REFERENCES
Abstract
The system of representative democracy is under considerable strain – its institutions are struggling to maintain legitimacy (Mair 2009), and elected representatives are failing to keep their monopoly on (formal) political representation (Van Biezen 2014), and are being contested by an emerging multitude of (new) claim makers (Saward 2008). These claims of misrepresentation challenge the legitimacy and authority of the elected representatives as well as the functioning of the existing system of representative democracy. In this paper, we compare claims of misrepresentation in Brazil (during the presidential impeachment in 2016) and in Germany (focusing on the 2017 electoral campaign of the Alternative for Germany). We argue that to adequately explain effects of the claims of misrepresentation on democratic representation, it is necessary to, first of all, understand how the challengers construct themselves as political actors vis-a-vis their intended constituency and the democratic system. Second, it is essential to comprehend what kind of claims emerge from these discourses: positive and/or negative. Using constructivist approach – Saward’s representative claim and literature on the interplay between populism and democracy (Kaltwasser 2012, 2014), our paper contributes to understanding the populist appeal – ‘the system’ the populists seek to challenge and ‘the people’ they claim to create.

1 Debora Almeida is professor at University of Brasília, Brazil, and received financial support from this University to participate in this Congress, from the “Edital DPI/DPG Nº 2/2018.”
Introduction
Representative democracy around the world is under stress – its institutions are struggling to maintain legitimacy (Mair 2009), elected representatives are failing to keep their monopoly on (formal) political representation (Van Biezen 2014), and are being contested by an emerging multitude of (new) claim makers (Saward 2008). Politics is no longer confined within the halls of parliaments. Alternative sites – offline and online continue to emerge – enlarging the space for contestation of the power monopoly of elected representatives. Within these sites, new mechanisms of democratic rule emerge – challenging elections as the only source of democratic legitimacy (e.g., sortation) and elected representatives as the only political representatives (e.g., self-selected or delegated representatives). Among the different vocabularies that have emerged to reconceive representation, the representative claims approach is promising, since it welcomes the significant broadening of the scope of sites, processes, and actors (Saward 2006, 2010).

Saward’s approach allows us to asses and analyzes competing claims: Marine Le Pen speaking ‘in the name of the people’ and Emmanuel Macron seeking to be ‘the president of all the people of France’ in the 2017 French Presidential elections. However, Saward offers little direction in addressing negative claims. For example, AFD’s Alexander Gauland claiming ‘German Social Democrats no longer represent workers’ and ‘the establishment (Altpartien) betrayed the German voters’, are both negative claims - claims of misrepresentation.

The claims of misrepresentation are raised by actors challenging the monopoly of power by elected representatives. This challenge takes place in multiple arenas (in parliaments - by political opposition, during demonstrations by protestors, in the media by critical journalists and on the social media by ordinary citizens).

In order to disentangle the claims of misrepresentation, this paper further conceptually develops the claims approach by incorporating, on the one hand, the Urbinati’s notion of rupture and their reflection about the negative effects of unpolitical discourses (2005, 2009) and, on the other, the Rosanvalon’s defense of the unpolitical as a form of counter-democracy (2008). In addition, we engage with categories of the literature on the interplay between populism and democracy (Kaltwasser 2012, 2014). This allows us to understand how claims of misrepresentation are created by appealing to an enemy/antagonist, generally challenging the political system, at the same time they claim to create and speak for “the people”. We argue that claims of misrepresentation, like populism, are not intrinsically democratic or undemocratic (Laclau, 2005; Mudde and Kaltwasser, 2011), but have different ways of manifestation and impacts on the representative system.

We employ most dissimilar case design to empirically test our approach. We do so by comparing claims of misrepresentation in Brazil (during the presidential impeachment in 2016) and in Germany (the first six months of the Alternative for Germany in the German parliament). These debates take place among different actors, within different sites and have different implications for democracy. To understand the variation of the claims of misrepresentation, we propose to analyze the challenges to existing policies (e.g. refugee policies in Germany, and conditional cash transfer program Bolsa Família in Brazil), politics – functioning of the existing
system of representative democracy (AFD challenging the definition of the German Bundestag as ‘working parliament’ whilst seeking to reduce the working time in committees and increase televised political debates, or the pro-impeachment organizations attacking the Workers’ Party in Brazil), and polity (definition of the people from which AFD excludes those with double citizenship, and the constitutionality of Impeachment in Brazil). The majority of claims of misrepresentation challenge the legitimacy and authority of the elected representatives – what they do (policies), how they do it (politics) and for whom they do it (polity).

We argue that to adequately explain effects of the claims of misrepresentation on democratic representation, it is necessary to, first of all, understand how the challengers construct themselves as political actors vis-a-vis their intended constituency and the democratic system. Second, it is essential to comprehend what kind of negative claims emerges from these discourses. Finally, it is essential to understand the system they seek to challenge and if they can present positive claims that appeal to “the people,” propose alternatives to the functioning of the political system, and situate who is/are the legitimate political representative (s).

