PINTEC%20202014.pdf


Repudio a ‘golpe’ faz FHC cancelar debate, politica.estadao.com.br. Available at: https://oglobo.globo.com/brasil/fh-cancela-palestra-em-nova-york-apos-protestos-de-intelectuais-19385682


Secret-Exclusive Information for the President of the Republic, Sep 30, 1981, Brazil-USA, Interview with US Secretary of State Alexander Haig No 319 by Ramiro Saraiva Guerreiro, digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org Available at: http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/115221


Verbete, CARDOSO, Fernando Henrique, fgv.br/cpdoc. Available at: http://www.fgv.br/cpdoc/acervo/dicionarios/verbete-biografico/cardoso-fernando-henrique

Verbete Relatório Meira Mattos. Available at: http://www.fgv.br/cpdoc/acervo/dicionarios/verbete-tematico/relatorio-meira-matos


RATIONALISM IN EXILE: A BRAZILIAN CONTRIBUTION TO IR THEORY

ABSTRACT: This article thinks past the Latin American Hybrid to investigate a Brazilian contribution to International Relations Theory (IRT). Through a qualitative methodology that applied a content-analysis to inquire bibliometric data from RBPI and CINT, while triangulating these findings with those provided by the TRIP Survey 2014 and by Kristensen’s (2015) interviews with Brazilian scholars where he searched for a Brazilian contribution to IRT, this research debated a new sociology of science on its reflexive and interactionist approaches. Ideas of social capital (scientific and temporal), and of the interaction between the macro-political and the micro-social spheres of Brazilian IR have pervaded the entire enterprise. Finally, a Brazilian contribution to IRT, inspired by the second generation of the Global IR/Non-Western theory debate, discussed the philosophy of science underlying the triangulation’s findings providing the final result of this research which is that there indeed is a
Brazilian contribution to IRT, and it is not a hybrid, but what we have hereby dubbed rationalism in exile.

Keywords: Brazil; Data; Rationalism; Sociology; Theory

**Introduction**

This article intends to falsify the following two hypotheses: up until the 1980s, IR sub-fields of diplomatic history and international political economy would be central to a Brazilian contribution to the Theory of International Relations; thenceforth the 1990s, reflections upon the country's foreign policy based on thoughts previously produced at ISEB, as well as on a post-positivist approach to international politics are central to a Brazilian contribution to the Theory of International Relations. 

Firstly, we found that Brazilian IR does not necessarily compartmentalize sub-fields in a rigid manner. The key underlying issue is Brazil, more frequently the country's foreign policy and security, which is sustained from a content-analysis of RBPI and CINT, as well as of the content to which the countries post-grad programs commit, besides on the data provided by the TRIP Survey 2014.

We have also realized that the idea that until the 1980s IR relied on diplomatic history and on IPE to produce knowledge is a result of a misperception about the content explored in the work of those who grapple with diplomatic history, as well as of an academic urban legend. When authors affirm IPE influenced Brazil's IR up until the 1980s, they are not referring to national developmentalism, but to dependency theory. We have thorough evidence that this is not the case, and that dependency theory has actually never even entered IR's most representative communications structure: its major journals. We have seen how the social capital of certain authors have influenced this misperception.

Furthermore, by analyzing Cervo’s so-called access to diplomatic history, we have found that he does not debate diplomatic history. He actually tends to cite only one author of this current, Pandiá Calógeras. What Cervo, the statistically most relevant author to IR in Brazil, does is to investigate Brazil's behavior in the country’s international insertion searching for patterns and regularities. By doing so, he ends up establishing a debate mainly with Hélio Jaguaribe, the author who represents one pillar of the tripod-constitution of the idea of national developmentalism, what we can refer to as a paradigm for all Humanities in Brazil.
If we wish to place national developmentalism as an IPE current, then, yes, a Brazilian contribution to IRT is rooted in IPE, which would be coherent with the content analysis of the country’s post-grad programs, as well as with the content of the publications of the most used author at RBPI, Paulo Roberto de Almeida. Nonetheless, placing national developmentalism under IPE is missing the point where even when political economy is at stake, particularly through Furtado’s work, the social variable is the one that is central. Plus, national developmentalism is not pure developmentalism. The ‘national’ part is not intended only to convey said developmentalism as a Brazilian contribution. In this case, national, as an adjective, really modifies the noun, developmentalism. The ‘national’ highlights in Furtado’s developmentalism what Darcy Ribeiro and Hélio Jaguaribe were producing, a project of nation-building that placed the social sphere above the political and the economic. Social determinants would be necessary variables for any event, for any change. Politics and economics would determine the social configuration. Combined, always in some arrangement within the paradigm of national developmentalism, the three variables would suffice to explain any type of change, or any behavior of the Brazilian State.

National developmentalism is then a paradigm for Brazil’s humanities – especially social sciences, political science, and IR. It has established the shoulders upon which these fields’ local, national, and regional contributions based in Brazil would stand. We have seen how it is verified in the case of IR, namely through inquiries over RBPI’s and CINT’s authorships, as well as citations. We have also investigated how it influenced Cervo’s – and consequently Saraiva’s - engagement with the theory of international relations.