We proceed as follows: the first section presents the theoretical framework, starting from the representative and constructivist turn in democratic theory. After presenting the claims-making approach, we appoint some flaws in Saward’s account and propose a new direction to analyze claims of misrepresentation. The second section explains the methodological orientation and techniques applied to the empirical cases. The third and fourth sections present, respectively, the Brazilian and German claims of misrepresentation, based on different sources of data and political contexts. Finally, we draw some conclusions regarding the similarities and differences between the cases, reflecting on the effects of negative claims on the democratic representation.

1. Theoretical framework
In recent years, the study of representation has been enjoying significant revival and transformation leading some authors to coin the term ‘representative turn’ in democratic theory (Näsström 2011, 2015, Urbinati & Warren 2008; Vieira, 2017). This renewed interest in representation is a reaction to the growing tensions between representation and democracy in the rapidly changing political context.

The basic premise of representative democracy is the fact that elected representatives represent the interests of the citizenry. The fundamental components of political representation that span all of the various theories are summarized in four questions: who is the representative (elected actors), what is represented (citizens or groups with opinions, positions, interests…), where the process of representation takes place (political arenas inside the state), and how is the relationship between representatives and the represented (based on accountability and responsiveness) (Almeida, 2015). Discussion between various theoretical approaches is based on the level of importance that the selected components of representation play (Hayward 2006; Rehfeld 2006; Weisberg 1978; Plotke 1997).
Similarly to Jane Mansbridge (2003), David Plotke challenges the strong accent on elections (Pitkin 1977) and proposes to include other forms of citizen participation. In Plotke’s view, democratic politics is partially constituted through representation – representation is constructive, producing knowledge, the capacity to share insights and the ability to reach difficult agreements (Plotke 1997: 31). Plotke’s critique of representative democracy postulates that conventional representative procedures, based on the fragmented and disinterested electorate, replaced or blocked political participation and left most people powerless (Plotke 1997: 23). This was a significant departure from the earlier (20th century) notion of political representation seen not as constitutive, but as reflective – dynamically shifting the outcome of interest group competition (Disch 2008: 56-57).

Going even further is Michael Saward’s concept of representative claim, by which he proposes to transfer the focus of the study of political representation from forms of representation to dynamics of representation. As opposed to Pitkin, the concept of representative claim is based on the understanding of representation as the mutual relationship between voters who elect their representative and elected representatives who "construct" their voters regarding their presentation or framing in a particular, discussible manner (Saward 2006: 297-302; Pollak 2009).

In addition to elected representatives, more and more special-interest groups and civil society organizations are entering the political arena, and the difference between formal and informal representations is slowly disappearing. In this context, it is, therefore, necessary to think about the concept of representation as constructed by actors in a political arena, as only then can empirical research examine existing democratic mechanisms (Pollak et al. 2009, Saward 2006, Mansbridge 2003).

The main aim of the constructivist approach to representation is to open up (theoretically) new ways of thinking about the relationship between representation and democracy (Plotke 1997, Schmitter 2009, Disch 2015). The large body of theoretical literature generated three significant shifts (1) from political will to political judgment; (2) from constitutional to constitutive character of representation; and (3) from electoral to non-electoral representation.

First, critical theoretical discussion of the substance and form of democracy led to reorientation from the emphasis on the will to the concentration on judgment, aimed at defining the viable distance between representatives and represented, which would maintain the necessary degree of responsiveness, while allowing representatives the necessary autonomy (Urbinati and Warren 2008).

Second, in the course of this development, representation is redefined as both constitutional and constitutive opens up three new vital areas within the study of representation (Saward 2010, Näström 2011). This follows the rise of new political actors and social movements (local, national, global) and the shifting focus from the institutional elements of representation to its constitutive features. The critical question here is the significance of non-elective claims. Representative claims approach (Saward 2005, 2006, 2009, 2010, 2016) focuses on what
representation does rather than what it is, explores the effects of its invocation, stresses the dynamic character of representation, rather than its correctly understood form or type (Saward 2010:4).

In this approach, interests are not merely present, but they are themselves ‘made’ through representative politics, and this ‘requires’ concentration on the performative dimension and inbuilt flexibility of the concept of representation. Its ambiguity, while present, is politically productive (Hayward 2009: 112). The critique of this representative constructivist approach is that broadening the scope of ‘makers’ of politics might destabilize the traditional distinction between participatory and representative politics (Näsström 2011: 507). Furthermore, the emphasis on the creative agency of the representative has raised concerns regarding the normative insufficiencies of constructivism to assess political representation as democratic. (Severs, 2010; Disch, 2015).

Third, there was a shift or redefinition of representation as both electoral and non-electoral (Montanaro 2012). While the traditional view of electoral representation encompassed by the premise of one person one vote, nullifies differences regarding wealth, status, and knowledge (Dahl 1967), it is also blind to the same differences (Phillips 1994). Non-electoral representatives do not encompass the procedural and numerical equality but may help to create conditions to equality when acting to highlight unacknowledged political inequalities, presenting demands that otherwise would be absent, and pressuring the political system for them to be addressed (Saward, 2016: 259).

Claims of misrepresentation: broadening the scope of the constructivist turn of representation

During the recent evolution of representative democracy, significant reframing of popular sovereignty took place and resulted in a dominant original understanding of ‘the people’ as an effect of democratic representation, not (only) the ground of democratic legitimacy (Disch 2008: 48). Pierre Rosanvallon sees the gap between democratic society (abstract) and democratic sovereignty (personified as will) as a ‘constitutive aporia’ - “a tension between juridical and a sociological principle and at the same time the necessary distance between the figuration of reality and reality itself” (Rosanvallon 2008, Disch 2008: 50).

The people do not pre-exist the fact of invocation (electoral politics) and are constructed within the electoral process. Hence ‘the people’ can only exist as a unified political agent in this process; there is no sociological original underlining political claim. Due to the incomplete character of the representation in the figuration of the people, Pierre Rosanvallon proposes linking the temporary character and indeterminacy to the democratic contest. The essentially representative aspect of democracy holds democratic political power permanently open to contest and ensures that no representative of the people can be taken for an actual and total embodiment. No representative can guarantee to “truly” and “fully” embody the people, and the continuous questioning of legitimacy is, paradoxically, democratic legitimacy’s only guarantee (Disch 2008: 52). Makers of representative claims (elected and self-appointed representatives) compete not to transmit preferences of constituencies, but to mobilize (and
constitute) new political actors. Claims of misrepresentation are an essential expression of the democratic contest, which has been largely overlooked by the representative claims literature (Saward 2005, 2006, 2009, 2010, 2016).

For Rosanvallon (2008), there are many aspiring political parties and advocacy groups seeking to challenge the status quo to accuse representatives or other advocacy groups of not representing their constituency. The exercise of the unpolitical based on counterpolitics (exercise of defiance or the critical work of the public) is an essential part of modern democracy and complementary to the ordinary political process of representative democracy. Although the negative power is unpolitical in its forms, it is not antipolitical in its outcome (Urbinati, 2009: 70). Claims of misrepresentation guarantee impartiality and reflexivity, pluralizing the spaces of contestation and political judgment.

Urbinati also recognizes the agency of representatives with respect to their constituencies and insists that the bond between representatives and constituency is “an idealized and artificial construction - meaning that a representative ‘belongs’ to constituency not by virtue of who or what he or she speaks for and fights for” - electors do not seek an existential identification with their representatives; they seek an identity of ideas and projects (Urbinati 2006: 46).

Furthermore, in moments of rupture between representatives and citizens is common to emerge extra-parliamentary forms of (self) representation. The function of the political judgment by citizens is to restore the circularity between state and society and the continuous exercise of sovereign presence. However, contrary to Rosanvallon, Urbinati (2010) considers that unpolitical expressions generate dispassionate judgment that “can suggest the desirability of bypassing the legitimate authority of citizens’ suffrage and the parliaments […] or replacing active or actuating politics with a negative politics of judgment” (2010: 75). She favours openness to revision instead of interruption and containment of democratic practices. Democratic representation requires the combination of political will and judgment and the equilibrium between representative expressions of state institutions and society (2005).

The literature on the interplay between populism and democracy is also fruitful to understand this combination between positive and negative claims. (Kaltwasser, 2012, 20914, Mudde and Kaltwasser, 2011). Van Biezen argues that the political crisis has been accompanied by the emergence of populist parties and leaders that successfully channel the anti-system and anti-party sentiments (2014: 187). There is a combination of anti-establishment rhetoric with claims of popular representation (Mudde and Kaltwasser 2011).

Although the intention of the paper is not to define misrepresentation as a populist expression, what is common in our case is that, generally, populist rhetoric is constructed in the criticism or the identification of an antagonist, such as the representative democracy, the political elites, immigrants, private corporations and so on (Laclau, 2005; Kioupkiolis, 2016). Besides, it is important the orientation that claims of misrepresentation are ambiguous, instead of intrinsically democratic (Rosanvallon, 2008) or adversarial to democracy (Urbinati, 2010).
There are populist expressions in the right and left spectrum, and it can be democratic or undemocratic, inclusionary or exclusionary (Laclau, 2005; Mudde and Kaltwasser, 2011; Van Biezen, 2014). Finally, in our cases, sometimes the appeal to the ordinary man, the people or the general interest, is not always followed by a clear positive demand of an alternative representative or even the creation of a populist leader. It is essential to analyze what are the implications of these negative discourses to representative democracy.