Hence, and aiming at falsifying the second hypothesis, since 1958, we find a deep influence of national developmentalism at RBPI. Even during the civil-military regime’s years of peaking repression (1964-1979), references to national development prevailed upon the Brazilian State behavior in international relations, even though scholars had no space to theorize on the pages of RBPI. After the 1979 amnesty, scholars quickly returned to the publication’s pages, and so did reflections upon patterns and regularities of Brazil’s insertion. These reflections offer prolific sources into how Brazilian IR can be brought into the debates of mainstream IRT.

This enterprise has been particularly easy, since, unlike what the second hypothesis supposed, post-positivism did not prevail. Neither did positivism. We discussed the differences between positivism and rationalism. This allowed us to figure out a
Brazilian contribution to IRT based on conversations about the philosophy of science. The most statistically relevant authors to the country's IR are Amado Luiz Cervo and José Flávio Sombra Saraiva, whose most statistically relevant sources are the works of Hélio Jaguaribe and of Maria Regina Soares de Lima. This is one of the reasons it would make little sense to talk about different schools within Brazil. Cervo and Saraiva would not be a Brasília School, but a Brazilian School. This Brazilian School, against all odds of academic politics and resource scarcity, does debate Rio de Janeiro's scholars (Jaguaribe and Lima) – except that these are not based at IRI PUC-Rio, but at the former IUPERJ, the current IESP, one that is actually a product of two intellectuals involved with IBESP and ISEB, Jaguaribe himself, and Cândido Mendes. Macro-politically and micro-socially, national developmentalism is in the roots of a Brazilian contribution to IRT. A philosophical conversation allowed us to extract from Cervo’s and his colleague Saraiva’s how a Brazilian paradigm to IRT is organized. We have realized when scholars united realism, and the liberalism in hybrids to explain Latin America’s IR, even though they are not philosophically compatible between each other, let alone with the third strand scholars included in the hybrid - structuralism or dependency theory -, they were attempting to make sense of the region’s thought through a contractualist lexicon that is not quite the same especially in Brazil. The affiliation to the national developmentalist paradigm to Brazil’s humanities entailed a different conception of IR’s constitutive ontologies. By seeking to understand why phenomena work the way they do, a rationalist in exile produces theory-directed explanatory research, through an interpretivist methodology that actually prevails throughout IR’s most prominent international journals. This finding contemplates this article’s general aim, as it represents the result of a thorough triangulation that has been debated through a new sociology of science culminating in a philosophical conversation about the triangulation’s findings. It fulfills the aim of the second generation of Global IR/Non-Western IR by combining empirically-oriented methodology with conceptual-normative reflections, providing a contrapuntal reading that highlights both the difference and the similarity between Brazilian and mainstream IRT. This contrapuntal reading is exactly what entails us to assume this narrative has provided a new historiography of IR, in general, and of Brazilian IR in particular.
Rationalism in Exile: a Brazilian Contribution to the Theory of International Relations

Acharya’s and Bilgin’s idea that Global IR/Non-Western Theory theoretical endeavors should be rid of exceptionalism is controversial, besides contradictory to Said’s conceptualization of exile, the core of the contrapuntal reading enterprise recovered by Bilgin (2016) and Chowdry (2007). I believe what Acharya and Bilgin sought to avoid was a paradigm-shift, in Kuhn’s (1977) terms, or the inclusion of one paradigm in the mainstream debate at the expense of all others—the authors do not necessarily mean local, national, and regional contributions to IRT should be rid of exceptionalism, given the latter is far from extrinsic from the former.

Having allowed myself gradually to assume the professional “voice of an American academic as a way of submerging my difficult and unassimilable past, I began to think and write contrapuntally, using the disparate halves of my experience, as an Arab and as an American, to work with and also against each other. This tendency began to take shape after 1967, and though it was difficult, it was also exciting. What prompted the initial change in my sense of self, and of the language I was using, was the realization that in accommodating to the exigencies of life in the U.S. melting-pot, I had willy-nilly to accept the principle of annulment (…) (Said 2000: 812-813)

Said offers a direct citation of Adorno to explain such a principle:

For this a special rubric has been invented. It is called “background” and appears on the questionnaire as an appendix, after sex, age and profession. To complete its violation, life is dragged along on the triumphal automobile of the united statisticians, and even the past is no longer safe from the present, whose remembrance of it consigns it a second time to oblivion (Adorno Apud Said 2000: 813).

The bi-national author explains how he ignited the flame of his background:

The net result in terms of my writing has been to attempt a greater transparency, to free myself from academic jargon, and not to hide behind euphemism and circumlocution where difficult issues have been concerned. I have given the name "worldliness" to this voice, by which I do not mean the jaded savoir-faire of the man about town, but rather a knowing and unafraid attitude toward exploring the world we live in (Said 2000: 817).

A contrapuntal reading would then world International Relations, to paraphrase both Said (Idem) and Ling (2014). Worlding IR would mean to better ground it, to better contextualize it, to turn the background music up.