These reflections on claims of misrepresentation opens up new possibilities to analyze representation. Before presenting the new directions is important to remember that the performative character of the representative claim is broad forward by three key features:

(1) Emphasis on constitutive character of political representation – refers to German darstellen - every act of representation includes the element of picturing: Representative (subject) becomes representative by portraying himself/herself as such to the constituency (object) (Saward 2010: 47-48); successful claim might or might not make a persuasive argument, but it must reach certain resonance – often by using existing and recognizable frameworks (frames);

(2) For Saward, what is represented (object of the claim) is the idea of the represented (Saward 2010: 36); Saward uses deconstructivist approach to highlight active production of the subject/object. Claim-makers construct verbal and visual images of their constituencies - claim to make puts different ‘ideas’ of the represented into play and opens them up for contestation.

(3) The function of the constituency/object is to judge the (legitimacy of) representative claim; this is the theatrical element of the performative aspect – representation through claims only works if claims are acknowledged by the audience (acceptance, rejection, engagement).

We identify three gaps in Saward’s concept, which inform our approach:

(1) Saward defines the relationship between subject and maker as cooperative (Saward 2010). However, de Wilde points out that there is not only cooperative but also competitive dynamics (de Wilde 2013); furthermore, maker constitutes himself and subject strategically - for example during elections candidates (M) make representations of their rivals (S) to discredit them (de Wilde 2013: 284). In that competition, representatives, in some occasions, are not making a statement with the aim of portraying themselves as subjects and explicitly constructing the represented, but only to discredit the existing forms and actors of representation.

(2) Our approach allows us to acknowledge the existence of competing accounts of the object thus highlighting the performative character of representation (cf. Severs 2012, Lord and Pollack 2013). As stated by Saward, the object sometimes is absent or not identified. However, it is crucial to complete this comprehension of the object with Castiglione’ critique (2017) that representatives offer more than images or statements about what the represented is. Sometimes they make explicit political demands without clearly identify the object (constituency). In the case of claims of misrepresentation, representatives may recognize that the object is not well represented, without presenting positive claims.
(3) Saward judges claim only by recognition (Lord and Pollack 2013), in order to make a full account of the competing claims, we follow Disch (2015: 487) and see claim making as a three-stage project (making of the claim, reception, and normative assessment - i.e., .e. judgement of the claim). We focus on mapping making of competing claims and their relation to the system of representative democracy.

To summarize, political representation is a reflexive procedural practice. Representation exists primarily by virtue of being practices/performered as a claim, or a set of claims. In order to fully understand representation, we need to focus both on claims of representation and claims of misrepresentation. In this paper we define claim of misrepresentation as follows: “claim maker disputes the existence of a linkage between established representative and the claimed constituency, by identifying a cause of misrepresentation and alleging that the established representative does NOT represent the claimed constituency.”

In the next subsections, we will present how the challenger construct themselves as political actors vis-a-vis their intended constituency and the democratic system. Second, we show what kind of negative/positive claims emerges from these discourses. In order to organize the variation in claims of misrepresentation, we propose to perceive the challenges to the political system in terms of critiques of the policies, politics, and polity.

2. Operationalization of the cases and methodological comments

We are comparing the presence of claims of misrepresentation in entirely different scenarios and political systems, based on the methodological orientation of most dissimilar case design (Anckar, 2008). In both cases considered in the article – in Brazilian debates during the presidential impeachment in 2016 and Germany during the first six months of the Alternative for Germany in the German parliament – there is a considerable degree of high presence of claims of misrepresentation. However, they differ in terms of the variation of the claims of representation directed to the policies, politics, and polity, as well as in the combination of negative and positive claims.

The Brazilian case was analyzed using indirect discourses made by seven civil society organizations in their Facebook pages (two organizations against impeachment and five pro-impeachment). The data was collected between 12/17/2016 and 12/05/2017, using Netvizz Facebook’s API. The posts collected from each civil society group were organized as a .csv database. Each line of the files included necessary information about each post: date of creation, link, text, number of likes, etc. The data encompasses the claims of misrepresentation presented from November 1st, 2014, shortly after the re-election of Dilma Rousseff, until August 31st, 2016, when the impeachment trial took place at the Brazilian Senate. We have collected posts made by the managers of the public pages, in a total of 48.704 posts, and performed a sample of 10% of this material on R Statistical Software, sorted by year and month of creation. The content of 4.872 posts was analysed using N.Vivo 11 Software. The unit of analysis corresponding to each message posted, including images, videos, or links to external pages.
The German case was analyzed using 34 shorthand stenoprotocols from the plenary meetings of the German Bundestag between 24.10.2017 and 18.5.2018 (first six months of the current term, the first in which AfD is present). A total number of 2,259 claims were identified from statements by MPs of the Alternative for Germany (AfD). Both formal and informal speech was analyzed (formal speech is an address by an MP, while informal speech is an interjection by an MP during the address of an MP from opposing our own party). Claims of misrepresentation made up 66.4% (1,500) of the overall sample and were the most dominant form of claim-making by the MPs of the Alternative for Germany (claims of misrepresentation were dominant category both among formal and informal forms of speech). Excell and Atlas.ti were utilized to analyze the claims. The unit of analysis corresponds to one claim – usually a sentence or part of sentence identified by the coder.

Defining elements of the claims on representation

Table 1. Theory and empirical adjustment for the two cases

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Definition</th>
<th>Brazil</th>
<th>Germany</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Claim makers</td>
<td>who speaks</td>
<td>(i.) elected representatives, (ii.) Delegated representatives from civil society (individual or collective) (iii.) Delegated representatives from government (individual or collective) (iv) self-selected representatives;</td>
<td>(i.) elected representatives, and non-elected representatives: (ii.) delegated representatives and (iii.) self-selected representatives;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subject representative</td>
<td>who acts/should act on behalf of the claimed constituency</td>
<td>(i.) elected representatives, (ii.) Delegated representatives from civil society (individual or collective) (iii.) Delegated representatives from government (individual or collective) (iv) self-selected representatives (individuals and collective);</td>
<td>(i.) claim-maker identical with a claimed representative; (ii.) claim maker and claimed representative are different; (iii.) absent;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Claimed constituency</td>
<td>on whose behalf subject claims to speak</td>
<td>(i.) the people (ii.) specific group (iii.) normative scheme (iv) absent (there were a significant number of claims which is not possible to identify the constituency since they are present demand about public policies,</td>
<td>(i.) human being(s), interests; (ii.) normative scheme(s), values; (iii.) absent</td>
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<td>----------------------</td>
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<td>----------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Justification</td>
<td>Why is claim being made</td>
<td>(i) Individual interests (ii) General interests (iii) Collective interests (iv) Sectoral interests (v) Ideology (vi) Values</td>
<td>(i.) referenced (either explicitly or implicitly), (ii.) disputed; (iii.) absent</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Claims

3. Brazilian Case of Impeachment

The impeachment of the Brazilian president Dilma Rousseff is an interesting phenomenon to understand claims of representation in a scenario of political representation and party crisis. Since her re-election in 2014, Dilma Rousseff has been targeted with many criticisms regarding the legitimacy of the elections, the economic measures taken shortly after the elections that contradict promises made in the campaign, and some executive measures that bypass the need of Congressional approval. After a period of instability, loss of control of the political dynamics in Congress and several impeachment's requests in Parliament, in December 2015, Eduardo Cunha, then Speaker of the House, initiated the impeachment proceedings. Many factors explain this decision and the Brazilian political crisis. In this paper, we pay attention in the strategy of some civil organizations that, in claiming the misrepresentation of the president and her political party, have contributed to the impeachment and the intensification of an unprecedented political crisis since democratization. Also, the material produced by them is an excellent example of the variation of the claims of misrepresentation and their claimants.

Despite the large number of civil society organizations involved in the impeachment campaign, other studies (Dias, 2017; Tatagiba, Trindade & Teixeira, 2015) and news articles indicate that five groups have led the mobilization process: Movimento Brasil Livre (MBL), NasRuas Movement, Movimento Endireita Brasil (MEB), Vem Pra Rua Brasil (VPR) and Revoltados ONLINE (ROL). Among the left-wing groups, two 'frentes,' or coalitions were created to defend PT's (Workers' Party) government and the legitimacy of the 2014 elections. Those coalitions are the Frente Brasil Popular (FBP) and the Frente Povo Sem Medo (PSM), which bring together civil society organizations that were already mobilized for decades.
In a short period they have made a variety of claims, based on an intensified presence in the Facebook pages, as seen in the graph below:

**Graph 1 - Number of posts by organization - All groups**

[Graph image]

As the graph shows, the presence of the pro-impeachment organizations in the online sphere was previous to the installation of the impeachment proceeding, and more intense (4574 posts) than one of the supporters of Dilma (298 posts). There are also many differences between the pro and anti-impeachment organizations. The organizations that claim for impeachment are located in the right-wing spectrum, and their leaders have different profiles. MBL was founded by young leaders, while NasRuas and ROL are run by liberal professionals who participated in anti-corruption groups. MEB, on the other hand, was created by entrepreneurs and liberal professionals. Some of them have already disputed elections or worked in elected administrations (Dias, 2017). VPR was founded by entrepreneurs, who mobilized in the face of Rousseff's impending re-election in 2014, as they tried to prevent it. All the groups that demanded the impeachment are situated in the same political field - right-wing - but they do not share the same political project or strategies to accomplish their goals (Dias, 2017). During the impeachment campaign, some of them claimed more conservative and aggressive agendas, as NasRuas and ROL did. In contrast, VPR's discourse could be identified as center-right.