In practical terms, ‘contrapuntal reading’ as I have called it means reading a text with an understanding of what is involved when an author shows, for instance, that a colonial sugar plantation is seen as important to the process of maintaining a particular style of life in England . . . the point is that contrapuntal reading must take account of both processes, that of imperialism and that of resistance to it, which can be done by extending our reading of the
texts to include what was once forcibly excluded (Said 1993:51).

A contrapuntal reading would unquestionably provide a narrative of exile: ‘failing into the encompassing and thumping language of national pride, collective sentiments, group passions’ would be irresistible’ (Said 2000: 286). In the case of a Brazilian contribution to IRT, a contrapuntal reading tells the story of macro-political and micro-social realities that have contextualized the institutional birth of the field of International Relations in Brazil’s Higher Ed system.

National developmentalist was consciously conceived in resistance to two international ideologies, Liberalism, and Marxism, national developmentalism was designed in the 1950s, in a context of macro-political, as well as of micro-social exile from mainstream IR. Hence, social sciences’ national developmentalism has influenced Brazilian IR providing it with background.

It is important to realize that in the case of Jaguaribe, the statistically most relevant source for Brazil’s IR, exile is not simply a metaphor. Jaguaribe was indeed in exile, as we mentioned previously. Besides, in the macro-political sphere, severely polarized in the country exactly when he was most active during the 1950s and the early 1960s, his national developmentalist ideas were increasingly led into a metaphorical exile the closer we got to the regime change in March 1964, when actual exile began. It is not hard to understand then how fitting it is to modify the noun that philosophically describes national developmentalism in IR through Said’s notion of exile, hence ‘rationalism in exile’.

Now, we will engage in a thorough investigation of how Cervo’s publications conform a paradigm of rationalism in exile. We have affirmed that rationalism in exile would not interact with a sovereignty-non-intervention duality. Instead, it would rely on a dependence-autonomy dualism. This lexicon is significantly related to the influence of national developmentalism, namely through the work of Jaguaribe.

The main idea underlying Cervo’s publications is that IRT does not suffice to investigate the case of Brazil. Also, IRT is a product of Western countries’ hegemonic intentions. His publications hereby analyzed date back to 1983, 1985, 1995, 2003, and 2008. The more recent the publication, the more Cervo denounces IRT. In the 1980s and in the 1990s, the author tended to acknowledge their insufficient capacity to deal with the country’s reality. In the 21st century, he directly approaches certain theories in particular, and IRT general.
Cervo (1983) sheds light on his article’s general goal, which would be to find ‘a Brazilian version of doctrines on the spot light back then [in the 1800s]’ (Idem: 104). Unlike the behavior of ‘the European powers’ who had institutionalized ‘the doctrine of intervention, in several summits succeeding the Vienna Congress’, Brazil would sustain a neutralist thought (Ibid). His second publication at RBPI dates back to 1985, and discusses the Brazilian Foreign Policy toward territorial borders in the 19th century. This is the first article in which he includes an abstract. This time, Cervo (1985) seeks to explain why ‘the issue of borders, per se, did not mobilize the political agenda of the statesmen who declared the country’s independence’ (1985: 49).

The idea of nationality designed in Brazil by the time of the independence is singular [if compared to the USA and to Western Europe, although he regrets he could not in that paper inquiry other Latin American cases] in terms of context and features. It has been developed based on two pillars: on the one hand, the schisms from Portugal, obtained at the cost of a decisive battle politically, and militarily-the politics of rupture-and exacerbated wish to affirm itself before the world, what entailed a policy of national recognition that undermined the historical conquest of independence, especially through a policy of concessions to European powers, namely the England; on the other hand, the achievement of territorial integrity, José Bonifácio’s greatest triumph, that relied on monarchy, adopted for this exact purpose (Idem: 52).

See how, there is a tendency to convey triumph. Cervo refrains from publishing at RBPI from 1985 until 1995, when he dedicates his time to produce, for instance, the first edition of a book (1992) that would be re-edited at least four times, until present days (2017). Cervo’s and Bueno’s (2002) ‘History of Brazil’s Foreign Policy’ is a robust research of primary sources. The authors then apply Cervo’s rationale to make sense of the data. In 1995, at RBPI, he publishes an article about multiculturalism and foreign policy. He claims that the relationship between these two has been frequently explored through the impact in the decision-making process of certain ethnical groups exiled in a country, and ‘[A]lthough Brazil is one of the most ethnically plural societies in the world, this hypothesis has not been particularly prolific in the study of our case (Cervo 1995: 133).’ His hypothesis is that the construction of a Brazilian identity based on ethnic and cultural pluralism, on a form of symbiosis, has entailed principles, values, and patterns of conduct that have been incorporated into the country’s foreign policy, establishing its historical background (Idem).

It is possible to notice how Cervo shifts from his then swift debate of international theories to frankly target IRT in the twenty-first century:
Every theory involves a viewpoint from within international relations, because it carries values, designs, and national interests. Hence, a foreign theory can be considered epistemologically inadequate to explain another country’s international relations, and, even more so, when it informs the other country’s decision-making process, it can be politically destructive. (…) In IR, knowledge is a capability, a useful instrument. For critical minds, it plays a preventive role before external threats as long as decision-makers draw their inspirations from introspective formulae that stem from national interest or national cultures (Cervo 2003: 5).