Nonetheless, all groups took the growing rejection – either towards the results of the economy, corruption scandals, government's actions or disputes over moral issues – to position themselves as relevant political actors and to carry forward their goals (Dias, 2017). More importantly, they are new in the political scenario and have increased their presence in the public sphere since the significant wake of protests in June 2013 in Brazil. They have no links to society or even a pattern of social movements organization based on identity share and affiliation of members. Contrary to the left groups, the online interaction is not complementary.
Among the two left coalitions, organizations such as CONTAG (National Confederation of Agricultural Workers), CPT (Pastoral Land Commission), CTB (Union of Workers of Brazil), CUT (The Central Union), Via Campesina and UNE (National Association of Students) created the FBP, as well as other unions, movements, associations and churches. PSM is formed by more than 30 social movements, among them, CUT and the MTST (Homeless Workers' Movement). It also counts on the support of artists and celebrities. The organizations that founded the coalitions are also close to left-wing parties such as PT, PC do B and PSOL.

Using Saward's terminology and our adaptations of claim-makers, we can consider the seven organizations as collective self-selected representatives to the population. They propose to speak for the popular will or the collectivity. In some occasions, the discourses presented on Facebook pages also include elected representatives, legislative and executive politicians, that support each group. One notable difference to Saward’s scheme is that although they are acting as representatives regarding presenting political demands (Castiglione, 2017), they are not portraying themselves as representatives or claiming to be the representative. The case shows that regarding claims of misrepresentation, sometimes the claimants are makers but not subjects, and indicate other representatives only to blame and discredit them, without presenting positive claims (De Wilde, 2013).

The pro-impeachment groups systematized dissatisfaction, proposed narratives and created the frames to blame the president, Workers' Party administrations and the ex-president Lula da Silva for the political crisis. They also use normative schemes to justify impeachment, appealing to ideological justification, such as the need to oppose socialist, communist or leftist ideas. Terms such as corruption, incompetence and the PT's failed political project are the primary diagnostic of the organizations for the causes of misrepresentation or, in populist terms, they function as an empty signifier that unifies demands for impeachment (Laclau, 2005). On the side of anti-impeachment organizations, the institutional coup d'Etat or the misuse of political institutions regarding impeachment procedures is the leading cause of misrepresentation and the reason for the political crisis.

The objects of the claims of misrepresentation are always implicit and not directly identified since they are not speaking as the subjects of representation. Although there is a general idea that appeals to the people, they differ regarding what they consider to be the constituency. For right-wing organizations, the president has lost the linkage with the people defined as the persons dissatisfied with the PT's political party, and the politics or the implemented policies of the president. Some of their constituencies, supposedly, are the ones that favor and believe in the minimal State model. The anti-impeachment organizations also appeal to the people who were affected by the changes in the economic and social policies – promoted by the Vice President Michel Temer in his provisional occupation of the presidency during impeachment trial – and to the Rousseff's voters and supporters.

The variation of the claims of misrepresentation assumes forms of accusation of the malfunctioning of the political system as a whole. Using the typology proposed in this article, we can highlight the following motives to the accusation of misrepresentation:
• Policy: Discourses from the pro-impeachment organizations against the policies adopted by the PT (Workers' Party). They have claimed the tenets of the minimal state, economic liberalism, and expansion of individual freedom as their own. They are against the economic policy of Dilma's administration, and social programs, such as the conditional cash transfer program "Bolsa Família." In relation to the left-wing organizations, despite calling for structural reforms such as political, tax, agrarian and urban reform, they did not propose any model of specific reform in that period.

• Politics: Right-wing organizations have anti-establishment discourses, but it does not affect the whole establishment or all political parties. The claims of misrepresentation are directed to Workers' Party, Lula da Silva, and Dilma Rousseff. They generally do not refer to other political parties or the Congress. The problem is specific of the PT – that was 14 years in power of the Federal government. Left-wing organizations blamed the political parties from the right, explicitly, the vice-president for conspiring against the president – from Brazilian Democratic Movement (PMDB) – the ex-president of the Congress, Eduardo Cunha, responsible for initiating the impeachment proceeding – also from the PMDB –, and the Senator Aécio Neves, who lost the presidential election and initiated the process of questioning the result of elections – from the Brazilian Social Democracy Party (PSDB).

• Polity: the main disagreement was about the constitutionality and legality of Dilma's impeachment. Although impeachment is previewed legally, during the process, there were juridical doubts if Dilma Rousseff had committed a crime of responsibility. The charge is that her government filled holes in its accounts by taking loans from state banks without congressional approval. There is no claim about the definition of polity itself concerning citizenship, the people, the sovereign.