In Brazil, theories integrate the syllabi of IR studies on the undergrad and on the post-grad levels, hence playing an important role for the construction of the country’s way of thinking and intelligence. They also inform a decision-making process, like Celso Amorim, Brazil’s Minister of External Affairs and a former Professor of IRT at IREL UnB, argues: those who do not know theory is not granted with an intuition counselor to the decision (Cervo 2008: 9).

In 2008, not only does denounce IRT, but he also raises awareness for the imperative to produce national and regional rationales.

Intellectual distrust invades the field of IRT with an ethical mandate. The roots that sustain the theories connect them to particular interests of particular societies that are, in turn, these theories’ loci of observation. These roots also connect these theories to values these societies nurture, and to patterns of conduct they elevate as ideal. While they promote these particularities, they discard other societies’ interests, values, and patterns of conduct (…) (Cervo 2008: 10)

As Kristensen interprets out of his interviews, exceptionalism plays no small part in Cervo’s literature neither.

In my interviews with Brazilian scholars, the conceptualization of the insertion project was often built on an exceptionalist discourse (Kristensen 2015: 571). Brazil’s uniqueness is construed in opposition to “old powers” that use violence (Idem: 573).
The “convivência das diferenças culturais” and tolerance are construed as distinctly “Brazilian concepts” different from American and British theories (represented by “clash of civilizations”) (Ibid: 574).

As we have realized from Said’s notion of nationalism and exile, it is not hard to understand the roots of this exceptionalism. Moreover, when Cervo, and Kristensen’s interviewees highlight Brazil’s exceptionalism in relation to an idea about one ‘other’:

To see a poet in exile—as opposed to reading the poetry of exile—is to see exile’s antinomies embodied and endured with a unique intensity. (…) These and so many other exiled poets and writers lend dignity to a condition legislated to deny dignity—to deny an identity to people. All nationalisms in their early stages develop from a condition of estrangement. All nationalisms in their early stages develop from a condition of estrangement (Said 1984: 281-285).
Restless, turbulent, unceasingly various, energetic, unsettling, resistant, and absorptive, New York today is what Paris was a hundred years ago, the capital of our time. It may seem paradoxical and even willful to add that the city’s centrality is due to its eccentricity and the peculiar mix of its attributes, but I think that that is so. This is not always a positive or comforting thing, and for a resident who is connected to neither the corporate nor the real estate nor the media world, New York’s strange status as a city unlike all others is often a troubling aspect of daily life, since marginality, and the solitude of the outsider, can frequently overtake one’s sense of habitually being in it (Said 2000: 8).
The macro-political stigmatization of scholars who assume a national developmentalist approach has been frequent in Brazil’s political scenario. Marginalization, solitude, exile would then tend to characterize these scholars status quo throughout Brazil’s recent history. Moreover, the country’s marginalization in international politics, especially in comparison with Western countries, is yet another factor that provides Brazilian IR scholars with a sense of exile, especially among those who study Brazil’s *international insertion*. Hence the Carmen Miranda syndrome. The micro-social exile of Brazil’s IR is also reinforced when we grapple with what type of knowledge is deemed valid – and this is significantly more accurate and exclusory when we are talking about the discipline and its communication structures throughout the twentieth century. At first, Brazilian IR’s exceptionalist approach would then result from the macro-political, as well as the micro-social exile of the country’s scholars who study the country itself. As we could see in Cervo, there tends to be an extension of geopolitical considerations into IRT. Hence, producing national and regional knowledge would represent buckling up the country’s and the region’s capabilities. In here, we can already picture a rationalist perspective. As Turton reminds us, rationalism can be defined as ‘formal and informal applications of rational choice theory’ (Turton 2016:73). By suggesting that IRT is capability, and Brazil must invest in its own nationally and regionally, Cervo definitely hints a rational choice in which he intends to foster IR ideas based on Brazil to maximize the country’s goals. Cervo condemns Western IRT for disguising the geopolitical agenda of their theories through alleged universal claims, while promoting knowledge, although more honest, not at all devoid of the same logic that would have motivated Western scholars to develop their own theories. It is evident then that Cervo does not engage in post-positivist paradigms, nor in a reflective approach. Unlike Tickner and Kristensen assume, a Coxian drive would not underlie Cervo’s thought. He would acknowledge theory is produced for someone with a certain aim, but he would not break apart from the same enterprise, yet committing to a more honest perspective in which he fully discloses the range of this thought. It is interesting to find in Cervo’s lexicon the use of the idea of ‘roots’ that support theoretical enterprises, but that connect them ‘to values these societies nurture, and to patterns of conduct they elevate as ideal’, meanwhile discarding ‘other societies’ interests, values, and patterns of conduct’. The rational choice underlying Cervo’s
investigations of Brazilian ‘paradigms’ and ‘concepts’ would then significantly rely on his perception of the country’s IR as one in exile.

Some Brazilian scholars have promoted the development of “Brazilian concepts”, mainly the so-called “Brasília School” of “international insertion”, to counter US theories (Cervo 2008; Bernal-Meza 2009; Saraiva 2009c). As this paper demonstrates, however, these theoretical and conceptual debates have gone largely unnoticed in mainstream IR discourse (Kristensen 2015: 213).

Rationalism is distinct from positivism, since it relies on “philosophical assumptions regarding the rationality of actors in the international system” (Wight 2002: 38). In his publications, Cervo is constantly searching for the rationality of the Brazilian State, by looking for patterns and regularities in the country’s behavior in its international insertion.

‘The prevalence of the neutralist thought’ in Brazil’s foreign policy would have undergone three phases: (i) 1849-1850, ‘marked by an unwavering defense of neutrality’; (ii) 1851-1856, ‘manifest through facts, and even through a treaty with Uruguay establishing the principle of non-intervention in each other’s domestic issues, a singular case in all of Brazil’s diplomatic history’; (iii) 1857-1860, ‘when the contradictions of this political thought are polarized to the point of synthesis, a compromise in between common sense and harmony’ (Cervo 1983: 104). Neutrality, argues Cervo, would be a legacy of the Monroe doctrine, as well as an adaptation of its regional range to the Plata Bay area (Idem).

Back in the beginning of the 1980s until the 1990s, Cervo was less engaged with the Theory of International Relations, as well as less self-conscious with the use of the notion of theorization:

Friendship, compromise, cooperation, trade without politics, politics without trade, a passive posture in light of domestic turmoil, dictatorships, expansionist intentions or acts, neutrality, non-interference or direct/indirect involvement of the Armed Forces, ousting unfavorable administrations, ‘civilizational’ expeditions? This range of ideas and, consequently, of possible actions is rather complex. Hence the need to theorize about the chaos. An analysis of the literature and of the facts will sustain the positive prospects of such an enterprise (Ibid).

Cervo (1985) also commits himself to a theorization, one that he dubs a processual theorization that, in turn, likewise the 1983 article entails the recognition of different phases—this case, four (Idem: 49-50). In 1995, at RBPI, he publishes an article about multiculturalism and foreign policy. He claims that the relationship between these two has been frequently explored through the impact in the decision-making process of certain ethnical groups exiled in a country, and ‘[A]lthough Brazil is one of the most
ethnically plural societies in the world, this hypothesis has not been particularly prolific in the study of our case (Cervo 1995: 133).’ His hypothesis is that

the construction of a Brazilian identity based on ethnic and cultural pluralism, on a form of symbiosis, has entailed principles, values, and patterns of conduct that have been incorporated into the country’s foreign policy, establishing its historical background [see Conclusion for a debate about the notion of background] (Idem).

He considers ‘four categories of data’ relevant for the inquiry of the subject: ‘the ethnic and cultural plurality that has historically constituted the Brazilian population’; ‘the analysis of the connections between ethnic groups and Brazil’s foreign policy’; ‘the intellectuals, and the State’, through ‘the construction of a plural cultural identity through social theories from the late 19th century until the 1960s’; and ‘the development of the country’s diplomatic thought based on the traditional approach to the country’s pluralist cultural identity’ (Ibid).

In this publication, Cervo raises his awareness in regard to a grounded scholarly debate, which coincides with the moment when Brazil had welcomed back from their PhDs scholars who would affiliate to the institutionalization of IR, and hence are still among the first generation of Brazilian IR scholars. Aside from primary sources, Cervo makes reference to Sombra Saraiva’s publications, to his own, to one of Moniz Bandeira, which is among our sample of the most used authors, and another of Renato Ortiz., all of them published in the 1990s, except his own book about Brazil’s Foreign Policy-Parliament relations (1981).

In a few paragraphs we will come back to some of the issues that emerge through these direct citations, such as the protagonist role of the notion of national identity. At this point, it is still curious to keep on exploring his shift toward hesitance in explicitly forging theories based on Brazil’s reality. In 2003, we can already observe this shift:

These considerations prove the imperative of a country’s development of its own theories based on theoretical constructions that are epistemologically adequate and sociologically useful. Latin America has its own. There are two versions of the Latin American thought applied to international relations: the one that thinkers focused on the regional reality of international relations produce, and the one that has been elaborated inside the cabinets of policy-makers and that have been historically exercised (Cervo 2003: 5-6).

(…) The paradigmatic analysis that we advance in our recent inquiries over Brazil’s and Latin America’s international relations has been a method through which instrumental concepts have been created based upon empirical observations that yield a set of concepts which leads to a theory (Idem).

Realize that whereas in the 1980s and 1990s Cervo did not problematize the notion of designing theories, in the twenty-first century, he changes the lexicon reaching out to the notion of paradigm and of concept to translate his enterprise. Kristensen has
already caught our attention to how Brazilian scholars based in UnB prefer to think of their engagement as a ‘thought’ not as a theory ‘yet’ (Kristensen 2015: 547). In Kristensen’s interview, a senior scholar explains that he would not dub theory Brazil’s ideas, but ‘thought’ out of scientific rigidity (Idem). However, to be scientifically rigid, there is no scientific rigidity to the idea of ‘thought’. Horta (2017) explains this hesitance:

The normativity Cervo criticizes in the theories of long range – a critique that drives the entire enterprise of the author – is not absent from his own work. He simply exchanged the nationality of the normativity (Idem: 169).