Considering our definition of claims of misrepresentation, we can summarize that organizations pro-impeachment dispute the existence of a linkage between Dilma Rousseff and the people, by identifying corruption, failed economic policies, the incompetence of Workers' Party and the president as the main causes of misrepresentation. Although they allege that the established representative does NOT represent the claimed constituency, they were not able to present an alternative subject or even themselves as such. 100% of the posts analyzed express claims of misrepresentation. On the one hand, the pro-impeachment posts express a strategy of deconstructing the credibility and legitimacy of Rousseff's. Indirectly and implicitly they defend a different way of representing without pointing out someone or themselves as the "good" or "real" representative. On the other, the organizations that support the president express a strategy to discredit the pro-impeachment organizations, the vice-President and some politicians and their political parties. However, the discourses of Dilma's supporters have expressed positive claims when appointing the elected president as the legitimate representative. The problem of them, compared with the online presence of the other organizations, is that their posts represent only 6% of the sample.

As discussed above, claims of misrepresentation are ambiguous. The impeachment case shows a campaign strategically designed and directed to claim the misrepresentation of the presidency
and the political party in charge. Although it does not entirely represent the feelings of misrepresentation from the population on that moment, we can reflect on the effects of these discourses on the legitimacy of representative democracy and the political will and judgment (Urbinati, 2010). In that sense, it does not mean that strong discourses anti-establishment do not exist in Brazil. On the contrary, after impeachment, this kind of claims has increased and is present in the current electoral campaign. A survey recently applied to a representative sample of the Brazilian population shows that the satisfaction with democracy in Brazil decreases dramatically in the last two years, and the satisfaction with Parliament and the trust in political parties have reached the worst indices of a historical series: 8 in 10 Brazilians evaluate the Congress as bad or the worst, and the same number distrust in political parties (INCT/UFMG)\textsuperscript{i}.

4. German Case AFD in the German Bundestag (I will put here my part to fir yours)

In this case study, we have focused on claims raised by the Alternative for Germany (AFD) in its first six months in the German Bundestag (24.10.2017-18.5.2018). We coded 3464 pages of documents, identified 2259 claims, of which 1500 (66.4%) were claims of misrepresentation. Of the claims of misrepresentation, approximately 50% focused on disagreements on policy, 30% were focused on disagreements on polity and approximately 20% on the polity.

Regarding policy, AFD focused on several issues: migration, monetary policy, and defense policy. The rejection of migration policy dominated all AFD speeches. In every formal speech by an AFD member of parliament (MP) regardless of the main topic, rejection of migration policy of the Merkel government was included. The criticism of the monetary policy was the second most frequent policy disagreement and represents the expression of AFD's Euroscepticism. It portrays the Markel's government as overreaching and setting the German taxpayers up for failure. It also portrays the German government as giving up sovereignty both to the European Commission and to France. The third most common policy issue criticized by the AFD were foreign military mission (and as a proxy NATO). In these claims of misrepresentation, AFD is critical towards the government – accusing it of underfunding the military, and betraying German soldiers and risking their lives by sending them to foreign missions underequipped. On a more general level, this critique questions the meaning of military missions as such and calls for the focus on internal security instead.

The AFD portrays refugees as a security risk, as a drain on resources, and more generally as a threat to German culture and the way of life. The refugees are often reduced to Muslims and portrayed as a particular danger to German women (especially following strongly medialized cases of attacks on women by migrants). After an attack of a young Muslim on a Jewish pupil in Berlin in spring 2018, AFD called for a discussion on antisemitism in the German Bundestag. In this one our debate (‘current issues’ Aktuelle Stunde) refugees and Muslims (used interchangeably) were portrayed as the main source of antisemitism in contemporary Germany. The AFD, which itself has strong anti-Semitic elements, portrayed itself as the defenders of the Jews in Germany against the danger posed by anti-Semitic refugees.
In respect to policy, it is important to say, that as a small oppositional party, AfD’s actual impact on policy is non-existent. Other parties support none of the AfD proposals, and AfD rarely supports bills or resolutions by other political parties. An exception is the support of the AfD neoliberal wing for some proposals by the oppositional (and neoliberal) Free Democratic Party. However, given that both AfD and FDP are in opposition, none of their proposals or resolutions won majority.

The fact that other parties consistently refuse AfD proposals fuels the claims of misrepresentation on politics. Here the AfD portrays itself as the ‘true voice of the people’ and accuses the established parties (Altparteien) of betraying the will of the people. Interestingly, most critique does not target the government, the Chancellor Angela Merkel or her Christian Democratic Union (CDU/CSU). Instead, the main target of the claims of misrepresentation targets the Social Democrats (SPD).

AFD accuses SPD of betraying the workers and portrays itself as the ‘new workers party.’ This is a strategic move on the part of the AfD – a strategy based on the calculation that future votes for AfD will come from the current SPD voters disenchantment with the SPD’s shift towards the centre and embrace of European integration and multiculturalism. In this way, the AfD seeks to exploit the gap between the SPD elite (more cosmopolitan) and the electorate (more communitarian). The AfD does not see similar potential for voter switch on the centre-right, thus the focus of accusations of misrepresentation on politics on the Social Democrats or target all parties as a whole – thus portraying the current system as corrupt (morally not economically).