Normativity is indeed inevitable in any form of rationalism. However, I believe the most relevant issue here is that of long-range theories. I believe that, whenever Cervo discards the creation of theories, he is actually discarding the geographical universality advocated by rationalist Western IRT.

It has been argued that a dividing line has emerged in Brazilian IR between a “conformist” approach to American IR, using theories like liberalism or realism without questioning them, and a “replacement” approach criticizing these theories and advocating the development of local, national, regional or “Southern” rooted concepts and narratives (Jatobá 2013:41). Conformists stress the pervasive influence of Euro-American thought in Brazil. (…)The conformist view of this scholar is simultaneously related to the universality of theory: “It’s difficult you know because, well the influence, Western influence is so much that what can you do? You can bring in contributions from social science in general to international relations, but you, my view actually is that any of these fields should be universal, you know. Why not? It’s not possible to have theories apply to one type of society[…]it’s very difficult to build national type of social science, you know, it’s universal. Theory construction is something that transcends, how you say, transcends national barriers.”

Since Cervo believes national identity is the pillar of any IR theory, and that national identities imply societal values, interests, and patterns of conduct, all, he assumes, flourishing on a national scale, geographical universalism would be a fallacy. Otherwise, when it comes to the ahistorical conception of universalism, Cervo tends to agree with Kuhn’s notion of normal science and of paradigm-shift:

The set of concepts, interconnected among each other and with the field of IR was presented in the book International Insertion. This set is similar to a theory, as it works to explain and to confer value. It differs from theory since it restricts its range to the international relations of only one country (Cervo 2008: 13)

We add to the study of IR the Brazilian contribution, essential in light of its cognitive merits, and legitimate for its ethical aims. We are not concerned with the elaboration of yet another theory, but we do not reject the idea that a set of concepts can be compared to a theory because it exercises identical roles (Idem: 14).

Finally, the paradigmatic analysis generates two types of results. From a paradigmatic analysis, on the one hand, one expects a cognitive effect, since the paradigm organizes the subject, that is, in turn, always complex, diffuse, disorganized, when we are observing human behavior-the paradigm offers the subject an organic intelligibility (Cervo 2003: 7).
The production of a paradigmatic concept presupposes a long duration, because the paradigm tends to yield more visible results in the long run, and should not be inconsistently applied to circumstantial analyses, unless in hindsight, since these short-term circumstances might then generate cognitive and operational relationships with the paradigm (Idem).

Thus, in the scope of the philosophy of science, it is possible to refer to Cervo’s intellectual efforts as intended short-range and in mid-range theorizations in terms of geographical range. Universality, however, is no stranger to Cervo’s work when we view it through Kuhn’s perspective about normal science and paradigm-shift. Indeed, we find universality in Cervo’s understanding of the State’s ontology, deemed an actor that inevitably makes rational choices. The sources of motivation for the State’s choices, as well as the goals the State seeks by maximizing its gains are the elements of Cervo’s rationalism are what allows us to perform a contrapuntal reading. In them, there is the similarity between Brazilian IR’s theoretical efforts and those from the West, the philosophical affiliation to rationalism. But also in them we find the differences that dub it rationalism in exile. The roots of these differences result from Cervo’s affiliation to national developmentalism, namely through references to Hélio Jaguaribe.

In Cervo, the State is not a black box. The State, in its international insertion, is a product of its relationship with the civil society. Cervo (1983) believes the Parliament and the Council of State, to the extent that he believes one of the determining variables for the country’s adoption of neutrality was Congressman Limpo de Abreu’s advocacy, one that aimed at avoiding Brazil’s interventionism in the Plata Bay region: ‘Limpo is, hence, the actual theorist of [Brazil’s] neutrality (…)’ (Cervo 1983: 106).

Cervo’s explicit treatment of the question of national interest had not yet appeared, but the sources to his research, and the role he assigns to journalists, intellectuals, congressmen, besides those who traditionally represent a State’s interest abroad indicate an approach to rationalism that differs from the realist or the liberal. Cervo offers substantial importance for the civil society in his perspective about the State’s international behavior: ‘[O]ther circumstances contributed for a late awareness among Brazil’s public opinion regarding the urging question of the country’s territorial borders (Cervo 1985: 52)’.

In Cervo’s article about the role of culture, more specifically of multiculturalism, in Brazil’s foreign policy is also revealing. Cervo believes that to come up with a better rationale of how multiculturalism affects foreign policy, namely in the case of Brazil, it
is of essential to observe, once again, the interaction between the ethnical groups and the State, when he insists in the relevance of the public opinion to Brazil’s behavior in the international arena, also taking into account the relationship between intellectuals and the State, not to mention Itamaraty itself.

By exploring what he calls paradigms and concepts, Cervo (2003; 2008) establishes those who would constitute the State’s national interest, which would hence shift according to those agents’ interpretation:

- the intellectuals who think of the nation, of its destiny, of its place in the world;
- the intellectuals who think of Brazil’s foreign policy, and those who are diplomats; the academic circles and the centers of scientific inquiry that methodically analyze the connections between the domestic and the international (Cervo 2008; 14).

These would perennially determine the State’s national interest. The content of the national interest, however, would not be perennial. It would depend not only on the level of consensus it gathers, but also upon each class prevails in a certain period of time. This is how Cervo (2003) explains the changes in Brazilian Foreign Policy from what he calls the liberal-conservative paradigm, to the developmentalist paradigm, to the normal/neoliberal paradigm, to the logistical-State paradigm.

This perspective is inherently based on national developmentalism. National developmentalism viewed the social sphere as the essential determinant for the State’s behavior. The social sphere would be influenced by the political, as well as the economic. These would create the conditions for a social class and its interests to rise or to plummet. These conditions would be the level of development, measured not only through economic indexes, but also through social transformations.

Yet, no matter which social class prevails, the State’s ontological goal would be to maintain its autonomy through development. In times when certain social classes would tend to behave in a more subservient manner in relation to other societies’ national interests, they would still seek to develop, as well as to allow for the country’s autonomy, if only in certain economic sectors they deem relevant. Their understanding of development might include the introduction of international competitiveness, but this would be regulated by the State in a case-specific basis.

When we examine the rationalism in exile through its ontological interpretation of the State, we are automatically dragged into a national developmentalist approach to social sciences. Trying to interpret Brazil’s exceptionalism through other viewpoints would lead one to an analysis that is clearly an attempt to bring Brazil’s behavior into
the logics of IRT, but that fails to do so by not grasping its similarities and its differences in regard to the Western IRT. When Kristensen tries to read Brazil’s notion of international insertion through these eyes, he ends up with a rather coherent analysis for a foreign analyst who wishes to understand the country.

However, when Kristensen places Brazilian IR’s exceptionalist perspectives on the scholar’s identity with the West, but through the lenses of the South, he falls short of a few matters. Firstly, it buys into a wide-spread notion among Brazilians that we are indeed Westerns. This falls into how the country has historically approached racism. There are several ways to name skin color, all of them avoiding the black and white divide, in a desperate and racist attempt to avoid being black. Being Western means being white, suffice it to include in Kristensen’s interviews questions about Bolívia’s or Haiti’s status. If Latin America is Western, they should also be Western.

Brazil’s uniqueness lies in “mestizaging” differences, another professor contends. This Brazilian exceptionalism—located in its special inclination for miscegenation and multiethnic/racial coexistence—can be traced back to Gilberto Freyre’s ideas on Lusotropicalism (for an elaboration of Brazilian exceptionalism, see Lafer 2000:209) (Kristensen 2015: 574).

It is understandable, and absolutely reasonable, that Kristensen distinguishes Brazil’s IR from theoretical efforts in India and in China, where pre-colonial cultures influence the way scholars are engaging in the IRT Non-Western Theory/Global IR debate. We are again faced with Lima’s (2015) misconception that Gilberto Freyre’s racial democracy has pervaded Brazil’s social sciences alongside with Buarque de Hollanda’s concept of patrimonialism.

In Brazilian IR, as one can observe through Cervo, there is no consensus over a harmonic society. Social classes would be in a constant struggle to define the country’s national interests. During the nineteenth century up until 1930, Cervo provides that

Brazilian liberal-conservative people monopolized the interpretation of national interest, evoking a simplistic concept of society that would be fundamentally composed of two classes: the land owners and the power owners, the rest would not matter, no matter who they were: slaves, former slaves, workers, immigrants (Cervo 2003: 10).

From 1930 until 1989, a new social scenario entailed a different interpretation of the national interest:

- critics of dependence and underdevelopment, as well as the demands of a rising urban middle class, of workers who demanded income and employment, an emerging national bourgeoisie claiming business opportunities, the military seeking modernization, intellectuals and politicians (Idem: 11-12).
In 1990, a social class who Cervo criticizes as subservient to neoliberalism would have once again re-interpreted national interest, a phase that lasted until early 2000s, when the social class empowered enough to establish its interpretation of the national interest was diverse and mature, which Cervo understands, as we have explored, as a stage of an advanced organization of the civil society.

Exceptionality is intrinsic to a rationalism in exile, but, since exile is never static, it entails insecurity, flow, change, to derive a Brazilian contribution to IRT from a collective misperception that is indeed frequently repeated at Itamaraty’s discourses, and even in our own scholarship is to narrow down our conception of theory to story-telling, without examining the underlying philosophical reflections.

Cervo rarely discusses the international system itself. Thus, we can compare this rationalism in exile to realism’s stage in Morgenthau’s contribution. While Morgenthau’s contribution is known as classical realism, and it derives its perspectives about the international system from the States’ behavior, we can definitely, yet with caution, extrapolate Cervo’s understanding of the State’s ontology into a perspective about the international system. Here is where the alleged benevolence of Brazilian Foreign Policy is unveiled.