The claims of misrepresentation focused on polity represent attempts at redefining who constitutes polity (exclusion of naturalized citizens, holders of double citizenship) and the rejection of values (gender equality, religious freedom, integration, etc.). In these claims the AfD portrays itself as the representative of the nation, national identity, sovereignty, German language, German history, German constitution, traditions, justice, democracy (in particular direct democracy), fairness human/women's rights, defender of religious freedom (for Jews and Christians, not for Muslims). It accuses other parties of betraying these norms, values and constituencies.

In terms of representation of human beings, we identified an internal split within the AfD: (a) neoliberal group of MPs focused on criticism of Euro, the EU, European monetary policies, presents itself as the representative of German taxpayers, German enterprises, (and normative schemes such as nation, national sovereignty, national identity); (b) a group of MPs who see AfD as the new worker’s party and sees itself as the representative of specific groups which the Merkel rule “betrayed” and “left behind” these are most often soldiers, ordinary working German families, small farmers, small and medium enterprises, car owners. There is a deep division within the AfD on economic policy, and the (only) issue that unifies these two factions within the AfD is the rejection of the refugees and the Merkel refugee policy. Given the significant differences in AfD support in the old (former BRD) and the new German states (former DDR), it is interesting that the underdogs (those left behind) are rarely portrayed as the ‘East Germans.’
In respect to polity, some AfD MPs also embrace a conspiracy theory that the migration policy is a plot by the establishment, which has lost the support of ‘true Germans’ to create new electorate by granting citizenship to migrants and refugees. This conspiracy theory has been circulating among the radical right in Germany for some time, but it is now presented on the floor of the German parliament. This discourse strongly resonates with those of the white supremacists in the USA, who often chant ‘you will not replace us’ (alluding to minorities).

The AfD case shows a campaign strategically designed and directed to claim the misrepresentation of the people by the establishment (both parties in power and the opposition – especially the Greens). The AfD discourse is populist and Eurosceptic. It combines both right-wing populism (portraying people as a nation, exclusionary in character) and left-wing populism (speaking on behalf of those ‘left behind’).

5. Preliminary conclusion

The representative turn in democratic theory has rapidly changed the way representation is defined and comprehended. Also, the recuperation of a constructivist dimension of representation presents in different traditions over time has generated three significant shifts (1) from political will to political judgment; (2) from constitutional to constitutive character of representation; and (3) from electoral to non-electoral representation. Michael Saward, the most cited author in this redirection, alerts us to analyze representation based on its performative role, instead of on the static model based exclusively on elections.

We argue that, despite many advantages of the claims perspective, it does not properly address the negative claims or offer clear direction to assess them. To perform this task, we suggest to incorporate contributions from Rosanvallon (2008) and his evaluation on the positive effects of claims of misrepresentation – counterpowers –; Urbinati’s concern of the unpolitical (2010), and some elements of the literature on the interplay between democracy and populism – the enemy, the appeal to the "people" and the presence or not of a positive claim. Since we are not analyzing populism, the positive claims may point out to the creation of a populist leader, the indication of the representative or alternative modes to be represented. Therefore, claims of misrepresentation are considered ambiguous concerning their effects on representative democracy. We also define claim of misrepresentation as follows: "claim maker disputes the existence of a linkage between established representative and the claimed constituency, by identifying a cause of misrepresentation and alleging that the established representative does NOT represent the claimed constituency." The challenge to the political system is made by presenting critiques of policies, politics, and polity.

Is it possible to identify both similarities and differences between our two cases? The nature of our cases leads to different makers – in the German case, these are members of parliament for the AfD, in the Brazilian case, the makers vary, and there is no indication of explicit subjects. As for objects, we find similarities – both cases show the populist division between the corrupt elite and the ‘pure people’ (Mudde and Kaltwasser 2011). The causes of the misrepresentation
are the moral (German case) and both moral and financial (Brazilian case) corruption of the political establishment.

Both cases present the critique of the system and call for direct democracy as a better expression of the popular will (cf. Urbinati 2010). In respect to exclusionary versus inclusionary character of the populist discourse, both the Brazilian and the German case can be described as exclusionary (cf. Mudde and Kaltwasser 2011). The effect of these claims of misrepresentation will largely depend on the reaction of the established parties – if they will focus on the message, not on the messenger – addressing the grievances of the people, rather than demonizing the ascending political opponents.

References:


Van Biezen, I. ((2014). The End of Party Democracy as We Know It? A Tribute to Peter Mair. *Irish Political Studies, 29* (2), 177-193.

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1 The data used in this article was part of the Master Dissertation defended by Tayrine Dias in the Political Science Institute of the University of Brasília. Also, Tayrine and Marília Oliveira have written with me the technical report of the Impeachment case that is part of the Claims’ Project. I am really grateful to both for this incredible work. The empirical effort of codification is totally due to Tayrine Dias, and in that article I am proposing a different approach to the data to understand claims of misrepresentation.