Under a rationalism in exile, a State’s ultimate goal would be to guarantee its autonomy. Instead of bucking up its own monopoly of the use of force in relation to other States’ military capacity, an exercise of diplomacy through which all States could find a minimum common denominator that would allow all others to share prosperity in the form of development measured not only in economic, but also in social terms. Inequality in the international structure would result from political and economic misbehavior that cause social imbalances, including war. States like Brazil, would carry a social responsibility to ignite change its presence in all for a would be welcome as it is intended to bridge divides. The level of commitment to such responsibility would vary according to which social niche is interpreting the national interest at a given time. Under this paradigm of rationalism in exile, to maximize gains means to succeed in forging consensus, in creating an environment where the inevitable clashes, controversies, struggles do not interfere with the States’ autonomy.

Methodologically, rationalism in exile would be primarily interpretivist. This is actually a powerful interface with Western IR. Turton (2016:81) shows that the methodological
orientation of 12 of the most prominent international journals in Western IR is 77% qualitative, and 23% quantitative.

Each article from the 12 journals being investigated from 1999 to 2009 was analyzed in order to determine the methodology used. If the authors made overtly clear, the article’s methodology through self-identification, then this was noted accordingly. The self-categorization of academics gave rise to the different categories used. In other words, all the different methodologies captured emerged from the authors themselves. If the authors did not make his or her methodology explicit, each article was read carefully using critical discourse analysis in order to uncover the methodology used, which was then noted. (...) Regarding the use of mixed methods if an article employed two distinct methodologies such as statistical analysis and interviews, for example, the ‘dominant’ method was noted. In other words, the method that produced the primary insights was accounted for (Idem: 80).

The 12 journals were International Organizations, International Studies, International Studies Review, International Studies Perspective, World Politics, European Journal of International Relations, Conflict and Cooperation, Journal of International Relations and Development, International Relations, Review of International Studies, American Journal of International Affairs, and International Relations of the Asia-Pacific. Interpretivism, the most used methodology, represents 42% of all articles, meaning that for the most part authors published in these journals use interpretive judgements and inductive reasoning [investigation of a hypothesis] in order to provide explanations and understandings of phenomena (Blaikie 2004: 509-511). The method refers to the understanding and interpreting of texts, documents, events, in a subjective manner, which relates to the subjective nature of the artifacts being interpreted (Ibid: 83).

Cervo’s affiliation to an interpretivist approach can be tracked throughout all of his publications in question. Cervo (1983) investigates the following categories of primary sources that are more appropriate to our endeavor: political speeches (in Parliament), technical reports (from the State Council), and the diplomatic act (from the Cabinet). In these places, a more complex elaboration of the national political thought was developed or resonated (Idem: 103).

Based on these he provides an understanding of ‘Brazilian doctrines on the spotlight’ during the nineteenth century, explaining the country’s behavior through references to Pandiá Calógeras’ historiography and to the primary sources he outlined (Ibid: 103, 117).

In his second publication at RBPI, Cervo thusly describes his methodology:

It is evident that, in each phase of the process [of the negotiation of territorial borders’ treaties], a certain type of document is produced. Combined with parliamentary documents, and with news from the press, these are the primary sources for this research. (...) (Idem: 50)

This article does not intend to retrace the history of the territorial borders. Instead, it focuses on one of historiography’s shortcomings, a political interpretation of the issue. What were the political patterns and regularities that
hove over the list of facts described through traditional analyses (Cervo 1985: 49)?

On his next publication, Cervo (1995) draws to an inductive reasoning, by establishing the insufficiency of the traditional approach to tackle the relationship between multiculturalism and foreign policy to deal with the Brazilian reality. He then investigates another hypothesis:

the constitution of Brazil’s national identity was based on a ethnically and culturally plural bulwark through a symbiosis that generated principles, values, and patterns of conduct that have been incorporated into the country’s foreign policy, creating its historical background (Idem: 133).

In his article about the behavior of Brazil’s social classes and its impact over the interpretation of the national interest, Cervo (2003) indicates that he interprets data from the country’s history of international relations to underline patterns and regularities related to the country’s history of international relations itself:

History is the locus of observation, the laboratory of the experiences which we investigate. Since our method entails the observation of the phenomenon, We collect historical experiences, from the year of the country’s formal independence until present days, on three different levels: the diplomatic, the political, and the international (Idem: 7). His hypothesis is that there are two versions of a Latin American thought applied to international relations, that of the intellectuals, and that of the decision-makers, and both would have been applied throughout history (Ibid: 6).

Cervo’s discussion over concepts in International Relations, in turn, inquiry the hypothesis that, in Brazil, the country’s, as well as South America’s experiences constitute the sources for conceptualizations that explain and qualify phenomena, but that, unlike theories, have a short-range or a mid-range ambition, hence providing a more accurate and honest contribution to the field (Cervo 2008: 8-9; 13; 21).

Based on Whitley’s (2000) approach to theory-making, it is finally possible to acknowledge that a Brazilian contribution to IRT based on a rationalism in exile is based on a theory-directed explanatory research, since it focuses on understanding why phenomena behave the way they do.

References


Cervo, Amado Luiz. (1985) A política brasileira de limites no século XIX. Revista Brasileira de Política


Kristensen, Peter Markus. (2015) Rising Powers in the International Relations Discipline: social inquiries into a dividing discipline and the quest for Non-Western Theory. Dissertation submitted to the Department of Political Science of the University of Copenhagen when the author obtained his PhD supervised by Ole Wæver


